AN INTERVIEW

WITH
ROBERT PUTNAM
ROBERT PUTNAM is Malkin Professor of Pub-
lic Policy at Harvard University. His works
include Bowling Alone:The Collapse and Revival
of American Community (2000) and Making De-
mocracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy
(1993).

The Future of US Civil Society

Civic Engagement After September I I

Do you believe that the 2004 US presidential election held
special significance for US civil society?
Long-run trends in the vitality' of US civil societ)' do not
follow the rhythm of elections. They ;ire driven by deeper
historical and technological trends. But there were several
things about 2004 that were relevant to those of us studying
and trying to change civil society.
Two things were notable about 2004. First, it was the
first national election after 9/11, That probably did have an
effect on the level of turnout in the election. Ol course, no
one is quite s\ire why we suddenly hatl this l)ig increase in
turnout. It could have been just the war in Traq, but my best
giiess is that W] 1 had the effect of making people realize the
importance of connections to one another and to society.
That was true for younger people, for people who were
in their most impressionable adolescent years at the time of
9/11. For people of my generation, 9/11 did have a short-
run effect on people's sense of cotnmunity. For most adults
that effect vanished pretty quickly, but for people who were
caught at a particularlj' impressionable time, 9/11 did have
a more enduring effect. In some ways its effect on this gen-
eration was like that of the eleetion of 1960 on people my
age. 'Fhis showed up in a higher than usual turnout and a
higher than usual interest in public affairs and in survey data.
C>)llege students are more interested in politics and public
affairs than their counterparts 8 to 14 years ago were.
The second connection between the 2004 election and
civil society is that the election reminded everybody of the
power of social connections, facc-to-lace connections, in
getting people to be involved in politics. Before the elec-
tion, we were aware of the way in which the comhination ot
the Internet and small groups workcil. \ernKjnt Clovcrnor
I loward Dean's campaign was a real innovation.
Dean himself turned out to be a flawed candidate and a
flawed leader, but organizationally his campaign innovated
to create networks that were not just electronic but also tace-
to-face. People would get toi^cther to drive lonir distances
across North Dakota or across New Hampshire to connect
with other people and do things. WTiat we became more
aware of after the election was that there was another kind
of face-to-facc network that was e\'cn more effective: the
face-to-face networks built hito large, evangelical mega-
churches. That is a different and, in some respects, a much
more powerful network.
Megachurches propagate powerful genuine human con-
nections. \^'e have been suiclying a church in Orange County,
C^alifornia, called Saddleback, a church of 30,000 members.
It has grown very rapidly, but the core ot the church is not
the thousands and thousands of people who show up Sunday
morning for services. There are thousands ot small groups
of 6 to 10 people. There are the Mountain Bikers for God,
the Volleyball Players for God, the Geeks for God, tbe small
group for sun'ivors of breast cancer, and the small group for
people who have family members in prison. Group members
spend two bours a week witb cacb otber. Tf one member gets
sick, sotnebody else in the group will bring her chicken soup.
If someone loses his joh, someone else in tbe group will tide
him over. WTien come November somebody says, "By the
way, don't torgct to vote. Jack," it is nt3t political—it is a

HARVARD IXTERXATIOXAL REVIEW • SuminiT 2006 Photo Courtesy Robert Putnam

close friend reminding you to vote. The megachurch is an civic. US citizens after 9/11, and especially US yonng people,
extremely effective structure, and it captures the importance were ot a mood to say, "We are all in this together. We need
of civil society for politics. to pull together. This was an attack on all of us."
There is absokitely nothing on the Democratic or There was a sense of solidarit)' that went across the usual
liberal side ofthe continuum that is comparable to those lines of race and class, a sense of solidarity that you could
sorts of organizations. It is hard to match stimethinij; that is see in the immediate data. In that context, to start a uar by
basically non-political with an organization based in quick cutting taxes on the rich was a horrible, horrible civics les-
connections and focused only on politics. Most US citizens son. This is the first time we have cut taxes on the wealthy
would not go ver\' far to go to a meeting on politics. The as we entered a war. That says we are not all in this together.
liberal side boasts only shallow ties, the very instantaneous Some of us have to make sacrifices and others do not. Sotne
tics you make when you greet someone at the doorstep and of us send kids to fight in Iraq and others do not. CAitting
tell him that he should vote for this or vote against that. lam taxes on the wealthy was a terrible civics lesson.
not dismissing that. Even that kind of tie is better than just Is it going to stick? That depends in part upon people
getting messages over the television—but if you go to one in their twenties and depends in part upon whether the 9/11
of these niegachurches and see people enjoying themselves, generation "sticks with it." The sustainahility ot the 9/11
singing rock music or praying together, you realize that it is eftect depends also on what lessons are taught by my gen-
an incredibly powerful social organization and the left has eration. The renewed civic interest following 9/11 is a kind
nothing comj>arable. of a spark, and we have since spent much time mistakenly
dousing the flame.
Regarding the 9/11 generation, will the effect of 9/11 on
civic engagement be sustained? What research or data substantiates theories on the
sustainability ofthe 9/11 generation?
That is the most important question about the 9/11
generation. About 10 or 15 years ago there was an upturn The underlying hard data comes from two annual long-
in volunteering and service among the younger generation, term national sur\eys. One is a survey ot college freshmen
specifically among high school and college students. That
turning point in volunteering or service occurred in the
early 1990s.
A large part ofthe ujiturn after 9/11 was that people be-
gin to generalize from the earlier, personal, onc-on-one kind
of inipulses^I want to help another person who cannot read
or does not have a home—^to the desire to help transform
the societ)' that allows there to be poor kids who cannot read
or poor people who do not have a home. Many academics,
including myselt, ha\'e written about that transition.
We ask, is it not odd that we have this new generation
of people, people in their early thirties, who seem interested
in senice but could not care less about politics? If you have
homeless people, the problem is not just how to build a soup
kitchen but how to figure out where we got the homeless
problem in the first place. The generation has to move be-
\'ond one-on-one retail senice to thinking about larger pub-
lic issues. That is w hat happened after 9/11, which somehow-
triggered a deeper, more serious interest in broader issues.
Will it be sustained? I do not know. A lot depends on leader-^
ship, both national leadership and grassroots leadership.
After 9/11 1 was called by the Wliite House and spent
time working with the George W. Bush administration on
how to make use ofthe tragedy of 9/11 to create a "new
greatest generation." That is the language that I used. Bush
used some of my language in addresses to the US Congress.
But the Bush administration has a walk-talk problem. It talks
Immigrants and their supporters rally in Washington, DC.
the talk but does not walk the walk, and the puhlic policies As diversity increases in the United States, the country must
that were pursued by the administration have been ver\' and- reconsider and recreate its "we" identity.

Photo Courtesy Reuters S u m m e r 2 0 ( 1 6 • 11 \ R \' A R 1 ) I N T F. R N A T I O N A I . R F. \' 1 K W

 INTERVIEW
that has hecn conducted since the 196()s. Atnong the ques-
tions asked: I low interested ;ire you in puhlic altairs? How
important are the follow ing things to you: making a lot of
money, serving my countn', finding a mate?
Until 9/11, the long-term trends were very clear and
ver\' distressing: a long, steady rise in the importance of
making a lot of money and a long, steady decline in the
importance of public affairs and puhlic semce. In the 1960s,
hve times as many college treshnien thought that puhlic
ser\ ice was important as thought that making a lot ot money
was important. By 2001 six or seven titnes as many people
thought that making money was more important. T hose
"ONE CAN IMAGINE LONG PERIODS OF SEVERAL
GENERATIONS BUILDING A KIND OF INTERNATIONAL
CIVIC SOCIETY THAT WOULD BEGIN TO HAVE
SERIOUS EFFECTS ON INTERNATIONAL POLITICS."
trentis turned in 2001, and interest in publie affairs has
continued to rise since. That is the evidence that I would
cite as good news.
The other long-term data series, paid for by the Drug
Enforcement Agency (DFA), goes hack to the 1970s. The
purpose ot the survey is to generate statistics on drug usage
among high school seniors. Aniong the questions in that
sutrey are some ahout political interests. Those experienced
an upturti after 2001, hut in the survey of 2004, political
interests began to go back down again. There is evidence
in hoth directions.
Are the types of social networks being fonned in the United
States post-9/11 of the right type? On a national level, are
they "bonding" social networks, which yoti define as bring-
ing together similar people, or are they "bridging" social
networks, which bring together different kinds of people?
There is another element to the trends in civil society
discovered last year. Ask, how do these trends in volunteer-
ing look it you break them down hy the social class? What
was discovered is, first of all, that most of the upturn that I
have described in volunteering is concentrated aniong kids ot
the upper middle class, not atnong working-class kids. The
ujiturn may he due to resume building, to kids who want to
go to Han'ard and are volunteering more—not the kids who
know that they arc going to end up working in H'al-jMart.
There is strong evidence that over the last 20 years auiong
high school kids, there has been a growing social class gap
in many aspects of their lives.
If you look at upper-middle-class kids over the last 30
years, they are becoming more invoked in society, more
likelv to go to church, and tnore likelv to volunteer. The\'
H \ R V A R I) I \ r F R N A I K ) \ A I, R K \' I V. W
have more trust in other people, more social capital, more
civic engagement, more interest in politics, more selt-conti-
dence in their own academic ability, and more self-conhdence
in their general lives compared to people just like them 30
years ago. /Vmong working-class kids—including working-
class white kids, as this is not a matter of race—all those
trends are sharply down. They are much less likely to go to
church, much less likely to he involved in social activities,
itiuch less likely to trust other people, anil uiuch less likely to
he self-confident about their own academic abilities. Work-
ing-class kids have lower aspirations.
The gap in volunteering is parallel to the income gap, the
growing gap between rich antl poor. 1 he income gap is being
inherited here. We arc more and more two /Vmericas.
Wljat can be done to mitigate or reverse the class divide in
civic engagement?
A lot lies in the hands ot educators, tiot so much uni-
versity educators as high school antl gratlc school educators.
The tt'cnd, class gap in civic engagement, highlights the
importance offindingwaystjfbuilding bridging social capital
among young people. There has hccn a structural change in
US society so that we are increasingly living in two separate
worlds. That is driven in large part by the trends we have
talkctl about, a growing gap hetween rich and poor, and
])artly by increasing class segregation, residential segrega-
tion. Increasingly, middle-class people do not live around
working-class people. The solution will require hard work
on econotnic policy. The retncdy hegiiis with politics and
preaching.
Can theories of civil society be applied to the international
community? Can civic society within nations contribttte to the
stiength of an international governing hotly such as the In-
tei'national Cnniinal Court (ICC) or the United Nations?
International civil society operates on a much longer
titne scale, (^ne can imagine long periods of several gen-
erations building a kind of international civic societ)- that
would begin to have serious effects on international politics.
I am distinguishing intemational civic society from what is
sometimes confused tor that, which is a couple of XCiCls
with tnembers in various societies and in various countries
getting together. This is sometimes thought ahout as an
S u m m e r :OI16
emergent internnrioiiiil ci\-ic society but affects only ii tiny
fraction of people \vt)rldv\ide.
I am skeptical of claims that international relations will
he quickly and powerfully affected hy the huilding of Uirge
numhers of deep, strong ties among the peoples ot the world.
That kind of idea has been around for 100 years. People
thought, if we just get together, if we ean all just get along,
we will not have wars. I am skeptical of that. Even in the case
of a relatively specific area, like Western Europe, those ties
are not as strong as you would have expected after 50 years
of the European integration movement.
I would like to think that the work of the United Nations
or the work of some international l)ody would he facilitated
hy the growth of international civil society, that the United
States, for example, would feel more constrained to sign the
Kyoto Accord and get involved in international environmen-
tal actions hecatise there is unity among civil societies from
Canada, Sweden, China, and so on. But I think US policy is
driven hy national and not international factors.
IVhat ahout the effect of the intei-national on the national—
jhr example, the effect ofimmigiation on US civil society?
It is true that immigration of any sort, in any context, is
disruptive of preexisting patterns of community. That was
true when my ancestors got here in the 164()s trom Kng-
land. They certainly disrupted the local social capital here
in New England. They destroyed most of it. Similarly, each
successive wave of immigrants has had a disruptive effect.
That was true of the last large wave of Russian Jews, Ital-
ians, and Poles when they arrived here at the turn of the last
centur\'. .And it takes time measured in decades, not weeks,
for integration to occur. Wiiat has happened historically
with immigration is that a new "us" or a new "we" has heen
created. The process that was occurring with Italians and
Irish lOOyearsagoprohahly realistically took 50 or 60 years
to work itself through.
We have moved rapidly in my lifetime toward integra-
tion that is not assimilation in the sense ot ever\-one hecom-
ing identical. It is not that inmiigrants have stopped heing
whatever they w e r e ^ i u t that distinction hecomes kind ot
invisible in social terms. By "invisible," I mean sociologically
invisible. 1 hat is not jet true of Vietnamese Americans or
Mexican .Americans moving here hecaiise we have not yet
created this new more encompassing sense of "we," and
therefore over the next decade or tw o we w ill have turbulence
associated with that process.
The process of immigration has the effect ot isolat-
ing everybody a little bit in the short run, hut this is not a
long-run problem. We have fixed this problem before. The
United States has heen through this prohlem before and
benefited. Previous waves of immigrants have tremendously
enriched the country'. Most ".American" Nohel Prize winners
are themselves immigrants or the children of immigrants.
Siiiniinier 2 0 0 6 • H A R V A R D
Immigration over the long run is a tremendous asset for the
I'nitetl States. One of the higgest assets we have as a country
is that we have learned to manage diversity, which is a big
advantage the United States has as compared to Europe,
for example.
The most certain prediction that you can make ahout
an\' modern society- is that it will be more ethnically diverse
.^0 years from now than it is now. This will he true of ever)'
place. We are all becoming more diverse. The victory in this
race will go to the country- or countries that most effectively
create out of that mix a new "we." The United States has
a huge advantage hecause we have done it before. The last
time they created a new "we" in Britain was a thousand
years ago. The same goes for France, Cermany, Sweden, or
Italy. These places are going to have a lot of trouhle with
immigration.
Diversity creates complications in the short run. On the
other hand, it is not difficult to figure out how to do this.
We have been through waves of immigration hefore. Fifty
years from now; this will be completely solved and it will be
wonderful. I would like to accelerate the process so that it
will not take 50 vears. DD
CIVIL CONTRIBUTIONS
USVolunteerism Since September I I
40
LP
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Rising volunteer ism f r o m 2001 t o 2005 reflects the growing
civil-mindedness of US society in the post-9/1 I era. Although
the increase has been only gradual, a heightened sense of
patriotism or nationalism has contributed. However,the data
reveals a marked difference in volunteering rates between
middle- and lower-class individuals.
Current Populotion Sur«y Vblunteerrng, Bureau of Labor Statistics
I \ T E R X A T I O X A L R F. V I E W"