The Matter of Habit (Camic) PDF

The Matter of Habit
Author(s): Charles Camic

Reviewed work(s):
Source: American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 91, No. 5 (Mar., 1986), pp. 1039-1087
Published by: The University of Chicago Press
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The Matter of Habit1
CharlesCamic
Universityof Wisconsin-Madison
This articleis a historicalinvestigationof the conceptof habit in

sociology.Beginningwith the claim that historiansof sociology
need to look beyondthe now-famousideas thatappear in thefore-
groundoftheworksofthesociologicalmasters,thearticleexamines
theneglectedidea ofhabitto documentthatthisconceptwas longa
stapletermin theconceptualvocabularyofWesternsocialtheorists
and that it continuedto functionas a major backgroundfactorin
the substantive writingsof both Emile Durkheim and Max
Weber-a factor that previous scholarshipon Durkheim and
Weber has almost completelyoverlooked.It is shown that Dur-
kheimviewedhabitnotonlyas a chiefdeterminant ofhumanaction
in a greatvarietyof areas but also as one of the principalsupports
forthemoralfabricofmodernsocieties.Similarly,habitis foundto
be significant in Weber'streatment of moderneconomicand polit-
ical life, Calvinism and the spiritof capitalism,and the forceof
traditionalism, which is so centrala factorin his frameworkfor
comparative-historical analysis.Althoughtheidea ofhabitwas also
used extensively in Americansociologydownto around1918,in the
courseof the two decades that followedthe conceptwas purpose-
fullyexcised fromthe conceptualstructureof the field.This dra-
maticchangeis shownto be a resultoftheinterdisciplinary disputes
thatsurroundedtheinstitutionalization ofsociologyas an academic
AUTHOR'S NOTE. -To make it possible to provide the relativelylarge amount of pri-
mary source documentationthat appears in this article, two space-saving measures
have been employed. First, in a number of instances, quotations are reportedwith
words or shortphrases enclosed within square brackets, the enclosed material repre-
senting an efforton my part to render concisely yet faithfullypoints that are for-
mulated in a less abbreviated way by the originalauthors. Second, when reportingthe
dates of the sources cited, the text gives only the year of original publication (or the
originaldate of deliveryin the case of lecturecourses). Informationabout the particu-
lar editionsthatI have used is containedin the listof references.Page citationsreferto
those editions.
1 I wouldliketo thankWarrenHagstrom,MaureenHallinan,Donald Levine,Hal
Winsborough,and ErikWright fortheirinstructive
adviceon thisarticle,research
for
whichwas facilitated
bygrantsfromtheGraduateSchoolResearchCommittee ofthe
University
of Wisconsin-Madison.Requestsforreprints shouldbe sentto Charles
Camic, Departmentof Sociology,Universityof Wisconsin,Madison, Wisconsin
53706.
? 1986 by The Universityof Chicago. All rightsreserved.

0002-9602/86/9105-0001$01
.50
AJS Volume 91 Number5 (March 1986): 1039-87 1039

AmericanJournalof Sociology
discipline,particularlysociology'sstruggleswith behavioristpsy-
chology,whichhad by thenprojectedintoprominencea notionof
habit derivingfrom19th-century biologicalthought.The analysis
suggeststhat the concept of habit was a casualty of sociology's
revoltagainstbehaviorism-a casualtywhose effectsare stillto be
seen.
On itsearthly
coursean idea alwaysandeverywhere
operates
in opposition
to itsoriginal
meaningand thereby
destroys
it-
self.[Max Weber,as reported by MarianneWeber(1926,
p. 337)]
Througha case studyof the changingrole of the conceptof habit in
sociologicalthought,thisarticleexaminesthegeneralquestionofhow the
underlyingconceptual structureof intellectualfieldstakes shape over
time.The analysisis an effort to tracetheidea ofhabitback to theperiod
when it was a standard and valued item in the conceptualidiom of
modernsocial theorists;to demonstratethat Emile Durkheimand Max
Weber both used the conceptextensivelywhen confronting the central
problemsthatorganizetheirsociologies;and thento providea sociolog-
ical explanationforthe demise of habit in the work of such American
sociologistsas W. I. Thomas, RobertPark, EllsworthFaris, and Talcott
Parsons. In the courseof treatingtheseissues,the essay seeks as well to
illustratethe value of investigating the historyof sociologyby looking
beyondthe particularideas that occupy the foregroundof established
sociologicalclassics.
The rationaleforchoosingtheconceptofhabitas thefocusofthiscase
studyis rootedin theveryfactthatcontemporary sociologyhas virtually
dispensedwiththe concept.There is no articleon habit in the Interna-
tionalEncyclopediaoftheSocial Sciences, no place forit in recentindi-
ces of the major sociologicaljournals, and no slot forit in the annual
reviewsand the standardtextbooks.What prevailsinstead (insofaras
claimsare made about humanconductin the social world)is a modelof
action that has alternativelybeen called purposive,rational,volunta-
ristic,or decisionalbut will here be designatedby the less controverted
term"reflective."Accordingto this widelyutilizedmodel, action is a
process arisingfromvarious utilitarian,moral, affectual,or othermo-
tives-motives formedof calculation,belief,attitude,and sentiment-
that defineends that an actor then intentionally pursuesby choosing,
fromamongavailable alternatives, themeansthatappear mostappropri-
ate when judged by normsof efficiency, duty,familiarity, and so on.
Thus, in a recentattemptto integratework on the generaltheoryof
action,Alexanderdismissesnotionsof"unreflexive action"and aversthat
"all action . . . inherently
involvesweightingof means and ends, norms
and conditions";and thisconception,he approvinglyreports,is one that
1040
Habit
currently suffusessociological"argumentsat everytheoreticallevel and

of everyideologicalstripe,"fromexchangetheoryto phenomenology to
neo-Marxism(1982a, pp. 67-80). Rangingover similarmaterials,Dawe
is likewisepleased to findbroad agreementthatactioninvolvespurpose-
ful agents reflecting over "alternativepatterns,alternativesequences,
alternativepossibilities"(1978, pp. 379, 413). Withless satisfaction,Stry-
kerobservesin symbolicinteractionism as well an emphasison "reflexiv-
ityas the essence of the human condition,[at the expenseof] a serious
considerationof habit"(1980, p. 152). A kindredview has been adopted
even by theoristssuch as Collins, who combine the insightsof eth-
nomethodologists and sociologistsof emotionto criticizesociologyforits
"rationalistmodels of cognitionand decision-making"but then bring
back a less wooden kindof reflective actionby proposingthatthe"struc-
tures of the social world" rest on "continuousmonitoring"and "self-
interestedmaneuver"by actingindividuals(1981, pp. 985, 996, 1012).
So obviouslyappropriatehas the reflective modelcome to appear that
those who employit seldom concernthemselveswith providinga rea-
soned defense,or even an explicitjustification, fortheirpracticeof uni-
formlycastinghuman conductinto this one mold. That the processof
actionmightbe modeleddifferently, and was in factmodeleddifferently
by some of the so-called mastersof sociologicalthought,has generally
passed altogetherunnoticed.And forthe persistenceof such parochial
innocence,scholarswritingon sociology'spast bear considerablerespon-
sibility.Placingan overlynarrowinterpretation on thedemandthathis-
toricalresearchbe relevantto thepresent,thesescholarshave channeled
too much of theirefforttowardextractingfromthe standardclassicsof
sociologythoseinsightsthatare seeminglymostpertinent to questionsof
currentsociologicalinterest.To do this,however,is simplyto endorse
currentways of approachingthe social world:it is notto take issue with
thoseways and to questionthepresentabout thelimitations ofitsoverall
approach. If researchon the historyof sociologyis to contributeto the
presentin this latter and larger sense, it must, as much as possible,
bracketthe immediateconcernsof contemporary practitionersof sociol-
ogy and striveto understandthe ideas of the past in theirown terms,
sincetheseare the onlytermsin whichlapsed alternativesto entrenched
present-dayperspectivesactuallydisclose themselvesto us. The whole
matterof habit is one such lapsed alternative.
METHODOLOGICAL INTRODUCTION
The suggestionthatthe studentof past ideas shouldseek to understand
thoseideas in theirown termsis not,ofcourse,an originalone. The same
basic argumenthas been forcefully put forthby scholarsin otherfields
1041
(see Gunnell1978; Skinner1969; Stocking1968),and historiansofsociol-

ogyhave recentlysoundedthesame notein growingnumbers(see Collini
1978;Jones1977; Simonds1978),thusissuinga call fora "new historyof
sociology"(Jones 1983). To date, however, the preachmentsof this
emergingfieldhave inevitablyoutrunits accomplishments, as a resultof
whichthe whole approach has come undermountingcriticism(see Ger-
stein 1983; Seidman 1983; Turner 1983).
One wonders,though,whetherthe new historiography would not be
more convincingif it worked to carry out its revolt against "pres-
entism"-the practiceof readingthe past throughthe filterof the pres-
ent-in a more thoroughgoing way. Thus far, too many of the new
historians'effortshave been spent traversingthe same territories that
theirmorepresentistadversarieshave charted.One consequenceof this
has been theirreluctanceto move much beyondthe well-established,
classic sociologicalthinkers(the Marxes, the Durkheims,the Webers),
even thoughit is by highlypresentiststandardsthatthesethinkershave
been elevatedintothe classical pantheon(see Camic 1979, 1981). A fur-
ther,moresubtleconsequenceof the lingeringpresentismhas been the
tendencywhen dealing with classic figuresto concentrateon the issues
that are in theforegroundof theirwritings-theveryissues that made
thesewritings,not those of others,stand out to the presentin the first
place-rather than on the themes, concepts, and ideas that remain
largelyin the background(see Polanyi'sdistinctionbetween"focal"and
"subsidiary"awareness[1958, pp. 55-57]).
By narrowingthe focus to classic thinkersand then to foreground
issues, even antipresentisthistoriansof sociologyhave provideda se-
verelytruncatedpictureof social theoriespast. In thesecircumstances, it
is notsurprisingthatbasic changesin theconceptualframework ofsociol-
ogyhave gone largelyunstudiedor thathabitin particularhas received
littleattentionin previousscholarshipon sociology'spast. In fact,not
onlyhas thisscholarshipneglectedalmostentirelythoseepisodesin the
developmentof habit that fall outsidethe classics, it has failed to ap-
preciatethe place of the idea even in the amplystudiedworksof Dur-
kheimand Weber. Hence, to take onlythemostrecentexample,Alexan-
derdeclaresthatDurkheimwas done withthenotionofhabitpriorto his
firstbook (Alexander1982b,pp. 108-28) and thatforWebertheconcept
was merely"a residualcategory,"reducibleto actionmotivatedbyaffects
and values (Alexander 1983, p. 152, n. 36). The evidence marshaled
below makes such pronouncements extremely doubtful;and therehave
been a fewscholarswho have come somewhatnearerthemark,notably
Roth (1968), Wallwork(1972), and Cohen, Hazelrigg,and Pope (1975).
But thefactthattheroleofhabitin thethoughtofDurkheimand Weber
1042
Habit
has yet to be sufficiently

broughtout offersa strikingindicationof the
extentofthepracticeofoverlookingramifying ideas in thebackgroundof
theirwritingsin the course of goingover and over the standardfore-
groundtopics.What has been missed,as a consequence,is theverykind
ofdevelopmentalprocessthatthehistorianofsociologyseeksto uncover:
the change in underlyingconceptualstructurethat separates us from
the age of Durkheimand Weber. It is with the aim of demonstrating
that such a change occurred,and not-I should emphasize-in the in-
terest of furtheroverextendinga reliance on the classics, that this
paper treatsDurkheimand Weberat some length,in additionto consid-
eringcertainimportantinstallmentsin the earlierand later historyof
habit thatare located outsidethe currently recognizedclassicsof sociol-
ogy.
It hardlyneed be said, however,thatthe studentof sociology'spast is
concernednot onlywithidentifying how the fieldhas changedbut also
withexplainingwhyit has done so. Accordingly, I willattemptbrieflyto
providea sociologicalaccountforthe eliminationof habit by American
sociologistsof the early20thcentury.In doing so, the analysiswill call
attentionto the intellectualconsequencesof the widespreadconcernon
the part of those sociologistswith securelyestablishingtheirfieldas an
autonomousdisciplinewithintheuniversities ofthetime.In stressing the
significance of the factorof institutionalization,
my argumentis simply
followingthelead of researchin thesociologyofscience(esp. Ben-David
1971),whichhas alreadybeeninstructively appliedto thedevelopmentof
sociology in America and elsewhere (Abrams 1968; Clark 1973;
Oberschall1972; Shils 1970). The twistis that,whilemostof thiswork
focuseson how institutionalization altered"the social-structural
aspects
of cultureproduction,[but] ignor[es]the contentof culture"(Kuklick
1983, p. 300), here the emphasiswill be on how the quest forgenuine
academicautonomyactuallydid affecttheconceptualfabricofsociology.
In thisregard,I especiallywant to urgethe importanceof studyingnot
onlywhat was goingon in the sociologicalliteraturebut also what was
takingplace in theliteratureof the disciplinesfromwhichsociologywas
seekingto secureits autonomy.We have all been taughtthat sociology
tookshape in oppositionto fieldssuchas economics,history, and psychol-
ogy.But, to date, thereal significance ofthispointhas been lostbecause
therehas beenvirtuallyno effort to divestourselvesofourcurrentimages
ofthesefieldsand to investigatehow theywerespecifically constitutedat
thetimethatsociologywas firstacquiringintellectualform.By examin-
ingsomeofthesubstantivecharacteristics ofpsychology duringthisdeci-
sive period, I hope to take a preliminarystep toward correctingthis
situation.
1043
CONCEPTUAL CONSIDERATIONS
At thisjuncture,somethingshould be said about what the conceptof
habit refersto in thisstudy.At firstglance, specifying thismay appear
problematic,giventhattheword"habit"(oritsFrenchor Germanequiv-
alent)has been used in a varietyofways by different social thinkersfrom
different ages. Fortunately,however,thecoremeaningsof theterm-as
the OxfordEnglish Dictionary shows-have been fairlyconstantfor
many centuries;the variabilityhas exhibiteditselfchieflyin different
loadingsontothe commoncore. The core meaningthatis pertinent here
standsout mostsharplywhenthepreviousdefinition ofreflective
conduct
is recalled,for"habit" ordinarilydesignatesactionsthat "are relatively
unmotivated"(Giddens 1979, p. 218), actions for which "means-ends
relations. . . are [fromtheactor'sstandpoint]'not subjectto argument'"
(Hartmann,1939,p. 91). Since definitions with"uns" and "nots"maybe
ratherunsatisfying, it is perhapsappropriateto restatethesepointsposi-
tively: the term "habit" generallydenominatesa more or less self-
actuatingdispositionor tendencyto engage in a previouslyadopted or
acquiredformof action.2
Withinthisbroad definition, certaindistinctions
can be made. In the
firstEncyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Murphyfoundit convenient,
forinstance,to differentiate (above thelevelof"motorhabits")"cognitive
habits,""emotionalhabits,"and "moralhabits"(1932,p. 238). But rather
2 Severalpointsof clarificationare perhapsin orderhere.First,the definition just

offeredis designedto indicatethe typicalway in whichthe majorityof thinkers
includedin thisstudyhave usedhabit;it is nota claimabouthowthetermshouldbe
used.Second,as thedefinition indicates, thepresentanalysisis concernednotwiththe
vagariesoftheword"habit"butwithchanging pointsofviewon thephenomenon that
theworddesignates.It happens,though,thatin thecountries and theperiodconsid-
eredinthisstudy,theconvention has beenactuallytorefertothephenomenon ofhabit
bytheterm"habit"(oritsFrenchor Germancounterpart) (see Funke1958)so thatin
onlya few cases will it be necessaryhereto take accountof otherterminological
pointers.Third,whilethedefinition and muchofthefollowing arecouched
discussion
in termsof thehabitsof theindividual,it shouldbe notedthatmostwriterson the
subjectmaintainthatmembers ofsocialgroupsexhibitmanycommonhabits.Weber,
in fact,employedthe separateterm"custom"to denotesuch "collectiveway[s]of
acting"thatderivefromhabitratherthanfromself-interest orsharednorms(1922a,p.
319; 1922b,p. 187). But thisparticularusage remainsan idiosyncratic one, for,as
MacIveronceremarked, customgenerally refers
tocollectivepracticesthatarebacked
by a socialsanction,"a qualitywhichis in no sensepartofthemeaningof . . . 'the
habitsof thegroup'" (1931,p. 294; see also T6nnies1909,pp. 35-36). Fourth,the
definitionleavesopenthequestionoftheoriginsofhabit,sincespace limitspreclude
takingup thisissue.It mustsuffice to recordthatthemostwidespreadviewhas been
thathabitis producedbyrepetition: thatformsofactionthatarefrequently practiced
tendovertimetobecomehabitual.Opinionshavediffered greatly, however,as tohow
thisprocessof habitformation is actuallysetintomotion.
1044
Habit
than place primaryemphasishereon thisclassification accordingto the

contentof different habits, it will be helpfulforhistoricalpurposesto
differentiate the various empiricalreferents of the conceptof habit in
terms of a dimension that crosscuts the cognitive/emotional/moral
classification,namely,whetherthe"formofaction"thatis beingrepeated
is simple and circumscribedor generalizedand complex. Since this is
obviouslynot a black-and-white issue, it is probablybest to envisiona
long continuumof possibilities.The two end pointsand the midpointof
thiscontinuummeritseparatecomment.
To beginat the beginning:habitsometimesrefersto thedispositionto
performcertainrelativelyelementaryand specificactivitiesskillfully.
Even in the heydayof the conceptof habit,activitiesof thistyperarely
attractedthe sustainedinterestof social theorists.The situationhas long
been otherwisein psychology, however,and in thevenerabletraditionof
WilliamJames(1890, p. 107) themodernpsychologist equates habitwith
"sequencesof behaviors,usuallysimple,. . . thathave becomevirtually
automatic"and thenillustratesthenotionwiththepracticeofputtingon
a leftsock beforea rightone (Lefran?ois1983, p. 393). Still withinthe
lower portionof the habit continuum,but gettingbeyondthe minutiae,
one mightalso locate habitsofwriting,speaking,perceiving,evaluating,
task execution,problemsolving,and the like, to which social thinkers
have devoted more attention,particularlywhen discussingthe require-
mentsforor impedimentsto reflective actionitself.
But proceedingto what may be looked on as thevast middlerangeof
thecontinuum,theformofactiondesignatedas habitbroadensto various
moreextendedlines or more involvedpatternsof conductin the social
world.Such phenomenawerefrequently in evidencein theworkofsocial
thinkersfromthe mid-18thto the early20thcentury,and in canvassing
thiswork,we will encounterhabitsofinterpersonal interaction;habitsof
economic,political,religious,and domesticbehavior;habitsofobedience
to rulesand to rulers;habitsof sacrifice,disinterestedness, and restraint;
and so on. This is not to say that those who speak of these kinds of
conductproposethattheyare uniformly habitual.Whenthehabitlabel is
applied, it is generallyto suggestthat an action, which may in some
situationscome about as a motivatedactorselectsappropriatemeansto
his or her ends, has-in the instanceof the actor being described-
emerged apart from such a reflectiveprocess. That habitual and
nonhabitual(reflectiveor other)considerationsmay actuallybe mixed
togethersimultaneously is somethingno commentator I know of denies.
Yet it is onlyWeberwho explicitlyconceivesofhabitualactionas a pure
type,whichconcretecases approachin varyingdegrees(1922a, pp. 25-
26)-and thisis a formulation thatencouragesus to appreciate,in many
of the allusionsby past thinkersto economic,political,religious,domes-
1045
tic, and other habits, an implicitclaim for the preponderanceof the

habitualelementin a givenpatternof action.
In the upper reaches of the habit continuum,one can situatea still-
broaderusage of the term.Accordingto thisusage, habitis the durable
and generalizeddispositionthatsuffusesa person'sactionthroughout an
entiredomainoflifeor, in theextremeinstance,throughout all oflife-in
whichcase thetermcomesto meanthewholemanner,turn,cast,ormold
ofthepersonality.Today theword"character"probablycomesclosestto
evokingthisnearlyforgotten meaningof habit, althougheven "charac-
ter"tendsto suggesta systemmade up ofnumerous,morespecificperson-
alityattributes, whereasthepointofusinghabitin itsbroadestsenseis to
denotenota sumofpartsbuta morenearlyall-encompassing modalityof
actionthat(ifone mayborrowout ofcontexta vividformulation fromthe
Grundrisse)thenassignsrank and influenceto othercomponentsof the
personality.3 AmongEuropean thinkers,thisdistinctconceptionofhabit
has oftenbeen denotedby leaving the word in its Latin form,habitus.
This, as we shall see, is a practicethatboth Durkheimand Weber fol-
lowed, and it is a practicethatBourdieuhas made a notablerecenteffort
at long last to revive(see, e.g., Bourdieuand Passeron 1970).
These definitional preliminaries serveto make one waryof some com-
mon stereotypes. To many,the notionof habitimmediately conjuresup
behaviorthatconsistsin a fixed,mechanicalreactionto particularstimuli
and is, as such, devoid of meaningfromthe actor's point of view. In
sociology,thisimage is one that became fairlywidespreadearlyin this
century,thoughit was alreadycurrentin the 1780s (see Reid 1788, pp.
114-17) and alive duringtheinterimas well. The pointto note,though,is
thatthe image has also met withsubstantialopposition.In place of the
idea of a fixed,mechanicalreactionto stimuli,it has been heldthathabit
createsa stableinnercorethataffordsimmunity fromexternalsensations
and impetuousappetites(Ferguson 1792, p. 225; Hegel 1821, p. 260;
1830,p. 144);thatit is notby such stimulias these,butby theego itself,
that habit is called into play and allowed to proceed,with leeway for
situationaladaptation(Hartmann1939, p. 88; James1890,p. 116; Ton-
3 It may, in fact, be helpfulto regard the conceptionof habit under discussion here as
the analogue in the personalityto the dominantmode of productionas seen by Marx:
"It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifiestheir
particularity.It is a particular ether which determinesthe specificgravityof every
being which has materializedwithinit" (1857, p. 107). The onlyAmericanwriterwell
known among sociologiststo make use of such an idea was JohnDewey, who defined
habit as that "orderingor systematizationof [the more] minor elements of [human]
action, which is projective, dynamic in quality, ready for overt manifestation,and
[operative]even when not obviously dominatingactivity"(1922, pp. 40-41; see also
Kestenbaum 1977; Petras 1968).
1046
Habit
nies 1909, pp. 32-33); and that,howevermuch habitualactionmay be

removedfrom"hesitationand reflection," such action is still no more
"mechanical"than action of the same type that emergesfromwholly
reflectiveprocesses(Stewart1792-1827, pp. 54, 55-57). And in place of
theclaim thathabitis devoid of subjectivemeaning,bothphenomenolo-
gistsand psychoanalysts have proposedthathabitualactiondoes exhibit
a "meaningful character"-eithertakenforgrantedbytheactororlodged
in the unconscious(Bergerand Luckmann 1966, p. 53; Hartmann1939,
p. 89; Kestenbaum1977,pp. 3-4; Schutz 1932,p. 19). I am notsuggest-
ingthattheseviews be directlysubstituted forthestereotype; spokesper-
sons on all sides have been sufficientlyreluctantto specifyto which
instancesofhabit,and to whatextent,theirstatements applythatcaution
is mandated all around if one is out for a descriptionof some of the
auxiliaryfeaturesof habitualaction.If one is concernedwiththehistory
of the conceptof habit,however,it is best simplyto set stereotypes and
counterstereotypesaside fromthestartand to leave themaside untilthey
becomean essentialpart of the storyitself.
HISTORICAL PROLOGUE
To understandthe transformation that the conceptof habit has under-
gone in sociology,it is necessaryto take noticeof certainpriordevelop-
ments that occurred chieflyoutside the classics of sociology. The
provenanceofhabitis remote.The notionwas alreadyan establishedone
amongancientGreekthinkers,and it thereafter provedresilient,playing
a consequentialrole in the writingsof medieval scholastics,reformed
theologians,and numerousearly modernphilosophersand litterateurs
(see Burnham 1968a, pp. 8-9; Dubray 1905, pp. 17-23; Fuchs 1952;
Funke 1958, pp. 32-344; Passmore 1970, pp. 161-62).
During the 18th century,the conceptreceivedstill more systematic
attention(see Funke 1958, pp. 345-496), most conspicuouslyfroma
numberof the major figuresof the Enlightenment. Speakingformany
thinkersof the FrenchEnlightenment, Helve'tius,forexample,proposed
that"habit [is a] principleby which[humanseverywhere] are actuated"
and thatitis also thegreatwellspringofmorality, bothprivateand public
(1758, pp. 57, 108, 180); as well, Rousseau proclaimedmanyformsof
social inequality"uniquelythe workof habit" and held thatlaw should
reston "theforceof habit,[ratherthanon] theforceof authority" (1755,
p. 138; 1762, p. 81); and Condorcetforecastthe progressivetransforma-
tionof"habits. .. adoptedthroughmiscalculation"by"freelycontracted
habits . . . inspiredby natureand acknowledgedby reason"(1793, pp.
192, 194). In Scotland,enlighteners such as Hume (1739-40, pp. 104-5,
503-4) and Ferguson(1792, pp. 209-34) expressedsimilaropinions;and
1047
even cerebralGermanAufkldrer such as Kant insistedon givinghabitits

due, if only betterto masterit. In fact,it was Kant's opinionthat "all
acquiredhabitsare objectionable,"that"virtueis moralstrength in pur-
suit of one's duty,a dutywhich should neverbe a matterof habit,but
should always proceed,freshand original,fromone's mode of thought"
(1798, pp. 32, 34). The idea continuedto hold its own, moreover,even
whenreactionto the Enlightenment set in duringtheearly19thcentury.
Indeed,theconceptremainedon activedutywiththinkersso otherwiseat
odds as English utilitariansin the mold of JamesMill (see Woodcock
1980)and Germanidealists,includingHegel himself,who postulatedthat
"habit is indispensableforthe existenceof all intellectuallife"(1830, p.
143).
But far-reaching changeswereabout to engulftheconceptofhabit.As
the precedingquotationsmay suggest,when thinkersof the 18th and
early 19thcenturiesspoke of habit, theyspoke principallyat a level of
generalitythat correspondsto the middlerangeof the habit continuum
describedabove. What increasingly came to the forein thecourseof the
19thcentury,however,was the practiceof equatinghabit moreexclu-
sivelywith activitiesof a relativelyelementarytype and thentreating
thesein a mannerthatled away fromthe analysisof actionin the social
world altogether.This transformation was broughton by two develop-
mentsthatoccurrednear the centerstage of European intellectuallife.
The firstofthesewas a rapidgrowthofthebiologicalsciences-chiefly
throughthe efflorescence of evolutionarytheoryand of experimental
physiology.The well-knownhistoryof evolutionarytheoryneed not be
detailed here, save for one basic item. Habit, it emerges,was a term
prominently used by evolutionistswhen theydescribedthe elementary
behaviorsof lower species. It was in this sense that Lamarck talkedof
giraffes"brows[ing]on the leaves of trees"and called this theirhabit,
talkedof"snakes . .. crawlingon theground"and called thisa habittoo
(citedby Oldroyd1980, p. 31), and it was in thissense also thatDarwin
spoke freelyin On the Origin of Species of such thingsas the feeding
habitsof "Britishinsects,"the climbinghabitsof the "largertitmouse,"
and the floweringhabitsof "plantswhen transported [into]another"cli-
mate(1859, pp. 11, 183). This same usage loomedstilllargerwhen,in his
later writing,Darwin hastenedfromhorses'pacing habits,caterpillars'
eatinghabits,and pigeons'flyinghabitsdirectlyto the habitsof human
beings(1872, pp. 29-31).
Here Darwin's workhappenedto linkup withthephysiologicallitera-
ture of the time: a noteworthy body of researchthat had the effectof
confirming the equation between habit and elementarybehavior and
drivingthe phenomenonentirelyout of the social world and into the
recessesof the biophysicalsciences(on this research,see Liddell 1960;
1048
Habit
Thomson1968,pp. 37-53; Young 1970).This effectcame aboutas physi-

ologistswere drawn, by theirinterestin the movementsof decapitated
chickens,headlessfrogs,and thelike,to theexperimental studyof"reflex
actions,"which were conceivedas motorresponsesactivatedby nerve
cells excitedby stimuliexternalto a givenorganism(see Fearing 1930).
This is significant,for to view reflexactions in this way was also to
physiologizethe conceptof habit thoroughlybecause the physiological
literaturehad long since adopted habit as the standard synonymfor
acquired reflexes(Burnham 1968a, p. 52; Fearing 1930). More signifi-
cantlystill,physiologists showed littlehesitationin extendingto human
beingswhatwas said aboutthechickensand thefrogs.Humans,afterall,
exhibitedacquiredmotorreflexesor habitstoo, and much-if notall-of
human action might,by extrapolation,be reducedto tendenciesof the
nervoussystem"to grow to the modes in which it has been habitually
exercised"(as the Englishphysiologist Carpenterput it in the 1870s;see
Danziger 1982, p. 130).
What made thisseeminglyesotericusage consequentialwas its coinci-
dence with a second major development:the gradual emergenceof the
scienceof psychology,Priorto the 19thcentury,psychologicalspecula-
tion was somethinggenerallycarried out by philosophersengaged in
ratherunspecializedinquiries.Thereafter, however,as theera ofintellec-
tual differentiationset in, studentsof themindsoughtgreaterautonomy
fortheirfield,and by the last quarterof the 19thcenturytheirefforts
began to pay off.Not onlydid psychologymanage,ahead ofmanyother
fledgling specialitiesofthetime,to establishitselfas a recognizedfieldin
theuniversities, especiallyin Germany(see Ben-David and Collins 1966;
Ross 1967; Woodward 1982), but even when the academic linkagesstill
leftmuch to be desired,therewas an impressiveoutpouringof research
concernedwith the "sensations,images and feelings. . . out of which
complexstatesof mindwerebuiltup" (Thomson1968,p. 89; in general,
see Boring 1957; Hearnshaw 1964; Thomson 1968; Watson 1968).
This "new psychology," as it was oftencalled,was on thewholealmost
militantlyscientistic.Perhaps as a resultof a still "low-statusfield['s]
attemptto upgrade [itself]by borrowingthe methodsof a high-status
field"(Ben-David and Collins 1966, p. 460), 19th-century psychology
leaned heavilyon theachievementsofthebiologicalsciences,particularly
evolutionismand, above all, physiologicalexperimentalism (see Murphy
and Kovach 1972,pp. 65-75, 126-47; Thomson1968,pp. 92-124, 168-
73). Habit was depictedaccordingly.Whatreliablyappearedin recurring
psychologicaldiscussionsof the subject was the idea of habit as a phe-
nomenonbelongingamongthe primaryprocessesof the (human)organ-
ism (see Andrews 1903, pp. 122-27; Dubray 1905, pp. 64-73; Fearing
1930, p. 239; James 1890, pp. 104-27). It was thus that Bain equated
1049
habitwithreflexactionand a "narrowingof the sphereof influenceof a

sensationalor active stimulus[to] one solitarychannel[in] the cerebral
system"(1859, pp. 11-12); and it was thus too that Dumont discussed
how "the impressionsof outerobjectsfashionforthemselvesin the ner-
vous systemmoreand moreappropriatepaths" and thenproposedthat
thesewell-fashioned neuralpathwaysare our habits(1876, p. 324; trans-
lationby James 1890, p. 106).
This distinctiveconceptualizationof habitwas to be triumphant, but
the triumphstill lay abroad in America. In late 19th-and early 20th-
centuryEurope, the new psychologists' views, widelyaired thoughthey
were, never held the intellectualfieldunchallenged,for the fieldwas
already rich in more traditionalstatementsabout habit. Hence, when
used in social-scientific
discourse,the concepttendedto retainthe same
basic characterit had had priorto thechangesjust enumerated.One can
see thisin writingsas diverseas thoseof Bagehot(1872, p. 9; 1879, pp.
141-64) and Bradleyand Bosanquet (Collini 1978,pp. 12-14) in Britain
(cf. Spencer 1855, pp. 525-30); Comte (1830-54, pp. 235, 253, passim)
and LePlay (1855-81, pp. 139, 143,passim)in France;and Jhering (1883,
2:239-47), T6nnies (1887, pp. 33-170; 1909), Simmel(1900), Vierkandt
(1908, pp. 103-9), and Lederer(1918-19) in Germany.It is truethatin
noneofthisworkdid habitexhaustthedomainofaction.More reflective
typesofconductwereconsistently on thesceneas well. But thesedid not
yetstand alone-and this is the point. Despite the efforts of biologists,
physiologists,and psychologists to carryhabit offin otherdirections,it
remaineda standardtermby whichsocial theoristscapturedthoseforms
and more
of actionin the social worldthatwereseen to be less reflective
self-actuating.It was in this contextthat Emile Durkheimand Max
Weberwrote.
HABIT IN CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY

Durkheim
Habit was well exercisedby Durkheim,and it was exercisedthroughout
much of his career,even as he underwent,accordingto at least some
scholars,certainfar-reaching theoreticalchanges.The conceptwas, to be
sure,rarelyat the forefront of his attentions,and all thosewho see only
the forefront have accordinglyglossedover it altogether.But, however
littlethetermmaymean to contemporary commentators, it was nonethe-
less a toolin Durkheim'sconceptualtoolbox,one thathe broughtout and
put to workon the mostvaried occasions.
Some scatteredillustrationsmay introducethe point. Take, for in-
stance,Durkheim'sobservationson theempiricalroleofhabitat different
1050
Habit
pointsin the evolutionaryprocess. Primitivepeoples, in his judgment,

live to a largeextentbythe"forceofhabit"and underthe"yokeofhabit"
(1893, p. 159; 1912, p. 103), for"when thingsgo on happeningin the
same way, habit . . . suffice[s] forconduct"and moralbehavioritselfis
easilytransformed "into habit mechanicallycarriedout" (1898-1900, p.
90; 1902-3b, p. 52). Much the same was true,he claimed,in advanced
citiesoftheMiddle Ages,where"habithas ... dominionoverpeopleand
overthingswithoutany counter-balance" (1898-1900, p. 38). Neitherdo
modernsocietiesdispensewithit. A social orderbased on thedivisionof
labor, Durkheimmaintained,requires"more and more intensiveand
assiduouswork,and [such workbecomes]habitual"-and habitualin a
particularway, since "civilization. . . imposesupon man monotonous
and continuouslabor, [which]impliesan absolute regularity in habits"
(1893, p. 242; 1902-3b,p. 70, m.t.; 1902-3a, p. 80).4 Thus, for"a worker
. . . to take his place in society,[he mustdevelop]the habitof exerting
himself"and other"habitsof work" that were simplyunknownamong
the torpidprimitives(1902-3b, pp. 173, 181; the generalargumenthere
bears comparisonwiththatof E. P. Thompson[1967]).
Habit was a recurrentfactor,too, in Durkheim'sanalysisof suicide:
"habitsof passive obedience,of absolutesubmission,of impersonalism"
increasethe suicide rate among militaryofficers,he asserted,whereas
"the habitof domesticsolidarity"decreasestheratewithinvariousother
populations(1897b, p. 238; 1888c, p. 234). The concept was also in
operationin certaindiscussionsofthedevelopmentofcollectiverepresen-
tations.In his earliestwritings,Durkheimproposedthat religionitself
firstemergesas a "theoryto explainand makesenseof[everyday] habits,"
and in subsequentwork he held that the "ideas and reasonswhichde-
velop in our consciousness[arise, interalia, from]ingrainedhabits of
whichwe are unaware" (1887a, p. 35; 1897a, p. 168). And his specula-
tions on social and culturalchange repeatedlyharked back to habit,
whichhe viewed as one of the greatestimpedimentsto progressof any
sort."It is alwaysa laboriousoperationto pull up therootsofhabitsthat
timehas fixedand organizedin us" (1893, p. 241); operatingoutsidethe
"sphereoftheclearconsciousness,. . . habits. . . resistanychange[since]
what cannotbe seen is not easilymodified"(1898-1900, p. 84). Hence,
Durkheimlamented,many social facts "continue. . . to exist merely
throughforceof habit,"amongthemantiquatedpenal, educational,and
4 "M.t."withina citation
indicatesthatI haveslightly
modified
theEnglishtranslation
of the citedpassage to preservesomethingabout habitthathas been lost in the
translation-andthisveryoftenis theconceptofhabititself.In suchcases,a reference
to thetranslation
will appearfirst,followedby a cross-referenceto theforeignlan-
guagesource.
1051
politicalinstitutionsand all mannerof unscientific ideas thatendurebe-

cause "inveteratehabits[ofthinking] lead us astray"(1895b, p. 120, m.t.;
1895a,p. 60; 1898-1900,pp. 60,99-100; 1899-1900,p. 180; 1902-3b,p.
14; 1909, p. 87).
Nor shouldtheseformulations be discountedas so manyslipsofa loose
pen. For thereare sufficient instancesin Durkheim'swritingswherethe
backgroundactuallybreaksto theforeground to make it clearhow much
theremarksjust quoted correspondwithhis fullyconsideredopinionson
habit. In his last new lecturecourse,Durkheimbroughtintotheopen a
fundamentalclaim that had long been in the recessesof his work (see
1887a, p. 34; 1897b,pp. 158-59; 1898-1900, p. 90). This was the idea
that,by its verynature,humanaction,whetherindividualor collective,
oscillatesbetweentwo poles,thatofconsciousnessor reflection on theone
side, and that of habit on the otherside, withthe latterpole beingthe
stronger.Durkheimwrotethat as long as "thereis an equilibriumbe-
tweenour dispositionsand the surrounding environment, [actionoccurs
by] merelyskim[ming]over [our] consciousness";"consciousnessand
reflection[only awaken] when habit is disrupted,when a process of
nonadaptionoccurs" (1913-14, pp. 79-80). In this eventuality,where
"the [individualor collective]being is . . . at a cross-roadssituation,"
"faced with a whole range of possible solutions,"reflection-whichon
otheroccasions "slows down, overloadsor paralyzesaction"-comes to
the fore,thoughonlyto "disappear . . . when it no longerserves[this]
purpose"and "habitsofall kinds"assertthemselvesonce again (1913-14,
pp. 38, 79, 83). But to say this is obviouslyto implythat most actors
proceed most of the time under the sway of theirhabits: those "inner
tendencies"or "internalizedforces[whichunfoldthemselves],activated,
as it were,spontaneously"(1895b,p. 54; 1902-3b, p. 28, m.t.; 1902-3a,
p. 32). And thisis preciselythe positionthatDurkheimforthrightly em-
braced, declaringthat "it is not enough to directour attentionto the
superficialportionof our consciousness;for the sentiments,the ideas
which come to the surfaceare not, by far,those which have the most
influenceon our conduct.Whatmustbe reachedare thehabits"-"these
are therealforceswhichgovernus" (1905-6, p. 152 [emphasisadded];see
also 1898-1900, p. 80).
So faithfulwas Durkheimto thisviewpointthat-quite aside fromthe
visiblepartthathe assignedto habitin histreatment ofprimitivesociety,
modernwork, suicide, and the like-the phenomenonassumed a vital
rolein hisanalysisoftheissuethat,byall recentaccounts,was at thevery
centerofhistheoreticaland practicalefforts: theissueofmoralityand the
moralfoundationsof modernsocieties(on the centrality ofthisissue, see
Alexander1982b; Bellah 1973; LaCapra 1972; Lukes 1973; Marks 1974;
Wallwork 1972). In overlookingDurkheim'sassessmentof habit,what
1052
Habit
theDurkheimianscholarshiphas sacrificedabove all else, therefore, is a

more adequate understandingof Durkheim's whole approach to the
"alarmingpovertyof morality"in his age (1897b, 387); fora good part
(thoughnot the whole) of the solutionto this predicamentwas seen by
himto lie in the domain of habit.
This becomesparticularly evidentat threejunctures.The firstofthese
is in The Division ofLabor, whereDurkheimmaintainedthatthe moral
normsnecessaryto end the crisisof anomieactuallywould come directly
intobeingwiththe developmentof habitsof interactionamongthe spe-
cialized partsthatconstitutethe worldof dividedlabor. "There are," he
stated, "certainways in which [differentiated functions]react on one
another,which,beingmorein accordancewiththenatureof things,are
repeatedmoreoftenand becomehabits;thenthe habits,as theyacquire
force,are transformed intorulesofconduct.... In otherwords,a certain
selectionof rightsand dutiesis made by habitualpracticeand theseend
up by becomingobligatory"(1893, p. 366; retranslation by Lukes [1973,
p. 164]; see also Durkheim 1886, p. 213; 1887b, p. 275; 1888a, p. 66;
1898-1900, pp. 7-9; 1902, pp. 14-15; Durkheimand Buisson 1911, p.
153; cf. the criticismsof Lukes [1973, p. 164] and Parsons[1937, p. 321]
withtheargument ofBergerand Luckmann[1966,pp. 53-67]). In hislater
work on occupationalcorporations,Durkheimconcludedthat thisfirst
formulation was "incomplete"(1902,p. 4), buthe immediately wenton to
incorporatehabit intohis plans formoralregeneration in a secondway.
He urgedhis celebratedprojectto revitalizeoccupationalgroupsin part
because he believed such institutions able to createand implantmuch-
neededhabitsofmoralconduct.So longas "thefamily[providestheonly]
collectivelifein which[specialists]participate,"theywill,Durkheimrea-
soned, become inuredto "the habit of actinglike lone wolves" and ac-
quire an "inclinationtowarda fierceindividualism"(1902-3b, pp. 233-
34). He then posed the problem,"How can we learn the [opposite]
habit?"-that of"disinterestedness," "self-forgetfulness,"
and "sacrifice"?
(1902, p. 4). His proposal for occupationalcorporationsfollowedim-
mediatelyin directanswer(see 1902, pp. 4-31).
But thiswas nottheonlyanswer,fora thirdway ofpressinghabitinto
service readilysuggesteditself-the prospectof instillinggood moral
habitsfromearliestchildhoodonwardinsteadofwaitingforoccupational
lifeto get underway. Durkheimseized upon thispossibilitywith great
enthusiasm,and his writingson educationindeedconstitute perhapsthe
fulleststatementon recordof the habitualbasis of social morality.It is
well knownthat,in Durkheim'sview, modernsecularsocietyrequiresa
moral code emphasizing(a) groupattachment,or devotionto collective
ideals; (b) regularity,or "behavingsimilarlyunderlikecircumstances"; (c)
authority, or dutifulsubmissionand self-restraintin accord withobliga-
1053
toryrules;and (d) autonomy,or reflective consciousnessconcerningeth-

ical principles(see esp. 1902-3b, pp. 17-126). What has never been
appreciatedis theplace of habitin thiswholeaffair.But, forDurkheim,
certaincomponentsofmoralityare inherently mattersofhabit:to become
attached to collectiveideals, "one must have developed the habits of
actingand thinking in common";"to assureregularity, itis onlynecessary
thathabitsbe strongly founded"(1902-3b, p. 233, 28, m.t.; 1902-3a, p.
32). Furthermore, while somethingmore than habit is required,in his
view, to producesubmissionto rulesand reflective consciousness(as we
shall see), even this somethingmore develops fromthe base of early
habits,particularly "thehabitofself-control and restraint" and "thehabit
oflucidthought"(1902-3b, p. 149; 1904-5, p. 347). This fact,alongwith
the postulatethat childrenare "creature[s]of habit," led Durkheimto
arguethateducationalinstitutions could go farin layingthegroundwork
forall elementsof his secularmorality:by offering the exampleof com-
mon classroomlife,the school could "induc[e]in the childthe habitsof
grouplife" and attachment;by enforcinga regimenof rules and disci-
pline,it could "accustom[thechild]to regularity" and "develop . . . the
habitofself-control"; and by teachingnaturalscience,it could encourage
"thechildto acquire wholesomeintellectualhabits,whichwillstrengthen
his moralconduct"(1902-3b, pp. 135, 143, 149, 249, 297; see also 1904-
5, pp. 275, 318, 331-48). This argumentis, in fact, one of the chief
reasonsthatschoolingcame to play so indispensablea rolein Durkheim's
continualefforts at moralreform.
It should be noted,though,that when advancingthisposition,Dur-
kheim'sfocuswas principallyon primaryeducation(see 1902-3b,p. 17).
In his analysisof secondaryeducation,a verydifferent spiritseemsto be
at work.In Durkheim'sjudgment,secondaryschoolingis not,and should
notbe, a processrevolvingabout "theacquisitionofcertainspecificabili-
ties or habits"(1904-5, p. 30). This contentionis an outgrowthof two
aspectsof his moraltheorymentioned,but not elaborated,above: first,
his insistence(esp. in his laterwritings)thatinsofaras it involvesdutiful
conformity to rules,moralitynecessarilytranscendshabit,since "a rule
. . . is notonlya habitualmeans of acting,it is, above all, an obligatory
meansofacting"-a meansofactingthatis imperative(1902, p. 4; 1902-
3b, p. 28; see also 1888b,pp. 214-15; 1903-12, p. 649; 1912, p. 482, n.
10; 1920,p. 265, n. 1); second,his beliefthat,underthe dynamiccondi-
tions of the modernage, any viable moralityentailsas well continual
reflection at theupperreachesofthesocial order(1898-1900, pp. 88-94;
1911a, p. 84; 1904-5, pp. 315-16).5 It was in hopes of fostering these
5 Despite thisbelief,it was Durkheim'sjudgmentthateven personsin professionaland

managerial positions, which demand constant reflectioninstead of fixedhabits, "be-
1054
Habit
obligatoryand reflective featuresof morallifethatDurkheim'swritings

on secondaryeducationset aside theissue ofcultivatingparticularhabits
ofconduct.Moral education,in hisview, clearlyrequiredmorethanthis.
Yet what the requirementturnsout to be comes as a considerable
surprise-particularlyifwe expectDurkheimto propose,likesociologists
oftoday,thatreflective conductin accordwithobligatoryruleshingeson
thetransmission ofmoralbeliefs,values, and norms.For thisis notat all
Durkheim'sown position.Making it the task of secondaryeducationto
impart"a certainnumberof true beliefs[and] specificarticlesof faith"
and to "decorat[ethe]mindwithcertainideas [and] certainformulae"is
nearlyas inappropriate,he argued,as concentrating at thislevel on the
"contract[ingof] certain specifichabits" (i904-5, p. 29). Both pos-
sibilities,in his opinion,amountto a reversionto thedubiouseducational
objectivesof antiquity,in place oftheproperpedagogicalprogramofthe
ChristianMiddle Ages,whereit was recognizedthat"ifwe are trulyto do
ourjob as educatorsand have an effectwhichwill be durable,"we must
concernourselveswith developingin the individual"a more profound
conditionwhichdetermines theother[specificaspectsofpersonality] and
givesthemtheirunity,[namely,]a generaldispositionofthemindand the
will":a "habitusofmoralbeing"(1904-5, pp. 28-29; see also 1902-3b,p.
21). Here, as habitin themostgeneralizedsenseis elevatedoverall more
specificusages, Durkheim vindicated his faith in the transformative
moral power of educationalinstitutions. It was his convictionthat the
Christianconceptionof the missionof educationwas theoretically the
correctone; were modernsecondaryschools only to work to create a
dutifuland reflective secularhabitusto replacethereligioushabitusofthe
past, the exactingmoraldemandsof the contemporary age mightyetbe
well satisfied(1904-5, pp. 30, 317).
If thissprawlingaccountby Durkheimof the vital interplaybetween
the habitual and the moral attestsfurtherto the factthat the ancient
conceptof habit was stillalive and well in his work,thereremainsan
illuminatingexceptionto this conclusion.The conceptis all but absent
fromDurkheim'sfrequentand ferventprogrammatic statementson the
fieldofsociologyitself(see 1888a, 1890, 1892, 1895b,1898b,1899, 1900a,
1900b, 1901, 1901-2, 1908a, 1908b, 1909, 1915). The omissionbears
witness,I would suggest,to the subtle ways in which the conceptual
have in [nonwork]contextsas simple persons actingby routine,who neitherthinknor

act otherwisethan the ignorantpopulace" (1904-5, pp. 315-16; 1905-6, p. 138). It
should be noted, moreover, that the objective of the type of reflectionDurkheim
advocated is not to dislodge habits but to "maintain them in the state of necessary
adaptability and flexibility"(1905-6, p. 137).
1055
structure of sociologicalthoughthas been shaped throughtheapparently

peripheralmovementto institutionalize the disciplineof sociology.
Durkheim'sprogrammatic statementswere,afterall, integralto what
Lukes has describedas a lifelong"campaignto win recognition forsociol-
ogy's scientificstatus" in an ossifiedacademic environmentextremely
reluctantto concedethescientific legitimacyofthenew field(Lukes 1973,
p. 36; see also Clark 1973; Shils 1970). It was Durkheim'sconviction,
furthermore, thatthe legitimacyof a would-besciencecould be securely
groundedonlywhen "its subjectmatteris an orderof factswhichother
sciencesdo notstudy"(1895b,p. 162). Differentiating sociologyfromthe
moreestablishedfieldof individualpsychologythus became an issue of
cardinalconcernto him. This, of course,is a pointthat previouscom-
mentatorshave oftenrecorded,albeit in such generaltermsthat Dur-
kheim'sencounterwithpsychologyemergesas a strugglewithan almost
facelessopponent.In fact,however,the enemywas an eminentlyfull-
bodied one: chiefly,it was the aggressive"new psychology" of the time.
When Durkheim describedpsychology,he spoke of researchon "the
organicand physicalconstitution of man" (1900a, p. 363); when he ad-
vertedto specificpsychologicalwritings,it was the English, French,
German,and Americanrepresentatives of the new psychologythat he
repeatedlycited (see 1898a; 1902-3b; 1913-14), even drawingon Du-
mont'spsychophysical discussionof "I'habitude,"whichwas mentioned
above (see 1898a, p. 5). Operatingagainstthisbackdropand determined
to endow sociologywith"a subjectmatterpeculiarlyits own" (1895b,p.
50), Durkheimdid notwait longto questionwhichdisciplineshouldhave
custodyof habit,and it did nottake long forhimto answerby explicitly
declaringthatthephenomenonbelongedto psychology (see, e.g., 1888a,
p. 51; 1901,p. 44; 1911b,p. 111). Nevermindthat,byhisowntestimony,
habitsmetthe same criteriaas the "social facts"thatwere at the core of
his sociology:thattheywere externalto the individualin the sense that
theywere amongthetendenciesthat"educationhas impressedupon us"
(1912, p. 389; see also 1893, p. 320; 1895b,pp. 50-54; 1902-3b, p. 244;
1904,p. 127) and thattheywere also constraining, "dominat[ing] us and
impos[ing]beliefsand practicesupon us" (1901, p. 44). For all this,the
idea of habit remained,in Durkheim'smind,too closelyassociatedwith
psychologyto meritinclusionin his sundrypronouncements about what
the disciplineof sociologyoughtto study;to mnake the concepta partof
sociologycould onlyriskthewhole cause bysuggesting thatthenew field
was notsuch an autonomousone afterall. It is truethatDurkheimmight
have stressedthe difference betweentheview ofhabitthatappears else-
where in his own writingsand the physiologicalnotioncurrentin the
psychologicalliterature,but it was safer to make a clean break and
concedethispawn to thepsychologists,
officially forsociologyhad enough
1056
Habit
to do in studyingthose phenomenathat possessedthe obligatorymoral

characterthathabitwas now said to lack. And ifhabitcould cometo this
end with Durkheim-at the same time that he employedthe concept
throughout his substantivework,heldthatit describedmostoftheaction
thatgoes on in thesocial world,and made it centralto hisplans formoral
regeneration-itsfate could only be worse at the hands of sociologists
acrossthe ocean who fellshorton muchofthisand who wereembroiled
in institutionalstrugglesthat appeared more threatening and more ur-
gent.
Weber
BetweenDurkheimand Weberthereis littlecommonground;in termsof
assumptions,problems,and methods,the two were greatlyat odds. Yet
Weberwas easilyas inclinedas Durkheimto make serioususe of habit,
thoughin doing so he ultimatelycarriedthe conceptalong paths that
divergedfromthe moralizinghighroadof his Frenchcontemporary.6
It so happens,however,thatto understandWeber'spositionon habit
properly,one mustattendnot onlyto his explicitreferences to habitand
itscognatesbut also to his observationson custom-in thestrictlyWebe-
riansenseofcollectiveuniformities ofactionrootedsimplyin habit(1913,
pp. 170-71; 1922a, pp. 29, 319-20, 652; 1922b,p. 187)-as well as to his
use of the special termEingestelltheit.This expression,borrowedby
Weber (less its psychophysicaltrappings)frompsychologistssuch as
Kraepelinand Wundt,was employedby himto designatethephenome-
non he had in view when speakingof habit,namely,an unreflective, set
dispositionto engage in actionsthat have been long practiced(1908-9,
pp. 93-94; 1922b,pp. 192,442). Here theword"disposition"willbe used
as a shorthandforthiskindof habitualdispositionand thusas thetrans-
lationforEingestelltheit.7
6 That Weber steered clear of the moral-reformist path of Durkheim does not mean
that he was withouthis own moral judgments on the value of habitual action. On the
contrary,the Weberian "ethic of responsibility,"as Levine has observed, extolled"the
freedomof actors to make theirown decisions" and enjoined individuals "to be con-
stant in employingcorrectivesagainst unthinkinghabit" (1981, p. 20). The difference
between this estimateof habit and Durkheim's assessmentof the same phenomenonis
noteworthy,though an examination of this evaluative discrepancy falls outside the
bounds of this article.
7 With one evident exception (Roth's translationof Weber 1922b, p. 570, in Weber
1922a, p. 988), Weber's Eingestelltheithas been rendered"attitude,""attitude-set,"or

the like, presumably because of its root in Einstellung, which is a modern German
equivalent for "attitude." But it is importantto recognize that, in Weber's day, the
term "attitude" had yet to gain wide intellectual currency(see Fleming 1967; cf.
Bendix 1960, p. 272, n. 24). Indeed, in the psychologicalliteraturefromwhich he
1057
If these semanticcomplicationsare kept in mind,Weber's views on

habitemergequite clearly.Consider,to startwith,his declarationof its
"far-reaching economicsignificance."In Weber'sestimate,"the level of
economicneed, which constitutesthe basis of all 'economicactivity,'is
comprehensively conditionedby merecustom,"whichplaysits partalso
in determining the means of exchangeand the utilizationof such basic
"economicadvantages" as labor and the means of production;further-
more,"thepatternsof use and of relationshipamong[modern]economic
units are determinedby habit" (1922a, pp. 67-68, 78, 89, 320, 335).
Workitself,as Webersaw it,restsheavilyon a habitualfoundation."The
smallPolishpeasant[succeedsin agriculture] on acountofthelow levelof
his physicaland intellectualhabitsof life"(1895, p. 434); "Germangirls
[workinefficiently in factoriesbecause of an inner]stonewall of habit"
(1904-5a, p. 62); the "freedmen[of antiquity]prospered,fortheyhad
acquiredhabitsof industryand thrift while slaves" (1909, p. 59). In the
modernworld,a similarsituationobtainswithincapitalistfactoriesand
bureaucraticoffices,theseinstitutions beingthe"offspring" ofdiscipline,
whichWeber definedas "the probabilitythatbyvirtue of habituation a
commandwill receivepromptand automaticobediencein stereotyped
forms"(1922a, pp. 53, 1149, 1156 [emphasisadded]). Accordingly,his
writings on industry discussedat lengththereplacement of"the'habits'of
the old occupation[s]"by docile habits"in line withthe demandsof the
[factory]workprocedure"(1908b,p. 130; 1922a, p. 1156; see also 1908b;
1908-9; 1922a, pp. 731, 1155-56), while his analysis of bureaucracy
placed great weight on officialdom's"disposition(Eingestelltheit)to
painstakingobedience[and to the] habitual and virtuosomasteryof a
singlefunction"(1922a, p. 988, m.t.; 1922b, p. 570).
By Weber's reckoning,habit is also plainlyin operationoutsidethe
sphere of work and economic activity.It is thereon the battlefields,
wheresuccesseshave been securedas well as "forfeited by [variousmar-
tial] habits" (1922a, p. 1152); therelikewise amid processesof group
formation,with"merecustom. . . facilitating intermarriage," "the for-
mationoffeelingsof'ethnic'identification," and "thecreationof commu-
nity"(1922a, p. 320, m.t.; 1922b, p. 187); and there,too, at the base of
modernpolitical-legalorders,where"thebroad mass of the participants
act in a way corresponding to legal norms,notout ofobedienceregarded
as a legal obligation,but [in a greatmany cases] merelyas a resultof
borrowed
thewordEingestelltheit,
Einstellung
itselfwas generally
without
itsmodern
meaning of "attitude"; e.g., Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology
(whichwas compiledin collaborationwithtwo well-placedGermanscholars,Mun-
sterbergand Groos) officially
translatesEinstellungas "acquireddisposition"(see
Baldwin1901,1:287,2:679-80).
1058
Habit
habit"(1922a, pp. 31, 312, m.t.; 1922b,pp. 16, 182; see also
unreflective
1913, p. 178).
But notonlydoes habitpromoteconformity withlegal(as well as other)
norms,it is also involvedin the genesisof such norms.In a mannerthat
recalls the early Durkheim,Weber held that "customsare frequently
transformed intobindingnorms,[since]themerefactoftheregularrecur-
rence of certain events somehow confers on them the dignityof
oughtness."In otherwords,"whatwereoriginally plainhabitsofconduct
owingto psychologicaldisposition(Eingestelltheit),comelaterto be expe-
riencedas binding;then, with the awareness of the diffusionof such
conductamonga pluralityofindividuals,it comesto be incorporated [in]
'expectations'as to the meaningfully correspondingconductof others;
[untilfinallytheseexpectations]acquiretheguarantyofcoerciveenforce-
ment" (1922a, pp. 326, 754, m.t.; 1922b, pp. 191, 442).
In remarkssuch as these,one sees the place of habitin Weber'streat-
ment of processes of change. More typically,however, what Weber
stressedwas "the inertiaof the habitual"(1922a, p. 321, m.t.; 1922b,p.
188). In hisjudgment,"theinnerdisposition(Eingestelltheit) [tocontinue
along as one has regularlydone] containsin itself[such]tangibleinhibi-
tionsagainst'innovations,'[thatit is problematic]how anythingnew can
ever arise in thisworld"(1922a, p. 321, m.t.; 1922b,p. 188). Moreover,
he continued,even where"revolts,panics, or othercatastrophes"have
forciblyintroducedchanges,the statusquo ante has oftenbeen restored
simply"by an appeal to the conditioneddisposition(Eingestelltheit) to
obedientcompliance"on thepartofsubjectsand officials alike (1922a, p.
988, m.t.; 1922b, p. 570).
That Weber thus adverted to the significanceof habit in so many
importantcontextswas not happenstance.The examplesthathave just
been mentioned-themajorityofthem,at any rate-were notincidental
commentsbut reasonedformulations fullyin accordwithWeber'sdirect
Not onlydo we discover,he wrote,"thefurther
testimony. we go back in
history,. . . that conduct, and particularlysocial action, is determinedin
an ever morecomprehensivesphereexclusivelyby the disposition(Ein-
towardthe purelyhabitual"(1922a, p. 320, m.t.; 1922b,p.
gestelltheit)
188), but we findthat"individualsare stillmarkedlyinfluencedby . . .
customeven today," so much so that "the great bulk of all everyday
action [approaches an] almost automatic reactionto habitual stimuli
which guide behaviorin a course which has been repeatedlyfollowed"
(1922a, pp. 25, 337). Despite such testimony,however,the habitual
undercurrent in Weber'sworkhas yetto be muchappreciated.Fixatedon
foreground,theburgeoning Weberianscholarshipofthepasttwodecades
has gonefarto dissectWeber'sviews on rationality,
but-aside fromthe
perceptivebeginningsofRoth (1968, pp. xxxv,xc, lxix)and Cohen et al.
1059
(1975, pp. 231-33, 239)-habit has been leftout oftheaccounting.This

omissionis themorepeculiarfor,in thewidelyread introductory section
ofEconomyand Society,Weber himselfpointedlyspotlighted the realm
of the habitual when he placed "traditionalaction" among his basic
"typesof social action,"conceivedof thisformof conductas action"de-
terminedby ingrainedhabit," and thenadded to thisthe above-quoted
claimthat"thegreatbulk of all everydayaction"approximatesthistype
(1922a, p. 25, m.t.; 1922b,p. 12). Studentsof Weber,nonetheless,have
failedto takedue heed ofthis;at best,theyhave made noteoftheconcept
of traditionalaction, recordedits definition, and thenlet the mattergo
(see, e.g., Alexander1983, p. 25; Aron 1967, p. 221; Giddens 1971, p.
153).
For Weber himself,however,traditionalaction was by no means a
residualcategory.The factthatthistypeof actionis definedas deriving
from"ingrainedhabit" servesto uniteit directlywiththe veryaspect of
Weber'sworkthathas just been considered,thatis, his treatment ofthe
markedeffectof habiton economicand politicallife,social stabilityand
change, and a good deal else. WithinEconomyand Society itself,the
conceptoftraditionalactionis a link,too, to thedetailedanalysis,which
immediately followstheconcept'sintroduction, ofthenatureofsocialand
economicrelations,forthisanalysisrevertsrepeatedlyto the role of the
traditional-in structuring communalrelationships, establishingthe ex-
pectationsthat underliestable organizations,rankingalternativeeco-
nomicends, canalizingworkeffort, and so on (1922a, pp. 40-41, 49, 88,
129, passim). In fact, unless one is to believe that Weber, at his ter-
minologically mostprecise,alteredwithoutwarninghis definition of tra-
ditional,theonlyfairconclusionis thatin all thishe was again observing
what to him were basicallythe ramifications of habit.
But even moreimportant,"traditionalaction"providesa bridgeout-
ward to Weber'svast writingson "traditionalism." This is a connection
thatParsonswas thefirst(and is stillamongthefew)to have discerned,
thoughhe thenbecloudedtheissue by recastingWeber'sformulations to
fithis own emphasison beliefsand values at the expenseof habit (see
1937, pp. 646-47). But, as Weber made clear when defininghis terms,
althoughtraditionalismmay become a patternof beliefaround which
reflective action is structured(1915e, p. 296; 1922a, p. 25), in the first
instance it is exactly what habit is: "the psychicdisposition(Einge-
stelltheit)towardhabituatedroutine"as thebasis ofaction(1915e,p. 296,
m.t.; 1915a, p. 269). Insofaras Weberwas seriousabout thisequationof
traditionalism withhabit,one would have to concludethathabitwas in
operationwell beyondthoseportionsof his workexaminedso far;thatit
was actuallyone oftheunderlying foundationstonesofthecomparative-
historicalstudies that constitutethe core of Weberian sociology,since
1060
Habit
traditionalism is amongthecentralconceptsused in thesestudies.To see

just how seriousWeberwas, itis notnecessaryto lookfar:forwhetherhis
subject was the economic, religious,or political dimensionof tradi-
tionalism,he continuallystressedthefirmlinkagebetweentraditionalism
and habit.
Economictraditionalism, accordingto Weber,is theadherenceto long-
practicedeconomicforms,particularly"to productswhich are stereo-
typedin quantityand qualityor to [an accustomed]level of earnings,or
both"(1922a, p. 151; 1923b,p. 16). In hisjudgment,economicactivityof
thiskind has been extremely prevalent,occurringnot onlyamongpeas-
ants the world over but also among medieval guildsmen,adventurer-
capitalists,Indian artisans,Chinese petitebourgeoisie,and numbersof
modernwage-laborers(see, e.g., 1904a,pp. 364-65; 1904-5a, pp. 59-76;
1906,pp. 321-22; 1915c,pp. 3-20; 1916-17, pp. 111-17). Whendiscuss-
ing such examples,Weber freelyacknowledgedthatcertainactorsmay
proceed in traditionalistic ways because doing so is in theireconomic
interestor is mandated by theirvalues and beliefs.Yet he explicitly
deniedthatthesereflective considerationsare the principalbases of eco-
nomictraditionalism. Indeed, he was verycarefulto set thelatterapart
frompatternsof economicactivityrootedin "self-interest" or "absolute
values" and to conjoin it instead with habit,just as he elsewherepor-
trayedtraditionalism in economicaffairsas a forcethatis virtuallyin-
stinctive,occurs "by nature," and is "great in itself,"even without
utilitarianand moralsupports(1904-5a, p. 60; 1915d,p. 356; 1916-17,
pp. 84, 112; 1922a, pp. 150-51; 1923b,p. 16). And, in his mostsystem-
atic treatmentofthetopic,economictraditionalism was depictedprimar-
ilyas a manifestation of humankind's"generalincapacityand indisposi-
tion to depart fromhabituatedpaths" (1923a, p. 355, m.t.; 1923b, p.
303)-or, in otherwords,as a matterof habit(see also Marshall 1980,p.
115; Cohen et al. 1975, p. 232).
A similaremphasis appears in Weber's writingson religionand on
domination.Throughouttheformer,thereis muchconcernwithwhat is
variously called "the traditionalismof the laity," "magical tradi-
tionalism,"or "magical stereotyping," expressionsthat generallydesig-
natetheformerly almostuniversaltendencyfor"magicallyprovedforms"
of actionto be "repeatedin the formonce established,[sometimeswith-
out]theslightest deviation"(1915d,p. 341; 1922a,pp. 405, 456; 1923a,p.
161; 1923b,p. 303). Like otheractiontendencies,thisone, Weberheld,
has oftenbeen sustainedby religiousconvictionsand by practicalinter-
ests(1915d,p. 331). But havingsaid this,he hasteneddirectlyto connect
magicaltraditionalism also withthe habitual:with"thepersisting habits
ofthemasses"(1922a, p. 467, m.t.; 1922b,p. 285; see also Warner1970,
p. 86). In his telling,the magical "habits" of the laity antedatedthe
1061
developmentof systematicreligiousactivityand retaineda lifeof their

own even afterward,as manyworldreligionsleftthevast majoritymired
in its originaltraditionalism(1915c, pp. 229-30; 1915e, pp. 275-88;
1916-17, p. 342; 1922a, pp. 466, 470, 629, m.t.; 1922b,p. 284; 1923a, p.
363). Traditionalism'shabitualunderpinnings are clearlybroughtout as
well in Weber'streatmentof politicaldomination,particularly when he
examinedthe natureof traditionalauthorityand soughtthe foundation
forthis"oldestand mostuniversaltypeoflegitimacy"(1922a, p. 37). His
statements herespeak forthemselves:a traditional"structure ofdomina-
tion[is based] on the beliefin the inviolabilityof what has always been;
[thisbelief]derives. . . effectivenessfromthe innerdisposition(Einge-
stelltheit)to theconditionedpowerofthepurelyhabitual"-that is, from
actors'"habitualorientation to conform"and "generalpsychological inhi-
bitionsagainstany sortofchangein ingrainedhabitsofaction"(1918, p.
79; 1922a, pp. 37, 1008, m.t.; 1922b,pp. 19, 582).
At thispoint,it is perhapsworthobservingthat,in additionto indicat-
ingthatWeberretainedtheancientconceptofhabitand putit to workto
understandwhat he saw as the great,proteanforceof traditionalism,
Weber'swritingson traditionalism may be seen as developing(in a way
that,to myknowledge,has nowherebeen matched)a macrosociological
perspectiveon habit.If Durkheim'sreformist zeal propelledhimto exam-
ine the micro-leveldevelopmentof specificmoralhabits,Weber'scom-
parative-historical orientationled him away fromthis issue and into a
morethoroughgoing investigationofthelargersocial and culturalcondi-
tionsunderwhich generalsocietalpatternsof habitualaction wax and
wane.
It was Weber's beliefthat habitualaction does not occur at random.
Whileindividualseverywhere may act out of habiton occasion,theyare
notall equallyinclinedin thisdirectionin all domainsoftheiractivity,for
thereis a strongaffinity betweenthe way of lifewithindifferent social
groups and the propensityof group memberstoward various sortsof
habitualor reflective conduct.Peasants,forexample,live a "simpleand
organicexistence"revolvingarounda recurring "cycle"ofnaturalevents,
with the resultthat traditionalism typically"goes withoutsaying";the
situationwithartisansis sometimesmuchthesame (1915d,pp. 344, 346;
1916-17, pp. 104, 112, 313; 1922a, pp. 468, 1197). In contrast,members
of "civic strata[exhibita] tendencytowardsa practicalrationalism,[for]
theirwholeexistence[is] based upon technologicaland economiccalcula-
tions[and] the masteryof natureand man" (1915e, p. 284). Reflective
tendencies,of thisand othertypes,can be detected,too, amonglay and
religious intellectualsand among incumbentsof rulershippositions
(1915c, pp. 41-44, 142-43; 1922a, pp. 467-518). Yet, as Weber con-
tinued,groupsthathave been imbuedwiththesenontraditional tenden-
1062
Habit
cies have oftenderivedreal or ideal benefits fromtraditionalistic arrange-

ments. Indeed, in many past social formations,such groups accrued
tremendousadvantages,botheconomicand political,fromtheunreflect-
ing,habitualpracticesofthemasses,and "manifoldvestedinterests" thus
aligned themselveson the side of traditionalism(1922a, p. 37), which
receivedfurtherreinforcement fromreligiousand philosophicalcreeds
opposedto thealterationofestablishedmodesof conduct(see 1915c,pp.
27-28, passim; 1916-17, pp. 102-33, passim; 1922a, pp. 199, 202, 239,
passim; 1923a, pp. 138-41, 355-65). In broad historicalterms,theresult
ofsocial and culturalforcesofthesesortshas been theestablishment ofa
macro-level"political,economic,and ideologicalstructure" in whichpre-
dominantlytraditionalaction has prevailedin place of otherformsof
human activity(1915c, p. 6). This is the sociologicalrationalebehind
Weber'scontention thatso muchofthepast was "a sea oftraditionalism"
(1909, p. 210; see also 1922a, p. 245). Given,moreover,thatcertainways
of lifesupportiveof traditionalism as well as various "vestedinterests"
concernedwith perpetuatingthis orientationlast into modern times
(1918, p. 104), one can likewise appreciate his argumentthat tradi-
tionalismis a "condition. . . transcendedonlygradually";that"even in
cases wherethereis a highdegreeofrationalization ofaction,theelement
oftraditionalorientation remainsconsiderable"(1923b,p. 16; translation
byShils 1981,p. 9; Weber1922a, p. 69). One mightnotice,too,thatthese
judgmentsabout the occurrenceof traditionalism-aboutits heavypre-
ponderancein previoushistoricalperiodsand its persistencelong after-
ward-directlyparallelWeber'sremarksaboutthehistoricalincidenceof
habitual action, exactlyas we should expectin view of the close corre-
spondencebetweentraditionalism and habitin the Weberianlexicon.
Exploringthe macrohistorical circumstancesconduciveto traditional
or habitual action was, of course, only a part of Weber's project.Not
these conditions,but the involvedsocioculturalprocessby which they
were overcometo make way formodernWesternrationalismand capi-
talismprovidesthe evidentfocusof muchof Weber'swork.Here, how-
ever,we are on terrainsufficiently familiarthatit can be largelypassed
over, except in one respect. It scarcelyneed be emphasizedthat the
CalvinistReformation figuressignificantlyin Weber'saccountof the de-
velopmentofthemodernWesternworld.In describingthisaccount,most
commentators use thestandardterminology ofreflective modelsofaction;
theyargue that Weber viewed Calvinistideas as the source of a new
complexofvalues and norms(i.e., theinner-worldly asceticprinciplesof
"the Protestantethic"), which, in turn,fosteredthe emergenceof the
rationalorientationto conductknownas "thespiritof capitalism"(Mar-
shall 1980, pp. 14-27). This interpretation is quite faithfulto Weber's
work,butonlyup to a point.For just as Durkheimheldthatmoralaction
1063
in themodernworlddependsless on simplytradingone set of beliefsfor

anotherthanon theformation ofan entirely new moralhabitus,so Weber
maintainedthat Calvinismspurredrationaleconomicaction because it
went beyond the articulationof ideas that favoredsuch activityand
produced,instead,a fundamentally different" 'habitus'amongindivid-
uals which prepared them in specificways to live up to the specific
demandsof earlymoderncapitalism"(1910a, p. 1124; 1915c, pp. 242-
43).
Weber'sthesishereis of a piece withhis otherwritingson religion.In
hisview,it has been one ofthehighestaims ofmanysalvationreligionsto
impartto religious"virtuosi"a "totalcharacter":a "specifically religious
habitus"-or "charismatichabitus," or "permanenthabitus"-which
transcendsthe "ordinaryhabitus" of everydaylife, that is, the often
unshakablenaturalhabitusof the majoritythattakes lifeas a "miscel-
laneous successionof discreteactions" and thus makes do with tradi-
tionalistways and an "adherenceto the habitual" (1915c, pp. 231-32,
m.t.; 1915b,pp. 517-18; 1922a, pp. 534-40, m.t.; 1922b,pp. 325-28).
The exclusivelyvirtuososects of Calvinism went the furthestin this
regard;"fromtheirreligiouslife,out oftheirreligiously conditionedfam-
ily traditionsand fromthe religiouslyinfluencedlife-style of theirenvi-
ronment"emergeda "centralinner habitus"-"a methodicallyunified
disposition(Eingestelltheit)"-which,whenchanneledintoinner-worldly
activities,resultedin a historically
momentousefflorescence ofsustained
rationalconduct(1910a, p. 1124; 1915c, pp. 240, 244, m.t.; 1915b,pp.
527, 531). In thissense,modernrationalactionitselfrests,forWeber,on
a foundationof habit: on a dynamichabitus that supplantsthe static
habitusthatunderliessimplehabitualaction.It is truethattheseare not
thetermsin whichtheWeberianpositionis ordinarily summarized.They
are, however,the termsin whichWeber himselfsoughtto representhis
argument.Indeed, Weber not only declared explicitlythat, when The
ProtestantEthic speaks of the developmentof the "capitalistspirit,"it
means "the developmentof [a] particularhabitus,"he statedunequivo-
callythathis controversialstudy"intentionally [concentratedon] the as-
pect mostdifficult to graspand 'prove,'[theaspect]relatingto the inner
habitus"(19lOb,pp. 157, 186,n. 39; lattertranslationbyTribe in Hennis
1983, p. 146; see also Weber 1904-5b, p. 182).
For all thisemphasison the habitual,thereis nonethelessone way in
whichtheconceptof habitoccupiesan uneasyplace in Weber'sthought.
To understandthis,it is importantto recognizethat,duringthelate 19th
and early 20th century,the German academic world was, like its
counterpartselsewhere,a competitivearena in whichthe advocates of
manythen-emerging disciplines,sociologyincluded,struggledfiercelyfor
1064
Habit
a securepositionwithinthe universitiesalongsidethe olderbranchesof

the naturaland socioculturalsciencesand such upstartfieldsas psychol-
ogy(see Ben-David and Collins 1966, pp. 461-63; Eisenstadtand Cure-
laru 1976, pp. 30-34; Oberschall 1965, p. 13). Writingfroma distin-
guishedand easily won chair of economics,Weber actuallyexhibiteda
good deal more openness regardingthese interdisciplinary borderdis-
putes than manyof his contemporaries (Hennis 1983, p. 161). He, too,
however,was an activeparticipantin theMethodenstreit, thecelebrated
controversy overthenatureofsciencethatprovidedtheintellectual back-
groundto thedisciplinary squabbles (see Burger1976,pp. 140-53; Cahn-
man 1964; Oakes 1975, pp. 16-39).
In positioninghimselfamid this controversy, Weber set the natural
sciencesapart fromthe socioculturalsciences,holdingthatit is onlythe
latterdisciplines-those withwhichhe was allied-that treathumansas
"culturalbeings"whose actionembodiesa "subjectivemeaning,[which]
maybe moreor less clearto theactor,whetherconsciouslynotedor not"
(1904b,p. 81; 1913, p. 152). The objectiveof such sciences,therefore, is
to understandhuman actionby "identify[ing] a concrete'motive'. . . to
which we can attributethe conductin question"(1903-6, p. 125). The
natural sciences,in contrast,eschew this "subjectiveunderstanding of
action[and favor]theexplanationofindividualfactsbyapplying[general
causal laws]" (1922a, p. 15). Accordingly,it was amongthe naturalsci-
ences that Weber classifiedmost contemporarypsychology,with its
search forthe "laws of psychophysics" and its fragmentation of experi-
ence into such " 'elements'[as] 'stimuli,''sensations,''reactions,'[and]
'automatisms'" (1903-6, pp. 136, 140; 1908a, p. 31). In his opinion,the
socioculturalsciences-economics, history,and also sociology-could do
withoutall this,foraction"does not . . . becomemore'understandable'
thanit would otherwisebythe[introduction of]psychophysical" concepts
(1908a, p. 29). Yet, as Weber'swide readingoftheEuropeanand Ameri-
can psychologicalliteraturedisclosed,thesewere preciselythe concepts
underwhichthe businessof habit was commonlysubsumed(see 1908b,
pp. 112-34; 1908-9, pp. 64-65, n. 1, 72-106).
For a more sectarianacademic, this circumstancemightwell have
sufficedto place habitaltogetherbeyondthepurviewofthesociocultural
sciences.Weber did not succumbto thisknee-jerkreaction,however.If
theworkofpsychologists drainedthesubjectivemeaningout ofhabit,his
own researchestendedin theoppositedirection,notonlywhenexamining
such greatvessels of meaningas the habitusof Calvinismand of other
salvationreligionsbutalso whenconsidering moremundaneworkhabits,
militaryhabits,politicalhabits,magical habits,and the like. For at no
point did Weber treat such phenomena,in the mannerof the natural
1065
scientist studying human activity, as "incomprehensivestatistical

probabilit[ies]"
(1922a, p. 12); thatis, as nonunderstandable behaviorsfor
whichit is impossibleto identify any consciousor nonconsciousmotive.
Nevertheless,even Weber came withinthe spell of psychologicalno-
tionsof habit. He thuscouchedhis definition of traditionalactionin the
psychophysicalargot of "stimuli"and "automaticreactions,"and he
tendedlikewiseto portraythisformofactionas existing"by nature"and
antecedentto culture(see above, and 1922a, pp. 17, 320-21, 333, 1134).
Given the interdisciplinarycontroversies of his age and his commitment
to study"culturalbeings" while settingaside the naturalscientificap-
proach of the psychologists, theseviews on habit could but raise grave
doubtsabout the concept'srelevancewithintheWeberianconceptionof
the socioculturalsciences. Such doubts were codifiedin Economy and
Society, where Weber urged the sociologistto investigatemeaningful
social actionand thenannouncedthattraditionalor habitualconduct-
describedhere in psychophysical terms,ratherthan in the interpretive
languageused in his empiricalstudies-"lies veryclose to the borderline
ofwhatcan justifiably be called meaningfully orientedaction,and indeed
oftenon the otherside" (1922a, p. 25). This formulationwas a risky
compromise.It leftthedoor to thedomainof habitsufficiently open that
Weber's sociologycould still incorporatehis own ample analyses of
habitualaction,but it set thatdoor precariouslyenoughajar thatthose
withotherinclinationsmightquicklyclose it, and close it forgood.
The AmericanScene
To Americancontemporaries of Durkheimand Weber, the conceptof
habitwas also a familiaritem.In thelast decades ofthe 19thcenturyand
theearlydecades ofthe 20th-to go back no further-onefindstheidea
all overtheintellectuallandscape,invokedalikebypopularreformers, by
solemnHarvard philosophers,by social evolutionistswith Lamarckian
leanings,and byevolutionary thinkersofa moreDarwinianbent,suchas
Sumneron the rightand Veblen on theleft(see Curti 1980,pp. 233-34;
Kuklick 1977, pp. 74-75, passim; Stocking1968, pp. 238-69; Sumner
1906; Veblen 1899, pp. 107-8, passim). Mentionof these evolutionary
currentsitselfsuggestssomethingof the biologisticlightin whichhabit
was seen at this time. But the best indicationof this,as well as of the
concept'scontinuingutilization,appears in theworkof theearlyAmeri-
can psychologists.This work is particularlyinstructivesince not only
does it containthe age's mostsystematicstatementsabout habit,it also
revealsthe pointof departureforthe sociologicaltreatments of the sub-
ject thatwere producedduringthe same period.
To appreciatethepsychologists' viewsproperly,however,a fewwords
1066
Habit
about institutionalcontextare necessary.In the post-Civil War era,

Americanintellectuallifewas affecteddeeplyby theemergenceof major
research-oriented universitiesand numeroussatellitecolleges,whichof-
fered,to thosemen and womenfortunate enoughto establishthemselves
securelyon the inside, solid researchand careeropportunities that had
long been in notoriouslyshortsupply.In thisregard,membersof disci-
plinesconstitutedas separatedepartments were in an especiallyfavored
position,since "departmentalstatus[meant]increasedrewardsin funds
and power, [an arrangementthat]provideda powerfulimpetusto the
[splittingoffof] distinctsubjects" (Ross 1979; p. 123). Here, however,
therewerecontendersaplenty,a majorityofthemviewedsuspiciouslyby
thosewho were alreadywithinthe various institutions of highereduca-
tion and quick, therefore, to demand that new fieldsjustifytheirown
entryinto the academy by "constantlyprov[ing]and solidify[ing] their
statusas sciences"(Ross 1979, p. 125). Faced withthisrequirement, it
was the youngdisciplineof psychologythatbecame a particularsuccess
story,achieving(despitefitsand starts)departmental rankin manylead-
inguniversitiesby aroundtheturnofthecenturyand spreadingoutward
to otherhighereducationalinstitutions by the end of WorldWar I (see
Camfield1973; Cravens 1978,pp. 58-71; Curti1980,pp. 197-203; Wat-
son 1965).Much ofthereasonforthiswas preciselythefactthat,fromits
start,Americanpsychologyfollowedthe exampleof the new European
psychologyand broughtto the studyof mental life the conceptsand
methodsof Darwinian biologyand experimentalphysiology-sciences
thenat the summitof the academic hierarchy(see Boring1950; Cravens
1978,pp. 56-86). For all thedisputesthatsoon emergedwithinacademic
psychology,moreover,thisstaunchcommitment to build the fieldalong
the lines of the establishedbiophysicalscienceswas one that actually
grew all the strongerby the early decades of the 20th century,as the
philosophicallytrainedpioneersof psychologyleftthe scene to numbers
of specializedresearchersdeterminedto push forwardthe campaignto
institutionalize
theireminentlyscientificdiscipline(see Camfield1973,
pp. 70-73; Smith1981, pp. 28-29).
The image of habit that had been incubatedin 19th-century Europe
came intoits own in thissituation,forhabitualprocesseswerea topicto
which Americanpsychologistsfrequentlyturned,and, wheneverthey
did, what emergedwas theidea thathabitis an essentiallybiophysiolog-
ical phenomenon,mostin evidencein thesimpleactivitiesofhumanand
otherorganisms.This idea was already presentedas a truismin the
broadlyread work of WilliamJames, which, in seekingto show how
"mechanicalscience. . . set[s]herbrandofownershipon thematter,"laid
it down thathabit bespeaks the factthat"our nervoussystemgrowsto
themodesin whichit has been exercised,"so muchso thateven complex
1067
habitsare "nothingbut concatenateddischargesin thenerve-centers, due

to the presencethereof systemsof reflexpaths"(1890, pp. 107-8, 112).
Congruentviews werewidelyexpressed:bytheveteranscholarBaldwin,
to whomhabitswere "lowermotorsyntheses"(1897, p. 55, n. 2); by the
risingyoung experimentalist Yerkes, who regardedhabit, whetherin
turtles,frogs, or humans, as "a tendencytoward a certain action
[resulting fromthedevelopmentin theorganism]ofa track[alongwhich]
nervousimpulse[s]pass" (1901, p. 545); by the eclectictheoretician An-
in
drews,who concluded an importanteffort at synthesis
that"habit...
is at bottoma physiologicalphenomenon[involving]neuralmodifications
[caused] by the neural excitations"(1903, pp. 139, 149). Similarstate-
mentswereinscribedintothetextbooksoftheperiodby authorities such
as Angell,Judd, Pillsbury,and Swift(see Fearing 1930, pp. 242, 247;
Watson 1914, pp. 252-56).
The completetriumphof thispointof view came whenJohnWatson
launched, early in the second decade of this century,the "behavioral
movement"in Americanpsychology.Determinedto make psychology
even moremanifestly scientific thanit had alreadybecome,to purgethe
fieldof all "introspectively isolable elements[suchas] sensation,percep-
tion, imagery,etc.," and to "write psychology[instead]in termsof
stimulusand response"(1913, pp. 199, 201), Watson adopted a thor-
oughlyphysiologizedconceptionof habitand thenplaced thisconceptat
the very centerof his programforthe analysisof human conduct.In
Watson's view, habit is simplya "systemof [acquired]reflexes"or re-
sponses, or, in other words, part of "the total stripedand unstriped
muscular and glandular changes which follow upon a given
[environmental] stimulus"(1914, pp. 184-85; 1919,p. 14; see also 1914,
pp. 184-276; 1919,pp. 169-347). He contended,furthermore, that"man
is the sum of his instinctsand habits,"meaningherebythat all nonin-
stinctiveactivityis to be seen as habitin his particularsenseoftheterm
(1917, p. 55; 1919,p. 270). So insistentwas Watsonon thiscountthathe
actuallyconceivedof thinkingitself-which had long been regardedas
the ultimatebasis of reflective humanaction-merely as an operationof
the"tongue,throat,and laryngealmuscles. .. movingin habitualtrains"
(1919, p. 11).
Had Watson's pronouncements been idiosyncraticoutpourings,one
might,ofcourse,easilywritethemoff.In fact,however,his behaviorism
not only representedan integrationof a good deal of previousworkin
Americanpsychology, it also became, by themid-1920s,one ofthegreat
intellectualorthodoxiesamongprofessional manyofwhom
psychologists,
wereutterly"electrified by . . . Watson's ideas," whichworked so well to
consolidatethescientific statusoftheirrisingfield(Cravensand Burnham
1971,p. 645; see also Baken 1966; Burnham1968b;Curti1980,pp. 373-
1068
Habit
80; Samuelson1981). Nor wereWatsonand his confederates reluctantto

extendtheirclaims into the traditionaldomains of the social sciences.
Convinced that human groupings,both simple and complex,differed
fromTortuga'sbirdsand whiteratsin littlemorethanthe greaterintri-
cacy of theirhabits,Watson offeredhis psychologyas a mastertool "to
guide society. . . towardsthe controlof group [as well as] individual
behavior"(1913, p. 202; 1917; 1919,pp. 2-3); and, followingsuit,fellow
behavioristssuch as Floyd Allportdefinedsocial institutions themselves
''merely[as] similarand reciprocalhabits of individualbehavior"and
thenproposedthatthe disciplineappropriateforthe studyof the social
world "is not sociology,but psychology,"which derives its principles
from"biology,chemistry, and the othernaturalsciences"(1924, p. 18;
1927, pp. 167-68).
As we shall see, sociologistsfoundclaims of thissortfartoo muchto
bear and soon reactedadverselyto the entire,physiologically contami-
nated businessof habit. The importantpointto appreciate,however,is
thatpriorto thisdevelopment,Americansociologistsalso made readyuse
oftheage-oldconcept,sometimesemployingitin themannerof 18th-and
19th-centuryEuropean social thinkers,thoughmore oftenactuallyen-
dorsingthe psychologists'biophysiologicalapproach. Such an endorse-
mentwill seem remarkable,too, untilit is recognizedthat,fromthelate
19th centurythroughthe early years of the 20th century,American
"sociologyas a whole restedprimarilyon [a] psycholog[ical]" foundation
and freelyadopted the "assumptionsof contemporary physiologicalpsy-
chology"(Petras1970,p. 231; Cravens 1978,p. 142;see also Hinkle 1980,
pp. 69-71; Hinkleand Hinkle 1954,pp. 7-9; Lewis and Smith1980,pp.
153-80). This was true,at any rate, among those sociologistswho re-
gardedtheirfieldas a bona fideintellectualdiscipline,formuchthatthen
went underthe name of "sociology"was reallya motleyassortmentof
effortsat moral reformand practical social improvement(Oberschall
1972,p. 203). It was, indeed,undertheappliedbannerthatsociologyfirst
insinuateditselfintomanyhighereducationalinstitutions, whereit long
survivedchieflyas an undergraduate vocationaloffering,taughtby part-
time instructors (Cravens 1978, p. 123; Oberschall 1972, pp. 210-13).
The discipline,as a result,was perpetuallysurrounded"by a sea of
academic doubterswho questioned[its]substance"-a situationbrought
homebytheraritywithwhichsociologywas accordeddepartmental rank
or admitted into prestigiousuniversities(other than Columbia and
Chicago) (Ross 1979, p. 117; see also Cravens 1978,pp. 123-38; Furner
1975,pp. 291-312; Oberschall1972). Underthesecircumstances, would-
be professionalsociologistsunderstandably developed"an obsessivecon-
cern with the academic legitimation[of theirdiscipline]as a science"
(Oberschall1972,p. 189). It was in partto achievethislegitimation that
1069
thesethinkerswidelyand frequently predicatedtheiranalysesof social

lifeon thefindingsof the moreestablishedscienceof psychology, just as
psychologyhad in its turnappealed to the distinguished biologicalfields
(Cravens 1978, p. 141).
Accordingly, amongsociologistsof the time,the conceptof habitcon-
tinuedto function-alongsidetermsencompassingthe reflective side of
human conduct-as an active partnerin the enterprise of social theory.
Examples are plentiful:Giddingsacceptingthe notionthat habit is an
affairof the "nervousapparatus" and then makingit the verytask of
sociologyto study"the nature of the soci[al man], his habits and his
activities"(1900, pp. 11,72); Cooleynoddinglikewisetowardthephysio-
logicalusage of habit and concerninghimselfwithhow "habit[exertsa]
fixingand consolidatingactionin thegrowthof theself,"withthedevel-
opmentof the "habit of conscience,"withthe way the moderneconomy
generates"a whole systemof [restless]habits,"and so on (1902, pp. 187,
368, 370, 379; 1909, pp. 328-29); Ross attendingin detail to "habitsof
consumption"and "habitsof production"(1908, pp. 262-66); theyoung
W. I. Thomas assertingthat"all sociologicalmanifestations proceedfrom
physiologicalconditions"and placing"thehabitsofthe group"and their
vagariesamongtheprimaryinterests ofthesocialtheorist(1905,pp. 446-
47, 449-51; Stocking1968, p. 260); Hayes (a decade laterstill)defining
habitsas "establishedcerebroneuraltendencies"and describingthemas
decisivemoldersof the humanpersonality(1915, pp. 297-98, 394); and
Ellwood adoptinga neurophysiological view of habitand thendeclaring
that"forthe individualand forsocietyhabit is of supremeimportance,
[sinceitis] themaincarrierofall thoseformsofassociation. . . whichrise
above themerelyinstinctive level, [and is thus]thechiefraw materialon
whichculturalevolutionmustact. The higherstagesof humanculture
[have actually]been builtup bythegradualdevelopment[of]highertypes
of habit, [and] the social orderof even the veryhighestcivilizationis
almostentirelymade up of habitualtypesof [individual]reaction"(1912,
p. 107; 1917, pp. 62-63). Even RobertPark, just embarkingupon his
academic career,jumped on the bandwagon,exuberantly laudingwork
on "thephysiology of thenervoussystem,"defining"character[as] noth-
ingmorethanthesum ... ofthosemechanismswhichwe call habit,"and
announcing"thateducationand socialcontrolare largelydependentupon
ourabilityto establishhabitsin ourselvesand in others"(1915,pp. 82, 84;
see also 1904, p. 39).
Despite all this, the concept'sdays were numbered.As behaviorism
grewin strength amongpsychologists in thedecade or so afterWorldWar
I and made its advances into sociologicalterritories, sociologistsdefen-
sivelyrecoiledfromthe conceptualframework of physiologicalpsychol-
ogy. That theyreactedin thisway, moreover,is morea commentary on
1070
Habit
thestateofsociologyitselfthanon behaviorism,forthebetter-established
social sciences of the time were generallyunruffled by the behaviorist
challenge(see Curti 1980,pp. 395-98). Sociology,however,remainedin
a vulnerableposition,laggingbehindin termsof academicinstitutional-
izationas late as theearly1920s,whenthedisciplinestillconsistedmainly
ofa scattering ofundergraduate coursestaughtfromwithinotherdepart-
ments(see Cravens 1978, pp. 129-30; Ross 1979, pp. 124-25). Com-
mittedspokesmenforthe fieldthusbecame ever morepassionatelycon-
cernedwith the vigorous"assertionof [the]disciplinaryautonomy"of
sociology(Matthews 1977, p. 149; Cravens 1978, pp. 121-22, 147-53)
and respondedwith alarm at the behaviorists'encroachments. Indeed,
formanypractitioners ofsociology,thewholepostwarperiodstoodout as
an age when "extremebehaviorismthreatenedto dominatethe sociolog-
ical scene" (Odum 1951, p. 450).
Fearfulof just such an outcome,sociologistsmoved withdispatchto
stemthe apparenttide of behaviorism,and it was in so doingthatthey
purposefullyabandoned the venerableconceptof habit. There are, of
course,exceptionsto the rule-Bernard (1926), who soughta compro-
mise withthe behavioriststhatpreservedhabitin its physiologicaltrap-
pings;Maclver (1931), who was steepedin a traditionof Europeansocial
theoryantedatingbehaviorismand continuedto speak of moral, reli-
gious,political,and economichabits(cf. Sorokin1947,pp. 43-51). But,
increasingly, thesewereminority voices.In theview ofmanysociologists,
habitwas thebehavioristidea ofhabit:to countenancethiswas to accept
behaviorism'sphysiologically reductionistaccountofhumanactionin the
social worldand to ruleout all thoseinstancesofreflectiveactionthathad
long held an importantplace in Americansociologyalong withhabitual
action. That broaderconceptualizationsof habit mighthave been sub-
stitutedforthebehavioristformulation and wereactuallyavailable in so
readya sourceas Dewey (1922; see n. 3 above) matteredlittle.Dewey's
statementson habit were read but not seized as an alternative(Allport
1954, p. 59), for in an intellectualsettingwhere habit was so closely
associatedwithpsychology, any use oftheconceptseemedto exhibitjust
thekindof"rel[iance]on conceptsborrowedfromanotherdiscipline"that
jeopardized the autonomyof sociology(Matthews1977, p. 149).8 It is
true, as sociologistsfranklyadmitted,that breakingwith psychology
meantthatsociologycould no longerenhanceits scientific credentialsby
leaning on the "reputationof the physicalsciences"(Ellwood 1930, p.
8 Mead's "social behaviorism,"

however,was palatablebecauseit concentrated
on
"theactivityofindividualsinsofaras theyare actingas self-conscious
membersofa
social group,"even thoughMead himself"saw most acts as habituatedresponses
proceeding withoutself-conscious
reflection"(Lewisand Smith1980,pp. 144, 160).
1071
187);butbythispointsucha sacrificeappearedpreferable to remaining in

the "intellectualthralldom"of psychologyand automaticallyrelinquish-
ing the largergoal of institutional independence(Cravens 1978,p. 191).
What eluded sociologicalthinkersherewas thattheyweremerelyinvert-
ing the approachtheyrejected:thatjust as Watsonmade habitvirtually
everything in social life,so in castingtheconceptaside, sociologistswere,
in effect,allottinghabit no role in the social worldwortheven speaking
of. The once-acceptedpropositionthathabitembracespartoftheprocess
of social action thus met its oppositein two extremedirections,as the
quest foracademic autonomyerodedthe prospectsforcontinuingin the
middleway.
This sweepingshiftaway fromhabitfounditsearliestexpressionin the
workofThomas. In theimmediateaftermath ofhisown earlyexposureto
Watsonianbehaviorism(see Jenningset al. 1917),Thomas unequivocally
reversedhis once-positivestancetowardphysiology and likewisetoward
habit. Now, deemingunacceptable"theprinciplesrecentlydevelopedby
the behavioristicschool," particularlyits "indistinct[application]of the
term'habit' to [all] uniformities of behavior,"he bluntlydeclaredthat
" 'habit' . . . shouldbe restricted to thebiologicalfield;[forit]involvesno
conscious,purposefulregulationof [conduct],but merely. .. is unreflec-
tive.... The uniformity of behavior[thatconstitutes social life]is not a
uniformity of organichabitsbut of consciouslyfollowedrules"(Thomas
and Znaniecki1918, 2:1849-52). Situatedwithinthe acclaimedvolumes
of The Polish Peasant, thispronouncement was an extremely important
one, not least because it was conjoined with a proposal to instatethe
conceptof"attitude"at thecenterofsocialtheory(1918, 1:22-35, 2:1831-
63). Indeed,ithas beenarguedthatthisproposalbyThomaswas actually
the watershedin the process by which the term"attitude"took on its
modernmeaningand was projectedintoprominence(see Fleming1967,
pp. 322-31). This is notto say thatThomas offered hisnew conceptas an
inoffensivesynonymfor habit; on the contrary,he conceptualizedat-
titudeas an aspect of "individualconsciousnesswhichdetermines" more
reflective typesof action(1918, 1:22, 2:1853; Fleming1967,pp. 326-27).
But it was not long beforenonreflective processeswere whollyeclipsed,
as it became commonplaceto use attitudeto describe"tendenciesof
action" that mightotherwisehave been called habits (Faris 1928, pp.
276-77).
As thispracticetook hold, the campaignagainsthabit thathad com-
mencedwithThe Polish Peasant enlistedsubstantialsupport.Thus, Ell-
wood, who had previouslyseenhabitas theessenceofculturalevolution,
was soon convincedthat"to express[man's]culturalevolutionin termsof
stimulusand habitis . . . inadequate,[since]it formulates whatis distinc-
tive of man in termsof what is commonto both man and the animals
1072
Habit
below him"(1918, p. 789). Increasinglycriticalofthewholeidea ofhabit

and of"theBehaviorist[whoneglectseverything] exceptthemodification
of habits or reflexes,"Ellwood devoted much of his later work to the
reflective"intellectualelements"bywhichhumanstranscendthehabitual
(1927, p. 65, 75; 1930, p. 204). In due course,Park, too, came to argue
thatwhatwe do "whenwe behave mostlikehumanbeings[is]prettysure
to escape thebehaviorists[whofocuson] habits";thathumancharacteris
neither"instinctivenor . . . habitudinal,"but an outgrowthof "present
attitudes,"whichthesociologistcan studywithoutrecourseto the"physi-
ological term . . . habit" (1930, p. 98; 1931, pp. 17-32; cf. Park and
Burgess 1921, pp. 438-39; Park and Miller 1921, pp. 82-83). Faris
soundedsimilarthemes,lashingout againstthe"physiological psychology
and neurologicalpsychology" ofthebehaviorists,disdainingtheir"defec-
tivetheoryofhabit"and concluding"theword'habit'is quiteunsatisfac-
tory"to capture all the "thinkingand striving"that constitutehuman
social conduct;forhimalso, attitudewas thepreferableconcept(1921,p.
194; 1924, p. 41; ca. 1930a, p. 236; ca. 1930b,pp. 244-46).9 In fact,so
readilydid this generalpointof view make its mark that,by the early
1930s,Queen could approvinglyreportthat"in recentyears... students
of human relationshave talked less about habits and more about at-
titudes"(1931, p. 209), while historiesof Americansociologyfromthe
same period could identifyno contemporary sociologicaltreatmentsof
habit save forthoseof Bernardand Dewey and digressedinsteadto the
topic of attitude(Bogardus 1929, pp. 518-19; Karpf 1932, pp. 334-42,
408-9). And a fewyearslater,whenZnanieckiissuedhismassivetreatise
Social Actions,he could confidently reiteratethe point,made yearsbe-
forewithThomas, that" 'habit'[is an expressionthatsociologists] prefer
notto use," sinceit denominatesa "biological'behavioral'pattern[that]is
ofno importanceforthestudyof [social]actions"(1936, pp. 40-42) and,
withthat,let the matterdrop altogether.
In the followingyear, a youngTalcott Parsons added to the chorus.
One often-overlooked leitmotifof The Structureof Social Actionis, in
fact, what Parsons later describedas its "vigorous. . . polemicizing"
against behaviorism (1978a, p. 1353). Attacking"the behavioristic
scheme" for reducing the individual to a "biophysical unit" and
9 Like manya naturalscientistwhohas practicedunderoneparadigmand can never

entirelyshifttoanotherin thewakeofa scientific
revolution
(see Kuhn1962,pp. 144-
59), Thomas,Ellwood,Park,and Farisall had moments whentheylapsedbackinto
talk about habit,even aftertheyhad formally deniedthesociologicalvalue of the
concept (see, e.g., Thomas 1927, pp. 143-47; Ellwood 1925, pp. 88-93; Park 1930, p.
96; Faris 1937,p. 182).Onlyin thegeneration
thatsucceededthesepioneerswas their
conceptualbreakwiththepastfullycarriedthrough-again,muchas in thecase of
scientific
revolutions.
1073
"exclud[ingthe] subjectiveaspect" of humanconduct,Parsonswas led,

like his earlycontemporaries, to equate habitdirectlywith"the psycho-
logicalconceptofhabit"or,in otherwords,withthebehaviorists'endless
talk about organically"conditionedreflexesor habits"(1937, pp. 76-78,
116, 380, n. 3, 647; see also 1934, pp. 437-40)-an equationhe was to
retainformuchof his career(1959, p. 687; 1975,pp. 667-68; 1978b,p.
389; cf. Parsonsand Shils 1951, pp. 78, 89, 125). But such an equation
could onlyprove inimicalto habit since,when writingThe Structureof
Social Action,Parsonswas as eageras othersin thesociologicalcommu-
nityto differentiate the sociologist'sapproach fromthe behavioristap-
proach,forthe latterseemedto implythattherewas "no place" forthe
youngfieldof sociology(1937, pp. 115-17, 773-74). He accordingly pro-
posed to establishsociologyas one ofa handfulof"independent"sciences
ofaction,each of whichwould have as itsdomainone ofthefour"emer-
gentproperties"of actionsystems-with"thehereditary basis ofperson-
ality"fallingto psychology,"economicrationality" to economics,"coer-
cive rationality" to politicalscience,and "common-valueintegration" to
sociology(1937, pp. 760-73). For presentpurposes,whatis moststriking
about thisseeminglyencompassingschemeis that,beyondthe"residuum
... referableto heredity"(1937, p. 769),it is a mappingwhollylimitedto
the provincesof reflectiveaction, a limitationthat accords well with
Parsons'spremisethat action consistsof a reasonedselectionof means
and endsbytheapplicationof"guidingnorms"(1937,pp. 26, 44-45, 48).
Twist and turnhis groundplan forthe sciencesof actionas muchas we
like,it yieldsno nichewithinsociology,or even withinallied disciplines,
forthestudyofhabitualformsofhumansocialaction.For Parsons,as for
othersociologicalopponentsof behaviorismduringthe 1920sand 1930s,
habithad abruptlyceased to be an acceptable,goingconcernofthesocial
theorist.
There are, however,factorsthat make Parsons's own treatmentof
habit in The Structureof Social Action especiallysignificant.For one
thing,thistreatment was presentedin conjunctionwitha lengthy-and
ultimatelyvery influential-accountof the developmentof European
social thought,which, aside froma few dismissiveremarks(1937, pp.
321, 646), wrotehabit out of the whole historyof modernsocial theory,
even when consideringDurkheimand Weber. This was so despitethe
factthat, throughoutthe actual course of this history,habit had often
referred to innerdispositionsand tendenciesthatwereverymuchpartof
the subjectiveside of humanconductthatParsonsnow counterposedto
habit. Parsons'sanalysisstandsout, in addition,because it articulated,
far more explicitlythan the work of Thomas, Ellwood, Park, and the
othershad done,theunderlying conceptionofactionat whichone arrives
once the idea of habit is set aside. This conception,as clearlystatedby
1074
Habit
Parsons, postulatesthat all action exhibitsa "commonstructure":that

actionprocessesdo notvaryin theirforms,onlyin theirsubstance-that
is, onlyin termsof the particularmeans, ends, and normswithwhich
givenactorsare concerned(1937, pp. 733-34; see also Warner1978,pp.
1321-22; Zaret 1980, p. 1194). And herelies the problem.
* * *
If we take a largerhistoricalperspectiveon the matterof habit than

that adopted by those who dispensed with the concept, then to
homogenizeactionprocessesin theway thatParsons'sworkillustratesso
well is, I submit,unsatisfactoryforthreereasons.First,thehomogenized
view ofactioneffectively blocksout consideration oftheempiricalroleof
habitin the social world. For thinkerslike Durkheimand Weber,habit
was of significantconsequence in economic, political, religious,and
morallife,and elsewhereas well; but its consequencesare notsomething
one is at all promptedto investigate,or even to notice,whenone assumes
that action always takes the formof a reflectiveweighing,by various
normativestandards,of meansto ends. Parsonshas, it is true,acknowl-
edged that "the adequate understandingof many concretephenomena
mayrequiretheemployment ofanalyticalcategoriesdrawnfrom"outside
thesciencesofaction(1937, p. 757). But thisdeclarationhas provedto be
a dead letterboth in his own later work and in mostcontemporaneous
linesof sociologicalresearch,forhabitualphenomenasimplydo notcon-
geal as salientempiricalrealitiesforthosewho operatewitha modelof
actionthatallots no place to habit.
A secondproblemwiththismodelis itsneglectofthetheoretical impli-
cationsof habitualaction,includingthosethatrelatedirectlyto thecen-
traltaskthatParsonssetsfora theoryofaction-the taskof"account[ing]
forthe elementof orderin social relationships" (1937, p. 102). In accord
withhis reflective conceptualization ofaction,Parsonsholds(in Munch's
[1982, p. 776] usefulsummary)thatsocial orderderivesfrom"therecip-
rocalpenetrationofinstrumental . . . and normatively obligatedaction."
Neitherhe nor criticsof his positionon this point raise any question
whateverabout the extentto which social regularitiesobtain because
humans also act in more nonreflective, habitual ways. Nowhere does
Parsons confrontthe Durkheimianthesis about the place of habit in
moral educationand considerthe degreeto which the reflective moral
action that he findsso necessaryto sustainsocial ordermay reston a
foundationof habits implantedearly on and may thereafter crystallize
only insofar as there are numbers of activitiesthat remain largely
habitual.Even less does the Parsonsianmodelof actionaccommodatea
moreWeberianmacrosociological perspectiveon theissue:thepossibility
1075
thatsomeactorsmayderivereal or ideal advantagesbecause otheractors

proceed(in some areas) in habitualways,withtheresultthattheadvan-
tagedactorsmaypursuecoursesofconductthatserveto perpetuate,or to
refashion, thesehabitualways and theordertheyimply(cf.Bourdieuand
Passeron 1970).
The thirddifficultywithhomogenizingaction as Parsonsdoes lies in
theresultingconceptionoftherelationship betweenthehumanpersonal-
ityand thesocial world.In his famousattackon theutilitariantradition,
Parsonsdeclaresthat"themostfundamentalcriticism ofutilitarianismis
thatit has had a wrongconceptionof the concretehuman personality"
(1937, p. 387). What he does not perceive,however,is themarkedsimi-
larity between the alternativehe develops and the formulationhe
criticizes.For whetheractionis depictedas thepursuitofeconomicends
via normsof efficiency, or whethermore sublimeends and obligatory
moralnormsare also takenintoconsideration, theunderlying assumption
is thatthe human personalityis essentiallythe aggregateof variousend
preferences and normativeorientations-attributes whose contentPar-
sons sees as varyingin differentsocial groupsand constituting the basic
substanceof the socializationprocess.Missingaltogetherhereis an ap-
preciationforthepointthatDurkheimand Weberurgedwhenadopting
theconceptof habitus,namely,thatpersonality is a gooddeal morethan
the tidy sum of attributeslike these; that the implicationsfor actual
conductof any particularnorms,beliefs,and ideas are highlycontingent
on thebasic cast or formof the wholepersonality of whichthesecompo-
nents are parts-on a generalizeddispositionwhose very shape may
differwithvariationsin thesocializationpracticesofdifferent groupsand
may undergomajor reorganizationas social formationschange histori-
cally.This way ofseeingpersonality was lostsightof,too,as thehomoge-
nized view of action proposedby Parsons codifiedthe outcomeof the
campaignagainsthabitthathe and hisoldercontemporaries werewaging
on behalfof the cause of sociology.
CONCLUSION
For the present,thereis no need to carrythis historicalinvestigation
forwardin time.It is enoughto recordthat,as habit was progressively
discardedfromthelanguageofsociology,new cohortsofsociologistswho
learnedthislanguageafreshinevitablycame to couchtheirown thoughts
and theoriesin termsotherthan habit, whetheror not theywere at all
cognizantof the rejectionof the conceptby the likes of Thomas, Park,
Faris, Znaniecki,or theincreasinglyprominentParsons.Since theterms
that were currentembracedaction only to the extentthat it was of a
reflective
variety,the work of thesecohortstendedineluctably(though
oftenunwittingly) to recapitulateParsons's course in The Structureof
1076
Habit
Social Action:to portrayall social actionas possessinga commonstruc-

tureand thento overlookboththeempiricaland theoreticalsignificance
of habitual conduct and the role of habitus in the organizationof the
humanpersonality.
One mightargue,to be sure,thatsociologyas a whole benefited, in a
verytangibleway, fromleavingthesemattersaside and gettingon with
otherbusiness:thattheexcisionof habiteffectively abettedinstitutional-
izationof the disciplineas well as the varioussubstantiveachievements
thatinstitutionalizationmade possible.But thesebenefits have longsince
been secured;theyhave ceased to affordgroundsfortramplingon con-
ceptualresourcesthatwereblightedin theheat oflong-forgotten circum-
stances.By uncoveringthesecircumstances and thusbringing to lightthe
historicalprocessthroughwhichtheconceptualstructure ofsociologyhas
cometo have itsdelimitedfocus,researchon sociology'spastconstitutes a
clear invitationto those who currentlywork withinthat structureand
takeitsfocusforgrantedat last to look withoutand considerseriouslythe
broaderalternativesthatare in factavailable to them.
In undertakingto examine the historyof the alternativethat is the
conceptofhabit,thisarticlehas proposedthatrecentefforts to overcome
presentist approachesto thestudyofsociology'spast be expandedso that
worksotherthanacknowledgedsociologicalclassicsand ideas otherthan
thoseoccupyingthe foreground of the classics come to be recognizedas
integralto understanding thehistoryofsociologicalthought.It has main-
tained, furthermore, that to appreciate how the conceptualfabricof
sociologyinitiallyacquiredcertainof its basic properties,it is instructive
to investigatethe intellectualconsequencesof the interdisciplinary dis-
putesthataccompaniedtheestablishment of sociologyas an independent
academic discipline and, in so doing, to examine the conceptual
frameworkof thosefieldsfromwhich sociologistsof earliergenerations
wereseekingto differentiate theirown discipline.Applyingthesesugges-
tions,thisstudyhas foundthattheconceptofhabitwas longa stapleitem
in the idiom of Westernsocial thinkers;that it served as a ramifying
backgroundforcein the workof bothDurkheimand Weber,exertinga
decisiveeffecteven as theycame to termswiththe centralsociological
issues posed in theirwritings;but that,duringthe earlydecades of the
20thcentury,thetermwas intentionally expungedfromthevocabularyof
sociologyas Americansociologistsattemptedto establishtheautonomyof
theirdisciplineby severingits ties with the fieldof psychology,where
(esp. in connectionwiththe growthof behavioralism)a restricted notion
of habit had come into very widespread usage. As strugglesgo, this
particularconfrontation withpsychology was one thatendedquicklyand
was soonforgotten-though forgotten at thesame timethatit leftperma-
nenteffectson the innerconceptualstructureof sociologicalthought.
1077
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The Matter of Habit

Author(s): Charles Camic

This articleis a historicalinvestigationof the conceptof habit in

? 1986 by The Universityof Chicago. All rightsreserved.

AJS Volume 91 Number5 (March 1986): 1039-87 1039

currently suffusessociological"argumentsat everytheoreticallevel and

(see Gunnell1978; Skinner1969; Stocking1968),and historiansofsociol-

has yet to be sufficiently

2 Severalpointsof clarificationare perhapsin orderhere.First,the definition just

than place primaryemphasishereon thisclassification accordingto the

tic, and other habits, an implicitclaim for the preponderanceof the

nies 1909, pp. 32-33); and that,howevermuch habitualactionmay be

even cerebralGermanAufkldrer such as Kant insistedon givinghabitits

Thomson1968,pp. 37-53; Young 1970).This effectcame aboutas physi-

habitwithreflexactionand a "narrowingof the sphereof influenceof a

HABIT IN CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY

pointsin the evolutionaryprocess. Primitivepeoples, in his judgment,

politicalinstitutionsand all mannerof unscientific ideas thatendurebe-

theDurkheimianscholarshiphas sacrificedabove all else, therefore, is a

toryrules;and (d) autonomy,or reflective consciousnessconcerningeth-

5 Despite thisbelief,it was Durkheim'sjudgmentthateven personsin professionaland

obligatoryand reflective featuresof morallifethatDurkheim'swritings

have in [nonwork]contextsas simple persons actingby routine,who neitherthinknor

structure of sociologicalthoughthas been shaped throughtheapparently

to do in studyingthose phenomenathat possessedthe obligatorymoral

1922a, p. 988), Weber's Eingestelltheithas been rendered"attitude,""attitude-set,"or

If these semanticcomplicationsare kept in mind,Weber's views on

(1975, pp. 231-33, 239)-habit has been leftout oftheaccounting.This

traditionalism is amongthecentralconceptsused in thesestudies.To see

developmentof systematicreligiousactivityand retaineda lifeof their

cies have oftenderivedreal or ideal benefits fromtraditionalistic arrange-

in themodernworlddependsless on simplytradingone set of beliefsfor

a securepositionwithinthe universitiesalongsidethe olderbranchesof

scientist studying human activity, as "incomprehensivestatistical

about institutionalcontextare necessary.In the post-Civil War era,

habitsare "nothingbut concatenateddischargesin thenerve-centers, due

80; Samuelson1981). Nor wereWatsonand his confederates reluctantto

thesethinkerswidelyand frequently predicatedtheiranalysesof social

8 Mead's "social behaviorism,"

187);butbythispointsucha sacrificeappearedpreferable to remaining in

below him"(1918, p. 789). Increasinglycriticalofthewholeidea ofhabit

9 Like manya naturalscientistwhohas practicedunderoneparadigmand can never

"exclud[ingthe] subjectiveaspect" of humanconduct,Parsonswas led,

Parsons, postulatesthat all action exhibitsa "commonstructure":that

If we take a largerhistoricalperspectiveon the matterof habit than

thatsomeactorsmayderivereal or ideal advantagesbecause otheractors

Social Action:to portrayall social actionas possessinga commonstruc-

3-81 in Handbook of Personality Theory and Research, edited by Edgar F. Bor-

. (1887a) 1975. "Review of M. Guyau, L'irrligion de l'avenir, etude de

Rousseau: Forerunnersof Sociology. Translated by Ralph Manheim. Ann Arbor:

187-211 in Behaviorism: A Battle Line, edited by William P. King. Nashville,

James,William (1890) 1950. The Principles ofPsychology,vol. 1. New York: Dover.

1972. "The Institutionalizationof American Sociology." Pp. 187-251 in The

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. (1755) 1964. Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of

Wallwork,Ernest.1972. Durkheim:Moralityand Milieu. Cambridge,Mass.: Har-

. (1910a) 1978. "AnticriticalLast Word on 'The Spiritof Capitalism.' " Trans-

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