G.R. No.

L-59731 January 11, 1990

ALFREDO CHING, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS & PEDRO ASEDILLO, respondents.

Joaquin E. Chipeco & Lorenzo D. Fuggan for petitioners.

Edgardo Salandanan for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent Court of
Appeals (penned by Hon. Rodolfo A. Nocon with the concurrence of Hon. Crisolito Pascual and Juan
A. Sison) in CA-G.R. No. 12358-SP entitled Alfredo Ching v. Hon. M. V. Romillo, et al. which in
effect affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, now Regional Trial Court (penned
by Judge Manuel V. Romillo, Jr. then District Judge, Branch XXVII Pasay City) granting ex-parte the
cancellation of title registered in the name of Ching Leng in favor of Pedro Asedillo in Civil Case No.
6888-P entitled Pedro Asedillo v. Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng.

The facts as culled from the records disclose that:

In May 1960, Decree No. N-78716 was issued to spouses Maximo Nofuente and Dominga
Lumandan in Land Registration Case No. N-2579 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and Original
Certificate of Title No. 2433 correspondingly given by the Register of Deeds for the Province of Rizal
covering a parcel of land situated at Sitio of Kay-Biga Barrio of San Dionisio, Municipality of
Paranaque, Province of Rizal, with an area of 51,852 square meters (Exhibit "7", p. 80, CA, Rollo).

In August 1960, 5/6 portion of the property was reconveyed by said spouses to Francisco, Regina,
Perfects, Constancio and Matilde all surnamed Nofuente and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 78633
was issued on August 10, 1960 accordingly (Exhibit "8", pp. 81 and 82, Ibid.).

By virtue of a sale to Ching Leng with postal address at No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 91137 was issued on September 18, 1961 and T.C.T. No. 78633 was deemed
cancelled. (Exhibit "5-2", pp. 76-77 and 83, Ibid.).

On October 19, 1965, Ching Leng died in Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America. His
legitimate son Alfredo Ching filed with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC) Branch III,
Pasay City a petition for administration of the estate of deceased Ching Leng docketed as Sp. Proc.
No. 1956-P. Notice of hearing on the petition was duly published in the "Daily Mirror", a newspaper
of general circulation on November 23 and 30 and December 7, 1965. No oppositors appeared at
the hearing on December 16, 1965, consequently after presentation of evidence petitioner Alfredo
Ching was appointed administrator of Ching Leng's estate on December 28, 1965 and letters of
administration issued on January 3, 1966 (pp. 51-53, Rollo). The land covered by T.C.T. No. 91137
was among those included in the inventory submitted to the court (p. 75, Ibid.).

Thirteen (13) years after Ching Leng's death, a suit against him was commenced on December 27,
1978 by private respondent Pedro Asedillo with the Court of First Instance of Rizal (now RTC),
Branch XXVII, Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. 6888-P for reconveyance of the abovesaid
property and cancellation of T.C.T. No. 91137 in his favor based on possession (p. 33, Ibid.). Ching
Leng's last known address is No. 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City which appears on the face of T.C.T.
No. 91137 (not No. 441 Libertad Street, Pasay City, as alleged in private respondent's complaint).
(Order dated May 29, 1980, p. 55, Ibid.). An amended complaint was filed by private respondent
against Ching Leng and/or Estate of Ching Leng on January 30, 1979 alleging "That on account of
the fact that the defendant has been residing abroad up to the present, and it is not known
whether the defendant is still alive or dead, he or his estate may be served by summons and other
processes only by publication;" (p. 38, Ibid.). Summons by publication to Ching Leng and/or his
estate was directed by the trial court in its order dated February 7, 1979. The summons and the
complaint were published in the "Economic Monitor", a newspaper of general circulation in the
province of Rizal including Pasay City on March 5, 12 and 19, 1979. Despite the lapse of the sixty
(60) day period within which to answer defendant failed to file a responsive pleading and on motion
of counsel for the private respondent, the court a quo in its order dated May 25, 1979, allowed the
presentation of evidence ex-parte. A judgment by default was rendered on June 15, 1979, the
decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, finding plaintiffs causes of action in the complaint to be duly

substantiated by the evidence, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff
and against the defendant declaring the former (Pedro Asedillo) to be the true and
absolute owner of the property covered by T.C.T. No. 91137; ordering the defendant
to reconvey the said property in favor of the plaintiff; sentencing the defendant Ching
Leng and/or the administrator of his estate to surrender to the Register of Deeds of
the Province of Rizal the owner's copy of T.C.T. No. 91137 so that the same may be
cancelled failing in which the said T.C.T. No. 91137 is hereby cancelled and the
Register of Deeds of the Province of Rizal is hereby ordered to issue, in lieu thereof,
a new transfer certificate of title over the said property in the name of the plaintiff
Pedro Asedillo of legal age, and a resident of Estrella Street, Makati, Metro Manila,
upon payment of the fees that may be required therefor, including the realty taxes
due the Government.

IT IS SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-44, Ibid.)

Said decision was likewise served by publication on July 2, 9 and 16, 1979 pursuant to Section 7 of
Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court (CA Decision, pp. 83-84, Ibid.). The title over the property in
the name of Ching Leng was cancelled and a new Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in favor of
Pedro Asedillo (p. 77, CA Rollo) who subsequently sold the property to Villa Esperanza
Development, Inc. on September 3, 1979 (pp. 125-126, Ibid.).

On October 29, 1979 petitioner Alfredo Ching learned of the abovestated decision. He filed a verified
petition on November 10, 1979 to set it aside as null and void for lack of jurisdiction which was
granted by the court on May 29, 1980 (penned by Hon. Florentino de la Pena, Vacation Judge, pp.
54-59, Rollo).

On motion of counsel for private respondent the said order of May 29, 1980 was reconsidered and
set aside, the decision dated June 15, 1979 aforequoted reinstated in the order dated September 2,
1980. (pp. 60-63, Ibid.)

On October 30, 1980, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the said latter order but the
same was denied by the trial court on April 12, 1981 (pp. 77-79, Ibid.)
Petitioner filed an original petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals but the same was
dismissed on September 30, 1981. His motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on February
10, 1982 (pp. 81-90, Ibid.)

Private respondent Pedro Asedillo died on June 7, 1981 at Makati, Metro Manila during the
pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals (p. 106, CA Rollo).

Hence, the instant petition.

Private respondent's comment was filed on June 1, 1982 (p. 117, Ibid.) in compliance with the
resolution dated April 26, 1982 (p. 109, Ibid.) Petitioner filed a reply to comment on June 18, 1982
(p. 159, Ibid ), and the Court gave due course to the petition in the resolution of June 28, 1982 (p.
191, Ibid.)

Petitioner raised the following:

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

WHETHER OR NOT A DEAD MAN CHING LENG AND/OR HIS ESTATE MAY BE
VALIDLY SERVED WITH SUMMONS AND DECISION BY PUBLICATION.

II

WHETHER OR NOT AN ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE OF PROPERTY AND

CANCELLATION OF TITLE IS IN PERSONAM, AND IF SO, WOULD A DEAD MAN
AND/OR HIS ESTATE BE BOUND BY SERVICE OF SUMMONS AND DECISION
BY PUBLICATION.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDINGS FOR RECONVEYANCE AND

CANCELLATION OF TITLE CAN BE HELD EX-PARTE.

IV

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THE

SUBJECT MATTER AND THE PARTIES.

WHETHER OR NOT PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS GUILTY OF LACHES IN

INSTITUTING THE ACTION FOR RECONVEYANCE AFTER THE LAPSE OF 19
YEARS FROM THE TIME THE DECREE OF REGISTRATION WAS ISSUED.

Petitioner's appeal hinges on whether or not the Court of Appeals has decided a question of
substance in a way probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court.
Petitioner avers that an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title is in personam and the
court a quo never acquired jurisdiction over the deceased Ching Leng and/or his estate by means of
service of summons by publication in accordance with the ruling laid down in Ang Lam v. Rosillosa
et al., 86 Phil. 448 [1950].

On the other hand, private respondent argues that an action for cancellation of title is quasi in rem,
for while the judgment that may be rendered therein is not strictly a judgment in in rem, it fixes and
settles the title to the property in controversy and to that extent partakes of the nature of the
judgment in rem, hence, service of summons by publication may be allowed unto Ching Leng who
on the face of the complaint was a non-resident of the Philippines in line with the doctrine enunciated
in Perkins v. Dizon, 69 Phil. 186 [1939].

The petition is impressed with merit.

An action to redeem, or to recover title to or possession of, real property is not an action in rem or an
action against the whole world, like a land registration proceeding or the probate of a will; it is an
action in personam, so much so that a judgment therein is binding only upon the parties properly
impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and actions in
rem differ in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments,
while the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments
with respect thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action
but it is an action in personam, for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to
a tangible thing (Ang Lam v. Rosillosa, supra).

Private respondent's action for reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam, the
judgment in question is null and void for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased
defendant Ching Leng. Verily, the action was commenced thirteen (13) years after the latter's death.
As ruled by this Court in Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc. (70 SCRA 475 [1976]) the decision
of the lower court insofar as the deceased is concerned, is void for lack of jurisdiction over his
person. He was not, and he could not have been validly served with summons. He had no more civil
personality. His juridical personality, that is fitness to be subject of legal relations, was lost through
death (Arts. 37 and 42 Civil Code).

The same conclusion would still inevitably be reached notwithstanding joinder of Ching Leng's estate
as co-defendant. it is a well-settled rule that an estate can sue or be sued through an executor or
administrator in his representative capacity (21 Am. Jr. 872). Contrary to private respondent's claims,
deceased Ching Leng is a resident of 44 Libertad Street, Pasay City as shown in his death certificate
and T. C. T. No. 91137 and there is an on-going intestate proceedings in the same court, Branch III
commenced in 1965, and notice of hearing thereof duly published in the same year. Such misleading
and misstatement of facts demonstrate lack of candor on the part of private respondent and his
counsel, which is censurable.

The complaint for cancellation of Ching Leng's Torrens Title must be filed in the original land
registration case, RTC, Pasig, Rizal, sitting as a land registration court in accordance with Section
112 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496, as amended) not in CFI Pasay City in connection
with, or as a mere incident in Civil Case No. 6888-P (Estanislao v. Honrado, 114 SCRA 748 [1982]).

Section 112 of the same law requires "notice to all parties in interest." Since Ching Leng was already
in the other world when the summons was published he could not have been notified at all and the
trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person. The ex-parte proceedings for cancellation of
title could not have been held (Estanislao v. Honrado, supra).
The cited case of Perkins v. Dizon, supra is inapplicable to the case at bar since petitioner Perkins
was a non-resident defendant sued in Philippine courts and sought to be excluded from whatever
interest she has in 52,874 shares of stocks with Benguet Consolidated Mining Company. The action
being a quasi in rem summons by publication satisfied the constitutional requirement of due process.

The petition to set aside the judgment for lack of jurisdiction should have been granted and the
amended complaint of private respondent based on possession and filed only in 1978 dismissed
outrightly. Ching Leng is an innocent purchaser for value as shown by the evidence adduced in his
behalf by petitioner herein, tracing back the roots of his title since 1960, from the time the decree of
registration was issued.

The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in
another's name—after one year from the date of the decree—is not to set aside the decree, but
respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to bring an ordinary action in
the ordinary court of justice for damages if the property has passed unto the hands of an innocent
purchaser for value (Sy, Sr. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 66742; Teoville Development
Corporation v. IAC, et al., G.R. No. 75011, June 16, 1988).

Failure to take steps to assert any rights over a disputed land for 19 years from the date of
registration of title is fatal to the private respondent's cause of action on the ground of laches.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercising
due diligence could or should have been done, earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right
within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it (Bailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78178, April 15,
1988; Villamor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 41508, June 27, 1988).

The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to
its legality. Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in
the portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa," to avoid the possibility of losing his land
(National Grains Authority v. IAC, 157 SCRA 388 [1988]).

A Torrens title is generally a conclusive evidence of the ownership of the land referred to therein
(Section 49, Act 496). A strong presumption exists that Torrens titles are regularly issued and that
they are valid. A Torrens title is incontrovertible against any "information possessoria" or title existing
prior to the issuance thereof not annotated on the title (Salamat Vda. de Medina v. Cruz, G.R. No.
39272, May 4, 1988).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, (1) the instant petition is hereby GRANTED; (2) the appealed decision
of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; (3) the trial court's decision dated
June 15, 1979 and the Order dated September 2, 1980 reinstating the same are hereby declared
NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction and (4) the complaint in Civil Case No. 6888-P is hereby
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 123361. March 3, 1997]

TEOFILO CACHO, petitioner-appellant, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, NATIONAL STEEL
CORPORATION and THE CITY OF ILIGAN, respondents-
appellees.

DECISION
MELO, J.:

The late Doa Demetria Cacho applied for the registration of two parcels of
land situated in what was then Lanao, Moro Province. Both parcels were
within the limits of Military Reservation No. 43, known as "Camp Overton".
The petitions were docketed as GLRO Record No. 6908 & 6909 and were
jointly tried and decided by Judge Jesse Jorge on December 10, 1912.
In the said decision, which was affirmed in toto by this Court in Cacho vs.
Government of the United States (28 Phil. 616 [1914]) the trial court made the
following pronouncements:

Re: Case No. 6908

The parcel object of Case No. 6908 is small. It was purchased

by the applicant, Doa Demetria Cacho y Soriano from Gabriel
Salzos. The title of Gabriel Salzos is founded on a deed of sale in
his favor, executed and signed by a Moro woman named Alanga,
who acted for her husband, a Moro named Dorondon. It appears
that the husband of Alanga, Datto Dorondon is alive yet and before
admitting this parcel to registration, it is ordered that a deed from
Dorondon be presented, renouncing all his rights in the small parcel
of land object of Case No. 6908. It is further ordered that the
applicant present the corresponding deed from Datto Dorondon on
or before March 30, 1913.
Re: Case No. 6909
The parcel of land claimed by the applicant in Case No. 6909 is
the larger of two parcels and contains 37.87 hectares or more than
90 acres. This was purchased by the applicant from the Moro Datto
Bunglay.
 Datto Bunglay claims to have acquired part of it by inheritance
from his uncle Datto Anandog who died without issue and the
balance by his own possession and cultivation.
A tract of land 37 hectares in area, is larger than is cultivated by
the Christian Filipinos. In the Zamboanga cadastral case of
thousands of parcels now on trial before this court, the average size
of the parcels is not above 3 or 4 hectares, and the court doubts very
much if a Moro with all his family could cultivate as extensive a
parcel of land as the one in question.
The court therefore finds that the applicant Doa Demetria Cacho
is owner of the portion of land occupied and planted by the
deceased Datto Anandog in the southern part of the large parcel
object of expediente No. 6909 only; and her application as to all the
rest of the land solicited in said case is denied.
On the 8th day of December, the court was at Camp Overton
and had another ocular inspection for the purpose of fixing the
limits of the part cultivated by Datto Anandog. The court set stakes
marking the N.E., S.E., & N.W. corners of the land found to have
been cultivated by Anandog.
And it is ordered that the new survey be made in accordance
with the points mentioned. It is further ordered that one half of the
costs of the new survey be paid by the applicant and the other half
by the Government of the United States.
Re: Cases 6908 & 6909
Final decision in these cases is reserved until the presentation of
the said deed and the new plan.
On June 29, 1978, Teofilo Cacho, herein petitioner, as the son and sole
heir of the late Doa Demetria Cacho, filed a petition for reconstitution of two
original certificates of title under Republic Act 26, and docketed under the
original GLRO Record No. 6908 and 6909.
The petition was opposed by herein respondents Republic of the
Philippines, National Steel Corporation (NSC), and the City of Iligan.
Acting on the motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence filed by the
Republic and the NSC, the lower court dismissed the petition because it found
the evidence inadequate to show the prior existence of the titles sought to be
restored. The same order stated further that the proper remedy was for the
reconstitution of decrees since it is undisputed that in Cases No. 6908 and
6909, Decrees No. 10364 and 18969, respectively, were already issued. The
same trial court specifically found that since the decrees had, in fact, been
issued, the judgment of this Court in Cacho vs. U.S., supra, although by itself
expressly dependent upon some conditions, must have indisputably become
final.
Thus, petitioner filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file and to
admit amended petition, but this was denied. Petitioner elevated the matter to
this Court (docketed as Teofilo Cacho vs. Hon. Manindiara P. Mangotara,
G.R. No. 85495) but we resolved to remand the case to the lower court,
ordering the latter to accept the amended petition and to hear it as one for re-
issuance of decrees under the following guidelines:
Considering the doctrines in Sta. Ana vs. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 (1961)
and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos vs. de Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315 (1968), and the
lower court findings that the decrees had in fact been issued, the omnibus
motion should have been heard as a motion to re-issue the decrees in order to
have a basis for the issuance of the titles and the respondents being heard in
their opposition.
Considering the foregoing, we resolve to order the lower court to
accept the amended petition subject to the private respondents being given
the opportunity to answer and to present their defenses. The evidence already
on record shall be allowed to stand but opportunity to controvert existing
evidence shall be given the parties.

(p. 59, Rollo.)

Thus, the lower court accepted the amended petition and heard it as one
for re-issuance of the decrees.
In their "Consolidated Answer and/or Opposition" to the amended petition,
respondents Republic of the Philippines and NSC raised the defenses that the
petition suffered from jurisdictional infirmities; that petitioner was not the real
party in interest; that petitioner was guilty of laches; that Demetria Cacho was
not the registered owner of the subject parcels of land; that no decrees
covering the properties were ever issued in the name of Demetria Cacho; and
that the issuance of the decrees was dubious and irregular.
On June 9, 1993, the lower court (RTC-City of Iligan, Branch 1) rendered
its decision decreeing the reconstitution and re-issuance of Decrees No.
10364 and 18969. The pertinent portion of the said decision reads:
The third issue is whether sufficient legal and factual basis exist for
the issuance of the subject decrees.
 This Court has already ruled that Decrees Nos. 10364 and 18959
were issued in these LRC Cases Nos. 6908 and 6909, respectively, and
that the issuance of the decrees presupposed a prior judgment that had
already become final. Oppositors never disputed the cited pronouncements
and therefore these should now be considered final and conclusive
In fine, the Land Registration Commission (now) National Land
Titles and Deeds Registration Administration (NALTDRA), through its
then Acting Commissioner Santiago M. Kapunan, its Deputy Clerk of
Court III, the Head Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration, all
certified that according to the Record Book of Decrees for Ordinary Land
Registration Case, Decree No. 18969 was issued in GLRO Record No.
6909 and Decree No. 10364 was issued in GLRO Record No. 6908.
(Exhibits "C", "D", "E" and "M").
In the manifestation submitted by the then Acting LRC
Commissioner Santiago Kapunan in compliance with an order of this
Court, confirmed that the proceedings undertaken by the LRC in the
original petition for reconstitution have been regularly and properly done
based on existing records; that Decrees 10364 and 18969 have been issued
and recorded in LRC's Record Book of Decrees; that the plan and
technical description of the lots involved were found to be correct,
approved by the LRC and transmitted to this Court, (Exh. "M").
On Record also is the decision in the Military Reservation Nos. 43 and
63 in which this Court affirmed the issuance of Decrees Nos. 10364 and
18969 in the name of Demetria Cacho.
Moreover, the testimony by way of deposition of one Ricardo A.
Arandilla, Deputy Clerk of Court of the LRC which identified and
validated the report of the LRC to this Court on the present petition, (Exh.
"M"), shows that the decrees registry of the LRC had recorded the fact and
date of issuance of Decrees No. 10364 and 18969 in GLRO Rec. No. 6908
and 6909 and the approval of the plans and corresponding technical
descriptions of the lots involved in the aforesaid record numbers and
decrees (Exh. "T").
It is worthy to note that on cross-examination by Oppositors' counsel,
Arandilla produced for scrutiny the LRC Registry Book of Ordinary
Registration Cases, which contained therein the entries showing that
Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9, 1913 in Case No. 6908 and
Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 7, 1915 in Case No. 6909. (Exhs.
"T", "P" and "19").
 From the foregoing environmental facts, the Court finds that the
existence of the decrees have been established sufficiently and indubitably
by the evidence submitted by the petitioner, and therefore, said amended
petition has to be granted.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as

follows:

1. The amended petition is hereby granted and approved. Declaring

Decrees No. 10364 and No. 18969 as reconstituted.
2. Ordering the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Administration (NALTDRA), (formerly Land Registration Commission)
to reissue Decrees No. 19364 and No. 16869 existing at the LRC Registry
Book of Ordinary Registration Cases in the name of Demetria Cacho upon
payment by the petitioner of the required legal fees.
SO ORDERED.

(pp. 62-65, Rollo.)

From the aforesaid decision, respondents appealed to the Court of

Appeals.
The Republic of the Philippines and the National Steel Corporation in their
joint brief assigned the following errors:

The lower court erred in granting appellee Teofilo Cacho's amended petition for
reconstitution of decrees of registration purportedly issued in LRC Record Nos. 6908
and 6909. Notwithstanding that

I. The petition suffers from fatal jurisdictional infirmities;

II. The Supreme Court declared in Cacho v. Government of the United States,
28 Phil. 616, that final decision in LRC Cases 6908 and 6909 had been
reserved pending compliance by the applicant therein of certain conditions
albeit, as of Date, No competent evidence exists showing compliance with
the imposed conditions and/or the rendition of a "final judgment" and/or the
issuance of decrees pursuant thereto;
III.The petition is barred by laches; and
IV.The petition is being prosecuted by a fictitious person and/or a party who
does not have a lawful interest in the case.
(pp. 16-17, Rollo.)
Respondent City of Iligan, for its part, argued that the trial court erred:
 1. In giving due course to "Teofilo Cacho's" petition for reconstitution of titles
when the same is already barred by laches.
2. In granting the amended petition for reconstitution when there is no proof that
Teofilo Cacho actually exists and is a real party in interest.
3. In granting the amended petition for reconstitution even in the absence of
sufficient proof to the effect that land registration Decree Nos. 10364 &
18969 were indeed issued to Demetria Cacho.
4. In reopening the case despite the finality of the order dated 16 April 1979
dismissing the original petition for reconstitution of title.
5. In giving title to petitioner over a parcel of land already owned by appellant
City of Iligan pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 469 (dated 4
October 1965) which ownership was affirmed by the Supreme Court on
26 February 1988 [City of Iligan versus Director of Lands, et al., 158
SCRA 158].
(pp. 17-18, Rollo.)
The Court of Appeals sustained the validity of the proceedings below and
brushed aside respondents' claim of jurisdictional infirmities. It also
acknowledged the issuance and existence of the registration decrees in favor
of Demetria Cacho, to wit:
As to the second issue, we can not do otherwise but hold that Decree
Nos. 10364 and 18969 were issued in GLRO Record No. 6908 and
GLRO Record No. 6909, on May 9, 1913 and July 8, 1915, respectively,
according to the Record Book of Decrees for Ordinary Land Registration
Case. Then Acting Commissioner of the Land Registration Commission
Santiago M. Kapunan (now Justice of the Supreme Court), submitted a
Manifestation, dated November 2, 1978, in compliance with an order at
the lower court, confirming that the plan and technical description of the
land involving both Lots 1 and 2 were correct, that said lots are decreed
properties, and that all the proceedings undertaken by the LRC were
regularly done based on existing records.

(pp. 49-50, Rollo.)

This notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the

lower court and dismissed the petition for re-issuance of Decrees No. 10364
and 18969, with prejudice, for the following reasons:
First. The decision of the Supreme Court in Cacho vs. Government of the
United States on December 10, 1914, now appearing in 28 Phil. 617,
regarding GLRO Record Nos. 6908 and 6909, denied in part and granted in
part the application for adjudication and registration of the two parcels of
land of Demetria Cacho, appellee's predecessor-in-interest. Final decision on
the cases was reserved pending compliance with conditions set forth therein.
1.) Re: Case 6908, "x x x before admitting this parcel to registration, it is ordered
that a deed from Dorondon . . . be presented, renouncing all his rights in the small
parcel of land object of Case No. 6908" (28 Phil. 629).
2.) Re: Case No. 6909, "the parcel of land claimed by the applicant in Case No.
6909 is the larger of two parcels and contains 37.87 hectares . . . (28 Phil. 619). The
court therefore finds that the applicant Doa Demetria Cacho is owner of the portion of
land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto Anandog in the southern part of the
large parcel object of expediente No. 6909 only; and her application as to all the rest
of the land solicited in said case is denied." (28 Phil. 629) On the 8th day of
December, the court was at Camp Overton and had another ocular inspection for the
purpose of fixing the limits of the part cultivated by Datto Anandog . . . with previous
notice to the applicant and her husband and representative Seor Vidal. Having arrived
late, Seor Vidal did not assist in the ocular inspection . . . But the court, nevertheless,
set stakes marking the N.E., S.E., and N.W. corners of the land found to have been
cultivated by the deceased Anandog" (28 Phil. 630); "And it is ordered that the new
survey be made in accordance with the points mentioned . . ." (28 Phil. 630).
The Court notes that the plan and technical description referred to in the
Manifestation dated November 2, 1978 of the Acting Commissioner of the
Land Registration Commission and the plan submitted by Demetria Cacho in
Case No. 6909 are the same as to the area, which is 37.87 hectares, and as to
the date of approval, which is November 15, 1910. Since the Supreme Court
decision in Cacho vs. US "ordered that the new survey be made in
accordance with the points mentioned"; that applicant Demetria Cacho is
owner only of the portion of land occupied and planted by the deceased Datto
Anandog; and that her application as to all the rest of the land solicited in
case No. 6909 is denied, it follows that the new survey, if it was made, must
have a smaller area and a later date of approval.
As it is, although there is proof that Decree No. 18969 was issued in GLRO
No. 6909, re-issuance of the decree cannot be made in the absence of the
"new survey" on which to base the area and technical description of the
parcel of land in Case No. 6909.
Second. While a person may not acquire title to registered property through
continuous adverse possession, in derogation of the title of the original
registered owner, the heir of the latter, however, may lose his right to recover
back the possession of such property and the title thereto, by reason of
laches.
According to appellee, appellants failed to prove:
a. any conduct on their part that would have impelled appellee to act earlier;
 b. that they were misled by appellee's inaction into believing that appellee
would not assert the right on which he bases his suit;
c. the nature of extent of injury or prejudice that would accrue to them in the
event that relief is accorded to the appellee or that the suit is not held barred;
and
d. that their claims fall within the metes and bounds of the property covered
by the decree.
The above need not be proven by appellants. Under the Regalian doctrine, all
lands of whatever classification belong to the state.
The rule applies even to privately owned unregistered lands which, unless the
contrary is shown, are presumed to be public lands, under the principle that
all "lands belong to the Crown which have not been granted by (the King), or
in his name, or by the kings who preceded him.
Finally, petitioner failed to establish his identity and existence and that he is a
real party interest. To qualify a person to be a real party in interest in whose
name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real
owner of the right sought to be enforced.
(pp. 50-53, Rollo.)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been denied, he filed the
present petition because allegedly, the Court of Appeals decided questions of
substance in a way not in accord with the law and applicable decisions of this
Court:

First: Respondent Court of Appeals erroneously embarked upon a reopening of

Decree Nos. 10364 and 18969 issued on May 9, 1913 and July 8, 1915, respectively,
when it required proof of compliance with conditions for their issuance. These
conditions are conclusively presumed to have been complied with before the original
decrees were issued and can no longer be inquired into.

Second: Respondent Court of Appeals contravened settled and standing doctrines

pronounced in Sta. Ana v. Menla, 1 SCRA 1297 and Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de
Banuvar, 25 SCRA 315, when it applied laches as a bar to the reissuance of decrees.

Third: Respondent Court of Appeals ignored standing decisions of this Honorable

Court when it applied laches despite the total absence of proof to establish the
requisite elements for its application.
Fourth: Respondent Court of Appeals erroneously applied the "Regalian doctrine" to
dispense with proof of the essential elements of laches.

Fifth: Respondent Court of Appeals abjured the judicial responsibility to uphold the
stability and integrity of the Torrens system.

Sixth: Respondent Court of Appeals ignored uncontroverted proof on the identity and
existence of petitioner and allowed itself to be swayed by wild and gratuitous
allusions to the contrary.

(pp. 21-22, Rollo.)

The petition having been given due course and the parties having filed
their respective memoranda, we shall now resolve the case.
We vote to grant the petition.
A land registration proceeding is "in rem," and, therefore, the decree of
registration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the
Government and its branches, irrespective of whether or not they were
personally notified of the filing of the application for registration or have
appeared and filed an answer to said application, because all persons are
considered as notified by the publication required by law.
Furthermore, a decree of registration that has become final shall be
deemed conclusive not only on the questions actually contested and
determined but also upon all matters that might be litigated or decided in the
land registration proceedings. With the certification duly issued by the then
Land Registration Commission, now National Land Titles and Deeds
Registration Administration (NALTDRA), through then Acting Commissioner
Santiago M. Kapunan (now a distinguished member of this Court), its Deputy
Clerk of Court III, the Head Geodetic Engineer, and the Chief of Registration,
the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly found there is no doubt that
decrees of registration had in fact been issued in the case at bench. It is
likewise beyond dispute that such decrees attained finality upon the lapse of
one year from entry thereof. To allow the final decrees to once again be
subject to the conditions set forth in the 1914 case of Cacho vs. U.S. would be
tantamount to setting aside the decrees which cannot be reopened after the
lapse of one year from the entry thereof (Lapore vs. Pascual, 107 Phil. 695
[1960]). Such action would definitely run counter to the very purpose of the
Torrens System.
Moreover, to sustain the Court of Appeals ruling as regards requiring
petitioners to fulfill the conditions set forth in Cacho vs. U.S. would constitute a
derogation of the doctrine of res judicata. Significantly, the issuance of the
subject decrees presupposes a prior final judgment because the issuance of
such decrees is a mere ministerial act on part of the Land Registration
Commission (now the NALTDRA), upon presentation of a final judgment. It is
also worth noting that the judgment in Cacho vs. U.S. could not have acquired
finality without the prior fulfillment of the conditions in GLRO Record No. 6908,
the presentation of the corresponding deed of sale from Datto Dorondon on or
before March 30, 1913 (upon which Decree No. 10364 was issued on May 9,
1913); and in GLRO Record No. 6909, the presentation of a new survey per
decision of Judge Jorge on December 10, 1912 and affirmed by this Court on
December 10, 1914 (upon which Decree No. 18969 was issued on July 8,
1915).
Requiring the submission of a new plan as a condition for the re-issuance
of the decree would render the finality attained by the Cacho vs. U.S. case
nugatory, thus, violating the fundamental rule regarding res judicata. It must
be stressed that the judgment and the resulting decree are res judicata, and
these are binding upon the whole world, the proceedings being in the nature
of proceedings in rem. Besides, such a requirement is an impermissible
assault upon the integrity and stability of the Torrens System of registration
because it also effectively renders the decree inconclusive.
As to the issue of laches, suffice it to state that the settled doctrine in this
jurisdiction is that laches cannot bar the issuance of a decree. The reason
therefor may be gleaned from Sta. Ana vs. Menla (1 SCRA 1294 [1961]):
. . . This provision of the Rules (Sec. 6, Rule 39) refers to civil actions and is
not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is
so because a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that
is secured against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same
within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision
unenforceable against the losing party. In special proceedings the purpose is
to establish a status, condition or fact; in land registration proceedings, the
ownership of a parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership
has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding
to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing
party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust
him therefrom.
. . . There is nothing in the law that limits the period within which the court
may order or issue a decree. The reason is . . . that the judgment is merely
declaratory in character and does not need to be asserted or enforced against
 the adverse party. Furthermore, the issuance of a decree is a ministerial duty
both of the judge and of the Land Registration Commission ...
(p. 1297-1298)
Thus, it was held in Heirs of Cristobal Marcos v. de Banuver (25 SCRA
316 [1968]) that a final decision in land registration cases can neither be
rendered inefficacious by the statute of limitations nor by laches. This was
reiterated in Vda. De Barroga vs. Albano (157 SCRA 131 [1988]).
Finally, anent the issue of identity and existence of petitioner and his being
a real party in interest, records show that petitioner has sufficiently established
his existence and identity as well as his legal interest.
By an Affidavit of Adjudication as sole heir of Demetria Cacho, the
property in question were adjudicated in favor of petitioner under Doc. 1355,
Page 128, Series of 1985 of the Consulate General of the Philippines in
Chicago. The fact of adjudication of the estate of Demetria Cacho was
published in the Times Journal. Petitioner also appeared personally before
Vice Consul Stephen V. David of the Philippine Consulate General of the
Republic of the Philippines in Chicago and executed a Special Power of
Attorney in favor of Atty. Godofredo Cabildo to represent him in this case.
The execution of public documents, as in the case of the Affidavit of
Adjudication, is entitled to a presumption of regularity and proof is required to
assail and controvert the same. Thus, the burden of proof rests upon him who
alleges the contrary and respondents cannot shift the burden to petitioner by
merely casting doubt as to his existence and his identity without presenting
preponderant evidence to controvert such presumption. With more reason
shall the same rule apply in the case of the Special Power of Attorney duly
sworn before the Philippine Consulate General of the Republic of the
Philippines in Chicago, the act of the administering oath being of itself a
performance of duty by a public official.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The decision of Branch I of the Regional Trial Court of the
Twelfth Judicial Region stationed at the City of Iligan, in its LRC Case No.
CLR (GLRO) Record Nos. 6908 and 6909 dated June 9, 1993, is
REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.
No special pronouncement is made as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-44493 November 3, 1938

MARIANO ANGELES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELENA SAMIA, defendant-appellant.

Jose Gutierrez David for appellant.

Filemon Cajator for appellee.

DIAZ, J.:

The question involved herein refers to the ownership of a parcel of land having an area of 7
hectares, 13 ares and 81 centiares, situated in the municipality of Bacolor of the Province of
Pampanga, included in lot No. 3679 described in cadastral record No. 11 of the said municipality, G.
L. R. O. Cadastral Record No. 148 of Pampanga, and now covered by original certificate of title No.
8995 of the registry of deeds of Pampanga, registered and issued on December 15, 1921, in the
name of Macaria Angeles, Petra Angeles, Felisberto Samia, and Elena Samia as their common
undivided property, in the following proportion: One third to Macaria Angeles, 1/6 to Petra Angeles,
¼ to Felisberto Samia, and ¼ to Elena Samia.

The plaintiff claims to be the exclusive owner of the property in question, and the defendant alleges
the same thing saying: (1) That said property was allotted to her when her co-owners made a
partition of all the properties owned by them in common, and 2 that if the plaintiff ever had any right
thereto prior to the issuance of said original certificate of title, such right prescribed a longtime ago.

The lower court decided the question in favor of the plaintiff and ordered the defendant to execute
the necessary deed of conveyance to the plaintiff of the land described in the complaint, which
constitutes the northern portion of 7 hectares, 13 ares and 81 centiares of said lot No. 3679, the
sketch of which appears in the plan Exhibit P as lot No. 3679-A, and to pay the costs of the trial.
From this judgment the defendant appealed, assigning in her brief the following alleged errors as
committed by the lower court to wit.

1. The lower court erred in not sustaining and holding that the plaintiff's action has
prescribed.

2. The lower court erred in not holding that the plain- tiff has neither alleged nor proven facts
constituting a cause of action.

3. The lower court erred in not holding that the plain- tiff's claim is contrary to the principal
objective of the Torrens System established in the country. law phi1.net

4. The lower court erred in concluding and holding that a constructive or implicit trust exists
in the present case, as claimed by the plaintiff.

5. The lower court erred in not holding that the case of "Villarosa vs. Sarmiento" (46 Phil.,
814), is applicable to and decides the present case, and in holding that the case of
"Dizon vs. Datu", decided by the Supreme Court as case G.R. No. 30517, applies to the
case at bar.
 6. The lower court erred in not dismissing the complaint in this case with costs to the plaintiff.

7. The lower court erred in denying the defendant- appellant's motion for new trial.

It is not disputed by the parties that the land in question was inherited by the plaintiff from his father
Antonio Angeles some time before the year 1896; that thereafter the plaintiff possessed and
occupied the land in question under claim of ownership up to the present that about the year 1909,
he attempted to register his title to said property in the registry of deeds, pursuant to the Land
Registration Act but his application was denied due to errors to and in his plan; that, this
notwithstanding, he continued to exercise acts of ownership over the land in question openly,
uninterruptedly and peacefully at least until March, 1933; that on December 15, 1921, without the
plaintiff's knowledge and without having been purposely applied for by the defendant and her
coparticipants Macaria, Petra, and Felisberto, said original certificate of title No. 8995 was issued in
the name of the latter four co-owners; that the said co-owners having decided to partition among
themselves the properties held by them in common, the land in question was allotted to the
defendant; that the defendant, desiring to know the area of said land, had it relocated about the end
of February of the beginning of March, 1993, and, as soon as it had been done, although she was
then aware that neither she nor any of her former coparticipants ever occupied it before, because it
had always been occupied by the plaintiff long before 1896, she entered upon said land to exercise
acts of ownership, for which purpose she cut and availed herself of the leaves of nipa palms found
therein, notwithstanding the protests and objections of the plaintiff; that the plaintiff, for the purpose
of avoiding frictions, requested the defendant, inasmuch as it was through error that the land in
question had been adjudicated to her and her co-owners, to deign to execute the corresponding
deed of transfer thereof in his favor, the land being lawfully his; that the defendant refused todo so
claiming that her title was already indefeasible; and that, in view of such attitude of said defendant,
the plaintiff brought this action one or two days later.

The defense of prescription which the defendant-appellant seeks to avail of to support the
irrevocability of her title and to counteract the action of the plaintiff-appellee, is untenable because,
aside from the fact that neither she nor her co-owners ever possessed the land in question in any
capacity, they never claimed to be the owners thereof, and if she has done so after the lapse of
more than eleven years from the issuance of the title in their favor, it was due to the fact that they
were declared owners thereof through error. The purpose of the Land Registration Act, as this court
has had occasion to so state more than once, is not to create or vest title, but to confirm and register
title already created and already vested, and of course, said original certificate of title No. 8995 could
not have vested in the defendant more title than what was rightfully due her and her co-owners. It
appearing that said certificate granted her much more than she expected, naturally to the prejudice
of another, it is but just that the error, which gave rise to said anomaly, be corrected (City of
Manila vs. Lack, 19 Phil., 324). The defendant and her co-owners knew or, at least, came to know
that it was through error that. the original certificate of title in question was issued by the court which
heard cadastral case No. 11 of Bacolor, not only in or prior to March, 1933, but from the time said
certificate was issued in their favor, that is, from December 15, 1921. This is evidenced by the fact
that, ever since, They remained passive without even attempting to make the least showing of
ownership over the land in question until after the lapse of more than eleven years. The land
Registration Act as well as the Cadastral Act protects only the holders of a title in good faith and
does not permit its provision to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud, or that one should
enrich himself at the expense of another (Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil., 442; Angelo vs. Director of
Lands, 49 Phil., 838). The above-stated Acts do not give anybody, who resorts to the provisions
thereof, a better title than he really and lawfully has. If he happened to obtain it by mistake or to
secure, to the prejudice of his neighbor, more land than he really owns, with or without bad faith on
his part, the certificate of title, which may have been issued to him under the circumstances, may
and should be cancelled or corrected (Legarda and Prieto vs. Saleeby, 31 Phil., 590). This is
permitted by section 112 of Act No. 496, which is applicable to the Cadastral Act because it is so
provided expressly by the provisions of section 11 of the latter Act. It cannot be otherwise because,
as stated in the case of Domingo vs. Santos, Ongsiako, Lim y Cia. (55 Phil., 361), errors in the plans
of lands sought to be registered in the registry and reproduced in the certificate of title issued later,
do not annul the decree of registration on the ground that it is not the plan but the land itself which is
registered in the registry. In other words, if the plan of an applicant for registration or claimant in a
cadastral case alleges that the land referred to in said plan is 100 or 1,000 hectares, and the land
which he really owns and desires to register in the registry is only 80 ares, he cannot claim to be the
owner of the existing difference if afterwards he is issued a certificate of title granting him said area
of 100 or 1,000 hectares.

Let it not be said that, as the decree of registration which gave rise to original certificate of title No.
8995 was on December 15, 1921, and the plaintiff failed to ask for the review of said decree within
one year, in accordance with section 38 of Act No. 496, he still has the right to question the legality
or validity of the decree in question, because the action brought by him in this case is not for said
purpose but merely to ask that the land in dispute, which was erroneously included in original
certificate of title No. 8995, be transferred to him by the defendant, he being the owner thereof. This
is possible and it is authorized by law, upon the amendment of the plan which must be approved by
the competent court, for which purpose there is no necessity of altering or modifying in the least the
decree already issued. For the foregoing reasons and for those taken into consideration in the cases
of Dizon vs. Datu (G.R. No. 30517, promulgated on June 3, 1929, not reported); Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija (49 Phil., 433); and Palet vs. Tejedor (55
Phil., 790), which are not repeated herein, for the sake of brevity, this court holds that the errors
attributed to the lower court are unfounded; that the appeal is unwarranted, and that the appealed
judgment is in accordance with the law.

Wherefore, the appealed judgment in question is affirmed in toto, and it is ordered that, upon the
amendment of the plan of parcel No. 3679 of cadastral survey No. 11 of Bacolor, G. L. R. O.
Cadastral Record No. 148 of Pampanga, the corresponding writ for the execution of said judgment
be issued by the lower court, with the costs to the appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-8539 December 24, 1914

MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN, petitioner-appellee,

vs.
RAFAEL ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., objectors-appellants.

Southworth and Faison for appellants.

D. R. Williams for appellee.

JOHNSON, J.:

It appears from the record that on the 12th day of January, 1906, the said petitioner, Maria del
Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, presented a petition in the Court of Land Registration for the
purpose of having registered, under the Torrens system, four parcels of land, known as Parcel A,
Parcel B, Parcel C, and Parcel D, all of which were located in the city of Manila. The only one of said
parcels to which attention need be given in the present appeal is Parcel A.

From an examination of said petition we find that parcel A was described generally and technically.

I. General description. — It is a parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located in
the district of Binondo of this city between Nos. 84, 90, 92, 94, and 96 Calle Escolta and the
northern bank of the Pasig River; bounded on the north by Calle Escolta for 31.08 meters, on
the south by the Pasig River for 25.19 meters, on the east by the estate of Pedro P. Roxas
for 66.48 meters, and on the west by the estate of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez for 62.10
meters; with an area of 1,817.03 square meters as set forth in the attached plan.

II. Technical description. — The undersigned on the 26th of the present month proceeded to
survey and fix the boundaries for preparing the topographical plan of a lot occupied by
buildings of strong materials one and two stories high belonging to Maria del Consuelo
Roxas y Chuidian, located in the district of Binondo of this city between Nos. 84, 90, 92, 94,
and 96 Calle Escolta and the northern bank of the Pasig River. The point marked on the plan
with the letter "X," located at the vertex of the angle formed by the northeastern side of Calle
Escolta and the corner of the Pasaje de Perez was selected as the basic point, whence S.
49º 40' W., 27.75 meters is located Point A, chosen as the point of beginning for the
topographical operations, the result whereof is as follows:1awphil.net

—————————————————————————————————— | Points
or | Directions in | Distances | Boundaries |
| stations. | degrees. | in meters. | |
——————————————————————————————————
| A to B | S. 44º 30' W | 31.08 | Calle Escolta. |
| B to C | S. 46º 15' E | 16.15 | Heirs of Antonio |
| C to D | S. 42º 00' E | 32.75 | } Enriquez. |
| D to E | S. 40º 50' E | 13.20 | |
| E to F | N. 49º 45' E | 14.25 | } Pasig River. |
| F to G | N. 52º 00' E | 10.94 | |
| G to H | N. 37º 10' W | 24.90 | |
| H to I | N. 35º 45' W | 6.56 | |
| I to J | N. 50º 30' E | 1.92 | } Pedro P. Roxas. |
 | J to K | N. 35º 00' W | 7.60 | |
| K to A | N. 42º 05' W | 25.50 | |
——————————————————————————————————

The lot described has an area of 1,817.03 square meters; all the points specified are marked
on the attached plan, the bearings are magnetic, and its boundaries are: on the north, Calle
Escolta; on the south, the Pasig River; on the east, the estate of Pedro P. Roxas; and on the
west, the estate of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez.

The plan to which reference is made in the above technical description and which accompanied the
petition is as follows and is marked "Exhibit A."

{bmc 029035a.bmp}

By comparing the above technical description with the plan presented (Exhibit A), it will be noted that
the line A-B in the technical description runs S. 44º, 30' W., and that the distance between A and B
was 31.08 meters, while in the plan line A-B runs S. 46º, 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters.
Attention is called to this difference between the technical description and the plan at this time, but
its importance to the questions presented will be discussed below.

Attached to said petition was a number of documents presented as exhibits, showing the chain of
title of the petitioner.

We find that said petition contains a statement of the names of the adjoining owners of the land in
question. The petition gives the names of said persons, as follows:

The names, surnames, and post-office addresses of the owners of the parcels of land
conterminous with this estate are, according to my information:

The heirs of Antonio Enriquez, whose representatives are the attorneys Hartigan, Marple,
Solignac & Gutierrez, 7 Anda, Intramuros, Manila, Pedro P. Roxas, 154 Malacañang, San
Miguel.

Upon the presentation of said petition, the plan, and the documents showing the chain of title of the
petitioner, the matter was referred to the examiner of titles of the Court of Land Registration, who
made a very careful examination of the title of the petitioner to the land in question, and on the 5th
day of March, 1906, presented a very carefully prepared report, in which he sets out in detail the title
of the petitioner to said Parcel A, as well as the other parcels, the recommends the registration of
said Parcel A, as well as the others, in the name of the petitioner.

Upon the issue thus presented we find that the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario, judge, on the 23d
day of March, 1906, in accordance with the provisions of section 31 of Act No. 496, issued the
following notice:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
[Registration of title. Court of Land Registration.
Case No. 1895.]
 To the Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of
Manila; A. Sing, Nos. 84-88; A. Burke, No. 90; Messrs. Macke and Chandler and F.
M. Sousa, these two No. 90 interior; Ramon Genato, No. 142; Tomas Serreno, No.
92; Rosendo Comas, No. 94; Cheng Tao Sang, No. 96; Luciano Cordoba, No. 28;
Messrs. Salgado, Gordillo and Martinez, No. 32; Messrs. Greilsammer Bros., No. 36;
and Messrs. Williams & Chandler, No. 34, upstairs; these on Calle Escolta; Antonio
Vy Chuico, No. 226, and Lim Tinco, No. 200, these two on Calle Rosario; Ang Seng
Queng, Calle Nueva No. 149; and Candido Lim, Calle Jaboneros No. 113; all these
of the district of Binondo; Messrs. Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez, attorneys of the heirs
of Antonio Enriquez, Calle Santo Tomas, corner of Calle Cabildo, district of
Intramuros; Carmen Ayala de Roxas, No. 154; and Maximo Cortes and Dolores
Ochoa, these two No. 330, the three on Calle Malacañang, district of San Miguel;
Francisco Saez, Plaza de Goiti No. 14, Alfonso Tiaoqui, Calle Lacoste No. 122, and
Gervasio Rosario Ventura, Calle Dulumbayan No. 111, these three of the district of
Santa Cruz; and Enrique Somes, Calle Alix No. 140, district of Sampaloc; all of the
city of Manila, P. I., and to all whom it may concern:

Whereas an application has been presented to said court by Maria del Consuelo Felisa
Roxas y Chuidian, through her attorney in fact Antonio Bonifas, Calle Padre Herrera No. 59,
district of Tondo, city of Manila, P. I., to register and confirm her title in the following
described land: Four parcels of land with the improvements of strong materials thereon,
situated in the district of Binondo, Manila, P. I., more particularly bounded and described as
follows:

Parcel A. — Situated on the Escolta Nos. 84-96, beginning at a pt. marked "A" on plan, being
S. 49º 40' W., 27.75 m. from the W. end of the chaflan at the S. intersection of the Escolta
and Pasaje de Perez; thence S. 46º 30' W., 31.08 m. along the SE. line of the Escolta, to pt.
"B"; S. 46º 15' E., 16.15 m. to pt. "C"; S. 42º E., 32.75 m. to pt. "D"; S. 40º 50' E., 13.20 m. to
pt. "E"; N. 49º 45' E., 14.25 m. to pt. "F"; N. 52º E., 10.94 m. to pt. "G"; N. 36º 20' W., 14.20
m. to pt. "H"; N. 38º 40' W., 17.16 m. to pt. "I"; N. 52º 35' E., 2.27 m. to pt. "J"; N. 38º 50' W.,
4.12 m. to pt. "K"; N. 53º 30' E., 0.30 m. to pt. "L"; N. 40º 05' W., 14 m. to pt. "M"; N. 44º W.,
15.35 m. to pt. "E" to "G" follow the NW. bank of the Pasig River.

Bounded on the NE. by property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas; SE. by the Pasig River; SW. by
property of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez and NW. by the Escolta.

Date of survey, December 26, 1905.

You are hereby cited to appear at the Court of Land Registration to be held at the City Hall,
Calzada de las Aguadas, city of Manila, P. I., on the 25th day of April, A. D. nineteen
hundred and six, at 8 o'clock in the forenoon, to show cause, if any you have, why the prayer
of said application shall not be granted; and unless you appear at such court at the time and
place aforesaid your default will be recorded and the said application will be taken as
confessed, and you will be forever barred from contesting said application or any decree
entered thereon.

Witness the Hon. S. del Rosario, judge of said court, this 23d day of March in the year
nineteen hundred and six.

Attest: A. K. JONES,
Clerk of said Court.
In accordance with said order of publication, the clerk of the Court of Land Registration, on the 28th
day of March, 1906, sent a copy of said order to each of the persons mentioned therein, by
registered mail. The record shows that each of said persons received a copy of said notice, including
the representative of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez (Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez). The record further
shows, by the certificate of James J. Peterson, sheriff of the city of Manila, that said notice was
posted upon the land in question. The record further shows that said notice had been published in
two daily newspapers of the city of Manila. The Manila Times and La Democracia.

On the 17th day of April, 1906, A. K. Jones, clerk of the Court of Land Registration, made the
following certificate relating to the notice and to the publication of the notices required by section 31
of Act No. 496.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.

Case No. 1895.

Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, Applicant.

I, A. K. Jones, clerk of the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands, certify that, in
compliance with the order issued by said court, a notice referring to the application for
registry No. 1895, presented by Antonio Bonifas, as representative of Maria del Consuelo
Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, was published once only in the daily newspapers of this city, The
Manila Times on March 28, 1906, and La Democracia on the 31st of the same month and
year, in English and Spanish respectively, and notice was served upon the Attorney-General
of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of Manila; A. Sing; A. Burke; Macke
& Chandler; F. M. Sousa; Ramon Genato; Tomas Serrano; Rosendo Comas; Cheng Tao
Sang; Luciano Cordoba; Salgado, Gordillo & Martinez; Greilsammer Hermanos; Williams &
Chandler; Antonio Vy Chuico; Lim Tinco; Ang Seng Queng; Candido Lim; Hartigan, Rohde &
Gutierrez; Carmen Ayala de Roxas; Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa, Francisco Saez;
Alfonso Tiaoqui; Gervasia Rosario Ventura; and Enrique Somes, a copy of said notice in
Spanish having been sent to each one on March 28, 1906, by registered mail. And for the
purposes of the necessary procedure, I issue the present in Manila on the 17th day of April,
1906.

A. K. JONES,
Clerk of the Court.

On the 19th day of April, 1906, the record shows that Modesto Reyes, attorney for the city of Manila
(p. 131, record) presented a written statement to the court calling its attention to the fact that there
existed an "error of closure" in the plan of said Parcel A, and asked the court to correct the error. The
said attorney also called the attention of the other plans of the other parcels of land, included in the
original petition. Our attention has not been called to any order made by the lower court, relating to
said request of the attorney of the city of Manila.

In accordance with said notice to all of the interested parties, the hearing on the said petition was
brought on for trial on the 25th day of April, 1906, at 9 o'clock a. m., at the place mentioned in said
notice. At the hearing the petitioner was represented. No one appeared to represent the "heirs of
Antonio Enriquez."
On said date (April 25, 1906, at 9 o'clock a. m.) the cause relating to said Parcel A was brought on
for trial. Mr. Antonio Bonifas appeared for the petitioner and My. Modesto Reyes, attorney for the city
of Manila, appeared for the city of Manila. Mr. Reyes called the attention of the court again to the fact
that there existed certain errors in the measurement of some of the sides of the plan presented by
the petitioner. In view of said fact (the existence of errors) the court ordered that said errors be
corrected. So far as the record shows no correction whatever was made in the plan of said Parcel A.

On the 21st day of July, 1906, the cause having been brought on for hearing, the honorable
Simplicio del Rosario, judge, distated the following order or judgment in default against all persons:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.

No. 1895.

Application of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian for registration of the real
estate described herein,

vs.

The Attorney-General of the Philippine Islands; the Municipal Board of the city of
Manila; A. Sing; A. Burke: Macke & Chandler; F. M. Sousa; Ramon Geneto; Tomas
Serrano; Rosendo Comas; Cheng Tao Sang; Luciano Cordoba; Salgado, Gordillo &
Martinez; Greilsammer Hermanos; Williams & Chandler; Antonio Vy Chuico; Lim
Tinco; And Seng Queng; Candido Lim; Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez; Carmen Ayala
de Roxas; Maximo Cortes and Dolores Ochoa; Francisco Saez; Alfonso Tiaoqui;
Gervasia Rosario Ventura; and Enrique Somes; and whomsoever it may concern,
defendants.

The present case having been duly tried, and

Whereas, the clerk of this court caused to be published once only a notice in due from
referring to the application mentioned, in two newspapers of general circulation, one printed
in the English language and another in the Spanish language, to wit, The Manila Times of
this city, and La Democracia of the same city; and 119 days have elapsed since publication
of said notice was effected;

Whereas, said clerk caused to be sent by registered mail, within seven days after the
publication of the said notice, a copy thereof in the Spanish language to each one of the
persons named in the application or who appeared to be concerned therein;

Whereas, the sheriff of Manila posted in a conspicuous place on each of the parcels of land
included in the application a certified copy of the notice in Spanish, and also in a
conspicuous place in the principal municipal building of the city of Manila, before the fourteen
days preceding that set for the termination of the period fixed;

Whereas, all of the persons cited as defendants have failed to appear to impugn the
application, within the period fixed by the law;
 This court orders a declaration of default against all the defendants and other persons who
may be concerned in opposing the application, which is granted.

Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the said Court of Land Registration, in
Manila, this 21st day of July, 1906.

Attest: A. K. JONES,
Clerk of the Court.

Later the Honorable Simplicio del Rosario dictated the following order, decreeing that said parcel of
land, A, be registered as the absolute property of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas Y Chuidian. Said
decree was as follows:

Having tried case No. 1895, this court decrees that Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y
Chuidian, of Manila, Philippine Islands, applicant, spinster, is the absolute owner of the real
property, which is adjudicated to her, located in the city of Manila, the description whereof is
hereinafter set forth:

A parcel of land, situated at Nos. 84 to 96 Calle Escolta, district of Binondo; bounded on the
NE. by the property of Carmen Ayala de Roxas; on the SE. by the Pasig River; on the SW.
by the property of the heirs of Antonio Enriquez; and on the NW. by Calle Escolta.

Beginning at a point marked A on the plan, which point is 27.75 m. S., 49º 40' W. from the
extreme W. of the angle situated at the intersection S. of Calle Escolta and Passage de
Perez; and from said point A., S., 46º 30' W., 31.08 m. to point B; thence S., 46º 15' E., 16.15
m. to point C; thence S., 42º E., 32.75 m. to point D; thence S., 40º 50' E., 13.20 m. to point
E.; thence N., 49º 45' E., 14.25 m. to point F; thence N., 52º E., 10.94 m. to point G; thence
N., 36º 20' W., 14.20 m. to point H; thence N., 38º 40' W., 17.16 m. to point I; thence N., 52º
35' E., 2.27 m. to point J; thence N., 38º 50' W., 4.12 m. to point K; thence N., 53º 30' E.,
0.30 m. to point L; thence N., 40º 05' W., 14 m. to point M; thence N., 44º W., 15.35 m. to
point of beginning; having an area of 1,817.03 square meters.

All the points named are marked on the plan; the bearings are magnetic; date of survey,
December 26, 1905.

Wherefore this court orders that the said real property be registered in accordance with the
provisions of the Land Registration Act in the name of the aforesaid Maria del Consuelo
Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, subject however to any of the encumbrances set forth in section 39
of said Act that may be in force and effect.

Given by the Honorable S. del Rosario, judge of the said Court of Land Registration, in
Manila, this twenty-first day of July, nineteen hundred and six, at eight o'clock and ten
minutes ante meridian.

Attest:
[SEAL.] (Sgd.) A. K. Jones,
Clerk of the Court.

A copy of this decree was sent to the register of deeds of Manila, September 25, 1906.
On the 21st day of July, 1906, the court issued the certificate of title known as No. 742, and
delivered to the petitioner the owner's duplicate, and the property became registered under the
Torrens system, in the name of the petitioner.

After the registration of said Parcel A in the name of the petitioner, on the 21st day of July, 1906,
nothing further seems to have been done in the Court of Land Registration until on or about the 19th
day of December, 1911, nearly five years and a half after said land had been registered, when we
find that the assistant attorney of the city of Manila filed the following petition:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION.

Case No. 1895.

Roxas y Cuyugan, applicant.

MOTION.

The city of Manila, through its undersigned attorney, comes now into the court and
respectfully represents;

I. That the plan of the property with which the present case deals is affected by an error of
closure greater than 1/1500;

II. That the city of Manila is interested in the correction of said error as it has to expropriate a
portion of said land for use as a public street;

Therefore, the petitioner prays the court to order a new survey of said property described in
the plan filed in this case.

Manila, P. I., December 18, 1911.

It is not clear whether said petition refers to the incorrections in the plan of Parcel A or to the
incorrections in the plans of the other parcels of land (B, C, and D), which were included in the
petition of the petitioner.

On the 23d date of December, 1911, the honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land
Registration, referred the petition of the city of Manila to the chief surveyor of the court. On the 27th
day of December, 1911, the said surveyor reported to the court that there existed "errors of closure
in said plans."

On the 5th day of January, 1912, the judge of the Court of Land Registration ordered the chief
surveyor to prepare new plans, in accordance with section 4 of Act No. 1875, and directed that
notice be given to the adjoining owners.

On the 28th day of February, 1912, the original petitioner, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y
Chuidian, presented a petition for the correction of the certificate issued to her on the 21st day of
July, 1906, so as to include the buildings upon the lands included in her petition. Said petition was as
follows:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION:

Case No. 1895.

Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, applicant.

Comes now the applicant into the Honorable Court of Land Registration and represents:

1. That on January 10, 1906, Don Antonio Bonifas, in the name and representation of the
applicant, sought the legalization of property title to four estates, among them the following:

(a) A parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located at Nos. 84 to 96 Calle
Escolta, district of Binondo.

(b) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon located at Nos. 28 to 36 Calle
Escolta, district of Binondo.

(c) Another parcel of land with the buildings erected thereon, located at No. 149 Calle Nueva,
corner of Callejon Carvajal, district of Binondo.

2. That the other estate mentioned in the said application refers to a parcel of land, with the
buildings erected thereon, located at Nos. 222 to 230 Calle Rosario, district of Binondo,
which buildings were totally destroyed by the fire that occurred on the 2d of November of the
year just past, and it cannot therefore be included in the purpose of the present application.

3. That in the said application it is stated that the land of the estate designated by the letter
(a) was assessed at 65,072 dollars and 50 cents United States currency, and the buildings at
18,500 dollars United States currency; that the land of the estate designated by the letter (b)
was assessed at 55,020 dollars and 50 cents, United States currency, and the buildings at
15,000 dollars, United States currency; and the land of the estate designated by the letter (c)
was assessed at 5,658 dollars Unites States currency, and the buildings at 5,000 dollars
United States currency.

4. That both in the property titles to the said estates and in the plans and technical
descriptions thereof which accompany said application and are annexed to the above-
entitled case, it appears that on the parcels of land which form part of the estates under
consideration there are erected buildings, consisting of two houses of strong materials, one
behind the other, in the estate designated by the letter (a); a house of stone and masonry in
that designated by the letter (b); and another house of stone and masonry in that designated
by the letter (c).

5. That in the record of the register of deeds, in the registration entries referring to the said
estates, it appears that they consist of the parcels of land and the buildings stated.

6. That in the notice to the Attorney-General, the Municipal Board, the tenants, and owners
conterminous with the estates referred to therein, the buildings erected on them are likewise
mentioned.
 7. That by decree of June 21, 1906, adjudication and registration of the estates were ordered
in applicant's favor in the terms set forth in the application; but in the certificate of the decree
or resolution under consideration, issued by the clerk of the court, the description of the
parcel of land corresponding to each estate was given, but the respective building on each
was omitted, and in this form were issued the certificates of title, Nos. 472, 764, and 743,
which accompany this application.

8. That on January 12, September 21, October 9 and 22, 1906, the legal representative of
the applicant guaranteed by deposit, as assurance fund, the rights of issuance of title and
one-tenth of 1 per cent of the assessed valuation, the sum of P943.70 Philippine currency,
the receipts and vouchers wherefore do not accompany this application because the
applicant destroyed them in the belief that there was no need to exhibit them, but averring
that the amounts paid for those purposes are credited in the accounting division of the Court
of Land Registration and the office of the register of deeds, as has been ascertained by a
person delegated therefor by the applicant.

9. That when applicant attempted to alienate one of the estates mentioned she observed the
omission in the corresponding certificate of title of the building existing thereon, the same as
in the certificates of title corresponding to the other two estates; and as it is to be supposed
that said omission is due solely to a simple clerical error, which nevertheless greatly affects
the applicant's right, she appeals to your honorable court with the request that you order the
correction of said omission, especially as there at present exist on the said parcels of land,
without modification or alteration, the same buildings that existed when legalization of title
thereto was applied for and which appear in the titles of acquisition annexed to the above-
entitled case, reference whereto has been made in the third paragraph.

10. That for greater assurance and for the purpose of proving that the said estates consist
not only in the parcel of land or lot but also in the building erected on each, the applicant
attaches hereto the assessment or property-tax receipts for each of the said estates, wherein
are stated the two points mentioned.

11. That in view of what has been set forth and explained, the applicant prays the honorable
court to decree, after the necessary legal proceedings, correction of the omission referred to
by ordering the free issuance of a new certificate of title to each of the said estates, wherein
record be made of the building erected on each, consisting of those enumerated in the third
paragraph of this application.

Manila, February 28, 1912.

MARIA DEL CONSUELO FELISA ROXAS Y CHUIDIAN.

On the 9th of April, 1912, the Masonic Temple Association of Manila sent a communication to
Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land Registration, accompanied by a contract,
showing that on the 20th day of March, 1912, Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian had sold
all her rights, title, and interest in said Parcel A, including the buildings thereon, to the said Masonic
Temple Association of Manila. Said Masonic Temple Association of Manila requested the judge of
the Land Court to attach said contract to the record in the case and issue a new certificate to it.

On the 19th day of April, 1912, a new plan of said Parcel A, prepared by Mr. B. W. Hay, surveyor of
the Bureau of Lands, was presented, in accordance with the order of the court of the 23d of
December, 1911. Said new plan was made for the purpose of correcting the errors in closure in the
original plan presented by the petitioner on the 10th day of January, 1906. Said new plan is as
follows (see page 48):

After the presentation of said new or corrected plan, the motions:

(a) That of the city of Manila to have corrected the error of closure in the original plan;

(b) That of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian, to have included in her certificate of title the
buildings located upon the lands registered in accordance with her original petition; and

(c) That of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila, to have a certificate issued to it in accordance
with its contract of purchase of said lands from Maria del Consuelo

{bmc 029048.bmp}

Felisa Roxas y Chuidian — after notice had been given to all the interested parties, were set down
for hearing. For one reason or another, the hearings on said motion were transferred from one date
to another from the 22d of April, 1912, until the 24th of August, 1912. During said various hearings,
in addition to the appointment of a commission to view the premises, certain proof was taken upon
the question of the correctness of the original plan presented by the petitioner, in January, 1906.
During said hearings the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez appeared and apparently made some
objection to the granting of said motions. They presented no written statement in which their specific
objections appear. The nearest approach to a definite and specific statement of their objections
appears in the argument of their counsel at the close of said several hearings, in which it appears
that their objections to the correction of the original plan and certificate and the issuance of a new
certificate to the Masonic Temple Association of Manila was based upon the ground that
they claimed easements or servitudes in the land in the question.

After hearing all of the parties, the Honorable Charles H. Smith, judge of the Court of Land
Registration, and his associates, the Honorable James A. Ostrand and the Honorable Norberto
Romualdez, auxiliary judges of said court, sitting in banc, on the 24th day of August, 1912, by a
unanimous decision, granted the motions of the city of Manila, of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y
Chuidian, and of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila.

On the 10th day of September, 1912, the attorneys for the objectors presented a motion for new trial,
basing it upon the ground that the conclusions of the lower court were manifestly contrary to the
proof. After a due consideration of said motion for a new trial and after hearing the respective
parties, the Court of Land Registration, sitting in banc, composed of Charles H. Smith, James A.
Ostrand, and Norberto Romualdez, denied said motion, and the case was appealed to this court. In
this court the respondents presented the following assignments of error:

1. That the court below erred in holding that the proceedings of the Court of Land
Registration were valid in entering judgment in favor of the plaintiff and appellee, confirming
the title to lot 4, which is in controversy in this suit.

2. That the judgment of the lower court is contrary to law.

 3. That the judgment of the court below is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

After a careful examination of the argument of the appellants in support of each of said assignments
of error, we are of the opinion that they may be discussed together.

In the argument of the appellants in support of their assignments of error, there is but little argument
against the decision of the court rendered on the 24th of August, 1912. Practically the whole
argument of the appellants is based upon the ground that the original certificate (No. 742, issued
July 21, 1906) is absolutely void, for the reason that "the appellants had no notice of the pendency of
the original action to confirm the title of said property." Appellants now admit that a notice of the
pendency of the original action was sent to attorneys Hartigan, Rohde & (Marple?) Gutierrez.
Appellants now allege that it affirmatively appears that neither this firm nor any of its members
represented the defendants and appellants in that action. The record shows, as we have pointed out
above, that the original petition showed that Hartigan, Rohde & Gutierrez were the representatives of
the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez, and that notice was duly sent to them. We have searched the
record now in vain to find the slightest denial of the fact that they were the representatives of said
heirs, even though one of said attorneys represented them, or at least some of them, in the present
proceedings. So far as the record shows there is not even a suggestion found in the various
hearings and proceedings taken and had under the above motions, that said attorneys were not the
representation of the heirs of Don Antonio Enriquez at the time of the original proceedings. Neither
does the record show any attempt on their part to deny the fact that they received the notices given
in the original action. The appellants assert in their argument that "personal notice was absolutely
necessary in order to justify the court below in rendering a decree in favor of the plaintiff and
appellee, in the first instance" (the original proceeding). The appellants, by that argument, attempt to
show, not that the judgment of the 24th of August, 1912, was invalid, but that the original certificate
(No. 742) was void, because they had not been served with personal notice. This brings us to the
question whether or not personal notice to all of the persons interested in an action for the
registration of real property under the Torrens system, is an absolute prerequisite to the validity of
said registration. It will be remembered that we noted above that personal notice of the pendency of
the original petition had been given and that a publication of the same had been made in accordance
with the provisions of sections 31 and 32 of Act No. 496. After the expiration of the period during
which notice must be given, the original cause was set down for hearing. The record also shows that
the clerk of the Land Court made a certificate showing that that notice had been issued and
published in accordance with the law. Section 32 provides, in part, that said "certificate of the clerk
that he had served the notice as directed by the court, by publishing or mailing, shall be filed in the
case before the return day, and shall be conclusive proof of such service."

On the day set for the hearing of said original petition, no one appeared to oppose the granting of
the prayer which it contained. Section 35 of Act No. 496 provides: "If no person appears and answer
within the time allowed, the court may at once, upon motion of the applicant, no reason to the
contrary appearing, order a general default to be recorded and the application ( petition) be taken for
confessed. By the description in the notice. "To all whom it may concern," all the world are made
parties defendant and shall be concluded by the default and order. The court shall not be bound by
the report of the examiner of titles, but may require other and further proof."

The provisions of section 35 seem to be directly contrary to the contention of the appellants. It
seems to directly contradict the requirements of personal notice as an absolute prerequisite to the
granting of a valid title under the Torrens system.

The same idea is further confirmed by the provisions of section 38 of said Act No. 496. Said section
38 provides that: "Every decree of registration shall bind the land and quite the title thereto, subject
only to the exceptions stated in the following section. It shall be conclusive upon and against all
persons, including the Insular Government, and all the branches thereof, whether mentioned by
name in the application, notice or citations, or included in the general description 'To all whom it may
concern.'"

There is a further and very strong intimation in the law that personal notice is not absolutely a
prerequisite to the validity of title under the Torrens system. Section 32 (Act No. 496) provides that:
"The court shall, so far as it deems it possible, require proof of actual notice to all the adjoining
owners and to all persons who appear to have an interest in or claim to the land included in the
application." It will be noted also that the petitioner in registration cases is not by law required to give
any notice to any person. The law requires the clerk of the court to give the notices. (Sections 31
and 32 of Act No. 496.) It is true that "the court may also cause other or further notice of the
application to be given in such a manner and to such persons as it may deem proper." Thus it is
seen that the applicant is by express provision of law relieved from any obligation whatsoever to give
motive to any person of the pendency of his application to have his land registered under the
Torrens system. That being true, upon what theory may the applicant be subjected to harassment or
delay or additional expense, because some person claims that he did not receive actual personal
notice? Section 101 and 102 (Act No. 496) seem to contain a remedy for persons who have suffered
damages for the failure on the part of court officials to comply with the law. (Noble State
Bank vs. Haskell, 219 U. S., 104.) His remedy is not to have the registration and certificate annulled,
unless he comes within the provisions of section 38, and even then he is without a remedy against
the applicant unless he can show, within a period of one year after the decree of registration and the
granting of the certificate, at he has been "deprived of land or any estate or interest therein," by
fraud, and not even then, if an "innocent purchaser for the value has acquired and interest." In the
present case five years and a half had transpired and negotiations for the sale of the land to an
innocent purchaser had been terminated. There is not intimation that the petitioner is guilty of fraud,
in the slightes degree.

While the Torrens Land Law is a law of modern times, is has been adopted in many States and its
provisions have been attacked at almost every point. The requirements relating to notices has been
a fruitful source of litigation. The constitutionality of the law has been attacked many times, because
of the provision of said law relating to notices. This is not the first time that the question has been
presented to this court. The same question was presented to this court in the case of Grey Alba vs.
De la Cruz (17 Phil. Rep., 49). In that case the registered title was attacked upon the ground that
fraud existed, simply because personal notice had not been given. The existence of fraud was
predicated upon the failure of actual personal notice. In passing upon that question, this court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Trent, said (quoting from the syllabus):

In original proceedings for the registration of land under Act No. 496, the appellee herein was
made a party- defendant by publication, but was not personally served with notice: Held,
That the decree of the Court of Land Registration is conclusive against his as well as all the
world.

The proceedings for the registration of land, under Act No. 496, are in rem and not in
personam. A proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to
judgment without personal service upon the claimants within the state or notice by name to
those outside of it. Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. Such a
proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it would hardly do to make a distinction
between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who were not
known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71.)

In the present case there is not the slightest intimation that the original applicant (Maria del Consuelo
Felisa Roxas y Chuidan) was guilty of fraud. The record shows that she named all the persons who
might have an interest in the registration of her land, in her petition. The applicant is not charged
even with negligence. The record shows that she did all the law required her to do.

In discussing the Torrens Land Law we must keep in mind that its primary purpose is the registration
of the title which the applicant or petitioner has and to relieve his land of unknown liens or claims,
just or unjust, against it. The Torrens system of land registration is a system for the registration
of title to land only, and not a system established for the acquisition of land. It is not intended that
lands may be acquired by said system of registration. It is intended only that the title, which the
petitioner has, shall be registered and thereby cleared of all liens and burdens of whatsoever
character, except those which shall be noted in the order of registration and in the certificate issued.

If there exists known and just claims against the title of the applicant, he gains nothing in effect by
his registration, except in the simplicity of subsequent transfer of his title. The registration either
relieves the land of all known as well as unknown claims, absolutely, or it compels the claimants to
come into court and to make there a record, so that thereafter there may be no uncertainly
concerning either the character or the extent of such claims.

The requirement that personal notice shall be a prerequisite to the validity of registration would
absolutely prohibit the foreclosure of unknown claims, for the reason that personal notice could
never be given to "unknown claimants." The great difficulty in land titles arises from the existence of
possible unknown claimants. Known claimants can be dealt with. They furnish no valid impediment,
in fact, to the transfer of titles.

Courts have held that in actions in rem personal notice to owners of a res is not necessary to give
the courts jurisdiction to deal with and to dispose of the res. (Grey Alba vs. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. Rep.,
49; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; American Land Company vs. Zeis, 219 U.S., 47.) This rule was
first established in admiralty proceedings. It was established out of the very necessities of the case.
The owner of a ship, for instance, lived in London. His ship was found in the most distant ports of the
earth. Its operation necessarily required supplies, such as men, coal, and food. The very nature of its
business necessitated the making of contracts. The continuance of its voyage depended upon its
capacity to make contracts and to get credit. It might also, perchance, cause damage to other craft,
in like conditions. To be able to secure all such necessities, to satisfy all possible obligations, to
continue its voyage and its business on the high seas, merchants and courts came to regard the
"ship" as a person, with whom or with which they were dealing, and not its real owner. Consequently
there came into existence this action in rem. For the purpose of carrying into effect the broader
purposes of the Torrens land law, it has been universally considered that the action should be
considered as one in rem. Mr. Justice Holmes, then of the Supreme Court of the State of
Massachusetts, and now a member of the Supreme Court of the United State, in the case of
Tyler vs. Judges (175 Mass., 71), in discussing this question, said:

Looked at either from the point of view of history or of the necessary requirements of justice,
a proceeding in rem, dealing with a tangible res, may be instituted and carried to judgment
without personal service upon claimants within the State or notice by name to those outside
of it, and not encounter any provision of either constitution (of the State of Massachusetts or
the United States). Jurisdiction is secured by the power of the court over the res. As we have
said, such a proceeding would be impossible were this not so, for it hardly would dot to make
a distinction between the constitutional rights of claimants who were known and those who
were not known to the plaintiff, when the proceeding is to bar all. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95
U.S., 714, 727; The Mary, 9 Cranch 126, 144.)

There are many classes of cases where men may be deprived of their property and of their rights,
without personal notice of the proceedings in which that may occur. For instance, in attachment
cases, notice or service upon the defendant may be had by publication. (Pennoyer vs. Neff, 95 U.S.,
714, 727.) So also in divorce proceedings, as well as the rights of claimants against estates of
deceased persons, personal notice is not a prerequisite. Notice by publication may be had. Also
unknown claimants or owners may be brought into court without personal notice in an action for the
condemnation of private property for public use. There exists a multitude of cases in which personal
service is not necessary and service by publication is sufficient.

The law, even before the Torrens Law, provided means by which title to land might be quited "by
notice by publication to all persons." (Hamilton vs. Brown, 101 U.S., 256, 274; Huling vs. Kaw Valley,
etc., Co., 130 U.S., 559, 564; Parker vs. Overman, 18 Howard (N.Y.) 137; American Land
Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; Arndt vs.Griggs, 134 U.S., 316; Perkins vs. Wakeman, 86 Cal.,
580.)

Even before the Torrens Law was adopted, the states had the power and right to provide a
procedure for the adjudication of title to real estate. The state had control over real property within its
limits. The conditions of ownership of real estate in a state, whether the owner be a stranger or a
citizen, are subject to its rules, concerning the holding, transfer, liability to obligations, private or
public, and the models of establishing title thereto; and for the purpose of determining these
question, it (the state) may provide any reasonable rules or procedure. (Clark vs. Smith, 13 Peters,
195; Barker vs. Harvey, 181 U.S., 481; Mitchell vs. Furman, 180 U.S., 402; Botiller vs. Domingues,
130 U.S., 238; Moore vs. Steinbach, 127 U.S., 70; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316; American Land
Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47.)

The state possesses not only the power to determine how title to real estate may be acquired and
proved, but it is also within its legislative competency to establish the method of procedure.
(American Land Co. vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; Bertrand vs. Taylor, 87 Ill., 235; Title, Document, etc.,
Company vs. Kerrigan, 150 Cal., 208, 305; Perkins vs. Wakeham, 86 Cal., 580.)

The estate, as sovereign over the lands situated within it, may provide for the adjudication of title in a
proceeding in rem, or in the nature of a proceeding in rem, which shall be binding upon all persons
known and unknown. (State vs. McGlynn, 20 Cal., 233; 81 Am. Dec., 118; Perkins vs. Wakeham, 86
Cal., 580; 21 Am.t. Rep., 67; McLaughlin vs. McCrory, 55 Ark., 442; 29 Am. St. Rep., 56; People's
National Bank vs. Cleveland, 117 Ga., 908; People vs. Simon, 176 Ill., 165; 68 Am. St. Rep., 175;
Quarl vs. Abbett, 102 Ind., 233; 52 Am. Rep., 662; Ruppin vs. McLaughlin, 122 Iowa, 343;
Young vs. Upshur, 42 La. An., 362; 21 Am. St. Rep., 381; Tyler vs. Judges, 175 Mass., 71; 51
L.R.A., 571; 57 L.R.A., 297; Rohrer vs. Ader, 124 Mo., 24; Sandiford vs. Town of Hempstead, 90
N.Y. Supp., 76, 79, 97; Arndt vs. Griggs, 134 U.S., 316.)

If the state can provide for substituted service for the purpose of quieting title to real estate against
an unknown resident, it may provide a reasonable method for securing substituted services against
residents. The power of the state to provide methods of quieting title should not be limited to known
persons. In order to make such a law valuable and effective to its fullest extent, it is necessary that it
be made to operate on all interest and persons known or unknown.

Mr. Justice Holmes, in the case of Tyler vs. Judges (175 Mass., 71) in discussing this question, said:
"If it (the procedure) does not satisfy the Constitution, a judicial proceeding to clear titles against all
the world hardly is possible, for the very meaning of such a proceeding is to get rid of unknown as
well as known claims — indeed certainly against the unknown may be said to be its chief end — and
unknown claims cannot be dealt with by personal service upon the claimant."

Mr. Chief Justice White of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of the American Land
Company vs.Zeiss (219 U. S., 47) said: "To argue that the provisions of the statute are repugnant to
the due process clause (of the Constitution) because a case may be conceived where rights in and
to property would be adversely affected without notice being actually conveyed by the proceedings is
in effect to deny the power of the state to deal with the subject. The criterion is not the possibility of
conceivable injury, but the just and reasonable character of the requirements, having reference to
the subject with which the statute deals."

The court of appeals of the State of New York, in the case of In re Empire City Bank (18 N.Y., 199,
215) in speaking of the right of the state to prescribe in suitable cases for substituted service, said:
"Various prudential regulations are made with respect to these remedies by it may possibly happen,
notwithstanding all these precautions, that a citizen who owes nothing, and has done none of the
acts mentioned in the statutes, may be deprived of his estate without any actual knowledge of the
process by which it has been taken from him. If we hold, as we must, in order to sustain this
legislation, that the Constitution does not positively require personal notice in order to constitute a
legal proceedings due process of law, it then belongs to the legislature to determine in the particular
instance whether the case calls for this kind of exceptional legislation, and what manner of
constructive notice shall be sufficient to reasonably apprise the party proceeded against of the Legal
steps which are taken against him. (American Land Company vs. Zeiss, 219 U.S., 47; Title,
Document, etc., Company vs.Kerrigan, 150 Cal., 289.)"

The only case cited by the appellants in support of their argument, is the case of the American Land
Company vs.Zeiss (219 U.S., 47). In view of the facts and the decisions of the different courts which
are cited in that case, it is difficult to understand how it is authority in support of the contention of the
appellants here. The facts in that case are as follows:

Zeiss, on the 22d of August, 1906, commenced an action in the superior court of the country San
Francisco, alleging in substance that on the 18th and 19th days of April, 1906, a material part of the
public records contained in the office of the county recorder of the city and county of San Francisco
was destroyed by fire; that on the 18th day of April, 1906, and at the time of the filing of the
complaint, he was the owner and in the actual and peaceable possession of the parcels of land in
controversy: that his estate, title, interest in and to said parcels of land, and each of them, was that
of owner in fee simple, absolute, free from all encumbrances, liens, defect, claims or demands of
any kind or nature whatsoever. Under these facts the plaintiff, Zeiss, prayed that the be adjudged to
be the owner of and entitled to the possession of said parcels of land, and each of them, was that of
owner in fee simple, absolute, free from all encumbrance, liens, defects, claims or demands of any
kind or nature whatsoever. Under these facts the plaintiff, Zeiss, prated that he be adjudged to be
the owner of and entitled to the possession of said described parcels of land in fee simple, and that
no one else had any estate, rights, title, interest or claim in or to the same, or any part thereof, either
legal or equitable, present or future, vested or contingent.

Upon the presentation of the petition by Zeisss, a summons was issued and notice of the pendency
of the action was published in certain newspaper, as was required by law. Notice was also posted
upon the property, as required by the statute. No one having appeared and opposed the granting of
the petition of the complaint, or claimed any interest in or lien upon the property described in the
complaint, a default was ordered against all persons, and on the 19th days of December, 1906, a
decree was entered in favor of Zeiss, adjudging that he was the owner in fee simple, absolute, and
entitled to the possession of the land described in the complaint and that no other person had any
right title, interest, or estate in and to the same, or any part thereof, either legal or equitable, present
or future, vested or contingent.

Nothing else seems to have transpired after said decree was issued in favor of Zeiss, until the 26th
day of May, 1908, or one year and five months after the entry of the decree of the superior court, in
the city and county of San Francisco. On that date (the 26th of May, 1908) an action was brought in
the United States Circuit Court for the Northern District of California, in which the plaintiffs claimed
title to the parcels of land, as owners in fee simple, absolute, which had theretofore been decreed to
Zeiss. The plaintiff alleged that the decree issued by the superior court of the city and county of San
Francisco was void and of no force and effect and was made and maintained without due process of
law, and that said superior court, in said action and proceedings never had any jurisdiction over the
persons holding the title during such proceedings, and that said court did not have or obtain
jurisdiction to divest the right, title, interest or estate of plaintiff . The complaint alleged that "Zeiss
had no right whatever in said parcels of land, other than his rights of possession and occupation."
The bill further alleged that the plaintiffs had been at all times citizens and residents of California, not
seeking to evade, but ready to accept service of summons and easily reached for that purpose; that,
notwithstanding that fact, no service was made upon them nor did they in any way receive notice of
the pendency of the action (Zeiss vs. All persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real
property herein described); nor did they gain any knowledge of existence of the decree until more
than a year after its entry. To the complaint the defendant, Zeiss, demurred.

Upon the issue thus presented, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth District certified the
question involved to the Supreme Court of the United States. The Supreme Court of the United
States, after a careful analysis of the facts and of the law, in a very lengthy and instructive opinion
(219 U. S., 47), decided each of the question submitted by the Circuit Court of Appeals against the
contention of the plaintiff and returned the cause to the court below.

The original action by Zeiss was brought to quiet the title to two parcels of land for the purpose of
registrating his title to the same under an act of the legislature of the State of California, entitled "An
act to provide for the establishment and quieting of title to real property in case of loss or destruction
of public records." Said law is known as the McEnerney Law. It was intended by said act to provide a
method whereby owners in possession of real estate, where records had been destroyed to such an
extent as to make it impossible to trace a record title, might secure a degree in the court which would
furnish public, authenticated evidence of title. The special occasion for the law was the fact that
practically all of the public records of title in several counties in the State of California had recently
theretofore been destroyed as the result of an earthquake and fire. Said law provided that whenever
the public records in the office of the county recorded had been, or shall hereafter be lost or
destroyed, in whole or in any material part, by flood, fire, or earthquake, any person who claims an
estate of inheritance or have title in, and who had by himself or his tenants, or other persons holding
under him, in actual and peaceable possession any real property in said county, may bring and
maintain an action in rem, against all the world, in the superior court for the county in which said real
property is situate, to establish his title, and to determine all adverse claims thereto.

The law further provides that an action shall be commenced by the filing of a verified complaint, in
which he shall name the defendants as "all persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real
property herein described, or any part thereof." He was required to give in his complaint a particular
description of the property. The law provided that upon the filing of the complaint, a summons or
notice was required to be issued, containing the names of the court and the country in which the
action was brought, the name of the plaintiff, and a particular description of the property involved,
which notice was directed to "all persons claiming any interest in or lien upon the real property herein
described, or any part thereof," as defendants.

The law further provided that said summons or notice should be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in the county where the action was brought, at least once a week for a period of two
months.

The law further provided that personal notice should be given to any person claiming an interest in
the property or a lien thereon adverse to the plaintiff.
The said law further provided that upon the publication and posting of the summons and its service
upon and mailing to the person, if any, upon whom it is herein directed to be specially served, the
court shall have full and complete jurisdiction over the plaintiff and said property and of the person
and every one claiming any estate, right, title, or interest in or to or lien upon said property, or any
part thereof, and shall be deemed to have obtained the possession and control of said property, for
the purpose of the action, and shall have full and complete jurisdiction to render judgment therein,
which is provided for in the law.

In the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss, cited and relied upon by the appellants, the
validity of said law was attacked and the legality of the title granted to Zeiss was impugned for the
reason that the law was unconstitutional and void, and because the plaintiff had not received actual
notice of the application to Zeiss to have his title quieted, under said law. The Supreme Court of the
United States (219 U.S., 47) held, as has been above indicated, that the law was constitutional and
that a compliance with the requirements of the notice provided for in said law was sufficient to give
the court jurisdiction over the res and to enter a valid decree. There seems to be but little in the
decision in the case of the American Land Company vs. Zeiss to support the contention of the
appellants.

Considering that the Legislature of the Philippine Islands had full power to adopt the procedure
provided for in Act No. 496, for the registration of the title of lands; and

Considering that the court in the original action followed strictly the procedure adopted by said law;
and

Considering that there is no claim of fraud, actual or constructive, upon the part of any of the parties
connected with said action, we are forced to the conclusion that the appellants here are not now
entitled to have that judgment or decree of registration and certificate amended or set aside.

There remains another question, however, which the appellants have not discussed and which we
deem of importance. It is the question of the right of the Land Court to correct an error of closure in a
plan or of a statement contained in a certificate. A plan is prepared and is presented with the petition
for the registration of a parcel of land. No opponents appear. No opposition is presented to the
registration. All the steps in the procedure required by law have been taken. The land is registered. It
is then discovered for the first time that by reason of a wrong direction given to one of the lines in the
plan, said plan will not close — that if a wall were built upon the lines of the plan, one of the four
corners of the wall would not meter. We believe that an error of the character may be corrected by
the court, provided that such correction does not include land not included in the original petition.
Upon the question whether the amended plan (p.252, record) included more or different lands than
were included in the original petition, we find the following statements made by one of the judges
who ordered said plan amended. The statements is:

At this stage of the proceedings and on his particular point nothing further is incumbent upon
the court than to determine the property as it was adjudicated in this case.

Therein no new portion was either added or subtracted, and this court finds that such should
be the holding on this particular point.

We have a further statement made by one of the judges, the Honorable Charles H. Smith, relating to
the same question, in an answer presented by him to a petition for a writ of prohibition, presented by
some the appellants herein, to the Supreme Court. That petition for a writ of prohibition involved
practically the same question presented by the appellants here now. Upon the question whether or
not additional lands had been included in the new plan (p.252, record), Judge Smith, in answering
for himself and his associates (Ostrand and Romualdez) said:

Respondents deny that a new dividing line between the premises in question (premises of
the plaintiff and appellant) was determined and established by an order of the court issued at
the conclusion of said proceedings, but, on the contrary, respondents charge the truth to be
that the dividing line between said properties was not changed but simply approved and so
indicated upon the record title. For instance, the line between said properties beginning on
the south side of the Escolta is exactly at the same point indicated in the original description
and approved by the court; in other words, the premises in question of the said Maria del
Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian have not been enlarged; the boundary lines thereof have
not been changed; the real descriptions of the properties have been left undisturbed; the
adjoining land owned by the petitioners is undiminished, except possibly as to alleged
easements claimed to have been created by the projection of some of the roots of the
petitioners' building over the aforesaid registered property of the said Roxas. That matter is
settled clearly by the provisions of the last paragraph of section 39 of Act No. 496."

We called attention above to the fact that the petitioner alleged that the line A-B of her property ran
S., 44º 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters, while the plan accompanying said petition (see Exhibit A,
page 35, ante) made said line to run S., 46º 30' W., a distance of 31.08 meters An examination of
the certificate issued to the petitioner (see page 39, ante) also states that the line A-B runs S., 46 30'
W., for a distance of 31.08 meters. The record contains no application why the original plan (see
Exhibit A, page 35, ante) did not conform to the description of the land given in the petition. That
error, in our judgment, seems to have constituted the real difficulty with the closure of the plan.
Under said conditions we are of the opinion that the Land Court is entirely justified in ordering the
plan corrected for the purposes above indicated.

There is still another question involved in the case, which the appellants have not discussed, and
that is the right of Maria del Consuelo Felisa Roxas y Chuidian to have her original certificate of
registration corrected, for the purpose of showing that she was the owner of the buildings located
upon the parcel of land in question. It will be remembered that in her petition presented January 12,
1906, she alleged that she was the owner of the parcel of land in question, together with
the buildings thereon. No opposition was presented. No objection was made to the registration of the
land as described in her petition. The record shows no reason why the buildings should have been
omitted in the certificate of registration. The omission must have been an errors. on the part of the
clerk. We find that Act No. 496 contains an express provision for the correction of such errors.
Section 112 provides that the registered owner may, at any time, apply by petition to have corrected
any "error, omission, or mistake made in entering a certificate, or any memorandum thereon, or on
any duplicate certificate." We think the petition presented by Miss Roxas for the correction of such
original certificate was entirely within her right under the law. It might be claimed, and we believe that
the proposition is sustained by law, that the registration of a parcel of land, unless the record
contains something to the contrary, necessarily includes the buildings and edifices located thereon,
even though they are not mentioned. Without relying upon that proposition of law, however, and in
view of the petition of the plaintiff, it is hereby ordered that the original certificate be amended so as
to include not only the land described in the original petition, but the buildings located thereon as
well.

With reference to the petition of the Masonic Temple Association of Manila, the record contains no
sufficient reasons for not granting the same.

Therefore, and in view of all of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the judgment of the court
below should be and it is hereby affirmed, with costs.
[G.R. No. 14167. August 14, 1919. ]

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner and appellee. ANTIPAS VAZQUEZ and
BASILIO GAYARES, Petitioners-Appellants, v. RUFINA ABURAL ET. AL., objectors-appellees.

Cohn & Fisher, for Appellants.

Hilado & Hilado, for Appellees.

DECISION

MALCOLM, J. :

The principal question which this appeal presents is — When does the registration of title, under the Torrens
System of Land Registration, especially under the different Philippine laws establishing the Cadastral
System, become final, conclusive, and indisputable? The supplementary questions are — At what stage of
the cadastral proceedings does a decree exist in legal contemplation? Does it exist from the moment that
the court, after hearing the evidence, adjudicates the land in favor of a person and then, or later decrees the
land in favor of this person, or does it exist when the Chief of the Land Registration Office transcribes the
adjudication in the prescribed form?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Cadastral proceedings were commenced in the municipality of Hinigaran, Province of Occidental Negros,
upon an application of the Director of Lands, on June 16, 1916. Notice of the proceedings were published in
the Official Gazette as provided by law. The trial judge also issued general notice to all interested parties.
Among others, Victoriano Siguenza presented an answer asking for registration in his name of lot No. 1608.
The instant petitioners, Antipas Vazquez and Basilio Gayares, although said to reside in this municipality,
and although said to have participated in other cadastral cases, did not enter any opposition as to this lot.
Hearing was had during September, 1916. On September 21 of this year, the court issued the following
decree:jgc: chan roble s.com.p h

"It is hereby decreed that, upon a previous declaration of general default, the following lots be adjudged and
registered in the names of those persons whose names appear next after the lots, and in accordance with
the following conditions: . . .

"Lot No. 1608 with the improvements thereon to the conjugal partnership of Victoriano Siguenza and
Marcela Guanzon." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

On November 23 of the same year, the court declared final the foregoing decree in the following
language: jgc:chanrobles. com.ph

"The decision rendered by the court in the above-entitled case having become final on September 21, 1916,
it is hereby ordered that the Chief of the General Land Registration Office issue the decrees corresponding to
the lots adjudged by said decision.

"An appeal having however been interposed as to the lots enumerated as follows, the decrees thereon, must
be suspended until further order by this court: jgc:c hanro bles. com.ph

"Lot No. 521.

Eight months later, that is, on July 23, 1917, but before the issuance by the Land Registration Office of the
so-called technical decree, Antipas Vazquez and Basilio Gayares, the latter as guardian of the minor Estrella
Vazquez, came into the case for the first time. The petitioners, after setting forth their right of ownership in
lot No. 1608, and that it was included in their "Hacienda Santa Filomena," and after stating that they were in
complete ignorance of the proceedings, asked that the judgment of the court be annulled and that the case
be reopened to receive proof relative to the ownership of the lot. Counsel for Victoriano Siguenza answered
by counter-motion, asking the court to dismiss the motion presented on behalf of Vazquez and Gayares. The
court denied the motion for a new trial on the theory that there being a decree already rendered and no
allegation of fraud having been made, the court lacked jurisdiction. It may also be stated parenthetically
that counsel for Vazquez and Gayares made an unsuccessful attempt in the Supreme Court, through
mandamus, to have the record completed by the taking of evidence.

In order that the matter may not be confused, let it again be made clear that counsel for petitioners have
not raised the question of fraud as provided for in Section 38 of the Land Registration Law, nor have they
asked to be relieved from a judgment or order, pursuant to Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
because of mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. As a matter of fact, they could not well
claim fraud because all the proceedings were public and free from any suspicion of chicanery. As a matter of
fact, also, any special reliance on Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure would not get them anywhere
because more than six months had elapsed after the issuance of a judgment in this case. The issue
fundamentally becomes one of whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the appeal, since if
the judgment and the supplemental decree issued by the Judge of the Court of First Instance on September
21, 1916, and November 23, 1916, respectively, have become final, petitioners may no bring their appeal
before this court, because the time for the filing of their bill of exceptions has expired; while, if the cadastral
proceedings did not become final until the formal decree was issued by the Land Registration Office, then it
was proper for them to ask for a reopening of the case, and it would, consequently, be just as proper for
this court to order the trial court to permit the same.

OPINION.

The prime purpose of the Torrens System is, as has been repeatedly stated, to decree land titles that shall
be final, irrevocable, and indisputable. Incontestability of title is the goal. All due precaution must
accordingly be taken to guard against injustice to interested individuals who, for some good reason, may not
be able to protect their rights. Nevertheless, even at the cost of possible cruelty which may result in
exceptional cases, it does become necessary in the interest of the public weal to enforce registration laws.
No stronger words can be found than those appearing in Section 38 of the Land Registration Law (Act No.
496) wherein it is said that: "Every decree of registration shall bind the land, and quiet title thereto. . . . It
shall be conclusive upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all the branches
thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application, notice, or citation, or included in the general
description ’To all whom it may concern,’ Such decree shall not be opened by reason of the absence,
infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby, nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing
judgments or decrees; subject, however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or
interest therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the Court of Land Registration (Court of
First Instance) a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree, provided no innocent
purchaser for value has acquired an interest." cralaw vi rtua 1aw lib rary

While such statements can be made of the Torrens System proper, they become even more incisive and
peremptory when we come to consider the offspring of this system, here known as the Cadastral System.
Under the Torrens System proper, whether action shall or shall not be taken is optional with the solicitant.
Under the Cadastral System, pursuant to initiative on the part of the Government, titles for all the land
within a stated area, are adjudicated whether or not the people living within this district desire to have titles
issued. The purpose, as stated in section one of the Cadastral Act (NO. 2259), is to serve the public
interests, by requiring that the titles to any lands "be settled and adjudicated." cralaw virt ua1aw lib ra ry

Admitting that such compulsory registration of land and such excessive interference with private property
constitutes due process of law and that the Acts providing for the same are constitutional, a question not
here raised, yet a study of the law indicates that many precautions are taken to guard against injustice. The
proceedings are initiated by a notice of survey. When the lands have been surveyed and plotted, the
Director of Lands, represented by the Attorney General, files a petition in court praying that the titles to the
lands named be settled and adjudicated. Notice of the filing of the petition is then published twice in
successive issues of the Official Gazette in both the English and Spanish languages. All persons interested
are given the benefit of assistance by competent officials and are informed of their rights. A trial is had. "All
conflicting interests shall be adjudicated by the court and decrees awarded in favor of the persons entitled to
the lands or the various parts thereof, and such decrees, when final, shall be the bases of original
certificates of title in favor of said persons." (Act No. 2259, Sec. 11.) Aside from this, the commotion caused
by the survey and a trial affecting ordinarily many people, together with the presence of strangers in the
community, should serve to put all those affected on their guard.

After trial in a cadastral case, three actions are taken. The first adjudicates ownership in favor of one of the
claimants. This constitutes the decision — the judgment — the decree of the court, and speaks in a judicial
manner. The second action is the declaration by the court that the decree is final and its order for the
issuance of the certificates of title by the Chief of the Land Registration Office. Such order is made if within
thirty days from the date of receipt of a copy of the decision no appeal is taken from the decision. This again
is judicial action, although to a less degree than the first.

The third and last action devolves upon the General Land Registration Office. This office has been instituted
"for the due effectuation and accomplishment of the laws relative to the registration of land."
(Administrative Code of 1917, Sec. 174.) An official found in the office, known as the chief surveyor, has as
one of his duties "to prepare final decrees in all adjudicated cases." (Administrative Code of 1917, Sec.
177.) This latter decree contains the technical description of the land and may not be issued until a
considerable time after the promulgation of the judgment. The form for the decree used by the General Land
Registration Office concludes with the words: "Witness, the Honorable (name of the judge), on this the
(date)." The date that is used as authority for the issuance of the decree is the date when, after hearing the
evidence, the trial court decreed the adjudication and registration of the land.

The judgment in a cadastral survey, including the rendition of the decree, is a judicial act. As the law says,
the judicial decree when final is the base of the certificate of title. The issuance of the decree by the Land
Registration Office is ministerial act. The date of the judgment, or more correctly stated, the date on which
the defeated party receives a copy of the decision, begins the running of the time for the interposition of a
motion for a new trial or for the perfection of an appeal to the Supreme Court. The date of the title prepared
by the Chief Surveyor is unimportant, for the adjudication has taken place and all that is left to be
performed is the mere formulation of the technical description. If an unknown individual could wait possibly
years until the day before a surveyor gets around to transcribing a technical description of a piece of land,
the defeated party could just as reasonably expect the same consideration for his appeal. As a matter of
fact, the so-called unknown is a party just as much as the known oppositor for notice is to all the world, and
the decree binds all the world.

Both counsel for petitioners and respondents rely upon the decision of this court in the case of Tambunting
v. Manuel ([1916], 35 Phil.; 699) . That case and the instant case are not the same. In the Tambunting case
the contest was really between two parties each claiming to have a Torrens title; here one party has the title
and the other is seeking to oust him from his fortress. In the Tambunting case the declaration of ownership
but not the decree of registration had issued; here both declaration and decree have issued. The doctrines
announced in the decision in Grey Alba v. De la Cruz ([1910], 17 Phil., 49) relating to general notice and the
indefensibility of land titles under the Torrens system are much more applicable and can, with as much
reason, be applied to the cadastral system.

As a general rule, registration of title under the cadastral system is final, conclusive and indisputable, after
the passage of the thirty-day period allowed for an appeal from the date of receipt by the party of a copy of
the judgment of the court adjudicating ownership without any step having been taken to perfect an appeal.
The prevailing party may then have execution of the judgment as of right and is entitled to the certificate of
title issued by the chief of the Land Registration Office. The exception is the special provision providing for
fraud.

Counsel for appellants and appellees have favored the court with able arguments relative to the applicability
of Sections 113 and 513 of the Code of Civil Procedure to cadastral proceedings. The view we take of the
case would make unprofitable any discussion of this question.

It appearing that the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros of September 21, 1916,
has become final, and that no action was taken within the time provided by law for the prosecution of an
appeal by bill of exceptions, this court is without jurisdiction. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed with costs
against the appellants. So ordered.
G.R. No. 83609 October 26, 1989

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, IBARRA BISNAR and AMELIA BISNAR, respondents.

Ibarra L. Bisnar for himself and for and in behalf of co-private respondent Amelia Bisnar.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:

Petitioner Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, seeks a review of the decision dated May
27, 1988, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66426, entitled "Ibarra Bisnar, et al. vs. Director
of Lands," affirming in toto the decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, granting the private
respondents' application for confirmation and registration of their title to two (2) parcels of land in
LRC Cad. Rec. 1256.

In their joint application for registration of title to two (2) parcels of land filed on July 20,1976, the
applicants Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar claimed to be the owners in fee simple of Lots 866 and 870 of
the Pilar Cadastre Plan AP-06-000869, respectively containing an area of 28 hectares (284,424 sq.
m.) and 34 hectares (345,385 sq. m.) situated in barrio Gen. Hizon, Municipality of President Roxas,
Province of Capiz (p. 14, Rollo). The applicants alleged that they inherited those parcels of land (p.
41, Rollo) and they had been paying the taxes thereon (p. 40, Rollo).

On December 16,1976, the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development,
opposed the application on the grounds that:

1. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to

acquire ownership in fee simple of the land or lots applied for, the same not having
been acquired by any of the various types of title issued by the Spanish Government,
such as, (1) 'titulo real' or royal grant, (2) the 'concession especial' or special grant,
(3) the 'composicion con el estado titulo' or adjustment title, (4) the 'titulo de
compra 'or title by purchase, and (5) the 'informacion possessoria' or possessory
information under the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894, or any other recognized
mode of acquisition of title over realty under pertinent applicable laws.

2. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,

continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
application.

3. The properties in question are a portion of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private appropriation, (pp. 17-19, Record
on Appeal). (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)

On February 24,1977, the applicants filed an amended application, which was approved on March
14, 1977, and included the following allegation:

Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case, they hereby
apply for the benefits of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, as they
 and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land as owners for
more than fifty (50) years. (p. 16, Rollo.)

After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the names of the
applicants, herein private respondents. It found that applicants and their predecessors- in-interest
have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcels of
land under bona fide claims of ownership for more than eighty (80) years (not only 30) prior to the
filing of the application for registration, introduced improvements on the lands by planting coconuts,
bamboos and other plants, and converted a part of the land into productive fishponds (p. 68, Rollo).

On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision. It held that the classification of the
lots as timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said lots
are indeed more valuable as forest land than as agricultural land, citing as authority the case
of Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10). In this petition, the government
alleges that:

1. the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable

agricultural land, mineral land or forest land is a prerogative of the Executive
Department of the government and not of the courts;

2. that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership; and

3. that an applicant for registration of title has the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of Section 48 of Com. Act No. 141, as amended. (p. 19, Rollo.)

The principal issue in this appeal is whether the lots in question may be registered under Section 48
(b) of CA 141, as amended.

The petition is impressed with merit.

In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, we ruled:

As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act
2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable,
mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the
government and not the courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for
doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of lands of the public
domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the
government, through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or
abuse of discretion for respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1)
the disputed area is within a timberland block, and (2) as certified to by the then
Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes. (pp. 21-22, Rollo.)

It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is
classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless and until the land classified as forest is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply
(Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129
SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679).
Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vano vs.
Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]). A parcel of
forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]).

Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural
land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded (p. 26, Rollo). We reiterate our ruling
in Amunategui that:

In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving
that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Republic Act 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he
is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein
sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as
those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding
the filing of his application. (Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA
69.)

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside. The application for registration in
LRC Cad. Rec. 1256 of the former Court of First Instance, is hereby dismissed without costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-15656 November 15, 1920

JESUS VAÑO, applicant-appellant,

vs.
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, objector-appellee.

Jose A. Clarin for appellant.

Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:

All, that applicant desires by these proceedings is to obtain title to a tract of land containing a little
over 3,793 hectares, including within its boundaries four municipalities and constituting a not
inconsiderable part of the entire Province of Bohol. Certainly a modest hope which, however, was
thwarted by the oppositions entered by the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, and the
adverse judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bohol, denying the registration of the land, with
costs against the applicant, without prejudice. Applicant appeals.

To prove title, open continuous, exclusive, and notorious occupation of the land by the applicant and
his predecessors in interest since 1882, interrupted by the revolution, is relied upon. Included within
the perimeter of the tract are approximately 685 hectares of forest land and four logging trails in the
nature of highways. These portions should, without question, be eliminated from the claim. The
government concedes, however, that approximately 1,060 hectares are under cultivation and that
certain other portions have been used by the claimant for pasturage. (See Exhibits A, 1, and 2.) But
the doctrine of Lands ([1918]), 39 Phil., 175) cannot be successfully advanced for the claimant is not
holding the land under color of title. To the tracts, of which applicant is in actual possession, he can
secure title, on submission of proper plans. lawph!l.net

Judgment is affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-32941 July 31, 1973

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PIO R. MARCOS, in his capacity as Judge, Court of First Instance of Baguio, Branch I,
ALSON CARANTES, BILL CARANTES and EDUARDO CARANTES, respondents.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Dominador L. Quiroz and
Solicitor Rosalio A. de Leon for petitioner.

Jesus M. Ponce for private respondents.

FERNANDO, J.:

A perusal, even the most cursory, of this petition for review on certiorari, would make evident its
being impressed with merit. Respondent Judge, under color of a statutory provision 1 and at the
instance of private respondents, did re-open Civil Registration Case No. 1 of the Court of First Instance of
Baguio establishing the Baguio Townsite Reservation, promulgated as far back as November 13, 1922,
thus enabling private respondents to apply for the registration of an area of 74,017 square meters inside
the Camp John Hay Leave and Recreation Center. In the decision now sought to be set aside in this suit
dated November 9, 1968, its registration therefor was ordered in favor of the aforesaid private
respondents. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines thus has a legitimate grievance. Republic v.
Marcos, 2 a 1969 a decision, speaks authoritatively. It does provide a firm, not to say rocklike foundation.
Respondent Judge was without power to re-open the aforesaid Civil Reservation Case No. 1 which was
not a cadastral proceeding. What is more, it is undeniable that the land in question, being a part of a duly
established military camp or reservation, cannot be thus ordered registered in favor of private
respondents. We have to grant the petition.

It would appear from the facts that on November 12, 1966, respondents, the Carantes heirs, filed
under Civil Reservation Case No. 1 3 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City a petition for the re-
opening of said proceeding to have them declared owners, and for the registration in their favor of four
lots with a total area of 74,017 square meters therein described. Then on December 14, 1966,
respondent Judge issued an order requiring the publication and posting of notices thereof. The Director of
Lands duly opposed, as a report of an investigator of his office was that the area sought to be registered
is inside Camp John Hay in Baguio City. This notwithstanding, on November 9, 1968, the respondent
Judge rendered his decision, the dispositive portion of which reads: "[Wherefore], this Court hereby
orders the registration of this parcel of land, situated in Res. Sec. "J", Baguio City, identified as Lots 1, 2,
3, and 4 as shown on survey plan PSU 223402, and described in its Technical Descriptions and
Surveyor's Certificate, with a combined total area of 74,017 square meters, more or less, in the names of
the petitioners, pro-indiviso, namely, [Alson Carantes], married to Monica Pedro, [Eduardo Carantes],
married to Jesusa Rosal, and [Bill Carantes], married to Budaet Onias, all of legal ages, Filipino citizens,
with residence and postal addresses at Loakan, Baguio City, Philippines." 4 The efforts exerted by the
Director of Lands and the City of Baguio to appeal said decision, seasonably made, did not prosper,
respondent Judge being of the belief that "the proper party to appeal should be Camp John Hay."
Unfortunately, with the Solicitor-General not having been informed of what did transpire, such denial went
unchallenged. 5 It was not until August 22, 1969 that the Solicitor-General entered his appearance in the
case and filed a motion to annul the decision based on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter of the proceedings as the land in question is part of a duly established military
reservation. Such motion was denied by respondent Judge on December 8, 1969. It must be noted that
the location of the lot inside Camp John Hay is not a subject of dispute. Apparently, the respondent Judge
in refusing to set aside his decision was impressed by the claim that the private respondents had been in
possession "since the Spanish regime," and thus came within the protection of the words annotated on all
survey plans of Camp John Hay, to wit: "subject to prior and existing private rights." 6

What is immediately apparent is that even if the above decision were not flawed by a grave infirmity,
it could not survive after the decision of this Court in Republic v. Marcos, 7 as noted in the brief for
private respondents, an action against the very same judge whose actuation over a matter not dissimilar
was challenged and — challenged successfully. For the absence of jurisdiction under such statutory
provision from which he would derive his competence as well as the location of the disputed area inside a
military reservation deprived the decision now sought to be nullified of the slightest claim to validity. Nor
could private respondents derive comfort from the doctrine of estoppel which as they should be the first to
realize cannot operate against the state. Accordingly, as noted at the outset, we grant the petition.

1. The question of jurisdiction was squarely raised and passed upon in the aforesaid Republic v.
Marcos. Thus: "Republic Act No. 931 speaks in a manner far from ambiguous. It is quite explicit and
categorical. Only persons "claiming to parcels of land that have been the object of cadastral
proceedings' are granted the right to petition for a re-opening thereof if the other conditions named
therein are successfully met. It cannot admit of doubt, therefore, that if the parcels of land were not
the object of cadastral proceedings, then this statute finds no application. Considering that as far
back as October 10, 1910, the then President of the United States, William H. Taft, issued an
executive order reserving for naval purposes the lots now disputed, they could not have been the
object of the cadastral proceedings involving the Baguio townsite reservation, decided only on
November 13, 1922." 8 It was then stated in the opinion: "The Cadastral Act was enacted on February
11, 1913, taking effect on its passage. As is made clear in the first section thereof, when public interest
requires that titles to any land be settled and adjudicated, in the opinion of the then executive, the
Governor General, he could order the Director of Lands, to make a survey and plan of such lands.
Clearly, it does not include the survey of lands declared as reservations." 9

Its historical background was next passed upon: "An earlier act, enacted as far back as 1903,
specifically governs the subject matter of reservations. As provided therein: "All lands or buildings, or
any interests therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within the boundaries of the areas now or
hereafter set apart and declared to be military reservations shall be forthwith brought under the
operations of the Land Registration Act, and such of said lands, buildings, and interests therein as
shall not be determined to be public lands shall become registered land in accordance with the
provisions of said Land Registration Act, under the circumstances hereinafter stated." The validity of
this statute was sustained as against the allegation that there was a violation of the due process
clause, in a 1910 decision, Jose v. Commander of the Philippine Squadron." 10 Finally, an earlier case
of decisive significance was referred to: "What is even more conclusive as to the absence of any right on
the part of the private respondents to seek a re-opening under Republic Act No. 931 is our ruling
in Government v. Court of First Instance of Pampanga, a 1926 decision. We there explicitly held: "The
defendant's contention that the respondent court, in a cadastral case, has jurisdiction to order the
registration portions of a legally established military reservation cannot be sustained. The establishment
of military reservations is governed by Act No. 627 of the Philippine Commission and Section 1 of that Act
provides that "All lands or buildings, or any interest therein, within the Philippine Islands lying within the
boundaries of the areas now or hereafter set apart and declared to be military reservations shall be
forthwith brought under the operations of the Land Registration
Act. ... ." ' " 11

This Court could conclude therefore that as contended by petitioner Republic, respondent Judge in
that case was devoid "of jurisdiction to pass upon the claim of private respondents invoking the
benefits of Republic Act No. 931." 12 So it is in the present case. The absence of jurisdiction is equally
clear.
2. That Republic v. Marcos is likewise an insuperable bar to the re-opening sought by private
respondents is made clear by the latter portion of the opinion. Thus: "This lack of jurisdiction on the
part of respondent Judge is made more patent by another specific restriction of the right of a person
to seek re-opening under this statute. For the power of the Court to order such re-opening is limited
'to such of said parcels of land as have not been alienated, reserved, leased, granted, or otherwise
provisionally or permanently disposed of by the Government. ... .' Included in the petition is an
executive order of then President Herbert Hoover of June 19, 1929 declaring to be a naval
reservation of the Government of the United States 'that tract of land known as lot no. 141, residence
Section D, Baguio naval reservation, heretofore reserved for naval
purposes ... .' If there were still any lingering doubt, that ought to be removed by this reaffirmation of
a presidential determination, then binding and conclusive as we were under American sovereignty,
that the lot in question should be a naval reservation." 13

3. The state of the law could thus be summarized: "The private respondents are thus bereft of any
right which they could assert under Republic Act No. 931. Such an enactment is the basis of
whatever standing that would justify their reliance on the specific power granted courts of first
instance to re-open cadastral proceedings. Such jurisdiction is thus limited and specific. Unless a
party can make it manifest by express language or a clear implication from the wording of the statute
too strong to be resisted, he may not set in motion the judicial machinery under such specific grant
of authority. This, private respondents have failed to do as the statute in terms that are crystal clear
and free from ambiguity denies them such a right. Petitioners have made out their case
for certiorari and prohibition." 14

Private respondents, however, would not give up without an attempt to escape from the operation of
a decision that is controlling. Not that it did them any good. Their counsel, with as show of diligence,
would cite authorities on estoppel. He ought to have known better. He should have realized that
resort to them would be without avail. For, as Justice J.B.L. Reyes, speaking for this Court,
in Luciano v. Estrella, 15 categorically declared, "it is a well known and settled rule in our jurisdiction that
the Republic, or its government, is usually not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or
agents." 16 In an earlier case, Republic v. Philippine Rabbit Lines, Inc., 17 there was an enunciation of such
a principle in this wise: "Thus did the lower court, as pointed out by the then Solicitor General, conclude
that the government was bound by the mistaken interpretation arrived at by the national treasurer and the
auditor general. It would consider estoppel as applicable. That is not the law. Estoppel does not lie. Such
a principle dates back to Aguinaldo de Romero v. Director of Lands, a 1919 decision." 18

Nor is this all. An indication that one's appreciation of controlling doctrine leaves something to be
desired is bad enough. What is worse is the impression yielded of a failure to discern the thought
that lies behind the 1969 decision of Republic v. Marcos. 19 It is this: the state as a persona in law is
the juridical entity, which is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land under the basic doctrine
embodied in the 1935 Constitution as well as the present charter. It is charged moreover with the
conservation of such patrimony. 20 There is need therefore of the most rigorous scrutiny before private
claims to portions thereof are judicially accorded recognition, especially so where the matter is sought to
be raked up anew after almost fifty years. Such primordial consideration, not the apparent carelessness,
much less the acquiescence of public officials, is the controlling norm. Nor is there anything unjust in such
an approach as the alleged deprivation of a private right without justification by the government is not
remediless, where there is persuasive proof that such is the case. The point of this decision as well as the
earlier Republic v. Marcos is that the procedure followed by private respondents is not the road to such
an objective even on the assumption, purely hypothetical, that there is basis in law for what is hoped for
and aimed.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the decision of respondent
Judge, dated November 9, 1968, which is declared to be without any force or effect as having been
issued without jurisdiction. Costs against private respondents.
G.R. No. L-61539 February 14, 1986

DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners,

vs.
LOPE GUZMAN RIVAS, PACIFICO V. VIJANDRE, FERNANDO A. PASCUA, and COURT OF
APPEALS,respondents.

AQUINO, C.J.:

This is a land registration case involving what the Republic of the Philippines claims to be grazing
land, a part of the forest reserve.

The evidence shows that on March 14, 1873 the Alcalde Mayor and judge of the Court of First
Instance in Tuguegarao, Cagayan purportedly granted to Domingo Bunagan a possessory
information title for a tract of land, called Nottab, "3,500 brazas de largo y 3,000 brazas de ancho",
"destinado al pasto de sus ganados" y bajo la condicion de sin perjuicio del derecho que el Estado o
otro tercero pudiera tener en referida finca rustica" (Exh. I and K).

The Gaceta de Manila dated November 3, 1885 mentions Bunagan as having obtained a
"composicion gratuita" for a parcel of land in Enrile, Cagayan (Exh. J-1) or a gratuitous adjustment
title as distinguished from an onerous adjustment title. **

What happened to the Nottab land? The conflicting evidence of the oppositor Cagayan Valley
Agricultural Corporation (Cavaco) and petitioner Pacifico Vijandre shows that two persons, the
brothers Luis Guzman Rivas and Lope Guzman Rivas, sons of Pablo Guzman, played decisive roles
in its disposition.

The evidence is conflicting because, according to Cavaco's evidence, the whole land was sold to
Luis Guzman Rivas and later to Cavaco, whereas, according to Vijandre's evidence, only a portion
was sold to Luis and the remainder was sold to Lope Guzman Rivas who in turn sold portions to
Vijandre and Fernando A. Pascua.

The Solicitor General's view is that the whole Nottab land, whatever its area, is forestal and grazing
land, and consequently, was inalienable land and, therefore, all supposed sales regarding that land
were void.

According to Cavaco's evidence, after Bunagan's death, his son-in-law, Ceferino Saddul,
as apoderado of Bunagan's heirs, sold the land to one Manuel Guzman sometime in 1904 or 1905 or
1908.

The administratrix of Manuel Guzman's estate, with the approval of the probate court, sold the land
in 1934 to Luis Guzman Rivas who died in 1944. The land passed to his widow, Dolores Enriquez,
who sold the northern portion of the land to Saturnino Moldero in 1944 and the southern portion to
Rafael Gonzales in 1951.

Moldero in 1948 sold his northern portion to the spouses Antonio and Josefa Estrada. In 1951 the
Estrada spouses and (Gonzales sold the land to Cavaco (Exh. 12-A to 15—Pascua, 242 Joint
Record on Appeal).
The trial court and the Court of Appeals in a land registration case adjudicated to Cavaco 1,222
hectares of the Nottab land. It is the registered owner of the land. Right or wrong that decision is the
law of the case. (Cagayan Valley Agricultural Corporation vs. Director of Lands, CA-G.R. No, 24931-
32, December 9, 1960).

The trial court correctly held that the said adjudication means that the respondent herein cannot use
anymore in this case the supposed 1873 informacion posesoria and the 1885 composicion
gratuita as bases of their application for registration. The reason is that said Spanish titles were
already used in the Cavaco case.

Under those Spanish titles a land grant could not exceed 1,000 hectares (Director of Lands vs,
Reves, L-27594, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177, 191 and other cases). It may be repeated that
Cavaco obtained more than 1,000 hectares by virtue of the said Spanish titles. Parenthetically, it
may be stated that Presidential Decree No. 892 since 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as
evidence in land registration proceedings.

It is the supposed remainder of Bunagan's land that is now involved in this case, the portion
transferred to Lope Guzman Rivas as differentiated from the Cavaco land which came from Lope's
brother Luis. It should be stressed that according to the Cavaco case the whole land was sold to
Luis and, therefore, no remainder could have been transferred to Lope.

On the other hand, according to Vijandre's evidence in this case, on July 26, 1915, Manuela
Bunagan, the sole heir of Domingo, sold to Pablo Guzman for Pl,000 the remainder of the land in
Nottab, Enrile, Cagayan, "una parcela de pasto de ganaderia", covered by Tax Declaration No. 626
(Exh. H).

Pablo Guzman died in 1927. The Nottab land was inherited by his son, petitioner Lope Guzman
Rivas, who leased the land for grazing purposes to other persons. Lope has been residing in Makati,
Metro Manila since 1961 because he has a heart ailment.

In 1958 about 800 hectares of the said land were sold by Lope to Ignacio Pascua who in 1962 sold
the same portion to his son, Fernando.

Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre filed in May, 1968 an application for the registration of two parcels
of land located at Sitio Nottab, the same Nottab land previously applied for by Cavaco. It is covered
by Plan Psu-178846, embracing thirteen lots with an area of 1,033 hectares, and Plan Psu-179101
covering fifteen lots with an area of 890 hectares, or a total of 1,92.7 hectares.

Before the application was filed, Lope Guzman Rivas sold to his co-petitioner Vijandre l/2 of the
entire land at P50 a hectare. Vijandre undertook to finance the registration of the land. Should the
registration of the land not materialize for causes not imputable to Vijandre, then Lope would return
to mall scashadvances(9-16, Joint Record on Appeal).

The learned trial court declared the disputed land public land and dismissed the applications of Lope
Guzman Rivas and Vijandre and the claims of Pascua and Cavaco.

The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's decision. It granted the application of Lope and
Vijandre, except with respect to Lot No. 13, which was already covered by OCT No. 0-393. The
Directors of Lands and Forest Development appealed to this Court. Lope Guzman Rivas and
Vijandre did not file any appellees' brief.
The Solicitor General contends that the Appellate Court erred (1) in not declaring that the disputed
land is part of a forest reservation; (2) in not finding that Lope Guzman Rivas and Vijandre and their
predecessors have not been in the open, continuous, uninterrupted, exclusive and notorious
possession of the disputed land and that their possession was not in the concept of owner: (3) in not
finding that Domingo Bunagan's Spanish titles were not authentic and (4) in not finding that the 1960
decision in favor of Cavaco is not res judicata.

On the other hand, lawyer Pascua argues (1) that the disputed land was already private in the hands
of Domingo Bunagans (2) that portions of said land, 1,222 hectares and 9 hectares, were titled in the
names of Cavaco and Melardo Agapay (Benjamin V. Pascua) respectively; (3) that the pasture lease
agreements did not convert private land into public land and (4) that Bunagan's Spanish titles were
authentic and valid.

We hold that the disputed land is inalienable public grazing land, being a part of the forest reserve. It
is part of Timberland Project No. 15-A of Enrile, Cagayan. It is included in the Bureau of Forestry
Map L. C. 2263, comprising the Timberland of the Cagayan Land Classification, containing an area
of 8,249 hectares, situated in Enrile, Solana and Amulong, Cagayan. It is non-registerable (Exh. 2-
Rep.). It cannot be appropriated by private persons. It is not disposable public agricultural land.

Said land is a part of the to forest reserve under Presidential Proclamation No. 159 dated February
13, 1967. It is intended for "wood production watershed soil protection and other forest uses" (Exh.
1-B and 7, Rep.; 63 OG 3364). The reservation was made prior to the instant 1968 application for
registration.

Applicant Lope Guzman Rivas and oppositor Pascua and their predecessors have always treated
the 1,923 hectares as pasture land. Portions of the land had been the object of pasture lease
agreements with the Bureau of Forestry. Among the lessees were oppositor Fernando A.
Pascua himself, Eliseo Lasam and J.T.Torres, Jr. (Exh. 3 and 4, Rep.).

The 1960 and 1968 tax declarations of applicant Lope Guzmian Rivas describe the 2,000 hectares
of land in question as for "pasture exclusively", meaning it is grazing land (Exh. R and S). Similarly,
the 1960 and 1962 tax declarations submitted in evidence by oppositor Pascua describe 790 or 767
hectares of the land as "pasture land" (Exh. 27 and 28—Pascua).

We have stated that the supposed possessory information title issued in 1873 to the original
claimant, Domingo Bunagan, describes the land as "una estancia de ganado al terreno" (grazing
land), or "un terreno destinado al pasto de sus ganados" or la estancia para ganados denominada
Nottab".

The application for the possessory information title was approved "bajo la condicion de sin perjuicio
determination derecho que el Estado o otro tercero pudiera tener en referida finca rustica" (Exh. 1).
(Note that Exhibit J, the 1885 resolution published in Gaceta de Manila, is not a composition title at
all).

Manuela Bunagan, the supposed heir to Domingo Bunagan, sold in 1915 the 2,000 hectares in
question to Pablo Guzman at fifty centavos a hectare as "una parcela de pasto de ganaderia (Exh.
H). Similarly, Ignacio A. Pascua bought from Lope Guzman Rivas the 800 hectares in 1962 as "a
parcel of pasture land" (Exh. I Pascua).

Grazing lands and timber lands are riot alienable under section 1, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution and sections 8, 10 and 11 of Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. Section 10
distinguishes strictly agricultural lands(disposable) from grazing lands (inalienable).
Lands within the forest zone or timber reservation cannot be the object of private ownership
(Republic vs. Animas, L- 37682, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 499; Director of Forestry vs. Munoz, 132
Phil. 637; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56077, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 156 and
other cases).

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Appellate Court is reversed and set aside. The application for
registration of Lope Guzman Rivas and Pacifico V. Vijandre and the counter-application of lawyer
Fernando A. Pascua are dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-38540 April 30, 1987

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and NIELSON & COMPANY, INC., respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Quasha, Aspillera, Zafra, Tayag and Ancheta for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals 1 in CA G.R.
No. 37417-R, dated 3 April 1974, reversing the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Manila which ordered private respondent
Nielson & Co., Inc. to pay the Government the amount of P11,496.00 as ad valorem tax, occupation fees, additional residence tax and 25%
surcharge for late payment, for the years 1949 to 1952, and costs of suit, and of the resolution of the respondent Court, dated 31 May 1974,
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said decision of 3 April 1974.

In a demand letter, dated 16 July 1955 (Exhibit A), the Commissioner of Internal Revenue assessed
private respondent deficiency taxes for the years 1949 to 1952, totalling P14,449.00, computed as
follows:

1-1/2% ad valorem tax on P448,000.00..........................P7,320.00

25% surcharge for late payment......................................1,830.00

Occupation fees for the years 1949

to 1952 at P1.00 per ha. per

year on 1, 230 hectares.....................................4,920.00

Additional residence tax on P79,000.00

at P1.00 per every P5,000.00

per year or P75.00 x 4 years................................303.20

25% surcharge for late payment.........................................75.00

TOTAL AMOUNT DUE............................ P14,449.00 2

Petitioner reiterated its demand upon private respondent for payment of said amount, per letters
dated 24 April 1956 (Exhibit D), 19 September 1956 (Exhibit E) and 9 February 1960 (Exhibit F).
Private respondent did not contest the assessment in the Court of Tax Appeals. On the theory that
the assessment had become final and executory, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of the said
amount against private respondent with the Court of First Instance of Manila, where it was docketed
as Civil Case No. 42911. However, for failure to serve summons upon private respondent, the
complaint was dismissed, without prejudice, in the Court's order dated 30 June 1961. On motion, the
order of dismissal was set aside, at the same time giving petitioner sixty (60) days within which to
serve summons upon private respondent.

For failure anew to serve summons, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order dated 4
October 1962 dismissing Civil Case No. 42911 without prejudice. The order of dismissal became
final on 5 November 1962.

On 15 November 1962, the complaint against private respondent for collection of the same tax was
refiled, but the same was erroneously docketed as Civil Case No. 42911, the same case previously
dismissed without prejudice. Without correcting this error, another complaint was filed on 26
November 1963, docketed as Civil Case No. 55817, the subject matter of the present appeal.

As herein earlier stated, the Court a quo rendered a decision against the private respondent. On
appeal to the respondent Court of Appeals, the decision was reversed. Petitioner, Republic of the
Philippines, filed a motion for reconsideration which was likewise denied by said Court in a resolution
dated 31 May 1974. Hence, this petition, with the following assignment of errors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE LETTER OF ASSESSMENT
DATED JULY 16, 1955, EXHIBIT "A," WAS RECEIVED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE
ORDINARY COURSE OF THE MAIL PURSUANT TO SECTION 8, RULE 13 OF THE REVISED
RULES OF COURT.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT FAILED
TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION THAT THE LETTER ASSESSMENT DATED JULY 16, 1955,
HAVING BEEN DULY DIRECTED AND MAILED WAS RECEIVED IN THE REGULAR COURSE OF
THE MAIL AND THAT OFFICIAL DUTY HAS BEEN REGULARLY PERFORMED.

III

THAT, ASSUMING, WITHOUT ADMITTING, THAT THE LETTER DATED JULY 16, 1955 (EXHIBIT
"A") CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS AN ASSESSMENT, ON THE THEORY THAT THE SAME HAS
NOT BEEN RECEIVED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE LETTER OF THE DEPUTY COLLECTOR (NOW DEPUTY COMMISSIONER)
OF INTERNAL REVENUE DATED SEPTEMBER 19, 1956 (EXHIBIT "E") IS ITSELF AN
ASSESSMENT WHICH WAS DULY RECEIVED BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT.

Relying on the provisions of Section 8, Rule 13 and Section 5, paragraphs m & v. Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules of Court, petitioner claims that the demand letter of 16 July 1955 showed an imprint
indicating that the original thereof was released and mailed on 4 August 1955 by the Chief, Records
Section of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and that the original letter was not returned to said
Bureau; thus, said demand letter must be considered to have been received by the private
respondent. 3 According to petitioner, if service is made by ordinary mail, unless the actual date of receipt
is shown, service is deemed complete and effective upon the expiration of five (5) days after mailing. 4 As
the letter of demand dated 16 July 1955 was actually mailed to private respondent, there arises the
presumption that the letter was received by private respondent in the absence of evidence to the
contrary. 5 More so, where private respondent did not offer any evidence, except the self-serving
testimony of its witness, that it had not received the original copy of the demand letter dated 16 July
1955. 6
We do not agree with petitioner's above contentions. As correctly observed by the respondent court
in its appealed decision, while the contention of petitioner is correct that a mailed letter is deemed
received by the addressee in the ordinary course of mail, stilt this is merely a disputable
presumption, subject to controversion, and a direct denial of the receipt thereof shifts the burden
upon the party favored by the presumption to prove that the mailed letter was indeed received by the
addressee. Thus:

Appellee contends that per Exhibit A, the notice was released and mailed to the
appellant by the BIR on Aug. 4, 1955 under the signature of the Chief, Records
Section, Office; that since the original thereof was not returned to the appellee, the
presumption is that the appellant received the mailed notice. This is correct, but this
being merely a mere disputable presumption, the same is subject to controversion,
and a direct denial of the receipt thereof shifts the burden upon the party favored by
the presumption to prove that the mailed letter was received by the addressee. The
appellee, however, argues that since notice was rc-,Ieased and mailed and the fact
of its release was admitted by the appellant the admission is proof that he received
the mailed notice of assessment. We do not think so. It is true the Court a quo made
such a finding of fact, but as pointed out by the appehant in its brief, and as borne
out by the records, no such admission was ever made by the appellant in the answer
or in any other pleading, or in any declaration, oral or documentary before the trial
court. We note that the appellee has not met this challenge, and after a review of the
records, we find appeflant's assertion well-taken. 7

Since petitioner has not adduced proof that private respondent had in fact received the demand
letter of 16 July 1955, it can not be assumed that private respondent received said letter. Records,
however, show that petitioner wrote private respondent a follow-up letter dated 19 September 1956,
reiterating its demand for the payment of taxes as originally demanded in petitioner's letter dated 16
July 1955. This follow-up letter is considered a notice of assessment in itself which was duly
received by private respondent in accordance with its own admission. 8 The aforesaid letter reads:

Septe
mber
19,
1956

Nielson and Company, Inc.

Ayala Boulevard, Manila

Gentlemen:

In reply to you (sic) letter dated June 1, 1956 relative to your pending internal
revenue tax liability involving the amount of P15,649.00 as annual occupation fees,
ad valorem and additional residence taxes, surcharges and penalty, originally
demanded of you on July 16, 1955, I have the honor to inform you that investigation
conducted by an agent of this office show that you and the Hixbar Gold Mining Co.,
Inc. entered into an agreement in 1938 whereby you were given full exclusive and
irrevocable control of all the operations, development, processing and marketing of
mineral products from the latter's mines and that au the assessments, taxes and fees
of any nature in connection with the said operation, development, proceeding and
marketing of these products shall be paid by you. In view thereof, and it appearing
that the aforesaid tax liabilities accrued when your contract was in fun force and
 effect, you are therefore, the party hable for the payment thereof, notwithstanding the
alleged contract subsequently entered into by you and the Hixbar Gold Mining Co.,
Inc. on September 9, 1954.

It is therefore, again requested that payment of the aforesaid amount of P15,649.00

be made to the City Treasurer, Manila within five (5) days from your receipt hereof so
that this case may be closed.

You are further requested to pay the sum of P150.00 as compromise suggested in
our letter to you dated February 24, 1955, it appearing that the same has not as yet
been paid up to the present.

Very respectfully yours,

JOSE ARANAS

Deputy Collector of Internal Revenue 9

Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, the assessment is appealable to the Court of Tax
Appeals within thirty (30) days from receipt of the letter. The taxpayer's failure to appeal in due time,
as in the case at bar, makes the assessment in question final, executory and demandable. Thus,
private respondent is now barred from disputing the correctness of the assessment or from invoking
any defense that would reopen the question of its liability on the merits. 10

In Mamburao Lumber Co. vs. Republic, 11 this Court further said:

In a suit for collection of internal revenue taxes, as in this case, where the assessment has already
become final and executory, the action to collect is akin to an action to enforce a judgment. No
inquiry can be made therein as to the merits of the original case or the justness of the judgment
relied upon. ...

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is hereby reversed. The decision of the Court a quo is
hereby reinstated. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 70825 March 11, 1991

DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ISIDRO ESPARTINEZ, respondents.

Antonio A. Azana for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. CV No.
66710 affirming in all respects the decision ** of the then Court of First Instance of Albay, Branch IV,
dated January 30, 1978, ordering the registration, in the name of Isidro Espartinez of Lot 6783, Cad
239, Ligao Cadastre, located in Agul, formerly of Ligao, Albay, now Pioduran, Albay.

The application for the registration of said lot, which allegedly contained an area of 1,036,172 square
meters, was filed by Espartinez on May 17, 1972. He alleged therein that he acquired lot by
purchase from Sotera Llacer. He invoked Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by
Republic Act No. 1942, should the Land Registration Act be not applicable.

The jurisdictional requirements of publication of notice of initial hearing (Exhibits "A" and "C") and
posting of such notices in conspicuous places in the parcel of land involved and in the municipal
building (Exhibit "B") having been complied with, and considering that only the Bureau of Lands and
the Bureau of Forestry represented by the fiscal had appeared, the lower court issued an order of
general default with the exception of said government agencies. Thereafter, one Perpetua Llarena
appeared and, together with the fiscal, she was required to file an opposition to the application.

Inasmuch as both the fiscal and Llarena failed to file their respective oppositions within the period
set by the court, on December 12, 1972, it commissioned the clerk of court to receive evidence. On
the same day, however, the Solicitor General entered his appearance for the government and at the
same time, filed an opposition to the application for registration. He alleged therein that neither
Espartinez nor his predecessors-in-interest had sufficient title to acquire ownership in fee simple of
the land the same not having been acquired by means of any of the various types of title issued by
the Spanish government or any other recognized mode of acquisition of title over realty under
pertinent laws; that neither Espartinez nor his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession of the land for at least thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the
application; that Espartinez may not avail of the provisions of Section 48 of the Public Land Act for
failure to fulfill the requisites prescribed therein; and that the parcel of land involved is part of the
public domain and therefore, not subject to private appropriation.

Thereafter, seventeen (17) oppositors, claiming to be farmer-settlers on the land, flied a motion to lift
the order of general default and opposition to the application for registration. Espartinez filed a
motion to dismiss the opposition contending that the private oppositors were, with one exception,
mere homestead applicants who were barred by prior judgments in Civil Case No. 2976, which was
dismissed for failure to prosecute, and in CAR Case No. 523 wherein the Court of Agrarian Relations
declared Sotera Llacer as the owner of Lot 6783 and the oppositors as her tenants.

On January 30, 1978, the lower court rendered the aforementioned decision based on the following
findings of facts:

On March 28, 1885, a parcel of land in Ligao (now Pioduran) Albay, was adjudicated to Faustino
Llacer. This is evidenced by the following entry on page 424 of the Gaceta de Manila:
 INTENDENCIA GENERAL DE HACIENDAS DE FILIPINAS

Indice de las resoluciones definitivas adoptadas por esa Intendencia general desde el 16 al
28 del Febrero proximo pasado, que se publica en la Gaceta, con arreglo a lo mandado en
Decreto de 28 de Octubre de 1869 . . .

Feb. 24. — Adjudicando a D. Faustino Llacer la extension de 80 hectares y 16 centiareas de

terreno situado en el pueblo de Ligao, Provincia de Albay, en la cantidad de pfs. 10053.

Manila de 28 de Marzo de 1885 . . . Luna. (Exhibit "L")

The same parcel of land was in turn, adjudicated after the death of Faustino Llacer, to then minor
Sotera Llacer through an order of the Court of First Instance of Albay dated November 11, 1913 in
Civil Case No. 422 entitled "Abintestato de los Finados Faustino Llacer y Maria Prollamante" (Exhibit
"K"). Hence, the land which was earlier declared for taxation purposes in the name of "Los
Herederos de los finados Faustino Llacer y Maria Prollamante" (Exhibits "P", "Q" and "R"), was so
declared by Sotera Llacer in her own name (Exhibits "I", "S" and "T"). In CAR Case No. 523, Sotera
Llacer and her husband, Bonifacio Viscaya were also declared by the Court of Agrarian Relations in
Legazpi City as landholders of Lot 6783 (Exhibit "J").

On November 26, 1969, Sotera Llacer sold to Isidro Espartinez Lot 6783 which is described in the
deed of absolute sale as containing an area of 1,036,172 square meters in consideration of the
amount of P 8,500.00 (Exhibit "E"). So as to reflect the agreement that Espartinez would assume the
responsibility and expenses in ejecting the occupants of the land pursuant to the decision in CAR
Case No. 523, Espartinez and Sotera Llacer executed an amended deed of sale on June 11, 1970
(Exhibit "F"). Thereafter, Espartinez declared the property for taxation purposes (Exhibit "G") and
paid the corresponding real property taxes thereon (Exhibit "H").

Espartinez secured a survey plan of the land (Exhibit "M") and a technical description thereof
(Exhibit "N") indicating that the actual area of the land is 103 hectares, 61 ares and 72 centares. He
planted it to sugar cane and coconuts and used a portion as grazing area for his cattle and
carabaos.

Based on these facts, the lower court concluded that the preponderance of evidence weighs heavily
in favor of Espartinez. The oppositor public officials appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate
Court which affirmed the lower court's decision in all respects.

The appellate court considered Exhibit "L" as a possessory information title. Citing Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, the appellate court held that
Espartinez' possession and occupancy of the land may be tacked to that of his predecessors-in-
interest who had possessed and occupied it from as far back as March 28, 1885 when it was
adjudicated in favor of Faustino Llacer, or a period of around 87 years when the application for
registration was filed.

The Director of Land and Forestry Development, through the Solicitor General, filed the instant
petition for review on certiorari contending that the Intermediate Appellate Court committed errors of
law in: (a) granting the application of confirming the title of Espartinez notwithstanding the fact that
he had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that he has a registerable title to the
property subject of the application, and (b) agreeing with the lower court's decision which directed
the registration of subject parcel of land even in the absence of proof that the same is alienable and
disposable and despite private respondent's failure to adduce in evidence certain required
documents.
A crucial point to resolve is whether the appellate court correctly considered Exhibit "L" as a
possessory information title. Worth noting is the fact that said document is, as the said court itself
describes it, "a copy of a certification issued by the Chief of the division of Archives of the Bureau of
Public Libraries of an excerpt of an entry appearing on page 424 of the Gaceta de Manila of the year
1885 regarding some resolution(s) issued and published pursuant to a certain decree dated October
28, 1869." (Rollo, p. 29). The "excerpt of an entry" is the Spanish text quoted above.

From said description alone, it is clear that Exhibit "L" is neither a document, deed or title evidencing
ownership over Lot 6783. The entry does not even contain an accurate description of the lot setting
forth its metes and bounds on which its identification may be based. Moreover, while the entry states
that Faustino Llacer had been adjudicated an 80-hectare parcel of land, it does not state by what
reason such adjudication was made.

Granting that there was indeed an "adjudication" or grant of the land to Llacer, still the same cannot
be considered as a possessory information title which has been converted into a registration of
ownership in the absence of proof that Llacer had complied with the requirements set forth in Article
393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law (Director of Lands vs. Reyes, L-27594, November 28, 1975, 68
SCRA 177, 191-192). Exhibit "L" not being either a titulo de informacion posesoria or a title
by composicion con el estado, it did not establish the right of ownership of Espartinez' predecessors-
in-interest (Heirs of Inocencio Santiago v. Castro, G.R. No. 62014-16, April 2, 1984, 128 SCRA 545).

The other proofs of an alleged registerable title presented by Espartinez are likewise not of any help
to him. Tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership
(Ferrer-Lopez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50420, May 29, 1987, 150 SCRA 393). The survey
plan, Exhibit "M", which allegedly evidences the fact that the land actually contains an area of around
103 hectares instead of the 80 hectares reflected in Exhibit "L", is not even admissible in evidence
because it has not been approved by the Director of Lands (Director of Lands vs. Heirs of Juana
Carolino, G.R. No. 61598, December 12, 1985, 140 SCRA 396).

In the same vein, while the presentation of the tracing cloth plan required by Sections 1858 and
1864 of the Revised Administrative Code may now be dispensed with where there is a survey plan
the correctness of which had not been overcome by clear, strong and convincing evidence (Director
of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56613, March 14, 1988, 158 SCRA 568, 571; Republic vs.
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 70594, October 10, 1986, 144 SCRA 705), in this case, the
tracing cloth plan assumes a great importance in view of the discrepancy between the area of the
land under Exhibit "L" and that being claimed by Espartinez. Unfortunately, there seems to be no
tracing plan at all, notwithstanding the allegation in the application that the same was attached
thereto (Record on Appeal, p. 3). There is no proof that it had been detached and kept by the Land
Registration Commission (See: Republic vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61462, July 31, 1984, 131
SCRA 140), and, inspite of herein petitioners' repeated contention of the absence of the tracing cloth
plan, Espartinez has failed to traverse such contention.

Neither may the decision in the intestate proceedings for the estate of Faustino Llacer and Maria
Prollamante be invoked by Espartinez. As earlier stated, Llacer had, in the very beginning, no
transmissible rights over the property. The other cases, Civil Case No. 2976 and CAR Case No. 523,
were not land registration cases and therefore, ownership of the property was not definitively passed
upon.

Espartinez' reliance on Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 is also misplaced. That law is
premised on the prior classification of the land involved as a disposable agricultural land, The law
states:
 Sec. 48 The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of title therefor, under the
land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in the
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, except as against
the Government since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title
under the provisions of this chapter.

Anyone who applies for confirmation of imperfect title under this provision has, under the ruling
in Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry (L-30035, November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 69) the
burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain. Although the application of said ruling should be on a case to case basis with the end in
view of enhancing the very reasons behind the enactment of land registration laws (Director of
Lands vs. Funtilar, G.R. No. 68533, May 23, 1986, 142 SCRA 57, 69), considering the foregoing
discussion and the glaring fact that the area sought to be registered is around 23 hectares larger
than that indicated in Exhibit "L" from which Espartinez' claim of ownership sprung, the ruling in
the Heirs Amunategui case must be given strict application.

Espartinez having failed to present any proof that the land in question has been classified as and
forms part of the disposable public domain, whatever possession he might have had, and however
long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 58867,
June 22, 1984, 129 SCRA 689 citingAdorable vs. Director of Lands, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]; Director of
Forestry vs. Muñoz, L-24796, June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1184; Director of Lands vs. Abanzadao, L-
21814, July 15, 1975, 65 SCRA 5, and Republic v. Court of Appeals, L-39473, April 30, 1979, 89
SCRA 648) and his failure to adduce clear and convincing evidence of his claim over the land has
given rise to the presumption that Lot 6783 is still part of the public domain (Director of Lands vs.
Heirs of Juana Carolino, supra).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appealed decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the land subject of the application for registration and
confirmation of imperfect title is hereby DECLARED as part of the public domain.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 74957

ROBERTO VALLARTA, CESAR VALLARTA, ANTONIO MANANSALA, JR., ARMANDO GARCIA

and ABELARDO LOPEZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. LORENZO B. VENERACION, in his capacity
as Judge presiding over Branch LIV, Regional Trial Court of Macabebe, Pampanga;
MARCELINO MARCOS; ROBERTO CUNANAN; VICENTE GONZALES; RODOLFO GUEVARRA;
FILEMON SINGSON; ANDRES BALINGIT; DIONISIO CATAHAN; MANUEL MANGHAHAS;
RODOLFO CANILAO; ATO GADDI; RICARDO (surnamed unknown) alias "Carding", JUAN
(surname unknown) of Sapang Kawayan and TRANQUILINO ARROYO, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This case commenced as a complaint for forcible entry filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Macabebe and Masantol, Pamanga against respondent Marcelino Marcos and his group who
allegedly entered the disputed fishponds through threat and intimidation on June 22, 1981 and threw
the petitioners out of the remises.

The defendants, now respondents, alleged their prior possession of the fishponds and claimed that
the petitioners were the ones who attempted to dispossess them from the property. Meanwhile,
respondent Tranquihno Arroyo, intervened in the ejectment case alleging that he was the real owner
of the fishponds and that the defendants, now his co-respondents in this petition, were his lessees.

The background facts from the petitioners's view-point are recited in their memorandum as follows:

l. Prior to July 22, 1981, the fishpond in dispute which consists of four (4) parcels of land with
an area of fifty-seven (57) hectares situated in Sitio Teracan, Barrio Consuelo, Municipality of
Macabebe, Pamanga, as depicted in LC Ma-SZ-R-3-6-01 was inalienable art of the public
domain having been classified as mangrove swam (forestral). (Exhibits H-3; K, K-1 to K-4).

On July 22, 1981, the Minister of Natural Resources, then Hon. Teodoro Q. Peña, issued
BFD Administrative Order No. 4-1596 (Exbibit H-3) which declared certain portions of the
public domain situated in the Municipality of Masantol, province of Pamanga under LC
project 21-A, as alienable and disposable for fishpond development. (Exhibit H-3) Among
those listed as claimants/occupants within said project 21-A, alienable and disposable for
fishpond development at Masantol, Pamanga, Barangay Consuelo and Esteban, is plaintiff
Roberto Vallarta, (Exhibits H-6 and H-7).

It was actually plaintiff Vallarta who recipitated the release from the public domain (forestral)
of the area in dispute as alienable and disposable for fishpond development by filing an
application therefor. (Exhibit 1)

2. Plaintiff Vallarta came upon a swamp area at Teracan, Bo. Consuelo, Municipality of
Macabebe, province of Pamanga, occupied by his co-plaintiffs, who inherited their respective
areas from their grandparents.
3. Plaintiff Vallarta, on his proposal, developed the subject area with his co-plaintiffs in 1976
and little by little, thru the years, improved it into a developed fishpond. presently fifty (50)
hectares are developed, while seven (7) hectares remain undeveloped.

4. From plaintiff Vallarta's verification from the Bureau of Lands, the land in question was still
public land (mangrove) swam). He was referred to the Bureau of Forestry, which informed
him that the area was art on the public domain (forestral) and was advised, as he was in
occupancy thereof, to file an application for lease agreement with the Bureau of Fisheries,
which in turn, told him that the area should first be classified as alienable and disposable. A
formal request therefor was thus made by Vallarta (Exh. 1) which he filed with the Bureau of
Forestry.

5. The application of plaintiff Vallarta was referred to the Composite Land Classification
Team CLC Team), the members of which are representatives of the Bureau of Lands, the
Bureau of Fisheries & Aquatic Resources and the Bureau of Forest Development. The CLC
Team classifies and zonifies area/s fitted for fishpond purposes, as alienable and disposable,
and effects survey and prepares the ma of the area involved.

6. The CLC Team verified from their own records the nature of the area involved and
certified the same as public land. The questioned area is depicted in LC-Map-SZ-R-360-1
(Exhibit A - Injunction).

The CLC Team conducted the necessary field work on the area applied for as alienable and
disposable for fishpond purposes. Finding the area in question suited for fishpond purposes,
the CLC Team issued the necessary certification that the area is alienable and disposable for
fishpond development subject to the approval of the Minister of Natural Resources. The
Minister of Natural Resources approved the recommendation of the Director of Forestry and
issued BFD ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER No. 4-1596 dated July 22,1981 which declares as
"alienable or disposable for fishpond development that portion of the public domain situated
in Masantol, Pamanga, containing an approximate area of 4,574.8 hectares, more or less, as
shown and described in the Bureau of Forest Development Ma SZ-68" (Exhibit H-3 The
57.6373 hectare fishpond, developed and occupied by plaintiff Vallarta is a portion of the
area covered by BFD Adm. Order No. 4-1596. (Exhibits K, K-1 to K-4 H-6 H-7)

When the CLC Team headed by Jose O. Banigued, who testify in the case, conducted in
January 1981 an ocular inspection of the area applied for, they found Roberto Vallarta in
occupancy of the subject area and saw workers and plaintiffs in the fishpond. They also saw
in the area in question concrete dikes and gates, as well as milkfish, and indeed found it to
be "fully developed area." The CLC Team reared their Memorandum to the Chairman,
National LC Committee and Swam Zonification Report dated January 17, 1981
recommending approval of the zonification of the area into alienable and disposable for
fishpond development. (Exhibits K, K-1 to K-4)

7. On May 22, 1981, plaintiff Vallarta filed his Application for Fishpond Lease Agreement
(Exhibit J) with the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, covering the 57-hectares
fishpond in question.

8. plaintiff Vallarta and his co-plaintiffs had since 1976 continuously and peacefully
developed and operated subject fishpond until disturbance occurred on May to June 1981
and complete interruption (forcible entry) occurred on June 22, 1981.
 9. Since May 1981 up to the time of forcible entry on June 22, 1981, defendants had been
harassing plaintiffs with the assistance of the military. (Rollo, 157-160).

In their memorandum, the private respondents adopt the facts as found by the appellate court:

The 57-hectare fishpond in litis forms art of a 102-hectare property developed as a fishpond,
located in Macabebe, Pamanga. Admittedly, a 47-hectare portion thereof is already titled in
the name of private respondent Tranquilino Arroyo under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
4244, a derivative of Original Certificate of Title No. 490 dating back to August 21, 1917. The
said 4-parcel, 57-hectare fishpond in litistogether with other unregistered land in Macabebe,
Pamanga, is subject of the ending Cadastral Case No. N-7 LRC Record No. N-619 filed on
behalf of the Director of Lands, the said four (14) parcels having been designated as Lots
Nos. 3305, 3324, 3329 and 3331 in a cadastral survey therefor.

Evidence of private respondent Arroyo's title to and ownership of the entirety of the 102-
hectare developed fishpond, aside from a certificate of title covering a portion thereof now
here in question, includes: (a) a 1921 tax declaration for the 102-hectare property in the
name of Proceso de Guzman; (b) subsequent tax declarations also in the name of Proceso
de Guzman for 1922, 1927, 1929 and 1942; (c) a 1965 tax declaration for the 102-hectare
property in the name of Nicolasa de Guzman, daughter of the late Proceso de Guzman; (d)
tax declarations therefor continuing in the name of Nicolasa de Guzman for 1969, 1973 and
1979; (e) official receipts of real estate tax payments for the property covered by said tax
declarations; (f) contracts of lease over the fishpond to Carpio Calara dated May 15, 1960; to
Cipriano Soriano and Carpio Calara dated May 15, 1961; to Geronimo Enriquez dated May
17, 1972 also for five (5) years; (g) a September 5, 1978 Order in Special proceedings Case
No. C-525 re the Testate Estate of the late Nicolas de Guzman-Arroyo, evidencing private
respondent Tranquihno Arroyo's accession to ownership of the property in litis; (h) lease to
Teofilo Panganiban, petitioner Vallarta's father-in-law, from May 20, 1978 to May 20, 1981;
and (i) lease to private respondent Marcelino Marcos thereafter u to May 21, 1983.

There is unrebutted testimony that petitioner, Vallarta served as Teofilo Panganiban's

overseer in the operation of the leased fishpond, and that while such an overseer, Vallarta
had occasion to deliver gift produce to private respondent Arroyo, and having once offered to
help Arroyo sell the fishpond (t.s.n., July 19, 1984, pp. 12-15). (Rollo, pp. 134-135)

This case was earlier elevated to this Court as G.R. No. 62709, Arroyo v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, et al.

Upon the filing of the forcible entry case, the petitioners were granted a temporary restraining order.
The defendants respondents were prohibited from harvesting the milkfish which were in the
fishponds when they took over possession. However, after hearing the parties, the municipal circuit
trial court denied the motions for mandatory and prohibitory injunctions thus enabling the
respondents to harvest the fish. When the case was elevated on certiorari and prohibition to the then
Court of First Instance of Pamanga, the order was reversed and a writ of injunction, both mandatory
and preventive, was issued. The petitioners were, therefore, given back their possession of the
disputed fishponds.

The private respondents went on certiorari to the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. No. 74573-S but their
petition was denied. Upon elevation of that petition to this Court, we affirmed the findings and the
orders which restored possession to the petitioners.
In the meantime, trial in the forcible entry case proceeded. Judgment was rendered in favor of
intervenor Arroyo on a finding that the disputed fishpond belonged to him. The original defendants
bowed out of the picture as the contract of lease allegedly executed between them and intervenor
Arroyo had expired. Based on the factual findings of the trial court, the regional trial court and the
respondent court affirmed the decision on appeal.

The petition before us calls for the resolution of the dispute between the petitioners and intervenor
Arroyo, now the principal private respondent.

The petitioners contend that the respondent court committed the following errors:

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED GRAVELY IN ASSUMING WITHOUT SUFFICIENT BASIS

THAT THE FOUR (4) ARCELS OF LAND IN DISPUTE ARE THE SAME LOTS COVERED
BY THE LEASE AGREEMENTS AND THE TAX DECLARATIONS OFFERED BY
RESPONDENT TRANQUILINO ARROYO AS BASIS OF HIS CLAIM OVER SUBJECT
ARCELS OF LAND OCCUPIED AND DEVELOPED BY PETITIONER VALLARTA AND HIS
CO-PETITIONERS.

II

RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED, NAY, ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS

JURISDICTION IN ADOPTING IN TOTO THE SAME FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS SET
FORTH IN THE DECISIONS SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED BEFORE IT,
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THESE ARE THE VERY FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
CHALLENGED BY PETITIONERS IN THEIR APPEAL FOR BEING DEVOID OF
EVIDENTIAL SUPPORT AND BEING CONJECTURAL AND, IN FACT, CONTRARY TO
THE EVIDENCE AND THE THEORY OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THEMSELVES.

III

RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING POSSESSION TO

RESPONDENT TRANQUILINO ARROYO (INTERVENOR) AND IN ORDERING
PETITIONERS TO VACATE THE FISHPOND IN DISPUTE (THE POSSESSION WHICH
WAS RETURNED TO PETITIONERS IN VIRTUE OF A PRELIMINARY MANDATORY
INJUNCTION DULY AFFIRMED BY THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT),
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FINDINGS THAT THERE WAS FORCIBLE ENTRY WHICH IS
THE MAIN ISSUE IN THIS CASE, THEREBY LEGALIZING PUBLIC DISORDERS AND
BREACH OF THE PEACE AND TRAVERSING THE BASIC PHILOSOPHY UNDERLYING
THE SUMMARY REMEDY OF FORCIBLE ENTRY UNDER RULE 70 OF THE RULES OF
COURT.

IV

RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED, NAY, ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONERS' RELIANCE ON BFD
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 4-1596 AND HIS APPLICATION FOR LEASE WITH THE
GOVERNMENT ARE INSUFFICIENT, ON THE BASIS OF AN UNFOUNDED ASSUMPTION
THAT THE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER REFERS TO LAND IN .MASANTOL, PAMANGA,
AND NOT IN MACABEBE, PAMANGA, WHERE THE SUBJECT AREA IS LOCATED, SAID
COURT BEING OBVIOUSLY OBLIVIOUS OF THE FACT THAT 'THE ADMINISTRATIVE
 ORDER COVERS THE VERY LAND IN DISPUTE AS TESTIFIED TO BY NO LESS THAN
THE CHIEF OF THE LAND CLASSIFICATION TEAM.

RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADJUDICATING OWNERSHIP IN FAVOR

OF RESPONDENT ARROYO (INTERVENOR) NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT
THE LAND IN DISPUTE IS PUBLIC LAND (FORESTRAL) WHICH IS NOT SUSCEPTIBLE
OF PRIVATE OWNERSHIP AND NOTWITHSTANDING FURTHER THAT SUCH
ADJUDICATION IS A CLEAR REJUDGMENT OF THE CADASTRAL CLAIM OF SAID
RESPONDENT-INTERVENOR WHICH HAS BEEN VIGOROUSLY OPPOSED BY THE
SOLICITOR GENERAL IN BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT.

VI

RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT RESPONDENT

JUDGE COMMITTED ERROR IN PASSING JUDGMENT UPON THE RIGHT OF
POSSESSION BASED ON INTERVENOR'S CLAIM OF OWNERSHIP WHICH IS
COGNIZABLE BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT IN AN ACCION PUBLICIANA, THE
SOLE ISSUE IN THE FORCIBLE ENTRY CASE BEING ONE OF PHYSICAL POSSESSION
WHICH IS EXCLUSIVELY COGNIZABLE BY THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT.

VII

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED GRAVELY, NAY, ACTED IN EXCESS OF ITS

JURISDICTION IN ORDERING PETITIONERS TO PAY RENTALS TO RESPONDENT -
INTERVENOR NOTWITHSTANDING THAT - (1) INTERVENOR HAS NO BETTER RIGHT
THAN PETITIONERS, AND, IN FACT, NO RIGHT AT ALL OVER THE DISPUTED
FISHPONDS, (2) THE INTERVENOR NEVER ALLEGED, MUCH LESS, RAYED FOR
SUCH RELIEF, (3) INTERVENOR RESERVED TO FILE SEPARATE ACTION FOR
DAMAGES IN THE PROPER COURT, AND (4) THE AWARD TO PAY RENTS IS IN THE
NATURE OF LOSS OF INCOME FROM RENTS THAT MAY BE DERIVED FROM
MARCOS' LEASE CONTRACT, BUT THE AMOUNT OF WHICH IS BEYOND THE
JURISDICTION OF THE LOWER COURT.

All of these assigned errors center around the nature and Identity of the disputed property and the
validity of the respondent-intervenor's claim of ownership.

The main defense of the respondents in this petition asserts that we should respect the factual
findings of the respondent court.

As a rule, we respect the factual findings of the appellate court and trial courts and accord them a
certain measure of finality. (Monfort v. Aguinaldo, et al. 91 Phil. 913; Collector of Customs of Manila
v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 137 SCRA 3; Espiritu v. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 50; Guita v.
Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 576; Alto Sales Corporation v. Judge Guardson R. Lood, et al., 128
SCRA 91; Hidalgo v. Court of Appeals, 130 SCRA 652; People v. Navoa, 131 SCRA 190; Leonardo
v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 890; Borlas v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA 254; Magantay v. Court
of Appeals, 116 SCRA 236; Regalario v. Northwest Finance Corporation, et al., 117 SCRA 45;
American Home Assurance Co. v. Court of Appeals, 109 SCRA 180 and Director of Lands v.Funtilar,
142 SCRA 57). However, this rule is subject to well established exceptions. We ruled in Moran Jr. V.
Court of Appeals (133 SCRA 88) that this Court retains the power to review and rectify the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals when (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd and
impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; and (5) when the court, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of
the case and the same are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee.
In Manero v. Court of Appeals (102 SCRA 817) we stated additional exceptions such as: (1) the
findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (2) said findings of
facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (3) the facts set
forth in the petition as wen as the petitioner's main and rely briefs are not disputed by the
respondents; and (4) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is remised on the absence of
evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record.

We have departed from the general rule in this case because there is a grave misapprehension of
facts and the inferences made are manifestly mistaken.

This case started out and continues to be a forcible entry litigation. Ownership was not in issue
except to aid in the determination of the legality of the prior possession of whoever was forcibly
ejected from the remises.

The fact is established that the petitioners had been in peaceful possession of the remises when
they were thrown out. The questioned decision of the appellate court awarded the properties not to
the original defendants or deforciants but to the intervenor-respondent, Tranquilino Arroyo, because
of its finding that he is the owner. It is clear, however, that Mr. Arroyo was not in possession and was
not even involved when the forcible entry took lace.

The records show that for many years prior to the defendants entry in 1981, the petitioners had been
constructing, enlarging, repairing, and maintaining the physical facilities and cultivating milkfish in the
disputed remises. The records sustain the petitioners' description of the defendants' take over, as
follows:

xxx xxx xxx

10. On June 22, 1981, at about 9:00 o'clock of the same morning, a group of armed men,
more than ten (10) in number, carrying armalites, .45 pistols and carbines, with bullets on
their body, arrived. They kicked the door of the central hut to force it open. Some of these
armed men were Identified thus: defendants Vicente Gonzales, Berting Cunanan, Filemon
Sison, Andres Balingit, Ato Gaddi, Rodolfo Canilao, Nazario Mangahas, Dionisio Catahan
and Carting Aquino. Berting Cunanan, Vicente Gonzales, Nazario Mangahas and Dionisio
Catahan entered the central hut pointing their firearms at the occupants, including Cesar
Vallarta, Marcelino Reyes and the workers who were inside the hut, and ordered them to get
out. One of these armed men was heard, saying. At last Celing (referring to Marcelino
Marcos) still get possession of the fishpond. The occupants of the main hut, for fear of their
lives, obeyed the order and went out of the hut. The occupants of the other huts in the
fishpond in question were already within the remises of the central hut when the People in
the latter hut went out. All of the men in the questioned fishpond were ordered at gun point to
ride in a banca, after which they went to Hagonoy, Bulacan, Some of their personal
belongings were left in the hut while some were thrown into the river.

On June 23, 1981, the incident on June 19-20, 1981 was complained of or reported by Cesar
Vallarta to the police station in .Macabebe. Cesar Vallarta was given a coy of the report in
the nature of complaint sheet dated June 23, 1981 about said incident (Exhibit E). The
incident of forcible entry of June 22, 1981 was the subject of another report (complaint sheet)
reared by the Macabebe police Station at Macabebe (Exhibit E-1).
 11. At the time when plaintiffs and the workers were forcibly disposed of the fishpond in
controversy, there were 150,000 pieces of bangus of 7-8 inches long worth .70 to l.00 each
in the "Kaluwangan" portion of the fishpond and some 700,000 pieces of f fingerlings 1 1/2
inches long valued at .40 each at the "Binhian" compartment thereof. The 100,000 released
in the "Kaluwangan" was acquired from Mrs. Milagros Soriano, while 50,000 pieces from
Bulacan, Bulacan; and the fingerlings released in the "Binhian" were acquired from Alfredo
Panganiban. (Exhibits C and D-Injunction) All these fish were left in the disputed fishpond on
June 22, 1981 or at the time of the forcible ejection of plaintiffs. (Rollo, . 19-20).

The appellate court found the forcible entry taken by Marcelino Marcos and his group censurable.
However, it did not return possession to the dispossessed petitioners because of its finding that
intervenor, Arroyo, is the owner and, therefore, entitled to possession.

Are the title and ownership of respondent Arroyo sufficiently established in this forcible entry case?
The records show that they are not. The evidence upon which the respondent court relied is tenuous
and unreliable.

The respondent court accepted the intervenor's claim that 47 hectares of the 57 hectares fishpond
forms art of a 102 hectares property which had been title in his predecessor's name since August 21,
1917. The petitioners, however, contend that the property covered by TCT No. 4244, derived from
OCT No. 490 cannot possibly refer to the disputed fishponds.

The evidence supports the petitioners' contention.

BFD Administrative Order No. 4-1596 dated July 22, 1981 shows that 4,574.8 hectares of mangrove
swamps earlier classified as forest land was on that date declared alienable or disposable for
fishpond development. The released forest land was laced under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources as art of its LC project No. 21-A. (Exh. H-3, Original Records) The
disputed property forms art of that forest land which became alienable only in 1981.

It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private
persons. It is not registrable. The adverse possession which can be the basis of a grant of title in
confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot commence until after forest land has been declared
alienable and disposable. possession of forest land, no matter how long cannot convert it into private
property. (Adorable, et al. v. Directory of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401; Heirs of Jose Amunategui v.
Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648). If
somehow forest land happens to have been included in a Torrens Title, the title is null and
void insofar as that forest land is concerned. (Director of Lands v. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177; Li Seng Gia
y Cia v. Director of Lands, 55 Phil. 693; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183; Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 121 Phil. 681).

Bolstering the nature of the disputed properties as recently released alienable land and, therefore,
not yet titled is the fact that Cadastral Case No. N-7, LRC Registration No. 619 which was filed to
settle the ownership and titles of unregistered lands in the area covered by the case includes the
disputed lots.

More specifically, the Solicitor-General in Cad. Case No. N7, LRC Reg. No. 619 before the then
Court of First Instance of Pamanga opposed the claim of Tranquihno Arroyo to Lot Nos. 3304, 3305,
3324, 2239, and 3331 on the ground that these lots, which consist of the disputed fishponds may be
disposed of only through lease by the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources. The Solicitor-
General asked in the cadastral case that the claim of Mr. Arroyo should be dismissed pursuant to
Sec. 24 of D 704, which provides:
 Sec. 24. Lease of Fishponds. — Public lands available for fishpond development including
those earmarked for family-sized fishponds and not yet leased prior to November 9, 1972,
shall be leased only to qualified person, association, cooperatives or corporations .... (Exhs.
H-1, Original Records)

Far from being a settled matter, the ownership of the fishponds in question is still to be adjudicated.
(See Claim of the Republic of the Philippines, Exh. H, Original Records). The Government itself has
asked that the claim of respondent Arroyo in the cadastral case be dismissed.

The records show that petitioner Vallarta in 1976 started to develop the swampland in Teracan,
Barrio Consuelo, Macabebe, Pamanga by building dikes and constructing fishponds. Upon inquiry
from the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry, he was told that the mangrove swampland he
was developing formed art of the public domain. On February 20, 1980, he, therefore, filed an
application with the Bureau of Forest Development asking for the release of Lots 3305, 3324, 3329,
and 3331 with an area of 57.637 hectares and raying for their classification as alienable and
disposable for fishpond development. (Exh. I, Original Records)

On January 17, 1981, CLC Team No. 16 composed of a Forestry Supervisor, two Senior Foresters,
an Engineer, and two cartographers rendered a report on the applied for property stating that four
lots with an area of 57.6373 hectares formed art of a big body of fishpond block already fully
developed into fishponds and recommended favorable action on the application. (Exh. K-1, Original
Records).

A recommendation was reared by Director Edmundo V. Cortes of the Bureau of Forest Development
with a draft BFD Administrative Order for the signature of Jose J. Leido, Jr., Minister of Natural
Resources to declare as alienable or disposable for fishpond development the 57.6373 hectares
described in BFD Ma SZ-R-3-6-01. (Exhs. K-3, Original Records)

As earlier stated, Minister Teodoro O. Peña of the Ministry of Natural Resources released on July
22, 1981 not only the above cited lots but a total area of 4,574.8 hectares of forest land.

The respondent court is plainly in error when it disregarded the above administrative proceedings
and affirmed the subject property as owned by respondent Arroyo and his predecessors-in-interest
as early as 1917. The survey conducted by a team of experienced foresters, cartographers, and an
engineer pinpointed the area as classified forest land suitable for release as alienable and
disposable land. The Minister of Natural Resources issued an Administrative Order. These acts
cannot be lightly disregarded. The court, therefore, erred in declaring the forest land as private
property owned by the intervenor for the purpose of determining possession in a forcible entry
proceeding.

Respondent Arroyo contends that BFD Administrative Order No. 4-1596 refers only to land located
in Masantol, Pamanga and does not extend to land in Macabebe, Pamanga. This contention is
answered by the Solicitor-General who stated in his memorandum in Cad. Case No. N-7, LRC Rec.
No. N-619:

The lots in question form art of a vast tract of land classified as swamp mangrove or
forestral land actually situated in the municipality of Macabebe, province of Pamanga, albeit
mentioned in the zonification ma (SZ-68) as portion of the public domain situated in the
municipality of Masantol. This is explained in the Memorandum of the Director of Bureau of
Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (Exhibits 4, 4-A and 4-B) as well as in the notation
appearing on said zonification ma that provincial/Municipal boundary lines are not actually
located and that such political boundaries are only for the purposes of determining the
 administrative jurisdiction of Forest Districts affected. It is further explained that the
"references used as far as political boundaries of Macabebe and Masantol is concerned are
obsolete, since according to your report the area involved is found in Macabebe not in
Masantol as indicated. It could further be inferred, that the land classification committee is
not authorized to change or alter the references from which the Municipal boundaries
indicated are based. Such political boundaries according to the above-quoted notation are
for purposes of determining the administrative jurisdiction of Forest District affected." (Exhibit
4-B) Verily, the lots in dispute are within the municipality of Macabebe as indicated in the
zonification ma (SZ-68), Exhibit 3, and thus form art •f that declared alienable and
disposable for fishpond development only.

It can be seen from BFD Administrative Order No. 4-1596 (Exhibit 1) that prior to its issuance
on July 22, 1981, the lots in question were portion of the swam mangrove or forestral land of
the public domain. It was only on July 22, 1981 that said forestral land, including the disputed
lots, was released or declared as alienable or disposable for fishpond development.
(Records of CA-G.R. No. 07803, 101-102).

The Solicitor-General is correct in stating that the disputed lots are not private properties and are not
registrable. Our decision in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, (133 SCRA 701) is cited. This
decision states:

Forestal land is not registerable. Its inclusion in a title, whether the title be issued during the
Spanish regime or under the Torrens system, nullifies the title. (Director of Lands vs. Reyes,
L27594 and Alinsunurin v. Director of Lands, L-28144, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 177,
194-5; Li Seng Gia v. Director of Lands, 55 Phil. 693; Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, L-24796,
June 28, 1968, 23 SCRA 1183; Dizon v. Rodriguez, and Republic v. Court of Appeals, 121
Phil, 681; Adorable v. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 40).

Section 48(b) cannot apply to forestal land before it is declassified to form art of disposable
public agricultural land (Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, L-27873,
November 29, 1983, 126 SCRA 69, 75). A patent issued for forestal land is void. The State
may sue for its reversion to the public domain (Republic v. Animas, L-37682, March 29,
1974, 56 SCRA 499). possession of forestal lands cannot ripen into private ownership
(Director of Forestry v. Muñoz, supra).

The error of the respondent court is further shown by the surveys forming art of the records.

Exhibit 3 of the original records in the trial court is a plan of Lots 3304, 3324, 3329, 3331, and 3305
drawn u by Geodetic Engineer Ernesto Montemayor on October 21-23, 1976 for Mr. Tranquilino
Arroyo.

"Exh. "A", Injunction, of the same original records is a land classification ma, Ma SZ-R-3-6-01,
bearing the names of Director Felix G. Gonzales of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources,
Director Edmundo Cortes of the Bureau of Forest Development, Director Juanito C. Fernandez of
the Bureau of Mines, and Director Ramon N. Casanova of the Bureau of Lands. This ma lots the
same Lot Nos. 3305, 3329, 3331, and 3324 (excluding Lot 3304) found in Exh. 3 of Mr. Arroyo.

The Government's land classification ma states that the four lots it covers, with an area of 57.6373,
is a correct ma of the areas demarcated as Alienable or Disposable. It states that the areas were
originally surveyed under Cad 378-D of the Macabebe Cadastre on March 1, 1966 to May 31, 1966
and approved by the Director of Lands on August 27, 1969.
As between the map prepared by a private surveyor for the intervenor and the ma reared for no less
than four different bureaus of the Ministry of Natural Resources as art of its land classification
program, this Court gives credit to the latter. The lots in question are not private property as
described by the respondent court but lands still belonging to the public domain although now
released to be developed as fishponds by authorized lessees.

In declaring respondent intervenor Arroyo as owner, the respondent court relied heavily on tax
declarations. Going over these tax declarations, we find them inadequate to sustain the court's
findings. The petitioners' contention appears to be meritorious that the supposed 1921 declaration
with superficially described boundaries underwent metamorphosis and extreme changes in area and
boundary descriptions when it suddenly evolved in 1980 as three tax declarations conveniently
referring to cadastral Lots 3331, 3329, and 3305. However, we see no need to discuss the evolution
of these tax declarations in detail in the light of the government declaration that these properties
were released for alienation and disposition only in 1981.

The petitioners do not claim to own the disputed fishponds. They admit that when they entered on
the land, improved and developed it, and planted fish therein, it was still forest land. This explains
why they filed applications with the proper authorities for permits or licenses to develop fishponds in
the area.

The claim for damages due to respondents' seizure of the fishponds for eight months is not fully
established in these ejectment proceedings. This case is without prejudice to the petitioners' taking
separate legal action to assert their claims for damages and rentals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned decision of the respondent court is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioners' right of possession is recognized.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-27873. November 29, 1983.]

HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI, Petitioners, v. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, Respondent.

[G.R. No. L-30035. November 29, 1983.]

ROQUE BORRE and ENCARNACION DELFIN, Petitioners, v. ANGEL ALPASAN, HEIRS OF

MELQUIADES BORRE, EMETERIO BEREBER and HEIRS OF JOSE AMUNATEGUI and THE CAPIZ
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, Respondents.

DECISION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The two petitions for review on certiorari before us question the decision of the Court of Appeals which
declared the disputed property as forest land, not subject to titling in favor of private persons.

These two petitions have their genesis in an application for confirmation of imperfect title and its registration
filed with the Court of First Instance of Capiz. The parcel of land sought to be registered is known as Lot No.
885 of the Cadastral Survey of Pilar, Capiz, and has an area of 645,703 square meters. cralawna d

Roque Borre, petitioner in G.R. No, L-30035, and Melquiades Borre, filed the application for registration. In
due time, the heirs of Jose Amunategui, petitioners in G.R. No. L-27873 filed an opposition to the application
of Roque and Melquiades Borre. At the same time, they prayed that the title to a portion of Lot No. 885 of
Pilar Cadastre containing 527,747 square meters be confirmed and registered in the names of said Heirs of
Jose Amunategui.

The Director of Forestry, through the Provincial Fiscal of Capiz, also filed an opposition to the application for
registration of title claiming that the land was mangrove swamp which was still classified as forest land and
part of the public domain.

Another oppositor, Emeterio Bereber filed his opposition insofar as a portion of Lot No. 885 containing
117,956 square meters was concerned and prayed that title to said portion be confirmed and registered in
his name.

During the progress of the trial, applicant-petitioner Roque Borre sold whatever rights and interests he may
have on Lot No. 885 to Angel Alpasan. The latter also filed an opposition, claiming that he is entitled to have
said lot registered in his name.

After trial, the Court of First Instance of Capiz adjudicated 117,956 square meters to Emeterio Bereber and
the rest of the land containing 527,747 square meters was adjudicated in the proportion of 5/6 share to
Angel Alpasan and 1/6 share to Melquiades Borre.

Only the Heirs of Jose Amunategui and the Director of Forestry filed their respective appeals with the Court
of Appeals, The case was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 34190-R.

In its decision, the Court of Appeals held:jgc:cha nrob les.com .ph

". . . the conclusion so far must have to be that as to the private litigants that have been shown to have a
better right over Lot 885 are, as to the northeastern portion of a little less than 117,956 square meters, it
was Emeterio Bereber and as to the rest of 527,747 square meters, it was the heirs of Jose Amunategui; but
the last question that must have to be considered is whether after all, the title that these two (2) private
litigants have shown did not amount to a registerable one in view of the opposition and evidence of the
Director of Forestry; . . .

". . . turning back the clock thirty (30) years from 1955 when the application was filed which would place it
at 1925, the fact must have to be accepted that during that period, the land was a classified forest land so
much so that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensee before 1926 and after that; that even Jose
Amunategui himself took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area; and this can only
mean that the Bureau of Forestry had stood and maintained its ground that it was a forest land as indeed
the testimonial evidence referred to above persuasively indicates, and the only time when the property was
converted into a fishpond was sometime after 1950; or a bare five (5) years before the filing of the
application; but only after there had been a previous warning by the District Forester that that could not be
done because it was classified as a public forest; so that having these in mind and remembering that even
under Republic Act 1942 which came into effect in 1957, two (2) years after this case had already been filed
in the lower Court, in order for applicant to be able to demonstrate a registerable title he must have shown.

"‘open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years, preceding the filing
of the application;’

the foregoing details cannot but justify the conclusion that not one of the applicants or oppositors had
shown that during the required period of thirty (30) years prescribed by Republic Act 1942 in order for him
to have shown a registerable title for the entire period of thirty (30) years before filing of the application, he
had been in

"‘open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain’,

it is evident that the Bureau of Forestry had insisted on its claim all throughout that period of thirty (30)
years and even before and applicants and their predecessors had made implicit recognition of that; the
result must be to deny all these applications; this Court stating that it had felt impelled notwithstanding, just
the same to resolve the conflicting positions of the private litigants among themselves as to who of them
had demonstrated a better right to possess because this Court foresees that this litigation will go all the way
to the Supreme Court and it is always better that the findings be as complete as possible to enable the
Highest Court to pass final judgment;

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision must have to be as it is hereby reversed; the application as well as all the
oppositions with the exception of that of the Director of Forestry which is hereby sustained are dismissed;
no more pronouncement as to costs." cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry

A petition for review on certiorari was filed by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui contending that the disputed lot
had been in the possession of private persons for over thirty years and therefore in accordance with
Republic Act No. 1942, said lot could still be the subject of registration and confirmation of title in the name
of a private person in accordance with Act No. 496 known as the Land Registration Act. On the other hand,
another petition for review on certiorari was filed by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, contending that
the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in dismissing their complaint against the Heirs of Jose
Amunategui. The Borre complaint was for the annulment of the deed of absolute sale of Lot No. 885
executed by them in favor of the Heirs of Amunategui. The complaint was dismissed on the basis of the
Court of Appeals’ decision that the disputed lot is part of the public domain. The petitioners also question the
jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals in passing upon the relative rights of the parties over the disputed lot
when its final decision after all is to declare said lot a part of the public domain classified as forest land.
chan robles law lib rary : re d

The need for resolving the questions raised by Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin in their petition depends
on the issue raised by the Heirs of Jose Amunategui, that is, whether or not Lot No. 885 is public forest land,
not capable of registration in the names of the private applicants.

The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as forest land because it is not
thickly forested but is a "mangrove swamp." Although conceding that a "mangrove swamp" is included in
the classification of forest land in accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the
petitioners argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of said Code as first, second and third groups
are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp,
is still subject to land registration proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private
persons for many years, and therefore, said land was already "private land" better adapted and more
valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under
forest classification.

The petition is without merit.

A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because
loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do
not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa
palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The
classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land
actually looks like. Unless and until the land classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on
confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

This Court ruled in the leading case of Director of Forestry v. Muñoz (23 SCRA 1184) that possession of
forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private ownership. And in Republic v. Animas (56 SCRA
499), we granted the petition on the ground that the area covered by the patent and title was not
disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone and any patent and title to said area is void ab
initio. It bears emphasizing that a positive act of Government is needed to declassify land which is classified
as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.

The findings of the Court of Appeals are particularly well-grounded in the instant petition.

The fact that no trees enumerated in Section 1821 of the Revised Administrative Code are found in Lot No.
885 does not divest such land of its being classified as forest land, much less as land of the public domain.
The appellate court found that in 1912, the land must have been a virgin forest as stated by Emeterio
Bereber’s witness Deogracias Gavacao, and that as late as 1926, it must have been a thickly forested area
as testified by Jaime Bertolde. The opposition of the Director of Forestry was strengthened by the appellate
court’s finding that timber licenses had to be issued to certain licensees and even Jose Amunategui himself
took the trouble to ask for a license to cut timber within the area. It was only sometime in 1950 that the
property was converted into fishpond but only after a previous warning from the District Forester that the
same could not be done because it was classified as "public forest." chan robles. com:c ralaw:red

In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. He must
overcome the presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an
interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as those
derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for
at least thirty (30) years preceding the filing of his application.

The decision of the appellate court is not based merely on the presumptions implicit in Commonwealth Act
No. 141 as amended. The records show that Lot No. 88S never ceased to be classified as forest land of the
public domain.

In Republic v. Gonong (118 SCRA 729) we ruled: jgc:c hanro bles. com.ph

"As held in Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, 75 Phil. 890, all lands that were not acquired from the Government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land that
should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his predecessors in-interests since time
immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been a private property even before the Spanish conquest." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

In the instant petitions, the exception in the Oh Cho case does not apply. The evidence is clear that Lot No.
885 had always been public land classified as forest.

Similarly, in Republic v. Vera (120 SCRA 210), we ruled: jgc:chan roble s.com.p h

". . . The possession of public land however long the period thereof may have extended, never confers title
thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate
against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim of
ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State. (Director of Lands v.
Reyes, 68 SCRA 177, 195)." cralaw virtua 1aw lib rary

We, therefore, affirm the finding that the disputed property Lot No. 885 is part of the public domain,
classified as public forest land. There is no need for us to pass upon the other issues raised by petitioners
Roque Borre and Encarnacion Delfin, as such issues are rendered moot by this finding. chanro bles vi rtua l lawli bra ry
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G. R. No. L-30035 and G. R. No. L-27873 are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-61598 December 12, 1985

DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
HEIRS OF JUANA CAROLINO, namely Macario, Zacarias and Francisco, all surnamed Abalos,
IGNACIO ABAYA, JUANA MINIANO and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

AQUINO, C.J.:

This is a controversy over Lot 3439 of the San Jose cadastre, Nueva Ecija located in Barrio Kita-
Kita with an area of more than 28 hectares.

The heirs of Juana Carolino, in their petition dated August 28, 1967 to reopen Cadastral Case No. 9,
alleged that Lot 3439 was adjudicated to Juana in 1925, that an order was issued for the issuance of
a decree and that said decision and order are not available as shown in the certification
dated August 9, 1967 of the branch clerk of court of the Court of First Instance of Cabanatuan City
which reads (Annex A):

This is to certify that in accordance with the Docket Book of Cadastral Lots kept in
this Court, Lot No. 3439, Cad. Case No. 9, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 268 of the San Jose
Cadastre was decided on May 18, 1925 and on December 15, 1925, an order was
issued for the issuance of decree.

It is further certified that copy of the said decision and order for the issuance of
decree are not among our salvaged files.

This certificate is issued upon request of Mrs. Francisca Abalos of San Jose, Nueva
Ecija.

It may be noted that the name of Juana Carolino is not mentioned at all in the said certification. And
yet her heirs rely on it as the evidence to prove that Lot 3439 was adjudicated to her forty-two years
before the filing of their petition to reopen the cadastral proceeding.

Ignacio Abaya and Juana Miniano opposed the petition on the ground that Juana Carolino was not
the adjudicates, owner or possessor of Lot No. 343; that the southern portion of Lot No. 3439, known
as Lot No. 3439-A, had been adjudicated to Maria Espiritu who sold it to Ignacio Abaya in 1937; that
Abaya had been in possession of said portion since then; that the rest of Lot 3439, designated as
Lot No. 3439-B, had been declared public land; that because Dionisio Miniano, the father of Juana
Miniano, and Macario Abalos were in actual possession of Lot No. 3439-B and they filed an
application for patent therefor, the land was awarded to them in 1941.

On the other hand Benjamin Dumale, the original claimant of Lot No. 3439, alleged in his opposition
that Lot No. 3439 was adjudicated to Maria Espiritu on May 18, 1925 that Maria sold the lot to him
on August 12, 1967 and that neither Juana Carolino nor her heirs, nor Ignacio Abaya nor Juana
Miniano had ever possessed any portion of Lot 3439.

After hearing, the trial court in its decision dated April 28, 1976 adjudicated (1) Lot No. 3439-A, with
an area of 60,746 square meters, to Ignacio Abaya; (2) Lot No. 3439-B, with an area of 87,281
square meters, to Juana Miniano and (3) Lot No. 3439-C, with an area of 139,971 square meters, to
the heirs of Juana Carolino.

The Director of Lands appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The
Director appealed to this Court. Have the claimants proven their contentions? That is the issue.

The heirs of Juana Carolino, namely, Macario Abalos, Zacarias Abalos and Francisco Abalos De
Guzman, who presented a survey plan, SWO-12231 Exhibit D, for the entire Lot 3439, prepared in
1967, did not file any appellees' brief.

Their Exhibit D was not approved by the Director of Lands as required by section 1858 of the
Revised Administrative Code and Presidential Decree No. 239. Therefore, it is not evidence in this
cadastral proceeding. They did not present any tax declaration nor real estate tax receipts.

As noted by the Solicitor General, although their sole witness, Raymundo Tanchoco, visited the land
four times since 1920, he did not see Juana Carolino nor her heirs cultivating the land or hauling
palay therefrom (p. 72, Rollo).

The Solicitor General observes that oppositors Abaya and Miniano did not file any petition for the
reopening of the cadastral case. Abaya's claim that he bought a portion of the land from Maria
Espiritu, the alleged original owner, is not supported by any deed of sale. He filed an application for
a free patent in 1950 for land located in Barrio Maangol (Exh. 3-Abaya) but that in itself does not
conclusively support his claim since no patent was issued.

Abaya paid the land taxes for the years 1970 to 1973, He did not pay the realty taxes for the prior
years (p. 73 Rollo).

In Miniano's case, she presented a tax declaration dated February 23, 1970 or almost two
years after she filed her opposition. She presented realty tax receipts for 1967 to 1970 but none for
the years prior thereto.

The appellees failed to present clear, convincing and trustworthy evidence to substantiate their
respective contentions that they and their predecessors-in-interest had possessed Lot 3439 en
concepto de dueno or that it had been decreed in favor of Juana Carolino or Maria Espiritu about
half a century ago. The lot must be presumed to be still a part of the public domain (Manila Electric
Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, L-49623, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 799, 806).

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Appellate Court is reversed and set aside. Lot 3439 is declared to
be still a part of the public domain. Appellees' claims are dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-45860 March 20, 1939

SALACOT MINING COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ, Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
QUIRINO ABADILLA, Director of Mines, and THE MINING RECORDER OF THE PROVINCE OF
BULACAN,respondents.

DeWitt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Ramon Diokno for respondents.

IMPERIAL, J.:

The petitioner, a domestic corporation organized under existing laws, seeks to compel the
respondents Eulogio Rodriguez, as Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, Quirico Abadilla, as
Director of the Bureau of Mines, and the Mining Recorder of the Province of Bulacan, respectively, to
approve petitioner's application for a patent for a certain mining claim, to prepare the necessary
papers in connection therewith, and to forward and submit said papers for the signature of the
President of the Philippines.

The petitioner alleges that it owns the Jacinta mineral claim, situated in barrio Matictic, municipality
of Norzagaray, Province of Bulacan, having validly located said mineral claim on public land on the
11th and 12th days of February, 1935, and recorded the declaration of location thereof on February
26, 1935, in the office of the respondent mining recorder of the Province of Bulacan, in accordance
with the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended by the Act, of Congress of
February 6, 1905, and of Act No. 624 of the Philippine Commission relative to the location of mining
claims; that from and after the location of said Jacinta mineral claim, the petitioner has been, and is,
the owner and in exclusive and undisturbed possession of the same; that the ground included in said
claim was, at the time of the location, unreserved, unappropriate and unoccupied, and that mineral
was actually found in place therein prior to its location; that from and after the date of the recording
of said claim, and prior to November 15, 1935, labor worth more than P1,000 was performed upon
the said claim by and at the expense of the herein petitioner, for the purpose of securing a patent
therefor; that prior to November 15, 1935, the petitioner filed in the office of the Director of the
Bureau of Science an application for an order of patent survey of said claim, which survey was duly
authorized by the Director of the Bureau of Science and performed by an assistant mineral land
surveyor of the former division of mines, Bureau of Science, at the expense of the petitioner; and
that the return of the surveyor, the plant and filed notes of the claim and certificate that labor worth
more than P1,000 had been performed on said claim, were approved by the Secretary of Agriculture
and Commerce; that subsequent to November 15, 1935, the petitioner filed with the respondent
mining director of the Province of Bulacan an application for patent to the Jacinta mineral claim
under oath, together with the certificate showing that labor worth more than P1,000 had been
performed by the petitioner upon the claim, and with the plat and field notes mentioned in the
preceding paragraph; having previously posted a copy of such plat, together with notice of said
application for patent, in a conspicuous place upon said claim; and filed a copy of such plat and of
such notice in the office of said mining recorder, as well as an affidavit of two reasons that such
notice had been duly posted; that the petitioner has requested the respondent mining recorder of the
Province of Bulacan to publish the notice of said petitioner's application for patent, once a week for a
period of sixty days, in a newspaper to be designated by the said respondent as nearest to the claim
subject of the application, and in two newspapers published at Manila, one in the English language
and one in the Spanish language, to be designated by the respondent Director of the Bureau of
Mines, pursuant to the provisions of section 37 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended;
that the petitioner has requested the respondent Director of the Bureau of Mines to designate the
two newspapers published at Manila, one in the English language and one in the Spanish language,
in which the notice of said petitioner's application for patent should be published, as stated in the
preceding paragraph; and that the petitioner has likewise requested the respondent Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce to order the respondent Director of the Bureau of Mines to make such
designation of the newspapers for the publication of petitioner's application for patent, and to order
the mining recorder of the Province of Bulacan to make such publication, with a view to the
subsequent approval of the application by the said respondent Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, the preparation by him of the necessary papers relative to the issuance of the patent
applied for, and the submission of such papers for the signature of the President of the Philippines;
that the respondents have failed and refused, and still fail and refuse, to comply with the request of
the petitioner as set forth in the two paragraphs next preceding; that the petitioner is entitled, as a
matter of right, to the patent applied for, having complied with all the requisites of the law, giving rise
to such right, including the discovery of mineral on the claim, the making of a valid location, the
recording of the declaration of location and accompanying affidavit, performance of the necessary
assessment work and payment of all costs of survey; and that it is a ministerial duty, clearly and
peremptorily enjoined by law upon the respondents, by virtue of their office to order the publication of
the notice of petitioner's application for patent, and prepare thereafter the necessary papers in
relation thereto, and submit the same to the President of the Philippines for his signature; that the
action of the respondents, in refusing to perform their duty as above-stated, unlawfully excludes the
petitioner from the use and enjoyment of its rights pertaining to its ownership of the mining claim
hereinbefore mentioned and of such other rights as are incident to the acquisition of a patent, in
accordance with the laws in force prior to the adoption of the Constitution on November 15, 1935,
and to the enactment of Act No. 137, known as the Mining Act, on November 7, 1936; and that there
is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law other than the present action
of mandamus.

Respondents, in their answer, admit some allegation of the petition and deny others and, by way of
special defense, allege "that the petitioner herein had no vested right to a patent to the "Jacinta"
claim when the Constitution of the Philippines became effective on November 15, 1935, and when
Commonwealth Act No. 137 was approved on November 7, 1936, inasmuch as the petitioner had
not complied, prior to the aforesaid dates, with the requisites essential to the accrual of the right to a
patent: that no vested right to a mineral patent can be acquired subsequent to the date of effectivity
of the Constitution of the Philippines and the passage of Commonwealth Act No. 137, inasmuch as
the provisions of the old mining law, in so far as they authorize the allegation of public mineral lands,
are inconsistent with, and nave, therefore, been repealed by, said Constitution and Act of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines."

The constitutional question involved in this cause is identical to that raised in G.R. No. 45859,
entitled Gold Creek Mining Corporation vs. Rodriguez and Abadilla (37 Off. Gaz., 1662), and we are
of the opinion that the doctrine land down in the latter case applies with equal force to the case at
bar. In the Gold Creek case we decided the issues therein involved in the following language:

This is one of several cases now pending in this court which call for an interpretation, a
determination of the meaning and scope, of section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution, with
reference to mining claims. The cases have been instituted as test cases, with a view to
determining the status, under the Constitution of the Mining Act (Commonwealth Act No.
137), of the holders of unpatented mining claims which were located under the provisions of
the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, as amended.

In view of the importance of the matter, we deem it conducive to the public interest to meet
squarely the fundamental question presented, disregarding for that purpose certain
discrepancies found in the pleading filed in this case. This is an accord with the view
expressed by the Solicitor-General in this memorandum where he says that the statements
of facts in both briefs of the petitioners may be accepted for the purpose of the legal issues
raised. We deny some of the allegations in the petitions and allege new ones in our answers,
but these discrepancies are not of such a nature or importance as should necessitate
introduction of evidence before the case are submitted for decision. From our view of the
cases, these may be submitted on the facts averred in the complaints, leaving out the
difference between the allegations in the pleadings to be adjusted or ironed out by the
parties later, which, we are confident, can be accomplished without much difficulty.

Section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution reads as follows:

"SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and
other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines,
or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is
owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at
the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution.
Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be
alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding
twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights
for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, in which case beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the
grant."

The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the
farmers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be
given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. It
is clear that the foregoing constitutional provision prohibits the alienation of natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land. It seems likewise clear that the term
"natural resources," as used therein, includes mineral lands of the public domain, but not
mineral lands which at the time the provision took effect no longer formed part of the public
domain. The reason for this conclusion is found in the terms of the provision itself. It first
declares that all agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, etc., and other
natural resources of the Philippines, belonging to the State. It then provides that their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations, at least sixty per centum of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at
the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Next
comes the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources. This prohibition is directed
against the alienation of such natural resources as were declared to be the property of the
State. And as only "agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain were
declared property of the State, it is fair to conclude that mineral lands which at the time the
constitutional provision took effect no longer formed part of the public domain, do not come
within the prohibition.

This brings us to the inquiry of whether the mining claim involved in the present proceeding
formed part of the public domain on November 15, 1935, when the provisions of Article XII of
the Constitution became effective in accordance with section 6 of Article XV thereof. In
deciding this point, it should be borne in mind that a constitutional provision must be
presumed to have been framed and adopted in the light and understanding of prior and
existing laws and with reference to them. "Courts are bound to presume that the people
adopting a constitution are familiar with the provisions and existing laws upon the subjects to
which its provisions relate, and upon which they express their judgment and opinion in its
adoption." (Barry vs.Truax, 13 N. D., 131; 99 N. W., 769; 65 L. R. A., 762.)

It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under consideration was perfected prior
to November 15, 1935, when the Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and
according to the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this court
in McDaniel vs. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil., 749), a valid location of a mining claim
segregated the area from the public domain. Said the court in that case: "The moment the
location discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and perfected his
location in accordance with law, the power of the United States Government to deprive him
of the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the
lands had become mineral lands and they were exempted from lands that could be granted
to any other person. The reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to include prior
mineral perfected locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon public
lands afterward include in a reservation, such inclusion or reservation does not affect the
validity of the former location. By such location and perfection, the land located is segregated
from the public domain even as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. vs. Smith, 249 U. S.,
337; Van Ness vs. Rooney, 160 Cal., 131; 27 Cyc., 546.)"

The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregated the area from
the public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the
right to a patent therefore upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.
"Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the
public domain and property of the locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. vs. Montana
Mining Co., 171 U. S., 650, 655; 43 Law. ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of mining claim is
perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of present and exclusive
possession, with the right to the exclusive enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of
all the minerals within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral rights of
adjoining locator; and this is the locator's right before as well as after the issuance of the
patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested property right by virtue of his location made in
compliance with the mining laws, the fee remains in the government until patent issues." (18
R. C. L., 1152.) In Noyes vs. Mantle (127 U. S., 384, 351; 32 Law. ed., 168, 170), the court
said:

"There is no pretense in this case that the original locators did not comply with all the
requirements of the law in making the location of the Pay Streak Lode Mining claim,
or that the claim was ever abandoned or forfeited. They were the discoverers of the
claim. They marked its boundaries by stakes, so that they could be readily traced.
They posted the required notice, when was duly recorded in compliance with the
regulations of the district. They had thus done all that was necessary under the law
for the acquisition of an exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the
ground. The claim was thenceforth their property. They needed only a patent of the
United States to render their title perfect, and that they could obtain at any time upon
proof of what they had done in locating the claim, and of subsequent expenditures to
a specified amount in developing it. Until the patent issued the government held the
title in trust for the locators or their vendees. The ground itself was not afterwards
open to sale."

In a recent case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, it was said:

"The rule is established by innumerable decisions of this court, and of state and
lower Federal courts, that when the location of a mining claim is perfected under the
 law, it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right of present and
exclusive possession. The claim is property in the fullest sense of that term; and may
be sold, transferred, mortgaged, and inherited without infringing any right or title of
the United States. The right of the owner is taxable by the state; and is "real
property," subject to the lien of a judgment recovered against the owner in a state or
territorial court. (Belk vs.Neagher, 104 U. S., 279, 283; 26 Law. ed., 735, 737; 1 Mor.
Min. Rep., 510; Manuel vs. Wolff, 152 U. S., 505, 510, 511; 38 Law. ed., 532-534; 14
Sup. Ct. Rep., 651; 18 Mor. Min. Rep., 85; Elder vs.Wood, 203 U. S., 226 [317] 232;
52 Law. ed., 464, 466; 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 263; Bradford vs. Morrison, 212 U. S., 389;
53 Law. ed., 564; 29 Sup. Ct. Rep., 349.) The owner is not required to purchase the
claim or secure patent from the United States; but so long as he complies with the
provisions of the mining laws, his possessory right, for all practical purposes of
ownership, is as good as though secured by patent." (Wilbur vs. United States ex
rel. Krushnic, 280 U. S., 306; 74 Law. ed., 445.)

The Solicitor-General admits in his memorandum that the decision in the McDaniel case is
determinative of the fundamental question involved in the instant case. But he maintains
"that this decision is based on a misapprehension of the authorities on which the court
relied," and that it "is not well-founded and should be abandoned." We do not deem it
necessary to belabor this point. Whether well-founded or not, the decision in that case was
the law when section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution became effective; and even if we
were disposed to overrule that decision now, our action could not affect rights already fixed
under it.

Our conclusion is that, as the mining claim under consideration no longer formed part of the
public domain when the provisions of Article XII of the Constitution became effective, it does
not come within the prohibition against the alienation of natural resources; and the petitioner
has the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed
by law.

It remains to consider whether mandamus is the proper remedy in this case. In

Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic, supra, the Supreme Court of the United States held
that 'mandamus will lie to compel the Secretary of the Interior to dispose of an application for
a patent for a mining claim on its merits, where his refusal to do so is based on his
misinterpretation of a statute.' In the course of its decision the court said: 'While the decisions
of this court exhibit a reluctance to direct a writ of mandamus against an executive officer,
they recognize the duty to do so by settled principle of law in some cases.
(Lane vs. Hoglund, 244 U. S., 174, 181; 61 Law. ed., 1066, 1069; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 552, and
case cited.) In Roberts vs. United States (176 U. S., 221, 231; 44 Law. ed., 443, 447; 20
Sup. Ct. Rep., 376), referred to and quoted in the Hoglund case, this court said:

"Every statute to some extent requires construction by the public officer whose duties
may be defined therein. Such officer must read the law, and he must therefore, in a
certain sense, construe it, in order to form a judgment from its language what duty he
is directed by the statute to perform. But that does not necessarily and in all cases
make the duty of the officer anything other than a purely ministerial one. If the law
direct him to perform an act in regard to which no discretion is committed to him, and
which, upon the facts existing, he is bound to perform, then that act is ministerial,
although depending upon a statute which requires, in some degree a construction of
its language by the officer. Unless this be so, the value of this writ is very greatly
impaired. Every executive officer whose duty is plainly devolved upon him by statute
might refuse to perform it, and when his refusal is brought before the court he might
successfully plead that the performance of the duty involved the construction of a
 statute by him, and therefore it was not ministerial, and the court would on that
account be powerless to give relief. Such a limitation of the power of the court, we
think, would be most unfortunate, as it would relieve from judicial supervision all
executive officers in the performance of their duties, whenever they should plead that
the duty required of them arose upon the construction of a statute, no matter how
plain its language, nor how plainly they violated their duty in refusing to perform the
act required."

The respondents further content that "the 'Jacinta' claim, which is the subject matter of this case,
was located on February 11 and 12, 1935, or several days after the adoption of the Constitution
(February 8, 1935). Before November 15, 1935, the locator thereof (according to the petition) had
performed no other act in addition to the location of said claim, except the performance of labor
worth more than P1,000, for the purpose of securing a patent (which is denied in the respondents'
answer, although hypothetically admitted for the purpose of the test case, without prejudice to
respondents' right to contest petitioner's pretense later on), and the filing of an application for a
patent survey, which was mostly performed subsequent to November 15, 1935. The filing of the
application for patent, as well as the posting of the required notice and plat of the claim, this filing of
copy of such plat and of such notice with the office of the mining recorder and the admission of proof
of said posting, took place two (2) years after the inauguration of the new Government. Notice of the
filing of said application has not been published as yet, and no tender of payment has ever been
made." We believe, and so hold, that there is no substantial difference between the instant case and
the Gold Creek case inasmuch as the right of location asserted by the petitioner accrued before
November 15, 1935, the date on which the Constitution took effect. The prohibition contained in
section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution took effect on November 15, 1935, when the Government
of the Commonwealth was inaugurated, and not on February 8, 1935, when the Constitution was
adopted. As to the restriction embodied in Act No. 137 of the Commonwealth, it is to be observed
that section 3 of said Act exempts from its provisions vested rights and privileges existing on the
date of the inauguration of the Government established under the Constitution.

In the instant case, we are not justified, upon the state of the pleadings, to grant the relief sought by
the petitioner. Considering, however, that the refusal of the respondents to act on the application for
a patent on its merits was due to their misinterpretation of certain constitutional and statutory
provisions, following the precedent established by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Wilbur vs. United States ex rel. Krushnic, supra, a writ of mandamusshould issue directing the
respondents to dispose of the application for patent on its merits, unaffected by the prohibition
against the alienation of natural resources contained in section 1 of Article XII of the Constitution and
in Commonwealth Act No. 137. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988

BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all
surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988

ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all
surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the bowels of the
earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private. 1 In the cases at bar, which have been
consolidated because they pose a common issue, this doctrine was not correctly applied.

These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on February 11,
1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three children, Victoria, Benjamin
and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and
covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa
and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. 2

The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5, Atok Big
Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the
Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9. 3

In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired the subject
land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after
the Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which was possessed by her parents under
claim of ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who
declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado,
nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos,
67 years old at the time, who recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's father. 5 Balbalio
presented her tax declaration in 1956 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964, 6 Alberto his tax
declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964. 7

Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was sold to it on
September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in
September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet had
been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in concept of owner, as evidenced
by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological
samplings and trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land. 8

For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by the Emma
and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded
on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased
from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous
and exclusive possession of the said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the
claims, such as the boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon. 9

The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the Philippine Bill of
1902 which provided that:

SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine Islands both
surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free and open to exploration,
occupation and purchase and the land in which they are found to occupation and
purchase by the citizens of the United States, or of said islands.

The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land sought to be
registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated
February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation under the
Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. 10

The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and ownership of the
land sought to be registered. 11 The applicants appealed to the respondent court, * which reversed the trial court and
12 In other words,
recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting their mining claims.
the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la Rosas over the land while at the same time
reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Atok by virtue of their mining claims.

Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of ownership. The
Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument that neither the private
respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim to the land because it is not
alienable and registerable.

It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central Cordillera
Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet and Atok at that time.
The Court of Appeals correctly declared that:

There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug mineral claims
of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of Atok. The June Bug
mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 mining claims of James E. Kelly,
American and mining locator. He filed his declaration of the location of the June Bug
mineral and the same was recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office on October 14,
1909. All of the Kelly claims ha subsequently been acquired by Benguet
Consolidated, Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had made improvements on the June
Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had submitted the
required affidavit of annual assessment. After World War II, Benguet introduced
improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and also conducted geological mappings,
geological sampling and trench side cuts. In 1948, Benguet redeclared the "June
Bug" for taxation and had religiously paid the taxes.
The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison registered in
1931, and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of Lots 1 to 5 and all of Lots
6 to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia mineral claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining
Company.

The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma mineral claims of
Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of the Constitution of the Philippines
of 1935, they were removed from the public domain and had become private
properties of Benguet and Atok.

It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim under

consideration was perfected prior to November 15, 1935, when the
Government of the Commonwealth was inaugurated; and according
to the laws existing at that time, as construed and applied by this
court in McDaniel v. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid
location of a mining claim segregated the area from the public
domain. Said the court in that case: The moment the locator
discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands located, and
perfected his location in accordance with law, the power of the United
States Government to deprive him of the exclusive right to the
possession and enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands
had become mineral lands and they were exempted from lands that
could be granted to any other person. The reservations of public
lands cannot be made so as to include prior mineral perfected
locations; and, of course, if a valid mining location is made upon
public lands afterwards included in a reservation, such inclusion or
reservation does not affect the validity of the former location. By such
location and perfection, the land located is segregated from the public
domain even as against the Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith,
249 U.S. 337; Van Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).

"The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to

segregate the area from the public domain, but to grant to the locator
the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right to a patent therefor
upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law.
Where there is a valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes
segregated from the public domain and the property of the locator."
(St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 650;
655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a location of a mining claim is
perfected it has the effect of a grant by the United States of the right
of present and exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive
enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals
within the lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral right
of adjoining locators; and this is the locator's right before as well as
after the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator acquires a
vested property right by virtue of his location made in compliance with
the mining laws, the fee remains in the government until patent
issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek Mining Corporation v. Hon.
Eulogio Rodriguez, Sec. of Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico
Abadilla, Director of the Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-266)

It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held in
the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner
 is not required to secure a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the
mining laws; his possessory right, for all practical purposes of ownership, is as good
as though secured by patent.

We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the requirements
of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the public domain, and not even
the government of the Philippines can take away this right from them. The reason is
obvious. Having become the private properties of the oppositors, they cannot be
deprived thereof without due process of law. 13

Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution against the
alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature for this was made
subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was categorically provided that:

SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters,
minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and
other natural resources of the Philipppines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines
or to corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by
such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of
the inauguration of the government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources with the exception of public agricultural lands, shall not be alienated, and
no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development or utilization of any
of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding 25 years, except as
to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which case beneficial use may be the measure and
the limit of the grant.

Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared:

Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the contrary

notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to February 8, 1935 within
lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec. 1826 of the Revised Administrative
Code which would be valid and subsisting location except to the existence of said
reserve are hereby declared to be valid and subsisting locations as of the date of
their respective locations.

The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in
force removed it from the public domain. 14 By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the
land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land or
the obtention of a patent over it. 15 As the land had become the private property of the locators, they had
the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok.

It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the
"vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the private
respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by the de la Rosas is
not available in the case at bar, for two reasons.

First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive possession
submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of ownership. They themselves
had acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its registration in 1965, relying on the earlier
alleged possession of their predecessors-in-interest. 16 The trial judge, who had the opportunity to
consider the evidence first-hand and observe the demeanor of the witnesses and test their credibility was
not convinced. We defer to his judgment in the absence of a showing that it was reached with grave
abuse of discretion or without sufficient basis. 17

Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had really been in
possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept of owner of the mining
claim but of the property as agricultural land, which it was not. The property was mineral land, and
they were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the lights of the mining locators
nor were they seeking to oust them as such and to replace them in the mining of the land. In fact,
Balbalio testified that she was aware of the diggings being undertaken "down below" 18 but she did
not mind, much less protest, the same although she claimed to be the owner of the said land.

The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the owners of
the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather doctrine, for it is a well-
known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only to its surface but also to
everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a reasonable height. 19 Under the aforesaid
ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate
claims of title. This is also difficult to understand, especially in its practical application.

Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land while the
mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well because he may
interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel lest he destroy the crops
above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner, go without encroaching on each
other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the surface and the sub-surface rights?

The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot be half
agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must be either
completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already observed, the land
which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and became mineral — and completely
mineral — once the mining claims were perfected. 20 As long as mining operations were being
undertaken thereon, or underneath, it did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly
so, because it was enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the
surface.

What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing as follows:

Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the State, and
their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall be limited to citizens of
the Philippines, or to corporations, or associations, at least 60% of the capital of
which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or
concession at the time of the inauguration of government established under the
Constitution.

SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural, industrial,
commercial, residential, or for any purpose other than mining does not include the
ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the minerals which may be found on or
under the surface.

SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included
within all areas for which public agricultural land patents are granted are excluded
and excepted from all such patents.
 SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the minerals included
within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted are excluded and excepted from
all such titles.

This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for the benefit
of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be
found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial, residential or
(for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is the owner of agricultural land in which
minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize
the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong.

The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the land could
be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that
once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted at the time,
such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to extract the minerals therein in the exercise
of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any
private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the
mining operations to be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course
entitled to just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings. 21

Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by virtue of
their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited
the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested rights
existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to the
private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously
by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE and that of
the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 88883 January 18, 1991

ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, INC., petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and LIWAN CONSI, respondents.

Mario C.V. Jalandoni for petitioner.

Joy B. Labiaga for private respondent.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul and set aside; (a) the decision* of the
Court of Appeals dated March 13, 1989 in CA-G.R. No. SP No. 13528 entitled "Liwan Consi vs. Hon.
Judge Ruben C. Ayson, et al." declaring that both the petitioner and private respondent hold
possessory titles to the land in question, and (b) the resolution denying the motion for
reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Fredia Mineral claim of about nine (9) hectares situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet, was located
sometime between December 25, 1930 and December 31, 1930, a period of six (6) days, by A.I.
Reynolds in accordance with the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, better known as
the Philippine Bill of 1902, in a so-called Declaration of Location. The said Declaration of Location of
mineral claim was duly recorded in the Office of the Mining Recorder sometime on January 2, 1931.
Fredia mineral claim, together with other mineral claims, was sold by A.I. Reynolds to Big Wedge
Mining Company, the earlier corporate name of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company, Inc. (Atok for
short; herein petitioner) in a Deed of Sale executed on November 2, 1931. Since then petitioner Atok
has been in continuous and exclusive ownership and possession of said claim up to the present
(Rollo, Annex "B", p. 21).

Atok has paid the realty taxes and occupation fees for the Fredia mineral claim. The Fredia mineral
claim together with other mineral claims owned by Atok has been declared under Tax Declaration
No. 9535 and that in view of Presidential Decree No. 1214 an application for lease was filed by Atok
covering the Fredia mineral claim (Rollo, Ibid., p. 22).

On the other hand, private respondent Liwan Consi has a lot below the land of a certain Mr. Acay at
Tuding Slide, Itogon, Benguet. He constructed a house thereon sometime in 1964. The lot is
covered by Tax Declaration No. 9462. When he first constructed his house below the lot of Mr. Acay
he was told that it was not necessary for him to obtain a building permit as it was only a nipa hut.
And no one prohibited him from entering the land so he was constructing a house thereon. It was
only in January 1984 when private respondent Consi repaired the said house that people came to
take pictures and told him that the lot belongs to Atok. Private respondent Consi has been paying
taxes on said land which his father before him had occupied (Rollo, Ibid., p. 22).

On January 1984, the security guards of Atok informed Feliciano Reyes, Security Officer of Atok,
that a construction was being undertaken at the area of the Fredia mineral claim by private
respondent Liwan Consi. Feliciano Reyes instructed the cashier to go and take pictures of the
construction. Feliciano Reyes himself and other security guards went to the place of the construction
to verify and then to the police to report the matter (Rollo, Ibid.).

On March 1, 1984, Atok filed a complaint for forcible entry and detainer against Liwan Consi (Rollo,
Annex "C", p. 32).

On January 29, 1987, after due hearing, the Municipal Trial Court of Itogon, presided over by Judge
Irving rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this case against Liwan Consi is hereby ordered dismissed. (Rollo, Annex
"A", p. 20).

Petitioner ATOK appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio and Benguet,
Branch VI, presided over by Judge Ruben Ayson (Rollo, Petition, p. 3). On December 5, 1987, the
RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing the decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Itogon
dated January 29, 1987 appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and a new one
entered in its place ordering the defendant Liwan Consi and all those claiming under him to
vacate the premises of the Fredia Mineral claim at Tuding, Itogon, Benguet immediately, and
to restore possession thereof to the plaintiff Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.

The defendant, Liwan Consi, is further ordered to remove and demolish his house
constructed in the premises of the land of Fredia mineral claim at Tuding, Benguet, and to
pay the costs.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, p. 30).

From said decision, Liwan Consi filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review (Rollo, Petition,
p. 4). On March 13, 1989, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the subject forcible entry action.
Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Annex "C" p. 48).

The Court of Appeals further ruled in part to wit:

The determination of whether the subject lot is mineral land or agricultural awaits the
decision of the Secretary of Natural Resources in a proceeding called for that purpose. Thus,
there is a chance that the subject property may be classified as alienable agricultural land. At
any rate, the mining company may not so readily describe Liwan Consi as a "squatter" he
also has possessory rights over the property. Such rights may mature into ownership on the
basis of long-term possession under the Public Land Law,

Thus it is Our holding, that both Consi and ATOK are of equal legal footing with regards the
subject lot. Both hold possessory titles to the land in question — the petitioner through his
long term occupancy of the same; the respondent mining firm by virtue of its being the claim
locator and applicant for a lease on the mineral claim within which the subject lot is found.
But it was established that the petitioner has been in actual and beneficial possession of the
 subject lot since before the Second World War in the concept of owner and in good faith.
(Rollo, Annex "C", pp. 47-48).

On June 16, 1989, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
ATOK (Rollo, Annex "D", p. 50).

Hence, the petition.

The main issue in this case is whether or not an individual's long term occupation of land of the
public domain vests him with such rights over the same as to defeat the rights of the owner of that
claim.

The petition is impressed with merit.

It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for as held in the Gold Creek
Mining Corporation case, for all physical purposes of ownership, the owner is not required to secure
a patent as long as he complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for all
practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by patent (Republic v. Court of
Appeals, 160 SCRA 228 [1988]).

In the case at bar, the evidence on record pointed that the petitioner Atok has faithfully complied with
all the requirements of the law regarding the maintenance of the said Fredia Mineral Claim.

The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the laws then in
force removed it from the public domain. By such act, the locators acquired exclusive rights over the
land, against even the government, without need of any further act such as the purchase of the land
or the obtention of a patent over it. As the land had become the private property of the locators, they
had the right to transfer the same, as they did, to Benguet and Atok (Ibid.).

As in the instant petition, the record shows that the lot in question was acquired through a Deed of
Sale executed between Atok and Fredia Mineral Claim.

The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not only to segregate the area from the
public domain, but to grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim and the right
to a patent therefor upon compliance with the terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where
there is a valid location of mining claim, the area becomes segregated from the public and
the property of the locator. When a location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of
a grant by the United States of the right of present and exclusive possession, with the right to
the exclusive enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all the minerals within the
lines of the claim, except as limited by the extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is
the locator's right before as well as after the issuance of the patent. While a lode locator
acquires a vested right by virtue of his location made in compliance with the mining laws, the
fee remains in the government until patent issues. (St. Louis Mining & Mineral Co. v.
Montana Mining Co., 171 U.S. 605, 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322)

It is, therefore, evident that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by
virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the Constitution of 1935
prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested
rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not have been transferred to
the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared
simultaneously by them and the mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes (Ibid).
On the matter of possession, private respondent contends that his predecessor-in-interest has been
in possession of said lot even before the war and has in fact cultivated the same.

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 288 1988, this Court held:

. . . even if it be assumed that the predecessor-in-interest of the de la Rosas had already

been in possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept of owner
of the mining claim but of the property as agricultural land, which it was not. The property
was mineral land, and they are claiming it as agricultural land. They were not disputing the
rights of the mining locators nor where they seeking to oust them as such and to replace
them in the mining of the land. . . .

Since the subject lot is mineral land, private respondent's possession of the subject lot no matter
how long did not confer upon him possessory rights over the same.

Furthermore, Article 538 of the New Civil Code provides:

Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different
personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the
fact of possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the
one longer in possession; if the dates of the possession are the same, the one who presents
a title; and if all these conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit
pending determination of its possession or ownership through proper proceedings.

Since 1931 up to the present, petitioner ATOK has been in continuous and exclusive possession of
the Frediamineral claim while private respondent's possession started only sometime in 1964 when
he constructed a house thereon. Clearly, ATOK has superior possessory rights than private
respondent, Liwan Consi, the former being "the one longer in possession."

It is therefore clear that from the legal viewpoint it was really petitioner who was in actual physical
possession of the property. Having been deprived of this possession by the private respondent,
petitioner has every right to sue for ejFectment.

With this ruling enunciated by the Court, it can further be declared and held that petitioner Atok has
the exclusive right to the property in question.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of
Appeals dated March 13, 1989 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Baguio and Benguet dated June 16, 1989 is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-14869 October 27, 1920

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, applicant-appelle,

vs.
THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA, objector-appellant.
JUSTA DE GUZMAN, ET AL., objectors-appellees.

Hartigan and Welch for appellant.

Gregorio C. Concepcion for appellees.

MALCOLM, J.:

In 1913, cadastral proceedings were begun to settle the title to a considerable tract of land situated
in the Province of Rizal. Thirteen of the cadastral lots were claimed by the municipality of Cainta,
Province of Rizal, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, and various private individuals. The
judgment of the trial court adjudicated the parcels in question to the private claimants. From this
judgment both the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila and the municipality of Cainta appealed,
but subsequently the appeal of the latter wad dismissed for failure to prosecute. The contest has
thus narrowed down to one between the Church as appellant and various individuals as appellees.

A ruling as to four of the lots can quickly be made. By stipulation during the trial, and by admission of
counsel for appellant, Policarpio Buenviaje is conceded to have title to lot 2187. As to lot 2186, the
only evidence before us, confirmed by the findings of the trial court, is, that Mamerta Roxas went into
possession of the same in 1895; and when counsel for the Church made his offer to present rebuttal
testimony, he failed to mention this lot. Likewise, as to lots 2213 and 2214, the only evidence before
us, confirmed by the findings of the trial court, is, that Antonio, Benito, and Gervasio dela Paz went
into possession of the same in 1896; the record states that "ambas partes dan por terminadas sus
pruebas," while counsel for the Church in making his offer of rebuttal testimony again failed to
include these two lots.

A more difficult situation has arisen with reference to the nine remaining cadastral lots. To
understand it, a brief narration of the course of the proceedings in the trial court will have to be
made.

The trial as to the land now before us opened with a stipulation to the effect that the composition title
of the Church with the spanish Government included this land. The Church presented one witness
and rested. The private oppositors then called their respective witnesses. Each endeavored to prove
title by possession, best understood by the following table:

Parcel No. Oppositor. Possession Acts of possession

began
2176, 2191, Justa de Guzman 1895 Planted rice; paid
2182 taxes
2178, 2180, Melecio S. 1882 Planted rice
2190 Buenaventura
2184, 2185 Justo S. Buenaventura 1885 Cultivation and
harvest
 2192 Justo Javier 1885 Planted rice;
harvested.

Counsel for the Church, thereupon, made an offer to present additional testimony with reference to
lots 2176, 2178, 2180, 2182, 2184, 2185, 2190, 2191, and 2192, or the lots above enumerated in the
table. Three witnesses were called to the stand, but each time, before any pertinent testimony could
be secured from them, an objection was made by counsel for the oppositors that the proof related to
the evidence in chief of the Church, and this was sustained by the court.

To resolve the facts into their simplest terms, it is evident that when an admission was made of the
royal title, the Church had shown that it was the legitimate owner of the land to which it refers. The
most perfect title could, however, be lost by abandonments. When, therefore, the private oppositors
showed possession for the prescriptive period, they had made their case, and the burden of proof
had shifted. To overcome this burden, it was then incumbent upon the Church to demonstrate that
such possession had been interrupted, or that it was merely possession through the tolerance of the
Church.

This brings us to the specific consideration of assignment of error No. 2 of the appellant to the effect
that the court erred in refusing to admit evidence tendered by this claimant and appellant in answer
to rival claims. A correct ruling can most appropriately be arrived at by a consideration of the nature
of cadastral proceedings, with reference to the usual rules of trial practice and evidence.

The object of a cadastral petition, as all know, is that the title to the various lots embraced in the
survey may be settled and adjudicated. It is in the nature of a proceeding in rem, promoted by the
Director of Lands, somewhat, akin to a judicial inquiry and investigation leading to a judicial decree.
In one sense, there is no plaintiff and there is no defendant. In another sense, the Government is the
plaintiff and all the claimants are defendants. (Act No. 2259, sec. 10.) The trial is conducted in the
same manner as ordinary trials and proceedings in the Court of Land Registration. (Sec. 11.) As to
this court, now abolished, the Land Registration Act provides that it "shall conform, as near as may
be, to the practice in special proceedings in courts of first instance." (Act No. 496, sec. 2) The Code
of Civil Procedure, which is thus brought into relation with the Cadastral Act, prescribes the order in
which the trial must proceed. (Secs. 56, 132). The usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence
govern registration proceedings.

Obviously, orderly procedure must be followed if injurious surprises and annoying delays in the
administration of justice are to be avoided. Evidence cannot be given piecemeal. The strict rule is
that the plaintiff must try his case out when he commences. Nevertheless, a relaxation of the rule is
permitted in the sound discretion of the court. "The proper rule for the exercise of this discretion," it
has been said by an eminent author, "is, that material testimony should not be excluded because
offered by the plaintiff after the defendant has rested, although not in rebuttal, unless it has been
kept back by a trick, and for the purpose of deceiving the defendant and affecting his case
injuriously." (1 Thompson on Trials, sec. 346.) 1awph!l.net

These principles find their echo in Philippine remedial law. While the general rule is rightly
recognized, the Code of Civil Procedure authorizes the judge "for special reasons," to change the
order of the trial, and "for good reason, in the furtherance of justice," to permit the parties "to offer
evidence upon their original case." (Sec. 132.) These exceptions are made stronger when one
considers the character of registration proceedings and the fact that where so many parties are
involved, and action is taken quickly and abruptly, conformity with precise legal rules should not
always be expected. Even at the risk of violating legal formulæ, an opportunity should be given to
parties to submit additional corroborative evidence in support of their claims of title, if the ends of
justice so require. (Rodriquez vs. Director of Lands [1915], 31 Phil., 272; Government of the
Philippine Islands vs. Abural [1919], 39 Phil., 996.)

We believe that the offer of counsel for the Church could property be classified as evidence in denial
of an affirmative fact; but that even if not technically rebuttal evidence, yet in the interest of justice
and the ascertainment of the truth it should be received. Whether such evidence would be sufficient
to overcome the case which exists in favor of the claimants of the nine lots cannot now be
determined.

In so far as the judgment relates to lots No. 2186, 2187, 2213, and 2214, it is affirmed, and in so far
as it relates to lots Nos. 2176, 2178, 2180, 2182, 2184, 2185, 2190, 2191, and 2192, it is reversed,
and the record shall be returned to the lower court for the taking of additional evidence under the
offer of counsel for the Church found on page 83 of the stenographic notes. No finding as to costs is
made in this instance. So ordered.
 [G.R. No. L-47847 : July 31, 1981.]
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MANUELA PASTOR,
Respondents.

DECISION

MAKASIAR, J.:

By this petition for review on certiorari, the Director of Lands seeks to set aside the decision
of the Court of Appeals in C.A.G.R. No. 59853-R affirming the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Batangas in LRC Case No. N-893 granting the application for registration under
R.A. 496 of thirteen (13) parcels of land in the name of herein private respondent Manuela
c ranad

Pastor.
It appears that on May 8, 1974, respondent Manuela Pastor filed with the Court of First
Instance of Batangas LRC Case No. N-893, an application for confirmation of imperfect title
over thirteen (13) lots situated in Gulod and Pallocan, Batangas City.
cra nad

The application shows that seven (7) of the lots, specifically Lots Nos. 9186-A, 9186-B,
c ranad

9186-D, 9330-A, 9330-C, 9402-A and 9402-D were allegedly inherited by respondent
Manuela Pastor from her parents Rafael Pastor and Natalia Quinio who died on July 1, 1938
and July 12, 1908, respectively. The other six (6) lots, namely Lots Nos. 9402-B, 9402-E,
crana d

9397-B, 9397-D, 9367 and 9360 were allegedly inherited by respondent from her aunt
Rosario Pastor who died on January 13, 1950 without any surviving heir except respondent
herein. In her application, the respondent claims that she and her predecessors-in-interest
had been in continuous, uninterrupted, open, public, adverse and notorious possession of
the lots under claim of ownership for more than thirty (30) years.
cra nad

On June 24, 1974 the application was amended to correct the description of two lots.
The Director of Lands filed an opposition to the application on the ground that applicant
Manuela Pastor and her predecessors-in-interest neither had title in fee simple nor imperfect
title under Section 48 of the Public Land Law, as amended, over the lots in question.
No other persons filed opposition to the application.
Accordingly, the Court of First Instance of Batangas, acting as a land registration court,
issued an order of general default with the exception of the Director of Lands, and then
proceeded to hear the applicant, her witnesses, and oppositor Director of Lands.
During the hearings, the applicant presented as her witnesses her nephew Antonio M.
Pastor, and Geodetic Engineer Quirino P. Clemeneo. Applicant Manuela Pastor testified on
her behalf that she has remained the owner and possessor of the lots in question; that her
possession has been peaceful, public, open, continuous, adverse against the whole world
and in the concept of owner; that she had paid the taxes thereon; and that the said lots
were planted to sugar cane.
Witness Antonio M. Pastor corroborated in all material respects the testimony of his aunt
Manuela Pastor.
The Geodetic Engineer, Quirino P. Clemeneo, testified that he conducted the survey of some
of the lots and verified the survey conducted by the Bureau of Lands on the others. He
found that the lots did not encroach upon private and public lands.
As part of her documentary evidence, applicant Manuela Pastor presented the certifications
of the Treasurer of Batangas City showing payments of the real estate tax on the lots from
1965 to 1974 (Exhibits J, J-1, J-2, J-3, J-4 and J-5) and official receipts of payments of real
c ranad

estate tax on the same lots for 1975 (Exhibits K, K-1 and K-2).
c ranad

Apart from the foregoing, applicant presented, however, a certification from the Land
Registration Commission (Exhibit L) stating that Lot No. 9330 of the Cadastral Survey of
cranad

Batangas, Province of Batangas, was declared public land in Cadastral Case No. 41, LRC
Cad. Record No. 1706. She likewise submitted another certification from the Land
Registration Commission (Exhibit L-1) to the effect that Lots Nos. 9186, 9360, 9367, 9397
cranad

and 9402 of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas, Province of Batangas, were the subject of a
decision in Cad. Case No. 43, LRC Cad. Record No. 1712, although no decree of registration
has as yet been issued.
On August 6, 1975 the Court of First Instance of Batangas rendered a decision pertinent
portions of which read as follows:
“From the evidence presented, it has been established that as early as in the year
1913, the original owners of the seven (7) parcels of land located in the barrio of
c ranad

Gulod, Batangas City, designated as Lots Nos. 9330-A, 9330-C, 9186-A, 9186-B,
9186-D, 9402-A and 9402-D, as reflected in the plan Csd-12122 Sheet 1 (Exhibit crana d

‘E’), were spouses Rafael Pastor and Natalia Quinio. Natalia Quinio died on July 12,
1908. Since then, Rafael Pastor possessed the said lots peacefully, openly,
continuously, adversely against the whole world and in the concept of owner up to
his death in 1938. After the death of Rafael Pastor on July 1, 1938, Manuela Pastor,
the applicant herein, being the only child and sole heiress, came into possession and
ownership thereof by way of inheritance. From 1938 when the applicant inherited the
said lots from her deceased parents and up to the present, she has remained the
owner and possessor thereof; that her possession over the said lots has been
peaceful, public, open, continuous, adverse against the whole world and in the
concept of owner up to the present; that the applicant had paid the estate and
inheritance taxes thereon before the Japanese Occupation; that the said lots were
planted with sugar cane, and since the year 1964 there were no tenants but paid
workers were provided with huts for their use therein; that there were no buildings,
houses or other improvements thereon. The other six (6) lots located in the barrio
crana d

of Pallocan, Batangas City, designated as Lots Nos. 9397-B, 9397-D, 9367, 9360,
9402-B and 9402-E, as reflected in the plans marked as Exhibits ‘E’, ‘G’, ‘H’, ‘H-1’,
‘H-1-a’ and ‘H-2’, were originally owned by the applicant’s aunt, Dra. Rosario Pastor;
that the latter possessed the said lots peacefully, openly, continuously, adversely
against the whole world and in the concept of owner up to her death in 1950; that
after the death of Dra. Rosario Pastor on January 13, 1950, the applicant, Manuela
Pastor, being the only niece and sole heiress, came into possession and ownership
thereof by way of inheritance. From 1950 when the said applicant inherited the said
lots from her deceased aunt and up to the present, she has remained the owner and
possessor thereof; that her possession over the said lots has been peaceful, public,
open, continuous, adverse against the whole world and in the concept of owner up to
the present; that the applicant had paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon;
that the said lots were planted with sugar cane, and since the year 1964 there were
no tenants but paid workers were provided with huts for their use therein; that there
were no buildings, houses or other improvements thereon.
“Evidence further shows that the late Rafael Pastor and Dra. Rosario Pastor, are
brother and sister. Dra. Pastor died single and without issue; that applicant, Manuela
Pastor, together with her predecessors-in-interest since the year 1913 and up to the
present have been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse and uninterrupted
possession over the said thirteen (13) lots in question; that said lots were covered
c ranad

by tax declarations in the name of herein applicant, as shown in the Assessment

Certificate issued by the City Assessor of Batangas (Exhibit ‘1’), and the taxes cra nad

thereon have been paid by the applicant (Exhibits ‘J’, ‘J-1’, ‘J-5’, ‘K’, ‘K-1’ and ‘K-2’);
cranad

that there were no lien or incumbrance affecting said lots. Furthermore, applicant
testified that she did not claim any portion of the road which bounded the lots in
question, nor the portion of the creeks or river; that any of the said lots were not
within any reservation of any kind.
“As required by this Court, the applicant submitted the following:
“(a) a certification of the Land Registration Commission that Lot No. 9330 of the
Cadastral Survey of Batangas Record No. 1706 was declared ‘public land’ in the
decision rendered thereon. It is further certified that copy of said decision relative to
the aforementioned lot is not available in this Commission (Exhibit ‘L’); (b) a cranad cranad

certification of the Land Registration Commission, that no decrees of registration

have as yet been issued to lots Nos. 9186, 9360, 9367 and 9397 and 9402 of the
Cadastral Survey of Batangas (Exh. ‘L-1’); and (c) a certification issued by officer-
cra nad crana d

in-charge Records Division of the Bureau of Lands to the effect that the
thirteen (13) lots situated in Barrios Gulod and Pallocan, Batangas City, are not
crana d

covered by any kind of public land, application or patent (Exh. ‘M’). c ranad

“All the documentary exhibits of applicant were submitted in evidence as offered,

there being no objection on the part of the oppositor. Oppositor Director of Lands
through City Fiscal of Batangas did not offer any contradictory evidence.
“Indisputably and by highly credible evidence, the applicant gave more than ample
proof of her rights to the grant of title over the properties in question. By herself and
through her predecessors-in-interest, the applicant has been in open, public,
peaceful, continuous, uninterrupted and adverse possession of the thirteen (13) cra nad

parcels of land up to the present — all for the requisite period of time and under a
bona fide claim of ownership which entitle her to confirmation of title over the
properties subject of this application.
“. . finding the application for confirmation and grant to title under Act 496 as
cra

amended, to be well-founded and fully substantiated by evidence sufficient and

requisite under the law, the Court hereby decrees the registration of:
“x x x
“in favor of applicant, MANUELA PASTOR . .” cra c hanro blesvi rt ualawlib ra ry (pp. 49-60, Record on Appeal, p. 45,
rec.).
Not, satisfied with the decision of the Court of First Instance, petitioner Director of
Lands appealed the same to the Court of Appeals assigning the following errors:
‘First Assignment of Error
‘THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF MANUELA
PASTOR FOR CONFIRMATION OF HER ALLEGED IMPERFECT TITLE TO LOTS
NO. 9330-A AND 9330-C DESPITE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY APPLICANT
HERSELF THAT SAID LOTS WERE DECLARED PUBLIC LAND IN A PREVIOUS
CADASTRAL PROCEEDING.’
‘Second Assignment of Error
‘THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF MANUELA
PASTOR FOR CONFIRMATION OF HER ALLEGED IMPERFECT TITLE TO LOTS
NO. 9186-A, 9186-B, 9186-D, 9402-A, 9402-B, 9402-D, 9402-E, 9397-B,
 9397-D, 9367 and 9360 DESPITE EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY APPLICANT
HERSELF THAT A DECISION RESPECTING SAID LOTS HAD BEEN RENDERED
IN A PREVIOUS CADASTRAL PROCEEDING.’
‘Third Assignment of Error
‘THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE IS ADEQUATE
EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED IMPERFECT TITLE OF MANUELA PASTOR TO THE
THIRTEEN (13) LOTS SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION’ (pp. 11-12, rec.).
cra nad c ralaw c ranad

On February 9, 1978 the Court of Appeals rendered judgment affirming in toto the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Batangas.
Hence, this petition.
I
Substantially, the same issues, as raised by petitioner in the Court of Appeals, are brought
before US.
Petitioner asserts that the decision rendered in Cadastral Case No. 41 (Exhibit L) declaring c ranad

Lot No. 9330 — from which Lots Nos. 9330-A and 9330-C were derived — constitutes res
adjudicata as to the nature of the lots in question and therefore, a bar to appellee’s
application.
Additionally, petitioner also argued that:
“Lots Nos. 9186-A, 9186-B and 9186-D of the Cadastral Survey of Batangas, were
derived from Lot No. 9186. Lots Nos. 9402-A, 9402-B, 9402-D and 9402-E were
derived from Lot No. 9402. Lots Nos. 9397-B and 9397-D were derived from Lot No.
9397.
“As shown by applicant’s Exhibit L-1, Lots Nos. 9186, 9360, 9367, 9397 and 9402
were the subject of a decision rendered in Cad. Case No. 43, LRC Cad. Record No.
1712, although no decree of registration has as yet been issued therein.
“The certificate, Exhibit L-1, is dated June 4, 1975. The decision of the lower court
was rendered more than two months later, on August 6, 1975. Thus, on the basis of
Exhibit L, the decision of the cadastral court might already be final when the
appealed decision was rendered. If such be the case, the decision of the cadastral
court constitutes res adjudicata and it is a bar to the present land registration
proceeding under Act No. 496 (Lopez v. Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 589; Section 1.
c rana d

paragraph (f), Rule 16, Rules of Court).

c ranad

“Assuming that the decision of the cadastral court was not yet final when the
appealed decision was rendered, it was nevertheless, litis pendentia which, under
Section 1, paragraph (e), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, is likewise a bar to the
c ranad

present proceeding for land registration case under Act No. 496.
“Either way, whether the decision of the cadastral court in Cad. Case No. 43 had
become final or not, the present proceeding for land registration under Act No. 496
cannot prosper because of the principles of res adjudicata and litis pendentia” (pp. chanrob lesvi rtualaw lib rary

15-16, rec.).
WE find no legal basis to uphold the foregoing contentions of petitioner. It is clear from the
evidence on record that in the proceedings had before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, acting as a land registration court, the oppositor Director of Lands, petitioner
herein, did not interpose any objection nor set up the defense of res adjudicata with respect
to the lots in question. Such failure on the part of oppositor Director of Lands, to OUR mind,
is a procedural infirmity which cannot be cured on appeal. Section 2, Rule 9, Revised Rules
of Court of 1964, in no uncertain language, provides that:
“SEC. 2. Defenses and objections not pleaded deemed waived. — Defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived; . .” cra

All defenses therefore not interposed in a motion to dismiss or in an answer are deemed
waived (Santiago, et al. vs. Ramirez, et al., L-15237, May 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 157, 162;
crana d

Torreda vs. Boncaros, L-39832, January 30, 1976, 69 SCRA 247, 253).
Thus, the defense of res adjudicata when not set up either in a motion to dismiss or in an
answer, is deemed waived. It cannot be pleaded for the first time at the trial or on
appeal (Phil. Coal Miner’s Union vs. CEPOC, et al., L-19007, April 30, 1964, 10 SCRA 784,
cranad

789).
But granting for a moment, that the defenses, of res adjudicata was properly raised by
petitioner herein, WE still hold that, factually, there is no prior final judgment at all to speak
of. The decision in Cadastral Case No. 41 does not constitute a bar to the application of
respondent Manuela Pastor; because a decision in a cadastral proceeding declaring a lot
public land is not the final decree contemplated in Sections 38 and 40 of the Land
Registration Act.
A judicial declaration that a parcel of land is public, does not preclude even the same
applicant from subsequently seeking a judicial confirmation of his title to the same land,
provided he thereafter complies with the provisions of Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, as amended, and as long as said public land remains alienable and disposable (now cranad

sections 3 and 4, P.D. No. 1073).

With respect to Cadastral Case No. 43, the evidence on record is too scanty to sustain the
view of the petitioner that the decision rendered therein constitutes res adjudicata, or in the
absence of finality thereof, litis pendentia. On the contrary, private respondent has amply
shown that no final decree whatsoever was issued in connection with said cadastral case,
even as it is not known in whose favor said decision was rendered. As found by the Court of
Appeals:
“Again, we sustain the appellee. There is an ambiguity as to what was adjudicated in Case
No. 43. If the lots in question were in that case awarded to a third party, the latter should
have intervened in this case. But no private party has challenged the application for
registration” (p. 30, rec.).
chan roble svirtualawl ibra ry

II
Finally, petitioner argues for the first time on appeal that “there is no substantial evidence
to show that she (private respondent Manuela Pastor) and her predecessors-in-interest
c ranad

have been in possession of the lots sought to be titled for a period of at least thirty (30) cra nad

years and in the manner provided in Section 48, as amended, of the Public Land Law.”
WE find no merit in the foregoing argument of petitioner. The uncontradicted testimony of
private respondent Manuela Pastor, which was further corroborated by the testimony of
Antonio Pastor, conclusively established beyond doubt that the respondent, together with
her predecessors-in-interest since the year 1913 and up to the present, had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the lots in question under
a bona fide claim of ownership. Moreover, the documentary evidence submitted by private
respondent also show that the lots have been declared for taxation purposes in the name of
respondent Manuela Pastor (Exhibit ‘I’), and the taxes thereon have been paid by said
cra nad

respondent herein (Exhibits ‘J’, ‘J-1’ to ‘J-5’, ‘K’, ‘K-1’ and ‘K-2’). And finally, Geodetic
cranad

Engineer Quirino Clemeneo, who conducted the survey of some of the lots and verified the
survey conducted by the Bureau of Lands, testified that the thirteen (13) lots in question
c ranad

did not encroach upon public or private lands. All these are unmistakable indicia that
respondent Manuela Pastor has performed and complied with all the conditions essential to
entitle her to a confirmation of her imperfect title over the thirteen (13) lots subject of her
crana d

application.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS AFFIRMED, AND THE PETITION
IS HEREBY DISMISSED. NO COSTS.
SO ORDERED.