Psychological Incapacity

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND JULIA ROSARIO BEDIA-SANTOS, respondents.
VITUG, J.:
Concededly a highly, if not indeed the most likely, controversial provision introduced by the Family
Code is Article 36 (as amended by E.O. No. 227 dated 17 July 1987), which declares:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.
The present petition for review on certiorari, at the instance of Leouel Santos ("Leouel"),
brings into fore the above provision which is now invoked by him. Undaunted by the
decisions of the court a quo1 and the Court of Appeal,2 Leouel persists in beseeching its
application in his attempt to have his marriage with herein private respondent, Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos ("Julia"), declared a nullity.
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army,
first met Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for Leouel and Julia. On 20
September 1986, the two exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio G. Lazaro of
Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's
parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18 July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby
boy, and he was christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not last long. It was bound
to happen, Leouel averred, because of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young
spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also start a "quarrel" over a number of other
things, like when and where the couple should start living independently from Julia's parents or
whenever Julia would express resentment on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's
pleas to so dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01 January 1989, Julia called up
Leouel for the first time by long distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the
expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When Leouel got a chance to visit the United
States, where he underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990, he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in
touch with, Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed with the regional trial Court of Negros
Oriental, Branch 30, a complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the Family Code"
(docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). Summons was served by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in Negros Oriental.
On 31 May 1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel), opposed the complaint and
denied its allegations, claiming, in main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been irresponsible
and incompetent.
A possible collusion between the parties to obtain a decree of nullity of their marriage was ruled out
by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor (in its report to the court).
On 25 October 1991, after pre-trial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit unsuccessfully, by
the court, Julia ultimately filed a manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit
evidence.
On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.3
Leouel appealed to the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial court.4
The petition should be denied not only because of its non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which
requires a certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the very least to communicate with him,
for more than five years are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically incapacitated
to enter into married life. In his own words, Leouel asserts:
. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia

Rosario Bedia-Santos failed all these years to communicate with the petitioner. A
wife who does not care to inform her husband about her whereabouts for a period of
five years, more or less, is psychologically incapacitated.
The family Code did not define the term "psychological incapacity." The deliberations during the
sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee, which has drafted the Code, can, however,
provide an insight on the import of the provision.
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 36. . . .
(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature
of marriage or was psychologically or mentally incapacitated to discharge the
essential marital obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after
the celebration.
On subparagraph (7), which as lifted from the Canon Law, Justice (Jose B.L.) Reyes
suggested that they say "wanting in sufficient use," but Justice (Eduardo) Caguioa
preferred to say "wanting in the sufficient use." On the other hand, Justice Reyes
proposed that they say "wanting in sufficient reason." Justice Caguioa, however,
pointed out that the idea is that one is not lacking in judgment but that he is lacking in
the exercise of judgment. He added that lack of judgment would make the marriage
voidable. Judge (Alicia Sempio-) Diy remarked that lack of judgment is more serious
than insufficient use of judgment and yet the latter would make the marriage null and
void and the former only voidable. Justice Caguioa suggested that subparagraph (7)
be modified to read:
"That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
obligations, even if such lack of incapacity is made manifest after the
celebration."
Justice Caguioa explained that the phrase "was wanting in sufficient use of reason of
judgment to understand the essential nature of marriage" refers to defects in the
mental faculties vitiating consent, which is not the idea in subparagraph (7), but lack
of appreciation of one's marital obligations.
Judge Diy raised the question: Since "insanity" is also a psychological or mental
incapacity, why is "insanity" only a ground for annulment and not for declaration or
nullity? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that in insanity, there is the appearance
of consent, which is the reason why it is a ground for voidable marriages, while
subparagraph (7) does not refer to consent but to the very essence of marital
obligations.
Prof. (Araceli) Baviera suggested that, in subparagraph (7), the word "mentally" be
deleted, with which Justice Caguioa concurred. Judge Diy, however, prefers to retain
the word "mentally."
Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence.

Justice (Ricardo) Puno stated that sometimes a person may be psychologically
impotent with one but not with another. Justice (Leonor Ines-) Luciano said that it is
called selective impotency.
Dean (Fortunato) Gupit stated that the confusion lies in the fact that in inserting the
Canon Law annulment in the Family Code, the Committee used a language which
describes a ground for voidable marriages under the Civil Code. Justice Caguioa
added that in Canon Law, there are voidable marriages under the Canon Law, there
are no voidable marriages Dean Gupit said that this is precisely the reason why they
should make a distinction.
Justice Puno remarked that in Canon Law, the defects in marriage cannot be cured.
Justice Reyes pointed out that the problem is: Why is "insanity" a ground for void ab
initio marriages? In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that insanity is curable and
there are lucid intervals, while psychological incapacity is not.
On another point, Justice Puno suggested that the phrase "even if such lack or
incapacity is made manifest" be modified to read "even if such lack or incapacity
becomes manifest."
Justice Reyes remarked that in insanity, at the time of the marriage, it is not
apparent.
Justice Caguioa stated that there are two interpretations of the phrase "psychological
or mentally incapacitated" — in the first one, there is vitiation of consent because one
does not know all the consequences of the marriages, and if he had known these
completely, he might not have consented to the marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground

for voidable marriages since otherwise it will encourage one who really understood
the consequences of marriage to claim that he did not and to make excuses for
invalidating the marriage by acting as if he did not understand the obligations of
marriage. Dean Gupit added that it is a loose way of providing for divorce.
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Caguioa explained that his point is that in the case of incapacity by reason of
defects in the mental faculties, which is less than insanity, there is a defect in
consent and, therefore, it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage
because there is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the
simple reason that there are lucid intervals and there are cases when the insanity is
curable. He emphasized that psychological incapacity does not refer to mental
faculties and has nothing to do with consent; it refers to obligations attendant to
marriage.
xxx xxx xxx
On psychological incapacity, Prof. (Flerida Ruth P.) Romero inquired if they do not
consider it as going to the very essence of consent. She asked if they are really
removing it from consent. In reply, Justice Caguioa explained that, ultimately,
consent in general is effected but he stressed that his point is that it is not principally
a vitiation of consent since there is a valid consent. He objected to the lumping
together of the validity of the marriage celebration and the obligations attendant to
marriage, which are completely different from each other, because they require a
different capacity, which is eighteen years of age, for marriage but in contract, it is
different. Justice Puno, however, felt that psychological incapacity is still a kind of
vice of consent and that it should not be classified as a voidable marriage which is
incapable of convalidation; it should be convalidated but there should be no
prescription. In other words, as long as the defect has not been cured, there is
always a right to annul the marriage and if the defect has been really cured, it should
be a defense in the action for annulment so that when the action for annulment is
instituted, the issue can be raised that actually, although one might have been
psychologically incapacitated, at the time the action is brought, it is no longer true
that he has no concept of the consequence of marriage.
Prof. (Esteban) Bautista raised the question: Will not cohabitation be a defense? In
response, Justice Puno stated that even the bearing of children and cohabitation
should not be a sign that psychological incapacity has been cured.
Prof. Romero opined that psychological incapacity is still insanity of a lesser degree.
Justice Luciano suggested that they invite a psychiatrist, who is the expert on this
matter. Justice Caguioa, however, reiterated that psychological incapacity is not a
defect in the mind but in the understanding of the consequences of marriage, and
therefore, a psychiatrist will not be a help.
Prof. Bautista stated that, in the same manner that there is a lucid interval in insanity,
there are also momentary periods when there is an understanding of the
consequences of marriage. Justice Reyes and Dean Gupit remarked that the ground
of psychological incapacity will not apply if the marriage was contracted at the time
when there is understanding of the consequences of marriage.5
xxx xxx xxx
Judge Diy proposed that they include physical incapacity to copulate among the
grounds for void marriages. Justice Reyes commented that in some instances the
impotence that in some instances the impotence is only temporary and only with
respect to a particular person. Judge Diy stated that they can specify that it is
incurable. Justice Caguioa remarked that the term "incurable" has a different
meaning in law and in medicine. Judge Diy stated that "psychological incapacity" can
also be cured. Justice Caguioa, however, pointed out that "psychological incapacity"
is incurable.
Justice Puno observed that under the present draft provision, it is enough to show
that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one was psychologically
incapacitated so that later on if already he can comply with the essential marital
obligations, the marriage is still void ab initio. Justice Caguioa explained that since in
divorce, the psychological incapacity may occur after the marriage, in void marriages,
it has to be at the time of the celebration of marriage. He, however, stressed that the
idea in the provision is that at the time of the celebration of the marriage, one is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations, which
incapacity continues and later becomes manifest.
Justice Puno and Judge Diy, however, pointed out that it is possible that after the
marriage, one's psychological incapacity become manifest but later on he is cured.
Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa opined that the remedy in this case is to allow
him to remarry.6
xxx xxx xxx
Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:
Art. 37. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated, to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage shall likewise be void from the
beginning even if such incapacity becomes manifest after its
solemnization.
Justice Caguioa suggested that "even if" be substituted with "although." On the other
hand, Prof. Bautista proposed that the clause "although such incapacity becomes
manifest after its solemnization" be deleted since it may encourage one to create the
manifestation of psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa pointed out that, as in
other provisions, they cannot argue on the basis of abuse.
Judge Diy suggested that they also include mental and physical incapacities, which
are lesser in degree than psychological incapacity. Justice Caguioa explained that
mental and physical incapacities are vices of consent while psychological incapacity
is not a species of vice or consent.
Dean Gupit read what Bishop Cruz said on the matter in the minutes of their
February 9, 1984 meeting:
"On the third ground, Bishop Cruz indicated that the phrase
"psychological or mental impotence" is an invention of some
churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is
considered a weak phrase. He said that the Code of Canon Law
would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity to
discharge . . ."
Justice Caguioa remarked that they deleted the word "mental" precisely to
distinguish it from vice of consent. He explained that "psychological incapacity" refers
to lack of understanding of the essential obligations of marriage.
Justice Puno reminded the members that, at the last meeting, they have decided not
to go into the classification of "psychological incapacity" because there was a lot of
debate on it and that this is precisely the reason why they classified it as a special
case.
At this point, Justice Puno, remarked that, since there having been annulments of
marriages arising from psychological incapacity, Civil Law should not reconcile with
Canon Law because it is a new ground even under Canon Law.
Prof. Romero raised the question: With this common provision in Civil Law and in
Canon Law, are they going to have a provision in the Family Code to the effect that
marriages annulled or declared void by the church on the ground of psychological
incapacity is automatically annulled in Civil Law? The other members replied
negatively.
Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or

prospective in application.
Justice Diy opined that she was for its retroactivity because it is their answer to the
problem of church annulments of marriages, which are still valid under the Civil Law.
On the other hand, Justice Reyes and Justice Puno were concerned about the
avalanche of cases.
Dean Gupit suggested that they put the issue to a vote, which the Committee
approved.
The members voted as follows:
(1) Justice Reyes, Justice Puno and Prof. Romero were for prospectivity.
(2) Justice Caguioa, Judge Diy, Dean Gupit, Prof. Bautista and Director Eufemio
were for retroactivity.
(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they put in the prescriptive period of ten years within
which the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage should be filed in court. The
Committee approved the suggestion.7
It could well be that, in sum, the Family Code Revision Committee in ultimately deciding to adopt the
provision with less specificity than expected, has in fact, so designed the law as to allow some
resiliency in its application. Mme. Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, a member of the Code Committee,
has been quoted by Mr. Justice Josue N. Bellosillo in Salita vs. Hon. Magtolis (G.R. No. 106429, 13
June 1994); thus:8
The Committee did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that
the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle
of ejusdem generis. Rather, the Committee would like the judge to interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision was taken from Canon Law.
A part of the provision is similar to Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law,9 which reads:
Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
1. who lack sufficient use of reason;
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila

matrimonial rights and duties, to be given and accepted mutually;
3. who for causes of psychological nature are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, although neither decisive nor even perhaps all that persuasive for having no juridical or
secular effect, the jurisprudence under Canon Law prevailing at the time of the code's enactment,
nevertheless, cannot be dismissed as impertinent for its value as an aid, at least, to the
interpretation or construction of the codal provision.
One author, Ladislas Orsy, S.J., in his treaties, 10 giving an account on how the third paragraph of
Canon 1095 has been framed, states:
The history of the drafting of this canon does not leave any doubt that the legislator
intended, indeed, to broaden the rule. A strict and narrow norm was proposed first:
Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage

because of a grave psycho-sexual anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam
psychosexualem) are unable to contract marriage (cf. SCH/1975,
canon 297, a new canon, novus);
then a broader one followed:
. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . .

. (cf. SCH/1980, canon 1049);
then the same wording was retained in the text submitted to the pope (cf. SCH/1982,
canon 1095, 3);
finally, a new version was promulgated:
because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).
So the progress was from psycho-sexual to psychological anomaly, then the term
anomaly was altogether eliminated. it would be, however, incorrect to draw the
conclusion that the cause of the incapacity need not be some kind of psychological
disorder; after all, normal and healthy person should be able to assume the ordinary
obligations of marriage.
Fr. Orsy concedes that the term "psychological incapacity" defies any precise definition since
psychological causes can be of an infinite variety.
In a book, entitled "Canons and Commentaries on Marriage," written by Ignatius Gramunt, Javier
Hervada and LeRoy Wauck, the following explanation appears:
This incapacity consists of the following: (a) a true inability to commit oneself to the
essentials of marriage. Some psychosexual disorders and other disorders of
personality can be the psychic cause of this defect, which is here described in legal
terms. This particular type of incapacity consists of a real inability to render what is
due by the contract. This could be compared to the incapacity of a farmer to enter a
binding contract to deliver the crops which he cannot possibly reap; (b) this inability
to commit oneself must refer to the essential obligations of marriage: the conjugal
act, the community of life and love, the rendering of mutual help, the procreation and
education of offspring; (c) the inability must be tantamount to a psychological
abnormality. The mere difficulty of assuming these obligations, which could be
overcome by normal effort, obviously does not constitute incapacity. The canon
contemplates a true psychological disorder which incapacitates a person from giving
what is due (cf. John Paul II, Address to R. Rota, Feb. 5, 1987). However, if the
marriage is to be declared invalid under this incapacity, it must be proved not only
that the person is afflicted by a psychological defect, but that the defect did in
fact deprive the person, at the moment of giving consent, of the ability to assume the
essential duties of marriage and consequently of the possibility of being bound by
these duties.
Justice Sempio-Diy 11 cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge
of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch 1), who opines
that psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
It should be obvious, looking at all the foregoing disquisitions, including, and most importantly, the
deliberations of the Family Code Revision Committee itself, that the use of the phrase "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases
of psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances (cited in Fr. Artemio Baluma's "Void and Voidable Marriages in
the Family Code and their Parallels in Canon Law," quoting from the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorder by the American Psychiatric Association; Edward Hudson's "Handbook II for
Marriage Nullity Cases"). Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and construed
independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage. Thus
correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter intensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This pschologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does
not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with
the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of a party being
of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant to Article 46, Family Code. If
drug addiction, habitual alcholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only during the
marriage, they become mere grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code.
These provisions of the Code, however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various
circumstances being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every circumstance that may
have some bearing on the degree, extent, and other conditions of that incapacity must, in every
case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is
peremptorily decreed. The well-considered opinions of psychiatrists, psychologists, and persons with
expertise in psychological disciplines might be helpful or even desirable.
Marriage is not an adventure but a lifetime commitment. We should continue to be reminded that
innate in our society, then enshrined in our Civil Code, and even now still indelible in Article 1 of the
Family Code, is that —
Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman

entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life.
It is the foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution whose nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation,
except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
Our Constitution is no less emphatic:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and
shall be protected by the State. (Article XV, 1987 Constitution).
The above provisions express so well and so distinctly the basic nucleus of our laws on marriage
and the family, and they are doubt the tenets we still hold on to.
The factual settings in the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the standards
required to decree a nullity of marriage. Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved,
even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always
provide all the specific answers to every individual problem.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But,
after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the
majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner
and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically incapacitated
to comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her
husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not
deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision in
definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a
marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for
nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate
opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by
couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough
safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the intervention by the State, through the
public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her
husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she
never did and neither is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein
petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he
exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of
Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia
indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it
is the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in
marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable
contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There
may also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have to live
separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for
each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with
the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no
intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts
eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has
she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of

psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations, although these indications
were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive
interpretation of the law and compel the petitioner to continue to be married to a wife who for
purposes of fulfilling her marital duties has, for all practical purposes, ceased to exist.
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not,
in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one
forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of
illegitimate children, simply because he is denied by private respondent, his wife, the companionship
and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?
I do not go as far as to suggest that Art. 36 of the Family Code is a sanction for absolute divorce but
I submit that we should not constrict it to non-recognition of its evident purpose and thus deny to one
like petitioner, an opportunity to turn a new leaf in his life by declaring his marriage a nullity by
reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel
Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the
Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage declared
a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter1 dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of
the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-
Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a
chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil
Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact,
some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the
spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of
marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of
separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation,
and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute
divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but
called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to
discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law
Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New
Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as —
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a

woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of
marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social
institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also realizing the
strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the
Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of
our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea
of absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity
of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such
an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve
the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized
by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a
draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to
avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil
Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as
a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate
the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The
result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of
void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment
to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically
or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or

pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage
void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may
already dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on
declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute
divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of
the Ateneo University as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the
Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II,
the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of
"lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds
for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because
of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or
ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a
woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children.
Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work
that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic
personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee
referred to above intended to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as
grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of
the provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every petition for declaration of
nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and
an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that
the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage although it be
manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to
abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed."2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on
a case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the
civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from Canon Law."3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family4 will remain the lodestar which our society
will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an
abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some
marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus,
the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-
accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment as to
render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the
lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the Bench have implemented the
provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the other.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
It is difficult to dissent from a well-written and studied opinion as Mr. Justice Vitug's ponencia. But,
after an extended reflection on the facts of this case, I cannot see my way clear into holding, as the
majority do, that there is no ground for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between petitioner
and private respondent.
To my mind, it is clear that private respondent has been shown to be psychologically incapacitated
to comply with at least one essential marital obligation, i.e. that of living and cohabiting with her
husband, herein petitioner. On the other hand, it has not been shown that petitioner does not
deserve to live and cohabit with his wife, herein private respondent.
There appears to be no disagreement that the term "psychological incapacity" defies precision in
definition. But, as used in Article 36 of the Family Code as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a
marriage, the intent of the framers of the Code is evidently to expand and liberalize the grounds for
nullifying a marriage, as well pointed out by Madam Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero in her separate
opinion in this case.
While it is true that the board term "psychological incapacity" can open the doors to abuse by
couples who may wish to have an easy way out of their marriage, there are, however, enough
safeguards against this contingency, among which, is the intervention by the State, through the
public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of evidence.
In their case at bench, it has been abundantly established that private respondent Julia Rosario
Bedia-Santos exhibits specific behavior which, to my mind, shows that she is psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill her essential marital obligations, to writ:
a. It took her seven (7) months after she left for the United States to call up her
husband.
b. Julia promised to return home after her job contract expired in July 1989, but she
never did and neither is there any showing that she informed her husband (herein
petitioner) of her whereabouts in the U.S.A.
c. When petitioner went to the United States on a mission for the Philippine Army, he
exerted efforts to "touch base" with Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of
Julia; there were no similar efforts on the part of Julia to do the same.
d. When petitioner filed this suit, more than five (5) years had elapsed, without Julia
indicating her plans to rejoin the petitioner or her whereabouts.
e. When petitioner filed this case in the trial court, Julia, in her answer, claimed that it
is the former who has been irresponsible and incompetent.
f. During the trial, Julia waived her right to appear and submit evidence.
A spouse's obligation to live and cohabit with his/her partner in marriage is a basic ground rule in
marriage, unless there are overpowering compelling reasons such as, for instance, an incurable
contagious disease on the part of a spouse or cruelty of one partner, bordering on insanity. There
may also be instances when, for economic and practical reasons, husband and wife have to live
separately, but the marital bond between the spouses always remains. Mutual love and respect for
each other would, in such cases, compel the absent spouse to at least have regular contracts with
the other to inform the latter of his/her condition and whereabouts.
In the present case, it is apparent that private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos has no
intention of cohabiting with petitioner, her husband, or maintaining contact with him. In fact, her acts
eloquently show that she does not want her husband to know of her whereabouts and neither has
she any intention of living and cohabiting with him.
To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of

psychological incapacity to comply with her essential marital obligations, although these indications
were made manifest after the celebration of the marriage.
It would be a great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. Is it not,
in effect directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster" or one
forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of
and conjugal love which he has sought from her and to which he is legally entitled?
reason of his wife's psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation.
I therefore vote to GRANT the petition and to DECLARE the marriage between petitioner Leouel
Santos and private respondent Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos VOID on the basis of Article 36 of the
Family Code.
ROMERO, J., concurring:
I agree under the circumstances of the case, petitioner is not entitled to have his marriage declared
a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of private respondent.
However, as a member of both the Family Law Revision Committee of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center, I wish to add some
observations. The letter1 dated April 15, 1985 of then Judge Alicia V. Sempio-Diy written in behalf of
the Family Law and Civil Code Revision Committee to then Assemblywoman Mercedes Cojuangco-
Teodoro traced the background of the inclusion of the present Article 36 in the Family Code.
During its early meetings, the Family Law Committee had thought of including a
chapter on absolute divorce in the draft of a new Family Code (Book I of the Civil
Code) that it had been tasked by the IBP and the UP Law Center to prepare. In fact,
some members of the Committee were in favor of a no-fault divorce between the
spouses after a number of years of separation, legal or de-facto. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes was then requested to prepare a proposal for an action for dissolution of
marriage and the effects thereof based on two grounds: (a) five continuous years of
separation between the spouses, with or without a judicial decree of legal separation,
and (b) whenever a married person would have obtained a decree of absolute
divorce in another country. Actually, such a proposal is one for absolute divorce but
called by another name. Later, even the Civil Code Revision Committee took time to
discuss the proposal of Justice Reyes on this matter.
Subsequently, however, when the Civil Code Revision Committee and Family Law
Committee started holding joint meetings on the preparation of the draft of the New
Family Code, they agreed and formulated the definition of marriage as —
"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a

woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the
property relations during the marriage within the limits provided by
law."
With the above definition, and considering the Christian traditional concept of
marriage of the Filipino people as a permanent, inviolable, indissoluble social
institution upon which the family and society are founded, and also realizing the
strong opposition that any provision on absolute divorce would encounter from the
Catholic Church and the Catholic sector of our citizenry to whom the great majority of
our people belong, the two Committees in their joint meetings did not pursue the idea
of absolute divorce and instead opted for an action for judicial declaration of invalidity
of marriage based on grounds available in the Canon Law. It was thought that such
an action would not only be an acceptable alternative to divorce but would also solve
the nagging problem of church annulments of marriages on grounds not recognized
by the civil law of the State. Justice Reyes was thus requested to again prepare a
draft of provisions on such action for celebration of invalidity of marriage. Still later, to
avoid the overlapping of provisions on void marriages as found in the present Civil
Code and those proposed by Justice Reyes on judicial declaration of invalidity of
marriage on grounds similar to the Canon Law, the two Committees now working as
a Joint Committee in the preparation of a New Family Code decided to consolidate
the present provisions on void marriages with the proposals of Justice Reyes. The
result was the inclusion of an additional kind of void marriage in the enumeration of
void marriages in the present Civil Code, to wit:
"(7) Those marriages contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was wanting in the sufficient use of reason or judgment
to understand the essential nature of marriage or was psychologically
or mentally incapacitated to discharge the essential marital
celebration."
as well as the following implementing provisions:
"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or

pleaded only on the basis of a final judgment declaring the marriage
void, without prejudice to the provision of Article 34."
"Art. 33. The action or defense for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe."
xxx xxx xxx
It is believed that many hopelessly broken marriages in our country today may
already dissolved or annulled on the grounds proposed by the Joint Committee on
declaration of nullity as well as annulment of marriages, thus rendering an absolute
divorce law unnecessary. In fact, during a conference with Father Gerald Healy of
the Ateneo University as well as another meeting with Archbishop Oscar Cruz of the
Archdiocese of Pampanga, the Joint Committee was informed that since Vatican II,
the Catholic Church has been declaring marriages null and void on the ground of
"lack of due discretion" for causes that, in other jurisdictions, would be clear grounds
for divorce, like teen-age or premature marriages; marriage to a man who, because
of some personality disorder or disturbance, cannot support a family; the foolish or
ridiculous choice of a spouse by an otherwise perfectly normal person; marriage to a
woman who refuses to cohabit with her husband or who refuses to have children.
Bishop Cruz also informed the Committee that they have found out in tribunal work
that a lot of machismo among husbands are manifestations of their sociopathic
personality anomaly, like inflicting physical violence upon their wives, constitutional
indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction, and psychological anomaly. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, by incorporating what is now Article 36 into the Family Code, the Revision Committee
referred to above intended to add another ground to those already listed in the Civil Code as
grounds for nullifying a marriage, thus expanding or liberalizing the same. Inherent in the inclusion of
the provision on psychological incapacity was the understanding that every petition for declaration of
nullity based on it should be treated on a case-to-case basis; hence, the absence of a definition and
an enumeration of what constitutes psychological incapacity. Moreover, the Committee feared that
the giving of examples would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis. But the law requires that the same be existing at the time of marriage although it be
manifested later.
Admittedly, the provision on psychological incapacity, just like any other provision of law, is open to
abuse. To prevent this, "the court shall take order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to
appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care
that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed."2 Moreover, the judge, in interpreting the provision on
a case-to-case basis, must be guided by "experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the
civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provisions was taken from Canon Law."3
The constitutional and statutory provisions on the family4 will remain the lodestar which our society
will hope to achieve ultimately. Therefore, the inclusion of Article 36 is not to be taken as an
abandonment of the ideal which we all cherish. If at all, it is a recognition of the reality that some
marriages, by reason of the incapacity of one of the contracting parties, fall short of this ideal; thus,
the parties are constrained to find a way of putting an end to their union through some legally-
accepted means.
Any criticism directed at the way that judges have interpreted the provision since its enactment as to
render it easier for unhappily-married couples to separate is addressed, not to the wisdom of the
lawmakers but to the manner by which some members of the Bench have implemented the
provision. These are not interchangeable, each being separate and distinct from the other.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997
CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and GINA LAO-TSOI, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:

Man has not invented a reliable compass by which to steer a marriage in its journey over troubled
waters. Laws are seemingly inadequate. Over time, much reliance has been placed in the works of
the unseen hand of Him who created all things.
Who is to blame when a marriage fails?
This case was originally commenced by a distraught wife against her uncaring husband in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (Branch 89) which decreed the annulment of the marriage on
the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to
respondent Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. CV No. 42758) which affirmed the Trial Court's decision
November 29, 1994 and correspondingly denied the motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated
February 14, 1995.
The statement of the case and of the facts made by the trial court and reproduced by the Court of
Appeals1 its decision are as follows:
From the evidence adduced, the following acts were preponderantly established:
Sometime on May 22, 1988, the plaintiff married the defendant at the Manila Cathedral, . . .
Intramuros Manila, as evidenced by their Marriage Contract. (Exh. "A")
After the celebration of their marriage and wedding reception at the South Villa, Makati, they
went and proceeded to the house of defendant's mother.
There, they slept together on the same bed in the same room for the first night of their
married life.
It is the version of the plaintiff, that contrary to her expectations, that as newlyweds they were
supposed to enjoy making love, or having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant
just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep . There
was no sexual intercourse between them during the first night. The same thing happened on
the second, third and fourth nights.
In an effort to have their honeymoon in a private place where they can enjoy together during
their first week as husband and wife, they went to Baguio City. But, they did so together with
her mother, an uncle, his mother and his nephew. They were all invited by the defendant to
join them. [T]hey stayed in Baguio City for four (4) days. But, during this period, there was no
sexual intercourse between them, since the defendant avoided her by taking a long walk
during siesta time or by just sleeping on a rocking chair located at the living room. They slept
together in the same room and on the same bed since May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989.
But during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. [S]he
claims, that she did not: even see her husband's private parts nor did he see hers.
Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufemio
Macalalag, a urologist at the Chinese General Hospital, on January 20, 1989.
The results of their physical examinations were that she is healthy, normal and still a virgin,
while that of her husband's examination was kept confidential up to this time. While no
medicine was prescribed for her, the doctor prescribed medications for her husband which
was also kept confidential. No treatment was given to her. For her husband, he was asked
by the doctor to return but he never did.
The plaintiff claims, that the defendant is impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show
his penis. She said, that she had observed the defendant using an eyebrow pencil and
sometimes the cleansing cream of his mother. And that, according to her, the defendant
married her, a Filipino citizen, to acquire or maintain his residency status here in the country
and to publicly maintain the appearance of a normal man.
The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.
On the other hand, it is the claim of the defendant that if their marriage shall be annulled by
reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
But, he said that he does not want his marriage with his wife annulled for several
reasons, viz: (1) that he loves her very much; (2) that he has no defect on his part and he is
physically and psychologically capable; and, (3) since the relationship is still very young and
if there is any differences between the two of them, it can still be reconciled and that,
according to him, if either one of them has some incapabilities, there is no certainty that this
will not be cured. He further claims, that if there is any defect, it can be cured by the
intervention of medical technology or science.
The defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on
March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this,
according to the defendant, was that everytime he wants to have sexual intercourse with his
wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always
removed his hands. The defendant claims, that he forced his wife to have sex with him only
once but he did not continue because she was shaking and she did not like it. So he
stopped.
There are two (2) reasons, according to the defendant , why the plaintiff filed this case
against him, and these are: (1) that she is afraid that she will be forced to return the pieces of
jewelry of his mother, and, (2) that her husband, the defendant, will consummate their
marriage.
The defendant insisted that their marriage will remain valid because they are still very young
and there is still a chance to overcome their differences.
The defendant submitted himself to a physical examination. His penis was examined by Dr.
Sergio Alteza, Jr., for the purpose of finding out whether he is impotent . As a result thereof,
Dr. Alteza submitted his Doctor's Medical Report. (Exh. "2"). It is stated there, that there is no
evidence of impotency (Exh. "2-B"), and he is capable of erection. (Exh. "2-C")
The doctor said, that he asked the defendant to masturbate to find out whether or not he has
an erection and he found out that from the original size of two (2) inches, or five (5)
centimeters, the penis of the defendant lengthened by one (1) inch and one centimeter. Dr.
Alteza said, that the defendant had only a soft erection which is why his penis is not in its full
length. But, still is capable of further erection, in that with his soft erection, the defendant is
capable of having sexual intercourse with a woman.
In open Court, the Trial Prosecutor manifested that there is no collusion between the parties
and that the evidence is not fabricated."2
After trial, the court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring as VOID the marriage entered into
by the plaintiff with the defendant on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral, Basilica of the
Immaculate Conception, Intramuros, Manila, before the Rt. Rev. Msgr. Melencio de Vera.
Without costs. Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon
City. Let another copy be furnished the Local Civil Registrar of Manila.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:
in affirming the conclusions of the lower court that there was no sexual intercourse between
the parties without making any findings of fact.
II
in holding that the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner is
a psychological incapacity inasmuch as proof thereof is totally absent.
III
in holding that the alleged refusal of both the petitioner and the private respondent to have
sex with each other constitutes psychological incapacity of both.
IV
in affirming the annulment of the marriage between the parties decreed by the lower court
without fully satisfying itself that there was no collusion between them.
We find the petition to be bereft of merit.
Petitioner contends that being the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-89-3141, private respondent has the
burden of proving the allegations in her complaint; that since there was no independent evidence to
prove the alleged non-coitus between the parties, there remains no other basis for the court's
conclusion except the admission of petitioner; that public policy should aid acts intended to validate
marriage and should retard acts intended to invalidate them; that the conclusion drawn by the trial
court on the admissions and confessions of the parties in their pleadings and in the course of the
trial is misplaced since it could have been a product of collusion; and that in actions for annulment of
marriage, the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.3
Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:
Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading, the court may, on
motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. But in actions for annulment of
marriage or for legal separation the material facts alleged in the complaint shall always be
proved.
The foregoing provision pertains to a judgment on the pleadings. What said provision seeks to
prevent is annulment of marriage without trial. The assailed decision was not based on such a
judgment on the pleadings. When private respondent testified under oath before the trial court and
was cross-examined by oath before the trial court and was cross-examined by the adverse party,
she thereby presented evidence in form of a testimony. After such evidence was presented, it be
came incumbent upon petitioner to present his side. He admitted that since their marriage on May
22, 1988, until their separation on March 15, 1989, there was no sexual intercourse between them.
To prevent collusion between the parties is the reason why, as stated by the petitioner, the Civil
Code provides that no judgment annulling a marriage shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment (Arts. 88 and 101[par. 2]) and the Rules of Court prohibit such
annulment without trial (Sec. 1, Rule 19).
The case has reached this Court because petitioner does not want their marriage to be annulled.
This only shows that there is no collusion between the parties. When petitioner admitted that he and
his wife (private respondent) have never had sexual contact with each other, he must have been
only telling the truth. We are reproducing the relevant portion of the challenged resolution denying
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration, penned with magisterial lucidity by Associate Justice
Minerva Gonzaga-Reyes, viz:
The judgment of the trial court which was affirmed by this Court is not based on a stipulation
of facts. The issue of whether or not the appellant is psychologically incapacitated to
discharge a basic marital obligation was resolved upon a review of both the documentary
and testimonial evidence on record. Appellant admitted that he did not have sexual relations
with his wife after almost ten months of cohabitation, and it appears that he is not suffering
from any physical disability. Such abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his
marriage is strongly indicative of a serious personality disorder which to the mind of this
Court clearly demonstrates an 'utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage' within the meaning of Article 36 of the Family Code (See Santos vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995).4
Petitioner further contends that respondent court erred in holding that the alleged refusal of both the
petitioner and the private respondent to have sex with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity of both. He points out as error the failure of the trial court to make "a categorical finding
about the alleged psychological incapacity and an in-depth analysis of the reasons for such refusal
which may not be necessarily due to physchological disorders" because there might have been other
reasons, — i.e., physical disorders, such as aches, pains or other discomforts, — why private
respondent would not want to have sexual intercourse from May 22, 1988 to March 15, 1989, in a
short span of 10 months.
First, it must be stated that neither the trial court nor the respondent court made a finding on who
between petitioner and private respondent refuses to have sexual contact with the other. The fact
remains, however, that there has never been coitus between them. At any rate, since the action to
declare the marriage void may be filed by either party, i.e., even the psychologically incapacitated,
the question of who refuses to have sex with the other becomes immaterial.
Petitioner claims that there is no independent evidence on record to show that any of the parties is
suffering from phychological incapacity. Petitioner also claims that he wanted to have sex with
private respondent; that the reason for private respondent's refusal may not be psychological but
physical disorder as stated above.
We do not agree. Assuming it to be so, petitioner could have discussed with private respondent or
asked her what is ailing her, and why she balks and avoids him everytime he wanted to have sexual
intercourse with her. He never did. At least, there is nothing in the record to show that he had tried to
find out or discover what the problem with his wife could be. What he presented in evidence is his
doctor's Medical Report that there is no evidence of his impotency and he is capable of
erection.5 Since it is petitioner's claim that the reason is not psychological but perhaps physical
disorder on the part of private respondent, it became incumbent upon him to prove such a claim.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential
marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals
attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a
spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of
psychological incapacity.6
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is "To procreate children
based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic
end of marriage." Constant non- fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
As aptly stated by the respondent court,
An examination of the evidence convinces Us that the husband's plea that the wife did not
want carnal intercourse with him does not inspire belief. Since he was not physically
impotent, but he refrained from sexual intercourse during the entire time (from May 22, 1988
to March 15, 1989) that he occupied the same bed with his wife, purely out of symphaty for
her feelings, he deserves to be doubted for not having asserted his right seven though she
balked (Tompkins vs. Tompkins, 111 Atl. 599, cited in I Paras, Civil Code, at p. 330).
Besides, if it were true that it is the wife was suffering from incapacity, the fact that defendant
did not go to court and seek the declaration of nullity weakens his claim. This case was
instituted by the wife whose normal expectations of her marriage were frustrated by her
husband's inadequacy. Considering the innate modesty of the Filipino woman, it is hard to
believe that she would expose her private life to public scrutiny and fabricate testimony
against her husband if it were not necessary to put her life in order and put to rest her marital
status.
We are not impressed by defendant's claim that what the evidence proved is the
unwillingness or lack of intention to perform the sexual act, which is not phychological
incapacity, and which can be achieved "through proper motivation." After almost ten months
of cohabitation, the admission that the husband is reluctant or unwilling to perform the sexual
act with his wife whom he professes to love very dearly, and who has not posed any
insurmountable resistance to his alleged approaches, is indicative of a hopeless situation,
and of a serious personality disorder that constitutes psychological incapacity to discharge
the basic marital covenants within the contemplation of the Family Code.7
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual
love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order" (Cuaderno vs.
Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an
island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say "I could not have cared less." This is so
because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but himself. In the natural
order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual intimacy is a gift
and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of procreation
and ensures the continuation of family relations.
It appears that there is absence of empathy between petitioner and private respondent. That is — a
shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced not only by having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process. An expressive interest in each other's feelings at a time it is needed by the other can go a
long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is definitely not for children but for two
consenting adults who view the relationship with love amor gignit amorem, respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to compromise, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.
This Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves trapped
in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no less but sustain the
studied judgment of respondent appellate court.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING PREMISES , the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
November 29, 1994 is hereby AFFIRMED in all respects and the petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RORIDEL OLAVIANO MOLINA, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Family Code of the Philippines provides an entirely new ground (in addition to those
enumerated in the Civil Code) to assail the validity of a marriage, namely, "psychological
incapacity." Since the Code's effectivity, our courts have been swamped with various
petitions to declare marriages void based on this ground. Although this Court had interpreted
the meaning of psychological incapacity in the recent case of Santos vs. Court of Appeals,
still many judges and lawyers find difficulty in applying said novel provision in specific
cases. In the present case and in the context of the herein assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals, the Solicitor General has labelled — exaggerated to be sure but nonetheless
expressive of his frustration — Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the
world." Hence, this Court in addition to resolving the present case, finds the need to lay down
specific guidelines in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 challenging the January 25, 1993
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 34858 affirming in toto the May 14, 1991
decision of the Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad,3 Benguet, which declared the marriage of
respondent Roridel Olaviano Molina to Reynaldo Molina void ab initio, on the ground of
"psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The Facts
This case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a
verified petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. Essentially, the petition
alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo were married on April 14, 1985 at the San Agustin Church4 in
Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born; that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs
of "immaturity and irresponsibility" as a husband and a father since he preferred to spend more time
with his peers and friends on whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his parents for
aid and assistance, and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances, resulting in
frequent quarrels between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was relieved of his job
in Manila, and since then Roridel had been the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986
the couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their relationship was estranged; that in
March 1987, Roridel resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her parents in Baguio City;
that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them;
that Reynaldo had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of complying with essential
marital obligations and was a highly immature and habitually quarrel some individual who thought of
himself as a king to be served; and that it would be to the couple's best interest to have their
marriage declared null and void in order to free them from what appeared to be an incompatible
marriage from the start.
In his Answer filed on August 28, 1989, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel could no longer live
together as husband and wife, but contended that their misunderstandings and frequent quarrels
were due to (1) Roridel's strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of friends even after
their marriage; (2) Roridel's refusal to perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals;
and (3) Roridel's failure to run the household and handle their finances.
During the pre-trial on October 17, 1990, the following were stipulated:
1. That the parties herein were legally married on April 14, 1985 at the Church of St.
Augustine, Manila;
2. That out of their marriage, a child named Albert Andre Olaviano Molina was born
on July 29, 1986;
3. That the parties are separated-in-fact for more than three years;
4. That petitioner is not asking support for her and her child;
5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

6. That the common child of the parties is in the custody of the petitioner wife.
Evidence for herein respondent wife consisted of her own testimony and that of her friends
Rosemarie Ventura and Maria Leonora Padilla as well as of Ruth G. Lalas, a social worker, and of
Dr. Teresita Hidalgo-Sison, a psychiatrist of the Baguio General Hospital and Medical Center. She
also submitted documents marked as Exhibits "A" to "E-1." Reynaldo did not present any evidence
as he appeared only during the pre-trial conference.
On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. The appeal of
petitioner was denied by the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the RTC's decision. Hence, the
present recourse.
The Issue
In his petition, the Solicitor General insists that "the Court of Appeals made an erroneous and
incorrect interpretation of the phrase 'psychological incapacity' (as provided under Art. 36 of the
Family Code) and made an incorrect application thereof to the facts of the case," adding that the
appealed Decision tended "to establish in effect the most liberal divorce procedure in the world
which is anathema to our culture."
In denying the Solicitor General's appeal, the respondent Court relied5 heavily on the trial court's
findings "that the marriage between the parties broke up because of their opposing and conflicting
personalities." Then, it added it sown opinion that "the Civil Code Revision Committee (hereinafter
referred to as Committee) intended to liberalize the application of our civil laws on personal and
family rights. . . ." It concluded that:
As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad

range of mental and behavioral conduct on the part of one spouse indicative of how
he or she regards the marital union, his or her personal relationship with the other
spouse, as well as his or her conduct in the long haul for the attainment of the
principal objectives of marriage. If said conduct, observed and considered as a
whole, tends to cause the union to self-destruct because it defeats the very
objectives of marriage, then there is enough reason to leave the spouses to their
individual fates.
In the case at bar, We find that the trial judge committed no indiscretion in analyzing
and deciding the instant case, as it did, hence, We find no cogent reason to disturb
the findings and conclusions thus made.
Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.
The petitioner, on the other hand, argues that "opposing and conflicting personalities" is not
equivalent to psychological incapacity, explaining that such ground "is not simply the neglect by the
parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their psychological nature
which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties."
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.

In Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals6 this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, ruled that
"psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (nor physical) incapacity . . . and that
(t)here is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of
an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This psychologic
condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated." Citing Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former
presiding judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila,7 Justice
Vitug wrote that "the psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."
On the other hand, in the present case, there is no clear showing to us that the psychological defect
spoken of is an incapacity. It appears to us to be more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or
"neglect" in the performance of some marital obligations. Mere showing of "irreconciliable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity. It is not
enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it
is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (nor
physical) illness.
The evidence adduced by respondent merely showed that she and her husband could nor get along
with each other. There had been no showing of the gravity of the problem; neither its juridical
antecedence nor its incurability. The expert testimony of Dr. Sison showed no incurable psychiatric
disorder but only incompatibility, not psychological incapacity. Dr. Sison testified:8
COURT
Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on

your findings that it is better for the Court to annul (sic) the marriage?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There is no hope for the marriage?
A There is no hope, the man is also living with another woman.
Q Is it also the stand of the psychiatrist that the parties are

psychologically unfit for each other but they are psychologically fit
with other parties?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Neither are they psychologically unfit for their professions?
A Yes, Your Honor.
The Court has no more questions.
In the case of Reynaldo, there is no showing that his alleged personality traits were constitutive of
psychological incapacity existing at the time of marriage celebration. While some effort was made to
prove that there was a failure to fulfill pre-nuptial impressions of "thoughtfulness and gentleness" on
Reynaldo's part of being "conservative, homely and intelligent" on the part of Roridel, such failure of
expectation is nor indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity. If at all, it merely shows love's
temporary blindness to the faults and blemishes of the beloved.
During its deliberations, the Court decided to go beyond merely ruling on the facts of this case vis-a-
vis existing law and jurisprudence. In view of the novelty of Art. 36 of the Family Code and the
difficulty experienced by many trial courts interpreting and applying it, the Court decided to invite
two amici curiae, namely, the Most Reverend Oscar V. Cruz,9 Vicar Judicial (Presiding Judge) of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, and Justice
Ricardo C. Puno, 10 a member of the Family Code Revision Committee. The Court takes this
occasion to thank these friends of the Court for their informative and interesting discussions during
the oral argument on December 3, 1996, which they followed up with written memoranda.
From their submissions and the Court's own deliberations, the following guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 36 of the Family Code are hereby handed down for the
guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its dissolution and
nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the
Family, 11 recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to
be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code 12 echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
the permanence, inviolability and solidarity
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological — not physical.
although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill to such an extent that the person
could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit
the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, 13 nevertheless such root
cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature explained. Expert
evidence may be given qualified psychiatrist and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the marriage. The
evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an essential
obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage. Thus, "mild characteriological peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, nor a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words,
there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in
the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts. It is clear
that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New
Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to
assume the essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological
nature. 14
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decision of such appellate tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law
on evidence — what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code provision,
contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here, the State and the
Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each other — shall walk together
in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and cherishing marriage and the family as
the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall he handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly staring therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
In the instant case and applying Leouel Santos, we have already ruled to grant the petition. Such
ruling becomes even more cogent with the use of the foregoing guidelines.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of Roridel Olaviano to Reynaldo Molina subsists and remains valid.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ.,
concur.
Regalado, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concurs in the result.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the
peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a given case
calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts
of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019,
4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was psychological
incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of
the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
according to its own facts. In the field of psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take
pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial
Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by
the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their Psychological
nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so
much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to
insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of
consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was to
exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on
psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised
provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or marriage" and to
"mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There
being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there
is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are
lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental
marriage."1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a
sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence,"
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention
of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase."
He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity
to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically
impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art.
36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase" and is
incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how
they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the
possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa
suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as

contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.

The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special
situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage
which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are
void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters,
now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the
time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage:
"3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with
respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the
voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually
declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid
sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated
marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process
which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties
as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil
marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict,
quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo — freed from the marriage bonds
in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws.
Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in
relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law
Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the
Family Code — and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally
in existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly
for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old
canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major elements required
in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external
freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct
but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack
of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of
the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person
was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding
ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to
the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the
first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was
probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The
nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a
cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after
1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested
themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the
ceremony.
Furthermore, and equally significant, the professional opinion of a psychological expert became
increasingly important in such cases. Data about the person's entire life, both before and after the
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about
a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
The Church took pains to point out that its new openness in this area did not amount to the addition
of new grounds for annulment, but rather was an accommodation by the Church to the advances
made in psychology during the past decades. There was now the expertise to provide the all-
important connecting link between a marriage breakdown and premarital causes.
During the 1970s, the Church broadened its whole idea of marriage from that of a legal contract to
that of a covenant. The result of this was that it could no longer be assumed in annulment cases that
a person who could intellectually understand the concept of marriage could necessarily give valid
consent to marry. The ability to both grasp and assume the real obligations of a mature, lifelong
commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.2
Rotal decisions continued applying the concept of incipient psychological incapacity, "not only to
sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses
from assuming or carrying out the essential obligations of marriage. For marriage . . . is not merely
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its
totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong
relationship. Rotal decisions since 1973 have refined the meaning of psychological or psychic
capacity for marriage as presupposing the development of an adult personality; as meaning the
capacity of the spouses to give themselves to each other and to accept the other as a distinct
person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a
self-giving love; and that the spouses must have the capacity for interpersonal relationship because
marriage is more than just a physical reality but involves a true intertwining of personalities. The
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of
this interpersonal relationship. A serious incapacity for interpersonal sharing and support is held to
impair the relationship and consequently, the ability to fulfill the essential marital obligations. The
marital capacity of one spouse is not considered in isolation but in reference to the fundamental
relationship to the other spouse.3
Fr. Green, in an article in Catholic Mind, lists six elements necessary to the mature marital
relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children
and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an
ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might
lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even

with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise
to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial
personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values;
(2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the
inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable
expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he
or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit
into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological
category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in
their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise
proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases
seem to be concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry out their responsibilities
an obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the
ground of lack of due competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered
into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital
responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into.4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not considered
equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia,
the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her
husband for more then five years is not proof of her psychological incapacity as to render the
marriage a nullity.5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,6 this Court upheld both the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological incapacity
on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife
never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the physical
disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn
refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based
on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
We declared:
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting absent
psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both of the
spouses.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I
find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper
appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The
term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code. Thus —
its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which
drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the
civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law.1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law —
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage; (those)
—
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential

obligations of marriage —
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation
and construction of the statutory enactment.2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a Code
must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity"
under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other
grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct
reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal
separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals;3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has
not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity,
and like circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children conceived prior
to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
The other forms of psychoses, if existing at the inception of marriage, like the state of
a party being of unsound mind or concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
homosexuality or lesbianism, merely renders the marriage contract voidable pursuant
to Article 46, Family Code. If drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they become mere grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological
incapacity.4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand,
assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and
fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its overt
manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a few
observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it, to
be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has failed to
carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the better, if it were
otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The
fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how
the State should regard marriage and the family, thus —
Section 2, Article XV:
shall be protected by the State.
Section 12, Article II:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . .
development. (The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the specific
issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that constitutional
provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a different intention is
manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by disregarding them.
It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been meant
to be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that demands a
meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concuring opinion:
I concur in the result of the decision penned by Mr. Justice Panganiban but only because of the
peculiar facts of the case. As to whether or not the psychological incapacity exists in a given case
calling for annulment of a marriage, depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts
of the case. In Leouel Santos v. Court of Appeals and Julia Rosario-Bedia Santos, G.R. No. 112019,
4 January 1995, 240 SCRA 20-36, I maintained, and I still maintain, that there was psychological
incapacity on the part of the wife to discharge the duties of a wife in a valid marriage. The facts of
the present case, after an indepth study, do not support a similar conclusion. Obviously, each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take
pains in examining the actual millieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
The majority opinion, overturning that of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial
Court ruling. upheld petitioner Solicitor General's position that "opposing and conflicting
personalities" is not equivalent to psychological incapacity, for the latter "is not simply the neglect by
the parties to the marriage of their responsibilities and duties, but a defect in their Psychological
nature which renders them incapable of performing such marital responsibilities and duties.
In the present case, the alleged personality traits of Reynaldo, the husband, did not constitute so
much "psychological incapacity" as a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations. "It is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to
be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological (not physical) illness."
I would add that neither should the incapacity be the result of mental illness. For if it were due to
insanity or defects in the mental faculties short of insanity, there is a resultant defect of vice of
consent, thus rendering the marriage annulable under Art. 45 of the Family Code.
That the intent of the members of the U.P. Law Center's Civil Code Revision Committee was to
exclude mental inability to understand the essential nature of marriage and focus strictly on
psychological incapacity is demonstrated in the way the provision in question underwent revisions.
At the Committee meeting of July 26, 1986, the draft provision read:
the celebration.
The twists and turns which the ensuing discussion took finally produced the following revised
provision even before the session was over:
(7) That contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to discharge the essential marital obligations, even if
such lack or incapacity becomes manifest after the celebration.
Noticeably, the immediately preceding formulation above has dropped any reference to "wanting in
the sufficient use of reason or judgment to understand the essential nature or marriage" and to
"mentally incapacitated." It was explained that these phrases refer to "defects in the mental faculties
vitiating consent, which is not the idea . . . but lack of appreciation of one's marital obligation." There
being a defect in consent, "it is clear that it should be a ground for voidable marriage because there
is the appearance of consent and it is capable of convalidation for the simple reason that there are
lucid intervals and there are sanity is curable. . . . Psychological incapacity does not refer to mental
marriage."1
My own position as a member of the Committee then was that psychological incapacity is, in a
sense, insanity of a lesser degree.
As to the proposal of Justice Caguioa to use the term "psychological or mental impotence,"
Archbishop Oscar Cruz opined in he earlier February 9, 1984 session that this term "is an invention
of some churchmen who are moralists but not canonists, that is why it is considered a weak phrase."
He said that the Code of Canon Law would rather express it as "psychological or mental incapacity
to discharge. . . ." Justice Ricardo C. Puno opined that sometimes a person may be psychologically
impotent with one but not with another.
One of the guidelines enumerated in the majority opinion for the interpretation and application of Art.
36 is: "Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of the same sex."
The Committee, through Prof. Araceli T. Barrera, considered the inclusion of the phrase" and is
incurable" but Prof. Esteban B. Bautista commented that this would give rise to the question of how
they will determine curability and Justice Caguioa agreed that it would be more problematic. Yet the
possibility that one may be cured after the psychological incapacity becomes manifest after the
marriage was not ruled out by Justice Puno and Justice Alice Sempio-Diy. Justice Caguioa
suggested that the remedy was to allow the afflicted spouse to remarry.
For clarity, the Committee classified the bases for determining void marriages, viz:
1. lack of one or more of the essential requisites of marriage as

contract;
2. reasons of public policy;
3. special cases and special situations.
The ground of psychological incapacity was subsumed under "special cases and special
situations," hence its special treatment in Art. 36 in the Family Code as finally enacted.
Nowhere in the Civil Code provisions on Marriage is there a ground for avoiding or annulling
marriages that even comes close to being psychological in nature.
Where consent is vitiated due to circumstances existing at the time of the marriage, such marriage
which stands valid until annulled is capable of ratification or convalidation.
On the other hand, for reasons of public policy or lack of essential requisites, some marriages are
void from the beginning.
With the revision of Book I of the Civil Code, particularly the provisions on Marriage, the drafters,
now open to fresh winds of change in keeping with the more permissive mores and practices of the
time, took a leaf from the relatively liberal provisions of Canon Law.
Canon 1095 which states, inter alia, that the following persons are incapable of contracting marriage:
"3. (those) who, because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage" provided the model for what is now Art. 36 of the Family Code: "A marriage
contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void even if such
incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
It bears stressing that unlike in Civil Law, Canon Law recognizes only two types of marriages with
respect to their validity: valid and void. Civil Law, however, recognizes an intermediate state, the
voidable or annullable marriages. When the Ecclesiastical Tribunal "annuls" a marriage, it actually
declares the marriage null and void, i.e., it never really existed in the first place, for a valid
sacramental marriage can never be dissolved. Hence, a properly performed and consummated
marriage between two living Roman Catholics can only be nullified by the formal annulment process
which entails a full tribunal procedure with a Court selection and a formal hearing.
Such so-called church "annulments" are not recognized by Civil Law as severing the marriage ties
as to capacitate the parties to enter lawfully into another marriage. The grounds for nullifying civil
marriage, not being congruent with those laid down by Canon Law, the former being more strict,
quite a number of married couples have found themselves in limbo — freed from the marriage bonds
in the eyes of the Catholic Church but yet unable to contract a valid civil marriage under state laws.
Heedless of civil law sanctions, some persons contract new marriages or enter into live-in
relationships.
It was precisely to provide a satisfactory solution to such anomalous situations that the Civil Law
Revision Committee decided to engraft the Canon Law concept of psychological incapacity into the
Family Code — and classified the same as a ground for declaring marriages void ab initio or totally
in existent from the beginning.
A brief historical note on the Old Canon Law (1917). This Old Code, while it did not provide directly
for psychological incapacity, in effect recognized the same indirectly from a combination of three old
canons: "Canon #1081 required persons to 'be capable according to law' in order to give valid
consent; Canon #1082 required that persons 'be at least not ignorant' of the major elements required
in marriage; and Canon #1087 (the force and fear category) required that internal and external
freedom be present in order for consent to be valid. This line of interpretation produced two distinct
but related grounds for annulment, called 'lack of due discretion' and 'lack of due competence.' Lack
of due discretion means that the person did not have the ability to give valid consent at the time of
the wedding and therefore the union is invalid. Lack of due competence means that the person
was incapable of carrying out the obligations of the promise he or she made during the wedding
ceremony.
"Favorable annulment decisions by the Roman Rota in the 1950s and 1960s involving sexual
disorders such as homosexuality and nymphomania laid the foundation for a broader approach to
the kind of proof necessary for psychological grounds for annulment. The Rota had reasoned for the
first time in several cases that the capacity to give valid consent at the time of marriage was
probably not present in persons who had displayed such problems shortly after the marriage. The
nature of this change was nothing short of revolutionary. Once the Rota itself had demonstrated a
cautious willingness to use this kind of hindsight, the way was paved for what came after
1970. Diocesan Tribunals began to accept proof of serious psychological problems that manifested
themselves shortly after the ceremony as proof of an inability to give valid consent at the time of the
ceremony.
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked to give professional opinions about
a party's mental at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and tended to be
accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
commitment are now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.2
sexual anomalies but to all kinds of personality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each others' body for heterosexual acts, but is, in its
totality, the right to the community of the whole of life, i.e., the right to a developing. lifelong
person; that the spouses must be 'other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a
fulfillment of the obligations of marriage depends. according to Church decisions, on the strength of
relationship to the other spouse.3
relationship:
The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a
permanent and faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children
and partner; (3) stability; (4) emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an
ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and strains of marriage, etc.
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might
lead to the failure of a marriage:
At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even

with the best intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise
to his or her inability to fulfill marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial
personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to persons or sense of moral values;
(2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of sexual choice; (3) the
inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fallshort of reasonable
expectations.
xxx xxx xxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he
or she has a case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit
into any of the more traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological
category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in
their use. Whereas originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise
proper judgment at the time of the marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases
seem to be concentrating on the parties' to assume or carry out their responsibilities
an obligations as promised (lack of due competence). An advantage to using the
ground of lack of due competence is that the at the time the marriage was entered
into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost is of someone's failure out marital
responsibilities as promised at the time the marriage was entered into.4
In the instant case, "opposing and conflicting personalities" of the spouses were not considered
equivalent to psychological incapacity. As well in Santos v. Court of Appeals cited in the ponencia,
the Court held that the failure of the wife to return home from the U.S. or to communicate with her
husband for more then five years is not proof of her psychological incapacity as to render the
marriage a nullity.5 Therefore, Art. 36 is inapplicable and the marriages remain valid and subsisting.
However in the recent case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,6 this Court upheld both the
Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals in declaring the presence of psychological incapacity
on the part of the husband. Said petitioner husband, after ten (10) months' sleeping with his wife
never had coitus with her, a fact he did not deny but he alleged that it was due to the physical
disorder of his wife which, however, he failed to prove. Goaded by the indifference and stubborn
refusal of her husband to fulfill a basic marital obligation described as "to procreate children based
on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage," the wife brought the action in the lower court to declare the marriage null.
The Court, quoting Dr. Gerardo Veloso, a former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila (Branch I) on Psychological incapacity concluded:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her
essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn
refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her
spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
We declared:
1 concur with the majority opinion that the herein marriage remains valid and subsisting absent
psychological incapacity (under Art. 36 of the Family Code) on the part of either or both of the
spouses.
VITUG, J., concurring:

I fully concur with my esteemed 'colleague Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban in his ponencia, and I
find to be most helpful the guidelines that he prepared for the bench and the bar in the proper
appreciation of Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209 ("The Family Code of the Philippines"). The
term "psychological incapacity" was neither defined nor exemplified by the Family Code. Thus —
its solemnization.
The Revision Committee, constituted under the auspices of the U.P. Law Center, which
drafted the Code explained:
(T)he Committee would like the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case
basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on the
civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from
Canon Law.1
Article 36 of the Family Code was concededly taken from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law —
Canon 1095. (The following persons) are incapable of contracting marriage; (those)
—
2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essential

obligations of marriage —
that should give that much value to Canon Law jurisprudence as an aid to the interpretation
and construction of the statutory enactment.2
The principles in the proper application of the law teach us that the several provisions of a Code
must be read like a congruent whole. Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity"
under Article 36, one must also read it along with, albeit to be taken as distinct from, the other
grounds enumerated in the Code, like Articles 35, 37, 38 and 41 that would likewise, but for distinct
reasons, render the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal
separation. Care must be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so
indiscriminately as if the law were indifferent on the matter.
I would wish to reiterate the Court's' statement in Santos vs. Court of Appeals;3 viz:
(T)he use of the phrase "psychological incapacity" under Article 36 of the Code has
not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of psychoses as, likewise
mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence, immaturity,
and like circumstances. . . Article 36 of the Family Code cannot be taken and
construed independently of, but must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in
our law on marriage. Thus correlated, "psychological incapacity" should refer to no
less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family
Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity
or inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions of the Code,
however, do not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances
being themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological
incapacity.4
In fine, the term "psychological incapacity," to be a ground for then nullity of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code, must be able to pass the following tests; viz:
First, the incapacity must be psychological or mental, not physical, in nature;
Second, the psychological incapacity must relate to the inability, not mere refusal, to understand,
assume end discharge the basic marital obligations of living together, observing love, respect and
fidelity and rendering mutual help and support;
Third, the psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is contracted although its overt
manifestations and the marriage may occur only thereafter; and
Fourth, the mental disorder must be grave or serious and incurable.
It may well be that the Family Code Revision Committee has envisioned Article 36, as not a few
observers would suspect, as another form of absolute divorce or, as still others would also put it, to
be a alternative to divorce; however, the fact still remains that the language of the law has failed to
carry out, even if true, any such intendment. It might have indeed turned out for the better, if it were
otherwise, there could be good reasons to doubt the constitutionality of the measure. The
fundamental law itself, no less, has laid down in terse language its unequivocal command on how
the State should regard marriage and the family, thus —
shall be protected by the State.
Section 12, Article II:

Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution . . . .
development. (The 1987 Constitution)
The case of Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51, might here be significant not so much for the specific
issue there resolved but for the tone it has set. The Court there has held that constitutional
provisions are to be considered mandatory unless by necessary implication, a different intention is
manifest such that to have them enforced strictly would cause more harm than by disregarding them.
It is quite clear to me that the constitutional mandate on marriage and the family has not been meant
to be simply directory in character, nor for mere expediency or convenience, but one that demands a
meaningful, not half-hearted, respect.
Footnotes
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130087. September 24, 2003]
DIANA M. BARCELONA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

TADEO R. BENGZON, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
The Petition for Review before us assails the 30 May 1997 Decision [1] as well as the
7 August 1997 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43393. The Court
of Appeals affirmed the Order[2] dated 21 January 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 106, in Civil Case No. Q-95-24471. The Regional Trial Court refused
to dismiss private respondents Petition for Annulment of Marriage for failure to state a
cause of action and for violation of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The
assailed Resolution denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
On 29 March 1995, private respondent Tadeo R. Bengzon (respondent Tadeo) filed

a Petition for Annulment of Marriage against petitioner Diana M. Barcelona (petitioner
Diana). The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-23445 (first petition) before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87.[3] On 9 May 1995, respondent Tadeo filed
a Motion to Withdraw Petition which the trial court granted in its Order dated 7 June 1995.
On 21 July 1995, respondent Tadeo filed anew a Petition for Annulment of Marriage
against petitioner Diana. This time, the case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-95-24471
(second petition) before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106 (trial court).
Petitioner Diana filed a Motion to Dismiss the second petition on two grounds. First,
the second petition fails to state a cause of action. Second, it violates Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 (Circular No. 04-94) on forum shopping. Respondent
Tadeo opposed the Motion to which petitioner Diana filed Additional Arguments in
Support of the Motion.
The trial court, through Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, issued on 18 September 1996 an
Order (first order) deferring resolution of the Motion until the parties ventilate their
arguments in a hearing.Petitioner Diana filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the
trial court, through Pairing Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison, issued on 21 January 1997 an
Order (second order) denying the motion. In denying the motion for reconsideration,
Judge Pison explained that when the ground for dismissal is the complaints failure to state
a cause of action, the trial court determines such fact solely from the petition itself. Judge
Pison held that contrary to petitioner Dianas claim, a perusal of the allegations in the
petition shows that petitioner Diana has violated respondent Tadeos right, thus giving rise
to a cause of action. Judge Pison also rejected petitioner Dianas claim that respondent
Tadeo is guilty of forum shopping in filing the second petition. Judge Pison explained that
when respondent Tadeo filed the second petition, the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-
23445) was no longer pending as it had been earlier dismissed without prejudice.
Petitioner Diana filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the
Court of Appeals assailing the trial courts first order deferring action on the Motion and
the second order denying the motion for reconsideration on 14 February 1997. The Court
of Appeals dismissed the petition and denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals agreed with petitioner Diana that the trial court in its first order
erred in deferring action on the Motion until after a hearing on whether the complaint
states a cause of action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the trial
courts second order corrected the situation since in denying the motion for
reconsideration, the trial court in effect denied the Motion. The appellate court agreed
with the trial court that the allegations in the second petition state a cause of action
sufficient to sustain a valid judgment if proven to be true.
The Court of Appeals also held that there was no violation of Circular No. 04-94. To
determine the existence of forum shopping, the elements of litis pendentia must exist or
a final judgment in one case must amount to res judicata in the other. In this case, there
is no litis pendentia because respondent Tadeo had caused the dismissal without
prejudice of the first petition before filing the second petition. Neither is there res
judicata because there is no final decision on the merits.
Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner Diana raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE SECOND PETITION FOR

ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE SUFFICIENTLY STATE A CAUSE
OF ACTION;
II. WHETHER RESPONDENT TADEO VIOLATED SUPREME COURT

ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 04-94 IN FAILING TO STATE
THE FILING OF A PREVIOUS PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF
MARRIAGE, ITS TERMINATION AND STATUS. [4]
The Courts Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Sufficiency of Cause of Action
Petitioner Dianas contention that the second petition fails to state a cause of action
is untenable. A cause of action is an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the
legal right of the plaintiff.[5] A complaint states a cause of action when it contains three
essential elements: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under
whatever law it arises; (2) an obligation of the defendant to respect such right; and (3) the
act or omission of the defendant violates the right of the plaintiff.[6]
We find the second petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action. The petition sought
the declaration of nullity of the marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. [7] The
petition alleged that respondent Tadeo and petitioner Diana were legally married at the
Holy Cross Parish after a whirlwind courtship as shown by the marriage contract attached
to the petition. The couple established their residence in Quezon City. The union begot
five children, Ana Maria, born on 8 November 1964; Isabel, born on 28 October 1968;
Ernesto Tadeo, born on 31 March 1970; Regina Rachelle born on 7 March 1974; and
Cristina Maria born in February 1978. The petition further alleged that petitioner Diana
was psychologically incapacitated at the time of the celebration of their marriage to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage and such incapacity subsists up to the
present time. The petition alleged the non-complied marital obligations in this manner:
xxx
5. During their marriage, they had frequent quarrels due to their varied
upbringing. Respondent, coming from a rich family, was a disorganized housekeeper
and was frequently out of the house. She would go to her sisters house or would play
tennis the whole day.
6. When the family had crisis due to several miscarriages suffered by respondent and
the sickness of a child, respondent withdrew to herself and eventually refused to speak
to her husband.
7. On November 1977, the respondent, who was five months pregnant with Cristina
Maria and on the pretext of re-evaluating her feelings with petitioner, requested the
latter to temporarily leave their conjugal dwelling. She further insisted that she wanted
to feel a little freedom from petitioners marital authority and influences. The
petitioner argued that he could occupy another room in their conjugal dwelling to
accommodate respondents desire, but no amount of plea and explanation could
dissuade her from demanding that the petitioner leave their conjugal dwelling.
8. In his desire to keep peace in the family and to safeguard the respondents
pregnancy, the petitioner was compelled to leave their conjugal dwelling and reside in
a condominium located in Greenhills.
9. This separation resulted in complete estrangement between the petitioner and the
respondent. The petitioner waived his right to the conjugal dwelling in respondents
favor through an extrajudicial dissolution of their conjugal partnership of gains. The
separation in fact between the petitioner and the respondent still subsists to the present
time.
10. The parties likewise agreed on the custody and support of the children. The
extrajudicial dissolution of conjugal partnership of gains is hereto attached as Annex
C and taken as an integral part hereof.
11. The respondent at the time of the celebration of their marriage was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligation of marriage and
such incapacity subsisted up to and until the present time. Such incapacity was
conclusively found in the psychological examination conducted on the relationship
between the petitioner and the respondent.
12. Under Article 36 of the Family Code, the marriage between the petitioner and the
respondent is void ab initio and needs to be annulled. This petition is in accordance
with Article 39 thereof.
xxx. [8]
The second petition states the ultimate facts on which respondent bases his claim in
accordance with Section 1, Rule 8 of the old Rules of Court. [9] Ultimate facts refer to the
principal, determinative, constitutive facts upon the existence of which the cause of action
rests. The term does not refer to details of probative matter or particulars of evidence
which establish the material elements.[10]
Petitioner Diana relies mainly[11] on the rulings in Santos v. Court of Appeals[12] as
well as in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina.[13] Santos gave life to the phrase
psychological incapacity, a novel provision in the Family Code, by defining the term in this
wise:
xxx psychological incapacity should refer to no less than mental (not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated. xxx.
Molina additionally provided procedural guidelines to assist the courts and the parties in
cases for annulment of marriages grounded on psychological incapacity. [14]
Petitioner Diana argues that the second petition falls short of the guidelines set forth
in Santos and Molina. Specifically, she contends that the second petition is defective
because it fails to allege the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity. The
second petition also fails to state that the alleged psychological incapacity existed from
the celebration of the marriage and that it is permanent or incurable. Further, the second
petition is devoid of any reference of the grave nature of the illness to bring about the
disability of the petitioner to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Lastly, the
second petition did not even state the marital obligations which petitioner Diana allegedly
failed to comply due to psychological incapacity.
Subsequent to Santos and Molina, the Court adopted the new Rules on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (new
Rules).[15] Specifically, Section 2, paragraph (d) of the new Rules provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
x x x.
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically
allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the
time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage but expert opinion need not be alleged.(Emphasis supplied)
Procedural rules apply to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their
passage.[16] The obvious effect of the new Rules providing that expert opinion need not
be alleged in the petition is that there is also no need to allege the root cause of the
psychological incapacity. Only experts in the fields of neurological and behavioral
sciences are competent to determine the root cause of psychological incapacity. Since
the new Rules do not require the petition to allege expert opinion on the psychological
incapacity, it follows that there is also no need to allege in the petition the root cause of
the psychological incapacity.
Science continues to explore, examine and explain how our brains work, respond to
and control the human body. Scientists still do not understand everything there is to know
about the root causes of psychological disorders. The root causes of many psychological
disorders are still unknown to science even as their outward, physical manifestations are
evident. Hence, what the new Rules require the petition to allege are the physical
manifestations indicative of psychological incapacity. Respondent Tadeos second
petition complies with this requirement.
The second petition states a cause of action since it states the legal right of
respondent Tadeo, the correlative obligation of petitioner Diana, and the act or omission
of petitioner Diana in violation of the legal right. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,[17] the Court
held:
In determining whether the allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause

of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or
allege the facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have
to be done at the trial on the merits of the case (Del Bros Hotel Corporation v. CA,
supra). If the allegations in a complaint can furnish a sufficient basis by which the
complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed regardless of the
defenses that may be assessed by the defendants (Rava Devt Corp. v. CA, 211 SCRA
152 [1992] citing Consolidated Bank & Trust Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 197
SCRA 663 [1991]). To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the
complaint must show that the claim for relief does not exist rather than that a
claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite or uncertain (Azur v.
Provincial Board, 27 SCRA 50 [1969]). xxx. (Emphasis supplied)
A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action

hypothetically admits all the factual averments in the complaint.[18] Given the hypothetically
admitted facts in the second petition, the trial court could render judgment over the case.
Forum Shopping
Similarly untenable is petitioner Dianas contention that the second petitions certificate
of non-forum shopping which does not mention the filing of the first petition and its
dismissal without prejudice violates Circular No. 04-94.[19] Petitioner Diana refers to this
portion of Circular No. 04-94-
1. The plaintiff, petitioner, applicant or principal party seeking relief in the complaint,
petition, application or other initiatory pleading shall certify under oath in such
original pleading, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed
therewith, to the truth of the following facts and undertakings: (a) he has not
theretofore commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues
in the Supreme court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (b)
to the best of his knowledge, no action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme
Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency; (c) if there is any such
action or proceeding which is either pending or may have been terminated, he
must state the status thereof; and (d) if he should thereafter learn that a similar
action or proceeding has been filed or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court
of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to report that fact within
five (5) days therefrom to the court or agency wherein the original pleading and sworn
certification contemplated herein have been filed. [20]
Petitioner Diana points out that respondent Tadeo did not disclose in his certificate of
non-forum shopping that he had previously commenced a similar action based on the
same grounds with the same prayer for relief. The certificate of non-forum shopping
should have stated the fact of termination of the first petition or its status.
The Court has consistently held that a certificate of non-forum shopping not attached
to the petition or one belatedly filed or one signed by counsel and not the party himself
constitutes a violation of the requirement. Such violation can result in the dismissal of the
complaint or petition. However, the Court has also previously held that the rule of
substantial compliance applies to the contents of the certification.[21]
In Roxas v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Court squarely addressed the issue of whether
the omission of a statement on the prior filing and dismissal of a case involving the same
parties and issues merits dismissal of the petition. In Roxas, the Court ruled:
xxx an omission in the certificate of non-forum shopping about any event that would
not constitute res judicata and litis pendentia as in the case at bar, is not fatal as to
merit the dismissal and nullification of the entire proceedings considering that the
evils sought to be prevented by the said certificate are not present. It is in this light
that we ruled in Maricalum Mining Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Commission that a liberal interpretation of Supreme Court Circular No. 04-94 on non-
forum shopping would be more in keeping with the objectives of procedural rules
which is to secure a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.
The dismissal of the first petition precluded the eventuality of litis pendentia. The first
petitions dismissal did not also amount to res judicata. Thus, there is no need to state in
the certificate of non-forum shopping in the second petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-24471)
about the prior filing and dismissal of the first petition (Civil Case No. Q-95-23445).
The first petition was dismissed without prejudice at the instance of respondent Tadeo
to keep the peace between him and his grown up children. The dismissal happened
before service of answer or any responsive pleading. Clearly, there is no litis
pendentia since respondent Tadeo had already withdrawn and caused the dismissal of
the first petition when he subsequently filed the second petition. Neither is there res
judicata because the dismissal order was not a decision on the merits but a dismissal
without prejudice.
Circular No. 04-94,[23] now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
must be interpreted and applied to achieve its purpose. The Supreme Court promulgated
the Circular to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice. The Circular
should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert its own ultimate and
legitimate objective or the goal of all rules of procedure which is to achieve substantial
justice as expeditiously as possible.[24]
A final word. We are ever mindful of the principle that marriage is an inviolable social
institution and the foundation of the family that the state cherishes and protects. [25] In
rendering this Decision, this Court is not prejudging the main issue of whether the
marriage is void based on Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court must resolve this
issue after trial on the merits where each party can present evidence to prove their
respective allegations and defenses. We are merely holding that, based on the
allegations in the second petition, the petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action and
does not violate the rule on forum shopping. Thus, the second petition is not subject to
attack by a motion to dismiss on these grounds.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. The assailed Decision dated 30 May 1997 as
well as the Resolution dated 7 August 1997 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
43393 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on leave.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia, and
Artemio G. Tuquero concurring.
[2]
Penned by Pairing Judge Rosalina L. Luna Pison.
[3]
Presided by Judge Elsie Ligot-Telan.
[4]
Rollo, pp. 243-244.
[5]
Far East Bank and Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 135548, 29 September 2000, 341 SCRA 486.
[6]
Relucio v. Lopez, G.R. No. 138497, 16 January 2002, 373 SCRA 578.
[7]
Article 36 of the Family Code provides: A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 54-55.
[9]
Section 1. In general. Every pleading shall contain in a methodical and logical form, a plain, concise and
direct statement of the ultimate facts on which the party pleading relies for his claim or defense, as
the case may be, omitting the statement of mere evidentiary facts.
[10]
OSCAR M. HERRERA, Remedial Law I, 1999 Ed.
[11]
Petitioner Diana relied on Santos for her motion to dismiss in the trial court and her certiorari petition in
the appellate court. In her motion to reconsider the decision of the Court of Appeals, she
cited Molina.
[12]
310 Phil. 21 (1995).
[13]
G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997, 268 SCRA 198.
[14]
Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, 17 April 2001, 356 SCRA 588.
[15]
Effective 15 March 2003.
[16]
Zulueta v. Asia Brewery, G.R. No. 138137, 8 March 2001, 354 SCRA 100; Presidential Commission on
Good Government v. Desierto, G.R. No. 140358, 8 December 2000, 347 SCRA 561.
[17]
313 Phil. 8 (1995).
[18]
Sta. Clara Homeowners Association v. Gaston, G.R. No. 141961, 23 January 2002, 374 SCRA 396.
[19]
Now Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[20]
Emphasis supplied by petitioner.
[21]
MC Engineering, Inc. v. NLRC, 412 Phil. 614 (2001).
[22]
415 Phil. 430 (2001).
[23]
Preceded by Circular No. 28-91.
[24]
See note 22.
[25]
See Section 2, Article XV, 1987 Constitution.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136490. October 19, 2000]
BRENDA B. MARCOS, petitioner, vs. WILSON G.

MARCOS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Psychological incapacity, as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be

established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however, that
the respondent should be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a conditio sine
qua non for such declaration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the July 24, 1998 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
55588, which disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the contested decision is set aside and the marriage between the
parties is hereby declared valid."[2]
Also challenged by petitioner is the December 3, 1998 CA Resolution denying her

Motion for Reconsideration.
Earlier, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had ruled thus:
"WHEREFORE, the marriage between petitioner Brenda B. Marcos and respondent

Wilson G. Marcos, solemnized on September 6, 1982 in Pasig City is declared null
and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. The conjugal properties, if
any, is dissolved [sic] in accordance with Articles 126 and 129 of the same Code in
relation to Articles 50, 51 and 52 relative to the delivery of the legitime of [the]
parties' children. In the best interest and welfare of the minor children, their custody is
granted to petitioner subject to the visitation rights of respondent.
"Upon finality of this Decision, furnish copy each to the Office of the Civil Registrar
of Pasig City where the marriage was solemnized, the National Census and Statistics
Office, Manila and the Register of Deeds of Mandaluyong City for their appropriate
action consistent with this Decision.
"SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The facts as found by the Court of Appeals are as follows:
"It was established during the trial that the parties were married twice: (1) on
September 6, 1982 which was solemnized by Judge Eriberto H. Espiritu at the
Municipal Court of Pasig (Exh. A); and (2) on May 8, 1983 which was solemnized by
Rev. Eduardo L. Eleazar, Command Chaplain, at the Presidential Security Command
Chapel in Malacaang Park, Manila (Exh. A-1). Out of their marriage, five (5) children
were born (Exhs. B, C, D, E and F).
"Appellant Wilson G. Marcos joined the Armed Forces of the Philippines in

1973. Later on, he was transferred to the Presidential Security Command in
Malacaang during the Marcos Regime. Appellee Brenda B. Marcos, on the other
hand, joined the Women's Auxilliary Corps under the Philippine Air Force in
1978. After the Edsa Revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military
service.
"They first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the Malacaang
Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President
Ferdinand Marcos. Through telephone conversations, they became acquainted and
eventually became sweethearts.
"After their marriage on September 6, 1982, they resided at No. 1702 Daisy Street,
Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong, a housing unit which she acquired from the Bliss
Development Corporation when she was still single.
"After the downfall of President Marcos, he left the military service in 1987 and then
engaged in different business ventures that did not however prosper. As a wife, she
always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him, instead of her,
as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any
gainful employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and
beat her. He would even force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He
would also inflict physical harm on their children for a slight mistake and was so
severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times during their cohabitation,
he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately.
"All the while, she was engrossed in the business of selling "magic uling" and
chickens. While she was still in the military, she would first make deliveries early in
the morning before going to Malacaang. When she was discharged from the military
service, she concentrated on her business. Then, she became a supplier in the Armed
Forces of the Philippines until she was able to put up a trading and construction
company, NS Ness Trading and Construction Development Corporation.
"The 'straw that broke the camel's back' took place on October 16, 1994, when they
had a bitter quarrel. As they were already living separately, she did not want him to
stay in their house anymore. On that day, when she saw him in their house, she was so
angry that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her
and even on her mother who came to her aid. The following day, October 17, 1994,
she and their children left the house and sought refuge in her sister's house.
"On October 19, 1994, she submitted herself [to] medical examination at the
Mandaluyong Medical Center where her injuries were diagnosed as contusions (Exh.
G, Records, 153).
"Sometime in August 1995, she together with her two sisters and driver, went to him
at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong to look for their missing child, Niko. Upon seeing
them, he got mad. After knowing the reason for their unexpected presence, he ran
after them with a samurai and even [beat] her driver.
"At the time of the filing of this case, she and their children were renting a house in
Camella, Paraaque, while the appellant was residing at the Bliss unit in Mandaluyong.
"In the case study conducted by Social Worker Sonia C. Millan, the children
described their father as cruel and physically abusive to them (Exh. UU, Records, pp.
85-100).
"The appellee submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for

psychological evaluation (Exh. YY, Records, pp. 207-216), while the appellant on the
other hand, did not.
"The court a quo found the appellant to be psychologically incapacitated to perform
his marital obligations mainly because of his failure to find work to support his family
and his violent attitude towards appellee and their children, x x x."[3]
Reversing the RTC, the CA held that psychological incapacity had not been
established by the totality of the evidence presented. It ratiocinated in this wise:
"Essential in a petition for annulment is the allegation of the root cause of the spouse's
psychological incapacity which should also be medically or clinically identified,
sufficiently proven by experts and clearly explained in the decision. The incapacity
must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage and shown
to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It must also be grave enough to
bring about the disability of the parties to assume the essential obligations of marriage
as set forth in Articles 68 to 71 and Articles 220 to 225 of the Family Code and such
non-complied marital obligations must similarly be alleged in the petition, established
by evidence and explained in the decision.
"In the case before us, the appellant was not subjected to any psychological or
psychiatric evaluation. The psychological findings about the appellant by psychiatrist
Natividad Dayan were based only on the interviews conducted with the
appellee. Expert evidence by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists is
essential if only to prove that the parties were or any one of them was mentally or
psychically ill to be truly incognitive of the marital obligations he or she was
assuming, or as would make him or her x x x unable to assume them. In fact, he
offered testimonial evidence to show that he [was] not psychologically
incapacitated. The root cause of his supposed incapacity was not alleged in the
petition, nor medically or clinically identified as a psychological illness or sufficiently
proven by an expert. Similarly, there is no evidence at all that would show that the
appellant was suffering from an incapacity which [was] psychological or mental - not
physical to the extent that he could not have known the obligations he was
assuming: that the incapacity [was] grave, ha[d] preceded the marriage and [was]
incurable."[4]
Hence, this Petition.[5]
Issues
In her Memorandum,[6] petitioner presents for this Court's consideration the following issues:
"I. Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals could set aside the findings by the
Regional Trial Court of psychological incapacity of a respondent in a Petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage simply because the respondent did not subject
himself to psychological evaluation.
II. Whether or not the totality of evidence presented and the demeanor of all the
witnesses should be the basis of the determination of the merits of the Petition." [7]
The Court's Ruling
We agree with petitioner that the personal medical or psychological examination of

respondent is not a requirement for a declaration of psychological
incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not show such
incapacity.
Preliminary Issue: Need for Personal Medical Examination
Petitioner contends that the testimonies and the results of various tests that were
submitted to determine respondent's psychological incapacity to perform the obligations
of marriage should not have been brushed aside by the Court of Appeals, simply because
respondent had not taken those tests himself. Petitioner adds that the CA should have
realized that under the circumstances, she had no choice but to rely on other sources of
information in order to determine the psychological capacity of respondent, who had
refused to submit himself to such tests.
In Republic v. CA and Molina,[8] the guidelines governing the application and the interpretation
of psychological incapacity referred to in Article 36 of the Family Code[9] were laid down by this Court
as follows:
"1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any
doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage
and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it 'as the
foundation of the nation.' It decrees marriage as legally 'inviolable,' thereby protecting
it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
'protected' by the state.
xxxxxxxxx
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms
may be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of
them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid
assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so
as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time of the celebration' of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their 'I do's.' The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same
sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume
the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, 'mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root
causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying
with the obligations essential to marriage.
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of
the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts.
xxxxxxxxx
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General
to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly
stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit
to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed
submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095."[10]
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the
Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals:[11] "psychological incapacity must be characterized
by (a) gravity (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability." The foregoing guidelines do
not require that a physician examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be "medically or clinically identified." What is
important is the presence of evidence that can adequately establish the
party's psychological condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is enough
to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the
person concerned need not be resorted to.
Main Issue: Totality of Evidence Presented
The main question, then, is whether the totality of the evidence presented in the
present case -- including the testimonies of petitioner, the common children, petitioner's
sister and the social worker -- was enough to sustain a finding that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated.
We rule in the negative. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that respondent
failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to physical abuse
and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that he had lost his job
and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six years. It was during this
period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral support, and
even left the family home.
Thus, his alleged psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the
inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his
condition is incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves. It refers to a
serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These
marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to 71, 220, 221 and 225 of the
Family Code.
Neither is Article 36 to be equated with legal separation, in which the grounds need
not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure, moral
corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity,
abandonment and the like.[12] At best, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to
grounds for legal separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
Because Article 36 has been abused as a convenient divorce law, this Court laid
down the procedural requirements for its invocation in Molina. Petitioner, however, has
not faithfully observed them.
In sum, this Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of
petitioner to show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence and incurability; and for her failure to observe the guidelines
outlined in Molina.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and assailed Decision AFFIRMED, except
that portion requiring personal medical examination as a conditio sine qua non to a finding
of psychological incapacity. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by Justice Bernardo LL Salas with the concurrence of Justices Fermin A. Martin Jr. (Division
chairman) and Candido V. Rivera (member).
[2] CA Decision, pp. 12-13; rollo, pp. 38-39.
[5]This case was deemed submitted for resolution on February 24, 2000, upon receipt by this Court of
respondent's Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Virgilio V. Macaraig. Petitioner's Memorandum,
signed by Atty. Rita Linda V. Jimeno, had been filed earlier on November 5, 1999.
[6] Rollo, p. 70; original in upper case.
[7] Memorandum for petitioner, p. 6; rollo, p. 70.
[8] 268 SCRA 198, February 13, 1997, per Panganiban, J.
[9]
"Article 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
"The action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under this Article shall prescribe in ten years after its
celebration."
[10] Supra, pp. 209-213.
[11] 240 SCRA 20, 34, January 4, 1995, per Vitug, J.
[12] "Article 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child,
or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to
engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the Philippines or
abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one year.
For purposes of this Article, the term 'child' shall include a child by nature or by adoption."
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 149498. May 20, 2004]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. LOLITA QUINTERO-

HAMANO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision[1] dated August 20, 2001 of the Court
of Appeals[2] affirming the decision[3] dated August 28, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court of
Rizal, Branch 72, declaring as null and void the marriage contracted between herein
respondent Lolita M. Quintero-Hamano and her husband Toshio Hamano.
On June 17, 1996, respondent Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to her husband Toshio Hamano, a Japanese
national, on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Respondent alleged that in October 1986, she and Toshio started a common-law
relationship in Japan. They later lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio
went back to Japanand stayed there for half of 1987. On November 16, 1987, she gave
birth to their child.
On January 14, 1988, she and Toshio were married by Judge Isauro M. Balderia of
the Municipal Trial Court of Bacoor, Cavite. Unknown to respondent, Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities, which incapacity
became manifest only after the marriage. One month after their marriage, Toshio returned
to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his
family. After sending money to respondent for two months, Toshio stopped giving
financial support. She wrote him several times but he never responded. Sometime in
1991, respondent learned from her friends that Toshio visited the Philippines but he did
not bother to see her and their child.
The summons issued to Toshio remained unserved because he was no longer
residing at his given address. Consequently, on July 8, 1996, respondent filed an ex
parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The trial court granted
the motion on July 12, 1996. In August 1996, the summons, accompanied by a copy of
the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days
to file his answer. Because Toshio failed to file a responsive pleading after the lapse of
60 days from publication, respondent filed a motion dated November 5, 1996 to refer the
case to the prosecutor for investigation. The trial court granted the motion on November
7, 1996.
On November 20, 1996, prosecutor Rolando I. Gonzales filed a report finding that no
collusion existed between the parties. He prayed that the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor be allowed to intervene to ensure that the evidence submitted was not
fabricated. On February 13, 1997, the trial court granted respondents motion to present
her evidence ex parte. She then testified on how Toshio abandoned his family. She
thereafter offered documentary evidence to support her testimony.
On August 28, 1997, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the marriage between petitioner Lolita M.

Quintero-Hamano and Toshio Hamano, is hereby declared NULL and VOID.
The Civil Register of Bacoor, Cavite and the National Statistics Office are ordered to
make proper entries into the records of the afore-named parties pursuant to this
judgment of the Court.
SO ORDERED. [4]
In declaring the nullity of the marriage on the ground of Toshios psychological

incapacity, the trial court held that:
It is clear from the records of the case that respondent spouses failed to fulfill his
obligations as husband of the petitioner and father to his daughter. Respondent
remained irresponsible and unconcerned over the needs and welfare of his family.
Such indifference, to the mind of the Court, is a clear manifestation of insensitivity
and lack of respect for his wife and child which characterizes a very immature person.
Certainly, such behavior could be traced to respondents mental incapacity and
disability of entering into marital life.
[5]
The Office of the Solicitor General, representing herein petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, appealed to the Court of Appeals but the same was denied in a decision
dated August 28, 1997, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, and pursuant to applicable law and
jurisprudence on the matter and evidence on hand, judgment is hereby rendered
denying the instant appeal. The decision of the court a quo is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED. [6]
The appellate court found that Toshio left respondent and their daughter a month
after the celebration of the marriage, and returned to Japan with the promise to support
his family and take steps to make them Japanese citizens. But except for two months, he
never sent any support to nor communicated with them despite the letters respondent
sent. He even visited the Philippines but he did not bother to see them. Respondent, on
the other hand, exerted all efforts to contact Toshio, to no avail.
The appellate court thus concluded that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his marital obligations to his family, and to observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support pursuant to Article 68 of the
Family Code of the Philippines. The appellate court rhetorically asked:
But what is there to preserve when the other spouse is an unwilling party to the
cohesion and creation of a family as a social inviolable institution? Why should
petitioner be made to suffer in a marriage where the other spouse is not around and
worse, left them without even helping them cope up with family life and assist in the
upbringing of their daughter as required under Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code? [7]
The appellate court emphasized that this case could not be equated with Republic
vs. Court of Appeals and Molina[8] and Santos vs. Court of Appeals.[9] In those cases, the
spouses were Filipinos while this case involved a mixed marriage, the husband being a
Japanese national.
Hence, this appeal by petitioner Republic based on this lone assignment of error:
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that respondent was able to prove the
psychological incapacity of Toshio Hamano to perform his marital obligations,
despite respondents failure to comply with the guidelines laid down in
the Molina case. [10]
According to petitioner, mere abandonment by Toshio of his family and his

insensitivity to them did not automatically constitute psychological incapacity. His
behavior merely indicated simple inadequacy in the personality of a spouse falling short
of reasonable expectations. Respondent failed to prove any severe and incurable
personality disorder on the part of Toshio, in accordance with the guidelines set in Molina.
The Office of the Public Attorney, representing respondent, reiterated the ruling of the
courts a quo and sought the denial of the instant petition.
We rule in favor of petitioner.
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen
the family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of
the family.[11] Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage. [12]
Respondent seeks to annul her marriage with Toshio on the ground of psychological
incapacity. Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
its solemnization.
In Molina, we came up with the following guidelines in the interpretation and

application of Article 36 for the guidance of the bench and the bar:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. x x
x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although its
manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such an extent
that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing
them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under
the principle of ejusdem generis (Salita vs. Magtolis, 233 SCRA 100, June 13, 1994),
nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their I dos. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a
profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in
diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as
root causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71

of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and
included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the

Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be,
to the petition. The Solicitor-General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is
deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor-General shall discharge
the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon
1095. (emphasis supplied)
[13]
The guidelines incorporate the three basic requirements earlier mandated by the
Court in Santos: psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity (b) juridical
antecedence and (c) incurability.[14] The foregoing guidelines do not require that a
physician examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. In fact, the
root cause may be medically or clinically identified. What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the partys psychological condition. For indeed, if
the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.[15]
We now proceed to determine whether respondent successfully proved Toshios
psychological incapacity to fulfill his marital responsibilities.
Petitioner showed that Toshio failed to meet his duty to live with, care for and support
his family. He abandoned them a month after his marriage to respondent. Respondent
sent him several letters but he never replied. He made a trip to the Philippines but did not
care at all to see his family.
We find that the totality of evidence presented fell short of proving that Toshio was
psychologically incapacitated to assume his marital responsibilities. Toshios act of
abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be
due to some kind of psychological illness. After respondent testified on how Toshio
abandoned his family, no other evidence was presented showing that his behavior was
caused by a psychological disorder. Although, as a rule, there was no need for an actual
medical examination, it would have greatly helped respondents case had she presented
evidence that medically or clinically identified his illness. This could have been done
through an expert witness. This respondent did not do.
We must remember that abandonment is also a ground for legal separation. [16] There
was no showing that the case at bar was not just an instance of abandonment in the
context of legal separation. We cannot presume psychological defect from the mere fact
that Toshio abandoned his family immediately after the celebration of the marriage. As
we ruled in Molina, it is not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his responsibility
and duty as a married person; it is essential that he must be shown to be incapable of
doing so due to some psychological, not physical, illness.[17] There was no proof of a natal
or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates a person from accepting and complying
with the obligations essential to marriage.[18]
According to the appellate court, the requirements in Molina and Santos do not apply
here because the present case involves a mixed marriage, the husband being a Japanese
national. We disagree. In proving psychological incapacity, we find no distinction between
an alien spouse and a Filipino spouse. We cannot be lenient in the application of the rules
merely because the spouse alleged to be psychologically incapacitated happens to be a
foreign national. The medical and clinical rules to determine psychological incapacity
were formulated on the basis of studies of human behavior in general. Hence, the norms
used for determining psychological incapacity should apply to any person regardless of
nationality.
In Pesca vs. Pesca,[19] this Court declared that marriage is an inviolable social
institution that the State cherishes and protects. While we commiserate with respondent,
terminating her marriage to her husband may not necessarily be the fitting denouement.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The decision
dated August 28, 1997 of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Chairman and Acting Chief Justice), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-
Morales, JJ., concur.
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, and concurred in by Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia
and Hilarion Aquino; Rollo, pp. 24-31.
[2]
Second Division.
[3]
Penned by Judge Rogelio Angeles; Rollo, pp. 32-33.
[4]
Rollo, p. 33.
[5]
Rollo, p. 52.
[6]
Rollo, p. 30.
[7]
Rollo, p. 29.
[8]
268 SCRA 198 [1997].
[9]
240 SCRA 20 [1995].
[10]
Rollo, p. 14.
[11]
Article II, Section 12; and, Article XV, Sections 1 & 2 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
[12]
Republic of the Philippines vs. Dagdag, 351 SCRA 425 [2001] citing Republic of the
Philippines vs. Hernandez, 320 SCRA 76 [1999].
[13]
Supra, Note 8, pp. 209-212.
[14]
Supra, Note 9, p. 33.
[15]
Marcos vs. Marcos, 343 SCRA 755, 764 [2000].
[16]
Article 55 (10) of the Family Code of the Philippines provides that:
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
xxx xxx xxx
[17]
Supra, Note 8, p. 210.
[18]
Ibid., pp. 211-212.
[19]
356 SCRA 588, 594 [2001].
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151867. January 29, 2004]

DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SHARON L.
CORPUZ-DEDEL a.k.a. JANE IBRAHIM, respondents.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Petitioner David B. Dedel met respondent Sharon L. Corpuz Dedel while he was
working in the advertising business of his father. The acquaintance led to courtship and
romantic relations, culminating in the exchange of marital vows before the City Court of
Pasay on September 28, 1966.[1] The civil marriage was ratified in a church wedding on
May 20, 1967.[2]
The union produced four children, namely: Beverly Jane, born on September 18,
1968;[3] Stephanie Janice born on September 9, 1969; [4] Kenneth David born on April 24,
1971;[5] and Ingrid born on October 20, 1976.[6] The conjugal partnership, nonetheless,
acquired neither property nor debt.
Petitioner avers that during the marriage, Sharon turned out to be an irresponsible
and immature wife and mother. She had extra-marital affairs with several men: a dentist
in the Armed Forces of the Philippines; a Lieutenant in the Presidential Security
Command and later a Jordanian national.
Sharon was once confirmed in the Manila Medical City for treatment by Dr. Lourdes
Lapuz, a clinical psychiatrist. Petitioner alleged that despite the treatment, Sharon did not
stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian national named Mustafa Ibrahim, whom she
married and with whom she had two children. However, when Mustafa Ibrahim left the
country, Sharon returned to petitioner bringing along her two children by
Ibrahim. Petitioner accepted her back and even considered the two illegitimate children
as his own. Thereafter, on December 9, 1995, Sharon abandoned petitioner to join
Ibrahim in Jordan with their two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the
country on special occasions.
Finally, giving up all hope of a reconciliation with Sharon, petitioner filed on April 1,
1997 a petition seeking the declaration of nullity of his marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity, as defined in Article 36 of the Family Code, before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 149. Summons was effected by publication in
the Pilipino Star Ngayon, a newspaper of general circulation in the country considering
that Sharon did not reside and could not be found in the Philippines.[7]
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad A. Dayan, who testified that she conducted a
psychological evaluation of petitioner and found him to be conscientious, hardworking,
diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed up to the final detail
and who exerts his best in whatever he does.
On the other hand, Dr. Dayan declared that Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social
Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she committed
several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even bringing with her the two
children of Mustafa Ibrahim to live with petitioner. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in
handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family
are indications of Anti-Social Personality Disorder amounting to psychological incapacity
to perform the essential obligations of marriage.[8]
After trial, judgment was rendered, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the civil and church marriages between
DAVID B. DEDEL and SHARON L. CORPUZ celebrated on September 28, 1966
and May 20, 1967 are hereby declared null and void on the ground of psychological
incapacity on the part of the respondent to perform the essential obligations of
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal partnership of gains existing between the parties is

dissolved and in lieu thereof a regime of complete separation of property between the
said spouses is established in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Family
Code, without prejudice to rights previously acquired by creditors.
Let a copy of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries
in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
SO ORDERED. [9]
Respondent Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed

alleging that
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION DESPITE THE
ABSENCE OF A VALID GROUND FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE CHURCH MARRIAGE
BETWEEN PETITIONER IS NULL AND VOID.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING A DECISION WITHOUT A
CERTIFICATION HAVING BEEN ISSUED BY THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AS
REQUIRED IN THE MOLINA CASE.
The Court of Appeals recalled and set aside the judgment of the trial court and
ordered dismissal of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.[10]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 8,
2002.[11] Hence, the instant petition.
Petitioner contends that the appellate court gravely abused its discretion and
manifestly erred in its conclusion that the: (1) respondent was not suffering from
psychological incapacity to perform her marital obligations; (2) psychological incapacity
of respondent is not attended by gravity, juridical antecedence and permanence or
incurability; and (3) totality of evidence submitted by the petitioner falls short to prove
psychological incapacity suffered by respondent.
The main question for resolution is whether or not the totality of the evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated. More specifically, does the aberrant sexual behavior of respondent
adverted to by petitioner fall within the term psychological incapacity?
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[12] it was ruled:
x x x psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical)

incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage
which, as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine
the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning
and significance to the marriage. This psychological condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated. The law does not evidently envision, upon the other hand,
an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with the other. This conclusion is
to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be legitimate.
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code. These provisions, however, do
not necessarily preclude the possibility of these various circumstances being
themselves, depending on the degree and severity of the disorder, indicia of
psychological incapacity.
Until further statutory and jurisprudential parameters are established, every

circumstance that may have some bearing on the degree, extent and other conditions
of that incapacity must, in every case, be carefully examined and evaluated so that no
precipitate and indiscriminate nullity is peremptorily decreed. The well-considered
opinion of psychiatrists, psychologists and persons with expertise in psychological
disciplines might be helpful or even desirable. [13]
The difficulty in resolving the problem lies in the fact that a personality disorder is a
very complex and elusive phenomenon which defies easy analysis and definition. In this
case, respondents sexual infidelity can hardly qualify as being mentally or psychically ill
to such an extent that she could not have known the obligations she was assuming, or
knowing them, could not have given a valid assumption thereof. [14] It appears that
respondents promiscuity did not exist prior to or at the inception of the marriage. What is,
in fact, disclosed by the records is a blissful marital union at its celebration, later affirmed
in church rites, and which produced four children.
Respondents sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves
constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither
could her emotional immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological
incapacity.[15] It must be shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make respondent completely unable to discharge the essential
obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity [16] or sexual
promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by petitioner are grounds for legal separation
under Article 55[17] of the Family Code. However, we pointed out in Marcos v.
Marcos[18] that Article 36 is not to be equated with legal separation in which the grounds
need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral pressure,
civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and
the like. In short, the evidence presented by petitioner refers only to grounds for legal
separation, not for declaring a marriage void.
We likewise agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court has no jurisdiction to
dissolve the church marriage of petitioner and respondent. The authority to do so is
exclusively lodged with the Ecclesiastical Court of the Roman Catholic Church.
All told, we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of the appellate court. We
cannot deny the grief, frustration and even desperation of petitioner in his present
situation. Regrettably, there are circumstances, like in this case, where neither law nor
society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem. [19] While we
sympathize with petitioners marital predicament, our first and foremost duty is to apply
the law no matter how harsh it may be.[20]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60406, which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case
No. 97-467 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, is AFFIRMED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Azcuna, J., on official leave.
[1]
Exhibits F and F-3.
[2]
Exhibit F.
[3]
Exhibit H.
[4]
Exhibit I.
[5]
Exhibit J.
[6]
Exhibit K.
[7]
Exhibits D to D-3.
[8]
Exhibit L; Records pp. 57-78.
[9]
Rollo, p. 49; penned by Presiding Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga (now an Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals).
[10]
Rollo, pp. 33-44; per Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Martin S.
Villarama, Jr. and Eliezer R. Delos Santos, concurring.
[11]
Rollo, p. 45.
[12]
310 Phil. 21 (1995).
[13]
Id., at 40-41.
[14]
Republic v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 109975, 9 February 2001, 351 SCRA 425.
[15]
Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, 17 April 2001, 356 SCRA 588, 594.
[16]
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 87-88.
[17]
ART. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child
or a child of the petitioner;
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to
engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six years even if pardoned;
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent;
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
(7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage in the Philippines, whether in the
Philippines or abroad;
(8) Sexual infidelity or perversion.
(9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner; or
For purposes of this Article, the term child shall include a child by nature or by adoption.
[18]
G.R. No. 136490, 19 October 2000, 343 SCRA 755, 765.
[19]
Santos v. Court of Appeals, supra, p. 36.
[20]
Pesca v. Pesca, supra.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. NO. 158896 October 27, 2004
JUANITA CARATING-SIAYNGCO, petitioner,

vs.
MANUEL SIAYNGCO, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals promulgated on 01
July 2003, reversing the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 102, Quezon City,
dated 31 January 2001, which dismissed the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by
respondent herein Judge Manuel Siayngco ("respondent Manuel").
Petitioner Juanita Carating-Siayngco ("Petitioner Juanita") and respondent Manuel were married at
civil rites on 27 June 1973 and before the Catholic Church on 11 August 1973. After discovering that
they could not have a child of their own, the couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they
named Jeremy.
On 25 September 1997, or after twenty-four (24) years of married life together, respondent Manuel
filed for the declaration of its nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity of petitioner Juanita.
He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his wife exhibited an over domineering and selfish
attitude towards him which was exacerbated by her extremely volatile and bellicose nature; that she
incessantly complained about almost everything and anyone connected with him like his elderly
parents, the staff in his office and anything not of her liking like the physical arrangement, tables,
chairs, wastebaskets in his office and with other trivial matters; that she showed no respect or regard
at all for the prestige and high position of his office as judge of the Municipal Trial Court; that she
would yell and scream at him and throw objects around the house within the hearing of their
neighbors; that she cared even less about his professional advancement as she did not even give
him moral support and encouragement; that her psychological incapacity arose before marriage,
rooted in her deep-seated resentment and vindictiveness for what she perceived as lack of love and
appreciation from her own parents since childhood and that such incapacity is permanent and
incurable and, even if treatment could be attempted, it will involve time and expense beyond the
emotional and physical capacity of the parties; and that he endured and suffered through his
turbulent and loveless marriage to her for twenty-two (22) years.
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is still living with her at their
conjugal home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against her so that he could
be free to marry his paramour; that she is a loving wife and mother; that it was respondent Manuel
who was remiss in his marital and family obligations; that she supported respondent Manuel in all his
endeavors despite his philandering; that she was raised in a real happy family and had a happy
childhood contrary to what was stated in the complaint.
In the pre-trial order,3 the parties only stipulated on the following:
1. That they were married on 27 June 1973;
2. That they have one son who is already 20 years old.

Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. Respondent Manuel first took the witness stand and
elaborated on the allegations in his petition. He testified that his parents never approved of his
marriage as they still harbored hope that he would return to the seminary.4 The early years of their
marriage were difficult years as they had a hard time being accepted as husband and wife by his
parents and it was at this period that his wife started exhibiting signs of being irritable and
temperamental5 to him and his parents.6 She was also obsessive about cleanliness which became
the common source of their quarrels.7 He, however, characterized their union as happy during that
period of time in 1979 when they moved to Malolos as they were engrossed in furnishing their new
house.8 In 1981, when he became busy with law school and with various community organizations, it
was then that he felt that he and his wife started to drift apart.9 He then narrated incidents during
their marriage that were greatly embarrassing and/or distressing to him, e.g., when his wife
quarreled with an elderly neighbor;10 when she would visit him in his office and remark that the
curtains were already dirty or when she kicked a trash can across the room or when she threw a
ballpen from his table;11 when she caused his office drawer to be forcibly opened while he was
away;12 when she confronted a female tenant of theirs and accused the tenant of having an affair
with him;13 and other incidents reported to him which would show her jealous nature. Money matters
continued to be a source of bitter quarrels.14 Respondent Manuel could not forget that he was not
able to celebrate his appointment as judge in 1995 as his wife did not approve it, ostensibly for lack
of money, but she was very generous when it came to celebrations of their parish
priest.15 Respondent Manuel then denied that he was a womanizer16 or that he had a
mistress.17 Lastly, respondent Manuel testified as to their conjugal properties and obligations.18
Next, LUCENA TAN, respondent Manuel’s Clerk of Court, testified that petitioner Juanita seldom
went to respondent Manuel’s office.19 But when she was there, she would call witness to complain
about the curtains and the cleanliness of the office.20 One time, witness remembered petitioner
Juanita rummaging through respondent Manuel’s drawer looking for his address book while the latter
was in Subic attending a conference.21 When petitioner Juanita could not open a locked drawer she
called witness, telling the latter that she was looking for the telephone number of respondent’s hotel
room in Subic. A process server was requested by petitioner Juanita to call for a locksmith in the
town proper. When the locksmith arrived, petitioner Juanita ordered him to open the locked drawer.
On another occasion, particularly in August of 1998, witness testified that she heard petitioner
Juanita remark to respondent Manuel "sino bang batang bibinyagan na yan? Baka anak mo yan sa
labas?"22
As his third witness, respondent Manuel presented DR. VALENTINA GARCIA whose professional
qualifications as a psychiatrist were admitted by petitioner Juanita.23 From her psychiatric
evaluation,24 Dr. Garcia concluded:
To sum up, Manuel de Jesus Siayngco and Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco contributed to
the marital collapse. There is a partner relational problem which affected their capacity to
sustain the marital bond with love, support and understanding.
The partner relational problem (coded V61/10 in the Fourth Edition of the Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders or DSM IV) is secondary to the psychopathology of
both spouses. Manuel and Juanita had engaged themselves in a defective communication
pattern which is characteristically negative and deformed. This affected their competence to
maintain the love and respect that they should give to each other.
Marriage requires a sustained level of adaptation from both partners who are expected to
use healthy strategies to solve their disputes and differences. Whereas Juanita would be
derogatory, critical, argumentative, depressive and obsessive-compulsive, Manuel makes
use of avoidance and suppression. In his effort to satisfy the self and to boost his masculine
ego to cover up for his felt or imagined inadequacies, he became callused to the detrimental
effects of his unfaithfulness and his failure to prioritize the marriage. Both spouses, who
display narcissistic psychological repertoire (along with their other maladaptive traits), failed
to adequately empathize (or to be responsive and sensitive) to each other’s needs and
feelings. The matrimonial plot is not conducive to a healthy and a progressive marriage.
Manuel and Juanita have shown their psychologically [sic] incapacity to satisfactorily comply
with the fundamental duties of marriage. The clashing of their patterns of maladaptive traits,
which warrant the diagnosis of personality disorder not otherwise specified (PDNOS, with
code 301.9 as per DSM IV criteria) will bring about more emotional mishaps and
psychopathology. These rigid sets of traits which were in existence before the marriage will
tend to be pervasive and impervious to recovery.25
In her defense, petitioner Juanita denied respondent Manuel’s allegations. She insisted that they
were a normal couple who had their own share of fights; that they were happily married until
respondent Manuel started having extra-marital affairs26 which he had admitted to her.27 Petitioner
Juanita professed that she would wish to preserve her marriage and that she truly loved her
husband.28 She stated further that she has continuously supported respondent Manuel, waiting up
for him while he was in law school to serve him food and drinks. Even when he already filed the
present case, she would still attend to his needs.29 She remembered that after the pre-trial, while
they were in the hallway, respondent Manuel implored her to give him a chance to have a new
family.30
DR. EDUARDO MAABA, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was admitted by respondent

Manuel,31 testified that he conducted a psychiatric evaluation on petitioner Juanita, the results of
which were embodied in his report. Said report stated in part:
Based on the clinical interviews and the results of the psychological tests, respondent
Juanita Victoria Carating-Siayngco, was found to be a mature, conservative, religious and
highly intelligent woman who possess [sic] more than enough psychological potentials for a
mutually satisfying long term heterosexual relationship. Superego is strong and she is
respectful of traditional institutions of society like the institution of marriage. She was also
found to be a loving, nurturing and self-sacrificing woman who is capable of enduring severe
environmental stress in her social milieu. Finally, she is reality-oriented and therefore
capable of rendering fair and sound decision.
In summary, the psychiatric evaluation found the respondent to be psychologically

capacitated to comply with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.32
CRISPINA SEVILLA, a friend of the spouses Siayngco since 1992 described the Siayngcos as the
ideal couple, sweet to each other.33 The couple would religiously attend prayer meetings in the
community.34 Both were likewise leaders in their community.35 Witness then stated that she would
often go to the house of the couple and, as late as March 2000, she still saw respondent Manuel
there.36
On 31 January 2001, the trial court denied respondent Manuel’s petition for declaration of nullity of
his marriage to petitioner Juanita holding in part that:
The asserted psychological incapacity of the defendant is not preponderantly supported in

evidence. The couple [was] happily married and after four years of marital bliss [was] blest
with a son. Their life together continued years thereafter in peace and prosperity.
The psychiatric finding that defendant has been critical, depressed and obsessive doubtless
arose later in the parties’ relationship sometime in the early 90’s when the defendant-wife
started receiving letters that the plaintiff is playing footsy.
xxx xxx xxx
The present state of our laws on marriage does not favor knee-jerk responses to slight stabs
of the Pavlovian hammer on marital relations. A wife, as in the instant case, may have
succumbed, due to her jealousy, to the constant delivery of irritating curtain lectures to her
husband. But, as our laws now stand, the dissolution of the marriage is not the remedy in
such cases. In contrast to some countries, our laws do not look at a marital partner as a
mere refrigerator in the Kitchen even if he or she sometimes may sound like a firetruck.37
A motion for reconsideration was filed but was denied in an order dated 04 May 2001.38
On 01 July 2003, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on the psychiatric
evaluation of Dr. Garcia finding both Manuel and Juanita psychologically incapacitated and on the
case of Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals.39 Thus:
The report clearly explained the root cause of the alleged psychological incapacity of plaintiff
Manuel and defendant Juanita. It appears that there is empathy between plaintiff and
defendant. That is – a shared feeling which between husband and wife must be experienced
not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion.
Marital union is a two-way process. An expressive interest in each other’s feelings at a time it
is needed by the other can go a long way in deepening the marital relationship. Marriage is
definitely not for children but for two consenting adults who view the relationship with love
"amore gignit amorem", sacrifice and a continuing commitment to compromise conscious of
its value as a sublime social institution (Chi Ming Tsoi vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 324).
This court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which the parties found themselves
trapped in its mire of unfulfilled vows and unconsummated marital obligations, can do no
less, but reverse and set aside the decision of the lower court. Plaintiff Manuel is entitled to
have his marriage declared a nullity on the ground of psychological incapacity, not only of
defendant but also of himself.40
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred –
I. IN ITS FINDINGS THAT PETITIONER JUANITA IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY

INCAPACITATED
II. IN ITS FINDINGS OF FACT THAT PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT SEPARATED ON

MARCH 1997, THE TRUTH IS THAT THEY ARE STILL LIVING TOGETHER AS HUSBAND
AND WIFE AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE PETITION UP TO THE PRESENT
III. WHEN IT DID NOT FOLLOW THE GUIDELINES LAID DOWN BY THE SUPREME
COURT IN THE CASE OF REPUBLIC V. MOLINA
IV. IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF HEREIN PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT NULL

AND VOID ON GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY UNDER ARTICLE 36 OF
THE FAMILY CODE
The Court’s Ruling
Our pronouncement in Republic v. Dagdag41 is apropos. There, we held that whether or not
psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage
depends crucially on the facts of the case. Each case must be closely scrutinized and judged
according to its own facts as there can be no case that is on "all fours" with another. This, the Court
of Appeals did not heed.
The Court of Appeals perfunctorily applied our ruling in Chi Ming Tsoi despite a clear divergence in
its factual milieu with the case at bar. In Chi Ming Tsoi, the couple involved therein, despite sharing
the same bed from the time of their wedding night on 22 May 1988 until their separation on 15 March
1989, never had coitus. The perplexed wife filed the petition for the declaration of the nullity of her
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity of her husband. We sustained the wife for the
reason that an essential marital obligation under the Family Code is procreation such that "the
senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity."
On the other hand, sexual intimacy for procreation is a non-issue herein. Rather, we have here a
case of a husband who is constantly embarrassed by his wife’s outbursts and overbearing ways,
who finds his wife’s obsession with cleanliness and the tight reign on his wallet "irritants" and who is
wounded by her lack of support and respect for his person and his position as a Judge. In our book,
however, these inadequacies of petitioner Juanita which led respondent Manuel to file a case
against her do not amount to psychological incapacity to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
It was in Santos v. Court of Appeals42 where we declared that "psychological incapacity" under
Article 36 of the Family Code is not meant to comprehend all possible cases of psychoses. It should
refer, rather, to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by
the parties to the marriage. Psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b)
juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.43 In Republic v. Court of Appeals44 we expounded:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our Constitution and our laws
cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation of the nation." It decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable," thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state. The Family Code
echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes their
permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: a) medically or clinically
identified, b) alleged in the complaint, c) sufficiently proven by experts and d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be
psychological – not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
The evidence must convince the court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or
physically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no
example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of the
provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the "time of the celebration" of the
marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do’s." The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time, but the
illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore, such incapacity must
be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be accepted as root causes. The illness must be
shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital obligation(s)
must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts.45
With the foregoing pronouncements as compass, we now resolve the issue of whether or not the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity against
petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel.
A. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF RESPONDENT MANUEL
We reiterate that the state has a high stake in the preservation of marriage rooted in its recognition
of the sanctity of married life and its mission to protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution.46 With this cardinal state policy in mind, we held in Republic v. Court of
Appeals47 that the burden of proof to show the nullity of marriage belongs to the plaintiff (respondent
Manuel herein). Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity.
In herein case, the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that respondent Manuel is
psychologically incapacitated. The psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondent Manuel’s
own evidence, contains candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in the best position to
gauge whether or not her husband fulfilled the essential marital obligations of marriage:
She talked about her spouse, "My husband is kind, a good provider, cool, intelligent but a
liar, masamang magalit at gastador. In spite of what he has done to me, I take care of him
whenever he is sick. He is having extra marital affairs because he wants to have a child. I
believe that our biggest problem is not having a child. It is his obsession to have a child with
his girl now. He started his relationship with this girl in 1994. I even saw them together in the
car. I think that it was the girl who encouraged him to file the petition." She feels that the
problems in the relationship is [sic] "paulit-ulit," but, that she still is willing to pursue it.
x x x. Overall, she feels that he is a good spouse and that he is not really psychologically
incapacitated. He apparently told her, "You and Jeremy should give me a chance to have a
new family." She answered and said, "Ikaw tinuruan mo akong to fight for my right.
Ipaglalaban ko ang marriage natin."48
What emerges from the psychological report of Dr. Garcia as well as from the testimonies of the
parties and their witnesses is that the only essential marital obligation which respondent Manuel was
not able to fulfill, if any, is the obligation of fidelity.49 Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not
constitute psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code.50 It must be shown
that respondent Manuel’s unfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality which makes
him completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the marital state51 and not merely
due to his ardent wish to have a child of his own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent Manuel
has admitted that: "I had [extra-marital] affairs because I wanted to have a child at that particular
point."52
B. RE: PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF PETITIONER JUANITA
As aforementioned, the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper

praesumitur pro matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that his wife’s lack
of respect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and her controlling
nature (especially with respect to his salary), and her inability to endear herself to his parents are
grave psychological maladies that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of
marriage. Neither is there any showing that these "defects" were already present at the inception of
the marriage or that they are incurable.53 In fact, Dr. Maaba, whose expertise as a psychiatrist was
admitted by respondent Manuel, reported that petitioner was psychologically capacitated to comply
with the basic and essential obligations of marriage.54
The psychological report of respondent Manuel’s witness, Dr. Garcia, on the other hand, does not
help his case any. Nothing in there supports the doctor’s conclusion that petitioner Juanita is
psychologically incapacitated. On the contrary, the report clearly shows that the root cause of
petitioner Juanita’s behavior is traceable – not from the inception of their marriage as required by law
– but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g., her in-laws’ disapproval of her as they wanted
their son to enter the priesthood,55 her husband’s philandering, admitted no less by him,56 and her
inability to conceive.57 Dr. Garcia’s report paints a story of a husband and wife who grew
professionally during the marriage, who pursued their individual dreams to the hilt, becoming busier
and busier, ultimately sacrificing intimacy and togetherness as a couple. This was confirmed by
respondent Manuel himself during his direct examination.58
Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by both parties, we have been allowed a window into
the Siayngcos’s life and have perceived therefrom a simple case of a married couple drifting apart,
becoming strangers to each other, with the husband consequently falling out of love and wanting a
way out.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. Mere showing of "irreconcilable
differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological incapacity.59 As we
stated in Marcos v. Marcos:60
Article 36 of the Family Code, we stress, is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts
the marital bond at the time the causes therefore manifests themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
We are not downplaying the frustration and misery respondent Manuel might be
experiencing in being shackled, so to speak, to a marriage that is no longer working.
Regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor society can provide the
specific answers to every individual problem.61
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated 01 July 2003 of the
Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated 31 January 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 102 is reinstated and given full force and effect. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
JAIME F. VILLALON, G.R. No. 167206

Petitioner,
Present:
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman),
- versus - Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago,
Carpio, and
Azcuna, JJ.
MA. CORAZON N. VILLALON,
Respondent. Promulgated:
November 18, 2005
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
On July 12, 1996, petitioner Jaime F. Villalon filed a petition[1] for the
annulment of his marriage to respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City where it was docketed as JDRC No. 3917 and
raffled to Branch 69. As ground therefor, petitioner cited his psychological
incapacity which he claimed existed even prior to his marriage.
According to petitioner, the manifestations of his psychological incapacity

were: (a) his chronic refusal to maintain harmonious family relations and his lack of
interest in having a normal married life; (b) his immaturity and irresponsibility in
refusing to accept the essential obligations of marriage as husband to his wife; (c)
his desire for other women and a life unchained from any spousal obligation; and (d)
his false assumption of the fundamental obligations of companionship and
consortium towards respondent. Petitioner thus prayed that his marriage to
respondent be declared null and void ab initio.
On September 25, 1996, respondent filed an answer[2] denying petitioners

allegations. She asserted that her 18-year marriage to petitioner has been fruitful and
characterized by joy, contentment and hopes for more growth in their relationship
and that their marital squabbles were normal based on community standards.
Petitioners success in his professional life aided him in performing his role as
husband, father, and provider. Respondent claimed that petitioners commitment to
his paternal and marital responsibilities was beyond reproach.
On October 7, 1996, the trial court directed the prosecutor to conduct an

investigation on whether there was collusion between the parties.[3] The report
submitted to the trial court stated that there was no such collusion.[4]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) subsequently entered its
appearance in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines[5] and submitted an
opposition[6] to the petition on September 23, 1997. Thereafter, trial on the merits
ensued.
Petitioner testified that he met respondent sometime in the early seventies

when he applied for a job at Metrobank, where respondent was employed as a foreign
exchange trader. They began dating in 1975 and had a romantic relationship soon
thereafter.[7] After going steady for about two years, petitioner and respondent were
married at the San Pancracio Chapel in Paco, Manila on April 22, 1978. Petitioner
claimed that he married respondent because he believed that it was the right time to
raise a family and that she would be a good mother to his children.[8]
In the middle of 1993, petitioner decided to separate from respondent.

According to him, their marriage reached a point where there was no longer any
communication between them and their relationship became devoid of love,
affection, support and respect due to his constant urge to see other
women.[9] Moreover, their relationship tended to be one-sided since respondent was
unresponsive and hardly ever showed her love, needs, wants and emotions.[10]
Petitioner admitted that on certain occasions before his marriage, he had two
girlfriends at the same time. He also saw other women even when he became
engaged to and, later on, married respondent.[11] Respondent learned of his affairs
but reacted in a subdued manner.[12] Petitioner surmised that it was respondents
nature to be silent and withdrawn.[13]
In January 1994, petitioner left the conjugal abode and moved into an
apartment located five to ten minutes away. Before he left, he and his wife spoke to
their three children who, at that time, were 14, 8, and 6 years old,
respectively.[14] Petitioner consulted a child psychologist before talking to his
children.[15] He considered himself as a good and loving father and described his
relationship with the children as great.[16]
Despite the separation, petitioner would regularly visit his children who
stayed with him on alternate weekends. He voluntarily gave monthly support to the
children and paid for their tuition fees. He also shouldered the childrens medical
expenses as well as the maintenance and miscellaneous fees for the conjugal
abode.[17]
Petitioner presented Dr. Natividad Dayan, a clinical psychologist, to testify on

his alleged psychological disorder of Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder
with Casanova Complex. Dr. Dayan described the said disorder as a pervasive
maladaptation in terms of interpersonal and occupational functioning with main
symptoms of grand ideation about oneself, self-centeredness, thinking he is unique
and wanting to always be the one followed, the I personality. A person afflicted with
this disorder believes that he is entitled to gratify his emotional and sexual feelings
and thus engages in serial infidelities. Likewise, a person with Casanova Complex
exhibits habitual adulterous behavior and goes from one relationship to another.[18]
Dr. Dayan submitted a psychological report on both petitioner and respondent

based on clinical interviews and psychological tests.[19]
Respondent testified that she first learned of her husbands infidelity in 1980.
She discovered that he was having an affair with one of her friends who worked as
a trader in her husbands company. The affair was cut short when the woman left for
the United States to work. Eventually, she and petitioner were able to rebuild their
relationship and overcome the crisis.[20]
When asked about the womanizing ways of her husband, respondent averred
that she did not know whether her husbands acts could be deemed womanizing since
there were only two instances of infidelity which occurred 13 years apart.[21] She
also theorized that petitioner wanted to have their marriage annulled so he could
marry her old friend.[22] She stated that she has not closed her doors to petitioner but
the latter would have to give up his extra-marital relationship.[23]
To controvert the findings of petitioners expert witness, respondent presented

a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas, who testified that Dr. Dayans findings were
incomplete because a team approach was necessary in evaluating an individuals
personality. An evaluation of ones psychological capacity requires the expertise of
a psychiatrist and social worker. [24]
Upon order of the trial court, the parties submitted their respective
memoranda.[25] The OSG likewise filed a certification[26] pursuant to Rep. of the
Phils. v. Court of Appeals.[27] In due course, the trial court rendered judgment as
follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage

between petitioner and respondent Ma. Corazon N. Villalon celebrated on April 22,
1978, as null and void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on the
part of the petitioner pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.
Accordingly, the conjugal assets and liabilities are hereby ordered to be

liquidated and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains be effected in
accordance with Article 129 of the Family Code.
As petitioner manifested that he wishes to maintain the custody arrangement

now existing, the custody of the three (3) children Miguel Alberto, Fernando
Alfonso, and Ma. Joanna Victoria shall remain with the respondent subject to
visitation rights of petitioner as may be mutually agreed upon by the parties.
In order to cancel the registration of the Marriage Contract between herein

parties appearing in the Book of Marriage of the city of Manila, let copies of this
Decision be furnished to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila as well as the National
Census and Statistics Office (NCSO), CRD Legal Department, EDSA, Quezon
City.
SO ORDERED.[28]
Respondent and the OSG seasonably filed an appeal from the decision of the
trial court, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74354. On March 23, 2004, the Court of
Appeals rendered a Decision, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated
November 12, 2001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new judgment entered
DISMISSING the petitioners petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[29]
Contrary to the trial courts findings, the appellate court held that petitioner
failed to prove the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of his alleged
psychological incapacity. Although Dr. Dayan testified that petitioners
psychological incapacity preceded the marriage, she failed to give sufficient basis
for such a finding. Dr. Dayan also stated that parental marital instability was the root
cause of petitioners psychological incapacity but failed to elaborate thereon or link
the two variables. Moreover, petitioners sexual infidelity was made to appear as
symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder when, in reality, the same merely
resulted from a general dissatisfaction with the marriage.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision

which was denied in an order dated October 28, 2004. [30] Thus, petitioner took this
recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, asserting that the Court of Appeals
erred in finding that he failed to prove his psychological incapacity under Article 36
of the Family Code.
The petition has no merit.
The totality of the evidence in this case does not support a finding that
petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations. On the
contrary, what is evident is the fact that petitioner was a good husband to respondent
for a substantial period of time prior to their separation, a loving father to their
children and a good provider of the family. Although he engaged in marital infidelity
in at least two occasions, the same does not appear to be symptomatic of a grave
psychological disorder which rendered him incapable of performing his spousal
obligations. The same appears as the result of a general dissatisfaction with his
marriage rather than a psychological disorder rooted in petitioners personal history.
In Santos v. Court of Appeals,[31] the court held that psychological incapacity,

as a ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage, must be characterized by
juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability.[32] It should
... [R]efer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party to
be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. There is hardly any
doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated....[33]
In the case at bar, although Dr. Dayan testified that petitioner suffered from
Narcissistic Histrionic Personality Disorder with Casanova Complex even before the
marriage and thus had the tendency to cheat on his wife, such conclusion was not
sufficiently backed by concrete evidence showing that petitioner indeed had several
affairs and finds it difficult to be faithful. Except for petitioners general claim that
on certain occasions he had two girlfriends at the same time, no details or
explanations were given of such circumstances that would demonstrate petitioners
inability to be faithful to respondent either before or at the time of the celebration of
their marriage.
Similarly, we agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner failed to establish
the incurability and gravity of his alleged psychological disorder. While Dr. Dayan
described the symptoms of one afflicted with Narcissistic Histrionic Personality
Disorder as self-centered, characterized by grandiose ideation and lack of empathy
in relating to others, and one with Casanova Complex as a serial adulterer, the
evidence on record betrays the presence of any of these symptoms.
Moreover, we are not convinced that petitioner is a serial or habitual adulterer,

as he wants the court to believe. As stated by respondent herself, it cannot be said
that two instances of infidelity which occurred 13 years apart could be deemed
womanizing, especially considering that these instances involved the same woman.
In fact, at the time of respondents testimony, petitioners illicit relationship has been
going on for six years. This is not consistent with the symptoms of a person suffering
from Casanova Complex who, according to Dr. Dayan, is one who jumps from one
relationship to another.
Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof that petitioner is suffering

from psychological incapacity. It must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make petitioner completely unable
to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.[34] The evidence on record fails to
convince us that petitioners marital indiscretions are symptomatic of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the evidence
reveals that petitioner was a good husband most of the time when he was living with
respondent, a loving father to his children as well as a good provider.
In Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,[35] we held that the cause of the
alleged psychological incapacity must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Further
The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal,

neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral element in the
personality structure that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.[36]
In the instant case, it appears that petitioner has simply lost his love for
respondent and has consequently refused to stay married to her. As revealed by his
own testimony, petitioner felt that he was no longer part of respondents life and that
the latter did not need or want him.[37] Respondents uncommunicative and
withdrawn nature apparently led to petitioners discontentment with the marital
relationship.
However, as held in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals,[38] refusal to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage is not psychological incapacity
within the meaning of the law. The policy of the State is to protect and strengthen
the family as the basic social institution and marriage is the foundation of the family.
Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of validity of the marriage.[39]
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The March 23, 2004 Decision of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74354 and its October 28, 2004 Resolution,
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice
[1]
RTC Records, pp. 1-4.
[2]
Id. at 21-26.
[3]
Id. at 27.
[4]
Id. at 28.
[5]
Id. at 73.
[6]
Id. at 69-72.
[7]
TSN, October 22, 1997, pp. 9-10.
[8]
Id. at 34.
[9]
Id. at 13, 14 & 16.
[10]
Id. at 19, 20 & 24.
[11]
Id. at 17-18.
[12]
Id. at 26, 28.
[13]
Id. at 30.
[14]
Id. at 49.
[15]
Id.
[16]
TSN, November 19, 1997, p. 7.
[17]
Id. at 24.
[18]
TSN, August 19, 1998, pp. 12-14.
[19]
Rollo, pp. 104-134.
[20]
TSN, February 16, 2000, pp. 8-12.
[21]
Id. at 36.
[22]
Id. at 26.
[23]
Id. at 31.
[24]
TSN, October 1, 1999, pp. 7-16.
[25]
RTC Records, pp. 374-393 & 401-407.
[26]
Id. at 418-423.
[27]
335 Phil. 664 (1997).
[28]
Rollo, p. 103. Penned by Judge Lorifel Lacap Pahimna.
[29]
Id. at 82. Penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and concurred in by Associate Justices Jose L.
Sabio, Jr. and Hakim S. Abdulwahid.
[30]
Id. at 84.
[31]
310 Phil. 21 (1995).
[32]
Id. at 39.
[33]
Id. at 40.
[34]
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 919, 931-932 (1999).
[35]
Supra.
[36]
Id. at 678.
[37]
TSN, October 22, 1997, p. 30.
[38]
Supra.
[39]
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals, supra at 932.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 162368 July 17, 2006
MA. ARMIDA PEREZ-FERRARIS, petitioner,

vs.
BRIX FERRARIS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
This resolves the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Ma. Armida Perez-Ferraris of the
Resolution dated June 9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari of the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2003 and February 24, 2004, respectively, for
failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error.
On February 20, 2001, the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 151 rendered a
Decision1 denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage with Brix Ferraris. The
trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to prove infidelity.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order2 dated April 20, 2001 where the trial
court reiterated that there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an
extent that he could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed3 in toto the judgment of the trial court. It
held that the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity or that his "defects" were incurable and already present at the inception of
the marriage.4 The Court of Appeals also found that Dr. Dayan's testimony failed to establish the
substance of respondent's psychological incapacity; that she failed to explain how she arrived at the
conclusion that the respondent has a mixed personality disorder; that she failed to clearly
demonstrate that there was a natal or supervening disabling factor or an adverse integral element in
respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting and complying with the
essential marital obligations.5
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied6 for lack of merit; thus, she filed a petition for
review on certiorari with this Court. As already stated, the petition for review was denied for failure of
petitioner to show that the appellate tribunal committed any reversible error.
Petitioner filed the instant motion for reconsideration.7 The Court required respondent Brix Ferraris to
file comment8 but failed to comply; thus, he is deemed to have waived the opportunity to file
comment. Further, the Court directed the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to comment on
petitioner's motion for reconsideration which it complied on March 2, 2006.
After considering the arguments of both the petitioner and the OSG, the Court resolves to deny
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of
marriage depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case.9 Such factual
issue, however, is beyond the province of this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to
analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises supportive of such factual
determination.10 It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court,11 save for the most compelling and cogent
reasons, like when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary
to the admissions of the parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts,12 which are
unavailing in the instant case.
The term "psychological incapacity" to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
the marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties
and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.13 As all people may have
certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality
disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning
of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative
of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.14 It is for this
reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the human
personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained,15 which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Simply put, the chief and basic consideration in the resolution of marital annulment cases is
the presence of evidence that can adequately establish respondent's psychological
condition. Here, appellant contends that there is such evidence. We do not agree. Indeed,
the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity. There is absolutely no showing that his "defects" were already
present at the inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable.
Quite apart from being plainly self-serving, petitioner's evidence showed that respondent's
alleged failure to perform his so-called marital obligations was not at all a manifestation of
some deep-seated, grave, permanent and incurable psychological malady. To be sure, the
couple's relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a
year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, petitioner was happy
and contented with her life in the company of respondent. In fact, by petitioner's own
reckoning, respondent was a responsible and loving husband. x x x. Their problems began
when petitioner started doubting respondent's fidelity. It was only when they started fighting
about the calls from women that respondent began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and
failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Respondent could not understand
petitioner's lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions
irrational. Respondent could not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. x x x.
xxxx
At any rate, Dr. Dayan did not explain how she arrived at her diagnosis that respondent has
a mixed personality disorder called "schizoid," and why he is the "dependent and avoidant
type." In fact, Dr. Dayan's statement that one suffering from such mixed personality disorder
is dependent on others for decision x x x lacks specificity; it seems to belong to the realm of
theoretical speculation. Also, Dr. Dayan's information that respondent had extramarital affairs
was supplied by the petitioner herself. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of
respondent's alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayan's answer was vague, evasive and
inconclusive. She replied that such disorder "can be part of his family upbringing" x x x. She
stated that there was a history of respondent's parents having difficulties in their relationship.
But this input on the supposed problematic history of respondent's parents also came from
petitioner. Nor did Dr. Dayan clearly demonstrate that there was really "a natal or
supervening disabling factor" on the part of respondent, or an "adverse integral element" in
respondent's character that effectively incapacitated him from accepting, and, thereby
complying with, the essential marital obligations. Of course, petitioner likewise failed to prove
that respondent's supposed psychological or mental malady existed even before the
marriage. All these omissions must be held up against petitioner, for the reason that upon
her devolved the onus of establishing nullity of the marriage. Indeed, any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage and the indissolubility of the marital
vinculum.16
We find respondent's alleged mixed personality disorder, the "leaving-the-house" attitude whenever
they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment
and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are
not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to
assume the essential obligations of marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals,17 where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with his
friends than his family on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid and
assistance, and was dishonest to his wife regarding his finances, the Court held that the
psychological defects spoken of were more of a "difficulty," if not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the
performance of some marital obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and
conflicting personalities in no wise constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that
the parties failed to meet their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they
must be shown to be incapable of doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
Also, we held in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals18 that habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or
perversion, and abandonment do not by themselves constitute grounds for declaring a marriage void
based on psychological incapacity.
While petitioner's marriage with the respondent failed and appears to be without hope of
reconciliation, the remedy however is not always to have it declared void ab initio on the ground of
psychological incapacity. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage.19 No
less than the Constitution recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees
marriage as legally "inviolable" and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the
family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.20
Thus, in determining the import of "psychological incapacity" under Article 36, it must be read in
conjunction with, although to be taken as distinct from Articles 35,21 37,22 38,23 and 4124 that would
likewise, but for different reasons, render the marriage void ab initio, or Article 4525 that would make
the marriage merely voidable, or Article 55 that could justify a petition for legal separation. Care must
be observed so that these various circumstances are not applied so indiscriminately as if the law
were indifferent on the matter.26 Article 36 should not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the
marital bond at the time the causes therefor manifest themselves.27 Neither it is to be equated with
legal separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted in psychological incapacity but on physical
violence, moral pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism,
sexual infidelity, abandonment and the like.28
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated June
9, 2004 denying the petition for review on certiorari for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show
that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error, is DENIED WITH FINALITY.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155800 March 10, 2006
LEONILO ANTONIO Petitioner,

vs.
MARIE IVONNE F. REYES, Respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Statistics never lie, but lovers often do, quipped a sage. This sad truth has unsettled many a love
transformed into matrimony. Any sort of deception between spouses, no matter the gravity, is always
disquieting. Deceit to the depth and breadth unveiled in the following pages, dark and irrational as in
the modern noir tale, dims any trace of certitude on the guilty spouse’s capability to fulfill the marital
obligations even more.
The Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
dated 29 November 2001 and 24 October 2002. The Court of Appeals had reversed the judgment3 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati declaring the marriage of Leonilo N. Antonio (petitioner)
and Marie Ivonne F. Reyes (respondent), null and void. After careful consideration, we reverse and
affirm instead the trial court.
Antecedent Facts
Petitioner and respondent met in August 1989 when petitioner was 26 years old and respondent was
36 years of age. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married before a minister of the
Gospel4 at the Manila City Hall, and through a subsequent church wedding5 at the Sta. Rosa de Lima
Parish, Bagong Ilog, Pasig, Metro Manila on 6 December 1990.6 Out of their union, a child was born
on 19 April 1991, who sadly died five (5) months later.
On 8 March 1993,7 petitioner filed a petition to have his marriage to respondent declared null and
void. He anchored his petition for nullity on Article 36 of the Family Code alleging that respondent
was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. He asserted
that respondent’s incapacity existed at the time their marriage was celebrated and still subsists up to
the present.8
As manifestations of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity, petitioner claimed that

respondent persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income,
educational attainment and other events or things, 9 to wit:
(1) She concealed the fact that she previously gave birth to an illegitimate son,10 and instead
introduced the boy to petitioner as the adopted child of her family. She only confessed the truth
about the boy’s parentage when petitioner learned about it from other sources after their marriage.11
(2) She fabricated a story that her brother-in-law, Edwin David, attempted to rape and kill her when
in fact, no such incident occurred.12
(3) She misrepresented herself as a psychiatrist to her obstetrician, Dr. Consuelo Gardiner, and told
some of her friends that she graduated with a degree in psychology, when she was neither.13
(4) She claimed to be a singer or a free-lance voice talent affiliated with Blackgold Recording
Company (Blackgold); yet, not a single member of her family ever witnessed her alleged singing
activities with the group. In the same vein, she postulated that a luncheon show was held at the
Philippine Village Hotel in her honor and even presented an invitation to that effect14 but petitioner
discovered per certification by the Director of Sales of said hotel that no such occasion had taken
place.15
(5) She invented friends named Babes Santos and Via Marquez, and under those names, sent
lengthy letters to petitioner claiming to be from Blackgold and touting her as the "number one
moneymaker" in the commercial industry worth P2 million.16 Petitioner later found out that
respondent herself was the one who wrote and sent the letters to him when she admitted the truth in
one of their quarrels.17 He likewise realized that Babes Santos and Via Marquez were only figments
of her imagination when he discovered they were not known in or connected with Blackgold.18
(6) She represented herself as a person of greater means, thus, she altered her payslip to make it
appear that she earned a higher income. She bought a sala set from a public market but told
petitioner that she acquired it from a famous furniture dealer.19 She spent lavishly on unnecessary
items and ended up borrowing money from other people on false pretexts.20
(7) She exhibited insecurities and jealousies over him to the extent of calling up his officemates to
monitor his whereabouts. When he could no longer take her unusual behavior, he separated from
her in August 1991. He tried to attempt a reconciliation but since her behavior did not change, he
finally left her for good in November 1991.21
In support of his petition, petitioner presented Dr. Dante Herrera Abcede (Dr. Abcede), a psychiatrist,
and Dr. Arnulfo V.
Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a clinical psychologist, who stated, based on the tests they conducted, that
petitioner was essentially a normal, introspective, shy and conservative type of person. On the other
hand, they observed that respondent’s persistent and constant lying
to petitioner was abnormal or pathological. It undermined the basic relationship that should be based
on love, trust and respect.22 They further asserted that respondent’s extreme jealousy was also
pathological. It reached the point of paranoia since there was no actual basis for her to suspect that
petitioner was having an affair with another woman. They concluded based on the foregoing that
respondent was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.23
In opposing the petition, respondent claimed that she performed her marital obligations by attending
to all the needs of her husband. She asserted that there was no truth to the allegation that she
fabricated stories, told lies and invented personalities.24 She presented her version, thus:
(1) She concealed her child by another man from petitioner because she was afraid of losing her
husband.25
(2) She told petitioner about David’s attempt to rape and kill her because she surmised such intent
from David’s act of touching her back and ogling her from head to foot.26
(3) She was actually a BS Banking and Finance graduate and had been teaching psychology at the
Pasig Catholic School for two (2) years.27
(4) She was a free-lance voice talent of Aris de las Alas, an executive producer of Channel 9 and
she had done three (3) commercials with McCann Erickson for the advertisement of Coca-cola,
Johnson & Johnson, and Traders Royal Bank. She told petitioner she was a Blackgold recording
artist although she was not under contract with the company, yet she reported to the Blackgold office
after office hours. She claimed that a luncheon show was indeed held in her honor at the Philippine
Village Hotel on 8 December 1979.28
(5) She vowed that the letters sent to petitioner were not written by her and the writers thereof were
not fictitious. Bea Marquez Recto of the Recto political clan was a resident of the United States while
Babes Santos was employed with Saniwares.29
(6) She admitted that she called up an officemate of her husband but averred that she merely asked
the latter in a diplomatic matter if she was the one asking for chocolates from petitioner, and not to
monitor her husband’s whereabouts.30
(7) She belied the allegation that she spent lavishly as she supported almost ten people from her
monthly budget of P7,000.00.31
In fine, respondent argued that apart from her non-disclosure of a child prior to their marriage, the
other lies attributed to her by petitioner were mostly hearsay and unconvincing. Her stance was that
the totality of the evidence presented is not sufficient for a finding of psychological incapacity on her
part.32
In addition, respondent presented Dr. Antonio Efren Reyes (Dr. Reyes), a psychiatrist, to refute the
allegations anent her psychological condition. Dr. Reyes testified that the series of tests conducted
by his assistant,33together with the screening procedures and the Comprehensive Psycho-
Pathological Rating Scale (CPRS) he himself conducted, led him to conclude that respondent was
not psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. He postulated that
regressive behavior, gross neuroticism, psychotic tendencies, and poor control of impulses, which
are signs that might point to the presence of disabling trends, were not elicited from respondent.34
In rebuttal, Dr. Lopez asseverated that there were flaws in the evaluation conducted by Dr. Reyes as
(i) he was not the one who administered and interpreted respondent’s psychological evaluation, and
(ii) he made use of only one instrument called CPRS which was not reliable because a good liar can
fake the results of such test.35
After trial, the lower court gave credence to petitioner’s evidence and held that respondent’s
propensity to lying about almost anything−her occupation, state of health, singing abilities and her
income, among others−had been duly established. According to the trial court, respondent’s fantastic
ability to invent and fabricate stories and personalities enabled her to live in a world of make-believe.
This made her psychologically incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and
significance to her marriage.36 The trial court thus declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void.
Shortly before the trial court rendered its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of
Manila annulled the Catholic marriage of the parties, on the ground of lack of due discretion on the
part of the parties.37 During the pendency of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, the Metropolitan
Tribunal’s ruling was affirmed with modification by both the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal,
which held instead that only respondent was impaired by a lack of due discretion.38 Subsequently,
the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal was upheld by the Roman Rota of the
Vatican.39
Petitioner duly alerted the Court of Appeals of these rulings by the Catholic tribunals. Still, the
appellate court reversed the RTC’s judgment. While conceding that respondent may not have been
completely honest with petitioner, the Court of Appeals nevertheless held that the totality of the
evidence presented was insufficient to establish respondent’s psychological incapacity. It declared
that the requirements in the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals40 governing the application and
interpretation of psychological incapacity had not been satisfied.
Taking exception to the appellate court’s pronouncement, petitioner elevated the case to this Court.
He contends herein that the evidence conclusively establish respondent’s psychological incapacity.
In considering the merit of this petition, the Court is heavily influenced by the credence accorded by
the RTC to the factual allegations of petitioner.41 It is a settled principle of civil procedure that the
conclusions of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses are entitled to great respect from
the appellate courts because the trial court had an opportunity to observe the demeanor of
witnesses while giving testimony which may indicate their candor or lack thereof.42 The Court is
likewise guided by the fact that the Court of Appeals did not dispute the veracity of the evidence
presented by petitioner. Instead, the appellate court concluded that such evidence was not sufficient
to establish the psychological incapacity of respondent.43
Thus, the Court is impelled to accept the factual version of petitioner as the operative facts. Still, the
crucial question remains as to whether the state of facts as presented by petitioner sufficiently meets
the standards set for the declaration of nullity of a marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
These standards were definitively laid down in the Court’s 1997 ruling in Republic v. Court of
Appeals44 (also known as the Molina case45), and indeed the Court of Appeals cited
the Molina guidelines in reversing the RTC in the case at bar.46 Since Molinawas decided in 1997,
the Supreme Court has yet to squarely affirm the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code.47 In fact, even before Molina was handed down, there was only one case, Chi Ming
Tsoi v. Court of Appeals,48 wherein the Court definitively concluded that a spouse was
psychologically incapacitated under Article 36.
This state of jurisprudential affairs may have led to the misperception that the remedy afforded by
Article 36 of the Family Code is hollow, insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned.49 Yet
what Molina and the succeeding cases did ordain was a set of guidelines which, while undoubtedly
onerous on the petitioner seeking the declaration of nullity, still leave room for a decree of nullity
under the proper circumstances. Molina did not foreclose the grant of a decree of nullity under Article
36, even as it raised the bar for its allowance.
Legal Guides to Understanding Article 36
Article 36 of the Family Code states that "[a] marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization."50 The concept of psychological incapacity as a ground for nullity of marriage is novel
in our body of laws, although mental incapacity has long been recognized as a ground for the
dissolution of a marriage.
The Spanish Civil Code of 1889 prohibited from contracting marriage persons "who are not in the full
enjoyment of their reason at the time of contracting marriage."51 Marriages with such persons were
ordained as void,52 in the same class as marriages with underage parties and persons already
married, among others. A party’s mental capacity was not a ground for divorce under the Divorce
Law of 1917,53 but a marriage where "either party was of unsound mind" at the time of its celebration
was cited as an "annullable marriage" under the Marriage Law of 1929.54 Divorce on the ground of a
spouse’s incurable insanity was permitted under the divorce law enacted during the Japanese
occupation.55 Upon the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950, a marriage contracted by a party of
"unsound mind" was classified under Article 85 of the Civil Code as a voidable marriage.56 The
mental capacity, or lack thereof, of the marrying spouse was not among the grounds for declaring a
marriage void ab initio.57 Similarly, among the marriages classified as voidable under Article 45 (2) of
the Family Code is one contracted by a party of unsound mind.58
Such cause for the annulment of marriage is recognized as a vice of consent, just like insanity
impinges on consent freely given which is one of the essential requisites of a contract.59 The initial
common consensus on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code was that it did
not constitute a specie of vice of consent. Justices Sempio-Diy and Caguioa, both members of the
Family Code revision committee that drafted the Code, have opined that psychological incapacity is
not a vice of consent, and conceded that the spouse may have given free and voluntary consent to a
marriage but was nonetheless incapable of fulfilling such rights and obligations.60 Dr. Tolentino
likewise stated in the 1990 edition of his commentaries on the Family Code that this "psychological
incapacity to comply with the essential marital obligations does not affect the consent to the
marriage."61
There were initial criticisms of this original understanding of Article 36 as phrased by the Family
Code committee. Tolentino opined that "psychologically incapacity to comply would not be
juridically different from physical incapacity of consummating the marriage, which makes the
marriage only voidable under Article 45 (5) of the Civil Code x x x [and thus] should have been a
cause for annulment of the marriage only."62 At the same time, Tolentino noted "[it] would be different
if it were psychological incapacity to understand the essential marital obligations, because then this
would amount to lack of consent to the marriage."63 These concerns though were answered,
beginning with Santos v. Court of Appeals,64 wherein the Court, through Justice Vitug, acknowledged
that "psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage."65
The notion that psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of
marriage, as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them, was further affirmed in
the Molina66 case. Therein, the Court, through then Justice (now Chief Justice) Panganiban
observed that "[t]he evidence [to establish psychological incapacity] must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such extent that the person could not have
known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereto."67 Jurisprudence since then has recognized that psychological incapacity "is a malady so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about to assume."68
It might seem that this present understanding of psychological incapacity deviates from the literal
wording of Article 36, with its central phase reading "psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations of marriage."69 At the same time, it has been consistently
recognized by this Court that the intent of the Family Code committee was to design the law as to
allow some resiliency in its application, by avoiding specific examples that would limit the
applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis. Rather, the preference of the
revision committee was for "the judge to interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, in the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals which, although not binding on
the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the provision was taken from Canon Law."70
We likewise observed in Republic v. Dagdag:71
Whether or not psychological incapacity exists in a given case calling for annulment of a marriage,
depends crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the case. Each case must be
judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its
own facts. In regard to psychological incapacity as a ground for annulment of marriage, it is trite to
say that no case is on "all fours" with another case. The trial judge must take pains in examining the
factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court.72
The Court thus acknowledges that the definition of psychological incapacity, as intended by the
revision committee, was not cast in intractable specifics. Judicial understanding of psychological
incapacity may be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars of each case,
current trends in psychological and even canonical thought, and experience. It is under the auspices
of the deliberate ambiguity of the framers that the Court has developed the Molina rules, which have
been consistently applied since 1997. Molina has proven indubitably useful in providing a unitary
framework that guides courts in adjudicating petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. At the
same time, the Molina guidelines are not set in stone, the clear legislative intent mandating a case-
to-case perception of each situation, and Molina itself arising from this evolutionary understanding of
Article 36. There is no cause to disavow Molina at present, and indeed the disposition of this case
shall rely primarily on that precedent. There is need though to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36.
Of particular notice has been the citation of the Court, first in Santos then in Molina, of the
considered opinion of canon law experts in the interpretation of psychological incapacity. This is but
unavoidable, considering that the Family Code committee had bluntly acknowledged that the
concept of psychological incapacity was derived from canon law,73 and as one member admitted,
enacted as a solution to the problem of marriages already annulled by the Catholic Church but still
existent under civil law.74 It would be disingenuous to disregard the influence of Catholic Church
doctrine in the formulation and subsequent understanding of Article 36, and the Court has expressly
acknowledged that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the local
Church, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.75 Still, it must
be emphasized that the Catholic Church is hardly the sole source of influence in the interpretation of
Article 36. Even though the concept may have been derived from canon law, its incorporation into
the Family Code and subsequent judicial interpretation occurred in wholly secular progression.
Indeed, while Church thought on psychological incapacity is merely persuasive on the trial courts,
judicial decisions of this Court interpreting psychological incapacity are binding on lower courts.76
Now is also opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the adjudication
of petitions for declaration of nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in
denying petitions of the kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution,
which respectively state that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total developmen[t]," and
that "[m]arriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State." These provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional
protection accorded to the institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a
social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define
all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on
whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that
such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the
case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect
marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the
Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects,
imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a
petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such
action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained
decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need
not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for
declaration of nullity.
Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a psychologically

incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this constitutional protection
of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the foundation of the family,
which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a corresponding interest for the State to
defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life. Void ab initio marriages under Article 36
do not further the initiatives of the State concerning marriage and family, as they promote wedlock
among persons who, for reasons independent of their will, are not capacitated to understand or
comply with the essential obligations of marriage.
These are the legal premises that inform us as we decide the present petition.
Molina Guidelines As Applied in This Case

As stated earlier, Molina established the guidelines presently recognized in the judicial disposition of
petitions for nullity under Article 36. The Court has consistently applied Molina since its promulgation
in 1997, and the guidelines therein operate as the general rules. They warrant citation in full:
1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected"’ by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically
psychological–not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.

marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but not
be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the

decision.
7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church
in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our
courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the essential
obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with
the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such harmonization, great
persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally—subject to our law
on evidence—what is decreed as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.77
Molina had provided for an additional requirement that the Solicitor General issue a certification
stating his reasons for his agreement or opposition to the petition.78 This requirement however was
dispensed with following the implementation of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages.79 Still, Article 48 of the
Family Code mandates that the appearance of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned be on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Obviously, collusion is not an issue in this case,
considering the consistent vigorous opposition of respondent to the petition for declaration of nullity.
In any event, the fiscal’s participation in the hearings before the trial court is extant from the records
of this case.
As earlier noted, the factual findings of the RTC are now deemed binding on this Court, owing to the
great weight accorded to the opinion of the primary trier of facts, and the refusal of the Court of
Appeals to dispute the veracity of these facts. As such, it must be considered that respondent had
consistently lied about many material aspects as to her character and personality. The question
remains whether her pattern of fabrication sufficiently establishes her psychological incapacity,
consistent with Article 36 and generally, the Molina guidelines.
We find that the present case sufficiently satisfies the guidelines in Molina.
First. Petitioner had sufficiently overcome his burden in proving the psychological incapacity of his
spouse. Apart from his own testimony, he presented witnesses who corroborated his allegations on
his wife’s behavior, and certifications from Blackgold Records and the Philippine Village Hotel
Pavillon which disputed respondent’s claims pertinent to her alleged singing career. He also
presented two (2) expert witnesses from the field of psychology who testified that the aberrant
behavior of respondent was tantamount to psychological incapacity. In any event, both courts below
considered petitioner’s evidence as credible enough. Even the appellate court acknowledged that
respondent was not totally honest with petitioner.80
As in all civil matters, the petitioner in an action for declaration of nullity under Article 36 must be
able to establish the cause of action with a preponderance of evidence. However, since the action
cannot be considered as a non-public matter between private parties, but is impressed with State
interest, the Family Code likewise requires the participation of the State, through the prosecuting
attorney, fiscal, or Solicitor General, to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to
take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. Thus, even if the petitioner is able establish
the psychological incapacity of respondent with preponderant evidence, any finding of collusion
among the parties would necessarily negate such proofs.
Second. The root cause of respondent’s psychological incapacity has been medically or clinically
identified, alleged in the complaint, sufficiently proven by experts, and clearly explained in the trial
court’s decision. The initiatory complaint alleged that respondent, from the start, had exhibited
unusual and abnormal behavior "of peren[n]ially telling lies, fabricating ridiculous stories, and
inventing personalities and situations," of writing letters to petitioner using fictitious names, and of
lying about her actual occupation, income, educational attainment, and family background, among
others.81
These allegations, initially characterized in generalities, were further linked to medical or clinical
causes by expert witnesses from the field of psychology. Petitioner presented two (2) such
witnesses in particular. Dr. Abcede, a psychiatrist who had headed the department of psychiatry of
at least two (2) major hospitals,82 testified as follows:
WITNESS:
Given that as a fact, which is only based on the affidavit provided to me, I can say that there are a
couple of things that [are] terribly wrong with the standards. There are a couple of things that seems
(sic) to be repeated over and over again in the affidavit. One of which is the persistent, constant and
repeated lying of the "respondent"; which, I think, based on assessment of normal behavior of an
individual, is abnormal or pathological. x x x
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that because of these actuations of the respondent she is then
incapable of performing the basic obligations of her marriage?
A- Well, persistent lying violates the respect that one owes towards another. The lack of concern, the
lack of love towards the person, and it is also something that endangers human relationship. You
see, relationship is based on communication between individuals and what we generally
communicate are our thoughts and feelings. But then when one talks and expresse[s] their feelings,
[you] are expected to tell the truth. And therefore, if you constantly lie, what do you think is going to
happen as far as this relationship is concerned. Therefore, it undermines that basic relationship that
should be based on love, trust and respect.
Q- Would you say then, Mr. witness, that due to the behavior of the respondent in constantly lying
and fabricating stories, she is then incapable of performing the basic obligations of the marriage?
xxx
ATTY. RAZ: (Back to the witness)
Q- Mr. witness, based on the testimony of Mr. Levy Mendoza, who is the third witness for the
petitioner, testified that the respondent has been calling up the petitioner’s officemates and ask him
(sic) on the activities of the petitioner and ask him on the behavior of the petitioner. And this is
specifically stated on page six (6) of the transcript of stenographic notes, what can you say about
this, Mr. witness?
A- If an individual is jealous enough to the point that he is paranoid, which means that there is no
actual basis on her suspect (sic) that her husband is having an affair with a woman, if carried on to
the extreme, then that is pathological. That is not abnormal. We all feel jealous, in the same way as
we also lie every now and then; but everything that is carried out in extreme is abnormal or
pathological. If there is no basis in reality to the fact that the husband is having an affair with another
woman and if she persistently believes that the husband is having an affair with different women,
then that is pathological and we call that paranoid jealousy.
Q- Now, if a person is in paranoid jealousy, would she be considered psychologically incapacitated

to perform the basic obligations of the marriage?
A- Yes, Ma’am.83
The other witness, Dr. Lopez, was presented to establish not only the psychological incapacity of
respondent, but also the psychological capacity of petitioner. He concluded that respondent "is [a]
pathological liar, that [she continues] to lie [and] she loves to fabricate about herself."84
These two witnesses based their conclusions of psychological incapacity on the case record,
particularly the trial transcripts of respondent’s testimony, as well as the supporting affidavits of
petitioner. While these witnesses did not personally examine respondent, the Court had already held
in Marcos v. Marcos85 that personal examination of the subject by the physician is not required for
the spouse to be declared psychologically incapacitated.86 We deem the methodology utilized by
petitioner’s witnesses as sufficient basis for their medical conclusions. Admittedly, Drs. Abcede and
Lopez’s common conclusion of respondent’s psychological incapacity hinged heavily on their own
acceptance of petitioner’s version as the true set of facts. However, since the trial court itself
accepted the veracity of petitioner’s factual premises, there is no cause to dispute the conclusion of
psychological incapacity drawn therefrom by petitioner’s expert witnesses.
Also, with the totality of the evidence presented as basis, the trial court explicated its finding of
psychological incapacity in its decision in this wise:
To the mind of the Court, all of the above are indications that respondent is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential obligations of marriage. It has been shown clearly from her
actuations that respondent has that propensity for telling lies about almost anything, be it her
occupation, her state of health, her singing abilities, her income, etc. She has this fantastic ability to
invent and fabricate stories and personalities. She practically lived in a world of make believe making
her therefore not in a position to give meaning and significance to her marriage to petitioner. In
persistently and constantly lying to petitioner, respondent undermined the basic tenets of relationship
between spouses that is based on love, trust and respect. As concluded by the psychiatrist
presented by petitioner, such repeated lying is abnormal and pathological and amounts to
psychological incapacity.87
Third. Respondent’s psychological incapacity was established to have clearly existed at the time of
and even before the celebration of marriage. She fabricated friends and made up letters from
fictitious characters well before she married petitioner. Likewise, she kept petitioner in the dark about
her natural child’s real parentage as she only confessed when the latter had found out the truth after
their marriage.
Fourth. The gravity of respondent’s psychological incapacity is sufficient to prove her disability to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. It is immediately discernible that the parties had
shared only a little over a year of cohabitation before the exasperated petitioner left his wife.
Whatever such circumstance speaks of the degree of tolerance of petitioner, it likewise supports the
belief that respondent’s psychological incapacity, as borne by the record, was so grave in extent that
any prolonged marital life was dubitable.
It should be noted that the lies attributed to respondent were not adopted as false pretenses in order
to induce petitioner into marriage. More disturbingly, they indicate a failure on the part of respondent
to distinguish truth from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. Petitioner’s witnesses and the trial court
were emphatic on respondent’s inveterate proclivity to telling lies and the pathologic nature of her
mistruths, which according to them, were revelatory of respondent’s inability to understand and
perform the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, a person unable to distinguish between
fantasy and reality would similarly be unable to comprehend the legal nature of the marital bond,
much less its psychic meaning, and the corresponding obligations attached to marriage, including
parenting. One unable to adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to any legal or
emotional commitments.
The Court of Appeals somehow concluded that since respondent allegedly tried her best to effect a
reconciliation, she had amply exhibited her ability to perform her marital obligations. We are not
convinced. Given the nature of her psychological condition, her willingness to remain in the marriage
hardly banishes nay extenuates her lack of capacity to fulfill the essential marital obligations.
Respondent’s ability to even comprehend what the essential marital obligations are is impaired at
best. Considering that the evidence convincingly disputes respondent’s ability to adhere to the truth,
her avowals as to her commitment to the marriage cannot be accorded much credence.
At this point, it is worth considering Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a marriage
may be annulled if the consent of either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which
enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article, clarifies that "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such
fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of marriage." It would be improper to draw
linkages between misrepresentations made by respondent and the misrepresentations under
Articles 45 (3) and 46. The fraud under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is lied to,
and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of
respondent point to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations, kindred to
psychological incapacity under Article 36.
Fifth. Respondent is evidently unable to comply with the essential marital obligations as embraced
by Articles 68 to 71 of the Family Code. Article 68, in particular, enjoins the spouses to live together,
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. As noted by the trial
court, it is difficult to see how an inveterate pathological liar would be able to commit to the basic
tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect.
Sixth. The Court of Appeals clearly erred when it failed to take into consideration the fact that the
marriage of the parties was annulled by the Catholic Church. The appellate court apparently deemed
this detail totally inconsequential as no reference was made to it anywhere in the assailed decision
despite petitioner’s efforts to bring the matter to its attention.88 Such deliberate ignorance is in
contravention of Molina, which held that interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.
As noted earlier, the Metropolitan Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila decreed the invalidity of the
marriage in question in a Conclusion89 dated 30 March 1995, citing the "lack of due discretion" on the
part of respondent.90Such decree of nullity was affirmed by both the National Appellate Matrimonial
Tribunal,91 and the Roman Rota of the Vatican.92 In fact, respondent’s psychological incapacity was
considered so grave that a restrictive clause93was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibiting
respondent from contracting another marriage without the Tribunal’s consent.
In its Decision dated 4 June 1995, the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal pronounced:
The JURISRPRUDENCE in the Case maintains that matrimonial consent is considered ontologically
defective and wherefore judicially ineffective when elicited by a Part Contractant in possession and
employ of a discretionary judgment faculty with a perceptive vigor markedly inadequate for the
practical understanding of the conjugal Covenant or serious impaired from the correct appreciation
of the integral significance and implications of the marriage vows.
The FACTS in the Case sufficiently prove with the certitude required by law that based on the
depositions of the Partes in Causa and premised on the testimonies of the Common and Expert
Witnesse[s], the Respondent made the marriage option in tenure of adverse personality
constracts that were markedly antithetical to the substantive content and implications of the
Marriage Covenant, and that seriously undermined the integrality of her matrimonial consent
in terms of its deliberative component. In other words, afflicted with a discretionary faculty
impaired in its practico-concrete judgment formation on account of an adverse action and
reaction pattern, the Respondent was impaired from eliciting a judicially binding matrimonial
consent. There is no sufficient evidence in the Case however to prove as well the fact of grave lack
of due discretion on the part of the Petitioner.94
Evidently, the conclusion of psychological incapacity was arrived at not only by the trial court, but
also by canonical bodies. Yet, we must clarify the proper import of the Church rulings annulling the
marriage in this case. They hold sway since they are drawn from a similar recognition, as the trial
court, of the veracity of petitioner’s allegations. Had the trial court instead appreciated respondent’s
version as correct, and the appellate court affirmed such conclusion, the rulings of the Catholic
Church on this matter would have diminished persuasive value. After all, it is the factual findings of
the judicial trier of facts, and not that of the canonical courts, that are accorded significant
recognition by this Court.
Seventh. The final point of contention is the requirement in Molina that such psychological incapacity
be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. It was on this score that the Court of
Appeals reversed the judgment of the trial court, the appellate court noting that it did not appear
certain that respondent’s condition was incurable and that Dr. Abcede did not testify to such effect.95
Petitioner points out that one month after he and his wife initially separated, he returned to her,
desiring to make their marriage work. However, respondent’s aberrant behavior remained
unchanged, as she continued to lie, fabricate stories, and maintained her excessive jealousy. From
this fact, he draws the conclusion that respondent’s condition is incurable.
From the totality of the evidence, can it be definitively concluded that respondent’s condition is
incurable? It would seem, at least, that respondent’s psychosis is quite grave, and a cure thereof a
remarkable feat. Certainly, it would have been easier had petitioner’s expert witnesses characterized
respondent’s condition as incurable. Instead, they remained silent on whether the psychological
incapacity was curable or incurable.
But on careful examination, there was good reason for the experts’ taciturnity on this point.
The petitioner’s expert witnesses testified in 1994 and 1995, and the trial court rendered its decision
on 10 August 1995. These events transpired well before Molina was promulgated in 1997 and made
explicit the requirement that the psychological incapacity must be shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Such requirement was not expressly stated in Article 36 or any other
provision of the Family Code.
On the other hand, the Court in Santos, which was decided in January 1995, began its discussion by
first citing the deliberations of the Family Code committee,96 then the opinion of canonical
scholars,97 before arriving at its formulation of the doctrinal definition of psychological
incapacity.98 Santos did refer to Justice Caguioa’s opinion expressed during the deliberations that
"psychological incapacity is incurable,"99 and the view of a former presiding judge of the Metropolitan
Marriage Tribunal of the Archdiocese of Manila that psychological incapacity must be characterized
"by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability."100 However, in formulating the doctrinal
rule on psychological incapacity, the Court in Santos omitted any reference to incurability as a
characteristic of psychological incapacity.101
This disquisition is material as Santos was decided months before the trial court came out with its
own ruling that remained silent on whether respondent’s psychological incapacity was incurable.
Certainly, Santos did not clearly mandate that the incurability of the psychological incapacity be
established in an action for declaration of nullity. At least, there was no jurisprudential clarity at the
time of the trial of this case and the subsequent promulgation of the trial court’s decision that
required a medical finding of incurability. Such requisite arose only with Molina in 1997, at a time
when this case was on appellate review, or after the reception of evidence.
We are aware that in Pesca v. Pesca,102 the Court countered an argument

that Molina and Santos should not apply retroactively
with the observation that the interpretation or construction placed by the courts of a law constitutes a
part of that law as of the date the statute in enacted.103 Yet we approach this present case from
utterly practical considerations. The requirement that psychological incapacity must be shown to be
medically or clinically permanent or incurable is one that necessarily cannot be divined without
expert opinion. Clearly in this case, there was no categorical averment from the expert witnesses
that respondent’s psychological incapacity was curable or incurable simply because there was no
legal necessity yet to elicit such a declaration and the appropriate question was not accordingly
propounded to him. If we apply Pesca without deep reflection, there would be undue prejudice to
those cases tried before Molina or Santos, especially those presently on appellate review, where
presumably the respective petitioners and their expert witnesses would not have seen the need to
adduce a diagnosis of incurability. It may hold in those cases, as in this case, that the psychological
incapacity of a spouse is actually incurable, even if not pronounced as such at the trial court level.
We stated earlier that Molina is not set in stone, and that the interpretation of Article 36 relies heavily
on a case-to-case perception. It would be insensate to reason to mandate in this case an expert
medical or clinical diagnosis of incurability, since the parties would have had no impelling cause to
present evidence to that effect at the time this case was tried by the RTC more than ten (10) years
ago. From the totality of the evidence, we are sufficiently convinced that the incurability of
respondent’s psychological incapacity has been established by the petitioner. Any lingering doubts
are further dispelled by the fact that the Catholic Church tribunals, which indubitably consider
incurability as an integral requisite of psychological incapacity, were sufficiently convinced that
respondent was so incapacitated to contract marriage to the degree that annulment was warranted.
All told, we conclude that petitioner has established his cause of action for declaration of nullity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC correctly ruled, and the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the trial court.
There is little relish in deciding this present petition, pronouncing as it does the marital bond as
having been inexistent in the first place. It is possible that respondent, despite her psychological
state, remains in love with petitioner, as exhibited by her persistent challenge to the petition for
nullity. In fact, the appellate court placed undue emphasis on respondent’s avowed commitment to
remain in the marriage. Yet the Court decides these cases on legal reasons and not vapid
sentimentality. Marriage, in legal contemplation, is more than the legitimatization of a desire of
people in love to live together.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the RTC dated 10 August 1995, declaring
the marriage between petitioner and respondent NULL and VOID under Article 36 of the Family
Code, is REINSTATED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
JORDAN CHAN PAZ, G.R. No. 166579

Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
JEANICE PAVON PAZ, PEREZ, JJ.
Respondent.
Promulgated:
February 18, 2010
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of the 9 August 2004[2] and 26 November

2004[3] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80473. In its 9
August 2004 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner Jordan Chan
Pazs (Jordan) appeal of the 13 May 2003 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Branch 69 (trial court), which granted respondent Jeanice Pavon Pazs
(Jeanice) petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. In its 26 November 2004
Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied Jordans motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Jordan and Jeanice met sometime in November 1996. Jeanice was only 19 years
old while Jordan was 27 years old. In January 1997, they became a couple and, on
10 May 1997, they were formally engaged. They had their civil wedding on 3 July
1997, and their church wedding on 21 September 1997. They have one son, Evan
Gaubert, who was born on 12 February 1998. After a big fight, Jeanice left their
conjugal home on 23 February 1999.
On 15 September 1999, Jeanice filed a petition for declaration of nullity of

marriage against Jordan. Jeanice alleged that Jordan was psychologically
incapable of assuming the essential obligations of marriage. According to Jeanice,
Jordans psychological incapacity was manifested by his uncontrollable tendency
to be self-preoccupied and self-indulgent, as well as his predisposition to become
violent and abusive whenever his whims and caprices were not satisfied.
Jeanice alleged that Jordan had a tendency to lie about his whereabouts and had
the habit of hanging out and spending a great deal of time with his friends. Since
Jordan worked in their family business, Jordan would allegedly just stay home,
tinker with the Play Station, and ask Jeanice to lie to his brothers about his
whereabouts. Jeanice further alleged that Jordan was heavily dependent on and
attached to his mother. After giving birth to their son, Jeanice noticed that Jordan
resented their son and spent more time with his friends rather than help her take
care of their son. Jordan also demanded from his mother a steady supply of milk
and diapers for their son.
At the early stage of their marriage, Jeanice said they had petty fights but that the
quarrels turned for the worse and Jordan became increasingly violent toward
her. At one point, Jordan threatened to hurt her with a pair of scissors. Jeanice
also alleged that on 22 February 1999, Jordan subjected her to verbal lashing and
insults and threatened to hit her with a golf club. Jeanice added that Jordan has
not provided any financial support or visited their son since she left their conjugal
home.
Psychologist Cristina R. Gates (Gates) testified that Jordan was afflicted with
Borderline Personality Disorder as manifested in his impulsive behavior,
delinquency and instability.[5] Gates concluded that Jordans psychological
maladies antedate their marriage and are rooted in his family background. Gates
added that with no indication of reformation, Jordans personality disorder
appears to be grave and incorrigible.
JORDAN DENIED JEANICES ALLEGATIONS. JORDAN ASSERTED THAT JEANICE

EXAGGERATED HER STATEMENTS AGAINST HIM. JORDAN SAID THAT JEANICE HAS
HER OWN PERSONAL INSECURITIES AND THAT HER ACTIONS SHOWED HER LACK
OF MATURITY, CHILDISHNESS AND EMOTIONAL INABILITY TO COPE WITH THE
STRUGGLES AND CHALLENGES OF MAINTAINING A MARRIED LIFE.
JORDAN ALSO OBJECTED TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL REPORT OFFERED BY

JEANICE. JORDAN POINTED OUT THAT HE WAS NOT SUBJECTED TO ANY
INTERVIEW OR PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTS BY GATES. JORDAN ARGUED THAT GATES
CONCLUSIONS WERE MERE SPECULATIONS, CONJECTURES AND SUPPOSITIONS
FROM THE INFORMATION SUPPLIED BY JEANICE. JORDAN ALLEGED THAT IT WAS
PATENTLY ONE-SIDED AND IS NOT ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AS IT WAS BASED ON
HEARSAY STATEMENTS OF JEANICE WHICH WERE OBVIOUSLY SELF-
SERVING. JORDAN SAID HE WANTS JEANICE BACK AND PRAYED FOR THE
DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION.
THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT
ON 13 MAY 2003, THE TRIAL COURT GRANTED JEANICES PETITION. THE TRIAL
COURT DECLARED THAT JORDANS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, WHICH WAS
SPECIFICALLY IDENTIFIED AS BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER, DEPRIVED
HIM OF THE CAPACITY TO FULLY UNDERSTAND HIS RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE
MARITAL BOND. THE TRIAL COURT FOUND THAT JORDAN WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE,
PARTICULARLY ARTICLES 68[6] AND 70[7] OF THE FAMILY CODE. THE TRIAL COURT
ALSO DECLARED THAT JORDANS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY, BEING ROOTED IN
HIS FAMILY BACKGROUND, ANTEDATES THE MARRIAGE AND THAT WITHOUT ANY
SIGN OF REFORMATION, FOUND THE SAME TO BE GRAVE AND INCURABLE.
THE DISPOSITVE PORTION OF THE TRIAL COURTS 13 MAY 2003 DECISION READS:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER JEANICE PAVON
PAZ AND RESPONDENT JORDAN CHAN PAZ CELEBRATED ON JULY 3,
1997 AND SEPTEMBER 21, 1997 AS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO ON THE
GROUND OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY ON THE PART OF
RESPONDENT PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE WITH
ALL THE EFFECTS PROVIDED BY LAW. THE COUPLES ABSOLUTE
COMMUNITY OF PROPERTIES [SIC] SHALL BE DISSOLVED IN THE
MANNER HEREIN PROVIDED. AND THE CUSTODY OVER EVAN SHALL
REMAIN WITH THE PETITIONER, WITHOUT REGARD TO VISITATION
RIGHTS OF THE RESPONDENT AS THE FATHER OF THE
CHILD. FURTHERMORE, THE PARTIES ARE JOINTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR
THE SUPPORT OF THEIR MINOR CHILD EVAN GUABERT PAVON PAZ.
LET COPIES OF THIS DECISION BE FURNISHED THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRARS OF QUEZON CITY AND PASIG
CITY RESPECTIVELY AS WELL AS THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE (NSO, CRP, LEGAL DEPARTMENT)
EDSA, QUEZON CITY.
SO ORDERED.[8]
On 6 June 2003, Jordan filed a Notice of Appeal.[9] The trial court promptly approved
Jordans appeal.
ON 10 FEBRUARY 2004, JEANICE FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS APPEAL WITH THE

COURT OF APPEALS.[10] IN HER MOTION, JEANICE SOUGHT THE IMMEDIATE
DISMISSAL OF JORDANS APPEAL ON THE GROUND THAT JORDAN FAILED TO
COMPLY WITH SECTION 20 OF A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC[11]WHICH PROVIDES:
SEC. 20. APPEAL.

(1) Pre-condition. No appeal from the decision shall be allowed unless
the appellant has filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial within
fifteen days from notice of judgment.
ON 9 AUGUST 2004, THE COURT OF APPEALS DISMISSED JORDANS

APPEAL. ACCORDING TO THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE RULES STATE IN
MANDATORY AND CATEGORICAL TERMS THAT THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OR NEW TRIAL IS A PRE-CONDITION BEFORE AN APPEAL FROM
THE DECISION IS ALLOWED. THE COURT OF APPEALS ADDED THAT WHEN THE LAW
IS CLEAR AND UNAMBIGUOUS, IT ADMITS NO ROOM FOR INTERPRETATION BUT
MERELY FOR APPLICATION.
JORDAN FILED A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. IN ITS 26 NOVEMBER 2004
RESOLUTION, THE COURT OF APPEALS DISMISSED THE MOTION.
HENCE, THIS PETITION.
IN A MINUTE RESOLUTION DATED 22 JUNE 2005, WE DENIED JORDANS PETITION

FOR FAILURE TO SUFFICIENTLY SHOW THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED
ANY REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THE CHALLENGED RESOLUTIONS AS TO WARRANT THE
EXERCISE BY THIS COURT OF ITS DISCRETIONARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION.[12]
On 18 August 2005, Jordan filed a motion for reconsideration. While Jordan
admits that he failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the trial courts 13 May
2003 Decision, Jordan submits that Section 20 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC should not
have been strictly applied against him because it took effect only on 15 March
2003, or less than two months prior to the rendition of the trial courts 13 May
2003 Decision. Moreover, Jordan enjoins the Court to decide the case on the
merits so as to preserve the sanctity of marriage as enshrined in the Constitution.
JEANICE ALSO FILED AN OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON

1 SEPTEMBER 2005.[13]
IN A MINUTE RESOLUTION DATED 19 SEPTEMBER 2005, WE GRANTED JORDANS

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND REINSTATED THE PETITION.[14]
JEANICE FILED A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. IN A MINUTE RESOLUTION

DATED 5 JUNE 2006, WE DENIED JEANICES MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FOR
LACK OF MERIT.[15]
ON 7 AUGUST 2006, JEANICE FILED A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION.

IN A MINUTE RESOLUTION DATED 20 SEPTEMBER 2006, WE DENIED JEANICES
SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FOR LACK OF MERIT AND REMINDED
JEANICE THAT A SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A PROHIBITED
PLEADING.[16]
THE ISSUE
THE ONLY ISSUE LEFT TO BE RESOLVED IS WHETHER JORDAN IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY

INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS.
THE RULING OF THIS COURT
THE PETITION HAS MERIT.
JEANICE FAILED TO PROVE JORDANS

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
JEANICES PETITION FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE IS ANCHORED

ON ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE WHICH PROVIDES:
A MARRIAGE CONTRACTED BY ANY PARTY WHO, AT THE TIME OF THE

CELEBRATION, WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY
WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE, SHALL
LIKEWISE BE VOID EVEN IF SUCH INCAPACITY BECOMES MANIFEST
ONLY AFTER ITS SOLEMNIZATION.
IN SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS,[17] THE COURT FIRST DECLARED THAT
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY MUST BE CHARACTERIZED BY (A) GRAVITY; (B)
JUDICIAL ANTECEDENCE; AND (C) INCURABILITY. IT MUST BE CONFINED TO THE
MOST SERIOUS CASES OF PERSONALITY DISORDERS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATIVE OF
AN UTTER INSENSITIVITY OR INABILITY TO GIVE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE TO
THE MARRIAGE.[18]
IN DIMAYUGA-LAURENA V. COURT OF APPEALS,[19] THE COURT EXPLAINED:
(A) GRAVITY IT MUST BE GRAVE AND SERIOUS SUCH THAT THE PARTY
WOULD BE INCAPABLE OF CARRYING OUT THE ORDINARY DUTIES
REQUIRED IN A MARRIAGE;
(B) JUDICIAL ANTECEDENCE IT MUST BE ROOTED IN THE HISTORY OF THE PARTY ANTEDATING THE
MARRIAGE, ALTHOUGH THE OVERT MANIFESTATIONS MAY EMERGE ONLY AFTER THE MARRIAGE; AND
(C) INCURABILITY IT MUST BE INCURABLE, OR EVEN IF IT WERE

OTHERWISE, THE CURE WOULD BE BEYOND THE MEANS OF THE
PARTY INVOLVED.[20]
IN GRANTING JEANICES PETITION, THE TRIAL COURT GAVE CREDENCE TO THE

TESTIMONY OF GATES TO SUPPORT ITS CONCLUSION THAT JORDAN WAS
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL
OBLIGATIONS. GATES DECLARED THAT JORDAN WAS SUFFERING FROM
BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER AS MANIFESTED BY HIS BEING A MAMAS
BOY AND THAT SUCH WAS GRAVE AND INCURABLE, ROOTED IN HIS FAMILY
BACKGROUND, [AND] ANTEDATES THE MARRIAGE.
ALTHOUGH THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT THAT A PARTY TO BE DECLARED
PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED SHOULD BE PERSONALLY EXAMINED BY A
PHYSICIAN OR A PSYCHOLOGIST, THERE IS NEVERTHELESS A NEED TO PROVE THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY THROUGH INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY
THE PERSON ALLEGING SAID DISORDER.[21]
CORRESPONDINGLY, THE PRESENTATION OF EXPERT PROOF PRESUPPOSES A
THOROUGH AND IN-DEPTH ASSESSMENT OF THE PARTIES BY THE PSYCHOLOGIST
OR EXPERT, FOR A CONCLUSIVE DIAGNOSIS OF A GRAVE, SEVERE AND INCURABLE
PRESENCE OF PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.[22]
IN THIS CASE, THE COURT NOTES THAT THE REPORT AND TESTIMONY OF GATES ON
JORDANS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY WERE BASED EXCLUSIVELY ON HER
INTERVIEWS WITH JEANICE AND THE TRANSCRIPT OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES OF
JEANICES TESTIMONY BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.[23] GATES ONLY DIAGNOSED
JORDAN FROM THE STATEMENTS OF JEANICE, WHOSE BIAS IN FAVOR OF HER
CAUSE CANNOT BE DOUBTED.GATES DID NOT ACTUALLY HEAR, SEE AND EVALUATE
JORDAN. GATES TESTIFIED:
Q- AS A LAST QUESTION MADAM WITNESS. SO ALL IN ALL YOUR CONCLUSIONS HERE ON

PAGE 1 TO PAGE 5 OF YOUR REPORT ARE ALL BASED ON THE STATEMENT AND
PERCEPTION OF THE PETITIONER (JEANICE) ON THE RESPONDENT (JORDAN)?
A- YES MAM.[24]
Consequently, Gates report and testimony were hearsay evidence since she had no
personal knowledge of the alleged facts she was testifying on.[25] Gates testimony
should have thus been dismissed for being unscientific and unreliable.[26]
MOREOVER, CONTRARY TO THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT, JORDANS ALLEGED

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY WAS NOT SHOWN TO BE SO GRAVE AND SO
PERMANENT AS TO DEPRIVE HIM OF THE AWARENESS OF THE DUTIES AND
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE MATRIMONIAL BOND. AT BEST, JEANICES ALLEGATIONS
SHOWED THAT JORDAN WAS IRRESPONSIBLE, INSENSITIVE, OR EMOTIONALLY
IMMATURE. THE INCIDENTS CITED BY JEANICE DO NOT SHOW THAT JORDAN
SUFFERED FROM GRAVE PSYCHOLOGICAL MALADIES THAT PARALYZED JORDAN
FROM COMPLYING WITH THE ESSENTIAL OBLIGATIONS OF MARRIAGE.
WHAT THE LAW REQUIRES TO RENDER A MARRIAGE VOID ON THE GROUND OF

PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY IS DOWNRIGHT INCAPACITY, NOT REFUSAL OR
NEGLECT OR DIFFICULTY, MUCH LESS ILL WILL.[27] THE MERE SHOWING OF
IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES AND CONFLICTING PERSONALITIES DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY.[28]
IN PEREZ-FERRARIS V. FERRARIS,[29] WE SAID:
AS ALL PEOPLE MAY HAVE CERTAIN QUIRKS AND IDIOSYNCRASIES, OR

ISOLATED CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH CERTAIN
PERSONALITY DISORDERS, THERE IS HARDLY A DOUBT THAT THE
INTENDMENT OF THE LAW HAS BEEN TO CONFINE THE MEANING OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY TO THE MOST SERIOUS CASES OF
PERSONALITY DISORDERS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATIVE OF AN UTTER
INSENSITIVITY OR INABILITY TO GIVE MEANING AND SIGNIFICANCE TO
MARRIAGE.[30]
Furthermore, Gates did not particularly describe the pattern of behavior which
showed that Jordan indeed suffers from Borderline Personality Disorder. Gates
also failed to explain how such a personality disorder made Jordan
psychologically incapacitated to perform his obligations as a husband.
LIKEWISE, JEANICE WAS NOT ABLE TO ESTABLISH WITH CERTAINTY THAT

JORDANS ALLEGED PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY WAS MEDICALLY OR CLINICALLY
PERMANENT OR INCURABLE. GATES TESTIMONY ON THE MATTER WAS VAGUE
AND INCONCLUSIVE. GATES TESTIFIED:
Q - NOW IS THIS DISORDER CURABLE?
A - IF ITS CONTINUING TO THE PRESENT THEREFORE ITS PERSEVERERATIVE BEHAVIOR. THEN THE
POSSIBILITY OF COUNTERING THE SAME MIGHT BE NIL.[31]
GATES DID NOT ADEQUATELY EXPLAIN HOW SHE CAME TO THE CONCLUSION
THAT JORDANS CONDITION WAS INCURABLE.
IN SUM, THE TOTALITY OF THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY JEANICE FAILED TO

SHOW THAT JORDAN WAS PSYCHOLOGICALLY INCAPACITATED TO COMPLY WITH
THE ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATIONS AND THAT SUCH INCAPACITY WAS GRAVE,
INCURABLE, AND EXISTING AT THE TIME OF THE SOLEMNIZATION OF THEIR
MARRIAGE.
IN REPUBLIC V. CABANTUG-BAGUIO,[32] WE SAID:
THE CONSTITUTION SETS OUT A POLICY OF PROTECTING AND STRENGTHENING THE

FAMILY AS THE BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION AND MARRIAGE AS THE FOUNDATION OF THE
FAMILY. MARRIAGE, AS AN INVIOLABLE INSTITUTION PROTECTED BY THE STATE, CANNOT
BE DISSOLVED AT THE WHIM OF THE PARTIES. IN PETITIONS FOR THE DECLARATION OF
NULLITY OF MARRIAGE, THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO SHOW THE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE
LIES ON THE PLAINTIFF. ANY DOUBT SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE EXISTENCE
AND CONTINUATION OF THE MARRIAGE AND AGAINST ITS DISSOLUTION AND NULLITY.[33]
WHEREFORE, WE GRANT THE PETITION. WE SET ASIDE THE 9 AUGUST 2004 AND
26 NOVEMBER 2004 RESOLUTIONS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. WE REVERSE THE
13 MAY 2003 DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 69. THE
MARRIAGE OF JEANICE PAVON PAZ TO JORDAN CHAN PAZ SUBSISTS AND REMAINS
VALID.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
D. BRION
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE ASSOCIATE JUSTICE

JOSE P. PEREZ
ASSOCIATE JUSTICE
ATTESTATION
I ATTEST THAT THE CONCLUSIONS IN THE ABOVE DECISION HAD BEEN REACHED IN
CONSULTATION BEFORE THE CASE WAS ASSIGNED TO THE WRITER OF THE
OPINION OF THE COURTS DIVISION.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the
Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 35-38. Penned by Associate Justice Danilo B. Pine, with Associate Justices Jose L. Sabio, Jr. and Noel
G. Tijam, concurring.
[3]
Id. at 40-41.
[4]
Id. at 103-114. Penned by Judge Lorifel Lacap Pahimna.
[5]
Records, p. 123.
[6]
Article 68 of the Family Code provides:
ART. 68. THE HUSBAND AND WIFE ARE OBLIGATED TO LIVE TOGETHER, OBSERVE MUTUAL
LOVE, RESPECT AND FIDELITY, AND RENDER MUTUAL HELP AND SUPPORT.
[7]
ARTICLE 70 OF THE FAMILY CODE PROVIDES:
ART. 70. THE SPOUSES ARE JOINTLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE SUPPORT OF THE FAMILY. THE
EXPENSES FOR SUCH SUPPORT AND OTHER CONJUGAL OBLIGATIONS SHALL BE PAID FROM THE
COMMUNITY PROPERTY AND, IN THE ABSENCE THEREOF, FROM THE INCOME OR FRUITS OF THEIR
SEPARATE PROPERTIES. IN CASE OF INSUFFICIENCY OR ABSENCE OF SAID INCOME OR FRUITS,
SUCH OBLIGATION SHALL BE SATISFIED FROM THEIR SEPARATE PROPERTIES.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 103-114.
[9]
Id. at 115.
[10]
Id. at 117-121.
[11]
RULE ON DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT OF
VOIDABLE MARRIAGES WHICH TOOK EFFECT ON 15 MARCH 2003.
[12]
Rollo, p. 171.
[13]
In a minute Resolution dated 9 November 2005, the Court resolved to note without action Jeanices Opposition to
the Motion for Reconsideration.
[14]
Rollo, p. 182.
[15]
Id. at 317.
[16]
Id. at 330. See Section 2, Rule 52 in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended.
[17]
310 Phil. 21 (1995).
[18]
ID. AT 40.
[19]
G.R. No. 159220, 22 September 2008, 566 SCRA 154.
[20]
Id. at 162.
[21]
Bier v. Bier, G.R. No. 173294, 27 February 2008, 547 SCRA 123; Republic v. Tanyag-San Jose,
G.R. No. 168328, 28 February 2007, 517 SCRA 123.
[22]
Ngo Te v. Yu-Te, G.R. No. 161793, 13 February 2009, 579 SCRA 193.
[23]
TSN, 15 November 2000, pp. 9-11, 21-24.
[24]
Id. at 52.
[25]
Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, 14 August 2009; Bier v. Bier, supra note 21.
[26]
NAJERA V. NAJERA, G.R. NO. 164817, 3 JULY 2009, 591 SCRA 541; BIER V. BIER, SUPRA NOTE 21.
[27]
Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997, 268 SCRA 198.
[28]
Id.
[29]
G.R. No. 162368, 17 July 2006, 495 SCRA 396.
[30]
Id. at 401.
[31]
TSN, 15 November 2000, p. 18.
[32]
G.R. No. 171042, 30 June 2008, 556 SCRA 711.
[33]
Id. at 727.

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
JOCELYN M. SUAZO, G.R. No. 164493

Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
DEL CASTILLO,
- versus - ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.
Promulgated:
ANGELITO SUAZO and REPUBLIC OF March 10, 2010

THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the appeal filed by petitioner Jocelyn Suazo (Jocelyn) from the
July 14, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 62443, which
reversed the January 29, 1999 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 119, Pasay City in Civil Case No. 97-1282.[2] The reversed RTC decision
nullified Jocelyns marriage with respondent Angelito Suazo (Angelito) on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
THE FACTS
Jocelyn and Angelito were 16 years old when they first met in June 1985; they were
residents of Laguna at that time. After months of courtship, Jocelyn went
to Manila with Angelito and some friends. Having been gone for three days, their
parents sought Jocelyn and Angelito and after finding them, brought them back to
Bian, Laguna. Soon thereafter, Jocelyn and Angelitos marriage was arranged and
they were married on March 3, 1986 in a ceremony officiated by the Mayor of Bian.
Without any means to support themselves, Jocelyn and Angelito lived with
Angelitos parents after their marriage. They had by this time stopped
schooling. Jocelyn took odd jobs and worked for Angelitos relatives as household
help. Angelito, on the other hand, refused to work and was most of the time drunk.
Jocelyn urged Angelito to find work and violent quarrels often resulted because of
Jocelyns efforts.
Jocelyn left Angelito sometime in July 1987. Angelito thereafter found

another woman with whom he has since lived. They now have children.
Ten years after their separation, or on October 8, 1997, Jocelyn filed with the RTC
a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
as amended. She claimed that Angelito was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. In addition to the above
historical narrative of their relationship, she alleged in her complaint:
xxxx
8. That from the time of their marriage up to their separation in July 1987, their
relationship had been marred with bitter quarrels which caused unbearable physical and
emotional pains on the part of the plaintiff because defendant inflicted physical injuries
upon her every time they had a troublesome encounter;
9. That the main reason for their quarrel was always the refusal of the defendant to work
or his indolence and his excessive drinking which makes him psychologically incapacitated
to perform his marital obligations making life unbearably bitter and intolerable to the
plaintiff causing their separation in fact in July 1987;
10. That such psychological incapacity of the defendant started from the time of their
marriage and became very apparent as time went and proves to be continuous,
permanent and incurable;
xxxx
Angelito did not answer the petition/complaint. Neither did he submit himself to a
psychological examination with psychologist Nedy Tayag (who was presumably
hired by Jocelyn).
The case proceeded to trial on the merits after the trial court found that no
collusion existed between the parties. Jocelyn, her aunt Maryjane Serrano, and the
psychologist testified at the trial.
In her testimony, Jocelyn essentially repeated the allegations in her petition,
including the alleged incidents of physical beating she received from Angelito. On
cross-examination, she remained firm on these declarations but significantly
declared that Angelito had not treated her violently before they were married.
Asst. Sol. Gen. Kim Briguera:

Q. Can you describe your relationship with the respondent before you got
married?
A. He always go (sic) to our house to court me.
Q. Since you cited violence, after celebration of marriage, will you describe his
behavioural (sic) pattern before you got married?
A. He show (sic) kindness, he always come (sic) to the house.
Q. So you cannot say his behavioral pattern composing of violent nature before
you got married (sic), is there any signs (sic) of violence?
A. None maam (sic), because we were not sweethearts.
Q. Even to other people?
A. He also quarrel (sic).[3]
Maryjane Serrano corroborated parts of Jocelyns testimony.
When the psychologist took the witness stand, she declared:
Q. What about the respondent, did you also make clinical interpretation of his
behavior?
A. Apparently, the behavior and actuation of the respondent during the time of
the marriage the respondent is suffering from anti-social personality Disorder this is a
serious and severe apparently incurable (sic). This disorder is chronic and long-standing
before the marriage.
Q. And you based your interpretation on the report given by the petitioner?
A. Based on the psychological examination wherein there is no pattern of lying

when I examined her, the petitioner was found to be very responsive, coherent, relevant
to marital relationship with respondent.
Q. And the last page of Exhibit E which is your report there is a statement rather
on the last page, last paragraph which state: It is the clinical opinion of the undersigned
that marriage between the two, had already hit bottom rock (sic) even before the actual
celebration of marriage. Respondent(s) immature, irresponsible and callous emotionality
practically harbors (sic) the possibility of having blissful relationship. His general behavior
fulfill(s) the diagnostic criteria for a person suffering from Anti Social Personality Disorder.
Such disorder is serious and severe and it interferred (sic) in his capacity to provide love,
caring, concern and responsibility to his family. The disorder is chronic and long-standing
in proportion and appear(s) incurable. The disorder was present at the time of the
wedding and became manifest thereafter due to stresses and pressure of married life. He
apparently grew up in a dysfunctional family. Could you explain what does chronic mean?
A. Chronic is a clinical language which means incurable it has been there long
before he entered marriage apparently, it came during early developmental (sic) Basic
trust was not develop (sic).
Q. And this long standing proportion (sic).
A. That no amount of psychological behavioral help to cure such because

psychological disorder are not detrimental to men but to others particularly and this (sic)
because the person who have this kind of disorder do not know that they have this kind
of disorder.
Q. So in other words, permanent?
A. Permanent and incurable.

Q. You also said that this psychological disorder is present during the wedding or
at the time of the wedding or became manifest thereafter?
A. Yes, maam.
xxxx
Court:
Q. Is there a clinical findings (sic)?
A. That is the clinical findings. Personality Disorder labeled on Anti-Social

Personality Disorder (sic).
Q. How was shown during the marriage (sic)?
A. The physical abuses on the petitioner also correlated without any employment
exploitative and silent (sic) on the part of the respondent is clearly Anti-Social Disorder.
Q. Do the respondent know that he has that kind of psychological disorder (sic)?
A. Usually a person suffering that psychological disorder will not admit that they
are suffering that kind of disorder (sic).
Court:
Q. So because of this Anti-Social Disorder the petitioner suffers a lot (sic)?

A. Yes, because the petitioner is a victim of hardships of marital relation to the
respondent (sic).
Court:
Q. Was the Anti-Social Personality Disorder also shown to the parents (sic)?
A. Yes, according to the petitioner, respondent never give due respect more often
than not he even shouted at them for no apparent reason (sic).
Court:
Q. Did you say Anti-Social Disorder incurable (sic)?
A. Yes, sir.
Court:
Q. Is there a physical violence (sic)?
A. Actually, I could see the petitioner is tortured mentally of the respondent (sic).
Court:
Q. How was the petitioner tortured?
A. She was able to counter-act by the time she was separated by the respondent
(sic).
Court:
Q. Do you mean to tell us that Anti-Social disorder is incurable?
A. Yes, sir.
Court:
Q. Why did you know?
A. Anti-Social disorder is incurable again because the person itself, the

respondent is not aware that this kind of personality affect the other party (sic).
Court:
Q. This Anti-Social behavior is naturally affected the petitioner (sic)?
A. They do not have children because more often than not the respondent is
under the influence of alcohol, they do not have peaceful harmonious relationship during
the less than one year and one thing what is significant, respondent allowed wife to work
as housemaid instead of he who should provide and the petitioner never receive and
enjoy her earning for the five months that she work and it is also the petitioner who took
sustainance of the vices. (sic)
Q. And because of that Anti-Social disorder he had not shown love to the
petitioner?
A. From the very start the respondent has no emotion to sustain the marital
relationship but what he need is to sustain his vices thru the petitioner (sic).
Court:
Q. What are the vices?
A. Alcohol and gambling.

Court:
Q. And this affected psychological incapacity to perform marital obligation?
A. Not only that up to this time from my clinical analysis of Anti-Social Personality
Disorder, he is good for nothing person.[4]
The psychologist also identified the Psychological Report she prepared. The Report
pertinently states:[5]
Report on the psychological condition of JOCELYN M. SUAZO, a petitioner for

Nullity of Marriage versus ANGELITO D. SUAZO
GENERAL DATA
[This pertains to Jocelyns]
BRIEF MARITAL HISTORY
xxxx
Husband is Angelito D. Suazo, 28 years old reached 3rd year high school, a part
time tricycle driver, eldest among 4 siblings. Father is a machine operator, described to
be an alcoholic, womanizer and a heavy gambler. While mother is a sales agent. It was a
common knowledge within their vicinity that she was also involved in an illicit
relationship. Familial relationship was described to be stormy, chaotic whose bickering
and squabbles were part and parcel of their day to day living.
TEST RESULTS AND EVALUATION

Projective data reveal an introvert person whose impulse life is adequately
suppressed so much so that it does not create inner tension and anxiety. She is fully
equipped in terms of drives and motivation particularly in uplifting not, only her socio-
emotional image but was as her morale. She may be sensitive yet capable of containing
the effect of such sensitiveness; in order to remain in goodstead (sic) with her immediate
environment.
She is pictured as a hard-working man (sic) who looks forward for a better future
in spite of difficulties she had gone through in the past. She is fully aware of external
realities of life that she set simple life goals which is (sic) commensurate with her
capabilities and limitations. However, she needs to prioritize her interest in order to direct
her energy toward specific goals. Her tolerance for frustration appears to be at par with
her coping mechanism that she is able to discharge negative trends appropriately.
REMARKS :
[Already cited in full in the psychologists testimony quoted above][6]
The Office of the Solicitor General representing the Republic of

the Philippines strongly opposed the petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage. Through a Certification filed with the RTC, it argued that the psychologist
failed to examine and test Angelito; thus, what she said about him was purely
hearsay.
THE RTC RULING
The RTC annulled the marriage under the following reasoning:
While there is no particular instance setforth (sic) in the law that a person may be
considered as psychologically incapacitated, there as (sic) some admitted grounds that
would render a person to be unfit to comply with his marital obligation, such as
immaturity, i.e., lack of an effective sense of rational judgment and responsibility,
otherwise peculiar to infants (like refusal of the husband to support the family or
excessive dependence on parents or peer group approval) and habitual alcoholism, or the
condition by which a person lives for the next drink and the next drinks (The Family Code
of the Phils, Alicia Sempio-Diy, p.39, 1988 ed.)
The evidence presented by the petitioner and the testimony of the petitioner and
Dr. Tayag, points (sic) to one thing that the petitioner failed to establish a harmonious
family life with the respondent.On the contrary, the respondent has not shown love and
respect to the petitioner manifested by the formers being irresponsible, immature,
jobless, gambler, drunkard and worst of all a wife beater. The petitioner, unable to bear
any longer the misbehavior and attitude of the respondent, decided, after one year and
four months of messy days, to leave the respondent.
In this regard, the petitioner was able to prove that right from the start of her
married life with the respondent, she already suffered from maltreatment, due to
physical injuries inflicted upon her and that she was the one who worked as a housemaid
of a relative of her husband to sustain the latters niece (sic) and because they were living
with her husbands family, she was obliged to do the household chores an indication that
she is a battered wife coupled with the fact that she served as a servant in his (sic)
husbands family.
This situation that the petitioner had underwent may be attributed to the fact
that at the time of their marriage, she and her husband are still young and was forced
only to said marriage by her relatives.The petitioner and the respondent had never
developed the feeling of love and respect, instead, the respondent blamed the petitioners
family for said early marriage and not to his own liking.
Applying the principles and the requisites of psychological incapacity enunciated by

this Court in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[7] the RTC concluded:
The above findings of the psychologist [referring to the psychologist testimony

quoted above] would only tend to show that the respondent was, indeed, suffering from
psychological incapacity which is not only grave but also incurable.
Likewise, applying the principles set forth in the case of Republic vs. Court of
Appeals and Molina, 268 SCRA 198, wherein the Supreme Court held that:
x x x x [At this point, the RTC cited the pertinent Molina ruling]
The Court is satisfied that the evidence presented and the testimony of the
petitioner and Dr. Familiar (sic) [the psychologist who testified in this case was Nedy
Tayag, not a Dr. Familiar]attesting that there is psychological incapacity on the part of
the respondent to comply with the essential marital obligations has been sufficiently and
clearly proven and, therefore, petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for.
A claim that the marriage is valid as there is no psychological incapacity of the

respondent is a speculation and conjecture and without moral certainty. This will
enhanced (sic) a greater tragedy as the battered wife/petitioner will still be using the
surname of the respondent, although they are now separated, and a grim and sad
reminder of her husband who made here a slave and a punching bag during the short
span of her marriage with him. The law on annulment should be liberally construed in
favor of an innocent suffering petitioner otherwise said law will be an instrument to
protect persons with mental illness like the serious anti-social behavior of herein
respondent.[8]
THE CA RULING
The Republic appealed the RTC decision to the CA. The CA reversed the RTC
decision, ruling that:
True, as stated in Marcos vs Marcos 343 SCRA 755, the guidelines set in Santos vs
Court of Appeals and Republic vs Court of Appeals do not require that a physician
personally examine the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated. The
Supreme Court adopted the totality of evidence approach which allows the fact of
psychological incapacity to be drawn from evidence that medically or clinically identify
the root causes of the illness. If the totality of the evidence is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination of the person concerned
need not be resorted to. Applied in Marcos, however, the aggregate testimony of the
aggrieved spouse, children, relatives and the social worker were not found to be sufficient
to prove psychological incapacity, in the absence of any evaluation of the respondent
himself, the person whose mental and psychological capacity was in question.
In the case at bench, there is much scarcer evidence to hold that the respondent
was psychologically incapable of entering into the marriage state, that is, to assume the
essential duties of marriage due to an underlying psychological illness. Only the wife gave
first-hand testimony on the behavior of the husband, and it is inconclusive. As observed
by the Court in Marcos, the respondent may have failed to provide material support to
the family and has resorted to physical abuse, but it is still necessary to show that they
were manifestations of a deeper psychological malaise that was clinically or medically
identified. The theory of the psychologist that the respondent was suffering from an anti-
social personality syndrome at the time of the marriage was not the product of any
adequate medical or clinical investigation. The evidence that she got from the petitioner,
anecdotal at best, could equally show that the behavior of the respondent was due simply
to causes like immaturity or irresponsibility which are not equivalent to psychological
incapacity, Pesca vs Pesca 356 SCRA 588, or the failure or refusal to work could have been
the result of rebelliousness on the part of one who felt that he had been forced into a
loveless marriage. In any event, the respondent was not under a permanent compulsion
because he had later on shown his ability to engage in productive work and more stable
relationships with another. The element of permanence or incurability that is one of the
defining characteristic of psychological incapacity is not present.
There is no doubt that for the short period that they were under the same roof,
the married life of the petitioner with the respondent was an unhappy one. But the
marriage cannot for this reason be extinguished. As the Supreme Court intimates
in Pesca, our strict handling of Article 36 will be a reminder of the inviolability of the
marriage institution in our country and the foundation of the family that the law seeks to
protect. The concept of psychological incapacity is not to be a mantra to legalize what in
reality are convenient excuses of parties to separate and divorce.
THE PETITION
Jocelyn now comes to us via the present petition to challenge and seek the reversal
of the CA ruling based on the following arguments:
1. The Court of Appeals went beyond what the law says, as it totally
disregarded the legal basis of the RTC in declaring the marriage null and
void Tuason v. Tuason (256 SCRA 158; to be accurate, should be Tuason v. Court
of Appeals) holds that the finding of the Trial Court as to the existence or non-
existence of petitioners psychological incapacity at the time of the marriage is final
and binding on us (the Supreme Court); petitioner has not sufficiently shown that
the trial courts factual findings and evaluation of the testimonies of private
respondents witnesses vis--vis petitioners defenses are clearly and manifestly
erroneous;
2. Article 36 of the Family Code did not define psychological incapacity; this
omission was intentional to give the courts a wider discretion to interpret the term
without being shackled by statutory parameters. Article 36 though was taken from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which gives three conditions that
would make a person unable to contract marriage from mental incapacity as
follows:
1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:
(1) who lack the sufficient use of reason;
(2) who suffer from grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning essential
matrimonial rights and duties which are to be mutually given and accepted;
(3) who are not capable of assuming the essential obligations of matrimony
due to causes of a psychic nature.
The decision of the RTC, Jocelyn claims, intelligently conforms to these

criteria. The RTC, being clothed with discretionary functions, applied its finding of
psychological incapacity based on existing jurisprudence and the law itself which
gave lower court magistrates enough latitude to define what constitutes
psychological incapacity. On the contrary, she further claims, the OSG relied on
generalities without being specific on why it is opposed to the dissolution of a
marriage that actually exists only in name.
Simply stated, we face the issue of whether there is basis to nullify Jocelyns
marriage with Angelito under Article 36 of the Family Code.
THE COURTS RULING
We find the petition devoid of merit. The CA committed no reversible error

of law in setting aside the RTC decision, as no basis exists to declare Jocelyns
marriage with Angelito a nullity under Article 36 of the Family Code and its related
jurisprudence.
The Law, Molina and Te

Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization.
A unique feature of this law is its intended open-ended application, as it

merely introduced an abstract concept psychological incapacity that disables
compliance with the contractual obligations of marriage without any concrete
definition or, at the very least, an illustrative example. We must therefore apply the
law based on how the concept of psychological incapacity was shaped and
developed in jurisprudence.
Santos v. Court of Appeals[9] declared that psychological incapacity must be

characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability. It
should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that causes a party
to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage. It must be confined to the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.[10]
The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the interpretation and
application of the law in Republic v. Court of Appeals[11] (Molina) as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the existence and continuation of the
marriage and against its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and unity of the family. Thus,
our Constitution devotes an entire Article on the Family, recognizing it as the foundation
of the nation. It decrees marriage as legally inviolable, thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be protected
by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d)
clearly explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity
must be psychological - not physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the parties or one of them was
mentally or psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless such
root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of
the marriage. The evidence must show that the illness was existing when the parties
exchanged their I do's. The manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such
time, but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other
spouse, not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex. Furthermore,
such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. x x x
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to
assume the essential obligations of marriage. Thus, mild characteriological peculiarities,
mood changes, occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted as root causes. The
illness must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor
in the person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and
225 of the same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence and included in the
text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great
respect by our courts x x x
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the
Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of
the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.[12]
Molina, subsequent jurisprudence holds, merely expounded on the basic

requirements of Santos.[13]
A later case, Marcos v. Marcos,[14] further clarified that there is no

requirement that the defendant/respondent spouse should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine qua non for the
declaration of nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it
is no longer necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under Article 36 of
the Family Code if the totality of evidence shows that psychological incapacity
exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, andincurability can be duly
established.[15]
Pesca v. Pesca[16] clarifies that the Molina guidelines apply even to cases then
already pending, under the reasoning that the courts interpretation or construction
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent of the law; the latter as so
interpreted and construed would thus constitute a part of that law as of the date
the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court finds itself later
overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be
applied prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and
have acted in good faith in accordance therewith under the familiar rule of lex
prospicit, non respicit.
On March 15, 2003, the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 08-11-10 SC, Rules)
promulgated by the Court took effect. Section 2(d) of the Rules pertinently
provides:
(d) What to allege. A petition under Article 36 of the Family Code shall specifically
allege the complete facts showing that either or both parties were psychologically
incapacitated from complying with the essential marital obligations of marriage at the
time of the celebration of marriage even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after
its celebration.
The complete facts should allege the physical manifestations, if any, as are
indicative of psychological incapacity at the time of the celebration of the marriage but
expert opinion need not be alleged.
Section 12(d) of the Rules requires a pre-trial brief containing all the evidence
presented, including expert opinion, if any, briefly stating or describing the nature
and purpose of these pieces of evidence. Section 14(b) requires the court to
consider during the pre-trial conference the advisability of receiving expert
testimony and such other matters as may aid in the prompt disposition of the
petition. Under Section 17 of the Rules, the grounds for the declaration of the
absolute nullity or annulment of marriage must be proved.
All cases involving the application of Article 36 of the Family Code that came
to us were invariably decided based on the principles in the cited cases. This was
the state of law and jurisprudence on Article 36 when the Court decided Te v. Yu-
Te[17] (Te) which revisited the Molina guidelines.
Te begins with the observation that the Committee that drafted the Family
Code did not give any examples of psychological incapacity for fear that by so doing,
it would limit the applicability of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis; that the Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision
on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, by the findings of experts and
researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals that,
although not binding on the civil courts, may be given persuasive effect since the
provision itself was taken from the Canon Law.[18] Te thus assumes it a basic
premise that the law is so designed to allow some resiliency in its application.[19]
Te then sustained Santos doctrinal value, saying that its interpretation is
consistent with that of the Canon Law.
Going back to its basic premise, Te said:
Conscious of the laws intention that it is the courts, on a case-to-case basis, that
should determine whether a party to a marriage is psychologically incapacitated, the
Court, in sustaining the lower courts judgment of annulment in Tuason v. Court of
Appeals, ruled that the findings of the trial court are final and binding on the appellate
courts.
Again, upholding the trial courts findings and declaring that its decision was
not a judgment on the pleadings, the Court, in Tsoi v. Court of Appeals, explained
that when private respondent testified under oath before the lower court and was
cross-examined by the adverse party, she thereby presented evidence in the form of
testimony. Importantly, the Court, aware of parallel decisions of Catholic marriage
tribunals, ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to
fulfill the marital obligation of procreating children is equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
With this as backdrop, Te launched an attack on Molina. It said that the resiliency
with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been
rendered ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards
in Molina. Molina, to Te, has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and
be bound by it; wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina,
has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and
the like, to continuously debase and pervert the sanctity of marriage.
Te then enunciated the principle that each case must be judged, not on the basis of a
priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own
facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and
by decisions of church tribunals.
As a final note though, Te expressly stated that it is not suggesting the

abandonment of Molina, but that, following Antonio v. Reyes, it merely looked at
other perspectives that should also govern the disposition of petitions for declaration
of nullity under Article 36. The subsequent Ting v. Velez-Ting[20] follows Tes lead
when it reiterated that Te did not abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it
simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent requirements, cognizant of the
explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the rationale of
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages:[21]
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of
the psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an
accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the
parties. They adversely affect access to justice of poor litigants. It is also a fact that
there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee
deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina
Case. The need for the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical
psychologist and the presentation of psychiatric experts shall now be determined
by the court during the pre-trial conference.
Te, therefore, instead of substantially departing from Molina,[22] merely

stands for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for declaration of nullity
of marriages based on psychological incapacity. It is also noteworthy for its
evidentiary approach in these cases, which it expounded on as follows:
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task
and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider
as decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental
temperaments of the parties.
xxxx
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting

expert testimony to establish the precise cause of a partys psychological incapacity,
and to show that it existed at the inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v.
Marcos asserts, there is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between
the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder
itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that
the presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological
incapacity.[23] [Underscoring supplied]
This evidentiary approach is repeated in Ting v. Velez-Ting.[24]
Under this evolutionary development, as shown by the current string of

cases on Article 36 of the Family Code, what should not be lost on us is the
intention of the law to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious
cases of personality disorders, clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage; that the
psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception of the
marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she
is about to assume.[25] It is not enough that the respondent, alleged to be
psychologically incapacitated, had difficulty in complying with his marital
obligations, or was unwilling to perform these obligations. Proof of a natal or
supervening disabling factor an adverse integral element in the respondents
personality structure that effectively incapacitated him from complying with his
essential marital obligations must be shown.[26] Mere difficulty, refusal or neglect in
the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different
from incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition or illness;
irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility and the like, do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological
incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a persons refusal or
unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.[27]
If all these sound familiar, they do, for they are but iterations
of Santos juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability requisites. This is
proof of Santoscontinuing doctrinal validity.
The Present Case
As the CA did, we find Jocelyns evidence insufficient to establish Angelitos

psychological incapacity to perform essential marital obligations. We so conclude
based on our own examination of the evidence on record, which we were compelled
to undertake because of the differences in the trial court and the appellate courts
appreciation and evaluation of Jocelyns presented evidence.
a. The Expert Opinion Evidence
Both the psychologists testimony and the psychological report did not
conclusively show the root cause, gravity and incurability of Angelitos alleged
psychological condition.
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the expert opinion

evidence the psychologists testimony and the psychological evaluation report that
Jocelyn presented. Based on her declarations in open court, the psychologist
evaluated Angelitos psychological condition only in an indirect manner she derived
all her conclusions from information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause
cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the information upon which the
psychologist heavily relied upon, the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of
the opinion with due care and with the application of the more rigid and stringent set
of standards outlined above, i.e., that there must be a thorough and in-depth
assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of
a psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.
In saying this, we do not suggest that a personal examination of the party

alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory; jurisprudence holds that
this type of examination is not a mandatory requirement. While such examination is
desirable, we recognize that it may not be practical in all instances given the
oftentimes estranged relations between the parties. For a determination though of a
partys complete personality profile, information coming from persons intimately
related to him (such as the partys close relatives and friends) may be helpful. This is
an approach in the application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same time
that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility gaps spawned by supposedly
expert opinion based entirely on doubtful sources of information.
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psych`ologist, using meager

information coming from a directly interested party, could not have secured a
complete personality profile and could not have conclusively formed an objective
opinion or diagnosis of Angelitos psychological condition. While the report or
evaluation may be conclusive with respect to Jocelyns psychological condition, this
is not true for Angelitos. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy the
required depth and comprehensiveness of examination required to evaluate a party
alleged to be suffering from a psychological disorder. In short, this is not the
psychological report that the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion that
psychological incapacity exists.
Other than this credibility or reliability gap, both the psychologists report and
testimony simply provided a general description of Angelitos purported anti-social
personality disorder, supported by the characterization of this disorder as chronic,
grave and incurable. The psychologist was conspicuously silent, however, on the
bases for her conclusion or the particulars that gave rise to the characterization she
gave. These particulars are simply not in the Report, and neither can they be found
in her testimony.
For instance, the psychologist testified that Angelitos personality disorder is chronic
or incurable; Angelito has long been afflicted with the disorder prior to his marriage
with Jocelyn or even during his early developmental stage, as basic trust was not
developed. However, she did not support this declaration with any factual basis. In
her Report, she based her conclusion on the presumption that Angelito apparently
grew up in a dysfunctional family. Quite noticeable, though, is the psychologists own
equivocation on this point she was not firm in her conclusion for she herself may
have realized that it was simply conjectural. The veracity, too, of this finding is
highly suspect, for it was based entirely on Jocelyns assumed knowledge of
Angelitos family background and upbringing.
Additionally, the psychologist merely generalized on the questions of why and

to what extent was Angelitos personality disorder grave and incurable, and on the
effects of the disorder on Angelitos awareness of and his capability to undertake the
duties and responsibilities of marriage.
The psychologist therefore failed to provide the answers to the more important
concerns or requisites of psychological incapacity, all of which are critical to the
success of Jocelyns cause.
b. Jocelyns Testimony
The inadequacy and/or lack of probative value of the psychological report and
the psychologists testimony impel us to proceed to the evaluation of Jocelyns
testimony, to find out whether she provided the court with sufficient facts to support
a finding of Angelitos psychological incapacity.
Unfortunately, we find Jocelyns testimony to be insufficient. Jocelyn merely

testified on Angelitos habitual drunkenness, gambling, refusal to seek employment
and the physical beatings she received from him all of which occurred after the
marriage. Significantly, she declared in her testimony that Angelito showed no signs
of violent behavior,assuming this to be indicative of a personality disorder, during
the courtship stage or at the earliest stages of her relationship with him. She testified
on the alleged physical beatings after the marriage, not before or at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. She did not clarify when these beatings exactly took
place whether it was near or at the time of celebration of the marriage or months or
years after. This is a clear evidentiary gap that materially affects her cause, as the
law and its related jurisprudence require that the psychological incapacity must exist
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
Habitual drunkenness, gambling and refusal to find a job, while indicative of

psychological incapacity, do not, by themselves, show psychological incapacity. All
these simply indicate difficulty, neglect or mere refusal to perform marital
obligations that, as the cited jurisprudence holds, cannot be considered to be
constitutive of psychological incapacity in the absence of proof that these are
manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition
or illness.
The physical violence allegedly inflicted on Jocelyn deserves a different

treatment. While we may concede that physical violence on women indicates
abnormal behavioral or personality patterns, such violence, standing alone, does not
constitute psychological incapacity. Jurisprudence holds that there must be
evidence showing a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest
psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. The evidence of this
nexus is irretrievably lost in the present case under our finding that the opinion of
the psychologist cannot be relied upon. Even assuming, therefore, that Jocelyns
account of the physical beatings she received from Angelito were true, this evidence
does not satisfy the requirement of Article 36 and its related jurisprudence,
specifically the Santos requisites.
On the whole, the CA correctly reversed the RTC judgment, whose factual
bases we now find to be clearly and manifestly erroneous. Our ruling
in Tuason recognizing the finality of the factual findings of the trial court in Article
36 cases (which is Jocelyns main anchor in her present appeal with us) does not
therefore apply in this case. We find that, on the contrary, the CA correctly applied
Article 36 and its related jurisprudence to the facts and the evidence of the present
case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of

merit. We AFFIRM the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 62443.Costs against the petitioner.
-SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer
of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guaria III, and concurred in by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and
Associate Justice Santiago Javier Raada (both retired).
[2]
Penned by Judge Pedro de Leon Gutierrez.
[3]
TSN, March 31, 1998, pp. 16-17.
[4]
TSN, July 16, 1998, pp. 15-22.
[5]
Record, pp. 36-39.
[6]
Parenthetical notes supplied.
[7]
The RTC enumerated the requisites as follows: (1) that psychological incapacity refers to no less than a mental not
physical incapacity; (2) that the law intended psychological incapacity to be confined to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
marriage; and (3) that the psychological condition must exist at the time of the marriage and must be characterized
by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurability. See citation at note 9.
[8]
Parenthetical notes supplied.
[9]
310 Phil 21 (1995).
[10]
Id. at 39-40.
[11]
335 Phil. 664 (1997).
[12]
Id. at 676-680.
[13]
See Marcos v. Marcos, 397 Phil. 840, 850 (2000).
[14]
Id.
[15]
Id. at 850.
[16]
408 Phil. 713, 720 (2001).
[17]
G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193.
[18]
Id. at 213.
[19]
Id.
[20]
G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009.
[21]
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
[22]
A step that Te, a Third Division case, could not have legally undertaken because the Molina ruling is an En
Banc ruling, in light of Article VIII, Section 4(3) of the Constitution.
[23]
Supra note 16, pp. 231-232.
[24]
Supra note 19.
[25]
See So v. Valera, G.R. No. 150677, June 5, 2009, and Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, August
14, 2009.
[26]
Id., Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua.
[27]
Navales v. Navales, G.R. No. 167523, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 272, 288-289.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 104818 September 17, 1993
ROBERTO DOMINGO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DELIA SOLEDAD AVERA represented by her Attorney-in-Fact
MOISES R. AVERA, respondents.
Jose P.O. Aliling IV for petitioner.
De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for private respondent.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition seeks the reversal of respondent court's ruling finding no grave abuse of
discretion in the lower court's order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage and separation of property.
On May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig entitled "Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property" against
petitioner Roberto Domingo. The petition which was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1989-J
alleged among others that: they were married on November 29, 1976 at the YMCA Youth Center
Bldg., as evidenced by a Marriage Contract Registry No. 1277K-76 with Marriage License No.
4999036 issued at Carmona, Cavite; unknown to her, he had a previous marriage with one Emerlina
dela Paz on April 25, 1969 which marriage is valid and still existing; she came to know of the prior
marriage only sometime in 1983 when Emerlina dela Paz sued them for bigamy; from January 23
1979 up to the present, she has been working in Saudi Arabia and she used to come to the
Philippines only when she would avail of the one-month annual vacation leave granted by her
foreign employer since 1983 up to the present, he has been unemployed and completely dependent
upon her for support and subsistence; out of her personal earnings, she purchased real and
personal properties with a total amount of approximately P350,000.00, which are under the
possession and administration of Roberto; sometime in June 1989, while on her one-month
vacation, she discovered that he was cohabiting with another woman; she further discovered that he
had been disposing of some of her properties without her knowledge or consent; she confronted him
about this and thereafter appointed her brother Moises R. Avera as her attorney-in-fact to take care
of her properties; he failed and refused to turn over the possession and administration of said
properties to her brother/attorney-in-fact; and he is not authorized to administer and possess the
same on account of the nullity of their marriage. The petition prayed that a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining Roberto from exercising any act of
administration and ownership over said properties; their marriage be declared null and void and of
no force and effect; and Delia Soledad be declared the sole and exclusive owner of all properties
acquired at the time of their void marriage and such properties be placed under the proper
management and administration of the attorney-in-fact.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the petition stated no cause of action. The
marriage being void ab initio, the petition for the declaration of its nullity is, therefore, superfluous
and unnecessary. It added that private respondent has no property which is in his possession.
On August 20, 1991, Judge Maria Alicia M. Austria issued an Order denying the motion to dismiss
for lack of merit. She explained:
Movant argues that a second marriage contracted after a first marriage by a man
with another woman is illegal and void (citing the case of Yap v. Court of Appeals,
145 SCRA 229) and no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a
void marriage (citing the cases of People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033; People v.
Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845). Indeed, under the Yap case there is no dispute that the
second marriage contracted by respondent with herein petitioner after a first
marriage with another woman is illegal and void. However, as to whether or not the
second marriage should first be judicially declared a nullity is not an issue in said
case. In the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. GSIS, the Supreme Court ruled in explicit
terms, thus:
And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed
that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab
initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting,
still there is need for judicial declaration of its nullity. (37 SCRA 316,
326)
The above ruling which is of later vintage deviated from the previous
rulings of the Supreme Court in the aforecited cases of Aragon and
Mendoza.
Finally, the contention of respondent movant that petitioner has no

property in his possession is an issue that may be determined only
after trial on the merits.1
A motion for reconsideration was filed stressing the erroneous application of Vda. de Consuegra
v. GSIS2 and the absence of justiciable controversy as to the nullity of the marriage. On September
11, 1991, Judge Austria denied the motion for reconsideration and gave petitioner fifteen (15) days
from receipt within which to file his answer.
Instead of filing the required answer, petitioner filed a special civil action
of certiorari and mandamus on the ground that the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying the motion to dismiss.
On February 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals3 dismissed the petition. It explained that the case of Yap
v. CA4 cited by petitioner and that of Consuegra v. GSIS relied upon by the lower court do not have
relevance in the case at bar, there being no identity of facts because these cases dealt with the
successional rights of the second wife while the instant case prays for separation of property
corollary with the declaration of nullity of marriage. It observed that the separation and subsequent
distribution of the properties acquired during the union can be had only upon proper determination of
the status of the marital relationship between said parties, whether or not the validity of the first
marriage is denied by petitioner. Furthermore, in order to avoid duplication and multiplicity of suits,
the declaration of nullity of marriage may be invoked in this proceeding together with the partition
and distribution of the properties involved. Citing Articles 48, 50 and 52 of the Family Code, it held
that private respondent's prayer for declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage may be raised
together with other incidents of their marriage such as the separation of their properties. Lastly, it
noted that since the Court has jurisdiction, the alleged error in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss
is merely one of law for which the remedy ordinarily would have been to file an answer, proceed with
the trial and in case of an adverse decision, reiterate the issue on appeal. The motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied for lack of merit.5
Hence, this petition.
The two basic issues confronting the Court in the instant case are the following.
First, whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the
affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.
Second, whether or not SP No. 1989-J is the proper remedy of private respondent to recover certain
real and personal properties allegedly belonging to her exclusively.
Petitioner, invoking the ruling in People v. Aragon6 and People v. Mendoza,7 contends that SP. No.
1989-J for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property filed by private respondent
must be dismissed for being unnecessary and superfluous. Furthermore, under his own
interpretation of Article 40 of the Family Code, he submits that a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of marriage is required only for purposes of remarriage. Since the petition in SP No. 1989-J
contains no allegation of private respondent's intention to remarry, said petition should therefore, be
dismissed.
On the other hand, private respondent insists on the necessity of a judicial declaration of the nullity
of their marriage, not for purposes of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation
and distribution of the properties acquired during coverture.
There is no question that the marriage of petitioner and private respondent celebrated while the
former's previous marriage with one Emerlina de la Paz was still subsisting, is bigamous. As such, it
is from the beginning.8 Petitioner himself does not dispute the absolute nullity of their marriage.9
The cases of People v. Aragon and People v. Mendoza relied upon by petitioner are cases where
the Court had earlier ruled that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void,
bigamous marriage. It is noteworthy to observe that Justice Alex Reyes, however, dissented on
these occasions stating that:
Though the logician may say that where the former marriage was void there would
be nothing to dissolve, still it is not for the spouses to judge whether that marriage
was void or not. That judgment is reserved to the courts. . . . 10
This dissenting opinion was adopted as the majority position in subsequent cases involving the
same issue. Thus, in Gomez v. Lipana, 11 the Court abandoned its earlier ruling in
the Aragon and Mendoza cases. In reversing the lower court's order forfeiting the husband's share of
the disputed property acquired during the second marriage, the Court stated that "if the nullity, or
annulment of the marriage is the basis for the application of Article 1417, there is need for a judicial
declaration thereof, which of course contemplates an action for that purpose."
Citing Gomez v. Lipana, the Court subsequently held in Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service
Insurance System, that "although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it
was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration
of such nullity."
In Tolentino v. Paras,12 however, the Court turned around and applied

the Aragon and Mendoza ruling once again. In granting the prayer of the first wife asking for a
declaration as the lawful surviving spouse and the correction of the death certificate of her deceased
husband, it explained that "(t)he second marriage that he contracted with private respondent during
the lifetime of his first spouse is null and void from the beginning and of no force and effect. No
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void marriage."
However, in the more recent case of Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy 13 the Court reverted to
the Consuegra case and held that there was "no need of introducing evidence about the existing
prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage
though void still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal
intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel."
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense. 14Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked
for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. 15
The Family Law Revision Committee and the Civil Code Revision Committee 16 which drafted what is
now the Family Code of the Philippines took the position that parties to a marriage should not be
allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again. This is borne
out by the following minutes of the 152nd Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees where the present Article 40, then Art. 39, was discussed.
B. Article 39. —
The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis

of a final judgment declaring the marriage void, except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that the above provision should include not only void but
also voidable marriages. He then suggested that the above provision be modified as
follows:
The validity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .
Justice Reyes (J.B.L. Reyes), however, proposed that they say:
The validity or invalidity of a marriage may be invoked

only . . .
On the other hand, Justice Puno suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only . . .

Justice Caguioa explained that his idea is that one cannot determine for himself
whether or not his marriage is valid and that a court action is needed. Justice Puno
accordingly proposed that the provision be modified to read:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a

final judgment annulling the marriage or declaring the marriage void,
except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa remarked that in annulment, there is no question. Justice Puno,

however, pointed out that, even if it is a judgment of annulment, they still have to
produce the judgment.
Justice Caguioa suggested that they say:
The invalidity of a marriage may be invoked only on the basis of a

final judgment declaring the marriage invalid, except as provided in
Article 41.
Justice Puno raised the question: When a marriage is declared invalid, does it
include the annulment of a marriage and the declaration that the marriage is void?
Justice Caguioa replied in the affirmative. Dean Gupit added that in some judgments,
even if the marriage is annulled, it is declared void. Justice Puno suggested that this
matter be made clear in the provision.
Prof. Baviera remarked that the original idea in the provision is to require first a
judicial declaration of a void marriage and not annullable marriages, with which the
other members concurred. Judge Diy added that annullable marriages are presumed
valid until a direct action is filed to annul it, which the other members affirmed.
Justice Puno remarked that if this is so, then the phrase "absolute nullity" can stand
since it might result in confusion if they change the phrase to "invalidity" if what they
are referring to in the provision is the declaration that the marriage is void.
Prof. Bautista commented that they will be doing away with collateral defense as well
as collateral attack. Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the provision is that
there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a party should not
declare for himself whether or not the marriage is void, while the other members
affirmed. Justice Caguioa added that they are, therefore, trying to avoid a collateral
attack on that point. Prof. Bautista stated that there are actions which are brought on
the assumption that the marriage is valid. He then asked: Are they depriving one of
the right to raise the defense that he has no liability because the basis of the liability
is void? Prof. Bautista added that they cannot say that there will be no judgment on
the validity or invalidity of the marriage because it will be taken up in the same
proceeding. It will not be a unilateral declaration that, it is a void marriage. Justice
Caguioa saw the point of Prof. Bautista and suggested that they limit the provision to
remarriage. He then proposed that Article 39 be reworded as follows:
The absolute nullity of a marriage for purposes of remarriage may be

invoked only on the basis of final judgment . . .
Justice Puno suggested that the above be modified as follows:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage only
on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Puno later modified the above as follows:
For the purpose of establishing the validity of a subsequent marriage,

the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on
the basis of a final judgment declaring such nullity, except as
provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa commented that the above provision is too broad and will not solve
the objection of Prof. Bautista. He proposed that they say:
For the purpose of entering into a subsequent marriage, the absolute

nullity of a previous marriage may only be invoked on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such nullity, except as provided in Article 41.
Justice Caguioa explained that the idea in the above provision is that if one enters
into a subsequent marriage without obtaining a final judgment declaring the nullity of
a previous marriage, said subsequent marriage is void ab initio.
After further deliberation, Justice Puno suggested that they go back to the original
wording of the provision as follows:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for

purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void, except as provided in Article
41. 17
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of
the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged
with bigamy. 18
Just over a year ago, the Court made the pronouncement that there is a necessity for a declaration
of absolute nullity of a prior subsisting marriage before contracting another in the recent case
of Terre v. Terre. 19 The Court, in turning down the defense of respondent Terre who was charged
with grossly immoral conduct consisting of contracting a second marriage and living with another
woman other than complainant while his prior marriage with the latter remained subsisting, said that
"for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a
judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential."
As regards the necessity for a judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, petitioner submits
that the same can be maintained only if it is for the purpose of remarriage. Failure to allege this
purpose, according to petitioner's theory, will warrant dismissal of the same.

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void. (n)
Crucial to the proper interpretation of Article 40 is the position in the provision of the word "solely."
As it is placed, the same shows that it is meant to qualify "final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void." Realizing the need for careful craftsmanship in conveying the precise intent of the
Committee members, the provision in question, as it finally emerged, did not state "The absolute
nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage . . .," in which case
"solely" would clearly qualify the phrase "for purposes of remarriage." Had the phraseology been
such, the interpretation of petitioner would have been correct and, that is, that the absolute nullity of
a previous marriage may be invoked solely for purposes of remarriage, thus rendering irrelevant the
clause "on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
That Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that such final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage.
Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for
liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well
as an action for the custody and support of their common children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance where a party who has previously contracted a
marriage which remains subsisting desires to enter into another marriage which is legally
unassailable, he is required by law to prove that the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this he
may do on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
This leads us to the question: Why the distinction? In other words, for purposes of remarriage, why
should the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity be a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void? Whereas, for purposes other than remarriage,
other evidence is acceptable?
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is

the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State."20 In more explicit terms, the
Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal, and family life." 21 So
crucial are marriage and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature,
consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not subject to stipulation . . ." 22 As a matter of
policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be
accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so
defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso
jure and with no legal effect — and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would
be reduced to a mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for
nullifying marriage would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could
conceive. For such a social significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts,
and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the same
would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.
That the law seeks to ensure that a prior marriage is no impediment to a second sought to be
contracted by one of the parties may be gleaned from new information required in the Family Code
to be included in the application for a marriage license, viz, "If previously married, how, when and
where the previous marriage was dissolved and annulled." 23
Reverting to the case before us, petitioner's interpretation of Art. 40 of the Family Code is,
undoubtedly, quite restrictive. Thus, his position that private respondent's failure to state in the
petition that the same is filed to enable her to remarry will result in the dismissal of SP No. 1989-J is
untenable. His misconstruction of Art. 40 resulting from the misplaced emphasis on the term "solely"
was in fact anticipated by the members of the Committee.
Dean Gupit commented the word "only" may be misconstrued to refer to "for
purposes of remarriage." Judge Diy stated that "only" refers to "final
judgment." Justice Puno suggested that they say "on the basis only of a final
judgment." Prof. Baviera suggested that they use the legal term "solely" instead of
"only," which the Committee approved. 24 (Emphasis supplied)
Pursuing his previous argument that the declaration for absolute nullity of marriage is unnecessary,
petitioner suggests that private respondent should have filed an ordinary civil action for the recovery
of the properties alleged to have been acquired during their union. In such an eventuality, the lower
court would not be acting as a mere special court but would be clothed with jurisdiction to rule on the
issues of possession and ownership. In addition, he pointed out that there is actually nothing to
separate or partition as the petition admits that all the properties were acquired with private
respondent's money.
The Court of Appeals disregarded this argument and concluded that "the prayer for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage may be raised together with the other incident of their marriage such as
the separation of their properties."
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, the law states that the final judgment therein shall
provide for "the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody
and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such
matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings." 25 Other specific effects flowing
therefrom, in proper cases, are the following:
Art. 43. xxx xxx xxx
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may
be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in
bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal
partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are
none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of
children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee
contracted the marriage in bad faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked
by operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the other spouse who acted
in bad faith as a beneficiary in any insurance policy, even if such designation be
stipulated as irrevocable; and
(5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be
disqualified to inherit from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.
(n)
Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage
shall be void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary
disposition made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law. (n) 26
Based on the foregoing provisions, private respondent's ultimate prayer for separation of property
will simply be one of the necessary consequences of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
their marriage. Thus, petitioner's suggestion that in order for their properties to be separated, an
ordinary civil action has to be instituted for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly
provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of
property according to the regime of property relations governing them. It stands to reason that the
lower court before whom the issue of nullity of a first marriage is brought is likewise clothed with
jurisdiction to decide the incidental questions regarding the couple's properties. Accordingly, the
respondent court committed no reversible error in finding that the lower court committed no grave
abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's motion to dismiss SP No. 1989-J.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of respondent Court dated
February 7, 1992 and the Resolution dated March 20, 1992 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000]
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the
RTC, Branch 139, Makati City, respondents.
DECISION
BUENA, J.:
This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeks to review and set aside the Order dated January 28, 1999
issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No. 98-3056, entitled "Meynardo
Beltran vs. People of the Philippines and Hon. Judge Alden Cervantes of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati city, Branch 61." The said Order denied
petitioners prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin
Judge Cervantes from proceeding with the trial of Criminal Case No. 236176,
a concubinage case against petitioner on the ground that the pending petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner against his wife
constitutes a prejudicial question.
The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:
Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on

June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao,
Quezon City. [1]
On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four

children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of
[2]
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code before Branch 87

of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-97-30192. [3]
In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged
that it was petitioner who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a
certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a
[4]
criminal complaint for concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal
[5]
Code against petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office
of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found probable
cause and ordered the filing of an Information against them. The case,
[6]
docketed as Criminal Case No. 236176, was filed before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 61.
On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant

for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings Including the Issuance of
the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the pendency
of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial
question to the determination of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez
Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order dated August 31, 1998.
[7]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order of denial was likewise
denied in an Order dated December 9, 1998.
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage
case, petitioner went to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139
on certiorari, questioning the Orders dated August 31, 1998 and December 9,
1998 issued by Judge Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. In an Order dated January 28, 1999, the Regional
[8] [9]
Trial Court of Makati denied the petition for certiorari. Said Court subsequently
issued another Order dated February 23, 1999, denying his motion for
[10]
reconsideration of the dismissal of his petition.

Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.
Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity
of his marriage based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the
criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife.
Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting decisions
might result from the civil case for annulment of marriage and the criminal
case for concubinage. In the civil case, the trial court might declare the
marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's complaint but in the criminal case,
the trial court might acquit petitioner because the evidence shows that his
marriage is void on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner submits that
the possible conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage can be
avoided, if the criminal case will be suspended, until the court rules on the
validity of marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is declared void by reason of
psychological incapacity then by reason of the arguments submitted in the
subject petition, his marriage has never existed; and that, accordingly,
petitioner could not be convicted in the criminal case because he was never
before a married man.
Petitioner's contentions are untenable.
The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two

conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves
an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed. [11]
The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is

not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be
considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the
latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only
that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined.

"The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void."
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that the import of said
[12]
provision is that for purposes of remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis
for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than
remarriage, other evidence is acceptable. The pertinent portions of said
Decision read:
"xxx Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a

party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a previous marriage
for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action
for liquidation, partition, distribution and separation of property
between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the
custody and support of their common children and the delivery of
the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence needs
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the
existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an
absolute nullity. These needs not be limited solely to an earlier
final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void."
So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need
not present a final judgment declaring his marriage void for he can adduce
evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a
final judgment declaring his marriage void.
With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge

of concubinage should his marriage be declared null and void, suffice it to
state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from
the beginning is not a defense.
Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Reloval cited in Donato vs.
[13]
Luna where this Court held that:

[14]
"xxx Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the
ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the
outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not
be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must
be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only
when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption
is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."
Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must
be submitted to judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of
the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no
such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and
purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the
judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in
affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that
pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial
question in a criminal case for concubinage.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 138509. July 31, 2000]
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner, vs. ISAGANI D.

BOBIS, respondent.
DECISION
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage with one Maria Dulce B.
Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or terminated, the same
respondent contracted a second marriage with petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on
January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third marriage with a certain Julia Sally Hernandez.
Based on petitioners complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy was filed against
respondent on February 25, 1998, which was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-
75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime thereafter,
respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first
marriage on the ground that it was celebrated without a marriage license. Respondent
then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking
the pending civil case for nullity of the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the
criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case in an
Order dated December 29, 1998.[1] Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the
same was denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent should
have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage before entering
into the second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying
suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the
Family Code.[2]
The issue to be resolved in this petition is whether the subsequent filing of a civil action
for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a prejudicial question to a
criminal case for bigamy.
A prejudicial question is one which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein.[3] It is a question based on a fact distinct and
separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or
innocence of the accused.[4] It must appear not only that the civil case involves facts
upon which the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised
in the civil action would necessarily be determinative of the criminal
case.[5] Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to
the same issue raised in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of whether
or not the latter action may proceed.[6] Its two essential elements are:[7]
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the
accused but simply tests the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to
sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial
question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential elements of a
crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution
has not yet presented a single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its
case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial
question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-
criminal suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code, which was effective at the time of celebration of the
second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage
before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties,
particularly the accused, to determine the validity or invalidity of the marriage. [8] Whether
or not the first marriage was void for lack of a license is a matter of defense because
there is still no judicial declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage was
contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted
provided all its elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent
marriage which would have been valid had it not been for the existence at the material
time of the first marriage.[9]
In the case at bar, respondents clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of
his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same judgment to prevent his
prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherwise, all that an
adventurous bigamist has to do is to disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a
subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first
marriage is void and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lack of a prior
judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aware of
the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a
subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of the first on the
assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario would render nugatory the
provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho v. Relova:[10]
(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its

nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such
declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A
party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.
Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us was void for lack of a
marriage license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her marriage to respondent
was exempt from the requirement of a marriage license. More specifically, petitioner
claims that prior to their marriage, they had already attained the age of majority and had
been living together as husband and wife for at least five years.[11] The issue in this case
is limited to the existence of a prejudicial question, and we are not called upon to
resolve the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state that the Civil
Code, under which the first marriage was celebrated, provides that "every intendment of
law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds."[12] Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of
their marriage, for the same must be submitted to the determination of competent
courts. Only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. [13] No
matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the intervention of
the courts must always be resorted to. That is why Article 40 of the Family Code
requires a "final judgment," which only the courts can render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho
v. Relova,[14] he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a
case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil
case for declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the
pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial
question.[15] This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the
subsistence of a marriage.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully
invoked as an excuse.[16] The contracting of a marriage knowing that the requirements of
the law have not been complied with or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal
impediment is an act penalized by the Revised Penal Code.[17] The legality of a marriage
is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the law. As respondent did not
obtain the judicial declaration of nullity when he entered into the second marriage, why
should he be allowed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to delay his
criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his own disobedience of the law? If
he wants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he can do it as a matter of
defense when he presents his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.
The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second
marriage was contracted rests upon the defense,[18] but that is a matter that can be
raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should be stressed that not
every defense raised in the civil action may be used as a prejudicial question to obtain
the suspension of the criminal action. The lower court, therefore, erred in suspending
the criminal case for bigamy. Moreover, when respondent was indicted for bigamy, the
fact that he entered into two marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It was only
after he was sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is that
respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the
purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. As has been discussed
above, this cannot be done.
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, without first having obtained
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be said to have validly
entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still
needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any party can marry again; otherwise the
second marriage will also be void.[19] The reason is that, without a judicial declaration of
its nullity, the first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent
was for all legal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time he
contracted his second marriage with petitioner.[20] Against this legal backdrop, any
decision in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that respondent entered
into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in
the civil case is not essential to the determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore,
not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his
own malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.[21]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
the trial court is ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed with Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 29-30.
[2]
Petition, p. 6; Rollo, p. 23.
[3]
Fortich-Celdran v. Celdran, 19 SCRA 502 (1967); Zapanta v. Montessa; 114 Phil. 428 (1962); Merced v. Diez,
109 Phil. 155 (1960); See also People v. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357 (1954) cited in Dichaves v. Judge Apalit, AM-MTJ-
00-1274, June 8, 2000.
[4]
Yap v. Paras, 205 SCRA 625 (1992); Donato v. Luna, 160 SCRA 441 (1988); Quiambao v. Osorio, 158 SCRA
674 (1988); Mendiola v. Macadaeg, 1 SCRA 593 (1961); Aleria v. Mendoza, 83 Phil. 427 (1949);
Berbari v. Concepcion, 40 Phil. 837 (1920)
[5]
Ras v. Rasul, 100 SCRA 125 (1980); Benitez v. Concepcion, Jr., 2 SCRA 178 (1961) citing De Leon v. Mabanag,
70 Phil. 202 (1940)
[6]
Yap v. Paras, 205 SCRA 625 (1992)
[7]
Rules of Court, Rule 111, Sec. 5. Elements of prejudicial question. The two (2) essential elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal
action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. (See also
Prado v. People, 218 Phil. 571)
[8]
Nial v. Badayog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000.
[9]
People v. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246 (1935). The elements of bigamy are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2)
that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not
been judicially declared presumptively dead; (3) that he contracts a subsequent marriage; (4) the subsequent
marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first. The exception to prosecution for
bigamy are those covered by Article 41 of the Family Code and by P.D. 1083 otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, which provides that penal laws relative to the crime of bigamy "shall not
apply to a person married xxx under Muslim Law" where the requirements set therein are met. See also Sulu Islamic
Association v. Malik, 226 SCRA 193 (1993); Merced v. Diez, 109 Phil. 155 (1960)
[10]
22 SCRA 731, 735 (1968)
[11]
Civil Code, Article 76.
[12]
[13]
Landicho v. Relova, supra.
[14]
Supra.
[15]
Beltran v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 137567, June 20, 2000.
[16]
[17]
Revised Penal Code, Article 350.
[18]
People v. Dungao, 56 Phil. 805 (1931)
[19]
Apiag v. Judge Cantero, 268 SCRA 47, 61 (1997)
[20]
Wiegel v. Hon. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499, 501 (1986)
[21]
People v. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357, 360 (1954)
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137110. August 1, 2000]
VINCENT PAUL G. MERCADO a.k.a. VINCENT G. MERCADO, petitioner,

vs. CONSUELO TAN, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a

subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage
without first obtaining suchjudicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies
even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the July 14, 1998 Decision
of the Court of Appeals (CA)[1] in CA-GR CR No. 19830 and its January 4, 1999 Resolution
denying reconsideration. The assailed Decision affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bacolod City in Criminal Case No. 13848, which convicted herein
petitioner of bigamy as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of accused Dr. Vincent Paul G. Mercado a.k.a.
Dr. Vincent G. Mercado of the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code to have been proven beyond reasonable doubt,
[the court hereby renders] judgment imposing upon him a prison term of three
(3) years, four (4) months and fifteen (15) days of prision correccional, as
minimum of his indeterminate sentence, to eight (8) years and twenty-one (21)
days of prision mayor, as maximum, plus accessory penalties provided by
law.
Costs against accused.[2]
The Facts
The facts are quoted by Court of Appeals (CA) from the trial courts judgment, as
follows: From the evidence adduced by the parties, there is no dispute that accused Dr.
Vincent Mercado and complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan got married on June 27, 1991
before MTCC-Bacolod City Br. 7 Judge Gorgonio J. Ibaez [by reason of] which a Marriage
Contract was duly executed and signed by the parties. As entered in said document, the
status of accused was single. There is no dispute either that at the time of the celebration
of the wedding with complainant, accused was actually a married man, having been in
lawful wedlock with Ma. Thelma Oliva in a marriage ceremony solemnized on April 10,
1976 by Judge Leonardo B. Caares, CFI-Br. XIV, Cebu City per Marriage Certificate
issued in connection therewith, which matrimony was further blessed by Rev. Father
Arthur Baur on October 10, 1976 in religious rites at the Sacred Heart Church, Cebu
City. In the same manner, the civil marriage between accused and complainant was
confirmed in a church ceremony on June 29, 1991 officiated by Msgr. Victorino A. Rivas,
Judicial Vicar, Diocese of Bacolod City. Both marriages were consummated when out of
the first consortium, Ma. Thelma Oliva bore accused two children, while a child, Vincent
Paul, Jr. was sired by accused with complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan.
On October 5, 1992, a letter-complaint for bigamy was filed by complainant

through counsel with the City Prosecutor of Bacolod City, which eventually
resulted [in] the institution of the present case before this Court against said
accused, Dr. Vincent G. Mercado, on March 1, 1993 in an Information dated
January 22, 1993.
On November 13, 1992, or more than a month after the bigamy case was
lodged in the Prosecutors Office, accused filed an action for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against Ma. Thelma V. Oliva in RTC-Br. 22, Cebu City, and
in a Decision dated May 6, 1993 the marriage between Vincent G. Mercado
and Ma. Thelma V. Oliva was declared null and void.
Accused is charged [with] bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code for having contracted a second marriage with herein complainant Ma.
Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991 when at that time he was previously united in
lawful marriage with Ma. Thelma V. Oliva on April 10, 1976 at Cebu City,
without said first marriage having been legally dissolved. As shown by the
evidence and admitted by accused, all the essential elements of the crime are
present, namely: (a) that the offender has been previously legally married; (2)
that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or in case the spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the
Civil Code; (3) that he contract[ed] a second or subsequent marriage; and (4)
that the second or subsequent marriage ha[d] all the essential requisites for
validity. x x x
While acknowledging the existence of the two marriage[s], accused posited

the defense that his previous marriage ha[d] been judicially declared null and
void and that the private complainant had knowledge of the first marriage of
accused.
It is an admitted fact that when the second marriage was entered into with Ma.
Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991, accuseds prior marriage with Ma. Thelma V.
Oliva was subsisting, no judicial action having yet been initiated or any judicial
declaration obtained as to the nullity of such prior marriage with Ma. Thelma
V. Oliva. Since no declaration of the nullity of his first marriage ha[d] yet been
made at the time of his second marriage, it is clear that accused was a
married man when he contracted such second marriage with complainant on
June 27, 1991. He was still at the time validly married to his first wife.[3]
Agreeing with the lower court, the Court of Appeals stated:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous

marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. But here, the final
judgment declaring null and void accuseds previous marriage came not before
the celebration of the second marriage, but after, when the case for bigamy
against accused was already tried in court. And what constitutes the crime of
bigamy is the act of any person who shall contract a second subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved.[4]
Hence, this Petition.[5]
The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
Whether or not the element of previous legal marriage is present in order to

convict petitioner.
Whether or not a liberal interpretation in favor of petitioner of Article 349 of the

Revised Penal Code punishing bigamy, in relation to Articles 36 and 40 of the
Family Code, negates the guilt of petitioner.
C
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to an acquittal on the basis of reasonable
doubt.[6]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
Main Issue:Effect of Nullity of Previous Marriage
Petitioner was convicted of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
which provides:
The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall
contract a second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.
The elements of this crime are as follows:
1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her
spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.[7]
When the Information was filed on January 22, 1993, all the elements of bigamy were
present. It is undisputed that petitioner married Thelma G. Oliva on April 10, 1976 in Cebu
City. While that marriage was still subsisting, he contracted a second marriage, this
time with Respondent Ma. Consuelo Tan who subsequently filed the Complaint for
bigamy.
Petitioner contends, however, that he obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his
first marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, thereby rendering it void ab
initio. Unlike voidable marriages which are considered valid until set aside by a competent
court, he argues that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all.[8] Thus,
he concludes that there is no first marriage to speak of. Petitioner also quotes the
commentaries[9] of former Justice Luis Reyes that it is now settled that if the first marriage
is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. But if the first marriage is
voidable, it is not a defense.
Respondent, on the other hand, admits that the first marriage was declared null and
void under Article 36 of the Family Code, but she points out that that declaration came
only after the Information had been filed. Hence, by then, the crime had already been
consummated. She argues that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous marriage
must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time.
We agree with the respondent.
To be sure, jurisprudence regarding the need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage has been characterized as conflicting.[10] In People v. Mendoza,[11] a
bigamy case involving an accused who married three times, the Court ruled that there
was no need for such declaration. In that case, the accused contracted a second marriage
during the subsistence of the first. When the first wife died, he married for the third
time. The second wife then charged him with bigamy. Acquitting him, the Court held that
the second marriage was void ab initio because it had been contracted while the first
marriage was still in effect. Since the second marriage was obviously void and illegal, the
Court ruled that there was no need for a judicial declaration of its nullity. Hence, the
accused did not commit bigamy when he married for the third time. This ruling was
affirmed by the Court in People v. Aragon,[12] which involved substantially the same facts.
But in subsequent cases, the Court impressed the need for a judicial declaration of
nullity. In Vda de Consuegra v. GSIS,[13] Jose Consuegra married for the second time
while the first marriage was still subsisting. Upon his death, the Court awarded one half
of the proceeds of his retirement benefits to the first wife and the other half to the second
wife and her children, notwithstanding the manifest nullity of the second marriage. It
held: And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observes that although
the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the
first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity.
In Tolentino v. Paras,[14] however, the Court again held that judicial declaration of
nullity of a void marriage was not necessary. In that case, a man married twice. In his
Death Certificate, his second wife was named as his surviving spouse. The first wife then
filed a Petition to correct the said entry in the Death Certificate. The Court ruled in favor
of the first wife, holding that the second marriage that he contracted with private
respondent during the lifetime of the first spouse is null and void from the beginning and
of no force and effect. No judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a void
marriage.
In Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy,[15] the Court stressed the need for such declaration. In that
case, Karl Heinz Wiegel filed an action for the declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lilia
Olivia Wiegel on the ground that the latter had a prior existing marriage. After pretrial, Lilia
asked that she be allowed to present evidence to prove, among others, that her first
husband had previously been married to another woman. In holding that there was no
need for such evidence, the Court ruled: x x x There is likewise no need of introducing
evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they married
each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs, according to this Court, a
judicial declaration of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be
regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent
Karl Heinz Wiegel; x x x.
Subsequently, in Yap v. CA,[16] the Court reverted to the ruling in People v. Mendoza,
holding that there was no need for such declaration of nullity.
In Domingo v. CA,[17] the issue raised was whether a judicial declaration of nullity was
still necessary for the recovery and the separation of properties of erstwhile
spouses. Ruling in the affirmative, the Court declared: The Family Code has settled once
and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration of the absolute nullity
of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense; in fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also
for the protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void,
marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.[18]
Unlike Mendoza and Aragon, Domingo as well as the other cases herein cited was
not a criminal prosecution for bigamy. Nonetheless, Domingo underscored the need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage on the basis of a new provision of the
Family Code, which came into effect several years after the promulgation
of Mendoza and Aragon.
In Mendoza and Aragon, the Court relied on Section 29 of Act No. 3613 (Marriage
Law), which provided:
Illegal marriages. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during

the lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(a) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved;

(b) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the
second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive,
or the absentee being generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, the marriage as
contracted being valid in either case until declared null and void by a competent
court."
The Court held in those two cases that the said provision plainly makes a subsequent
marriage contracted by any person during the lifetime of his first spouse illegal and void
from its performance, and no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity, as
distinguished from mere annulable marriages.[19]
The provision appeared in substantially the same form under Article 83 of the 1950
Civil Code and Article 41 of the Family Code. However, Article 40 of the Family Code, a
new provision, expressly requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage,
as follows:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
marriage void.
In view of this provision, Domingo stressed that a final judgment declaring such
marriage void was necessary. Verily, the Family Code and Domingo affirm the earlier
ruling in Wiegel. Thus, a Civil Law authority and member of the Civil Code Revision
Commitee has observed:
[Article 40] is also in line with the recent decisions of the Supreme Court that
the marriage of a person may be null and void but there is need of a judicial
declaration of such fact before that person can marry again; otherwise, the
second marriage will also be void (Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy, Aug. 19/86, 143
SCRA 499, Vda. De Consuegra v. GSIS, 37 SCRA 315). This provision
changes the old rule that where a marriage is illegal and void from its
performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its validity (People v.
Mendoza, 95 Phil. 843; People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033).[20]
In this light, the statutory mooring of the ruling in Mendoza and Aragon that there is
no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage -- has been cast aside by
Article 40 of the Family Code. Such declaration is now necessary before one can contract
a second marriage. Absent that declaration, we hold that one may be charged with and
convicted of bigamy.
The present ruling is consistent with our pronouncement in Terre v. Terre,[21] which
involved an administrative Complaint against a lawyer for marrying twice. In rejecting the
lawyers argument that he was free to enter into a second marriage because the first one
was void ab initio, the Court ruled: for purposes of determining whether a person is legally
free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null
and void ab initio is essential. The Court further noted that the said rule was cast into
statutory form by Article 40 of the Family Code. Significantly, it observed that the second
marriage, contracted without a judicial declaration that the first marriage was void, was
bigamous and criminal in character.
Moreover, Justice Reyes, an authority in Criminal Law whose earlier work was cited
by petitioner, changed his view on the subject in view of Article 40 of the Family Code
and wrote in 1993 that a person must first obtain a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
void marriage before contracting a subsequent marriage:[22]
It is now settled that the fact that the first marriage is void from the beginning
is not a defense in a bigamy charge. As with a voidable marriage, there must
be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a marriage before contracting the
second marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code states that x x x. The Code
Commission believes that the parties to a marriage should not be allowed to
assume that their marriage is void, even if such is the fact, but must first
secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their marriage before they should be
allowed to marry again. x x x.
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a second marriage although there was yet
no judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to
have the first marriage declared void only after complainant had filed a letter-complaint
charging him with bigamy. By contracting a second marriage while the first was still
subsisting, he committed the acts punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage
was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had already been consummated by then. Moreover,
his view effectively encourages delay in the prosecution of bigamy cases; an accused
could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the pendency
of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
Under the circumstances of the present case, he is guilty of the charge against him.
Damages
In her Memorandum, respondent prays that the Court set aside the ruling of the Court
of Appeals insofar as it denied her claim of damages and attorneys fees. [23]
Her prayer has no merit. She did not appeal the ruling of the CA against her; hence,
she cannot obtain affirmative relief from this Court.[24] In any event, we find no reason to
reverse or set aside the pertinent ruling of the CA on this point, which we quote hereunder:
We are convinced from the totality of the evidence presented in this case that
Consuelo Tan is not the innocent victim that she claims to be; she was well
aware of the existence of the previous marriage when she contracted
matrimony with Dr. Mercado. The testimonies of the defense witnesses prove
this, and we find no reason to doubt said testimonies.
xxxxxxxxx
Indeed, the claim of Consuelo Tan that she was not aware of his previous
marriage does not inspire belief, especially as she had seen that Dr. Mercado
had two (2) children with him. We are convinced that she took the plunge
anyway, relying on the fact that the first wife would no longer return to Dr.
Mercado, she being by then already living with another man.
Consuelo Tan can therefore not claim damages in this case where she was
fully conscious of the consequences of her act. She should have known that
she would suffer humiliation in the event the truth [would] come out, as it did in
this case, ironically because of her personal instigation. If there are indeed
damages caused to her reputation, they are of her own willful making.[25]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
VITUG, J.:
At the pith of the controversy is the defense of the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage in an indictment for bigamy. The majority opinion, penned by my esteemed
brother, Mr. Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, enunciates that it is only a judicially decreed
prior void marriage which can constitute a defense against the criminal charge.
The civil law rule stated in Article 40 of the Family Code is a given but I have strong
reservations on its application beyond what appears to be its expressed context. The
subject of the instant petition is a criminal prosecution, not a civil case, and
the ponencia affirms the conviction of petitioner Vincent Paul G. Mercado for bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family code reads:
ART. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void.
The phrase for purposes of remarriage is not at all insignificant. Void marriages, like
void contracts, are inexistent from the very beginning. It is only by way of exception that
the Family code requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before a
subsequent marriage is contracted; without such declaration, the validity and the full legal
consequence of the subsequent marriage would itself be in similar jeopardy under Article
53, in relation to Article 52, of the Family Code. Parenthetically, I would daresay that the
necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage for the purpose of
remarriage should be held to refer merely to cases where it can be said that a marriage,
at least ostensibly, had taken place. No such judicial declaration of nullity, in my view,
should still be deemed essential when the marriage, for instance, is between persons of
the same sex or when either or both parties had not at all given consent to the
marriage.Indeed, it is likely that Article 40 of the Family Code has been meant and
intended to refer only to marriages declared void under the provisions of Articles 35, 36,
37, 38 and 53 thereof.
In fine, the Family Code, I respectfully submit, did not have the effect of overturning
the rule in criminal law and related jurisprudence. The Revised Penal Code expresses:
Art. 349. Bigamy.---The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any
person who shall contract a second or subsequent marriage before the
former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in
the proper proceedings.
Surely, the foregoing provision contemplated an existing, not void, prior

marriage. Covered by article 349 would thus be, for instance, a voidable marriage, it
obviously being valid and subsisting until set aside by a competent court. As early as
People vs. Aragon,1 this Court has underscored:
xxx Our Revised Penal Code is of recent enactment and had the rule
enunciated in Spain and in America requiring judicial declaration of
nullity of ab initio void marriages been within the contemplation of the
legislature, an express provision to that effect would or should have
been inserted in the law. In its absence, we are bound by said rule of
strict interpretation.
Unlike a voidable marriage which legally exists until judicially annulled (and therefore
not a defense in bigamy if the second marriage were contracted prior to the decree
of annulment), the complete nullity, however, of a previously contracted marriage, being
a total nullity and inexistent, should be capable of being independently raised by way of
a defense in a criminal case for bigamy. I see no incongruence between this rule in
criminal law and that of the Family Code, and each may be applied within the respective
spheres of governance.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.
1
100 Phil. 1033.
[1]
Penned by J. Salome A. Montoya, Division chairman; with the concurrence of JJ Conchita Carpio Morales and
Bernardo P. Abesamis, members.
[2]
RTC Decision, pp. 16-17; rollo, pp. 136-137. This was written by Judge Edgar G. Garvilles.
[3]
CA Decision, pp. 2-4; rollo, pp. 45-47.
[4]
Ibid., p. 6; rollo, p. 13.
[5]
The case was deemed submitted for resolution on May 26, 2000, upon receipt by this Court of the OSG
Memorandum signed by Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Mariano M Martinez and Sol. Jesus P. Castelo.
Respondents Memorandum, which was signed by Atty. Julius C. Baldado, was received on November 11, 1999; while
petitioners Memorandum, signed by Attys. Bernard B. Lopez and Maritoni Z. Liwanag, had been filed earlier on
September 30, 1999.
[6]
Petitioners Memorandum, p. 5; rollo, p. 215.
[7]
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, 13th ed. (1993), p. 828.
[8]
Citing Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines: Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, p. 265.
[9]
Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book Two, 12th ed. (1981), p. 907.9
[10]
Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572, September 17, 1993, per Romero, J.
[11]
95 Phil. 845, September 28, 1954.
[12]
100 Phil. 1033, February 28, 1957.
[13]
37 SCRA 315, 326, January 30, 1971, per Zaldivar, J. Emphasis supplied. See also Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA
615, June 30, 1970.
[14]
122 SCRA 525,529, May 30, 1983; per Melencio-Herrera, J. Emphasis supplied.
[15]
143 SCRA 499, August 19, 1986, per Paras, J. Emphasis supplied.
[16]
145 SCRA 229, October 28, 1986.
[17]
226 SCRA 572, September 17, 1993, per Romero, J, citing Sempio-Diy, Handbook of the Family Code of the
Philippines, 1988, p. 46.
[18]
Supra, p. 579.
[19]
People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845, 847, September 28, 1954, per Paras, CJ. See also People v. Aragon, 100 Phil.
1033, 1034-1035, February 28, 1957, per Labrador, J.
[20]
Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1995 ed., p. 56.
[21]
211 SCRA 6, 11, July 3, 1992, per curiam.
[22]
Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Book Two, 13th ed. (1993), p. 829. Emphasis supplied. Petitioner had cited the
statement of Justice Reyes that if the first marriage is void from the beginning, it is a defense in a bigamy charge. This
statement, however, appeared in the 1981 edition of Reyes book, before the enactment of the Family Code.
[23]
Respondents Memorandum, p. 16; rollo, p. 259.
[24]
Lagandaon v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 330, May 21, 1998; Dio v. Concepcion, 296 SCRA 579, September
25, 1998.
[25]
CA Decision, pp. 7-9; rollo, pp. 50-52.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004]

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision[1] dated October 21,
1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the
judgment[2] dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in
Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven
(7) months of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution[3] of the appellate court,
dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina
Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from
1974-1978).
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each
other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there.
While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join
her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990
at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant
Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition
for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and
to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago at [4]
the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The
complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accuseds marriage
with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information filed by [5]
the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol. [6]
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil
case for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the
bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case
No. 8688, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo
y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision
Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as
maximum.
SO ORDERED. [7]
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first
marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[8] the
trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of
bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is
void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of
their marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez
v. Gmur,[9] which held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is
domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of
obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties.
As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere.
Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court
stressed that following People v. Bitdu,[10] everyone is presumed to know the law, and the
fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt
him from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending
before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020
declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio since no marriage
ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then
became final and executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby

AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED. [11]
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the
subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could
not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 349 [12] of the
Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage
had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the
beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from
the Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article
15[13] of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this
jurisdiction. Under Article 17[14] of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be
rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending that
the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,[15] allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such
as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of
merit.[16] However, the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate courts
original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the
opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first
marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of.
Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein
petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY
THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL
CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE.
COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL
INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE
CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY

THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE
INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. [17]
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed
bigamy and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the
divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second
marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The
petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or
acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under
the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent
are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the
intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not
necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an
intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith
in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon
our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[18] which held that bigamy can be successfully
prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 40 [19] of the
Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry.
Whether or not the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone
is presumed to know the law. The OSG counters that petitioners contention that he was
in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by
his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage
to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we
must first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case.
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[20] we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence
of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision
in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the

annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete
on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of
Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED. [21]
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of
the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial
court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3[22] and 4[23] of
the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it,
This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of
nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and
purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab
initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes
of the law, never married.[24] The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision
of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and
executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been
legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to
Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of
retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from
the beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this
argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia
at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity
of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical
that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to
speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v.
Tan.[25] In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise
obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a

subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage
without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle
applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as void. [26]
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized
not just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued
and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the
first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for
which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal
statute in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption
of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case,
we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not
tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which
is now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated
October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the
resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioners
motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo
y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not
been proven with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 38-44. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by Associate
Justices Marina L. Buzon and Edgardo P. Cruz.
[2]
Records, pp. 114-119.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 46-58. Per Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and
Marina L. Buzon, concurring and Eugenio S. Labitoria and Bernardo P. Abesamis, dissenting.
[4]
Her correct name is Maria Jececha Limbago (Italics for emphasis). See Exh. B, the copy of their marriage
contract. Records, p. 10.
The accusatory portion of the charge sheet found in Records, p. 1, reads:
[5]
That, on or about the 4th day of October, 1992, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being previously united in lawful
marriage with Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 and without the said marriage having been legally
dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with
Maria Jececha Limbago to the damage and prejudice of Lucia Barrete in the amount to be proved
during trial.
Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
[6]
Rollo, pp. 38-40.
[7]
Records, p. 119.
[8]
G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA 572.
[9]
42 Phil. 855, 863 (1918).
[10]
58 Phil. 817 (1933).
[11]
Rollo, p. 43.
[12]
ART. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before
the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.
[13]
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
[14]
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by
the laws of the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the
Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed
in their execution.
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public
order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
[15]
G.R. Nos. 89983-84, 6 March 1992, 207 SCRA 85.
[16]
Rollo, p. 51.
[17]
Id. at 20-21.
[18]
G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000, 336 SCRA 747, 752-753.
[19]
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
[20]
Supra.
[21]
CA Rollo, p. 38.
[22]
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in
the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
[23]
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab
initio, except as stated in Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.
[24]
Rollo, p. 54.
[25]
G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122.
[26]
Id. at 124.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136467. April 6, 2000]
ANTONIA ARMAS Y CALISTERIO, petitioner, vs. MARIETTA

CALISTERIO, respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
On 24 April 1992, Teodorico Calisterio died intestate, leaving several parcels of land
with an estimated value of P604,750.00. Teodorico was survived by his wife, herein
respondent Marietta Calisterio. Esm
Teodorico was the second husband of Marietta who had previously been married to
James William Bounds on 13 January 1946 at Caloocan City. James Bounds
disappeared without a trace on 11 February 1947. Teodorico and Marietta were married
eleven years later, or on 08 May 1958, without Marietta having priorly secured a court
declaration that James was presumptively dead.Esmsc
On 09 October 1992, herein petitioner Antonia Armas y Calisterio, a surviving sister of

Teodorico, filed with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of Quezon City, Branch 104, a
petition entitled, "In the Matter of Intestate Estate of the Deceased Teodorico Calisterio
y Cacabelos, Antonia Armas, Petitioner," claiming to be inter alia, the sole surviving heir
of Teodorico Calisterio, the marriage between the latter and respondent Marietta
Espinosa Calisterio being allegedly bigamous and thereby null and void. She prayed
that her son Sinfroniano C. Armas, Jr., be appointed administrator, without bond, of the
estate of the deceased and that the inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the
obligations of the estate would have been settled.
Respondent Marietta opposed the petition. Marietta stated that her first marriage with
James Bounds had been dissolved due to the latter's absence, his whereabouts being
unknown, for more than eleven years before she contracted her second marriage with
Teodorico. Contending to be the surviving spouse of Teodorico, she sought priority in
the administration of the estate of the decedent. Esmmis
On 05 February 1993, the trial court issued an order appointing jointly Sinfroniano C.
Armas, Jr., and respondent Marietta administrator and administratrix, respectively, of
the intestate estate of Teodorico.
On 17 January 1996, the lower court handed down its decision in favor of petitioner
Antonia; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding for the petitioner and

against the oppositor whereby herein petitioner, Antonia Armas y
Calisterio, is declared as the sole heir of the estate of Teodorico Calisterio
y Cacabelos."[1]
Respondent Marietta appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals,
formulating that-
"1. The trial court erred in applying the provisions of the Family Code in
the instant case despite the fact that the controversy arose when the New
Civil Code was the law in force.
"2. The trial court erred in holding that the marriage between oppositor-
appellant and the deceased Teodorico Calisterio is bigamous for failure of
the former to secure a decree of the presumptive death of her first spouse.
"3. The trial court erred in not holding that the property situated at No. 32
Batangas Street, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, is the conjugal
property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased Teodorico
Calisterio. Esmso
"4. The trial court erred in holding that oppositor-appellant is not a legal
heir of deceased Teodorico Calisterio.
"5. The trial court erred in not holding that letters of administration should
be granted solely in favor of oppositor-appellant."[2]
On 31 August 1998, the appellate court, through Mr. Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.,
promulgated its now assailed decision, thus:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision appealed from is

REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and a new one entered declaring as
follows:
"(a) Marietta Calisterio's marriage to Teodorico remains valid;
"(b) The house and lot situated at #32 Batangas Street, San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City, belong to the conjugal partnership property with the
concomitant obligation of the partnership to pay the value of the land to
Teodorico's estate as of the time of the taking;
"(c) Marietta Calisterio, being Teodorico's compulsory heir, is entitled to

one half of her husband's estate, and Teodorico's sister, herein petitioner
Antonia Armas and her children, to the other half; Msesm
"(d) The trial court is ordered to determine the competence of Marietta E.

Calisterio to act as administrator of Teodorico's estate, and if so found
competent and willing, that she be appointed as such; otherwise, to
determine who among the deceased's next of kin is competent and willing
to become the administrator of the estate."[3]
On 23 November 1998, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for

reconsideration, prompting her to interpose the present appeal. Petitioner asseverates:
"It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the Court of Appeals

reversing and setting aside the decision of the trial court is not in accord
with the law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court." [4]
It is evident that the basic issue focuses on the validity of the marriage between the
deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta, that, in turn, would be determinative of
her right as a surviving spouse. Exsm
The marriage between the deceased Teodorico and respondent Marietta was
solemnized on 08 May 1958. The law in force at that time was the Civil Code, not the
Family Code which took effect only on 03 August 1988. Article 256 of the Family
Code[5] itself limited its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby would not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other
laws.
Verily, the applicable specific provision in the instant controversy is Article 83 of the
New Civil Code which provides: Kyle
"Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the
lifetime of the first spouse of such person with any person other than such
first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance, unless:
"(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
"(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the
time of the second marriage without the spouse present having news of
the absentee being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent
for less than seven years, is generally considered as dead and believed to
be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390
and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three
cases until declared null and void by a competent court."
Under the foregoing provisions, a subsequent marriage contracted during the lifetime of
the first spouse is illegal and void ab initio unless the prior marriage is first annulled or
dissolved. Paragraph (2) of the law gives exceptions from the above rule. For the
subsequent marriage referred to in the three exceptional cases therein provided, to be
held valid, the spouse present (not the absentee spouse) so contracting the later
marriage must have done so in good faith.[6] Bad faith imports a dishonest purpose or
some moral obliquity and conscious doing of wrong - it partakes of the nature of fraud, a
breach of a known duty through some motive of interest or ill will.[7] The Court does not
find these circumstances to be here extant. Kycalr
A judicial declaration of absence of the absentee spouse is not necessary[8] as long as

the prescribed period of absence is met. It is equally noteworthy that the marriage in
these exceptional cases are, by the explicit mandate of Article 83, to be deemed valid
"until declared null and void by a competent court." It follows that the burden of proof
would be, in these cases, on the party assailing the second marriage. Calrky
In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage
may exceptionally be considered valid, the following conditions must concur; viz.: (a)
The prior spouse of the contracting party must have been absent for four consecutive
years, or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated in
Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the
old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absentee for which purpose
the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that
declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of
judicial intervention in subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41[9], in relation to
Article 40,[10] of the Family Code. Mesm
In the case at bar, it remained undisputed that respondent Marietta's first husband,
James William Bounds, had been absent or had disappeared for more than eleven
years before she entered into a second marriage in 1958 with the deceased Teodorico
Calisterio. This second marriage, having been contracted during the regime of the Civil
Code, should thus be deemed valid notwithstanding the absence of a judicial
declaration of presumptive death of James Bounds.
The conjugal property of Teodorico and Marietta, no evidence having been adduced to
indicate another property regime between the spouses, pertains to them in common.
Upon its dissolution with the death of Teodorico, the property should rightly be divided in
two equal portions -- one portion going to the surviving spouse and the other portion to
the estate of the deceased spouse. The successional right in intestacy of a surviving
spouse over the net estate[11] of the deceased, concurring with legitimate brothers and
sisters or nephews and nieces (the latter by right of representation), is one-half of the
inheritance, the brothers and sisters or nephews and nieces, being entitled to the other
half. Nephews and nieces, however, can only succeed by right of representation in the
presence of uncles and aunts; alone, upon the other hand, nephews and nieces can
succeed in their own right which is to say that brothers or sisters exclude nephews and
nieces except only in representation by the latter of their parents who predecease or are
incapacitated to succeed. The appellate court has thus erred in granting, in paragraph
(c) of the dispositive portion of its judgment, successional rights, to petitioner's children,
along with their own mother Antonia who herself is invoking successional rights over the
estate of her deceased brother. Slx
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the Coin of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51574
is AFFIRMED except insofar only as it decreed in paragraph (c) of the dispositive
portion thereof that the children of petitioner are likewise entitled, along with her, to the
other half of the inheritance, in lieu of which, it is hereby DECLARED that said one-half
share of the decedent's estate pertains solely to petitioner to the exclusion of her own
children. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Panganiban, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1]
Rollo, p. 45.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 29-30.
[3]
Rollo, pp. 35-36.
[4]
Rollo, p. 15.
[5]
Article 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
[6]
The good faith or bad faith of the other contracting party to the subsequent marriage is not all that consequential
(See Lapuz Sy vs. Eufemio, 43 SCRA 177).
[7]
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 557.
[8]
Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179.
Article 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and
[9]
void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the
civil code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
[10]
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
[11]
First deducting to her favor her one-half share of the conjugal property.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 94053 March 17, 1993
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
GREGORIO NOLASCO, respondent.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Warloo G. Cardenal for respondent.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
On 5 August 1988, respondent Gregorio Nolasco filed before the Regional Trial Court of Antique,
Branch 10, a petition for the declaration of presumptive death of his wife Janet Monica Parker,
invoking Article 41 of the Family Code. The petition prayed that respondent's wife be declared
presumptively dead or, in the alternative, that the marriage be declared null and void.1
The Republic of the Philippines opposed the petition through the Provincial Prosecutor of Antique
who had been deputized to assist the Solicitor-General in the instant case. The Republic argued,
first, that Nolasco did not possess a "well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead,"2 and second, Nolasco's attempt to have his marriage annulled in the same proceeding was a
"cunning attempt" to circumvent the law on marriage.3
During trial, respondent Nolasco testified that he was a seaman and that he had first met Janet
Monica Parker, a British subject, in a bar in England during one of his ship's port calls. From that
chance meeting onwards, Janet Monica Parker lived with respondent Nolasco on his ship for six (6)
months until they returned to respondent's hometown of San Jose, Antique on 19 November 1980
after his seaman's contract expired. On 15 January 1982, respondent married Janet Monica Parker
in San Jose, Antique, in Catholic rites officiated by Fr. Henry van Tilborg in the Cathedral of San
Jose.
Respondent Nolasco further testified that after the marriage celebration, he obtained another
employment contract as a seaman and left his wife with his parents in San Jose, Antique. Sometime
in January 1983, while working overseas, respondent received a letter from his mother informing him
that Janet Monica had given birth to his son. The same letter informed him that Janet Monica had
left Antique. Respondent claimed he then immediately asked permission to leave his ship to return
home. He arrived in Antique in November 1983.
Respondent further testified that his efforts to look for her himself whenever his ship docked in
England proved fruitless. He also stated that all the letters he had sent to his missing spouse at No.
38 Ravena Road, Allerton, Liverpool, England, the address of the bar where he and Janet Monica
first met, were all returned to him. He also claimed that he inquired from among friends but they too
had no news of Janet Monica.
On cross-examination, respondent stated that he had lived with and later married Janet Monica
Parker despite his lack of knowledge as to her family background. He insisted that his wife continued
to refuse to give him such information even after they were married. He also testified that he did not
report the matter of Janet Monica's disappearance to the Philippine government authorities.
Respondent Nolasco presented his mother, Alicia Nolasco, as his witness. She testified that her
daughter-in-law Janet Monica had expressed a desire to return to England even before she had
given birth to Gerry Nolasco on 7 December 1982. When asked why her daughter-in-law might have
wished to leave Antique, respondent's mother replied that Janet Monica never got used to the rural
way of life in San Jose, Antique. Alicia Nolasco also said that she had tried to dissuade Janet
Monica from leaving as she had given birth to her son just fifteen days before, but when she (Alicia)
failed to do so, she gave Janet Monica P22,000.00 for her expenses before she left on 22 December
1982 for England. She further claimed that she had no information as to the missing person's
present whereabouts.
The trial court granted Nolasco's petition in a Judgment dated 12 October 1988 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
Wherefore, under Article 41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines
(Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No. 227,
July 17, 1987) this Court hereby declares as presumptively dead Janet Monica
Parker Nolasco, without prejudice to her reappearance.4
The Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals contending that the trial court erred in declaring
Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead because respondent Nolasco had failed to show that there
existed a well founded belief for such declaration.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that respondent had sufficiently
established a basis to form a belief that his absent spouse had already died.
The Republic, through the Solicitor-General, is now before this Court on a Petition for Review where
the following allegations are made:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court's finding that there existed a
well-founded belief on the part of Nolasco that Janet Monica Parker was already
dead; and
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial Court's declaration that the petition
was a proper case of the declaration of presumptive death under Article 41, Family
Code.5
The issue before this Court, as formulated by petitioner is "[w]hether or not Nolasco has a well-
founded belief that his wife is already dead."6
The present case was filed before the trial court pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code which
provides that:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provision of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding
paragraph, the spouse present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in
this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis supplied).
When Article 41 is compared with the old provision of the Civil Code, which it superseded,7 the
following crucial differences emerge. Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise
has been shortened to four (4) years; however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive
death to enable the spouse present to remarry.8 Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a
stricter standard than the Civil Code: Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there
be no news that such absentee is still alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be
dead and believed to be so by the spouse present, or is presumed dead under Article 390 and 391
of the Civil Code.9 The Family Code, upon the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that
the absentee is already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
As pointed out by the Solicitor-General, there are four (4) requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;
3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee. 10
Respondent naturally asserts that he had complied with all these requirements.11
Petitioner's argument, upon the other hand, boils down to this: that respondent failed to prove that he
had complied with the third requirement, i.e., the existence of a "well-founded belief" that the absent
spouse is already dead.
The Court believes that respondent Nolasco failed to conduct a search for his missing wife with such
diligence as to give rise to a "well-founded belief" that she is dead.
United States v. Biasbas, 12 is instructive as to degree of diligence required in searching for a missing
spouse. In that case, defendant Macario Biasbas was charged with the crime of bigamy. He set-up
the defense of a good faith belief that his first wife had already died. The Court held that defendant
had not exercised due diligence to ascertain the whereabouts of his first wife, noting that:
While the defendant testified that he had made inquiries concerning the whereabouts
of his wife, he fails to state of whom he made such inquiries. He did not even write to
the parents of his first wife, who lived in the Province of Pampanga, for the purpose
of securing information concerning her whereabouts. He admits that he had a
suspicion only that his first wife was dead. He admits that the only basis of his
suspicion was the fact that she had been absent. . . . 13
In the case at bar, the Court considers that the investigation allegedly conducted by respondent in
his attempt to ascertain Janet Monica Parker's whereabouts is too sketchy to form the basis of a
reasonable or well-founded belief that she was already dead. When he arrived in San Jose, Antique
after learning of Janet Monica's departure, instead of seeking the help of local authorities or of the
British Embassy, 14 he secured another seaman's contract and went to London, a vast city of many
millions of inhabitants, to look for her there.
Q After arriving here in San Jose, Antique, did you exert efforts to
inquire the whereabouts of your wife?
A Yes, Sir.
Court:
How did you do that?
A I secured another contract with the ship and we had a trip to

London and I went to London to look for her I could not find
her (sic). 15 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent's testimony, however, showed that he confused London for Liverpool and this casts
doubt on his supposed efforts to locate his wife in England. The Court of Appeal's justification of the
mistake, to wit:
. . . Well, while the cognoscente (sic) would readily know the geographical difference
between London and Liverpool, for a humble seaman like Gregorio the two places
could mean one — place in England, the port where his ship docked and where he
found Janet. Our own provincial folks, every time they leave home to visit relatives in
Pasay City, Kalookan City, or Parañaque, would announce to friends and relatives,
"We're going to Manila." This apparent error in naming of places of destination does
not appear to be fatal. 16
is not well taken. There is no analogy between Manila and its neighboring cities, on one hand, and
London and Liverpool, on the other, which, as pointed out by the Solicitor-General, are around three
hundred fifty (350) kilometers apart. We do not consider that walking into a major city like Liverpool
or London with a simple hope of somehow bumping into one particular person there — which is in
effect what Nolasco says he did — can be regarded as a reasonably diligent search.
The Court also views respondent's claim that Janet Monica declined to give any information as to
her personal background even after she had married respondent 17 too convenient an excuse to
justify his failure to locate her. The same can be said of the loss of the alleged letters respondent
had sent to his wife which respondent claims were all returned to him. Respondent said he had lost
these returned letters, under unspecified circumstances.
Neither can this Court give much credence to respondent's bare assertion that he had inquired from
their friends of her whereabouts, considering that respondent did not identify those friends in his
testimony. The Court of Appeals ruled that since the prosecutor failed to rebut this evidence during
trial, it is good evidence. But this kind of evidence cannot, by its nature, be rebutted. In any case,
admissibility is not synonymous with credibility. 18 As noted before, there are serious doubts to
respondent's credibility. Moreover, even if admitted as evidence, said testimony merely tended to
show that the missing spouse had chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances,
and not that she was dead.
Respondent testified that immediately after receiving his mother's letter sometime in January 1983,
he cut short his employment contract to return to San Jose, Antique. However, he did not explain the
delay of nine (9) months from January 1983, when he allegedly asked leave from his captain, to
November 1983 when be finally reached San Jose. Respondent, moreover, claimed he married
Janet Monica Parker without inquiring about her parents and their place of residence. 19 Also,
respondent failed to explain why he did not even try to get the help of the police or other authorities
in London and Liverpool in his effort to find his wife. The circumstances of Janet Monica's departure
and respondent's subsequent behavior make it very difficult to regard the claimed belief that Janet
Monica was dead a well-founded one.
In Goitia v. Campos-Rueda, 20 the Court stressed that:
. . . Marriage is an institution, the maintenance of which in its purity the public is

deeply interested. It is a relationship for life and the parties cannot terminate it at any
shorter period by virtue of any contract they make. . . . . 21 (Emphasis supplied)
By the same token, the spouses should not be allowed, by the simple expedient of agreeing that one
of them leave the conjugal abode and never to return again, to circumvent the policy of the laws on
marriage. The Court notes that respondent even tried to have his marriage annulled before the trial
court in the same proceeding.
In In Re Szatraw, 22 the Court warned against such collusion between the parties when they find it
impossible to dissolve the marital bonds through existing legal means.
While the Court understands the need of respondent's young son, Gerry Nolasco, for maternal care,
still the requirements of the law must prevail. Since respondent failed to satisfy the clear
requirements of the law, his petition for a judicial declaration of presumptive death must be denied.
The law does not view marriage like an ordinary contract. Article 1 of the Family Code emphasizes
that.
. . . Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a

woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and
family life. It is the foundation of the familyand an inviolable social
institution whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law and not
subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
In Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 23 the Court stressed strongly the need to protect.
. . . the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of
which the State bas the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the
most fundamental kind. In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth
the following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. . . .
The same sentiment bas been expressed in the Family Code of the Philippines in
Article 149:
The family, being the foundation of the nation, is a basic social

institution which public policy cherishes and protects. Consequently,
family relations are governed by law and no custom, practice or
agreement destructive of the family shall be recognized or given
effect. 24
In fine, respondent failed to establish that he had the well-founded belief required by law that his
absent wife was already dead that would sustain the issuance of a court order declaring Janet
Monica Parker presumptively dead.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February 1990, affirming the trial
court's decision declaring Janet Monica Parker presumptively dead is hereby REVERSED and both
Decisions are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. Costs against respondent.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 184621 December 10, 2013
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MARIA FE ESPINOSA CANTOR, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
The petition for review on certiorari1 before us assails the decision2 dated August 27, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 01558-MIN which affirmed be order3 dated December 15,
2006 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Koronadal City, South Cotabato, in SP Proc.
Case No. 313-25, declaring Jerry F. Cantor, respondent Maria Fe Espinosa Cantor’s husband,
presumptively dead under Article 41 of the Family Code.
The Factual Antecedents
The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as husband
and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South Cotabato. Sometime in
January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel brought about by: (1) the respondent’s inability to
reach "sexual climax" whenever she and Jerry would have intimate moments; and (2) Jerry’s
expression of animosity toward the respondent’s father.
After their quarrel, Jerry left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent
ever saw him. Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about
his whereabouts.
On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerry’s disappearance, the
respondent filed before the RTC a petition4for her husband’s declaration of presumptive death,
docketed as SP Proc. Case No. 313-25. She claimed that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry
was already dead. She alleged that she had inquired from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her
sisters-in-law, as well as her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding Jerry, she
also allegedly made it a point to check the patients’ directory whenever she went to a hospital. All
these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile, prompting her to file the petition in court.
The Ruling of the RTC
After due proceedings, the RTC issued an order granting the respondent’s petition and declaring
Jerry presumptively dead. It concluded that the respondent had a well-founded belief that her
husband was already dead since more than four (4) years had passed without the former receiving
any news about the latter or his whereabouts. The dispositive portion of the order dated December
15, 2006 reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares, as it hereby declared that respondent Jerry F. Cantor is
presumptively dead pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code of the Philippines without prejudice to
the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse Jerry F. Cantor.5
The Ruling of the CA
The case reached the CA through a petition for certiorari6filed by the petitioner, Republic of the
Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In its August 27, 2008 decision, the
CA dismissed the petitioner’s petition, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the RTC’s part, and,
accordingly, fully affirmed the latter’s order, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises foregoing (sic), the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed
Order dated December 15, 2006 declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is hereby AFFIRMED
in toto.7
The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court. The Petition The petitioner
contends that certiorari lies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts in
petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Rule 41 of the Family
Code. It maintains that although judgments of trial courts in summary judicial proceedings, including
presumptive death cases, are deemed immediately final and executory (hence, not appeal able
under Article 247 of the Family Code), this rule does not mean that they are not subject to review
on certiorari.
The petitioner also posits that the respondent did not have a well-founded belief to justify the
declaration of her husband’s presumptive death. It claims that the respondent failed to conduct the
requisite diligent search for her missing husband. Likewise, the petitioner invites this Court’s
attention to the attendant circumstances surrounding the case, particularly, the degree of search
conducted and the respondent’s resultant failure to meet the strict standard under Article 41 of the
Family Code.
The Issues
The petition poses to us the following issues:
(1) Whether certiorarilies to challenge the decisions, judgments or final orders of trial courts
in petitions for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
Family Code; and
(2) Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition.
a. On the Issue of the Propriety of Certiorari as a Remedy
Court’s Judgment in the Judicial

Proceedings for Declaration of
Presumptive Death Is Final and
Executory, Hence, Unappealable
The Family Code was explicit that the court’s judgment in summary proceedings, such as the
declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code, shall be
immediately final and executory.
Article 41,in relation to Article 247, of the Family Code provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null
and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only two
years shall be sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory. [underscores ours]
With the judgment being final, it necessarily follows that it is no longer subject to an appeal, the
dispositions and conclusions therein having become immutable and unalterable not only as against
the parties but even as against the courts.8 Modification of the court’s ruling, no matter how
erroneous is no longer permissible. The final and executory nature of this summary proceeding thus
prohibits the resort to appeal. As explained in Republic of the Phils. v. Bermudez-Lorino,9 the right to
appeal is not granted to parties because of the express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code,
to wit:
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary period within
which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision
of [Article] 247, Family Code, supra, are "immediately final and executory." It was erroneous,
therefore, on the part of the RTCto give due course to the Republic’s appeal and order the
transmittal of the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express provision of law,
is immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec, "the right to appeal is
not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory privilege." Since, by
express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code, all judgments rendered in summary judicial
proceedings in Family Law are "immediately final and executory," the right to appeal was not granted
to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for
declaration of presumptive death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC
decision of November 7, 2001. [emphases ours; italics supplied]
Certiorari Lies to Challenge the

Decisions, Judgments or Final
Orders of Trial Courts in a Summary
Proceeding for the Declaration of Presumptive
Death Under the Family Code
A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a remedy. While jurisprudence
tells us that no appeal can be made from the trial court's judgment, an aggrieved party may,
nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to question any abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that transpired.
As held in Delos Santos v. Rodriguez, et al.,10 the fact that a decision has become final does not
automatically negate the original action of the CA to issue certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in
connection with orders or processes issued by the trial court. Certiorari may be availed of where a
court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, and where the
ordinary remedy of appeal is not available. Such a procedure finds support in the case of Republic v.
Tango,11 wherein we held that:
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in
summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions
thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE
FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
"ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all
cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided
in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules."
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two and
three of the same title. It states:
"ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary
proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are
applicable."(Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
"ART.247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory."
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the
trial court's judgment ina summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved party
may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such
petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of
Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is concurrent
with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. [emphasis ours]
Viewed in this light, we find that the petitioner’s resort to certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to question the RTC’s order declaring Jerry presumptively dead was proper.
b. On the Issue of the Existence of Well-Founded Belief
The Essential Requisites for the

Declaration of Presumptive Death
Under Article 41 of the Family Code
Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown that the prior
spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present spouse had a well-founded
belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article 41 of the Family Code, there are four (4)
essential requisites for the declaration of presumptive death:
1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two consecutive
years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death under the circumstances
laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;
2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead; and
4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive
death of the absentee.12
The Present Spouse Has the Burden

of Proof to Show that All the
Requisites Under Article 41 of the
Family Code Are Present
The burden of proof rests on the present spouse to show that all the requisites under Article 41 of
the Family Code are present. Since it is the present spouse who, for purposes of declaration of
presumptive death, substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue, it stands to reason that the
burden of proof lies with him/her. He who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.13
Declaration of Presumptive Death

Under Article 41 of the Family Code
Imposes a Stricter Standard
Notably, Article 41 of the Family Code, compared to the old provision of the Civil Code which it
superseded, imposes a stricter standard. It requires a "well-founded belief " that the absentee is
already dead before a petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted. We have had
occasion to make the same observation in Republic v. Nolasco,14 where we noted the crucial
differences between Article 41 of the Family Code and Article 83 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Under Article 41, the time required for the presumption to arise has been shortened to four (4) years;
however, there is need for a judicial declaration of presumptive death to enable the spouse present
to remarry. Also, Article 41 of the Family Code imposes a stricter standard than the Civil Code:
Article 83 of the Civil Code merely requires either that there be no news that such absentee is still
alive; or the absentee is generally considered to be dead and believed to be so by the spouse
present, or is presumed dead under Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code. The Family Code, upon
the other hand, prescribes as "well founded belief" that the absentee is already dead before a
petition for declaration of presumptive death can be granted.
Thus, mere absence of the spouse (even for such period required by the law), lack of any news that
such absentee is still alive, failure to communicate or general presumption of absence under the
Civil Code would not suffice. This conclusion proceeds from the premise that Article 41 of the Family
Code places upon the present spouse the burden of proving the additional and more stringent
requirement of "well-founded belief" which can only be discharged upon a showing of proper and
honest-to-goodness inquiries and efforts to ascertain not only the absent spouse’s whereabouts but,
more importantly, that the absent spouse is still alive or is already dead.15
The Requirement of Well-Founded Belief
The law did not define what is meant by "well-founded belief." It depends upon the circumstances of
each particular case. Its determination, so to speak, remains on a case-to-case basis. To be able to
comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief was the result of
diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based on these
efforts and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouseis already
dead. It requires exertion of active effort (not a mere passive one).
To illustrate this degree of "diligent and reasonable search" required by the law, an analysis of the
following relevant cases is warranted:
i. Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.)16
In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),17 the Court ruled that the present
spouse failed to prove that he had a well-founded belief that his absent spouse was already dead
before he filed his petition. His efforts to locate his absent wife allegedly consisted of the following:
(1) He went to his in-laws’ house to look for her;
(2) He sought the barangay captain’s aid to locate her;
(3) He went to her friends’ houses to find her and inquired about her whereabouts among his
friends;
(4) He went to Manila and worked as a part-time taxi driver to look for her in malls during his
free time;
(5) He went back to Catbalogan and again looked for her; and
(6) He reported her disappearance to the local police station and to the NBI.
Despite these alleged "earnest efforts," the Court still ruled against the present spouse. The Court
found that he failed to present the persons from whom he allegedly made inquiries and only reported
his wife’s absence after the OSG filed its notice to dismiss his petition in the RTC.
The Court also provided the following criteria for determining the existence of a "well-founded belief"
under Article 41 of the Family Code:
The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still
alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death
of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the
inquiries made by [the] present spouse.18
ii. Republic v. Granada19
Similarly in Granada, the Court ruled that the absent spouse failed to prove her "well-founded belief"
that her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the petition. In this case, the present
spouse alleged that her brother had made inquiries from their relatives regarding the absent
spouse’s whereabouts. The present spouse did not report to the police nor seek the aid of the mass
media. Applying the standards in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),20 the
Court ruled against the present spouse, as follows:
Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda
did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio
testified to having inquiredabout the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latter’s relatives, these relatives
were not presented to corroborate Diosdado’s testimony. In short, respondent was allegedly not
diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues that if she were, she would have sought
information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or assistance from other government agencies in
Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also utilized mass media for this end, but she did not.
Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.
iii.Republic v. Nolasco21
In Nolasco, the present spouse filed a petition for declaration of presumptive death of his wife, who
had been missing for more than four years. He testified that his efforts to find her consisted of:
(1) Searching for her whenever his ship docked in England;
(2) Sending her letters which were all returned to him; and
(3) Inquiring from their friends regarding her whereabouts, which all proved fruitless. The
Court ruled that the present spouse’s investigations were too sketchy to form a basis that his
wife was already dead and ruled that the pieces of evidence only proved that his wife had
chosen not to communicate with their common acquaintances, and not that she was dead.
iv.The present case
In the case at bar, the respondent’s "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged "earnest
efforts" to locate Jerry, which consisted of the following:
(1) She made inquiries about Jerry’s whereabouts from her in-laws, neighbors and friends;
and
(2) Whenever she went to a hospital, she saw to it that she looked through the patients’
directory, hoping to find Jerry.
These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of diligence required by
jurisprudence for the following reasons:
First, the respondent did not actively look for her missing husband. It can be inferred from the
1âwphi 1
records that her hospital visits and her consequent checking of the patients’ directory therein were
unintentional. She did not purposely undertake a diligent search for her husband as her hospital
visits were not planned nor primarily directed to look for him. This Court thus considers these
attempts insufficient to engender a belief that her husband is dead.
Second, she did not report Jerry’s absence to the police nor did she seek the aid of the authorities to
look for him. While a finding of well-founded belief varies with the nature of the situation in which the
present spouse is placed, under present conditions, we find it proper and prudent for a present
spouse, whose spouse had been missing, to seek the aid of the authorities or, at the very least,
report his/her absence to the police.
Third, she did not present as witnesses Jerry’s relatives or their neighbors and friends, who can
corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from whom she allegedly made
inquiries, were not even named. As held in Nolasco, the present spouse’s bare assertion that he
inquired from his friends about his absent spouse’s whereabouts is insufficient as the names of the
friends from whom he made inquiries were not identified in the testimony nor presented as
witnesses.
Lastly, there was no other corroborative evidence to support the respondent’s claim that she
conducted a diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a well-
founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends and in-laws about her
husband’s whereabouts. In sum, the Court is of the view that the respondent merely engaged in a
"passive search" where she relied on uncorroborated inquiries from her in-laws, neighbors and
friends. She failed to conduct a diligent search because her alleged efforts are insufficient to form a
well-founded belief that her husband was already dead. As held in Republic of the Philippines v.
Court of Appeals (Tenth Div.),22 "[w]hether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief
of death of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many
circumstances occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the
natureand extent of the inquiries made by [the] present spouse."
Strict Standard Approach Is

Consistent with the State’s Policy
to Protect and Strengthen Marriage
In the above-cited cases, the Court, fully aware of the possible collusion of spouses in nullifying their
marriage, has consistently applied the "strictstandard" approach. This is to ensure that a petition for
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not used as a tool to
conveniently circumvent the laws. Courts should never allow procedural shortcuts and should ensure
that the stricter standard required by the Family Code is met. In Republic of the Philippines v. Court
of Appeals (Tenth Div.),23 we emphasized that:
In view of the summary nature of proceedings under Article 41 of the Family Code for the declaration
of presumptive death of one’s spouse, the degree of due diligence set by this Honorable Court in the
above-mentioned cases in locating the whereabouts of a missing spouse must be strictly complied
with. There have been times when Article 41 of the Family Code had been resorted to by parties
wishing to remarry knowing fully well that their alleged missing spouses are alive and well. It is even
possible that those who cannot have their marriages xxx declared null and void under Article 36 of
the Family Code resort to Article 41 of the Family Code for relief because of the xxx summary nature
of its proceedings.
The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we consider the State’s
policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage.24 Since marriage serves as the family’s
foundation25 and since it is the state’s policy to protect and strengthen the family as a basic social
institution,26 marriage should not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In
interpreting and applying Article 41, this is the underlying rationale –to uphold the sanctity of
marriage. Arroyo, Jr.v. Court of Appeals27 reflected this sentiment when we stressed:
[The]protection of the basic social institutions of marriage and the family in the preservation of which
the State has the strongest interest; the public policy here involved is of the most fundamental kind.
In Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution there is set forth the following basic state policy:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution.
Strict Standard Prescribed Under

Article 41 of the Family Code
Is for the Present Spouse’s Benefit
The requisite judicial declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse (and consequently, the
application of a stringent standard for its issuance) is also for the present spouse's benefit. It is
intended to protect him/her from a criminal prosecution of bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code which might come into play if he/she would prematurely remarry sans the court's
declaration.
Upon the issuance of the decision declaring his/her absent spouse presumptively dead, the present
spouse's good faith in contracting a second marriage is effectively established. The decision of the
competent court constitutes sufficient proof of his/her good faith and his/her criminal intent in case of
remarriage is effectively negated.28 Thus, for purposes of remarriage, it is necessary to strictly
comply with the stringent standard and have the absent spouse judicially declared presumptively
dead.
Final Word
As a final word, it has not escaped this Court's attention that the strict standard required in petitions
for declaration of presumptive death has not been fully observed by the lower courts. We need only
to cite the instances when this Court, on review, has consistently ruled on the sanctity of marriage
and reiterated that anything less than the use of the strict standard necessitates a denial. To rectify
this situation, lower courts are now expressly put on notice of the strict standard this Court requires
in cases under Article 41 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed decision dated August 27, 2008 of the Court of
Appeals, which affirmed the order dated December 15, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
Koronadal City, South Cotabato, declaring Jerry F. Cantor presumptively dead is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 166357 January 14, 2015
VALERIO E. KALAW, Petitioner,

vs.
MA. ELENA FERNANDEZ, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
In our decision promulgated on September 19, 2011,1 the Court dismissed the complaint for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of the parties upon the following ratiocination, to wit:
The petition has no merit. The CA committed no reversible error in setting aside the trial court's
Decision for lack of legal and factual basis.
xxxx
In the case at bar, petitioner failed to prove that his wife (respondent) suffers from psychological
incapacity. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised
on the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. Petitioner’s
experts heavily relied on petitioner’s allegations of respondent’s constant mahjong sessions, visits to
the beauty parlor, going out with friends, adultery, and neglect of their children. Petitioner’s experts
opined that respondent’s alleged habits, when performed constantly to the detriment of quality and
quantity of time devoted to her duties as mother and wife, constitute a psychological incapacity in the
form of NPD.
But petitioner’s allegations, which served as the bases or underlying premises of the conclusions of
his experts, were not actually proven. In fact, respondent presented contrary evidence refuting these
allegations of the petitioner.
For instance, petitioner alleged that respondent constantly played mahjong and neglected their
children as a result. Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged
in mahjong so frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted
petitioner’s allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to
three times a week and always with the permission of her husband and without abandoning her
children at home. The children corroborated this, saying that they were with their mother when she
played mahjong in their relative’s home. Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own
testimony, that the mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While
he intimated that two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to
respondent’s mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of
respondent’s mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second grade. This
was not done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged
debilitating frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.
Also unproven was petitioner’s claim about respondent’s alleged constant visits to the beauty parlor,
going out with friends, and obsessive need for attention from other men. No proof whatsoever was
presented to prove her visits to beauty salons orher frequent partying with friends. Petitioner
presented Mario (an alleged companion of respondent during these nights-out) in order to prove that
respondent had affairs with other men, but Mario only testified that respondent appeared to be
dating other men. Even assuming arguendothat petitioner was able to prove that respondent had an
extramarital affair with another man, that one instance of sexual infidelity cannot, by itself, be
equated with obsessive need for attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per seis a ground for
legal separation, but it does not necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
Given the insufficiency of evidence that respondent actually engaged in the behaviors described as
constitutive of NPD, there is no basis for concluding that she was indeed psychologically
incapacitated. Indeed, the totality of the evidence points to the opposite conclusion. A fair
assessment of the facts would show that respondent was not totally remiss and incapable of
appreciating and performing her marital and parental duties. Not once did the children state that they
were neglected by their mother. On the contrary, they narrated that she took care of them, was
around when they were sick, and cooked the food they like. It appears that respondent made real
efforts tosee and take care of her children despite her estrangement from their father. There was no
testimony whatsoever that shows abandonment and neglect of familial duties. While petitioner cites
the fact that his two sons, Rio and Miggy, both failed the second elementary level despite having
tutors, there is nothing to link their academic short comings to Malyn’s actions.
After poring over the records of the case, the Court finds no factual basis for the conclusion of
psychological incapacity. There is no error in the CA’s reversal of the trial court’s ruling that there
was psychological incapacity. The trial court’s Decision merely summarized the allegations,
testimonies, and evidence of the respective parties, but it did not actually assess the veracity of
these allegations, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of the evidence. The trial court did
not make factual findings which can serve as bases for its legal conclusionof psychological
incapacity.
What transpired between the parties is acrimony and, perhaps, infidelity, which may have
constrained them from dedicating the best of themselves to each other and to their children. There
may be grounds for legal separation, but certainly not psychological incapacity that voids a marriage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals’ May 27, 2004
Decision and its December 15, 2004 Resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 64240 are AFFIRMED. SO
ORDERED.2
In his Motion for Reconsideration,3 the petitioner implores the Court to take a thorough second look
into what constitutes psychological incapacity; to uphold the findings of the trial court as supported
by the testimonies of three expert witnesses; and consequently to find that the respondent, if not
both parties, were psychologically incapacitated to perform their respective essential marital
obligation.
Upon an assiduous review of the records, we resolve to grant the petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
Psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even prior to the celebration of the marriage
that is permanent as to deprive the party of the awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was about to assume. Although the Family Code has not defined the
term psychological incapacity, the Court has usually looked up its meaning by reviewing the
deliberations of the sessions of the Family Code Revision Committee that had drafted the Family
Code in order to gain an insight on the provision. It appeared that the members of the Family Code
Revision Committee were not unanimous on the meaning, and in the end they decided to adopt the
provision "with less specificity than expected" in order to have the law "allow some resiliency in its
application."4Illustrative of the "less specificity than expected" has been the omission by the Family
Code Revision Committee to give any examples of psychological incapacity that would have limited
the applicability of the provision conformably with the principle of ejusdem generis, because the
Committee desired that the courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and the decisions of
church tribunals that had persuasive effect by virtue of the provision itself having been taken from
the Canon Law.5
On the other hand, as the Court has observed in Santos v. Court of Appeals,6 the deliberations of the
Family Code Revision Committee and the relevant materials on psychological incapacity as a
ground for the nullity of marriage have rendered it obvious that the term psychological incapacity as
used in Article 36 of the Family Code"has not been meant to comprehend all such possible cases of
psychoses as, likewise mentioned by some ecclesiastical authorities, extremely low intelligence,
immaturity, and like circumstances," and could not be taken and construed independently of "but
must stand in conjunction with, existing precepts in our law on marriage." Thus correlated:-
x x x "psychological incapacity" should refer to no less than a mental (not physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by Article 68 of the
Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and
render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of "psychological incapacity" to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage. This psychologic condition must exist at the time the marriage is celebrated. The law does
not evidently envision, upon the other hand, an inability of the spouse to have sexual relations with
the other. This conclusion is implicit under Article 54 of the Family Code which considers children
conceived prior to the judicial declaration of nullity of the void marriage to be "legitimate."7
In time, in Republic v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court set some guidelines for the interpretation and
application of Article 36 of the Family Code, as follows:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage and the family and emphasizes
their permanence, inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically
psychological — not physical, althoughits manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
psychically ill to such an extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was
(3) The incapacity must be proven tobe existing at "the time of the celebration" of the
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable.
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may
be effective in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine to cure them but
may not be psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as
an essential obligation of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic
Church in the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from
Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became effective in 1983 and which
provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those who are unable to assume the
essential obligations of marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including suchprovision in our Family Code is to harmonize our civil
laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions of such appellate
tribunal. Ideally — subject to our law on evidence — whatis decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, inview of the evident source and purpose of the Family Code
provision, contemporaneous religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church — while remaining independent, separate and apart from each
other — shall walk together in synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor
General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the
court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi
contemplated under Canon 1095.9
The foregoing guidelines have turned out to be rigid, such that their application to every instance
practically condemned the petitions for declaration of nullity to the fate of certain rejection. But Article
36 of the Family Code must not be so strictly and too literally read and applied given the clear
intendment of the drafters to adopt its enacted version of "less specificity" obviously to enable "some
resiliency in its application." Instead, every court should approach the issue of nullity "not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but according to its own facts" in
recognition of the verity that no case would be on "all fours" with the next one in the field of
psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of marriage; hence, every "trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, asmuch as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."10
In the task of ascertaining the presence of psychological incapacity as a ground for the nullity of
marriage, the courts, which are concededly not endowed with expertise in the field of psychology,
must of necessity rely on the opinions of experts in order to inform themselves on the matter, and
thus enable themselves to arrive at an intelligent and judicious judgment. Indeed, the conditions for
the malady of being grave, antecedent and incurable demand the in-depth diagnosis by experts.11
II
The findings of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) on the existence or non-existence of a party’s
psychological incapacity should be final and binding for as long as such findings and evaluation of
the testimonies of witnesses and other evidence are not shown to be clearly and manifestly
erroneous.12 In every situation where the findings of the trial court are sufficiently supported by the
facts and evidence presented during trial, the appellate court should restrain itself from substituting
its own judgment.13 It is not enough reason to ignore the findings and evaluation by the trial court and
substitute our own as an appellate tribunal only because the Constitution and the Family Code
regard marriage as an inviolable social institution. We have to stress that the fulfilment of the
constitutional mandate for the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution14 only
relates to a valid marriage. No protection can be accordedto a marriage that is null and void ab initio,
because such a marriage has no legal existence.15
In declaring a marriage null and void ab initio, therefore, the Courts really assiduously defend and
promote the sanctity of marriage as an inviolable social institution. The foundation of our society is
thereby made all the more strong and solid.
Here, the findings and evaluation by the RTC as the trial court deserved credence because it was in
the better position to view and examine the demeanor of the witnesses while they were
testifying.16 The position and role of the trial judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the
psychological incapacity were not to be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and
respect.
Yet, in the September 19, 2011 decision, the Court brushed aside the opinions tendered by Dr.
Cristina Gates,a psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely
based on the petitioner’s version of the events.
After a long and hard second look, we consider it improper and unwarranted to give to such expert
opinions a merely generalized consideration and treatment, least of all to dismiss their value as
inadequate basis for the declaration of the nullity of the marriage. Instead, we hold that said experts
sufficiently and competently described the psychological incapacity of the respondent within the
standards of Article 36 of the Family Code. We uphold the conclusions reached by the two expert
witnesses because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not
anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the petitioner’s factual
premises.17
Admittedly, Dr. Gates based her findings on the transcript of the petitioner’s testimony, as well as on
her interviews of the petitioner, his sister Trinidad, and his son Miguel. Although her findings would
seem to be unilateral under such circumstances, it was not right to disregard the findings on that
basis alone. After all, her expert opinion took into consideration other factors extant in the records,
including the own opinions of another expert who had analyzed the issue from the side of the
respondent herself. Moreover, it is already settled that the courts must accord weight to expert
testimony on the psychological and mental state of the parties in cases for the declaration of the
nullityof marriages, for by the very nature of Article 36 of the Family Code the courts, "despite having
the primary task and burden of decision-making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as
decisive evidence the expert opinion on the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties."18
The expert opinion of Dr. Gates was ultimately necessary herein to enable the trial court to properly
determine the issue of psychological incapacity of the respondent (if not alsoof the petitioner).
Consequently, the lack of personal examination and interview of the person diagnosed with
personality disorder, like the respondent, did not per se invalidate the findings of the experts. The
Court has stressed in Marcos v. Marcos19 that there is no requirement for one to bedeclared
psychologically incapacitated to be personally examined by a physician, because what is important
is the presence of evidence that adequately establishes the party’s psychological incapacity. Hence,
"if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to."20
Verily, the totality of the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself. If other evidence showing
that a certain condition could possibly result from an assumed state of facts existed in the record, the
expert opinion should be admissible and be weighed as an aid for the court in interpreting such other
evidence on the causation.21 Indeed, an expert opinion on psychological incapacity should be
considered as conjectural or speculative and without any probative value only in the absence of
other evidence to establish causation. The expert’s findings under such circumstances would not
constitute hearsay that would justify their exclusion as evidence.22 This is so, considering that any
ruling that brands the scientific and technical procedure adopted by Dr. Gates as weakened by bias
should be eschewed if it was clear that her psychiatric evaluation had been based on the parties’
upbringing and psychodynamics.23 In that context, Dr. Gates’ expertopinion should be considered not
in isolation but along with the other evidence presented here.
Moreover, in its determination of the issue of psychological incapacity, the trial court was expectedto
compare the expert findings and opinion of Dr. Natividad Dayan, the respondent’s own witness, and
those of Dr. Gates.
In her Psychological Evaluation Report,24 Dr. Dayan impressed that the respondent had "compulsive
and dependent tendencies" to the extent of being "relationship dependent." Based from the
respondent’s psychological data, Dr. Dayan indicated that:
In her relationship with people, Malyne is likely to be reserved and seemingly detached in her ways.
Although she likes to be around people, she may keep her emotional distance. She, too, values her
relationship but she may not be that demonstrative of her affections. Intimacy may be quite difficult
for her since she tries to maintain a certain distance to minimize opportunities for rejection. To
others, Malyne may appear, critical and demanding in her ways. She can be assertive when
opinions contrary to those of her own are expressed. And yet, she is apt to be a dependent person.
At a less conscious level, Malyne fears that others will abandon her. Malyne, who always felt a bit
lonely, placed an enormous value on having significant others would depend on most times.
xxxx
But the minute she started to care, she became a different person— clingy and immature, doubting
his love, constantly demanding reassurance that she was the most important person in his life. She
became relationship-dependent.25
Dr. Dayan was able to clearly interpret the results of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory
test26 conducted on the respondent, observing that the respondent obtained high scores on
dependency, narcissism and compulsiveness, to wit:
Atty. Bretania
Q : How about this Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory?
A : Sir, the cut of the score which is supposed to be normal is 73 percental round and there are
several scores wherein Mrs. Kalaw obtained very high score and these are on the score of
dependency, narcissism and compulsion.
Q : Would you please tell us again, Madam Witness, what is the acceptable score?
A : When your score is 73 and above, that means that it is very significant. So, if 72 and below, it will
be considered as acceptable.
Q : In what area did Mrs. Kalaw obtain high score?
A : Under dependency, her score is 78; under narcissism, is 79; under compulsiveness, it is 84.27
It is notable that Dr. Dayan’s findings did not contradict but corroborated the findings of Dr. Gates to
the effect that the respondent had been afflicted with Narcissistic Personality Disorder as well as
with AntiSocial Disorder. Dr. Gates relevantly testified:
ATTY. GONONG
Q : Could you please repeat for clarity. I myself is [sic] not quite familiar with psychology terms. So,
more or less, could you please tell me in more layman’s terms how you arrived at your findings that
the respondent is self-centered or narcissistic?
A : I moved into this particular conclusion. Basically, if you ask about her childhood background, her
fatherdied in a vehicular accident when she was in her teens and thereafter she was prompted to
look for a job to partly assume the breadwinner’s role in her family. I gathered that paternal
grandmother partly took care of her and her siblings against the fact that her own mother was unable
to carry out her respective duties and responsibilities towards Elena Fernandez and her siblings
considering that the husband died prematurely. And there was an indication that Elena Fernandez
on several occasions ever told petitioner that he cannot blame her for being negligent as a mother
because she herself never experienced the care and affection of her own mother herself. So, there
is a precedent in her background, in her childhood, and indeed this seems to indicate a particular
script, we call it in psychology a script, the tendency to repeat somekind of experience or the lack of
care, let’s say some kind of deprivation, there is a tendency to sustain it even on to your own life
when you have your own family. I did interview the son because I was not satisfied with what I
gathered from both Trinidad and Valerio and even though as a young son at the age of fourteen
already expressed the he could not see, according to the child, the sincerity of maternal care on the
part of Elena and that he preferred to live with the father actually.
Q : Taking these all out, you came to the conclusion that respondent is self-centered and
narcissistic?
A : Actually respondent has some needs which tempts [sic] from a deprived childhood and she is still
insearch of this. In her several boyfriends, it seems that she would jump from one boyfriend to
another. There is this need for attention, this need for love on other people.
Q : And that led you to conclude?
A : And therefore I concluded that she is self-centered to the point of neglecting her duty as a wife
and as a mother.28
The probative force of the testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of her theory or
opinion, but rather in the assistance that she can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve
as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which the logic of her conclusion is
founded.29 Hence, we should weigh and consider the probative value of the findings of the expert
witnesses vis-à-vis the other evidence available.
The other expert of the petitioner was Fr. Healy, a canon law expert, an advocate before the Manila
Archdiocese and Matrimonial Tribunal, and a consultant of the Family Code Revision Committee.
Regarding Father Healy’s expert testimony, we have once declared that judicial understanding of
psychological incapacity could be informed by evolving standards, taking into account the particulars
of each case, by current trends in psychological and even by canonical thought, and by
experience.30 It is prudent for us to do so because the concept of psychological incapacity adopted
under Article 36 of the Family Code was derived from Canon Law.
Father Healy tendered his opinion onwhether or not the respondent’s level of immaturity and
irresponsibility with regard to her own children and to her husband constituted psychological
incapacity, testifying thusly:
ATTY. MADRID
Q : Now, respondent Ma. Elena Fernandez claims that she is not psychologically incapacitated. On
the facts as you read it based on the records of this case before this Honorable Court, what can you
say to that claim of respondent?
A : I would say it is a clear case of psychological incapacity because of her immaturity and traumatic
irresponsibility with regards to her own children.
Q : So what you are saying is that, the claim of respondent that she is not psychologically
incapacitated is not true?
A : Yes. It should be rejected.
Q : Why do you say so?
A : Because of what she has manifested in her whole lifestyle, inconsistent pattern has been
manifested running through their life made a doubt that this is immaturity and irresponsibility
because her family was dysfunctional and then her being a model in her early life and being the
bread winner of the family put her in an unusual position of prominence and then begun to inflate her
own ego and she begun to concentrate her own beauty and that became an obsession and that led
to her few responsibility of subordinating to her children to this lifestyle that she had embraced.
Q : You only mentioned her relationship with the children, the impact. How about the impact on the
relationship of the respondent with her husband?
A : Also the same thing. It just did notfit in to her lifestyle to fulfill her obligation to her husband and
toher children. She had her own priorities, her beauty and her going out and her mahjong and
associating with friends. They were the priorities of her life.
Q : And what you are saying is that, her family was merely secondary?
A : Secondary.
Q : And how does that relate to psychological incapacity?
A : That she could not appreciate or absorb or fulfill the obligations of marriage which everybody
takes for granted. The concentration on the husband and the children before everything else would
be subordinated to the marriage withher. It’s the other way around.
Her beauty, her going out, her beauty parlor and her mahjong, they were their priorities in her life.
Q : And in medical or clinical parlance, what specifically do you call this?
A : That is narcissism where the person falls in love with himself is from a myt[h]ical case in Roman
history.
Q : Could you please define tous what narcissism is?
A : It’s a self-love, falling in love with oneself to make up for the loss of a dear friend as in the case of
Narcissus, the myth, and then that became known in clinical terminology as narcissism. When a
person is so concern[ed] with her own beauty and prolonging and protecting it, then it becomes the
top priority in her life.
xxxx
Q : And you stated that circumstances that prove this narcissism. How do you consider this
narcissism afflicting respondent, it is grave, slight or ….?
A : I would say it’s grave from the actual cases of neglect of her family and that causes serious
obligations which she has ignored and not properly esteemed because she is so concern[ed] with
herself in her own lifestyle. Very serious.
Q : And do you have an opinion whether or not this narcissism afflicting respondent was already
existing at the time or marriage or even thereafter?
xxxx
A : When you get married you don’t develop narcissism or psychological incapacity. You bring with
you into the marriage and then it becomes manifested because in marriage you accept these
responsibilities. And now you show that you don’t accept them and you are not capable of fulfilling
them and you don’t care about them.
Q : Is this narcissism, Fr. Healy, acquired by accident or congenital or what?
A : No. The lifestyle generates it. Once you become a model and still the family was depended [sic]
upon her and she was a model at Hyatt and then Rustan’s, it began to inflate her ego so much that
this became the top priority in her life. It’s her lifestyle.
Q : What you are saying is that, the narcissism of respondent even expanded after the marriage?
A : That could have expanded because it became very obvious after the marriage because she was
neglecting such fundamental obligations.
Q : And how about the matter of curability, is this medically or clinically curable, this narcissism that
you mentioned?
A : Let’s say, it was manifested for so many years in her life. It was found in her family background
situation. Say, almost for sure would be incurable now.
Q : What specific background are you referring to?
A : Well, the fact when the father died and she was the breadwinner and her beauty was so
important to give in her job and money and influence and so on. But this is a very unusual situation
for a young girl and her position in the family was exalted in a very very unusual manner and
therefore she had that pressure on her and in her accepting the pressure, in going along with it and
putting it in top priority.31
Given his credentials and conceded expertise in Canon Law, Father Healy’s opinions and findings
commanded respect. The contribution that his opinions and findings could add to the judicial
determination of the parties’ psychological incapacity was substantive and instructive. He could
thereby inform the trial court on the degrees of the malady that would warrant the nullity of marriage,
and he could as well thereby provideto the trial court an analytical insight upon a subject as esoteric
to the courts as psychological incapacity has been. We could not justly disregard his opinions and
findings. Appreciating them together with those of Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan would advance more the
cause of justice. The Court observed in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te:32
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the primary task and burden of decision-
making, must not discount but, instead, must consider as decisive evidence the expert opinion on
the psychological and mental temperaments of the parties.
Justice Romero explained this in Molina, as follows:
ceremony, were presented to these experts and they were asked togive professional opinions about
a party's mental capacity at the time of the wedding. These opinions were rarely challenged and
tended to be accepted as decisive evidence of lack of valid consent.
commitmentare now considered a necessary prerequisite to valid matrimonial consent.
sexual anomalies but to all kinds ofpersonality disorders that incapacitate a spouse or both spouses
cohabitation or the right of the spouses to each other's body for hetero sexual acts, but is, in its
totality the right to the community of the whole of life; i.e., the right to a developing lifelong
person; that the spouses must be `other oriented' since the obligations of marriage are rooted in a
fulfillment of the obligations ofmarriage depends, according to Church decisions, on the strength of
relationship to the other spouse.
relationship:
"The courts consider the following elements crucial to the marital commitment: (1) a permanent and
faithful commitment to the marriage partner; (2) openness to children and partner; (3) stability; (4)
emotional maturity; (5) financial responsibility; (6) an ability to cope with the ordinary stresses and
strains of marriage, etc."
Fr. Green goes on to speak about some of the psychological conditions that might lead to the failure
of a marriage:
"At stake is a type of constitutional impairment precluding conjugal communion even with the best
intentions of the parties. Among the psychic factors possibly giving rise to his orher inability to fulfill
marital obligations are the following: (1) antisocial personality with its fundamental lack of loyalty to
persons or sense of moral values; (2) hyperesthesia, where the individual has no real freedom of
sexual choice; (3) the inadequate personality where personal responses consistently fall short of
reasonable expectations.
xxxx
The psychological grounds are the best approach for anyone who doubts whether he or she has a
case for an annulment on any other terms. A situation that does not fit into any of the more
traditional categories often fits very easily into the psychological category.
As new as the psychological grounds are, experts are already detecting a shift in their use. Whereas
originally the emphasis was on the parties' inability to exercise proper judgment at the time of the
marriage (lack of due discretion), recent cases seem to be concentrating on the parties' incapacity to
assume or carry out their responsibilities and obligations as promised(lack of due competence). An
advantage to using the ground of lack of due competence is that at the time the marriage was
entered into civil divorce and breakup of the family almost always is proof of someone's failure to
carry out marital responsibilities as promisedat the time the marriage was entered into."
Hernandez v. Court of Appeals emphasizes the importance of presenting expert testimony to

establish the precise cause of a party's psychological incapacity, and to show that it existed at the
inception of the marriage. And as Marcos v. Marcosasserts, there is no requirement that the person
to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally examined by a physician, if the totalityof
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence
must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological incapacity and
the psychological disorder itself.
This is not to mention, but we mention nevertheless for emphasis, that the presentation of expert
proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the psychologist or expert,
for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of psychological incapacity.33
Ngo Tealso emphasized that in light of the unintended consequences of strictly applying the
standards set in Molina,34 the courts should consider the totality of evidence in adjudicating petitions
for declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code, viz:
The resiliency with which the concept should be applied and the case-to-case basis by which the
provision should be interpreted, as so intended by its framers, had, somehow, been rendered
ineffectual by the imposition of a set of strict standards in Molina, thus:
xxxx
Noteworthy is that in Molina, while the majority of the Court’s membership concurred in the ponencia
of then Associate Justice (later Chief Justice) Artemio V. Panganiban, three justices concurred "in
the result" and another three--including, as aforesaid, Justice Romero--took pains to compose their
individual separate opinions. Then Justice Teodoro R. Padilla even emphasized that "each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations, but
marriage, it is trite to say that no case is on ‘all fours’ with another case. The trial judge must take
pains in examining the factual milieu and the appellate court must, as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment for that of the trial court."
Predictably, however, in resolving subsequent cases, the Court has applied the aforesaid standards,
without too much regard for the law's clear intention that each case is to be treated differently, as
"courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of
experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals."
In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in
Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was then
alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of marital bonds, and was sensitive to the
OSG's exaggeration of Article 36 as the "most liberal divorce procedure in the world." The
unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on people who have to live with
deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume
little by little the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions. Far fromwhat was
intended by the Court, Molina has become a strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by
it. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying Molina, has allowed diagnosed
sociopaths, schizophrenics, nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, tocontinuously debase and
pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota has annulled marriages on account of
the personality disorders of the said individuals.
The Court need not worry about the possible abuse of the remedy provided by Article 36, for there
are ample safeguards against this contingency, among which is the intervention by the State,
through the public prosecutor, to guard against collusion between the parties and/or fabrication of
evidence. The Court should rather be alarmed by the rising number of cases involving marital abuse,
child abuse, domestic violence and incestuous rape.
In dissolving marital bonds on account of either party's psychological incapacity, the Court isnot
demolishing the foundation of families, but it is actually protecting the sanctity of marriage, because
it refuses to allow a person afflicted with a psychological disorder, who cannot comply with or
assume the essential marital obligations, from remaining in that sacred bond. It may be stressed that
the infliction of physical violence, constitutional indolence or laziness, drug dependence or addiction,
and psycho sexual anomaly are manifestations of a sociopathic personality anomaly. Let itbe noted
that in Article 36, there is no marriage to speak of in the first place, as the same is void from the very
beginning. To indulge in imagery, the declaration of nullity under Article 36 will simply provide a
decent burial to a stillborn marriage.
xxxx
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not suggesting the abandonment of Molina in this case. We simply
declare that, as aptly stated by Justice Dante O. Tinga in Antonio v. Reyes, there is need to
emphasize other perspectives as well which should govern the disposition of petitions for declaration
of nullity under Article 36. At the risk of being redundant, we reiterate once more the principle that
each case must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations
but according to its own facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret the provision on a
case-to-case basis; guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.35
III
In the decision of September 19, 2011,the Court declared as follows:
Respondent admittedly played mahjong, but it was not proven that she engaged in mahjong so
frequently that she neglected her duties as a mother and a wife. Respondent refuted petitioner’s
allegations that she played four to five times a week. She maintained it was only two to three times a
week and always withthe permission of her husband and without abandoning her children at home.
The children corroborated this, saying that theywere with their mother when she played mahjong in
their relatives home.Petitioner did not present any proof, other than his own testimony, that the
mahjong sessions were so frequent that respondent neglected her family. While he intimated that
two of his sons repeated the second grade, he was not able to link this episode to respondent’s
mahjong-playing. The least that could have been done was to prove the frequency of respondent’s
mahjong-playing during the years when these two children were in second grade. This was not
done. Thus, while there is no dispute that respondent played mahjong, its alleged debilitating
frequency and adverse effect on the children were not proven.36 (Emphasis supplied)
The frequency of the respondent’s mahjong playing should not have delimited our determination of
the presence or absence of psychological incapacity. Instead, the determinant should be her obvious
failure to fully appreciate the duties and responsibilities of parenthood at the time she made her
marital vows. Had she fully appreciated such duties and responsibilities, she would have known that
bringing along her children of very tender ages to her mahjong sessions would expose them to a
culture of gambling and other vices that would erode their moral fiber.
Nonetheless, the long-term effects of the respondent’s obsessive mahjong playing surely impacted
on her family life, particularly on her very young children. We do find to be revealing the disclosures
made by Valerio Teodoro Kalaw37 – the parties’ eldest son – in his deposition, whereby the son
confirmed the claim of his father that his mother had been hooked on playing mahjong, viz:
ATTY. PISON: From the time before your parent’s separation, do you remember any habit or activity
or practice which your mother engaged in, before the separation?
WITNESS: Yeah, habit? She was a heavy smoker and she likes to play mahjong a lot, and I can’t
remember.
xxxx
ATTY. PISON: You said that your mother played mahjong frequently. How frequent, do you
remember?
WITNESS : Not really, but it was a lot. Not actually, I can’t, I can’t…
ATTY. PISON: How long would she stay playing mahjong say one session?
WITNESS : Really long cuz’we would go to my aunt’s house in White Plains and I think we would get
there by lunch then leave, we fall asleep. I think it was like one in the morning. ATTY. PISON: You,
you went there? She brought you?
WITNESS : Yeah, to play withmy cousins, yeah and my brothers & sisters.
ATTY. PISON: Were you brought all the time?
WITNESS: Yeah, almost all the time but sometimes, I guess she’d go out by herself.38
The fact that the respondent brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point
to her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture of
gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion of her
mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for parenting to the
gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This was the observation of Father Healy
himself. In that regard, Dr. Gates and Dr. Dayan both explained that the current psychological state
of the respondent had been rooted on her own childhood experience.
The respondent revealed her wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development.
This disregard violated her duty as a parent to safeguard and protect her children, as expressly
defined under Article 209 and Article 220 of the Family Code, to wit:
Article 209. Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents over the person and property of their
unemancipated children, parental authority and responsibility shall includethe caring for and rearing
of such children for civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their moral, mental
and physical character and well-being.
Article 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their
unemancipated children or wards the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept
and good example, and to provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) x x x x
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity,
self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and
inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To enhance, protect, preserve and maintain their physical and mental health at all times;
(5) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their
activities, recreation and association with others, protect them from bad company, and
prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
(6) x x x x
(7) x x x x
(8) x x x x
(9) x x x x (emphasis supplied)
The September 19, 2011 decision did not properly take into consideration the findings of the RTC to
the effect that both the petitioner and the respondent had been psychologically incapacitated, and
thus could not assume the essential obligations of marriage. The RTC would not have found so
without the allegation to that effect by the respondent in her answer,39 whereby she averred that it
was not she but the petitioner who had suffered from psychological incapacity.
The allegation of the petitioner’spsychological incapacity was substantiated by Dr. Dayan, as follows:
ATTY. BRETAÑA:
Q : You stated earlier that both parties were behaviorally immature?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : And that the marriage was a mistake?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What is your basis for your statement that respondent was behaviorally immature?
A : Sir, for the reason that even before the marriage Malyn had noticed already some of those short
temper of the petitioner but she was very much in love and so she lived-in with him and even the
time that they were together, that they were living in, she also had noticed some of his psychological
deficits if we may say so. But as I said, because she is also dependent and she was one who
determined to make the relationship work, she was denying even those kinds of problems that she
had seen.
Q : To make it clear, Madam witness, I’m talking here of the petitioner, Mr. Kalaw. What led you to
conclude that Mr. Kalaw was behaviorally immature?
A : I think he also mentioned that his concept of marriage was not duly stable then. He was not really
thinking of marriage except that his wife got pregnant and so he thought that he had to marry her.
And even that time he was not also a monogamous person.
Q : Are you saying, Madam Witness, that ultimately the decision to marry lied on the petitioner? A : I
think so, Sir.
Q : Now, in your report, Madam Witness, you mentioned here that the petitioner admitted to you that
in his younger years he was often out seeking other women. I’m referring specifically to page 18. He
also admitted to you that the thought of commitment scared him, the petitioner. Now, given these
admissions by petitioner to you, my questions is, is it possible for such a person to enter into
marriage despite this fear of commitment and given his admission that he was a womanizer? Is it
possible for this person to stop his womanizing ways during the marriage?
A : Sir, it’s difficult.
Q : It would be difficult for that person?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the probability of this person giving up his womanizing after marriage?
A : Sir, I would say the probability of his giving up is almost only 20%.
Q : So, it is entirely possible that the respondent womanized during his marriage with the
respondent?
A : Yes, Sir.
Q : What is the bearing of this fearof commitment on the part of the petitioner insofar as his
psychological capacity to perform his duties as a husband is concerned?
A : Sir, it would impair his ability to have sexual integrity and also to be fully committed to the role of
husband to Malyn.
Q : Madam Witness, you never directly answered my question on whether the petitioner was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his duty as a husband. You only said that the petitioner was
behaviorally immature and that the marriage was a mistake. Now, may I asked [sic] you that
question again and request you to answer that directly?
A : Sir, he is psychologically incapacitated.40
Although the petitioner, as the plaintiff, carried the burden to prove the nullity of the marriage, the
respondent, as the defendant spouse, could establish the psychological incapacity of her husband
because she raised the matter in her answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null
and void under Article 36 of the Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the
respondent who imputes the psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully
substantiated with proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of
them, and if psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed
null and void.
More than twenty (20) years had passed since the parties parted ways. By now, they must have
already accepted and come to terms with the awful truth that their marriage, assuming it existed in
the eyes of the law, was already beyond repair. Both parties had inflicted so much damage not only
to themselves, but also to the lives and psyche of their own children. It would be a greater injustice
should we insist on still recognizing their void marriage, and then force them and their children to
endure some more damage. This was the very same injustice that Justice Romero decried in her
erudite dissenting opinion in Santos v. Court of Appeals:41
It would be great injustice, I believe, to petitioner for this Court to give a much too restrictive
Besides, there are public policy considerations involved in the ruling the Court makes today. It is 1âw phi 1
not, in effect, directly or indirectly, facilitating the transformation of petitioner into a "habitual tryster"
or one forced to maintain illicit relations with another woman or women with emerging problems of
and conjugal love which he has sought from her and towhich he is legally entitled?
reason of his wife’s psychological incapacity to perform an essential marital obligation. In this case,
the marriage never existed from the beginning because the respondent was afflicted with
psychological incapacity at and prior to the time of the marriage. Hence, the Court should not
hesitate to declare the nullity of the marriage between the parties.
To stress, our mandate to protect the inviolability of marriage as the basic foundation of our society
does not preclude striking down a marital union that is "ill-equipped to promote family life," thus:
Now is also the opportune time to comment on another common legal guide utilized in the
adjudication of petitions for declaration of nullity in the adjudication of petitions for declaration of
nullity under Article 36. All too frequently, this Court and lower courts, in denying petitions of the
kind, have favorably cited Sections 1 and 2, Article XV of the Constitution, which respectively state
that "[t]he State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development[t]," and that [m]arriage, as an
inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State." These
provisions highlight the importance of the family and the constitutional protection accorded to the
institution of marriage.
But the Constitution itself does not establish the parameters of state protection to marriage as a
social institution and the foundation of the family. It remains the province of the legislature to define
all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities to protect it, based on
whatever socio-political influences it deems proper, and subject of course to the qualification that
such legislative enactment itself adheres to the Constitution and the Bill of Rights. This being the
case, it also falls on the legislature to put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect
marriage and the family. This has been accomplished at present through the enactment of the
Family Code, which defines marriage and the family, spells out the corresponding legal effects,
imposes the limitations that affect married and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for
declaration of nullity and those for legal separation. While it may appear that the judicial denial of a
petition for declaration of nullity is reflective of the constitutional mandate to protect marriage, such
action in fact merely enforces a statutory definition of marriage, not a constitutionally ordained
decree of what marriage is. Indeed, if circumstances warrant, Sections 1 and 2 of Article XV need
not be the only constitutional considerations to be taken into account in resolving a petition for
declaration of nullity. Indeed, Article 36 of the Family Code, in classifying marriages contracted by a
psychologically incapacitated person as a nullity, should be deemed as an implement of this
constitutional protection of marriage. Given the avowed State interest in promoting marriage as the
foundation of the family, which in turn serves as the foundation of the nation, there is a
corresponding interest for the State to defend against marriages ill-equipped to promote family life.
Void ab initio marriages under Article 36 do not further the initiatives of the State concerning
marriage and family, as they promote wedlock among persons who, for reasons independent of their
will, are not capacitated to understand or comply with the essential obligations of
marriage.42(Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE
the decision promulgated on September 19, 2011; and REINSTATES the decision rendered by the
Regional Trial Court declaring the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent on November
4, 1976 as NULL AND VOID AB INITIO due to the psychological incapacity of the parties pursuant to
Article 36 of the Family Code.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 160258. January 19, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. GLORIA BERMUDEZ-

LORINO, respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Via this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
seeks the reversal and setting aside of the decision dated September 23, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73884, which affirmed on appeal an earlier decision
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at San Mateo, Rizal in a summary judicial proceeding
thereat commenced by the herein respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino for the declaration
of the presumptive death of her absent spouse, Francisco Lorino, Jr., based on the
provisions of Article 41 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage.
The facts may be summarized, as follows:

Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino (Gloria for brevity), and her husband were
married on June 12, 1987. Out of this marriage, she begot three (3) children, namely:
Francis Jeno, Fria Lou and Fatima.
Before they got married in 1987, Gloria was unaware that her husband was a habitual
drinker, possessed with violent character/attitude, and had the propensity to go out with
friends to the extent of being unable to engage in any gainful work.
Because of her husbands violent character, Gloria found it safer to leave him behind
and decided to go back to her parents together with her three (3) children. In order to
support the children, Gloria was compelled to work abroad.
From the time of her physical separation from her husband in 1991, Gloria has not
heard of him at all. She had absolutely no communications with him, or with any of his
relatives.
On August 14, 2000, nine (9) years after she left her husband, Gloria filed a verified
petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at San Mateo, Rizal under the rules
on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the Family Law provided for in the Family Code,
which petition was docketed in the same court as Special Proceeding No. 325-00 SM.
On August 28, 2000, the RTC issued an order directing, inter alia, the publication of
the petition in a newspaper of general circulation, thus:
A verified petition was filed by herein petitioner through counsel alleging that she
married Francisco Lorino, Jr. on June 12, 1987 but because of the violent character of
his husband, she decided to go back to her parents and lived separately from her
husband. After nine (9) years, there was absolutely no news about him and she
believes that he is already dead and is now seeking through this petition for a Court
declaration that her husband is judicially presumed dead for the purpose of
remarriage.
Finding the said petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the same is hereby set
for hearing before this Court on September 18, 2000 at 8:30 oclock in the morning at
which place, date and time, any or all persons who may claim any interest thereto may
appear and show cause why the same should not be granted.
Let a copy of this Order be published in a newspaper of general circulation in this

province once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks and be posted in the bulletin
boards of the Hall of Justice and the Municipal Hall, San Mateo, Rizal, all at the
expense of the petitioner.
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General a copy of this Order together with a copy
of the petition. Further, send a copy of this Order to the last known address of
Francisco Lorino, Jr. at 719 Burgos St., Sta. Elena, Marikina City.
SO ORDERED [1]
The evidence in support of the summary judicial proceeding are: the order of
publication dated August 28, 2000 (Exhibit A); affidavit of publication dated September
16, 2000 (Exhibit B)[2]; copies of the newspapers where the order appeared (Exhibits C to
E-1)[3]; a deposition dated September 4, 2000 of Gloria taken in Hong Kong (Exhibit G) [4];
Glorias affidavit dated October 21, 1999, also executed in Hong Kong (Exhibit G-1)[5]; and
a certification by Department of Foreign Affairs Authentication Officer, Catalina C.
Gonzalez, dated November 3, 1999, therein certifying that the signature of Vice Consul
Adriane Bernie C. Candolada, appearing below the jurat in Glorias affidavit of October
21, 1999, is authentic (Exhibit G-2)[6].
In a decision dated November 7, 2001, the RTC, finding merit in the summary petition,
rendered judgment granting the same, to wit:
WHEREFORE, this Court in view of the facts and circumstances obtaining, finds the
petition with merit and hereby grants its imprimatur to the petition. Judgment is
hereby rendered declaring the presumptive death/absence of Francisco Lorino, Jr.
pursuant to Art. 41 of the New Family Code but subject to all restrictions and
conditions provided therein.
SO ORDERED. [7]
Despite the judgment being immediately final and executory under the provisions of
Article 247 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory,
the Office of the Solicitor General, for the Republic of the Philippines, nevertheless filed
a Notice of Appeal.[8] Acting thereon, the RTC had the records elevated to the Court of
Appeals which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CV No. 73884.
In a decision dated September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals, treating the case as
an ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, denied
the Republics appeal and accordingly affirmed the appealed RTC decision:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is DENIED.

Accordingly, the appealed November 7, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
San Mateo, Rizal in Spec. Proc. No. 325-00 SM is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. [9]
Without filing any motion for reconsideration, petitioner Republic directly went to this
Court via the instant recourse under Rule 45, maintaining that the petition raises a pure
question of law that does not require prior filing of a motion for reconsideration.
The foregoing factual antecedents present to this Court the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS DULY ACQUIRED JURISDICTION
OVER THE APPEAL ON A FINAL AND EXECUTORY JUDGMENT OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT; and
WHETHER OR NOT THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES FOR A JUDICIAL
DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY
CODE WERE DULY ESTABLISHED IN THIS CASE.
The Court rules against petitioner Republic.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
IN THE FAMILY LAW, sets the tenor for cases covered by these rules, to wit:
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall
apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings.
Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical
rules.
Judge Elizabeth Balquin-Reyes of RTC, Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal duly complied
with the above-cited provision by expeditiously rendering judgment within ninety (90) days
after the formal offer of evidence by therein petitioner, Gloria Bermudez-Lorino.
The problem came about when the judge gave due course to the Republics appeal
upon the filing of a Notice of Appeal, and had the entire records of the case elevated to
the Court of Appeals, stating in her order of December 18, 2001, as follows:
Notice of Appeal having been filed through registered mail on November 22, 2001 by
the Office of the Solicitor General who received a copy of the Decision in this case on
November 14, 2001, within the reglementary period fixed by the Rules, let the entire
records of this case be transmitted to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED. [10]
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is no reglementary

period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely because judgments rendered
thereunder, by express provision of Section 247, Family Code, supra, are immediately
final and executory. It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course
to the Republics appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records of the case to the
Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment which, by express
provision of law, is immediately final and executory. As we have said in Veloria vs.
Comelec,[11] the right to appeal is not a natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is
merely a statutory privilege. Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code,
all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law are immediately
final and executory, the right to appeal was not granted to any of the parties therein. The
Republic of the Philippines, as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive
death, should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC decision of
November 7, 2001.
It was fortunate, though, that the Court of Appeals, acting through its Special Fourth
Division, with Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion as Acting Chairman and ponente, denied the
Republics appeal and affirmed without modification the final and executory judgment of
the lower court. For, as we have held in Nacuray vs. NLRC:[12]
Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory
it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an
erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and whether made by the highest court of the land
(citing Nunal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94005, 6 April 1993, 221 SCRA 26).
But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance of the bench and
the bar, let it be stated that the RTCs decision dated November 7, 2001, was immediately
final and executory upon notice to the parties. It was erroneous for the OSG to file a notice
of appeal, and for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired no
jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal outright on that ground.
This judgment of denial was elevated to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. Although the result of the Court of Appeals denial of the appeal would
apparently be the same, there is a big difference between having the supposed appeal
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that the RTC decision sought to be
appealed is immediately final and executory, and the denial of the appeal for lack of merit.
In the former, the supposed appellee can immediately ask for the issuance of an Entry of
Judgment in the RTC, whereas, in the latter, the appellant can still raise the matter to this
Court on petition for review and the RTC judgment cannot be executed until this Court
makes the final pronouncement.
The Court, therefore, finds in this case grave error on the part of both the RTC and
the Court of Appeals. To stress, the Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal
on ground of lack of jurisdiction, and reiterated the fact that the RTC decision of November
7, 2001 was immediately final and executory. As it were, the Court of Appeals committed
grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the erroneous appeal of the Republic on
ground of lack of jurisdiction because, by express provision of law, the judgment was not
appealable.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Panganiban, (Chairman), J., in the result.
[1]
Records, p. 9.
[2]
Records, pp. 10-11.
[3]
Records, pp. 12-15.
[4]
Records, pp. 37-40.
[5]
Records, p. 42.
[6]
Records, p. 41.
[7]
RTC Decision, p. 2; Records, pp. 51-52.
[8]
Records, p. 53.
[9]
Rollo, pp. 22-26.
[10]
Records, p. 56.
[11]
211 SCRA 907 [1992].
[12]
270 SCRA 9 [1997].

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
MANUEL G. ALMELOR, G.R. No. 179620

Petitioner,
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL REYES, JJ.
COURT OF LAS PIAS CITY,
BRANCH 254, and Promulgated:
LEONIDA T. ALMELOR,
Respondent. August 26, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
MARRIAGE, in its totality, involves the spouses right to the community of

their whole lives. It likewise involves a true intertwining of personalities.[1]
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[2] of the Court of

Appeals (CA) denying the petition for annulment of judgment and affirming in
toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Las Pias, Branch 254. The
CA dismissed outright the Rule 47 petition for being the wrong remedy.
The Facts
Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida

Trinidad (Leonida) were married on January 29, 1989 at the Manila
Cathedral.[3] Their union bore threechildren: (1) Maria Paulina Corinne, born
on October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon Manuel, born on August 9, 1991; and (3)
Manuel Homer, born on July 4, 1994.[4] Manuel and Leonida are both medical
practitioners, an anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively.[5]
After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a petition with
the RTC in Las Pias City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. The case,
docketed as LP-00-0132 was raffled off to Branch 254.
During the trial, Leonida testified that she first met Manuel in 1981 at the
San Lazaro Hospital where they worked as medical student clerks. At that time, she
regarded Manuel as a very thoughtful person who got along well with other
people. They soon became sweethearts. Three years after, they got married.[6]
Leonida averred that Manuels kind and gentle demeanor did not last
long. In the public eye, Manuel was the picture of a perfect husband and
father. This was not the case in his private life. At home, Leonida described Manuel
as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuels
unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their
frequent fights as a couple.[7] Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to
the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for his mother. Manuels deep
attachment to his mother and his dependence on her decision-making were
incomprehensible to Leonida.[8]
Further adding to her woes was his concealment to her of his

homosexuality. Her suspicions were first aroused when she noticed Manuels
peculiar closeness to his male companions. For instance, she caught him in an
indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male
caller.[9] She also found several pornographic homosexual materials in his
possession.[10] Her worse fears were confirmed when she saw Manuel kissed
another man on the lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales.[11] When she
confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this point, Leonida took her children
and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving support to their
children.[12]
Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to
prove Leonidas claim. Dr. del Fonso Garcia testified that she conducted evaluative
interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests on Leonida. She also had a one-time
interview with Manuel and face-to-face interviews with Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the
eldest child).[13] She concluded that Manuel is psychologically
[14]
incapacitated. Such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before
the marriage and appeared to be incurable.
Manuel, for his part, admitted that he and Leonida had some petty
arguments here and there. He, however, maintained that their marital relationship
was generally harmonious. The petition for annulment filed by Leonida came as a
surprise to him.
Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonidas hostility against him was
their professional rivalry. It began when he refused to heed the
[15]
memorandum released by Christ the King Hospital. The memorandum ordered
him to desist from converting his own lying-in clinic to a primary or secondary
hospital.[16] Leonidas family owns Christ the King Hospital which is situated in the
same subdivision as Manuels clinic and residence.[17] In other words, he and her
family have competing or rival hospitals in the same vicinity.
Manuel belied her allegation that he was a cruel father

to their children. He denied maltreating them. At most, he only imposed the
necessary discipline on the children.
He also defended his show of affection for his mother. He said there was
nothing wrong for him to return the love and affection of the person who reared
and looked after him and his siblings. This is especially apt now that his mother is
in her twilight years.[18] Manuel pointed out that Leonida found fault in this
otherwise healthy relationship because of her very jealous
[19]
and possessive nature.
This same overly jealous behavior of Leonida drove Manuel to avoid
the company of female friends. He wanted to avoid any further misunderstanding
with his wife. But, Leonida instead conjured up stories about his sexual
preference. She also fabricated tales about pornographic materials found in his
possession to cast doubt on his masculinity.[20]
To corroborate his version, he presented his brother, Jesus G.

Almelor. Jesus narrated that he usually stayed at Manuels house during his weekly
trips to Manila from IrigaCity. He was a witness to the generally harmonious
relationship between his brother Manuel and sister-in-law, Leonida. True, they
had some quarrels typical of a husband and wife relationship. But there
was nothing similar to what Leonida described in her testimony.[21]
Jesus further testified that he was with his brother on the day Leonida
allegedly saw Manuel kissed another man. He denied that such an incident
occurred. On that particular date,[22] he and Manuel went straight home from a trip
to Bicol. There was no other person with them at that time, except their driver.[23]
Manuel expressed his intention to refute Dr. del Fonso Garcias findings by
presenting his own expert witness. However, no psychiatrist was presented.
RTC Disposition
By decision dated November 25, 2005, the RTC granted the petition for
annulment, with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, premised on the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring the marriage contracted by herein parties on 29 January
1989 and all its effects under the law null and void from the
beginning;
2. Dissolving the regime of community property between the same

parties with forfeiture of defendants share thereon in favor of the
same parties children whose
legal custody is awarded to plaintiff with visitorial right afforded to
defendant;
3. Ordering the defendant to give monthly financial support to all the

children; and
4. Pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC:
a. Directing the Branch Clerk of this Court to enter this

Judgment upon its finality in the Book of Entry of Judgment
and to issue an Entry of Judgment in accordance thereto;
and
b. Directing the Local Civil Registrars of Las Pias City

and Manila City to cause the registration of the said Entry
of Judgment in their respective Books of Marriages.
Upon compliance, a decree of nullity of marriage shall be issued.
SO ORDERED.[24] (Emphasis supplied)
The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of Article 36, but
Article 45 of the Family Code. It ratiocinated:
x x x a careful evaluation and in-depth analysis of the surrounding circumstances

of the allegations in the complaint and of the evidence presented in support thereof (sic)
reveals that in this case (sic) there is more than meets the eyes (sic).
Both legally and biologically, homosexuality x x x is, indeed, generally
incompatible with hetero sexual marriage. This is reason enough that in this jurisdiction
(sic) the law recognizes marriage as a special contract exclusively only between a man and
a woman x x x and thus when homosexuality has trespassed into marriage, the same law
provides ample remedies to correct the situation [Article 45(3) in relation to Article 46(4)
or Article 55, par. 6, Family Code]. This is of course in recognition of the biological fact
that no matter how a man cheats himself that he is not a homosexual and forces himself
to live a normal heterosexual life, there will surely come a time when his true sexual
preference as a homosexual shall prevail in haunting him and thus jeopardizing the
solidity, honor, and welfare of his own family.[25]
Manuel filed a notice of appeal which was, however, denied due

course. Undaunted, he filed a petition for annulment of judgment with the CA.[26]
Manuel contended that the assailed decision was issued in excess of the
lower courts jurisdiction; that it had no jurisdiction to dissolve the absolute
community of property and forfeit his conjugal share in favor of his children.
CA Disposition
On July 31, 2007, the CA denied the petition, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Annulment of Judgment is hereby

DENIED. The Court AFFIRMS in toto the Decision (dated November 25, 2005) of the
Regional Trial Court (Branch 254), in Las Pias City, in Civil Case No. LP-00-0132. No costs.[27]
The CA stated that petitioner pursued the wrong remedy by filing the
extraordinary remedy of petition for annulment of judgment. Said the appellate
court:
It is obvious that the petitioner is questioning the propriety of the decision

rendered by the lower Court. But the remedy assuming there was a mistake is not a
Petition for Annulment of Judgment but an ordinary appeal. An error of judgment may be
reversed or corrected only by appeal.
What petitioner is ascribing is an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction, which is

properly the subject of an ordinary appeal.
In short, petitioner admits the jurisdiction of the lower court but he claims excess
in the exercise thereof. Excess assuming there was is not covered by Rule 47 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.The Rule refers the lack of jurisdiction and not the exercise
thereof.[28]
Issues
Petitioner Manuel takes the present recourse via Rule 45, assigning to the
CA the following errors:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT TREATING THE PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE
OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS NULL ANDVOID ON THE
GROUND OF PETITIONERS PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL
COURT AS REGARDS THE ORDER TO FORFEIT THE SHARE OF PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE OF
THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.[29]
Our Ruling
I. The stringent rules of procedures may be relaxed to serve the demands of

substantial justice and in the Courts exercise of equity jurisdiction.
Generally, an appeal taken either to the Supreme Court or the CA by the

wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed.[30] This is to prevent the party
from benefiting from ones neglect and mistakes. However, like most rules, it
carries certain exceptions. After all, the ultimate purpose of all rules of procedures
is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.[31]
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a last remedy. It can not be resorted

to if the ordinary remedies are available or no longer available through no fault of
petitioner.[32]However, in Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals,[33] this Court clarified the
proper appreciation for technical rules of procedure, in this wise:
Rules of procedures are intended to promote, not to defeat, substantial justice

and, therefore, they should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The
exception is that while the Rules are liberally construed, the provisions with respect to
the rules on the manner and periods for perfecting appeals are strictly applied. As an
exception to the exception, these rules have sometimes been relaxed on equitable
considerations. Also, in some cases the Supreme Court has given due course to an appeal
perfected out of time where a stringent application of the rules would have denied it, but
only when to do so would serve the demands of substantial justice and in the exercise of
equity jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.[34] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
For reasons of justice and equity, this Court has allowed exceptions to the stringent
rules governing appeals.[35] It has, in the past, refused to sacrifice justice for
technicality.[36]
After discovering the palpable error of his petition, Manuel seeks the indulgence
of this Court to consider his petition before the CA instead as a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
A perusal of the said petition reveals that Manuel imputed grave abuse of
discretion to the lower court for annulling his marriage on account of his alleged
homosexuality.This is not the first time that this Court is faced with a similar
situation. In Nerves v. Civil Service Commission,[37] petitioner Delia R. Nerves
elevated to the CA a Civil Service Commission (CSC) decision suspending her for six
(6) months. The CSC ruled Nerves, a public school teacher, is deemed to have
already served her six-month suspensionduring the pendency of the
case. Nevertheless, she is ordered reinstated without back wages. On appeal,
Nerves stated in her petition, inter alia:
1. This is a petition for certiorari filed pursuant to Article IX-A, Section 7 of the
Constitution of the Philippines and under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
2. But per Supreme Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 (Revised Circular
No. 1-91) petitioner is filing the instant petition with this Honorable Court instead of
the Supreme Court.[38](Underscoring supplied)
The CA dismissed Nerves petition for certiorari for being the wrong remedy
or the inappropriate mode of appeal.[39] The CA opined that under the Supreme
Court Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95 x x x appeals from judgments or final
orders or resolutions of CSC is by a petition for review.[40]
This Court granted Nerves petition and held that she had substantially complied
with the Administrative Circular. The Court stated:
That it was erroneously labeled as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is only a minor procedural lapse, not fatal to the appeal. x x x
More importantly, the appeal on its face appears to be impressed with merit. Hence, the
Court of Appeals should have overlooked the insubstantial defects of the petition x x x in
order to do justice to the parties concerned. There is, indeed, nothing sacrosanct about
procedural rules, which should be liberally construed in order to promote their object and
assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action
or proceeding. As it has been said, where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate
substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified
in exempting a particular case from the operation of the rules.[41] (Underscoring supplied)
Similarly, in the more recent case of Tan v. Dumarpa,[42] petitioner Joy

G. Tan availed of a wrong remedy by filing a petition for review on certiorari instead
of a motion for new trial or an ordinary appeal. In the interest of justice, this Court
considered the petition, pro hac vice, as a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
This Court found that based on Tans allegations, the trial court prima
facie committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering a judgment by default. If
uncorrected, it will cause petitioner great injustice. The Court elucidated in this
wise:
Indeed, where as here, there is a strong showing that grave miscarriage of justice
would result from the strict application of the Rules, we will not hesitate to relax the same
in the interest of substantial justice.[43] (Underscoring supplied)
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, justice will be better served by giving due
course to the present petition and treating petitioners CA petition as
one for certiorari under Rule 65, considering that what is at stake is the validity or
non-validity of a marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,[44] citing Labad v. University of Southeastern

Philippines, this Court reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals on purely technical grounds is frowned upon. While

the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right, nonetheless it is an essential part of
our judicial system and courts should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of
the right to appeal, but rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.[45]
Indeed, it is far better and more prudent for a court to excuse a technical lapse and
afford the parties a review of the case on the merits to attain the ends of justice.[46]
Furthermore, it was the negligence and incompetence of Manuels

counsel that prejudiced his right to appeal. His counsel, Atty. Christine
Dugenio, repeatedly availed of inappropriate remedies. After the denial of her
notice of appeal, she failed to move for reconsideration or new trial at the first
instance. She also erroneously filed a petition for annulment of judgment rather
than pursue an ordinary appeal.
These manifest errors were clearly indicative of counsels

incompetence. These gravely worked to the detriment of Manuels appeal. True it
is that the negligence of counsel binds the client. Still, this Court has recognized
certain exceptions: (1) where reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the
client of due process of law; (2) when its application will result in outright
deprivation of the clients liberty and property; or (3) where the interest of justice
so require.[47]
The negligence of Manuels counsel falls under

the exceptions. Ultimately, the reckless or gross negligence of petitioners former
counsel led to the loss of his right to appeal. He should not be made to suffer for
his counsels grave mistakes. Higher interests of justice and equity demand
that he be allowed to ventilate his case in a higher court.
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[48] this Court explained thus:

It is settled that the negligence of counsel binds the client. This is based on the rule
that any act performed by a counsel within the scope of his general or implied authority is
regarded as an act of his client. However, where counsel is guilty of gross ignorance,
negligence and dereliction of duty, which resulted in the clients being held liable for
damages in a damage suit, the client is deprived of his day in court and the judgment may
be set aside on such ground. In the instant case, higher interests of justice and equity
demand that petitioners be allowed to present evidence on their defense. Petitioners may
not be made to suffer for the lawyers mistakes. This Court will always be disposed to grant
relief to parties aggrieved by perfidy, fraud, reckless inattention and downright
incompetence of lawyers, which has the consequence of depriving their clients, of their
day in court.[49] (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the power to except a particular case from the
operation of the rule whenever the demands of justice require it. With more
conviction should it wield such power in a case involving the sacrosanct institution
of marriage. This Court is guided with the thrust of giving a party the fullest
opportunity to establish the merits of ones action.[50]
The client was likewise spared from counsels negligence

in Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson Commercial Buildings,
Inc.[51] and Ancheta v. Guersey-Dalaygon.[52] Said the Court in Bengson:
But if under the circumstances of the case, the rule deserts its proper office as an
aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to
admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In other words, the court
has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the
purposes of justice require it.[53]
II. Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not

homosexuality per se.
Manuel is a desperate man determined to salvage what remains of his
marriage. Persistent in his quest, he fought back all the heavy accusations of
incapacity, cruelty, and doubted masculinity thrown at him.
The trial court declared that Leonidas petition for nullity had no basis at all because
the supporting grounds relied upon can not legally make a case under Article 36
of the Family Code. It went further by citing Republic v. Molina:[54]
Indeed, mere allegations of conflicting personalities, irreconcilable differences, incessant

quarrels and/or beatings, unpredictable mood swings, infidelities, vices, abandonment,
and difficulty, neglect, or failure in the performance of some marital obligations do not
suffice to establish psychological incapacity.[55]
If so, the lower court should have dismissed outright the petition for not
meeting the guidelines set in Molina. What Leonida attempted to demonstrate
were Manuels homosexual tendencies by citing overt acts generally predominant
among homosexual individuals.[56] She wanted to prove that the perceived
homosexuality rendered Manuelincapable of fulfilling the essential marital
obligations.
But instead of dismissing the petition, the trial court nullified the marriage
between Manuel and Leonida on the ground of vitiated consent by virtue of
fraud. In support of its conclusion, the lower court reasoned out:
As insinuated by the State (p. 75, TSN, 15 December 2003), when there is smoke
surely there is fire. Although vehemently denied by defendant, there is preponderant
evidence enough to establish with certainty that defendant is really a homosexual. This is
the fact that can be deduced from the totality of the marriage life scenario of herein
parties.
Before his marriage, defendant knew very well that people around him even
including his own close friends doubted his true sexual preference (TSN, pp. 35-36, 13
December 2000; pp. 73-75, 15 December 2003). After receiving many forewarnings,
plaintiff told defendant about the rumor she heard but defendant did not do anything to
prove to the whole world once and for all the truth of all his denials. Defendant
threatened to sue those people but nothing happened after that. There may have been
more important matters to attend to than to waste time and effort filing cases against
and be effected by these people and so, putting more premiums on defendants denials,
plaintiff just the same married him. Reasons upon reasons may be advanced to either
exculpate or nail to the cross defendant for his act of initially concealing his homosexuality
to plaintiff, but in the end, only one thing is certain even during his marriage with plaintiff,
the smoke of doubt about his real preference continued and even got thicker, reason why
obviously defendant failed to establish a happy and solid family; and in so failing, plaintiff
and their children became his innocent and unwilling victims.
Yes, there is nothing untoward of a man if, like herein defendant, he is meticulous
over even small details in the house (sic) like wrongly folded bed sheets, etc. or if a man
is more authoritative in knowing what clothes or jewelry shall fit his wife (pp. 77-81, TSN,
15 December 2003); but these admissions of defendant taken in the light of evidence
presented apparently showing that he had extra fondness of his male friends (sic) to the
extent that twice on separate occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14 February 2001) he was allegedly
seen by plaintiff kissing another man lips-to-lips plus the homosexual magazines and
tapes likewise allegedly discovered underneath his bed (Exhibits L and M), the doubt as
to his real sex identity becomes stronger. The accusation of plaintiff versus thereof of
defendant may be the name of the game in this case; but the simple reason of
professional rivalry advanced by the defendant is certainly not enough to justify and
obscure the question why plaintiff should accuse him of such a very untoward infidelity
at the expense and humiliation of their children and family as a whole.[57]
Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations

that Manuel is a homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of
their marriage.The lower court considered the public perception of Manuels sexual
preference without the corroboration of witnesses. Also, it took cognizance of
Manuels peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that Manuel is a homosexual, the lower
court cannot appreciate it as a ground to annul his marriage with Leonida. The law
is clear amarriage may be annulled when the consent of either party was obtained
by fraud,[58] such as concealment of homosexuality.[59] Nowhere in
the said decision was it proven by preponderance of evidence that Manuel was a
homosexual at the onset of his marriage and that he deliberately hid such fact to
his wife.[60] It is the concealment of homosexuality, and not homosexuality per se,
that vitiates the consent of the innocent party. Such concealment presupposes bad
faith and intent to defraud the other party in giving consent to the marriage.
Consent is an essential requisite of a valid marriage. To be valid, it must be freely

given by both parties. An allegation of vitiated consent must be proven by
preponderance of evidence. The Family Code has enumerated an exclusive list of
circumstances[61] constituting fraud. Homosexuality per se is not among those
cited, but its concealment.
This distinction becomes more apparent when we go over the deliberations[62] of

the Committees on the Civil Code and Family Law, to wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that this ground should be eliminated in the provision on
the grounds for legal separation. Dean Gupit, however, pointed out that in Article 46, they
are talking only of concealment, while in the article on legal separation, there is
actuality. Judge Diy added that in legal separation, the ground existed after the marriage,
while in Article 46, the ground existed at the time of the marriage. Justice Reyes suggested
that, for clarity, they add the phrase existing at the time of the marriage at the end of
subparagraph (4). The Committee approved the suggestion.[63]
To reiterate, homosexuality per se is only a ground for legal separation. It is

its concealment that serves as a valid ground to annul a marriage.[64] Concealment
in this case is not simply a blanket denial, but one that is constitutive of fraud. It is
this fundamental element that respondent failed to prove.
In the United States, homosexuality has been considered as a basis for

divorce. It indicates that questions of sexual identity strike so deeply at one of the
basic elements of marriage, which is the exclusive sexual bond between the
spouses.[65] In Crutcher v. Crutcher,[66] the Court held:
Unnatural practices of the kind charged here are an infamous indignity to the wife,
and which would make the marriage relation so revolting to her that it would become
impossible for her to discharge the duties of a wife, and would defeat the whole purpose of
the relation. In the natural course of things, they would cause mental suffering to the extent
of affecting her health.[67]
However, although there may be similar sentiments here in the Philippines,

the legal overtones are significantly different. Divorce is not recognized in the
country.Homosexuality and its alleged incompatibility to a healthy heterosexual life
are not sanctioned as grounds to sever the marriage bond in our jurisdiction. At
most, it is only a ground to separate from bed and board.
What was proven in the hearings a quo was a relatively blissful marital union
for more than eleven (11) years, which produced three (3) children. The burden of
proof to show the nullity of the marriage rests on Leonida. Sadly, she failed to
discharge this onus.
The same failure to prove fraud which purportedly resulted to a vitiated

marital consent was found in Villanueva v. Court of Appeals.[68] In Villanueva,
instead of proving vitiation of consent, appellant resorted to baseless portrayals of
his wife as a perpetrator of fraudulent schemes. Said the Court:
Factual findings of the Court of Appeals, especially if they coincide with those of
the trial court, as in the instant case, are generally binding on this Court. We affirm the
findings of the Court of Appeals that petitioner freely and voluntarily married private
respondent and that no threats or intimidation, duress or violence compelled him to do
so, thus
Appellant anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground
that he did not freely consent to be married to the appellee. He cited several incidents
that created on his mind a reasonable and well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave
danger to his life and safety. x x x
The Court is not convinced that appellants apprehension of danger to his person
is so overwhelming as to deprive him of the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of
marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly being harassed, appellant
worked as a security guard in a bank. Given the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very
least, the proper way to keep himself out of harms way. x x x
Appellant also invoked fraud to annul his marriage, as he was made to believe by
appellee that the latter was pregnant with his child when they were married. Appellants
excuse that he could not have impregnated the appellee because he did not have an
erection during their tryst is flimsy at best, and an outright lie at worst. The complaint is
bereft of any reference to his inability to copulate with the appellee. x x x
xxxx
x x x The failure to cohabit becomes relevant only if it arises as a result of the

perpetration of any of the grounds for annulling the marriage, such as lack of parental
consent, insanity, fraud, intimidation, or undue influence x x x. Since the appellant failed
to justify his failure to cohabit with the appellee on any of these grounds, the validity of
his marriage must be upheld.[69]
Verily, the lower court committed grave abuse of discretion, not only by
solely taking into account petitioners homosexuality per se and not its
concealment, but by declaring the marriage void from its existence.
This Court is mindful of the constitutional policy to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation
of the family.[70]The State and the public have vital interest in the maintenance and
preservation of these social institutions against desecration by fabricated
evidence.[71] Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.
III. In a valid marriage, the husband and wife jointly administer and enjoy their
community or conjugal property.
Article 96 of the Family Code, on regimes of absolute community

property, provides:
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community property shall belong to
both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject
to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper remedy, which must be availed of within
five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the
administration of the common properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include the powers of disposition or encumbrance
without the authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon
the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is
withdrawn by either or both offerors.
A similar provision, Article 124[72] prescribes joint administration and

enjoyment in a regime of conjugal partnership. In a valid marriage, both spouses
exercise administration and enjoyment of the property regime, jointly.
In the case under review, the RTC decreed a dissolution of the community
property of Manuel and Leonida. In the same breath, the trial court forfeited
Manuels share in favor of the children. Considering that the marriage is upheld
valid and subsisting, the dissolution and forfeiture of Manuels share in the property
regime is unwarranted. They remain the joint administrators of the community
property.
WHEREFORE, the petition

is GRANTED. The appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
petition in the trial court to annul the marriage is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1]
See Separate Opinion of Justice Romero in Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108763, February 13, 1997, 268
SCRA 198.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 22-42. Dated July 31, 2007. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, with Associate Justices Regalado
E. Maambong and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring.
[3]
Id. at 46.
[4]
Id.
[5]
Id.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Id.
[8]
Id. at 26.
[9]
Id.
[10]
Id.
[11]
Id.
[12]
Id.
[13]
Id. at 47.
[14]
Id. x x x defendant x x x suffer(s) from Narcissistic Personality Disorder of lack of empathy or unresponsiveness
to the needs and feelings of his spouse and children, sense of entitlements or expectations of automatic compliance,
manipulative and deceit stance, grandiose sense of self-importance, the strong need to seek approval and recognition
and to prove his self-worth with Anti-social Features of irritability, verbal and physical aggression and lack of genuine
remorse. Rigidly pervasive and egosyntonic in nature and hence no effective psychiatric therapeutic modality could
satisfactorily remedy his unremitting psychology, defendants psychological incapacity has its antecedence as early as
before his marriage. x x x
[15]
Id. at 48. Dated October 27, 1998.
[16]
Id.
[17]
Id.
[18]
Id.
[19]
Id.
[20]
Id.
[21]
Id.
[22]
Id. at 47. Dated November 1, 2002.
[23]
Id.
[24]
Id. at 51-52.
[25]
Id. at 49.
[26]
Id. at 22. Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93817. Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, with Associate Justices
Regalado E. Maambong and Arturo G. Tayag, concurring.
[27]
Id. at 41.
[28]
Id. at 36-37.
[29]
Id. at 10.
[30]
Supreme Court Circular No. 2-90 (1994).
[31]
Gabionza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112547, July 18, 1994, 234 SCRA 192.
[32]
Rules of Civil Procedure (1997), Rule 47, Sec. 1 provides:
Section 1. Coverage. This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of appeals of judgments or final
orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for which ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of
petitioner.
[33]
G.R. No. 142021, November 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 563.
[34]
Buenaflor v. Court of Appeals, id. at 568.
[35]
Siguenza v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-44050, July 16, 1985, 137 SCRA 570.
[36]
Gerales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85909, February 9, 1993, 218 SCRA 638; Teodoro v. Carague, G.R. No.
96004, February 21, 1992, 206 SCRA 429; Cabutin v. Amacio, G.R. No. 55228, February 28, 1989, 170 SCRA
750; American Express International, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-70766, November 9, 1988,
167 SCRA 209; Fonseca v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-36035, August 30, 1988, 165 SCRA 40; Calasiao Farmers
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 50633, August 17, 1981, 106 SCRA 630; A-
One Feeds, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-35560, October 30, 1980, 100 SCRA 590; Gregorio v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. L-43511, July 28, 1976, 72 SCRA 120; Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 (1910).
[37]
G.R. No. 123561, July 31, 1997, 276 SCRA 610.
[38]
Nerves v. Civil Service Commission, id. at 613.
[39]
Id. at 613-614.
[40]
Id. at 614.
[41]
Id. at 615.
[42]
G.R. No. 138777, September 22, 2004, 438 SCRA 659.
[43]
Tan v. Dumarpa, id. at 665.
[44]
G.R. 142920, February 6, 2002, 376 SCRA 459.
[45]
Salazar v. Court of Appeals, id. at 471.
[46]
Sarraga, Sr. v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 143783, December 9, 2002, 393 SCRA 566.
[47]
Id. at 574.
[48]
G.R. No. 133750, November 29, 1999, 319 SCRA 456.
[49]
Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, id. at 465.
[50]
Aguilar v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 114282, November 28, 1995, 250 SCRA 371.
[51]
G.R. No. 137448, January 31, 2002, 375 SCRA 431.
[52]
G.R. No. 139868, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 140.
[53]
Government Service Insurance System v. Bengson Commercial Buildings, Inc., supra note 51, at 445.
[54]
Supra note 1.
[55]
Rollo, p. 49.
[56]
Id.
[57]
Id. at 49-50.
[58]
Family Code, Art. 45(3).
[59]
Id., Art. 46(4).
[60]
Rollo, pp. 49-51.
[61]
Article 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding
Article:
1) Non-disclosure of previous conviction by final judgment of the other party of a crime involving moral
turpitude;
2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other
than her husband;
3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless of its nature, existing at the time of the
marriage; or
4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, or homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time
of the marriage.
[62]
Minutes of the 154th Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees held on September 6, 1986, 9:00
a.m. at the Conference Room, First Floor, Bacobo Hall, U.P. Law Complex, Diliman, Quezon City.
[63]
Id. at 12.
[64]
Id.
[65]
78 ALR 2d 807.
[66]
38 So. 337 (1905).
[67]
Crutcher v. Crutcher, id. at 337.
[68]
G.R. No. 132955, October 27, 2006, 505 SCRA 565.
[69]
Villanueva v. Court of Appeals, id. at 569-570.
[70]
Philippine Constitution (1987), Art. II, Sec. 12 provides:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social institution. x x x
Art. XV, Secs. 1-2 provides:
Sec. 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Sec. 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected
by the State.
[71]
Tolentino v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-23264, March 15, 1974, 56 SCRA 1.
[72]
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership property shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority
or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 178044 January 19, 2011
ALAIN M. DIÑO , Petitioner,

vs.
MA. CARIDAD L. DIÑO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 18 October 2006 Decision2 and the 12 March
2007 Order3of the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas City, Branch 254 (trial court) in Civil Case No.
LP-01-0149.
The Antecedent Facts
Alain M. Diño (petitioner) and Ma. Caridad L. Diño (respondent) were childhood friends and
sweethearts. They started living together in 1984 until they decided to separate in 1994. In 1996,
petitioner and respondent decided to live together again. On 14 January 1998, they were married
before Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Piñas City.
On 30 May 2001, petitioner filed an action for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage against respondent,
citing psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. Petitioner alleged that
respondent failed in her marital obligation to give love and support to him, and had abandoned her
responsibility to the family, choosing instead to go on shopping sprees and gallivanting with her
friends that depleted the family assets. Petitioner further alleged that respondent was not faithful,
and would at times become violent and hurt him.
Extrajudicial service of summons was effected upon respondent who, at the time of the filing of the
petition, was already living in the United States of America. Despite receipt of the summons,
respondent did not file an answer to the petition within the reglementary period. Petitioner later
learned that respondent filed a petition for divorce/dissolution of her marriage with petitioner, which
was granted by the Superior Court of California on 25 May 2001. Petitioner also learned that on 5
October 2001, respondent married a certain Manuel V. Alcantara.
On 30 April 2002, the Office of the Las Piñas prosecutor found that there were no indicative facts of
collusion between the parties and the case was set for trial on the merits.
Dr. Nedy L. Tayag (Dr. Tayag), a clinical psychologist, submitted a psychological report establishing
that respondent was suffering from Narcissistic Personality Disorder which was deeply ingrained in
her system since her early formative years. Dr. Tayag found that respondent’s disorder was long-
lasting and by nature, incurable.
In its 18 October 2006 Decision, the trial court granted the petition on the ground that respondent
was psychologically incapacited to comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
The Decision of the Trial Court
The trial court ruled that based on the evidence presented, petitioner was able to establish
respondent’s psychological incapacity. The trial court ruled that even without Dr. Tayag’s
psychological report, the allegations in the complaint, substantiated in the witness stand, clearly
made out a case of psychological incapacity against respondent. The trial court found that
respondent committed acts which hurt and embarrassed petitioner and the rest of the family, and
that respondent failed to observe mutual love, respect and fidelity required of her under Article 68 of
the Family Code. The trial court also ruled that respondent abandoned petitioner when she obtained
a divorce abroad and married another man.
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L.
DIÑO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the
beginning; and
2. Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall only be issued upon compliance with
Article[s] 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, Office of the
City Prosecutor, Las Piñas City and the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration questioning the dissolution of the absolute
community of property and the ruling that the decree of annulment shall only be issued upon
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code.
In its 12 March 2007 Order, the trial court partially granted the motion and modified its 18 October
2006 Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
1) Declaring the marriage between plaintiff ALAIN M. DIÑO and defendant MA. CARIDAD L.
DIÑO on January 14, 1998, and all its effects under the law, as NULL and VOID from the
beginning; and
2) Dissolving the regime of absolute community of property.
A DECREE OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY OF MARRIAGE shall be issued after liquidation, partition and
distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
Let copies of this Order be furnished the parties, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City and the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas City, for their information
and guidance.5
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The sole issue in this case is whether the trial court erred when it ordered that a decree of absolute
nullity of marriage shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’
properties under Article 147 of the Family Code.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
Petitioner assails the ruling of the trial court ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of marriage
shall only be issued after liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article
147 of the Family Code. Petitioner argues that Section 19(1) of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Null Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages6 (the Rule) does not apply to Article
147 of the Family Code.
We agree with petitioner.
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC, Branch 102, Quezon City that in a void marriage, regardless
of its cause, the property relations of the parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either
by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code applies to union of
parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but
whose marriage is nonetheless void,8 such as petitioner and respondent in the case before the
Court.
Article 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively
with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their
wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of
them through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be
presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them
in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until after the
termination of their cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in
the co-ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver
by any or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the
innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of the cohabitation.
For Article 147 of the Family Code to apply, the following elements must be present:
1. The man and the woman must be capacitated to marry each other;
2. They live exclusively with each other as husband and wife; and
3. Their union is without the benefit of marriage, or their marriage is void.9
All these elements are present in this case and there is no question that Article 147 of the Family
Code applies to the property relations between petitioner and respondent.
We agree with petitioner that the trial court erred in ordering that a decree of absolute nullity of
marriage shall be issued only after liquidation, partition and distribution of the parties’ properties
under Article 147 of the Family Code. The ruling has no basis because Section 19(1) of the Rule
does not apply to cases governed under Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code. Section 19(1) of
the Rule provides:
Sec. 19. Decision. - (1) If the court renders a decision granting the petition, it shall declare therein
that the decree of absolute nullity or decree of annulment shall be issued by the court only after
compliance with Articles 50 and 51 of the Family Code as implemented under the Rule on
Liquidation, Partition and Distribution of Properties.
The pertinent provisions of the Family Code cited in Section 19(1) of the Rule are:
Article 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44
shall also apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final
judgment under Articles 40 and 45.10
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their
presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
All creditors of the spouses as well as of the absolute community of the conjugal partnership shall be
notified of the proceedings for liquidation.
In the partition, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated, shall be adjudicated in
accordance with the provisions of Articles 102 and 129.
Article 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children, computed
as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash, property or sound
securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement judicially approved, had already provided for
such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the trustee of their property, may ask for the enforcement of the
judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the ultimate
successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the parents; but the
value of the properties already received under the decree of annulment or absolute nullity shall be
considered as advances on their legitime.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule applies only to marriages
which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40 and 45 of the
Family Code. In short, Article 50 of the Family Code does not apply to marriages which are declared
void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code, which should be declared void without waiting for
the liquidation of the properties of the parties.
Article 40 of the Family Code contemplates a situation where a second or bigamous marriage was
contracted. Under Article 40, "[t]he absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
1avvphil
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage
void." Thus we ruled:
x x x where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be
free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring a previous marriage void.11
Article 45 of the Family Code, on the other hand, refers to voidable marriages, meaning, marriages
which are valid until they are set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for
annulment.12 In both instances under Articles 40 and 45, the marriages are governed either by
absolute community of property13 or conjugal partnership of gains14 unless the parties agree to a
complete separation of property in a marriage settlement entered into before the marriage. Since the
property relations of the parties is governed by absolute community of property or conjugal
partnership of gains, there is a need to liquidate, partition and distribute the properties before a
decree of annulment could be issued. That is not the case for annulment of marriage under Article
36 of the Family Code because the marriage is governed by the ordinary rules on co-ownership.
In this case, petitioner’s marriage to respondent was declared void under Article 3615 of the Family
Code and not under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what governs the liquidation of properties owned in
common by petitioner and respondent are the rules on co-ownership. In Valdes, the Court ruled that
the property relations of parties in a void marriage during the period of cohabitation is governed
either by Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family Code.16The rules on co-ownership apply and the
properties of the spouses should be liquidated in accordance with the Civil Code provisions on co-
ownership. Under Article 496 of the Civil Code, "[p]artition may be made by agreement between the
parties or by judicial proceedings. x x x." It is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the spouses
in the same proceeding for declaration of nullity of marriage.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the trial court with the MODIFICATION that the decree
of absolute nullity of the marriage shall be issued upon finality of the trial court’s decision without
waiting for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the parties’ properties under Article 147 of the
Family Code.
SO ORDERED.

Psychological Incapacity

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Psychological Incapacity

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Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 112019 January 4, 1995

LEOUEL SANTOS, petitioner,

. . . (T)here is no leave, there is no affection for (him) because respondent Julia

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Caguioa remarked that subparagraph (7) refers to psychological impotence.

xxx xxx xxx

Prof. Bautista stated that he is in favor of making psychological incapacity a ground

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Justice Puno formulated the next Article as follows:

Justice Puno and Prof. Romero inquired if Article 37 should be retroactive or

The members voted as follows:

(3) Prof. Baviera abstained.

Canon 1095. They are incapable of contracting marriage:

1. who lack sufficient use of reason;

2. who suffer from a grave defect of discretion of judgment concerning essentila

Those who cannot assume the essential obligations of marriage

. . . because of a grave psychological anomaly (ob gravem anomaliam psychicam) . .

finally, a new version was promulgated:

because of causes of a psychological nature (ob causas naturae psychiae).

Art. 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man a woman

Our Constitution is no less emphatic:

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of

ROMERO, J., concurring:

"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a

as well as the following implementing provisions:

"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or

xxx xxx xxx

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

To me there appears to be, on the part of private respondent, an unmistakeable indication of

ROMERO, J., concurring:

"a special contract of permanent partnership between a man and a

as well as the following implementing provisions:

"Art. 32. The absolute nullity of a marriage may be invoked or

xxx xxx xxx

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 119190 January 16, 1997

CHI MING TSOI, petitioner,

TORRES, JR., J.:

Who is to blame when a marriage fails?

The plaintiff is not willing to reconcile with her husband.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred:

We find the petition to be bereft of merit.

Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court reads:

Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. — Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or

As aptly stated by the respondent court,

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

5. That the respondent is not asking for damages;

As ground for annulment of marriage, We view psychologically incapacity as a broad

Respondent, in her Memorandum, adopts these discussions of the Court of Appeals.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Q It is therefore the recommendation of the psychiatrist based on

A Yes, Your Honor.