First Division: Decision Decision

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 156132. October 16, 2006.]
CITIBANK, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) and INVESTORS'

FINANCE CORPORATION, doing business under the name and style of
FNCB Finance , petitioners, vs . MODESTA R. SABENIANO , respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO , J : p
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, 1 under Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court, of the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26
March 2002, and the Resolution, 3 dated 20 November 2002, of the same court which,
although modifying its earlier Decision, still denied for the most part the Motion for
Reconsideration of herein petitioners.
Petitioner Citibank, N.A. (formerly known as the First National City Bank) is a banking
corporation duly authorized and existing under the laws of the United States of America and
licensed to do commercial banking activities and perform trust functions in the Philippines.
Petitioner Investor's Finance Corporation, which did business under the name and style
of FNCB Finance, was an a liate company of petitioner Citibank, speci cally handling money
market placements for its clients. It is now, by virtue of a merger, doing business as part of
its successor-in-interest, BPI Card Finance Corporation. However, so as to consistently
establish its identity in the Petition at bar, the said petitioner shall still be referred to herein
as FNCB Finance. 4
Respondent Modesta R. Sabeniano was a client of both petitioners Citibank and FNCB
Finance. Regrettably, the business relations among the parties subsequently went awry.
On 8 August 1985, respondent led a Complaint 5 against petitioners, docketed as
Civil Case No. 11336, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. Respondent
claimed to have substantial deposits and money market placements with the petitioners, as
well as money market placements with the Ayala Investment and Development Corporation
(AIDC), the proceeds of which were supposedly deposited automatically and directly to
respondent's accounts with petitioner Citibank. Respondent alleged that petitioners refused
to return her deposits and the proceeds of her money market placements despite her
repeated demands, thus, compelling respondent to le Civil Case No. 11336 against
petitioners for "Accounting, Sum of Money and Damages." Respondent eventually led an
Amended Complaint 6 on 9 October 1985 to include additional claims to deposits and
money market placements inadvertently left out from her original Complaint.
In their joint Answer 7 and Answer to Amended Complaint, 8 led on 12 September
1985 and 6 November 1985, respectively, petitioners admitted that respondent had deposits
and money market placements with them, including dollar accounts in the Citibank branch in
Geneva, Switzerland (Citibank-Geneva). Petitioners further alleged that the respondent later
obtained several loans from petitioner Citibank, for which she executed Promissory Notes
(PNs), and secured by (a) a Declaration of Pledge of her dollar accounts in Citibank-Geneva,
and (b) Deeds of Assignment of her money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance.
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When respondent failed to pay her loans despite repeated demands by petitioner Citibank,
the latter exercised its right to off-set or compensate respondent's outstanding loans with
her deposits and money market placements, pursuant to the Declaration of Pledge and the
Deeds of Assignment executed by respondent in its favor. Petitioner Citibank supposedly
informed respondent Sabeniano of the foregoing compensation through letters, dated 28
September 1979 and 31 October 1979. Petitioners were therefore surprised when six years
later, in 1985, respondent and her counsel made repeated requests for the withdrawal of
respondent's deposits and money market placements with petitioner Citibank, including her
dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva and her money market placements with petitioner
FNCB Finance. Thus, petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint and for the award
of actual, moral, and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. HAaScT
When the parties failed to reach a compromise during the pre-trial hearing, 9 trial
proper ensued and the parties proceeded with the presentation of their respective evidence.
Ten years after the ling of the Complaint on 8 August 1985, a Decision 1 0 was nally
rendered in Civil Case No. 11336 on 24 August 1995 by the fourth Judge 1 1 who handled the
said case, Judge Manuel D. Victorio, the dispositive portion of which reads —
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, decision is hereby rendered as
follows:
(1) Declaring as illegal, null and void the setoff effected by the defendant
Bank [petitioner Citibank] of plaintiff's [respondent Sabeniano] dollar deposit with
Citibank, Switzerland, in the amount of US$149,632.99, and ordering the said
defendant [petitioner Citibank] to refund the said amount to the plaintiff with legal
interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum, compounded yearly, from 31
October 1979 until fully paid, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment;
(2) Declaring the plaintiff [respondent Sabeniano] indebted to the
defendant Bank [petitioner Citibank] in the amount of P1,069,847.40 as of 5
September 1979 and ordering the plaintiff [respondent Sabeniano] to pay said
amount, however, there shall be no interest and penalty charges from the time the
illegal setoff was effected on 31 October 1979;
(3) Dismissing all other claims and counterclaims interposed by the
parties against each other.
Costs against the defendant Bank.
All the parties appealed the foregoing Decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 51930. Respondent questioned the ndings of the RTC that she
was still indebted to petitioner Citibank, as well as the failure of the RTC to order petitioners
to render an accounting of respondent's deposits and money market placements with them.
On the other hand, petitioners argued that petitioner Citibank validly compensated
respondent's outstanding loans with her dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva, in accordance
with the Declaration of Pledge she executed in its favor. Petitioners also alleged that the RTC
erred in not declaring respondent liable for damages and interest.
On 26 March 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision 1 2 a rming with
modi cation the RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 11336, dated 24 August 1995, and ruling
entirely in favor of respondent in this wise —
Wherefore, premises considered, the assailed 24 August 1995 Decision of the
court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION , as follows:
1. Declaring as illegal, null and void the set-off effected by the defendant-
appellant Bank of the plaintiff-appellant's dollar deposit with Citibank, Switzerland,
in the amount of US$149,632.99, and ordering defendant-appellant Citibank to
refund the said amount to the plaintiff-appellant with legal interest at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) per annum, compounded yearly, from 31 October 1979 until
fully paid, or its peso equivalent at the time of payment;
2. As defendant-appellant Citibank failed to establish by competent

evidence the alleged indebtedness of plaintiff-appellant, the set-off of P1,069,847.40
in the account of Ms. Sabeniano is hereby declared as without legal and factual
basis;
3. As defendants-appellants failed to account the following plaintiff-
appellant's money market placements, savings account and current accounts, the
former is hereby ordered to return the same, in accordance with the terms and
conditions agreed upon by the contending parties as evidenced by the certi cates of
investments, to wit:
(i) Citibank NNPN Serial No. 023356 (Cancels and Supersedes
NNPN No. 22526) issued on 17 March 1977, P318,897.34 with 14.50%
interest p.a.;
(ii) Citibank NNPN Serial No. 23357 (Cancels and Supersedes
NNPN No. 22528) issued on 17 March 1977, P203,150.00 with 14.50 interest
p.a.;
(iii) FNCB NNPN Serial No. 05757 (Cancels and Supersedes NNPN
No. 04952), issued on 02 June 1977, P500,000.00 with 17% interest p.a.;
(iv) FNCB NNPN Serial No. 05758 (Cancels and Supersedes NNPN
No. 04962), issued on 02 June 1977, P500,000.00 with 17% interest per
annum;
(v) The Two Million (P2,000,000.00) money market placements of
Ms. Sabeniano with the Ayala Investment & Development Corporation (AIDC)
with legal interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum compounded
yearly, from 30 September 1976 until fully paid;
4. Ordering defendants-appellants to jointly and severally pay the
plaintiff-appellant the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) by
way of moral damages, FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00) as
exemplary damages, and ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as
attorney's fees.
Apparently, the parties to the case, namely, the respondent, on one hand, and the
petitioners, on the other, made separate attempts to bring the aforementioned Decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated 26 March 2002, before this Court for review.
G.R. No. 152985
Respondent no longer sought a reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, and instead, led immediately with
this Court on 3 May 2002 a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review, 1 3
which, after payment of the docket and other lawful fees, was assigned the docket number
G.R. No. 152985. In the said Motion, respondent alleged that she received a copy of the
assailed Court of Appeals Decision on 18 April 2002 and, thus, had 15 days therefrom or until
3 May 2002 within which to le her Petition for Review. Since she informed her counsel of her
desire to pursue an appeal of the Court of Appeals Decision only on 29 April 2002, her
counsel neither had enough time to file a motion for reconsideration of the said Decision with
the Court of Appeals, nor a Petition for Certiorari with this Court. Yet, the Motion failed to
state the exact extension period respondent was requesting for. EcDTIH
Since this Court did not act upon respondent's Motion for Extension of Time to le her
Petition for Review, then the period for appeal continued to run and still expired on 3 May
2002. 1 4 Respondent failed to le any Petition for Review within the prescribed period for
appeal and, hence, this Court issued a Resolution, 1 5 dated 13 November 2002, in which it
pronounced that —
G.R. No. 152985 (Modesta R. Sabeniano vs. Court of Appeals, et
al.). — It appearing that petitioner failed to le the intended petition for review on
certiorari within the period which expired on May 3, 2002, the Court Resolves to
DECLARE THIS CASE TERMINATED and DIRECT the Division Clerk of Court to
INFORM the parties that the judgment sought to be reviewed has become nal and
executory.
The said Resolution was duly recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on 3 January
2003.
G.R. No. 156132
Meanwhile, petitioners led with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Reconsideration of
its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002. Acting upon the said Motion, the
Court of Appeals issued the Resolution, 1 6 dated 20 November 2002, modifying its Decision
of 26 March 2002, as follows —
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the instant Motion for Reconsideration
i s PARTIALLY GRANTED as Sub-paragraph (V) paragraph 3 of the assailed
Decision's dispositive portion is hereby ordered DELETED .
The challenged 26 March 2002 Decision of the Court is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION .
Assailing the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930,
dated 26 March 2002 and 20 November 2002, respectively, petitioners led the present
Petition, docketed as G.R. No. 156132. The Petition was initially denied 1 7 by this Court for
failure of the petitioners to attach thereto a Certi cation against Forum Shopping. However,
upon petitioners' Motion and compliance with the requirements, this Court resolved 1 8 to
reinstate the Petition.
The Petition presented fourteen (14) assignments of errors allegedly committed by
the Court of Appeals in its Decision, dated 26 March 2002, involving both questions of fact
and questions of law which this Court, for the sake of expediency, discusses jointly, whenever
possible, in the succeeding paragraphs.
I
The Resolution of this Court, dated
13 November 2002, in G.R. No.
152985, declaring the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated 26 March
2002, final and executory, pertains to
respondent Sabeniano alone.
Before proceeding to a discussion of the merits of the instant Petition, this Court
wishes to address rst the argument, persistently advanced by respondent in her pleadings
on record, as well as her numerous personal and unofficial letters to this Court which were no
longer made part of the record, that the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51930, dated 26 March 2002, had already become nal and executory by virtue of the
Resolution of this Court in G.R. No. 152985, dated 13 November 2002.
G.R. No. 152985 was the docket number assigned by this Court to respondent's
Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review. Respondent, though, did not le
her supposed Petition. Thus, after the lapse of the prescribed period for the ling of the
Petition, this Court issued the Resolution, dated 13 November 2002, declaring the Decision
of the Court of Appeals, dated 26 March 2002, nal and executory. It should be pointed out,
however, that the Resolution, dated 13 November 2002, referred only to G.R. No. 152985,
respondent's appeal, which she failed to perfect through the ling of a Petition for Review
within the prescribed period. The declaration of this Court in the same Resolution would bind
respondent solely, and not petitioners which led their own separate appeal before this
Court, docketed as G.R. No. 156132, the Petition at bar. This would mean that respondent, on
her part, should be bound by the ndings of fact and law of the Court of Appeals, including
the monetary amounts consequently awarded to her by the appellate court in its Decision,
dated 26 March 2002; and she can no longer refute or assail any part thereof. 1 9
This Court already explained the matter to respondent when it issued a Resolution 2 0 in
G.R. No. 156132, dated 2 February 2004, which addressed her Urgent Motion for the Release
of the Decision with the Implementation of the Entry of Judgment in the following manner —
[A]cting on Citibank's and FNCB Finance's Motion for Reconsideration, we
resolved to grant the motion, reinstate the petition and require Sabeniano to le a
comment thereto in our Resolution of June 23, 2003. Sabeniano led a Comment
dated July 17, 2003 to which Citibank and FNCB Finance led a Reply dated August
20, 2003.
From the foregoing, it is clear that Sabeniano had knowledge of, and in fact
participated in, the proceedings in G.R. No. 156132. She cannot feign ignorance of
the proceedings therein and claim that the Decision of the Court of Appeals has
become nal and executory. More precisely, the Decision became nal and
executory only with regard to Sabeniano in view of her failure to le a petition
for review within the extended period granted by the Court, and not to Citibank and
FNCB Finance whose Petition for Review was duly reinstated and is now submitted
for decision.
Accordingly, the instant Urgent Motion is hereby DENIED. (Emphasis

supplied.)
To sustain the argument of respondent would result in an unjust and incongruous

situation wherein one party may frustrate the efforts of the opposing party to appeal the
case by merely ling with this Court a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for
Review, ahead of the opposing party, then not actually ling the intended Petition. 2 1 The
party who fails to le its intended Petition within the reglementary or extended period
should solely bear the consequences of such failure. aCTADI
Respondent Sabeniano did not

commit forum shopping.
Another issue that does not directly involve the merits of the present Petition, but
raised by petitioners, is whether respondent should be held liable for forum shopping.
Petitioners contend that respondent committed forum shopping on the basis of the
following facts:
While petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930,
dated 26 March 2002, was still pending before the Court of Appeals, respondent already
led with this Court on 3 May 2002 her Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for
Review of the same Court of Appeals Decision, docketed as G.R. No. 152985. Thereafter,
respondent continued to participate in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 51930 by ling her Comment, dated 17 July 2002, to petitioners' Motion for
Reconsideration; and a Rejoinder, dated 23 September 2002, to petitioners' Reply. Thus,
petitioners argue that by seeking relief concurrently from this Court and the Court of
Appeals, respondent is undeniably guilty of forum shopping, if not indirect contempt.
This Court, however, nds no su cient basis to hold respondent liable for forum
shopping.
Forum shopping has been de ned as the ling of two or more suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose
of obtaining a favorable judgment. 2 2 The test for determining forum shopping is whether in
the two (or more) cases pending, there is an identity of parties, rights or causes of action,
and relief sought. 2 3 To guard against this deplorable practice, Rule 7, Section 5 of the
revised Rules of Court imposes the following requirement —
SEC. 5. Certi cation against forum shopping . — The plaintiff or principal
party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a
claim for relief, or in a sworn certi cation annexed thereto and simultaneously led
therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced any action or led any claim
involving the same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the
best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is
such other pending action or claim, a complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim
has been led or is pending, he shall report that fact within ve (5) days therefrom
to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by

mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for
the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion
and after hearing. The submission of a false certi cation or non-compliance with
any of the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without
prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the
party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the
same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute
direct contempt, as well as cause for administrative sanctions.
Although it may seem at rst glance that respondent was simultaneously seeking
recourse from the Court of Appeals and this Court, a careful and closer scrutiny of the details
of the case at bar would reveal otherwise.
It should be recalled that respondent did nothing more in G.R. No. 152985 than to le
with this Court a Motion for Extension of Time within which to le her Petition for Review. For
unexplained reasons, respondent failed to submit to this Court her intended Petition within
the reglementary period. Consequently, this Court was prompted to issue a Resolution, dated
13 November 2002, declaring G.R. No. 152985 terminated, and the therein assailed Court of
Appeals Decision nal and executory. G.R. No. 152985, therefore, did not progress and
respondent's appeal was unperfected.

The Petition for Review would constitute the initiatory pleading before this Court, upon
the timely ling of which, the case before this Court commences; much in the same way a
case is initiated by the ling of a Complaint before the trial court. The Petition for Review
establishes the identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and relief sought from this
Court, and without such a Petition, there is technically no case before this Court. The Motion
led by respondent seeking extension of time within which to le her Petition for Review
does not serve the same purpose as the Petition for Review itself. Such a Motion merely
presents the important dates and the justi cation for the additional time requested for, but it
does not go into the details of the appealed case.
Without any particular idea as to the assignments of error or the relief respondent
intended to seek from this Court, in light of her failure to le her Petition for Review, there is
actually no second case involving the same parties, rights or causes of action, and relief
sought, as that in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930.
It should also be noted that the Certi cation against Forum Shopping is required to be
attached to the initiatory pleading, which, in G.R. No. 152985, should have been respondent's
Petition for Review. It is in that Certi cation wherein respondent certi es, under oath, that: (a)
she has not commenced any action or led any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of her knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, that she is
presenting a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if she should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been led or is pending, she shall
report that fact within ve days therefrom to this Court. Without her Petition for Review,
respondent had no obligation to execute and submit the foregoing Certi cation against
Forum Shopping. Thus, respondent did not violate Rule 7, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of
Court; neither did she mislead this Court as to the pendency of another similar case.
Lastly, the fact alone that the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 26 March 2002,
essentially ruled in favor of respondent, does not necessarily preclude her from appealing the
same. Granted that such a move is ostensibly irrational, nonetheless, it does not amount to
malice, bad faith or abuse of the court processes in the absence of further proof. Again, it
should be noted that the respondent did not le her intended Petition for Review. The
Petition for Review would have presented before this Court the grounds for respondent's
appeal and her arguments in support thereof. Without said Petition, any reason attributed to
the respondent for appealing the 26 March 2002 Decision would be grounded on mere
speculations, to which this Court cannot give credence. DAESTI
II
As an exception to the general rule,
this Court takes cognizance of
questions of fact raised in the
Petition at bar.
It is already a well-settled rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought
before it from the Court of Appeals by virtue of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is
limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive
upon this Court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule, namely: (1)
when the ndings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when
the interference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when
the ndings of fact are con icting; (6) when in making its ndings, the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its ndings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the ndings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
when the ndings are conclusions without citation of speci c evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the ndings of fact are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 2 4
Several of the enumerated exceptions pertain to the Petition at bar.
It is indubitable that the Court of Appeals made factual ndings that are contrary to
those of the RTC, 2 5 thus, resulting in its substantial modi cation of the trial court's Decision,
and a ruling entirely in favor of the respondent. In addition, petitioners invoked in the instant
Petition for Review several exceptions that would justify this Court's review of the factual
ndings of the Court of Appeals, i.e., the Court of Appeals made con icting ndings of fact;
ndings of fact which went beyond the issues raised on appeal before it; as well as ndings
of fact premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record.
On the basis of the foregoing, this Court shall proceed to reviewing and re-evaluating
the evidence on record in order to settle questions of fact raised in the Petition at bar.
The fact that the trial judge who
rendered the RTC Decision in Civil
Case No. 11336, dated 24 August
1995, was not the same judge who
heard and tried the case, does not, by
itself, render the said Decision erroneous.
The Decision in Civil Case No. 11336 was rendered more than 10 years from the
institution of the said case. In the course of its trial, the case was presided over by four (4)
different RTC judges. 2 6 It was Judge Victorio, the fourth judge assigned to the case, who
wrote the RTC Decision, dated 24 August 1995. In his Decision, 2 7 Judge Victorio made the
following findings —
After carefully evaluating the mass of evidence adduced by the parties, this
Court is not inclined to believe the plaintiff's assertion that the promissory notes as
well as the deeds of assignments of her FNCB Finance money market placements
were simulated. The evidence is overwhelming that the plaintiff received the
proceeds of the loans evidenced by the various promissory notes she had signed.
What is more, there was not an iota of proof save the plaintiff's bare testimony that
she had indeed applied for loan with the Development Bank of the Philippines.
More importantly, the two deeds of assignment were notarized, hence they
partake the nature of a public document. It makes more than preponderant proof to
overturn the effect of a notarial attestation. Copies of the deeds of assignments
were actually filed with the Records Management and Archives Office.
Finally, there were su cient evidence wherein the plaintiff had admitted the
existence of her loans with the defendant Bank in the total amount of P1,920,000.00
exclusive of interests and penalty charges (Exhibits "28", "31", "32", and "33").
In ne, this Court hereby nds that the defendants had established the
genuineness and due execution of the various promissory notes heretofore
identi ed as well as the two deeds of assignments of the plaintiff's money market
placements with defendant FNCB Finance, on the strength of which the said money
market placements were applied to partially pay the plaintiff's past due obligation
with the defendant Bank. Thus, the total sum of P1,053,995.80 of the plaintiff's past
due obligation was partially offset by the said money market placement leaving a
balance of P1,069,847.40 as of 5 September 1979 (Exhibit "34").
Disagreeing in the foregoing ndings, the Court of Appeals stressed, in its Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, "that the ponente of the herein assailed
Decision is not the Presiding Judge who heard and tried the case." 2 8 This brings us to the
question of whether the fact alone that the RTC Decision was rendered by a judge other than
the judge who actually heard and tried the case is su cient justi cation for the appellate
court to disregard or set aside the findings in the Decision of the court a quo?
This Court rules in the negative.
What deserves stressing is that, in this jurisdiction, there exists a disputable
presumption that the RTC Decision was rendered by the judge in the regular performance of
his o cial duties. While the said presumption is only disputable, it is satisfactory unless
contradicted or overcame by other evidence. 2 9 Encompassed in this presumption of
regularity is the presumption that the RTC judge, in resolving the case and drafting his
Decision, reviewed, evaluated, and weighed all the evidence on record. That the said RTC
judge is not the same judge who heard the case and received the evidence is of little
consequence when the records and transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) are complete
and available for consideration by the former.
In People v. Gazmen, 3 0 this Court already elucidated its position on such an issue —
Accused-appellant makes an issue of the fact that the judge who penned the
decision was not the judge who heard and tried the case and concludes therefrom
that the ndings of the former are erroneous. Accused-appellant's argument does
not merit a lengthy discussion. It is well-settled that the decision of a judge who did
not try the case is not by that reason alone erroneous. DAEaTS
It is true that the judge who ultimately decided the case had not heard the
controversy at all, the trial having been conducted by then Judge Emilio L. Polig,
who was inde nitely suspended by this Court. Nonetheless, the transcripts of
stenographic notes taken during the trial were complete and were presumably
examined and studied by Judge Baguilat before he rendered his decision. It is not
unusual for a judge who did not try a case to decide it on the basis of the record.
The fact that he did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses during the trial but merely relied on the transcript of their testimonies does
not for that reason alone render the judgment erroneous.
(People vs. Jaymalin, 214 SCRA 685, 692 [1992])

Although it is true that the judge who heard the witnesses testify is in a better
position to observe the witnesses on the stand and determine by their demeanor
whether they are telling the truth or mouthing falsehood, it does not necessarily
follow that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid
decision since he can rely on the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the
trial as basis of his decision.
Accused-appellant's contention that the trial judge did not have the
opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses since he was not
the same judge who conducted the hearing is also untenable. While it is true that the
trial judge who conducted the hearing would be in a better position to ascertain the
truth and falsity of the testimonies of the witnesses, it does not necessarily follow
that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid and just
decision since the latter can also rely on the transcribed stenographic notes taken
during the trial as the basis of his decision.
(People vs. De Paz, 212 SCRA 56, 63 [1992])

At any rate, the test to determine the value of the testimony of the witness is
whether or not such is in conformity with knowledge and consistent with the
experience of mankind (People vs. Morre, 217 SCRA 219 [1993]). Further, the
credibility of witnesses can also be assessed on the basis of the substance of their
testimony and the surrounding circumstances (People v. Gonzales , 210 SCRA 44
[1992]). A critical evaluation of the testimony of the prosecution witnesses reveals
that their testimony accords with the aforementioned tests, and carries with it the
ring of truth end perforce, must be given full weight and credit.
Irrefragably, by reason alone that the judge who penned the RTC Decision was not the
same judge who heard the case and received the evidence therein would not render the
ndings in the said Decision erroneous and unreliable. While the conduct and demeanor of
witnesses may sway a trial court judge in deciding a case, it is not, and should not be, his only
consideration. Even more vital for the trial court judge's decision are the contents and
substance of the witnesses' testimonies, as borne out by the TSNs, as well as the object and
documentary evidence submitted and made part of the records of the case.
This Court proceeds to making its
own findings of fact.
Since the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51930, dated 26 March
2002, has become nal and executory as to the respondent, due to her failure to interpose an
appeal therefrom within the reglementary period, she is already bound by the factual ndings
in the said Decision. Likewise, respondent's failure to le, within the reglementary period, a
Motion for Reconsideration or an appeal of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals in the
same case, dated 20 November 2002, which modi ed its earlier Decision by deleting
paragraph 3(v) of its dispositive portion, ordering petitioners to return to respondent the
proceeds of her money market placement with AIDC, shall already bar her from questioning
such modi cation before this Court. Thus, what is for review before this Court is the Decision
of the Court of Appeals, dated 26 March 2002, as modi ed by the Resolution of the same
court, dated 20 November 2002.
Respondent alleged that she had several deposits and money market placements with
petitioners. These deposits and money market placements, as determined by the Court of
Appeals in its Decision, dated 26 March 2002, and as modi ed by its Resolution, dated 20
November 2002, are as follows —
Deposit/Placement Amount
Dollar deposit with Citibank-Geneva $149,632.99
Money market placement with Citibank, evidenced by

Promissory Note (PN) No. 23356 (which cancels and
supersedes PN No. 22526), earning 14.5% interest per
annum (p.a.) P318,897.34
Money market placement with Citibank, evidenced by PN

No. 23357 (which cancels and supersedes PN No. 22528),
earning 14.5% interest p.a. P203,150.00

Money market placement with FNCB Finance, evidenced
by PN No. 5757 (which cancels and supersedes PN No.
4952), earning 17% interest p.a. P500,000.00
Money market placement with FNCB Finance, evidenced

by PN No. 5758 (which cancels and supersedes PN No.
2962), earning 17% interest p.a. P500,000.00
This Court is tasked to determine whether petitioners are indeed liable to return the
foregoing amounts, together with the appropriate interests and penalties, to respondent.
It shall trace respondent's transactions with petitioners, from her money market
placements with petitioner Citibank and petitioner FNCB Finance, to her savings and
current accounts with petitioner Citibank, and to her dollar accounts with Citibank-
Geneva. TcAECH
Money market placements with petitioner Citibank

The history of respondent's money market placements with petitioner Citibank began
on 6 December 1976, when she made a placement of P500,000.00 as principal amount,
which was supposed to earn an interest of 16% p.a. and for which PN No. 20773 was issued.
Respondent did not yet claim the proceeds of her placement and, instead, rolled-over or re-
invested the principal and proceeds several times in the succeeding years for which new PNs
were issued by petitioner Citibank to replace the ones which matured. Petitioner Citibank
accounted for respondent's original placement and the subsequent roll-overs thereof, as
follows —
Maturity
Date PN No. Cancels Date Amount Interest
(mm/dd/yyyy) PN No. (mm/dd/yyyy) (P) (p.a.)
12/06/1976 20773 None 01/13/1977 500,000.00 16%

01/14/1977 21686 20773 02/08/1977 508,444.44 15%
02/09/1977 22526 21686 03/16/1977 313,952.59 15-3/4%
22528 21686 03/16/1977 200,000.00 15-3/4%
03/17/1977 23356 22526 04/20/1977 318,897.34 14-1/2%
23357 22528 04/20/1977 203,150.00 14-1/2%
Petitioner Citibank alleged that it had already paid to respondent the principal
amounts and proceeds of PNs No. 23356 and 23357, upon their maturity. Petitioner Citibank
further averred that respondent used the P500,000.00 from the payment of PNs No. 23356
and 23357, plus P600,000.00 sourced from her other funds, to open two time deposit (TD)
accounts with petitioner Citibank, namely, TD Accounts No. 17783 and 17784.
Petitioner Citibank did not deny the existence nor questioned the authenticity of PNs
No. 23356 and 23357 it issued in favor of respondent for her money market placements. In
fact, it admitted the genuineness and due execution of the said PNs, but quali ed that they
were no longer outstanding. 3 1 In Hibberd v. Rohde and McMillian , 3 2 this Court delineated
the consequences of such an admission —
By the admission of the genuineness and due execution of an instrument, as
provided in this section, is meant that the party whose signature it bears admits that
he signed it or that it was signed by another for him with his authority; that at the
time it was signed it was in words and gures exactly as set out in the pleading of
the party relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that any formal
requisites required by law, such as a seal, an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp,
which it lacks, are waived by him. Hence, such defenses as that the signature is a
forgery (Puritan Mfg. Co. vs. Toti & Gradi , 14 N. M., 425; Cox vs. Northwestern Stage
Co., 1 Idaho, 376; Woollen vs. Whitacre, 73 Ind., 198; Smith vs. Ehnert, 47 Wis., 479;
Faelnar vs. Escaño, 11 Phil. Rep., 92); or that it was unauthorized, as in the case of
an agent signing for his principal, or one signing in behalf of a partnership (Country
Bank vs. Greenberg, 127 Cal., 26; Henshaw vs. Root, 60 Inc., 220; Naftzker vs. Lantz,
137 Mich., 441) or of a corporation (Merchant vs. International Banking Corporation,
6 Phil Rep., 314; Wanita vs. Rollins, 75 Miss., 253; Barnes vs. Spencer & Barnes Co.,
162 Mich., 509); or that, in the case of the latter, that the corporation was authorized
under its charter to sign the instrument (Merchant vs. International Banking
Corporation, supra); or that the party charged signed the instrument in some other
capacity than that alleged in the pleading setting it out (Payne vs. National Bank, 16
Kan., 147); or that it was never delivered (Hunt vs. Weir, 29 Ill., 83; Elbring vs. Mullen,
4 Idaho, 199; Thorp vs. Keokuk Coal Co., 48 N.Y., 253; Fire Association of
Philadelphia vs. Ruby, 60 Neb., 216) are cut off by the admission of its genuineness
and due execution.
The effect of the admission is such that in the case of a promissory note a
prima facie case is made for the plaintiff which dispenses with the necessity of
evidence on his part and entitles him to a judgment on the pleadings unless a
special defense of new matter, such as payment, is interposed by the defendant
(Papa vs. Martinez, 12 Phil. Rep., 613; Chinese Chamber of Commerce vs. Pua To
Ching, 14 Phil. Rep., 222; Banco Español-Filipino vs. McKay & Zoeller, 27 Phil. Rep.,
183). . . .
Since the genuineness and due execution of PNs No. 23356 and 23357 are uncontested,
respondent was able to establish prima facie that petitioner Citibank is liable to her for
the amounts stated therein. The assertion of petitioner Citibank of payment of the said
PNs is an a rmative allegation of a new matter, the burden of proof as to such resting on
petitioner Citibank. Respondent having proved the existence of the obligation, the burden
of proof was upon petitioner Citibank to show that it had been discharged. 3 3 It has
already been established by this Court that —
As a general rule, one who pleads payment has the burden of proving it. Even
where the plaintiff must allege non-payment, the general rule is that the burden rests
on the defendant to prove payment, rather than on the plaintiff to prove non-
payment. The debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the
obligation has been discharged by payment.
When the existence of a debt is fully established by the evidence contained in
the record, the burden of proving that it has been extinguished by payment devolves
upon the debtor who offers such defense to the claim of the creditor. Where the
debtor introduces some evidence of payment, the burden of going forward with the
evidence — as distinct from the general burden of proof — shifts to the creditor, who
is then under the duty of producing some evidence of non-payment. 3 4
Reviewing the evidence on record, this Court nds that petitioner Citibank failed to
satisfactorily prove that PNs No. 23356 and 23357 had already been paid, and that the
amount so paid was actually used to open one of respondent's TD accounts with petitioner
Citibank.
Petitioner Citibank presented the testimonies of two witnesses to support its
contention of payment: (1) That of Mr. Herminio Pujeda, 3 5 the o cer-in-charge of loans and
placements at the time when the questioned transactions took place; and (2) that of Mr.
Francisco Tan, 3 6 the former Assistant Vice-President of Citibank, who directly dealt with
respondent with regard to her deposits and loans.
The relevant portion 3 7 of Mr. Pujeda's testimony as to PNs No. 23356 and 23357
(referred to therein as Exhibits No. "47" and "48," respectively) is reproduced below —
Atty. Mabasa:
Okey [sic]. Now Mr. Witness, you were asked to testify in this case and this case
is [sic] consist [sic] of several documents involving transactions between the
plaintiff and the defendant. Now, were you able to make your own
memorandum regarding all these transactions? TCEaDI
A Yes, based on my recollection of these facts, I did come up of [sic] the outline
of the chronological sequence of events.
Court:
Are you trying to say that you have personal knowledge or participation to
these transactions?
A Yes, your Honor, I was the officer-in charge of the unit that was processing
these transactions. Some of the documents bear my signature.
Court:
And this resume or summary that you have prepared is based on purely your
recollection or documents?
A Based on documents, your Honor.
Court:
Are these documents still available now?
A Yes, your honor.

Court:
Better present the documents.
Atty. Mabasa:
Yes, your Honor, that is why your Honor.
Atty. Mabasa:
Q Now, basing on the notes that you prepared, Mr. Witness, and according to
you basing also on your personal recollection about all the transactions
involved between Modesta Sabeniano and defendant City Bank [sic] in this
case. Now, would you tell us what happened to the money market
placements of Modesta Sabeniano that you have earlier identified in Exhs.
"47" and "48"?
A The transactions which I said earlier were terminated and booked to time
deposits.
Q And you are saying time deposits with what bank?
A With First National Citibank.
Q Is it the same bank as Citibank, N.A.?

A Yes, sir.
Q And how much was the amount booked as time deposit with defendant
Citibank?
A In the amount of P500,000.00.
Q And outside this P500,000.00 which you said was booked out of the proceeds
of Exhs. "47" and "48", were there other time deposits opened by Mrs.
Modesta Sabeniano at that time.
A Yes, she also opened another time deposit for P600,000.00.
Q So all in all Mr. Witness, sometime in April of 1978 Mrs. Modesta Sabeneano
[sic] had time deposit placements with Citibank in the amount of
P500,000.00 which is the proceeds of Exh. "47" and "48" and another
P600,000.00, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q And would you know where did the other P600,000 placed by Mrs. Sabeneano
[sic] in a time deposit with Citibank, N.A. came [sic] from?
A She funded it directly.

Q What are you saying Mr. Witness is that the P600,000 is a [sic] fresh money
coming from Mrs. Modesta Sabeneano [sic]?
A That is right.
In his deposition in Hong Kong, Mr. Tan recounted what happened to PNs No. 23356
and 23357 (referred to therein as Exhibits "E" and "F," respectively), as follows —
Atty. Mabasa:
Now from the Exhibits that you have identified Mr. Tan from Exhibits "A" to "F",
which are Exhibits of the plaintiff. Now, do I understand from you that the
original amount is Five Hundred Thousand and thereafter renewed in the
succeeding exhibits?
Mr. Tan:
Yes, Sir.
Atty. Mabasa:
Alright, after these Exhibits "E" and "F" matured, what happened thereafter?
Mr. Tan:
Split into two time deposits.
Atty. Mabasa:
Exhibits "E" and "F"?
Before anything else, it should be noted that when Mr. Pujeda's testimony before the
RTC was made on 12 March 1990 and Mr. Tan's deposition in Hong Kong was conducted on
3 September 1990, more than a decade had passed from the time the transactions they
were testifying on took place. This Court had previously recognized the frailty and
unreliability of human memory with regards to gures after the lapse of ve years. 3 8 Taking
into consideration the substantial length of time between the transactions and the
witnesses' testimonies, as well as the undeniable fact that bank o cers deal with multiple
clients and process numerous transactions during their tenure, this Court is reluctant to give
much weight to the testimonies of Mr. Pujeda and Mr. Tan regarding the payment of PNs No.
23356 and 23357 and the use by respondent of the proceeds thereof for opening TD
accounts. This Court finds it implausible that they should remember, after all these years, this
particular transaction with respondent involving her PNs No. 23356 and 23357 and TD
accounts. Both witnesses did not give any reason as to why, from among all the clients they
had dealt with and all the transactions they had processed as o cers of petitioner Citibank,
they specially remembered respondent and her PNs No. 23356 and 23357. Their testimonies
likewise lacked details on the circumstances surrounding the payment of the two PNs and
the opening of the time deposit accounts by respondent, such as the date of payment of the
two PNs, mode of payment, and the manner and context by which respondent relayed her
instructions to the o cers of petitioner Citibank to use the proceeds of her two PNs in
opening the TD accounts. ADSIaT
Moreover, while there are documentary evidences to support and trace respondent's
money market placements with petitioner Citibank, from the original PN No. 20773, rolled-
over several times to, nally, PNs No. 23356 and 23357, there is an evident absence of any
documentary evidence on the payment of these last two PNs and the use of the proceeds
thereof by respondent for opening TD accounts. The paper trail seems to have ended with
the copies of PNs No. 23356 and 23357. Although both Mr. Pujeda and Mr. Tan said that
they based their testimonies, not just on their memories but also on the documents on le,
the supposed documents on which they based those portions of their testimony on the
payment of PNs No. 23356 and 23357 and the opening of the TD accounts from the
proceeds thereof, were never presented before the courts nor made part of the
records of the case . Respondent's money market placements were of substantial
amounts — consisting of the principal amount of P500,000.00, plus the interest it should
have earned during the years of placement — and it is di cult for this Court to believe that
petitioner Citibank would not have had documented the payment thereof.
When Mr. Pujeda testi ed before the RTC on 6 February 1990, 3 9 petitioners' counsel
attempted to present in evidence a document that would supposedly support the claim of
petitioner Citibank that the proceeds of PNs No. 23356 and 23357 were used by respondent
to open one of her two TD accounts in the amount of P500,000.00. Respondent's counsel
objected to the presentation of the document since it was a mere "xerox" copy, and was
blurred and hardly readable. Petitioners' counsel then asked for a continuance of the hearing
so that they can have time to produce a better document, which was granted by the court.
However, during the next hearing and continuance of Mr. Pujeda's testimony on 12 March
1990, petitioners' counsel no longer referred to the said document.
As respondent had established a prima facie case that petitioner Citibank is obligated
to her for the amounts stated in PNs No. 23356 and 23357, and as petitioner Citibank failed
to present su cient proof of payment of the said PNs and the use by the respondent of the
proceeds thereof to open her TD accounts, this Court nds that PNs No. 23356 and
23357 are still outstanding and petitioner Citibank is still liable to respondent for
the amounts stated therein .
The signi cance of this Court's declaration that PNs No. 23356 and 23357 are still
outstanding becomes apparent in the light of petitioners' next contentions — that respondent
used the proceeds of PNs No. 23356 and 23357, together with additional money, to open TD
Accounts No. 17783 and 17784 with petitioner Citibank; and, subsequently, respondent pre-
terminated these TD accounts and transferred the proceeds thereof, amounting to
P1,100,000.00, to petitioner FNCB Finance for money market placements. While
respondent's money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance may be traced back
with de niteness to TD Accounts No. 17783 and 17784, there is only imsy and
unsubstantiated connection between the said TD accounts and the supposed proceeds paid
from PNs No. 23356 and 23357. With PNs No. 23356 and 23357 still unpaid, then they
represent an obligation of petitioner Citibank separate and distinct from the obligation of
petitioner FNCB Finance arising from respondent's money market placements with the latter.
Money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance
According to petitioners, respondent's TD Accounts No. 17783 and 17784, in the total
amount of P1,100,000.00, were supposed to mature on 15 March 1978. However,
respondent, through a letter dated 28 April 1977, 4 0 pre-terminated the said TD accounts and
transferred all the proceeds thereof to petitioner FNCB Finance for money market
placement. Pursuant to her instructions, TD Accounts No. 17783 and 17784 were pre-
terminated and petitioner Citibank (then still named First National City Bank) issued
Manager's Checks (MC) No. 199253 4 1 and 199251 4 2 for the amounts of P500,000.00 and
P600,00.00, respectively. Both MCs were payable to Citi nance (which, according to Mr.
Pujeda, 4 3 was one with and the same as petitioner FNCB Finance), with the additional
notation that "A/C MODESTA R. SABENIANO." Typewritten on MC No. 199253 is the phrase
"Ref. Proceeds of TD 17783," and on MC No. 199251 is a similar phrase, "Ref. Proceeds of TD
17784." These phrases purportedly established that the MCs were paid from the proceeds
of respondent's pre-terminated TD accounts with petitioner Citibank. Upon receipt of the
MCs, petitioner FNCB Finance deposited the same to its account with Feati Bank and Trust
Co., as evidenced by the rubber stamp mark of the latter found at the back of both MCs. In
exchange, petitioner FNCB Finance booked the amounts received as money market
placements, and accordingly issued PNs No. 4952 and 4962, for the amounts of
P500,000.00 and P600,000.00, respectively, payable to respondent's savings account with
petitioner Citibank, S/A No. 25-13703-4, upon their maturity on 1 June 1977. Once again,
respondent rolled-over several times the principal amounts of her money market placements
with petitioner FNCB Finance, as follows —
Maturity
Date PN No. Cancels Date Amount Interest
(mm/dd/yyyy) PN No. (mm/dd/yyyy) (P) (p.a.)
04/29/1977 4952 None 06/01/1977 500,000.00 17%

4962 None 06/01/1977 600,000.00 17%
06/02/1977 5757 4952 08/31/1977 500,000.00 17%
5758 4962 08/31/1977 500,000.00 17%
08/17/1977 8167 5757 08/25/1978 500,000.00 14%
8169 5752 08/25/1978 500,000.00 14%
As presented by the petitioner FNCB Finance, respondent rolled-over only the principal
amounts of her money market placements as she chose to receive the interest income
therefrom. Petitioner FNCB Finance also pointed out that when PN No. 4962, with
principal amount of P600,000.00, matured on 1 June 1977, respondent received a partial
payment of the principal which, together with the interest, amounted to P102,633.33; 4 4
thus, only the amount of P500,000.00 from PN No. 4962 was rolled-over to PN No. 5758.
Based on the foregoing records, the principal amounts of PNs No. 5757 and 5758,
upon their maturity, were rolled over to PNs No. 8167 and 8169, respectively. PN No. 8167 4 5
expressly canceled and superseded PN No. 5757, while PN No. 8169 4 6 also explicitly
canceled and superseded PN No. 5758. Thus, it is patently erroneous for the Court of
Appeals to still award to respondent the principal amounts and interests covered by PNs No.
5757 and 5758 when these were already canceled and superseded. It is now incumbent
upon this Court to determine what subsequently happened to PNs No. 8167 and 8169. AcISTE
Petitioner FNCB Finance presented four checks as proof of payment of the principal
amounts and interests of PNs No. 8167 and 8169 upon their maturity. All the checks were
payable to respondent's savings account with petitioner Citibank, with the following details —
Date of Issuance Amount
(mm/dd/yyyy) Check No. (P) Notation
09/01/1978 76962 12,833.34 Interest payment on PN#08167

09/01/1978 76961 12,833.34 Interest payment on PN#08169
09/05/1978 77035 500,000.00 Full payment of principal on PN#08167
which is hereby cancelled
09/05/1978 77034 500,000.00 Full payment of principal on PN#08169
which is hereby cancelled
Then again, Checks No. 77035 and 77034 were later returned to petitioner FNCB Finance
together with a memo, 4 7 dated 6 September 1978, from Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank, to
a Mr. Bobby Mendoza of petitioner FNCB Finance. According to the memo, the two
checks, in the total amount of P1,000,000.00, were to be returned to respondent's
account with instructions to book the said amount in money market placements for one
more year. Pursuant to the said memo, Checks No. 77035 and 77034 were invested by
petitioner FNCB Finance, on behalf of respondent, in money market placements for which
it issued PNs No. 20138 and 20139. The PNs each covered P500,000.00, to earn 11%
interest per annum, and to mature on 3 September 1979.
On 3 September 1979, petitioner FNCB Finance issued Check No. 100168, pay to the
order of "Citibank N.A. A/C Modesta Sabeniano," in the amount of P1,022,916.66, as full
payment of the principal amounts and interests of both PNs No. 20138 and 20139 and,
resultantly, canceling the said PNs. 4 8 Respondent actually admitted the issuance and
existence of Check No. 100168, but with the quali cation that the proceeds thereof were
turned over to petitioner Citibank. 4 9 Respondent did not clarify the circumstances attending
the supposed turn over, but on the basis of the allegations of petitioner Citibank itself, the
proceeds of PNs No. 20138 and 20139, amounting to P1,022,916.66, was used by it to
liquidate respondent's outstanding loans. Therefore, the determination of whether or not
respondent is still entitled to the return of the proceeds of PNs No. 20138 and 20139 shall
be dependent on the resolution of the issues raised as to the existence of the loans and the
authority of petitioner Citibank to use the proceeds of the said PNs, together with
respondent's other deposits and money market placements, to pay for the same.
Savings and current accounts with petitioner Citibank
Respondent presented and submitted before the RTC deposit slips and bank
statements to prove deposits made to several of her accounts with petitioner Citibank,
particularly, Accounts No. 00484202, 59091, and 472-751, which would have amounted to a
total of P3,812,712.32, had there been no withdrawals or debits from the said accounts from
the time the said deposits were made.
Although the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not make any de nitive ndings as to
the status of respondent's savings and current accounts with petitioner Citibank, the
Decisions of both the trial and appellate courts effectively recognized only the P31,079.14
coming from respondent's savings account which was used to off-set her alleged
outstanding loans with petitioner Citibank. 5 0
Since both the RTC and the Court of Appeals had consistently recognized only the
P31,079.14 of respondent's savings account with petitioner Citibank, and that respondent
failed to move for reconsideration or to appeal this particular nding of fact by the trial and
appellate courts, it is already binding upon this Court. Respondent is already precluded from
claiming any greater amount in her savings and current accounts with petitioner Citibank.
Thus, this Court shall limit itself to determining whether or not respondent is entitled to the
return of the amount of P31,079.14 should the off-set thereof by petitioner Citibank against
her supposed loans be found invalid.
Dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva
Respondent made an effort of preparing and presenting before the RTC her own
computations of her money market placements and dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva,
purportedly amounting to a total of United States (US) $343,220.98, as of 23 June 1985. 5 1
In her Memorandum led with the RTC, she claimed a much bigger amount of deposits and
money market placements with Citibank-Geneva, totaling US$1,336,638.65. 5 2 However,
respondent herself also submitted as part of her formal offer of evidence the computation of
her money market placements and dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva as determined by
the latter. 5 3 Citibank-Geneva accounted for respondent's money market placements and
dollar accounts as follows —
MODESTA SABENIANO &/OR
US$ 30'000.-- Principal Fid. Placement

+ US$ 339.06 Interest at 3,875% p.a. from 12.07.-25.10.79
- US$ 95.-- Commission (minimum)
––––––––––––––––––
US$ 30'244.06 Total proceeds on 25.10.1979
US$ 114'000.-- Principal Fid. Placement
+ US$ 1'358.50 Interest at 4,125% p.a. from 12.07.-25.10.79
- US$ 41.17 Commission
––––––––––––––––––
US$ 115'317.33 Total proceeds on 25.10.1979
US$ 145'561.39 Total proceeds of both placements on 25.10.1979
+ US$ 11'381.31 total of both current accounts
––––––––––––––––––
US$ 156'942.70 Total funds available
- US$ 149'632.99 Transfer to Citibank Manila on 26.10.1979
–––––––––––––––––– (counter value of Pesos 1'102'944.78)
US$ 7'309.71 Balance in current accounts
- US$ 6'998.84 Transfer to Citibank Zurich — ac no. 121359 on March 13,
–––––––––––––––––– 1980
US$ 310.87 various charges including closing charges
According to the foregoing computation, by 25 October 1979, respondent had a total

of US$156,942.70, from which, US$149,632.99 was transferred by Citibank-Geneva to
petitioner Citibank in Manila, and was used by the latter to off-set respondent's outstanding
loans. The balance of respondent's accounts with Citibank-Geneva, after the remittance to
petitioner Citibank in Manila, amounted to US$7,309.71, which was subsequently expended
by a transfer to another account with Citibank-Zuerich, in the amount of US$6,998.84, and by
payment of various bank charges, including closing charges, in the amount of US$310.87.
Rightly so, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals gave more credence to the computation of
Citibank-Geneva as to the status of respondent's accounts with the said bank, rather than the
one prepared by respondent herself, which was evidently self-serving. Once again, this Court
shall limit itself to determining whether or not respondent is entitled to the return of the
amount of US$149,632.99 should the off-set thereof by petitioner Citibank against her
alleged outstanding loans be found invalid. Respondent cannot claim any greater amount
since she did not perfect an appeal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 26 March
2002, which found that she is entitled only to the return of the said amount, as far as her
accounts with Citibank-Geneva is concerned. TcDaSI
III
Petitioner Citibank was able to
establish by preponderance of
evidence the existence of
respondent's loans.
Petitioners' version of events
In sum, the following amounts were used by petitioner Citibank to liquidate
respondent's purported outstanding loans —
Description Amount
Principal and interests of PNs No. 20138 and 20139

(money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance) P1,022,916.66
Savings account with petitioner Citibank 31,079.14
Dollar remittance from Citibank-Geneva (peso equivalent
Of US$149,632.99) 1,102,944.78
Total P2,156,940.58
According to petitioner Citibank, respondent incurred her loans under the

circumstances narrated below.
As early as 9 February 1978, respondent obtained her rst loan from petitioner
Citibank in the principal amount of P200,000.00, for which she executed PN No. 31504. 5 4
Petitioner Citibank extended to her several other loans in the succeeding months. Some of
these loans were paid, while others were rolled-over or renewed. Signi cant to the Petition at
bar are the loans which respondent obtained from July 1978 to January 1979, appropriately
covered by PNs ( rst set). 5 5 The aggregate principal amount of these loans was
P1,920,000.00, which could be broken down as follows —
Date of Date of Date of
PN Issuance Maturity Principal Release MC
No. (mm/dd/yyyy) (mm/dd/yyyy) Amount (mm/dd/yyyy) No.
32935 07/20/1978 09/18/1978 P400,000.00 07/20/1978 220701

33751 10/13/1978 12/12/1978 100,000.00 Unrecovered
33798 10/19/1978 11/03/1978 100,000.00 10/19/1978 226285
34025 11/15/1978 01/15/1979 150,000.00 11/16/1978 226439
34079 11/21/1978 01/19/1979 250,000.00 11/21/1978 226467
34192 12/04/1978 01/18/1979 100,000.00 12/05/1978 228057
34402 12/26/1978 02/23/1979 300,000.00 12/26/1978 228203
34534
34609 01/09/1979
01/17/1979 03/09/1979
03/19/1979 150,000.00 01/09/1979
01/17/1979 228270
228357
34740 01/30/1979 03/30/1979 220,000.00 01/30/1979 228400
Total P1,920,000.00
When respondent was unable to pay the rst set of PNs upon their maturity, these were
rolled-over or renewed several times, necessitating the execution by respondent of new
PNs in favor of petitioner Citibank. As of 5 April 1979, respondent had the following
outstanding PNs (second set), 5 6 the principal amount of which remained at
P1,920,000.00 —
Date of Issuance Date of Maturity
PN No. (mm/dd/yyyy) (mm/dd/yyyy) Principal Amount
34510 01/01/1979 03/02/1979 P400,000.00

34509 01/02/1979 03/02/1979 100,000.00
34534 01/09/1979 03/09/1979 150,000.00
34612 01/19/1979 03/16/1979 150,000.00
34741 01/26/1979 03/12/1979 100,000.00
35689 02/23/1979 05/29/1979 300,000.00
35694 03/19/1979 05/29/1979 150,000.00
35695 03/19/1979 05/29/1979 100,000.00
356946 03/20/1979 05/29/1979 250,000.00
35697 03/30/1979 05/29/1979 220,000.00
Total P1,920,000.00
All the PNs stated that the purpose of the loans covered thereby is "To liquidate existing
obligation," except for PN No. 34534, which stated for its purpose "personal investment."
Respondent secured her foregoing loans with petitioner Citibank by executing Deeds
of Assignment of her money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance. On 2 March
1978, respondent executed in favor of petitioner Citibank a Deed of Assignment 5 7 of PN No.
8169, which was issued by petitioner FNCB Finance, to secure payment of the credit and
banking facilities extended to her by petitioner Citibank, in the aggregate principal amount of
P500,000.00. On 9 March 1978, respondent executed in favor of petitioner Citibank another
Deed of Assignment, 5 8 this time, of PN No. 8167, also issued by petitioner FNCB Finance, to
secure payment of the credit and banking facilities extended to her by petitioner Citibank, in
the aggregate amount of P500,000.00. When PNs No. 8167 and 8169, representing
respondent's money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance, matured and were
rolled-over to PNs No. 20138 and 20139, respondent executed new Deeds of Assignment, 5 9
in favor of petitioner Citibank, on 25 August 1978. According to the more recent Deeds,
respondent assigned PNs No. 20138 and 20139, representing her rolled-over money market
placements with petitioner FNCB Finance, to petitioner Citibank as security for the banking
and credit facilities it extended to her, in the aggregate principal amount of P500,000.00 per
Deed.
In addition to the Deeds of Assignment of her money market placements with
petitioner FNCB Finance, respondent also executed a Declaration of Pledge, 6 0 in which she
supposedly pledged "[a]ll present and future duciary placements held in my personal and/or
joint name with Citibank, Switzerland," to secure all claims the petitioner Citibank may have
or, in the future, acquire against respondent. The petitioners' copy of the Declaration of
Pledge is undated, while that of the respondent, a copy certi ed by a Citibank-Geneva o cer,
bore the date 24 September 1979. 6 1
When respondent failed to pay the second set of PNs upon their maturity, an exchange
of letters ensued between respondent and/or her representatives, on one hand, and the
representatives of petitioners, on the other.
The rst letter 6 2 was dated 5 April 1979, addressed to respondent and signed by Mr.
Tan, as the manager of petitioner Citibank, which stated, in part, that —
Despite our repeated requests and follow-up, we regret you have not granted
us with any response or payment.
We, therefore, have no alternative but to call your loan of P1,920,000.00 plus
interests and other charges due and demandable. If you still fail to settle this
obligation by 4/27/79, we shall have no other alternative but to refer your account to
our lawyers for legal action to protect the interest of the bank.
Respondent sent a reply letter 6 3 dated 26 April 1979, printed on paper bearing the
letterhead of respondent's company, MC Adore International Palace, the body of which reads
—
This is in reply to your letter dated April 5, 1979 inviting my attention to my
loan which has become due. Pursuant to our representation with you over the
telephone through Mr. F. A. Tan, you allow us to pay the interests due for the
meantime.
Please accept our Comtrust Check in the amount of P62,683.33.
Please bear with us for a little while, at most ninety days. As you know, we
have a pending loan with the Development Bank of the Philippines in the amount of
P11-M. This loan has already been recommended for approval and would be
submitted to the Board of Governors. In fact, to further facilitate the early release of
this loan, we have presented and furnished Gov. J. Tengco a xerox copy of your
letter.
You will be doing our corporation a very viable service, should you grant us
our request for a little more time.
A week later or on 3 May 1979, a certain C. N. Pugeda, designated as "Executive

Secretary," sent a letter 6 4 to petitioner Citibank, on behalf of respondent. The letter was
again printed on paper bearing the letterhead of MC Adore International Palace. The
pertinent paragraphs of the said letter are reproduced below —
Per instructions of Mrs. Modesta R. Sabeniano, we would like to request for a
re-computation of the interest and penalty charges on her loan in the aggregate
amount of P1,920,000.00 with maturity date of all promissory notes at June 30,
1979. As she has personally discussed with you yesterday, this date will more or
less assure you of early settlement. cTECHI
In this regard, please entrust to bearer, our Comtrust check for P62,683.33 to
be replaced by another check with amount resulting from the new computation.
Also, to facilitate the processing of the same, may we request for another set of
promissory notes for the signature of Mrs. Sabeniano and to cancel the previous
ones she has signed and forwarded to you.
This was followed by a telegram, 6 5 dated 5 June 1979, and received by petitioner
Citibank the following day. The telegram was sent by a Dewey G. Soriano, Legal Counsel. The
telegram acknowledged receipt of the telegram sent by petitioner Citibank regarding the "re-
past due obligation" of McAdore International Palace. However, it reported that respondent,
the President and Chairman of MC Adore International Palace, was presently abroad
negotiating for a big loan. Thus, he was requesting for an extension of the due date of the
obligation until respondent's arrival on or before 31 July 1979.
The next letter, 6 6 dated 21 June 1979, was signed by respondent herself and
addressed to Mr. Bobby Mendoza, a Manager of petitioner FNCB Finance. Respondent wrote
therein —
Re: PN No. 20138 for P500,000.00 & PN No. 20139 for
P500,000.00 totalling P1 Million, both PNs will mature on
9/3/1979.
This is to authorize you to release the accrued quarterly interests payment

from my captioned placements and forward directly to Citibank, Manila Attention:
Mr. F. A. Tan, Manager, to apply to my interest payable on my outstanding loan with
Citibank.
Please note that the captioned two placements are continuously

pledged/hypothecated to Citibank, Manila to support my personal outstanding loan.
Therefore, please do not release the captioned placements upon maturity until you
have received the instruction from Citibank, Manila.
On even date, respondent sent another letter 6 7 to Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank,
stating that —
Re: S/A No. 25-225928
and C/A No. 484-946
This letter serves as an authority to debit whatever the outstanding balance

from my captioned accounts and credit the amount to my loan outstanding account
with you.
Unlike respondent's earlier letters, both letters, dated 21 June 1979, are printed on plain
paper, without the letterhead of her company, MC Adore International Palace.
By 5 September 1979, respondent's outstanding and past due obligations to
petitioner Citibank totaled P2,123,843.20, representing the principal amounts plus interests.
Relying on respondent's Deeds of Assignment, petitioner Citibank applied the proceeds of
respondent's money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance, as well as her deposit
account with petitioner Citibank, to partly liquidate respondent's outstanding loan balance, 6 8
as follows —
Respondent's outstanding obligation (principal and interest) P2,123,843.20

Less:Proceeds from respondent's money market placements
with petitioner FNCB Finance (principal and interest) (1,022,916.66)
Deposits in respondent's bank accounts with petitioner
Citibank (31,079.14)
––––––––––––
Balance of respondent's obligation P1,069,847.40
==========
Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank subsequently sent a letter, 6 9 dated 28 September 1979,
notifying respondent of the status of her loans and the foregoing compensation which
petitioner Citibank effected. In the letter, Mr. Tan informed respondent that she still had a
remaining past-due obligation in the amount of P1,069,847.40, as of 5 September 1979, and
should respondent fail to pay the amount by 15 October 1979, then petitioner Citibank shall
proceed to off-set the unpaid amount with respondent's other collateral, particularly, a
money market placement in Citibank-Hongkong.
On 5 October 1979, respondent wrote Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank, on paper bearing
the letterhead of MC Adore International Palace, as regards the P1,920,000.00 loan account
supposedly of MC Adore Finance & Investment, Inc., and requested for a statement of
account covering the principal and interest of the loan as of 31 October 1979. She stated
therein that the loan obligation shall be paid within 60 days from receipt of the statement of
account.
Almost three weeks later, or on 25 October 1979, a certain Atty. Moises Tolentino
dropped by the o ce of petitioner Citibank, with a letter, dated 9 October 1979, and printed
on paper with the letterhead of MC Adore International Palace, which authorized the bearer
thereof to represent the respondent in settling the overdue account, this time, purportedly, of
MC Adore International Palace Hotel. The letter was signed by respondent as the President
and Chairman of the Board.
Eventually, Atty. Antonio Agcaoili of Agcaoili & Associates, as counsel of petitioner
Citibank, sent a letter to respondent, dated 31 October 1979, informing her that petitioner
Citibank had effected an off-set using her account with Citibank-Geneva, in the amount of
US$149,632.99, against her "outstanding, overdue, demandable and unpaid obligation" to
petitioner Citibank. Atty. Agcaoili claimed therein that the compensation or off-set was made
pursuant to and in accordance with the provisions of Articles 1278 through 1290 of the Civil
Code. He further declared that respondent's obligation to petitioner Citibank was now fully
paid and liquidated. aEDCAH
Unfortunately, on 7 October 1987, a re gutted the 7th oor of petitioner Citibank's

building at Paseo de Roxas St., Makati, Metro Manila. Petitioners submitted a Certi cation 7 0
to this effect, dated 17 January 1991, issued by the Chief of the Arson Investigation Section,
Fire District III, Makati Fire Station, Metropolitan Police Force. The 7th oor of petitioner
Citibank's building housed its Control Division, which was in charge of keeping the necessary
documents for cases in which it was involved. After compiling the documentary evidence for
the present case, Atty. Renato J. Fernandez, internal legal counsel of petitioner Citibank,
forwarded them to the Control Division. The original copies of the MCs, which supposedly
represent the proceeds of the rst set of PNs, as well as that of other documentary evidence
related to the case, were among those burned in the said fire. 7 1
Respondent's version of events
Respondent disputed petitioners' narration of the circumstances surrounding her
loans with petitioner Citibank and the alleged authority she gave for the off-set or
compensation of her money market placements and deposit accounts with petitioners
against her loan obligation.
Respondent denied outright executing the rst set of PNs, except for one (PN No.
34534 in particular). Although she admitted that she obtained several loans from petitioner
Citibank, these only amounted to P1,150,000.00, and she had already paid them. She secured
from petitioner Citibank two loans of P500,000.00 each. She executed in favor of petitioner
Citibank the corresponding PNs for the loans and the Deeds of Assignment of her money
market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance as security. 7 2 To prove payment of these
loans, respondent presented two provisional receipts of petitioner Citibank — No. 19471, 7 3
dated 11 August 1978, and No. 12723, 7 4 dated 10 November 1978 — both signed by Mr.
Tan, and acknowledging receipt from respondent of several checks in the total amount of
P500,744.00 and P500,000.00, respectively, for "liquidation of loan."
She borrowed another P150,000.00 from petitioner Citibank for personal investment,
and for which she executed PN No. 34534, on 9 January 1979. Thus, she admitted to
receiving the proceeds of this loan via MC No. 228270. She invested the loan amount in
another money market placement with petitioner FNCB Finance. In turn, she used the very
same money market placement with petitioner FNCB Finance as security for her
P150,000.00 loan from petitioner Citibank. When she failed to pay the loan when it became
due, petitioner Citibank allegedly forfeited her money market placement with petitioner FNCB
Finance and, thus, the loan was already paid. 7 5
Respondent likewise questioned the MCs presented by petitioners, except for one (MC
No. 228270 in particular), as proof that she received the proceeds of the loans covered by
the rst set of PNs. As recounted in the preceding paragraph, respondent admitted to
obtaining a loan of P150,000.00, covered by PN No. 34534, and receiving MC No. 228270
representing the proceeds thereof, but claimed that she already paid the same. She denied
ever receiving MCs No. 220701 (for the loan of P400,000.00, covered by PN No. 33935) and
No. 226467 (for the loan of P250,000.00, covered by PN No. 34079), and pointed out that
the checks did not bear her indorsements. She did not deny receiving all other checks but
she interposed that she received these checks, not as proceeds of loans, but as payment of
the principal amounts and/or interests from her money market placements with petitioner
Citibank. She also raised doubts as to the notation on each of the checks that reads "RE:
Proceeds of PN#[corresponding PN No.]," saying that such notation did not appear on the
MCs when she originally received them and that the notation appears to have been written by
a typewriter different from that used in writing all other information on the checks (i.e., date,
payee, and amount). 7 6 She even testi ed that MCs were not supposed to bear notations
indicating the purpose for which they were issued.
As to the second set of PNs, respondent acknowledged having signed them all.
However, she asserted that she only executed these PNs as part of the simulated loans she
and Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank concocted. Respondent explained that she had a pending
loan application for a big amount with the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), and
when Mr. Tan found out about this, he suggested that they could make it appear that the
respondent had outstanding loans with petitioner Citibank and the latter was already
demanding payment thereof; this might persuade DBP to approve respondent's loan
application. Mr. Tan made the respondent sign the second set of PNs, so that he may have
something to show the DBP investigator who might inquire with petitioner Citibank as to
respondent's loans with the latter. On her own copies of the said PNs, respondent wrote by
hand the notation, "This isa (sic) simulated non-negotiable note, signed copy given to Mr.
Tan., (sic) per agreement to be shown to DBP representative. itwill (sic) be returned to me if
the P11=M (sic) loan for MC Adore Palace Hotel is approved by DBP." 7 7
Findings of this Court as to the existence of the loans
After going through the testimonial and documentary evidence presented by both
sides to this case, it is this Court's assessment that respondent did indeed have outstanding
loans with petitioner Citibank at the time it effected the off-set or compensation on 25 July
1979 (using respondent's savings deposit with petitioner Citibank), 5 September 1979
(using the proceeds of respondent's money market placements with petitioner FNCB
Finance) and 26 October 1979 (using respondent's dollar accounts remitted from Citibank-
Geneva). The totality of petitioners' evidence as to the existence of the said loans
preponderates over respondent's. Preponderant evidence means that, as a whole, the
evidence adduced by one side outweighs that of the adverse party. 7 8
Respondent's outstanding obligation for P1,920,000.00 had been su ciently
documented by petitioner Citibank.
The second set of PNs is a mere renewal of the prior loans originally covered by the
rst set of PNs, except for PN No. 34534. The rst set of PNs is supported, in turn, by the
existence of the MCs that represent the proceeds thereof received by the respondent. AaEcHC
It bears to emphasize that the proceeds of the loans were paid to respondent in MCs,
with the respondent speci cally named as payee. MCs checks are drawn by the bank's
manager upon the bank itself and regarded to be as good as the money it represents. 7 9
Moreover, the MCs were crossed checks, with the words "Payee's Account Only."
In general, a crossed check cannot be presented to the drawee bank for payment in
cash. Instead, the check can only be deposited with the payee's bank which, in turn, must
present it for payment against the drawee bank in the course of normal banking hours. The
crossed check cannot be presented for payment, but it can only be deposited and the
drawee bank may only pay to another bank in the payee's or indorser's account. 8 0 The effect
of crossing a check was described by this Court in Philippine Commercial International Bank
v. Court of Appeals 8 1 —
[T]he crossing of a check with the phrase "Payee's Account Only" is a warning
that the check should be deposited in the account of the payee. Thus, it is the duty
of the collecting bank PCI Bank to ascertain that the check be deposited in payee's
account only. It is bound to scrutinize the check and to know its depositors before it
can make the clearing indorsement "all prior indorsements and/or lack of
indorsement guaranteed."
The crossed MCs presented by petitioner Bank were indeed deposited in several
different bank accounts and cleared by the Clearing O ce of the Central Bank of the
Philippines, as evidenced by the stamp marks and notations on the said checks. The crossed
MCs are already in the possession of petitioner Citibank, the drawee bank, which was
ultimately responsible for the payment of the amount stated in the checks. Given that a
check is more than just an instrument of credit used in commercial transactions for it also
serves as a receipt or evidence for the drawee bank of the cancellation of the said check due
to payment, 8 2 then, the possession by petitioner Citibank of the said MCs, duly stamped
"Paid" gives rise to the presumption that the said MCs were already paid out to the intended
payee, who was in this case, the respondent.
This Court nds applicable herein the presumptions that private transactions have
been fair and regular, 8 3 and that the ordinary course of business has been followed. 8 4 There
is no question that the loan transaction between petitioner Citibank and the respondent is a
private transaction. The transactions revolving around the crossed MCs — from their
issuance by petitioner Citibank to respondent as payment of the proceeds of her loans; to its
deposit in respondent's accounts with several different banks; to the clearing of the MCs by
an independent clearing house; and nally, to the payment of the MCs by petitioner Citibank
as the drawee bank of the said checks — are all private transactions which shall be presumed
to have been fair and regular to all the parties concerned. In addition, the banks involved in
the foregoing transactions are also presumed to have followed the ordinary course of
business in the acceptance of the crossed MCs for deposit in respondent's accounts,
submitting them for clearing, and their eventual payment and cancellation.
The afore-stated presumptions are disputable, meaning, they are satisfactory if

uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence. 8 5 Respondent,
however, was unable to present su cient and credible evidence to dispute these
presumptions.
It should be recalled that out of the nine MCs presented by petitioner Citibank,
respondent admitted to receiving one as proceeds of a loan (MC No. 228270), denied
receiving two (MCs No. 220701 and 226467), and admitted to receiving all the rest, but not
as proceeds of her loans, but as return on the principal amounts and interests from her
money market placements.
Respondent admitted receiving MC No. 228270 representing the proceeds of her loan
covered by PN No. 34534. Although the principal amount of the loan is P150,000.00,
respondent only received P146,312.50, because the interest and handling fee on the loan
transaction were already deducted therefrom. 8 6 Stamps and notations at the back of MC
No. 228270 reveal that it was deposited at the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), Cubao
Branch, in Account No. 0123-0572-28. 8 7 The check also bore the signature of respondent at
the back. 8 8 And, although respondent would later admit that she did sign PN No. 34534 and
received MC No. 228270 as proceeds of the loan extended to her by petitioner Citibank, she
contradicted herself when, in an earlier testimony, she claimed that PN No. 34534 was
among the PNs she executed as simulated loans with petitioner Citibank. 8 9
Respondent denied ever receiving MCs No. 220701 and 226467. However,
considering that the said checks were crossed for payee's account only, and that they were
actually deposited, cleared, and paid, then the presumption would be that the said checks
were properly deposited to the account of respondent, who was clearly named the payee in
the checks. Respondent's bare allegations that she did not receive the two checks fail to
convince this Court, for to sustain her, would be for this Court to conclude that an irregularity
had occurred somewhere from the time of the issuance of the said checks, to their deposit,
clearance, and payment, and which would have involved not only petitioner Citibank, but also
BPI, which accepted the checks for deposit, and the Central Bank of the Philippines, which
cleared the checks. It falls upon the respondent to overcome or dispute the presumption
that the crossed checks were issued, accepted for deposit, cleared, and paid for by the
banks involved following the ordinary course of their business.
The mere fact that MCs No. 220701 and 226467 do not bear respondent's signature
at the back does not negate deposit thereof in her account. The liability for the lack of
indorsement on the MCs no longer fall on petitioner Citibank, but on the bank who received
the same for deposit, in this case, BPI Cubao Branch. Once again, it must be noted that the
MCs were crossed, for payee's account only, and the payee named in both checks was none
other than respondent. The crossing of the MCs was already a warning to BPI to receive said
checks for deposit only in respondent's account. It was up to BPI to verify whether it was
receiving the crossed MCs in accordance with the instructions on the face thereof. If, indeed,
the MCs were deposited in accounts other than respondent's, then the respondent would
have a cause of action against BPI. 9 0
BPI further stamped its guarantee on the back of the checks to the effect that, "All
prior endorsement and/or Lack of endorsement guaranteed." Thus, BPI became the indorser
of the MCs, and assumed all the warranties of an indorser, 9 1 speci cally, that the checks
were genuine and in all respects what they purported to be; that it had a good title to the
checks; that all prior parties had capacity to contract; and that the checks were, at the time
of their indorsement, valid and subsisting. 9 2 So even if the MCs deposited by BPI's client,
whether it be by respondent herself or some other person, lacked the necessary
indorsement, BPI, as the collecting bank, is bound by its warranties as an indorser and
cannot set up the defense of lack of indorsement as against petitioner Citibank, the drawee
bank. 9 3
Furthermore, respondent's bare and unsubstantiated denial of receipt of the MCs in
question and their deposit in her account is rendered suspect when MC No. 220701 was
actually deposited in Account No. 0123-0572-28 of BPI Cubao Branch, the very same
account in which MC No. 228270 (which respondent admitted to receiving as proceeds of
her loan from petitioner Citibank), and MCs No. 228203, 228357, and 228400 (which
respondent admitted to receiving as proceeds from her money market placements) were
deposited. Likewise, MC No. 226467 was deposited in Account No. 0121-002-43 of BPI
Cubao Branch, to which MCs No. 226285 and 226439 (which respondent admitted to
receiving as proceeds from her money market placements) were deposited. It is an apparent
contradiction for respondent to claim having received the proceeds of checks deposited in
an account, and then deny receiving the proceeds of another check deposited in the very
same account. HDCTAc
Another inconsistency in respondent's denial of receipt of MC No. 226467 and her

deposit of the same in her account, is her presentation of Exhibit "HHH," a provisional receipt
which was supposed to prove that respondent turned over P500,000.00 to Mr. Tan of
petitioner Citibank, that the said amount was split into three money market placements, and
that MC No. 226467 represented the return on her investment from one of these
placements. 9 4 Because of her Exhibit "HHH," respondent effectively admitted receipt of MC
No. 226467, although for reasons other than as proceeds of a loan.
Neither can this Court give credence to respondent's contention that the notations on
the MCs, stating that they were the proceeds of particular PNs, were not there when she
received the checks and that the notations appeared to be written by a typewriter different
from that used to write the other information on the checks. Once more, respondent's
allegations were uncorroborated by any other evidence. Her and her counsel's observation
that the notations on the MCs appear to be written by a typewriter different from that used
to write the other information on the checks hardly convinces this Court considering that it
constitutes a mere opinion on the appearance of the notation by a witness who does not
possess the necessary expertise on the matter. In addition, the notations on the MCs were
written using both capital and small letters, while the other information on the checks were
written using capital letters only, such difference could easily confuse an untrained eye and
lead to a hasty conclusion that they were written by different typewriters.
Respondent's testimony, that based on her experience transacting with banks, the
MCs were not supposed to include notations on the purpose for which the checks were
issued, also deserves scant consideration. While respondent may have extensive experience
dealing with banks, it still does not qualify her as a competent witness on banking
procedures and practices. Her testimony on this matter is even belied by the fact that the
other MCs issued by petitioner Citibank (when it was still named First National City Bank)
and by petitioner FNCB Finance, the existence and validity of which were not disputed by
respondent, also bear similar notations that state the reason for which they were issued.
Respondent presented several more pieces of evidence to substantiate her claim that
she received MCs No. 226285, 226439, 226467, 226057, 228357, and 228400, not as
proceeds of her loans from petitioner Citibank, but as the return of the principal amounts and
payment of interests from her money market placements with petitioners. Part of
respondent's exhibits were personal checks 9 5 drawn by respondent on her account with
Feati Bank & Trust Co., which she allegedly invested in separate money market placements
with both petitioners, the returns from which were paid to her via MCs No. 226285 and
228400. Yet, to this Court, the personal checks only managed to establish respondent's
issuance thereof, but there was nothing on the face of the checks that would reveal the
purpose for which they were issued and that they were actually invested in money market
placements as respondent claimed.
Respondent further submitted handwritten notes that purportedly computed and
presented the returns on her money market placements, corresponding to the amount stated
in the MCs she received from petitioner Citibank. Exhibit "HHH-1" 9 6 was a handwritten note,
which respondent attributed to Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank, showing the breakdown of her
BPI Check for P500,000.00 into three different money market placements with petitioner
Citibank. This Court, however, noticed several factors which render the note highly suspect.
One, it was written on the reversed side of Provisional Receipt No. 12724 of petitioner
Citibank which bore the initials of Mr. Tan acknowledging receipt of respondent's BPI Check
No. 120989 for P500,000.00; but the initials on the handwritten note appeared to be that of
Mr. Bobby Mendoza of petitioner FNCB Finance. 9 7 Second, according to Provisional Receipt
No. 12724, BPI Check No. 120989 for P500,000.00 was supposed to be invested in three
money market placements with petitioner Citibank for the period of 60 days. Since all these
money market placements were made through one check deposited on the same day, 10
November 1978, it made no sense that the handwritten note at the back of Provisional
Receipt No. 12724 provided for different dates of maturity for each of the money market
placements (i.e., 16 November 1978, 17 January 1979, and 21 November 1978), and such
dates did not correspond to the 60 day placement period stated on the face of the
provisional receipt. And third, the principal amounts of the money market placements as
stated in the handwritten note — P145,000.00, P145,000.00 and P242,000.00 — totaled
P532,000.00, and was obviously in excess of the P500,000.00 acknowledged on the face of
Provisional Receipt No. 12724.
Exhibits "III" and "III-1," the front and bank pages of a handwritten note of Mr. Bobby
Mendoza of petitioner FNCB Finance, 9 8 also did not deserve much evidentiary weight, and
this Court cannot rely on the truth and accuracy of the computations presented therein. Mr.
Mendoza was not presented as a witness during the trial before the RTC, so that the
document was not properly authenticated nor its contents su ciently explained. No one was
able to competently identify whether the initials as appearing on the note were actually Mr.
Mendoza's.
Also, going by the information on the front page of the note, this Court observes that
payment of respondent's alleged money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance
were made using Citytrust Checks; the MCs in question, including MC No. 228057, were
issued by petitioner Citibank. Although Citytrust (formerly Feati Bank & Trust Co.), petitioner
FNCB Finance, and petitioner Citibank may be a liates of one another, they each remained
separate and distinct corporations, each having its own nancial system and records. Thus,
this Court cannot simply assume that one corporation, such as petitioner Citibank or
Citytrust, can issue a check to discharge an obligation of petitioner FNCB Finance. It should
be recalled that when petitioner FNCB Finance paid for respondent's money market
placements, covered by its PNs No. 8167 and 8169, as well as PNs No. 20138 and 20139,
petitioner FNCB Finance issued its own checks. cCSHET
As a last point on this matter, if respondent truly had money market placements with
petitioners, then these would have been evidenced by PNs issued by either petitioner
Citibank or petitioner FNCB Finance, acknowledging the principal amounts of the
investments, and stating the applicable interest rates, as well as the dates of their of
issuance and maturity. After respondent had so meticulously reconstructed her other money
market placements with petitioners and consolidated the documentary evidence thereon,
she came surprisingly short of offering similar details and substantiation for these particular
money market placements.
Since this Court is satis ed that respondent indeed received the proceeds of the rst
set of PNs, then it proceeds to analyze her evidence of payment thereof.
In support of respondent's assertion that she had already paid whatever loans she
may have had with petitioner Citibank, she presented as evidence Provisional Receipts No.
19471, dated 11 August 1978, and No. 12723, dated 10 November 1978, both of petitioner
Citibank and signed by Mr. Tan, for the amounts of P500,744.00 and P500,000.00,
respectively. While these provisional receipts did state that Mr. Tan, on behalf of petitioner
Citibank, received respondent's checks as payment for her loans, they failed to speci cally
identify which loans were actually paid. Petitioner Citibank was able to present evidence that
respondent had executed several PNs in the years 1978 and 1979 to cover the loans she
secured from the said bank. Petitioner Citibank did admit that respondent was able to pay
for some of these PNs, and what it identi ed as the rst and second sets of PNs were only
those which remained unpaid. It thus became incumbent upon respondent to prove that the
checks received by Mr. Tan were actually applied to the PNs in either the rst or second set;
a fact that, unfortunately, cannot be determined from the provisional receipts submitted by
respondent since they only generally stated that the checks received by Mr. Tan were
payment for respondent's loans.
Mr. Tan, in his deposition, further explained that provisional receipts were issued when
payment to the bank was made using checks, since the checks would still be subject to
clearing. The purpose for the provisional receipts was merely to acknowledge the delivery of
the checks to the possession of the bank, but not yet of payment. 9 9 This bank practice nds
legitimacy in the pronouncement of this Court that a check, whether an MC or an ordinary
check, is not legal tender and, therefore, cannot constitute valid tender of payment. In
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 1 0 0 this Court elucidated that:
Since a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money,
the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment (Sec. 189,
Act 2031 on Negs. Insts.; Art. 1249, Civil Code; Bryan Landon Co. v. American Bank ,
7 Phil. 255; Tan Sunco, v. Santos , 9 Phil. 44; 21 R.C.L. 60, 61). A check, whether a
manager's check or ordinary check, is not legal tender, and an offer of a check in
payment of a debt is not a valid tender of payment and may be refused receipt by
the obligee or creditor. Mere delivery of checks does not discharge the obligation
under a judgment. The obligation is not extinguished and remains suspended until
the payment by commercial document is actually realized (Art. 1249, Civil Code, par.
3).
In the case at bar, the issuance of an o cial receipt by petitioner Citibank would have
been dependent on whether the checks delivered by respondent were actually cleared and
paid for by the drawee banks.
As for PN No. 34534, respondent asserted payment thereof at two separate instances
by two different means. In her formal offer of exhibits, respondent submitted a deposit slip
of petitioner Citibank, dated 11 August 1978, evidencing the deposit of BPI Check No. 5785
for P150,000.00. 1 0 1 In her Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits, dated 7 July 1989,
respondent stated that the purpose for the presentation of the said deposit slip was to
prove that she already paid her loan covered by PN No. 34534. 1 0 2 In her testimony before
the RTC three years later, on 28 November 1991, she changed her story. This time she
narrated that the loan covered by PN No. 34534 was secured by her money market
placement with petitioner FNCB Finance, and when she failed to pay the said PN when it
became due, the security was applied to the loan, therefore, the loan was considered paid.
1 0 3 Given the foregoing, respondent's assertion of payment of PN No. 34534 is extremely
dubious.
According to petitioner Citibank, the PNs in the second set, except for PN No. 34534,
were mere renewals of the unpaid PNs in the rst set, which was why the PNs stated that
they were for the purpose of liquidating existing obligations. PN No. 34534, however, which
was part of the rst set, was still valid and subsisting and so it was included in the second
set without need for its renewal, and it still being the original PN for that particular loan, its
stated purpose was for personal investment. 1 0 4 Respondent essentially admitted executing
the second set of PNs, but they were only meant to cover simulated loans. Mr. Tan
supposedly convinced her that her pending loan application with DBP would have a greater
chance of being approved if they made it appear that respondent urgently needed the money
because petitioner Citibank was already demanding payment for her simulated loans.
Respondent's defense of simulated loans to escape liability for the second set of PNs
is truly a novel one. It is regrettable, however, that she was unable to substantiate the same.
Yet again, respondent's version of events is totally based on her own uncorroborated
testimony. The notations on the second set of PNs, that they were non-negotiable simulated
notes, were admittedly made by respondent herself and were, thus, self-serving. Equally self-
serving was respondent's letter, written on 7 October 1985, or more than six years after the
execution of the second set of PNs, in which she demanded return of the simulated or
ctitious PNs, together with the letters relating thereto, which Mr. Tan purportedly asked her
to execute. Respondent further failed to present any proof of her alleged loan application
with the DBP, and of any circumstance or correspondence wherein the simulated or ctitious
PNs were indeed used for their supposed purpose. EcTDCI
In contrast, petitioner Citibank, as supported by the testimonies of its o cers and

available documentation, consistently treated the said PNs as regular loans — accepted,
approved, and paid in the ordinary course of its business.
The PNs executed by the respondent in favor of petitioner Citibank to cover her loans
were duly- lled out and signed, including the disclosure statement found at the back of the
said PNs, in adherence to the Central Bank requirement to disclose the full nance charges
to a loan granted to borrowers.
Mr. Tan, then an account o cer with the Marketing Department of petitioner Citibank,
testi ed that he dealt directly with respondent; he facilitated the loans; and the PNs, at least
in the second set, were signed by respondent in his presence. 1 0 5
Mr. Pujeda, the o cer who was previously in charge of loans and placements,
con rmed that the signatures on the PNs were veri ed against respondent's specimen
signature with the bank. 1 0 6
Ms. Cristina Dondoyano, who worked at petitioner Citibank as a loan processor, was
responsible for booking respondent's loans. Booking the loans means recording it in the
General Ledger. She explained the procedure for booking loans, as follows: The account
o cer, in the Marketing Department, deals directly with the clients who wish to borrow
money from petitioner Citibank. The Marketing Department will forward a loan booking
checklist, together with the borrowing client's PNs and other supporting documents, to the
loan pre-processor, who will check whether the details in the loan booking checklist are the
same as those in the PNs. The documents are then sent to Signature Control for veri cation
of the client's signature in the PNs, after which, they are returned to the loan pre-processor,
to be forwarded nally to the loan processor. The loan processor shall book the loan in the
General Ledger, indicating therein the client name, loan amount, interest rate, maturity date,
and the corresponding PN number. Since she booked respondent's loans personally, Ms.
Dondoyano testi ed that she saw the original PNs. In 1986, Atty. Fernandez of petitioner
Citibank requested her to prepare an accounting of respondent's loans, which she did, and
which was presented as Exhibit "120" for the petitioners. The gures from the said exhibit
were culled from the bookings in the General Ledger, a fact which respondent's counsel was
even willing to stipulate. 1 0 7
Ms. Teresita Glorioso was an Investigation and Reconcilement Clerk at the Control
Department of petitioner Citibank. She was presented by petitioner Citibank to expound on
the micro lming procedure at the bank, since most of the copies of the PNs were retrieved
from microfilm. Microfilming of the documents are actually done by people at the Operations
Department. At the end of the day or during the day, the original copies of all bank
documents, not just those pertaining to loans, are micro lmed. She refuted the possibility
that insertions could be made in the micro lm because the micro lm is inserted in a
cassette; the cassette is placed in the micro lm machine for use; at the end of the day, the
cassette is taken out of the micro lm machine and put in a safe vault; and the cassette is
returned to the machine only the following day for use, until the spool is full. This is the
micro lming procedure followed everyday. When the micro lm spool is already full, the
micro lm is developed, then sent to the Control Department, which double checks the
contents of the micro lms against the entries in the General Ledger. The Control Department
also conducts a random comparison of the contents of the micro lms with the original
documents; a random review of the contents is done on every role of microfilm. 1 0 8
Ms. Renee Rubio worked for petitioner Citibank for 20 years. She rose from the ranks,
initially working as a secretary in the Personnel Group; then as a secretary to the Personnel
Group Head; a Service Assistant with the Marketing Group, in 1972 to 1974, dealing directly
with corporate and individual clients who, among other things, secured loans from petitioner
Citibank; the Head of the Collection Group of the Foreign Department in 1974 to 1976; the
Head of the Money Transfer Unit in 1976 to 1978; the Head of the Loans and Placements
Unit up to the early 1980s; and, thereafter, she established operations training for petitioner
Citibank in the Asia-Pacific Region responsible for the training of the officers of the bank. She
testi ed on the standard loan application process at petitioner Citibank. According to Ms.
Rubio, the account o cer or marketing person submits a proposal to grant a loan to an
individual or corporation. Petitioner Citibank has a worldwide policy that requires a credit
committee, composed of a minimum of three people, which would approve the loan and
amount thereof. There can be no instance when only one o cer has the power to approve
the loan application. When the loan is approved, the account o cer in charge will obtain the
corresponding PNs from the client. The PNs are sent to the signature veri er who would
validate the signatures therein against those appearing in the signature cards previously
submitted by the client to the bank. The Operations Unit will check and review the
documents, including the PNs, if it is a clean loan, and securities and deposits, if it is
collateralized. The loan is then recorded in the General Ledger. The Loans and Placements
Department will not book the loans without the PNs. When the PNs are liquidated, whether
they are paid or rolled-over, they are returned to the client. 1 0 9 Ms. Rubio further explained
that she was familiar with respondent's accounts since, while she was still the Head of the
Loan and Placements Unit, she was asked by Mr. Tan to prepare a list of respondent's
outstanding obligations. 1 1 0 She thus calculated respondent's outstanding loans, which was
sent as an attachment to Mr. Tan's letter to respondent, dated 28 September 1979, and
presented before the RTC as Exhibits "34-B" and "34-C." 1 1 1
Lastly, the exchange of letters between petitioner Citibank and respondent, as well as
the letters sent by other people working for respondent, had consistently recognized that
respondent owed petitioner Citibank money.
In consideration of the foregoing discussion, this Court nds that the preponderance
of evidence supports the existence of the respondent's loans, in the principal sum of
P1,920,000.00, as of 5 September 1979. While it is well-settled that the term "preponderance
of evidence" should not be wholly dependent on the number of witnesses, there are certain
instances when the number of witnesses become the determining factor —
The preponderance of evidence may be determined, under certain conditions,
by the number of witnesses testifying to a particular fact or state of facts. For
instance, one or two witnesses may testify to a given state of facts, and six or seven
witnesses of equal candor, fairness, intelligence, and truthfulness, and equally well
corroborated by all the remaining evidence, who have no greater interest in the result
of the suit, testify against such state of facts. Then the preponderance of evidence
is determined by the number of witnesses. (Wilcox vs. Hines, 100 Tenn. 524, 66 Am.
St. Rep., 761.) 1 1 2
Best evidence rule

This Court disagrees in the pronouncement made by the Court of Appeals summarily
dismissing the documentary evidence submitted by petitioners based on its broad and
indiscriminate application of the best evidence rule.
In general, the best evidence rule requires that the highest available degree of proof
must be produced. Accordingly, for documentary evidence, the contents of a document are
best proved by the production of the document itself, 1 1 3 to the exclusion of any secondary
or substitutionary evidence. 1 1 4
The best evidence rule has been made part of the revised Rules of Court, Rule 130,
Section 3, which reads —
SEC. 3. Original document must be produced; exceptions. — When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced
in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party
against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after
reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents
which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to
be established from them is only the general result of the whole; and ISADET
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public o cer
or is recorded in a public office.
As the afore-quoted provision states, the best evidence rule applies only when the subject
of the inquiry is the contents of the document. The scope of the rule is more extensively
explained thus —
But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule applies
only when the content of such document is the subject of the inquiry. Where the
issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists, or on
the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule
does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible (5 Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-66; 4
Martin, op. cit., p. 78). Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible
without need for accounting for the original.
Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or condition it is
offered not as documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol evidence of the fact of
execution of the documents is allowed (Hernaez, et al. vs. McGrath, etc., et al., 91
Phil 565). . . . 1 1 5
In Estrada v. Desierto, 1 1 6 this Court had occasion to rule that —

It is true that the Court relied not upon the original but only copy of the
Angara Diary as published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer on February 4-6, 2001. In
doing so, the Court, did not, however, violate the best evidence rule. Wigmore , in his
book on evidence, states that:
"Production of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court's
discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona de dispute
the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by
requiring production.
xxx xxx xxx
"In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been

abandoned, for certain documents in which ordinarily no real dispute arised. This
measure is a sensible and progressive one and deserves universal adoption (post,
sec. 1233). Its essential feature is that a copy may be used unconditionally, if the
opponent has been given an opportunity to inspect it." (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court did not violate the best evidence rule when it considered and weighed in
evidence the photocopies and micro lm copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters submitted by
the petitioners to establish the existence of respondent's loans. The terms or contents of
these documents were never the point of contention in the Petition at bar. It was
respondent's position that the PNs in the first set (with the exception of PN No. 34534) never
existed, while the PNs in the second set (again, excluding PN No. 34534) were merely
executed to cover simulated loan transactions. As for the MCs representing the proceeds of
the loans, the respondent either denied receipt of certain MCs or admitted receipt of the
other MCs but for another purpose. Respondent further admitted the letters she wrote
personally or through her representatives to Mr. Tan of petitioner Citibank acknowledging
the loans, except that she claimed that these letters were just meant to keep up the ruse of
the simulated loans. Thus, respondent questioned the documents as to their existence or
execution, or when the former is admitted, as to the purpose for which the documents were
executed, matters which are, undoubtedly, external to the documents, and which had nothing
to do with the contents thereof.
Alternatively, even if it is granted that the best evidence rule should apply to the
evidence presented by petitioners regarding the existence of respondent's loans, it should be
borne in mind that the rule admits of the following exceptions under Rule 130, Section 5 of
the revised Rules of Court —
SEC. 5. When the original document is unavailable. — When the original

document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror,
upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without
bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents
in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.
The execution or existence of the original copies of the documents was established
through the testimonies of witnesses, such as Mr. Tan, before whom most of the documents
were personally executed by respondent. The original PNs also went through the whole loan
booking system of petitioner Citibank — from the account o cer in its Marketing
Department, to the pre-processor, to the signature veri er, back to the pre-processor, then to
the processor for booking. 1 1 7 The original PNs were seen by Ms. Dondoyano, the processor,
who recorded them in the General Ledger. Mr. Pujeda personally saw the original MCs,
proving respondent's receipt of the proceeds of her loans from petitioner Citibank, when he
helped Attys. Cleofe and Fernandez, the bank's legal counsels, to reconstruct the records of
respondent's loans. The original MCs were presented to Atty. Cleofe who used the same
during the preliminary investigation of the case, sometime in years 1986-1987. The original
MCs were subsequently turned over to the Control and Investigation Division of petitioner
Citibank. 1 1 8
It was only petitioner FNCB Finance who claimed that they lost the original copies of
the PNs when it moved to a new o ce. Citibank did not make a similar contention; instead, it
explained that the original copies of the PNs were returned to the borrower upon liquidation
of the loan, either through payment or roll-over. Petitioner Citibank proffered the excuse that
they were still looking for the documents in their storage or warehouse to explain the delay
and di culty in the retrieval thereof, but not their absence or loss. The original documents in
this case, such as the MCs and letters, were destroyed and, thus, unavailable for presentation
before the RTC only on 7 October 1987, when a re broke out on the 7th oor of the o ce
building of petitioner Citibank. There is no showing that the re was intentionally set. The re
destroyed relevant documents, not just of the present case, but also of other cases, since the
7th oor housed the Control and Investigation Division, in charge of keeping the necessary
documents for cases in which petitioner Citibank was involved.
The foregoing would have been su cient to allow the presentation of photocopies or
micro lm copies of the PNs, MCs, and letters by the petitioners as secondary evidence to
establish the existence of respondent's loans, as an exception to the best evidence rule. HcDaAI
The impact of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in the Dy case

In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals made the following pronouncement —
Besides, We find the declaration and conclusions of this Court in CA-G.R. CV
No. 15934 entitled Sps. Dr. Ricardo L. Dy and Rosalind O. Dy vs. City Bank, N.A., et
al, promulgated on 15 January 1990, as disturbing taking into consideration the
similarities of the fraud, machinations, and deceits employed by the defendant-
appellant Citibank and its Account Manager Francisco Tan.
Worthy of note is the fact that Our declarations and conclusions against
Citibank and the person of Francisco Tan in CA-G.R. CV No. 15934 were a rmed
in toto by the Highest Magistrate in a Minute Resolution dated 22 August 1990
entitled Citibank, N.A., vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. 93350.
As the factual milieu of the present appeal created reasonable doubts as to

whether the nine (9) Promissory Notes were indeed executed with considerations,
the doubts, coupled by the ndings and conclusions of this Court in CA-G.R. CV
No. 15934 and the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 93350 . should be construed
against herein defendants-appellants Citibank and FNCB Finance.
What this Court truly nds disturbing is the signi cance given by the Court of Appeals
in its assailed Decision to the Decision 1 1 9 of its Third Division in CA-G.R. CV No. 15934 (or
the Dy case), when there is an absolute lack of legal basis for doing such.
Although petitioner Citibank and its o cer, Mr. Tan, were also involved in the Dy case,
that is about the only connection between the Dy case and the one at bar. Not only did the Dy
case tackle transactions between parties other than the parties presently before this Court,
but the transactions are absolutely independent and unrelated to those in the instant
Petition.
In the Dy case, Severino Chua Caedo managed to obtain loans from herein petitioner
Citibank amounting to P7,000,000.00, secured to the extent of P5,000,000.00 by a Third
Party Real Estate Mortgage of the properties of Caedo's aunt, Rosalind Dy. It turned out that
Rosalind Dy and her husband were unaware of the said loans and the mortgage of their
properties. The transactions were carried out exclusively between Caedo and Mr. Tan of
petitioner Citibank. The RTC found Mr. Tan guilty of fraud for his participation in the
questionable transactions, essentially because he allowed Caedo to take out the signature
cards, when these should have been signed by the Dy spouses personally before him.
Although the Dy spouses' signatures in the PNs and Third Party Real Estate Mortgage were
forged, they were approved by the signature veri er since the signature cards against which
they were compared to were also forged. Neither the RTC nor the Court of Appeals, however,
categorically declared Mr. Tan personally responsible for the forgeries, which, in the narration
of the facts, were more likely committed by Caedo.
In the Petition at bar, respondent dealt with Mr. Tan directly, there was no third party
involved who could have perpetrated any fraud or forgery in her loan transactions. Although
respondent attempted to raise suspicion as to the authenticity of her signatures on certain
documents, these were nothing more than naked allegations with no corroborating evidence;
worse, even her own allegations were replete with inconsistencies. She could not even
establish in what manner or under what circumstances the fraud or forgery was committed,
or how Mr. Tan could have been directly responsible for the same.
While the Court of Appeals can take judicial notice of the Decision of its Third Division
in the Dy case, it should not have given the said case much weight when it rendered the
assailed Decision, since the former does not constitute a precedent. The Court of Appeals, in
the challenged Decision, did not apply any legal argument or principle established in the Dy
case but, rather, adopted the ndings therein of wrongdoing or misconduct on the part of
herein petitioner Citibank and Mr. Tan. Any nding of wrongdoing or misconduct as against
herein petitioners should be made based on the factual background and pieces of evidence
submitted in this case, not those in another case.
It is apparent that the Court of Appeals took judicial notice of the Dy case not as a
legal precedent for the present case, but rather as evidence of similar acts committed by
petitioner Citibank and Mr. Tan. A basic rule of evidence, however, states that, "Evidence that
one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did
not do the same or similar thing at another time; but it may be received to prove a speci c
intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit, custom or usage, and the like." 1 2 0
The rationale for the rule is explained thus —
The rule is founded upon reason, public policy, justice and judicial
convenience. The fact that a person has committed the same or similar acts at
some prior time affords, as a general rule, no logical guaranty that he committed the
act in question. This is so because, subjectively, a man's mind and even his modes
of life may change; and, objectively, the conditions under which he may nd himself
at a given time may likewise change and thus induce him to act in a different way.
Besides, if evidence of similar acts are to be invariably admitted, they will give rise to
a multiplicity of collateral issues and will subject the defendant to surprise as well
as confuse the court and prolong the trial. 1 2 1
The factual backgrounds of the two cases are so different and unrelated that the Dy case
cannot be used to prove speci c intent, knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme, habit,
custom or usage on the part of petitioner Citibank or its o cer, Mr. Tan, to defraud
respondent in the present case.
IV
The liquidation of respondent's
outstanding loans were valid in so
far as petitioner Citibank used
respondent's savings account with
the bank and her money market
placements with petitioner FNCB
Finance; but illegal and void in so
far as petitioner Citibank used
respondent's dollar accounts with
Citibank-Geneva.
Savings Account with petitioner Citibank
Compensation is a recognized mode of extinguishing obligations. Relevant provisions
of the Civil Code provides —
Art. 1278. Compensation shall take place when two persons, in their own
right, are creditors and debtors of each other.
Art. 1279. In order that compensation may be proper, it is necessary;
(1) That each one of the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at
the same time a principal creditor of the other;
(2) That both debts consist in a sum of money, or if the things due are
consumable, they be of the same kind, and also of the same quality if the latter has
been stated; DISEaC
(3) That the two debts be due;
(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;
(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy,

commenced by third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor.
There is little controversy when it comes to the right of petitioner Citibank to

compensate respondent's outstanding loans with her deposit account. As already found by
this Court, petitioner Citibank was the creditor of respondent for her outstanding loans. At
the same time, respondent was the creditor of petitioner Citibank, as far as her deposit
account was concerned, since bank deposits, whether xed, savings, or current, should be
considered as simple loan or mutuum by the depositor to the banking institution. 1 2 2 Both
debts consist in sums of money. By June 1979, all of respondent's PNs in the second set had
matured and became demandable, while respondent's savings account was demandable
anytime. Neither was there any retention or controversy over the PNs and the deposit
account commenced by a third person and communicated in due time to the debtor
concerned. Compensation takes place by operation of law, 1 2 3 therefore, even in the absence
of an expressed authority from respondent, petitioner Citibank had the right to effect, on 25
June 1979, the partial compensation or off-set of respondent's outstanding loans with her
deposit account, amounting to P31,079.14.
Money market placements with FNCB Finance

Things though are not as simple and as straightforward as regards to the money
market placements and bank account used by petitioner Citibank to complete the
compensation or off-set of respondent's outstanding loans, which came from persons other
than petitioner Citibank.
Respondent's money market placements were with petitioner FNCB Finance, and after
several roll-overs, they were ultimately covered by PNs No. 20138 and 20139, which, by 3
September 1979, the date the check for the proceeds of the said PNs were issued,
amounted to P1,022,916.66, inclusive of the principal amounts and interests. As to these
money market placements, respondent was the creditor and petitioner FNCB Finance the
debtor; while, as to the outstanding loans, petitioner Citibank was the creditor and
respondent the debtor. Consequently, legal compensation, under Article 1278 of the Civil
Code, would not apply since the rst requirement for a valid compensation, that each one of
the obligors be bound principally, and that he be at the same time a principal creditor of the
other, was not met.
What petitioner Citibank actually did was to exercise its rights to the proceeds of
respondent's money market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance by virtue of the Deeds
of Assignment executed by respondent in its favor.
The Court of Appeals did not consider these Deeds of Assignment because of
petitioners' failure to produce the original copies thereof in violation of the best evidence
rule. This Court again nds itself in disagreement in the application of the best evidence rule
by the appellate court.
To recall, the best evidence rule, in so far as documentary evidence is concerned,
requires the presentation of the original copy of the document only when the context thereof
is the subject of inquiry in the case. Respondent does not question the contents of the Deeds
of Assignment. While she admitted the existence and execution of the Deeds of Assignment,
dated 2 March 1978 and 9 March 1978, covering PNs No. 8169 and 8167 issued by
petitioner FNCB Finance, she claimed, as defense, that the loans for which the said Deeds
were executed as security, were already paid. She denied ever executing both Deeds of
Assignment, dated 25 August 1978, covering PNs No. 20138 and 20139. These are again
issues collateral to the contents of the documents involved, which could be proven by
evidence other than the original copies of the said documents.
Moreover, the Deeds of Assignment of the money market placements with petitioner
FNCB Finance were notarized documents, thus, admissible in evidence. Rule 132, Section 30
of the Rules of Court provides that —
SEC. 30. Proof of notarial documents. — Every instrument duly
acknowledged or proved and certi ed as provided by law, may be presented in
evidence without further proof, the certi cate of acknowledgement being prima
facie evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved.
Signi cant herein is this Court's elucidation in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals , 1 2 4 which
reads —
On the evidentiary value of these documents, it should be recalled that the
notarization of a private document converts it into a public one and renders it
admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity (Joson vs. Baltazar, 194
SCRA 114 [1991]). This is so because a public document duly executed and entered
in the proper registry is presumed to be valid and genuine until the contrary is shown
by clear and convincing proof (Asido vs. Guzman, 57 Phil. 652 [1918]; U.S. vs.
Enriquez, 1 Phil 241 [1902]; Favor vs. Court of Appeals, 194 SCRA 308 [1991]). As
such, the party challenging the recital of the document must prove his claim with
clear and convincing evidence (Diaz vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 346 [1986]).
The rule on the evidentiary weight that must be accorded a notarized document is
clear and unambiguous. The certi cate of acknowledgement in the notarized Deeds of
Assignment constituted prima facie evidence of the execution thereof. Thus, the burden of
refuting this presumption fell on respondent. She could have presented evidence of any
defect or irregularity in the execution of the said documents 1 2 5 or raised questions as to the
verity of the notary public's acknowledgment and certi cate in the Deeds. 1 2 6 But again,
respondent admitted executing the Deeds of Assignment, dated 2 March 1978 and 9 March
1978, although claiming that the loans for which they were executed as security were already
paid. And, she assailed the Deeds of Assignment, dated 25 August 1978, with nothing more
than her bare denial of execution thereof, hardly the clear and convincing evidence required to
trounce the presumption of due execution of a notarized document. IHaSED
Petitioners not only presented the notarized Deeds of Assignment, but even secured
certi ed literal copies thereof from the National Archives. 1 2 7 Mr. Renato Medua, an archivist,
working at the Records Management and Archives O ce of the National Library, testi ed
that the copies of the Deeds presented before the RTC were certi ed literal copies of those
contained in the Notarial Registries of the notary publics concerned, which were already in
the possession of the National Archives. He also explained that he could not bring to the RTC
the Notarial Registries containing the original copies of the Deeds of Assignment, because
the Department of Justice (DOJ) Circular No. 97, dated 8 November 1968, prohibits the
bringing of original documents to the courts to prevent the loss of irreplaceable and
priceless documents. 1 2 8
Accordingly, this Court gives the Deeds of Assignment grave importance in
establishing the authority given by the respondent to petitioner Citibank to use as security
for her loans her money her market placements with petitioner FNCB Finance, represented by
PNs No. 8167 and 8169, later to be rolled-over as PNs No. 20138 and 20139. These Deeds
of Assignment constitute the law between the parties, and the obligations arising therefrom
shall have the force of law between the parties and should be complied with in good faith.
1 2 9 Standard clauses in all of the Deeds provide that —
The ASSIGNOR and the ASSIGNEE hereby further agree as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

2. In the event the OBLIGATIONS are not paid at maturity or upon
demand, as the case may be, the ASSIGNEE is fully authorized and empowered to
collect and receive the PLACEMENT (or so much thereof as may be necessary) and
apply the same in payment of the OBLIGATIONS. Furthermore, the ASSIGNOR
agrees that at any time, and from time to time, upon request by the ASSIGNEE, the
ASSIGNOR will promptly execute and deliver any and all such further instruments
and documents as may be necessary to effectuate this Assignment.
xxx xxx xxx

5. This Assignment shall be considered as su cient authority to FNCB
Finance to pay and deliver the PLACEMENT or so much thereof as may be
necessary to liquidate the OBLIGATIONS, to the ASSIGNEE in accordance with terms
and provisions hereof. 1 3 0
Petitioner Citibank was only acting upon the authority granted to it under the foregoing
Deeds when it nally used the proceeds of PNs No. 20138 and 20139, paid by petitioner
FNCB Finance, to partly pay for respondent's outstanding loans. Strictly speaking, it did not
effect a legal compensation or off-set under Article 1278 of the Civil Code, but rather, it
partly extinguished respondent's obligations through the application of the security given by
the respondent for her loans. Although the pertinent documents were entitled Deeds of
Assignment, they were, in reality, more of a pledge by respondent to petitioner Citibank of her
credit due from petitioner FNCB Finance by virtue of her money market placements with the
latter. According to Article 2118 of the Civil Code —
ART. 2118. If a credit has been pledged becomes due before it is
redeemed, the pledgee may collect and receive the amount due. He shall apply the
same to the payment of his claim, and deliver the surplus, should there be any, to
the pledgor.
PNs No. 20138 and 20139 matured on 3 September 1979, without them being
redeemed by respondent, so that petitioner Citibank collected from petitioner FNCB Finance
the proceeds thereof, which included the principal amounts and interests earned by the
money market placements, amounting to P1,022,916.66, and applied the same against
respondent's outstanding loans, leaving no surplus to be delivered to respondent.
Dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva
Despite the legal compensation of respondent's savings account and the total
application of the proceeds of PNs No. 20138 and 20139 to respondent's outstanding loans,
there still remained a balance of P1,069,847.40. Petitioner Citibank then proceeded to
applying respondent's dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva against her remaining loan
balance, pursuant to a Declaration of Pledge supposedly executed by respondent in its favor.
Certain principles of private international law should be considered herein because the
property pledged was in the possession of an entity in a foreign country, namely, Citibank-
Geneva. In the absence of any allegation and evidence presented by petitioners of the
speci c rules and laws governing the constitution of a pledge in Geneva, Switzerland, they
will be presumed to be the same as Philippine local or domestic laws; this is known as
processual presumption. 1 3 1
Upon closer scrutiny of the Declaration of Pledge, this Court nds the same
exceedingly suspicious and irregular.
First of all, it escapes this Court why petitioner Citibank took care to have the Deeds of
Assignment of the PNs notarized, yet left the Declaration of Pledge unnotarized. This Court
would think that petitioner Citibank would take greater cautionary measures with the
preparation and execution of the Declaration of Pledge because it involved respondent's "all
present and future duciary placements" with a Citibank branch in another country,
speci cally, in Geneva, Switzerland. While there is no express legal requirement that the
Declaration of Pledge had to be notarized to be effective, even so, it could not enjoy the same
prima facie presumption of due execution that is extended to notarized documents, and
petitioner Citibank must discharge the burden of proving due execution and authenticity of
the Declaration of Pledge.
Second, petitioner Citibank was unable to establish the date when the Declaration of
Pledge was actually executed. The photocopy of the Declaration of Pledge submitted by
petitioner Citibank before the RTC was undated. 1 3 2 It presented only a photocopy of the
pledge because it already forwarded the original copy thereof to Citibank-Geneva when it
requested for the remittance of respondent's dollar accounts pursuant thereto. Respondent,
on the other hand, was able to secure a copy of the Declaration of Pledge, certi ed by an
o cer of Citibank-Geneva, which bore the date 24 September 1979. 1 3 3 Respondent,
however, presented her passport and plane tickets to prove that she was out of the country
on the said date and could not have signed the pledge. Petitioner Citibank insisted that the
pledge was signed before 24 September 1979, but could not provide an explanation as to
how and why the said date was written on the pledge. Although Mr. Tan testi ed that the
Declaration of Pledge was signed by respondent personally before him, he could not give the
exact date when the said signing took place. It is important to note that the copy of the
Declaration of Pledge submitted by the respondent to the RTC was certi ed by an o cer of
Citibank-Geneva, which had possession of the original copy of the pledge. It is dated 24
September 1979, and this Court shall abide by the presumption that the written document is
truly dated. 1 3 4 Since it is undeniable that respondent was out of the country on 24
September 1979, then she could not have executed the pledge on the said date. DSCIEa
Third, the Declaration of Pledge was irregularly lled-out. The pledge was in a standard
printed form. It was constituted in favor of Citibank, N.A., otherwise referred to therein as the
Bank. It should be noted, however, that in the space which should have named the pledgor,
the name of petitioner Citibank was typewritten, to wit —
The pledge right herewith constituted shall secure all claims which the Bank
now has or in the future acquires against Citibank, N.A., Manila (full name and
address of the Debtor), regardless of the legal cause or the transaction (for example
current account, securities transactions, collections, credits, payments, documentary
credits and collections) which gives rise thereto, and including principal, all
contractual and penalty interest, commissions, charges, and costs.
The pledge, therefore, made no sense, the pledgor and pledgee being the same entity.
Was a mistake made by whoever lled-out the form? Yes, it could be a possibility.
Nonetheless, considering the value of such a document, the mistake as to a signi cant
detail in the pledge could only be committed with gross carelessness on the part of
petitioner Citibank, and raised serious doubts as to the authenticity and due execution of
the same. The Declaration of Pledge had passed through the hands of several bank
o cers in the country and abroad, yet, surprisingly and implausibly, no one noticed such a
glaring mistake.
Lastly, respondent denied that it was her signature on the Declaration of Pledge. She
claimed that the signature was a forgery. When a document is assailed on the basis of
forgery, the best evidence rule applies —
Basic is the rule of evidence that when the subject of inquiry is the contents
of a document, no evidence is admissible other than the original document itself
except in the instances mentioned in Section 3, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Mere photocopies of documents are inadmissible pursuant to the best
evidence rule. This is especially true when the issue is that of forgery .
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive

and convincing evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery.
The best evidence of a forged signature in an instrument is the instrument itself
re ecting the alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be established
by a comparison between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and
genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized upon to have been
forged. Without the original document containing the alleged forged signature, one
cannot make a de nitive comparison which would establish forgery. A comparison
based on a mere xerox copy or reproduction of the document under controversy
cannot produce reliable results. 1 3 5

Respondent made several attempts to have the original copy of the pledge produced
before the RTC so as to have it examined by experts. Yet, despite several Orders by the RTC,
1 3 6 petitioner Citibank failed to comply with the production of the original Declaration of
Pledge. It is admitted that Citibank-Geneva had possession of the original copy of the
pledge. While petitioner Citibank in Manila and its branch in Geneva may be separate and
distinct entities, they are still incontestably related, and between petitioner Citibank and
respondent, the former had more in uence and resources to convince Citibank-Geneva to
return, albeit temporarily, the original Declaration of Pledge. Petitioner Citibank did not
present any evidence to convince this Court that it had exerted diligent efforts to secure the
original copy of the pledge, nor did it proffer the reason why Citibank-Geneva obstinately
refused to give it back, when such document would have been very vital to the case of
petitioner Citibank. There is thus no justi cation to allow the presentation of a mere
photocopy of the Declaration of Pledge in lieu of the original, and the photocopy of the
pledge presented by petitioner Citibank has nil probative value. 1 3 7 In addition, even if this
Court cannot make a categorical nding that respondent's signature on the original copy of
the pledge was forged, it is persuaded that petitioner Citibank willfully suppressed the
presentation of the original document, and takes into consideration the presumption that the
evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse to petitioner Citibank if produced. 1 3 8
Without the Declaration of Pledge, petitioner Citibank had no authority to demand the
remittance of respondent's dollar accounts with Citibank-Geneva and to apply them to her
outstanding loans. It cannot effect legal compensation under Article 1278 of the Civil Code
since, petitioner Citibank itself admitted that Citibank-Geneva is a distinct and separate
entity. As for the dollar accounts, respondent was the creditor and Citibank-Geneva is the
debtor; and as for the outstanding loans, petitioner Citibank was the creditor and respondent
was the debtor. The parties in these transactions were evidently not the principal creditor of
each other.
Therefore, this Court declares that the remittance of respondent's dollar accounts
from Citibank-Geneva and the application thereof to her outstanding loans with petitioner
Citibank was illegal, and null and void. Resultantly, petitioner Citibank is obligated to return to
respondent the amount of US$149,632.99 from her Citibank-Geneva accounts, or its present
equivalent value in Philippine currency; and, at the same time, respondent continues to be
obligated to petitioner Citibank for the balance of her outstanding loans which, as of 5
September 1979, amounted to P1,069,847.40.
V
The parties shall be liable for
interests on their monetary
obligations to each other,
as determined herein.
In summary, petitioner Citibank is ordered by this Court to pay respondent the
proceeds of her money market placements, represented by PNs No. 23356 and 23357,
amounting to P318,897.34 and P203,150.00, respectively, earning an interest of 14.5% per
annum as stipulated in the PNs, 1 3 9 beginning 17 March 1977, the date of the placements.
Petitioner Citibank is also ordered to refund to respondent the amount of
US$149,632.99, or its equivalent in Philippine currency, which had been remitted from her
Citibank-Geneva accounts. These dollar accounts, consisting of two duciary placements
and current accounts with Citibank-Geneva shall continue earning their respective stipulated
interests from 26 October 1979, the date of their remittance by Citibank-Geneva to petitioner
Citibank in Manila and applied against respondent's outstanding loans.
As for respondent, she is ordered to pay petitioner Citibank the balance of her
outstanding loans, which amounted to P1,069,847.40 as of 5 September 1979. These loans
continue to earn interest, as stipulated in the corresponding PNs, from the time of their
respective maturity dates, since the supposed payment thereof using respondent's dollar
accounts from Citibank-Geneva is deemed illegal, null and void, and, thus, ineffective.
VI
Petitioner Citibank shall be liable for
damages to respondent.
Petitioners protest the award by the Court of Appeals of moral damages, exemplary
damages, and attorney's fees in favor of respondent. They argued that the RTC did not award
any damages, and respondent, in her appeal before the Court of Appeals, did not raise in
issue the absence of such. CAaSED
While it is true that the general rule is that only errors which have been stated in the
assignment of errors and properly argued in the brief shall be considered, this Court has also
recognized exceptions to the general rule, wherein it authorized the review of matters, even
those not assigned as errors in the appeal, if the consideration thereof is necessary in
arriving at a just decision of the case, and there is a close inter-relation between the omitted
assignment of error and those actually assigned and discussed by the appellant. 1 4 0 Thus,
the Court of Appeals did not err in awarding the damages when it already made ndings that
would justify and support the said award.
Although this Court appreciates the right of petitioner Citibank to effect legal
compensation of respondent's local deposits, as well as its right to the proceeds of PNs No.
20138 and 20139 by virtue of the notarized Deeds of Assignment, to partly extinguish
respondent's outstanding loans, it nds that petitioner Citibank did commit wrong when it
failed to pay and properly account for the proceeds of respondent's money market
placements, evidenced by PNs No. 23356 and 23357, and when it sought the remittance of
respondent's dollar accounts from Citibank-Geneva by virtue of a highly-suspect Declaration
of Pledge to be applied to the remaining balance of respondent's outstanding loans. It bears
to emphasize that banking is impressed with public interest and its duciary character
requires high standards of integrity and performance. 1 4 1 A bank is under the obligation to
treat the accounts of its depositors with meticulous care whether such accounts consist
only of a few hundred pesos or of millions of pesos. 1 4 2 The bank must record every single
transaction accurately, down to the last centavo, and as promptly as possible. 1 4 3 Petitioner
Citibank evidently failed to exercise the required degree of care and transparency in its
transactions with respondent, thus, resulting in the wrongful deprivation of her property.
Respondent had been deprived of substantial amounts of her investments and

deposits for more than two decades. During this span of years, respondent had found herself
in desperate need of the amounts wrongfully withheld from her. In her testimony 1 4 4 before
the RTC, respondent narrated —
Q By the way Mrs. Witness will you kindly tell us again, you said before that you
are a businesswoman, will you tell us again what are the businesses you are
engaged into [sic]?
A I am engaged in real estate. I am the owner of the Modesta Village 1 and 2 in

San Mateo, Rizal. I am also the President and Chairman of the Board of
Macador [sic] Co. and Business Inc. which operates the Macador [sic]
International Palace Hotel. I am also the President of the Macador [sic]
International Palace Hotel, and also the Treasures Home Industries, Inc.
which I am the Chairman and president of the Board and also operating
affiliated company in the name of Treasures Motor Sales engaged in car
dealers [sic] like Delta Motors, we are the dealers of the whole Northern Luzon
and I am the president of the Disto Company, Ltd., based in Hongkong
licensed in Honkong [sic] and now operating in Los Angeles, California.
Q What is the business of that Disto Company Ltd.?
A Disto Company, Ltd., is engaged in real estate and construction.
Q Aside from those businesses are you a member of any national or community
organization for social and civil activities?
A Yes sir.
Q What are those?

A I am the Vice-President of thes [sic] Subdivision Association of the Philippines
in 1976, I am also an officer of the . . . Chamber of Real Estate Business
Association; I am also an officer of the Chatholic [sic] Women's League and I
am also a member of the CMLI, I forgot the definition.
Q How about any political affiliation or government position held if any?
A I was also a candidate for Mayo last January 30, 1980.
Q Where?
A In Dagupan City, Pangasinan.

Q What else?
A I also ran as an Assemblywoman last May, 1984, Independent party in

Regional I, Pangasinan.
Q What happened to your businesses you mentioned as a result of your failure

to recover you [sic] investments and bank deposits from the defendants?
A They are not all operating, in short, I was hampered to push through the
businesses that I have.
A [sic] Of all the businesses and enterprises that you mentioned what are those that
are paralyzed and what remain inactive?
A Of all the company [sic] that I have, only the Disto Company that is now
operating in California.
Q How about your candidacy as Mayor of Dagupan, [sic] City, and later as
Assemblywoman of Region I, what happened to this?
A I won by voting but when election comes on [sic] the counting I lost and I
protested this, it is still pending and because I don't have financial resources I
was not able to push through the case. I just have it pending in the Comelec.
Q Now, do these things also affect your social and civic activities?
A Yes sir, definitely. CacISA
Q How?
A I was embarrassed because being a businesswoman I would like to inform

the Honorable Court that I was awarded as the most outstanding
businesswoman of the year in 1976 but when this money was not given back
to me I was not able to comply with the commitments that I have promised to
these associations that I am engaged into [sic], sir.
For the mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, moral shock and social
humiliation suffered by the respondent, the award of moral damages is but proper.
However, this Court reduces the amount thereof to P300,000.00, for the award of moral
damages is meant to compensate for the actual injury suffered by the respondent, not to
enrich her. 1 4 5
Having failed to exercise more care and prudence than a private individual in its
dealings with respondent, petitioner Citibank should be liable for exemplary damages, in the
amount of P250,000.00, in accordance with Article 2229 1 4 6 and 2234 1 4 7 of the Civil Code.
With the award of exemplary damages, then respondent shall also be entitled to an
award of attorney's fees. 1 4 8 Additionally, attorney's fees may be awarded when a party is
compelled to litigate or to incur expenses to protect his interest by reason of an unjusti ed
act of the other party. 1 4 9 In this case, an award of P200,000.00 attorney's fees shall be
satisfactory.
In contrast, this Court nds no su cient basis to award damages to petitioners.
Respondent was compelled to institute the present case in the exercise of her rights and in
the protection of her interests. In fact, although her Complaint before the RTC was not
sustained in its entirety, it did raise meritorious points and on which this Court rules in her
favor. Any injury resulting from the exercise of one's rights is damnum absque injuria. 1 5 0
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 51930, dated 26 March 2002, as already
modi ed by its Resolution, dated 20 November 2002, is hereby AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION, as follows —
1. PNs No. 23356 and 23357 are DECLARED subsisting and outstanding.
Petitioner Citibank is ORDERED to return to respondent the principal amounts of the said
PNs, amounting to Three Hundred Eighteen Thousand Eight Hundred Ninety-Seven Pesos
and Thirty-Four Centavos (P318,897.34) and Two Hundred Three Thousand One Hundred
Fifty Pesos (P203,150.00), respectively, plus the stipulated interest of Fourteen and a half
percent (14.5%) per annum, beginning 17 March 1977;
2. The remittance of One Hundred Forty-Nine Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Two US
Dollars and Ninety-Nine Cents (US$149,632.99) from respondent's Citibank-Geneva
accounts to petitioner Citibank in Manila, and the application of the same against
respondent's outstanding loans with the latter, is DECLARED illegal, null and void. Petitioner
Citibank is ORDERED to refund to respondent the said amount, or its equivalent in Philippine
currency using the exchange rate at the time of payment, plus the stipulated interest for each
of the fiduciary placements and current accounts involved, beginning 26 October 1979;
3. Petitioner Citibank is ORDERED to pay respondent moral damages in the
amount of Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00); exemplary damages in the
amount of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P250,000.00); and attorney's fees in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00); and
4. Respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner Citibank the balance of her
outstanding loans, which, from the respective dates of their maturity to 5 September 1979,
was computed to be in the sum of One Million Sixty-Nine Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-
Seven Pesos and Forty Centavos (P1,069,847.40), inclusive of interest. These outstanding
loans shall continue to earn interest, at the rates stipulated in the corresponding PNs, from 5
September 1979 until payment thereof. DTIaHE
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 165-325.

2. Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes, Jr. with Associate Justices Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr. and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; id. at 327-366.
3. Id. at 368-374.
4. TSN, Deposition of Mr. Francisco Tan, 3 September 1990, pp. 9-10.
5. Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-8.
6. Id. at 148-157.
7. Id. at 40-51.
8. Id. at 208-227.
9. Order, dated 11 December 1985, penned by Judge Ansberto P. Paredes, Records, Vol. I, p.
346.
10. Penned by Judge Manuel D. Victorio, Records, Vol. III, pp. 1607-1621.
11. Civil Case No. 11336 was raffled and re-reffled to four different Judges of the Makati RTC
before it was finally resolved. It was originally raffled to Makati RTC, Branch 140, presided
by Judge Ansberto P. Paredes. On 4 February 1987, before the termination of the re-direct
examination of herein respondent (plaintiff before the RTC), the case was transferred to
Makati RTC, Branch 57, presided by Judge Francisco X. Velez, for reasons not disclosed in
the Records. Judge Velez was able to try and hear the case until the presentation of the
evidence by herein petitioners (defendants before the RTC). Respondent again took the
stand to present rebuttal evidence, but even before she could finish her testimony, Judge
Velez inhibited himself upon petitioners' motion (Order, dated 10 April 1992, penned by
Judge Francisco X. Velez, Records, Vol. 11, p. 1085). The case was transferred to Makati
RTC, Branch 141, presided by Judge Marcelino F. Bautista, Jr. For reasons not disclosed in
the Records, Judge Manuel D. Victorio took over Makati RTC, Branch 141. After the parties
submitted their respective Memoranda, Judge Victorio declared the case submitted for
decision (Order, dated 9 December 1994, penned by Judge Manuel D. Victorio, Records, Vol.
III, p. 1602). Judge Victorio rendered his Decision in Civil Case No. 11336 on 24 August
1995 (Records, Vol. III, pp. 1607-1621).
12. Rollo, pp. 365-366.

13. Rollo of G.R. No. 152985, pp. 3-4.
14. The filing of a motion for extension does not automatically suspend the running of the
period for appeal, since the purpose of such motion is to merely ask the court to grant an
enlargement of the time fixed by law. The movant, therefore, has no right to assume that
his motion would be granted, and should check with the court as to the outcome of his
motion, so that if the same is denied, he can still perfect his appeal. (Hon. Bello and Ferrer
v. Fernando, 114 Phil. 101, 104 [1962].)
15. Rollo of G.R. No. 156132, p. 1227.
16. Rollo, p. 374.
17. Resolution, dated 29 January 2003; rollo, pp. 980-A-B.
18. Resolution, dated 23 June 2003; id. at 1311-1312.

19. Firestone Tire and Rubber Company of the Philippines v. Tempongko, 137 Phil. 239, 244
(1969); Singh v. Liberty Insurance Corp., 118 Phil. 532, 535 (1963).
20. Rollo, pp. 1443-1445.

21. See the case of Borromeo v. Court of Appeals (162 Phil. 430, 438 [1976]) wherein this
Court pronounced that a party's right to appeal shall not be affected by the perfection of
another appeal from the same decision; otherwise, it would lead to the absurd proposition
that one party may be deprived of the right to appeal from the portion of a decision against
him just because the other party who had been notified of the decision ahead had already
perfected his appeal in so far as the said decision adversely affects him. If the perfection
of an appeal by one party would not bar the right of the other party to appeal from the
same decision, then an unperfected appeal, as in the case at bar, would have far less
effect.
22. The Executive Secretary v. Gordon, 359 Phil. 266, 271 (1998).
23. Young v. John Keng Seng, 446 Phil. 823, 833 (2003).
24. Sps. Sta. Maria v. Court of Appeals, 349 Phil. 275, 282-283 (1998).
25. The Court of Appeals modified the trial court's findings and conclusions, as follows: (1)
By declaring the P1,069,847.40 alleged indebtedness of Ms. Sabeniano as non-existing for
failure of Citibank to substantiate its allegations; (2) By declaring that there are unpaid
money market placements, current accounts and savings account of Ms. Sabeniano; and
(3) The awarding of damages in favor of Ms. Sabeniano and against Citibank.
26. Supra note 11.
27. Records, Vol. III, pp. 1612-1613.
28. Penned by Associate Justice Andres B. Reyes with Associate Justices Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr. and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; rollo, p. 344.
29. Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the REVISED RULES OF COURT reads —
SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if

uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx

(m) That official duty has been regularly performed.
30. 317 Phil. 495, 501-503 (1995).
31. Records, Vol. I, p. 515.
32. 32 Phil. 476, 478-479.

33. Behn, Meyer & Co. v. Rosatzin, 5 Phil. 660, 662 (1906).
34. Jimenez v. National Labor Relations Commission, 326 Phil. 89, 95 (1996).
35. Mr. Herminio Pujeda, at the time he testified before the RTC in 1990, was already the Vice
President of petitioner Citibank.
36. Mr. Francisco Tan, at the time of his deposition in 1990, was already working as Assistant
General Manager for Dai-Chi Kangyo Bank in Hong Kong.
37. TSN, 12 March 1990, pp. 6-10.
38. Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 84 Phil. 330, 346 (1949).
39. TSN, 6 February 1990, Vol. V, pp. 16-24.
40. Exhibit "37," defendants' folder of exhibits, p. 106.

41. Exhibit "37-C," id. at 107.
42. Exhibit "37-F," id. at 108.
43. TSN, 12 March 1990, p. 13.
44. Exhibit "104-C," defendants' folder of exhibits, p. 111.
45. Exhibit "105," id. at 112.

46. Exhibit "106," id. at 114.
47. Exhibit "108," id. at 118.
48. Exhibits "112" and "119," id. at 121-A, 124.
49. Records, Vol. III, p. 1367.
50. Exhibit "34-B," petitioners' folder of exhibits, p. 102.

51. Exhibit "G," plaintiff's folder of exhibits, pp. 4-15.
52. Records, Vol. III, p. 1,562.
53. Exhibit "J," plaintiff's folder of exhibits, p. 49.
54. Exhibit "120-H," defendants' folder of exhibits, pp. 131.

55. Exhibits "1" to "9," id. at 44-52.
56. Exhibits "18" to "26," id. at 83-92.
57. Exhibit "13-E," id. at 65-67.
58. Exhibit "14-G," id. at 72-74.
59. Exhibit "15" and "Exhibit 17-D," id. at 77-78, 81-82.

60. Exhibit "38," id. at 109-110.
61. Exhibit "K-1," plaintiff's folder of exhibits, pp. 54-55.
63. Exhibit "28," id. at 94.
64. Exhibit "29," id. at 95.

65. Exhibit "30," id. at 96.
66. Exhibit "31," id. at 97.
67. Exhibit "32," id. at 98.
68. Exhibits "34-B" and "34-C," id. at 102-103.

69. Exhibit "34," id. at 100.
70. Exhibit "121," id. at 207.
71. TSN, 14 May 1991, Vol. XI, pp. 12-14.
72. TSN, 28 November 1991, Vol. XIII, pp. 5, 15, 23, 28-29.
73. Exhibit "QQQ," plaintiff's folder of exhibits, p. 117.

74. Exhibit "AAAA," id. at 124.
75. TSN, 28 November 1991, Vol. XIII, pp. 7-8, 23.
76. Id. at 16-23.

77. TSN, 7 May 1986, Vol. II, pp. 42-52; TSN, 19 May 1986, Vol. II, pp. 3-28.
78. Sarmiento v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 613, 621 (1999).
79. Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Court of Appeals, 383 Phil. 538, 553 (2000), with
reference to Tan v. Court of Appeals, 239 Phil. 310, 322 (1994).
80. Gempesaw v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92244, 9 February 1993, 218 SCRA 682, 695.
81. 403 Phil. 361, 383 (2001).
82. Moran v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105836, 7 March 1994, 230 SCRA 799, 311-312.
83. REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Section 3(p).
84. Id., Rule 131, Section 3(q).

85. Id., Section 3.
87. Exhibits "9-D" and "9-G," id. at 52.

88. Exhibit "9-F," id. at 52.
89. TSN, 19 May 1986, Vol. II, p. 10.
90. Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89802, 7 May 1992, 208 SCRA 465, 469-
471.
91. Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank v Equitable Banking Corporation, G.R. No.
74917, 20 January 1988, 157 SCRA 188, 199.
92. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, Section 66, in connection with Section 65.
93. Associated Bank v. Court of Appeals, 322 Phil. 677, 697 (1996); Associated Bank v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 89802, 7 May 1992, 208 SCRA 465, 472.
94. Plaintiff's Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits, records, Vol. I, pp. 504-505; plaintiff's
folder of exhibits, p. 110.
95. Exhibits "GGG" and "JJJ," plaintiff's folder of exhibits, pp. 109, 113.
96. Plaintiff's folder of exhibits, p. 110.
97. See the initials on Exhibit "III-1," plaintiff's folder of exhibits, p. 112.
98. Plaintiff's folder of exhibits, p. 112.
99. TSN, deposition of Mr. Francisco Tan, 3 September 1990, p. 118.
100. G.R. No. 49188, 30 January 1990, 181 SCRA 557, 568.
101. Exhibit "MMM," plaintiff's folder of exhibits, p. 115.
102. Records, Vol. I, p. 507.
103. TSN, 28 November 1991, Vol. XIII, pp. 7-8.
104. TSN, deposition of Mr. Francisco Tan, 3 September 1990, p. 96.
105. TSN, deposition of Mr. Francisco A. Tan, 3 September 1990, pp. 13-16.
106. TSN, 22 May 1990, Vol. V, pp. 31-61.
107. TSN, 7 March 1991, Vol. IX, pp. 15-19; TSN, 13 March 1991, Vol X, pp. 7-9.
108. TSN, 19 March 1991, Vol. X, pp. 17-21; TSN, 8 April 1991, Vol. X, pp. 31-34.
109. TSN, 18 April 1991, Vol. X, pp. 3-13.

110. Id. at 15-23.
111. Folder of defendants' exhibits, pp. 102-103.
112. Municipality of Moncada v. Cajuigan, 21 Phil 184, 190 (1912).

113. J.A.R. Sibal and J.N. Salazar, Jr., COMPENDIUM ON EVIDENCE 31 (4th ed., 1995).
114. F.D. Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, Vol. II, p. 571 (8th ed., 2000).
115. F.D. Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM, Vol. II, 571 (8th ed., 2000).
116. G.R. Nos. 146710-15, 3 April 2001, 356 SCRA 108, 137-138.
117. TSN, 13 March 1991, Vol X, pp. 7-9.
118. TSN, 22 May 1990, Vol. V, pp. 14-17.

119. Dr. Ricardo L. Dy and Rosalind O. Dy vs. Citibank, N.A., CA-G.R. CV No. 15934, 15
January 1990, penned by Associate Justice Nicolas P. Lapeña, Jr. with Associate Justices
Santiago M. Kapunan and Emeterio C. Cui, concurring.
120. REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 130, Section 34.
121. J.A.R. Sibal and J.N. Salazar, Jr., COMPENDIUM ON EVIDENCE 199-200 (4th ed., 1995).
122. CIVIL CODE, Article 1980; Guingona, Jr. v. City Fiscal of Manila, 213 Phil. 516,523-524
(1984).
123. CIVIL CODE, Article 1286.
124. G.R. No. 57092, 21 January 1993, 217 SCRA 307, 313-314.
125. Anachuelo v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-71391, 29 January 1987, 147
SCRA 434, 441-442.
126. Antillon v. Barcelon, 37 Phil. 148, 150-151 (1917).

127. See Exhibits "13-E, "14-G," "15-D," and "17-D," defendants' folder of exhibits, pp. 65-67, 72-
74, 77-78, 81-82.
128. TSN, 7 March 1991, Vol. IX, pp. 3-6.
129. Cuizon v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 456, 482 (1996).

130. Exhibits "13-E, "14-G," "15-D," and "17-D," defendants' folder of exhibits, pp. 65-66, 72-73,
77-78, 81-82.
131. Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 396 Phil. 383, 396 (2000).
132. Exhibit "38," defendants' folder of exhibits, pp. 109-110.
133. Exhibit "K-1," plaintiff's folder of exhibits, 54-55.
134. REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Section 3(u).
135. Heirs of Severa P. Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 360 Phil. 753, 763 (1998).
136. Order, dated 12 November 1985, penned by Judge Ansberto P. Paredes, records, Vol. I, p.
310; Order, dated 2 September 1988, id. at penned by Judge Francisco X. Velez, records,
Vol. I, p. 449; Order, dated 24 November 1988, penned by Judge Francisco X. Velez, records,
Vol. I, p. 458; Order, dated 25 April 1989, penned by Judge Francisco X. Velez, records, Vol. I,
pp. 476-477
137. Security Bank & Trust Co. v. Triumph Lumber and Construction Corporation, 361 Phil.
463, 477 (1999).
138. REVISED RULES OF COURT, Rule 131, Section 3(e).

139. The stipulated interest shall apply as indemnity for the damages incurred in the delay of
payment as provided in Article 2209 of the CIVIL CODE which reads —
ART. 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of a sum of money, and the debtor
incurs delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be
the payment of the interest agreed upon , and in the absence of a stipulation, the legal
interest, which is six percent per annum. [Emphasis supplied.]
Note, however, that the legal interest has been increased from six percent to twelve
percent per annum by virtue of Central Bank Circulars No. 416, dated 29 July 1974, and No.
905, dated 10 December 1982.
140. Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. Nos. 101181-84, 22 June 1992, 210 SCRA 222, 226-227; Ortigas, Jr. v. Lufthansa
German Airlines, G.R. No. L-28773, 30 June 1975, 64 SCRA 610, 633-634; Hernandez v.
Andal, 78 Phil. 196, 209-210 (1947).
141. THE GENERAL BANKING LAW OF 2000, Section 2.
142. Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 942, 948 (1999).
143. Simex International (Manila), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88013, 19 March 1990,
183 SCRA 360, 367; Bank of Philippine Islands vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No.
69162, 21 February 1992, 206 SCRA 408, 412-413.
144. TSN, 28 January 1986, Vol. I, pp. 5-7.

145. Tiongco v. Atty. Deguma, 375 Phil. 978, 994-995 (1999); Zenith Insurance Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85296, 14 May 1990, 185 SCRA 398, 402-403.
146. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the
public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
147. While the amount of exemplary damages need not be proved, the plaintiff must show
that he is entitled to moral, temperate or compensatory damages before the court may
consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages should be awarded. . . .
148. CIVIL CODE, Article 2208(1).
149. Ching Sen Ben vs. Court of Appeals, 373 Phil. 544, 555 (1999).
150. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 498, 531-532 (1999);
Tierra International Construction Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
88912, 3 July 1992, 211 SCRA 73, 81; Saba v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 77950, 24 August
1990, 189 SCRA 50, 55.

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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 156132. October 16, 2006.]

CITIBANK, N.A. (Formerly First National City Bank) and INVESTORS'

2. As defendant-appellant Citibank failed to establish by competent

Accordingly, the instant Urgent Motion is hereby DENIED. (Emphasis

To sustain the argument of respondent would result in an unjust and incongruous

Respondent Sabeniano did not

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by

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(People vs. Jaymalin, 214 SCRA 685, 692 [1992])

(People vs. De Paz, 212 SCRA 56, 63 [1992])

Dollar deposit with Citibank-Geneva $149,632.99

Money market placement with Citibank, evidenced by

Money market placement with Citibank, evidenced by PN

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Money market placement with FNCB Finance, evidenced

Money market placements with petitioner Citibank

12/06/1976 20773 None 01/13/1977 500,000.00 16%

A Yes, your honor.

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A She funded it directly.

04/29/1977 4952 None 06/01/1977 500,000.00 17%

09/01/1978 76962 12,833.34 Interest payment on PN#08167

US$ 30'000.-- Principal Fid. Placement

According to the foregoing computation, by 25 October 1979, respondent had a total

Principal and interests of PNs No. 20138 and 20139

According to petitioner Citibank, respondent incurred her loans under the

32935 07/20/1978 09/18/1978 P400,000.00 07/20/1978 220701

34510 01/01/1979 03/02/1979 P400,000.00

A week later or on 3 May 1979, a certain C. N. Pugeda, designated as "Executive

This is to authorize you to release the accrued quarterly interests payment

Please note that the captioned two placements are continuously

This letter serves as an authority to debit whatever the outstanding balance

Respondent's outstanding obligation (principal and interest) P2,123,843.20

Unfortunately, on 7 October 1987, a re gutted the 7th oor of petitioner Citibank's

The afore-stated presumptions are disputable, meaning, they are satisfactory if

Another inconsistency in respondent's denial of receipt of MC No. 226467 and her

In contrast, petitioner Citibank, as supported by the testimonies of its o cers and

Best evidence rule

In Estrada v. Desierto, 1 1 6 this Court had occasion to rule that —

"In several Canadian provinces, the principle of unavailability has been

SEC. 5. When the original document is unavailable. — When the original

The impact of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in the Dy case

As the factual milieu of the present appeal created reasonable doubts as to

(3) That the two debts be due;

(4) That they be liquidated and demandable;

(5) That over neither of them there be any retention or controversy,

There is little controversy when it comes to the right of petitioner Citibank to

Money market placements with FNCB Finance

The ASSIGNOR and the ASSIGNEE hereby further agree as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive

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Respondent had been deprived of substantial amounts of her investments and

A I am engaged in real estate. I am the owner of the Modesta Village 1 and 2 in

A Disto Company, Ltd., is engaged in real estate and construction.

Q What are those?

A I was also a candidate for Mayo last January 30, 1980.

A In Dagupan City, Pangasinan.

A I also ran as an Assemblywoman last May, 1984, Independent party in

Q What happened to your businesses you mentioned as a result of your failure

A Yes sir, definitely. CacISA