G.R. No.
140944, April 30, 2008
RAFAEL ARSENIO S. DIZON, in his capacity as the Judicial Administrator of
the Estate of the deceased JOSE P. FERNANDEZ, Petitioner,
-versus-
COURT OF TAX APPEALS and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
Respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Decision[2] dated April 30, 1999 which affirmed the Decision[3] of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA) dated June 17, 1997.[4]
The Facts
On November 7, 1987, Jose P. Fernandez (Jose) died. Thereafter, a petition for the
probate of his will[5] was filed with Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Manila(probate court).[6] The probate court then appointed retired Supreme Court
Justice Arsenio P. Dizon (Justice Dizon) and petitioner, Atty. Rafael Arsenio P. Dizon
(petitioner) as Special and Assistant Special Administrator, respectively, of the Estate
of Jose (Estate). In a letter[7] dated October 13, 1988, Justice Dizon informed
respondent Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of the special
proceedings for the Estate.
Petitioner alleged that several requests for extension of the period to file the required
estate tax return were granted by the BIR since the assets of the estate, as well as the
claims against it, had yet to be collated, determined and identified. Thus, in a
letter[8] dated March 14, 1990, Justice Dizon authorized Atty. Jesus M. Gonzales (Atty.
Gonzales) to sign and file on behalf of the Estate the required estate tax return and to
represent the same in securing a Certificate of Tax Clearance. Eventually, on April 17,
1990, Atty. Gonzales wrote a letter[9] addressed to the BIR Regional Director for San
Pablo City and filed the estate tax return[10] with the same BIR Regional Office, showing
therein a NIL estate tax liability, computed as follows:
COMPUTATION OF TAX
Conjugal Real Property (Sch. 1) P10,855,020.00
Conjugal Personal Property (Sch.2) 3,460,591.34
Taxable Transfer (Sch. 3)
Gross Conjugal Estate 14,315,611.34
Less: Deductions (Sch. 4) 187,822,576.06
Net Conjugal Estate NIL
Less: Share of Surviving Spouse NIL .
Net Share in Conjugal Estate NIL
xxx
Net Taxable Estate NIL .
Estate Tax Due NIL .[11]
On April 27, 1990, BIR Regional Director for San Pablo City, Osmundo G.
Umali issued Certification Nos. 2052[12] and 2053[13] stating that the taxes due on the
transfer of real and personal properties[14] of Jose had been fully paid and said
properties may be transferred to his heirs. Sometime in August 1990, Justice Dizon
passed away. Thus, on October 22, 1990, the probate court appointed petitioner as the
administrator of the Estate.[15]
Petitioner requested the probate court's authority to sell several properties
forming part of the Estate, for the purpose of paying its creditors, namely: Equitable
Banking Corporation (P19,756,428.31), Banque de L'Indochine et. de Suez
(US$4,828,905.90 as of January 31, 1988), Manila Banking Corporation
(P84,199,160.46 as of February 28, 1989) and State Investment House, Inc.
(P6,280,006.21). Petitioner manifested that Manila Bank, a major creditor of the Estate
was not included, as it did not file a claim with the probate court since it had security
over several real estate properties forming part of the Estate.[16]
However, on November 26, 1991, the Assistant Commissioner for Collection
of the BIR, Themistocles Montalban, issued Estate Tax Assessment Notice No. FAS-
E-87-91-003269,[17] demanding the payment of P66,973,985.40 as deficiency estate
tax, itemized as follows:
Deficiency Estate Tax- 1987
Estate tax P31,868,414.48
25% surcharge- late filing 7,967,103.62
late payment 7,967,103.62
 Interest 19,121,048.68 3. Pleading entitled "Compliance"
Compromise-non filing 25,000.00 filed with the probate Court
non payment 25,000.00 submitting the final inventory
no notice of death 15.00 of all the properties of the
no CPA Certificate 300.00 deceased (p. 106, BIR records); "C"

Total amount due & collectible P66,973,985.40[18] 4. Attachment to Exh. "C" which
is the detailed and complete
listing of the properties of
In his letter[19] dated December 12, 1991, Atty. Gonzales moved for the reconsideration the deceased (pp. 89-105, BIR rec.); "C-1" to "C-17"
of the said estate tax assessment. However, in her letter[20] dated April 12, 1994, the
BIR Commissioner denied the request and reiterated that the estate is liable for the 5. Claims against the estate filed
payment of P66,973,985.40 as deficiency estate tax. On May 3, 1994, petitioner by Equitable Banking Corp. with
received the letter of denial. On June 2, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for the probate Court in the amount
review[21] before respondent CTA. Trial on the merits ensued. of P19,756,428.31 as of March 31,
1988, together with the Annexes
to the claim (pp. 64-88, BIR records); "D" to "D-24"
As found by the CTA, the respective parties presented the following pieces of evidence,
to wit: 6. Claim filed by Banque de L'
Indochine et de Suez with the
In the hearings conducted, petitioner did not present testimonial probate Court in the amount of
evidence but merely documentary evidence consisting of the US $4,828,905.90 as of January 31,
following: 1988 (pp. 262-265, BIR records); "E" to "E-3"

Nature of Document (sic) Exhibits 7. Claim of the Manila Banking

Corporation (MBC) which as of
1. Letter dated October 13, 1988 November 7, 1987 amounts to
from Arsenio P. Dizon addressed P65,158,023.54, but recomputed
to the Commissioner of Internal as of February 28, 1989 at a
Revenue informing the latter of total amount of P84,199,160.46;
the special proceedings for the together with the demand letter
settlement of the estate (p. 126, from MBC's lawyer (pp. 194-197,
BIR records); "A" BIR records); "F" to "F-3"

2. Petition for the probate of the 8. Demand letter of Manila Banking

will and issuance of letter of Corporation prepared by Asedillo,
administration filed with the Ramos and Associates Law Offices
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of addressed to Fernandez Hermanos,
Manila, docketed as Sp. Proc. Inc., represented by Jose P.
No. 87-42980 (pp. 107-108, BIR Fernandez, as mortgagors, in the
records); "B" & "B-1 total amount of P240,479,693.17
as of February 28, 1989
(pp. 186-187, BIR records); "G" & "G-1"
9. Claim of State Investment
House, Inc. filed with the
RTC, Branch VII of Manila,
docketed as Civil Case No.
86-38599 entitled "State
Investment House, Inc.,
Plaintiff, versus Maritime
Company Overseas, Inc. and/or
Jose P. Fernandez, Defendants,"
(pp. 200-215, BIR records); "H" to "H-16"
10. Letter dated March 14, 1990
of Arsenio P. Dizon addressed
to Atty. Jesus M. Gonzales,
(p. 184, BIR records); "I"
11. Letter dated April 17, 1990
from J.M. Gonzales addressed
to the Regional Director of
BIR in San Pablo City
(p. 183, BIR records); "J"
12. Estate Tax Return filed by
the estate of the late Jose P.
Fernandez through its authorized
representative, Atty. Jesus M.
Gonzales, for Arsenio P. Dizon,
with attachments (pp. 177-182,
BIR records); "K" to "K-5"
13. Certified true copy of the
Letter of Administration
issued by RTC Manila, Branch
51, in Sp. Proc. No. 87-42980
appointing Atty. Rafael S.
Dizon as Judicial Administrator
of the estate of Jose P.
Fernandez; (p. 102, CTA records)
and "L"
14. Certification of Payment of
estate taxes Nos. 2052 and
2053, both dated April 27, 1990,
issued by the Office of the
Regional Director, Revenue
Region No. 4-C, San Pablo
City, with attachments
(pp. 103-104, CTA records.). "M" to "M-5"
Respondent's [BIR] counsel presented on June 26, 1995 one
witness in the person of Alberto Enriquez, who was one of the
revenue examiners who conducted the investigation on the
estate tax case of the late Jose P. Fernandez. In the course of
the direct examination of the witness, he identified the
following:
Documents/
Signatures BIR Record
1. Estate Tax Return prepared by
the BIR; p. 138
2. Signatures of Ma. Anabella
Abuloc and Alberto Enriquez,
Jr. appearing at the lower
Portion of Exh. "1"; -do-
3. Memorandum for the Commissioner,
dated July 19, 1991, prepared by
revenue examiners, Ma. Anabella A.
Abuloc, Alberto S. Enriquez and
Raymund S. Gallardo; Reviewed by
Maximino V. Tagle pp. 143-144
4. Signature of Alberto S.
Enriquez appearing at the
lower portion on p. 2 of Exh. "2"; -do-
5. Signature of Ma. Anabella A.
Abuloc appearing at the
lower portion on p. 2 of Exh. "2"; -do-
 On June 17, 1997, the CTA denied the said petition for review. Citing this Court's ruling
6. Signature of Raymund S. in Vda. de Oate v. Court of Appeals,[23] the CTA opined that the aforementioned pieces
Gallardo appearing at the of evidence introduced by the BIR were admissible in evidence. The CTA ratiocinated:
Lower portion on p. 2 of Exh. "2"; -do- Although the above-mentioned documents were not formally offered
as evidence for respondent, considering that respondent has been
7. Signature of Maximino V. declared to have waived the presentation thereof during the hearing
Tagle also appearing on on March 20, 1996, still they could be considered as evidence for
p. 2 of Exh. "2"; -do- respondent since they were properly identified during the
presentation of respondent's witness, whose testimony was duly
8. Summary of revenue recorded as part of the records of this case. Besides, the documents
Enforcement Officers Audit marked as respondent's exhibits formed part of the BIR records of
Report, dated July 19, 1991; p. 139 the case.[24]

9. Signature of Alberto
Enriquez at the lower
portion of Exh. "3"; -do- Nevertheless, the CTA did not fully adopt the assessment made by the BIR and it came
up with its own computation of the deficiency estate tax, to wit:
10. Signature of Ma. Anabella A.
Abuloc at the lower Conjugal Real Property P 5,062,016.00
portion of Exh. "3"; -do- Conjugal Personal Prop. 33,021,999.93
Gross Conjugal Estate 38,084,015.93
11. Signature of Raymond S. Less: Deductions 26,250,000.00
Gallardo at the lower Net Conjugal Estate P 11,834,015.93
portion of Exh. "3"; -do- Less: Share of Surviving Spouse 5,917,007.96
Net Share in Conjugal Estate P 5,917,007.96
12. Signature of Maximino Add: Capital/Paraphernal
V. Tagle at the lower Properties P44,652,813.66
portion of Exh. "3"; -do- Less: Capital/Paraphernal
Deductions 44,652,813.66
13. Demand letter (FAS-E-87-91-00), Net Taxable Estate P 50,569,821.62
signed by the Asst. Commissioner ============
for Collection for the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue, demanding Estate Tax Due P 29,935,342.97
payment of the amount of Add: 25% Surcharge for Late Filing 7,483,835.74
P66,973,985.40; and p. 169 Add: Penalties for-No notice of death 15.00
No CPA certificate 300.00
14. Assessment Notice FAS-E-87-91-00 pp. 169-170[22] Total deficiency estate tax P 37,419,493.71
=============

The CTA's Ruling exclusive of 20% interest from due date of its payment until full
payment thereof
[Sec. 283 (b), Tax Code of 1987].[25]

Thus, the CTA disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, viewed from all the foregoing, the Court finds the
petition unmeritorious and denies the same. Petitioner and/or the
heirs of Jose P. Fernandez are hereby ordered to pay to respondent
the amount of P37,419,493.71 plus 20% interest from the due date
of its payment until full payment thereof as estate tax liability of the
estate of Jose P. Fernandez who died on November 7, 1987.
SO ORDERED.[26]
Aggrieved, petitioner, on March 2, 1998, went to the CA via a petition for review.[27]
The CA's Ruling
On April 30, 1999, the CA affirmed the CTA's ruling. Adopting in full the CTA's findings,
the CA ruled that the petitioner's act of filing an estate tax return with the BIR and the
issuance of BIR Certification Nos. 2052 and 2053 did not deprive the BIR
Commissioner of her authority to re-examine or re-assess the said return filed on behalf
of the Estate.[28]
On May 31, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[29] which the CA denied
in its Resolution[30] dated November 3, 1999.
Hence, the instant Petition raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not the admission of evidence which were not
formally offered by the respondent BIR by the Court of Tax
Appeals which was subsequently upheld by the Court of
Appeals is contrary to the Rules of Court and rulings of this
Honorable Court;
2. Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals
erred in recognizing/considering the estate tax return prepared
and filed by respondent BIR knowing that the probate court
appointed administrator of the estate of Jose P. Fernandez had
previously filed one as in fact, BIR Certification Clearance Nos.
2052 and 2053 had been issued in the estate's favor;
3. Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals
erred in disallowing the valid and enforceable claims of creditors
against the estate, as lawful deductions despite clear and
convincing evidence thereof; and
4. Whether or not the Court of Tax Appeals and the Court of Appeals
erred in validating erroneous double imputation of values on the
very same estate properties in the estate tax return it prepared
and filed which effectively bloated the estate's assets.[31]
The petitioner claims that in as much as the valid claims of creditors against the Estate
are in excess of the gross estate, no estate tax was due; that the lack of a formal offer
of evidence is fatal to BIR's cause; that the doctrine laid down in Vda. de Oate has
already been abandoned in a long line of cases in which the Court held that evidence
not formally offered is without any weight or value; that Section 34 of Rule 132 of the
Rules on Evidence requiring a formal offer of evidence is mandatory in character; that,
while BIR's witness Alberto Enriquez (Alberto) in his testimony before the CTA
identified the pieces of evidence aforementioned such that the same were marked,
BIR's failure to formally offer said pieces of evidence and depriving petitioner the
opportunity to cross-examine Alberto, render the same inadmissible in evidence; that
assuming arguendo that the ruling in Vda. de Oate is still applicable, BIR failed to
comply with the doctrine's requisites because the documents herein remained simply
part of the BIR records and were not duly incorporated in the court records; that the
BIR failed to consider that although the actual payments made to the Estate creditors
were lower than their respective claims, such were compromise agreements reached
long after the Estate's liability had been settled by the filing of its estate tax return and
the issuance of BIR Certification Nos. 2052 and 2053; and that the reckoning date of
the claims against the Estate and the settlement of the estate tax due should be at the
time the estate tax return was filed by the judicial administrator and the issuance of
said BIR Certifications and not at the time the aforementioned Compromise
Agreements were entered into with the Estate's creditors.[32]
On the other hand, respondent counters that the documents, being part of the records
of the case and duly identified in a duly recorded testimony are considered evidence
even if the same were not formally offered; that the filing of the estate tax return by the
Estate and the issuance of BIR Certification Nos. 2052 and 2053 did not deprive the
BIR of its authority to examine the return and assess the estate tax; and that the factual
findings of the CTA as affirmed by the CA may no longer be reviewed by this Court via
a petition for review.[33]
The Issues
There are two ultimate issues which require resolution in this case:
First. Whether or not the CTA and the CA gravely erred in allowing the admission of
the pieces of evidence which were not formally offered by the BIR; and
Second. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the CTA in the latter's determination
of the deficiency estate tax imposed against the Estate.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is impressed with merit.
Under Section 8 of RA 1125, the CTA is categorically described as a court of record.
As cases filed before it are litigated de novo, party-litigants shall prove every minute
aspect of their cases. Indubitably, no evidentiary value can be given the pieces of
evidence submitted by the BIR, as the rules on documentary evidence require that
these documents must be formally offered before the CTA.[34] Pertinent is Section 34,
Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence which reads:
SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.
The CTA and the CA rely solely on the case of Vda. de Oate, which reiterated
this Court's previous rulings in People v. Napat-a[35] and People v. Mate[36] on the
admission and consideration of exhibits which were not formally offered during the
trial. Although in a long line of cases many of which were decided after Vda. de Oate,
we held that courts cannot consider evidence which has not been formally
offered,[37] nevertheless, petitioner cannot validly assume that the doctrine laid down
in Vda. de Oate has already been abandoned. Recently, in Ramos v. Dizon,[38] this
Court, applying the said doctrine, ruled that the trial court judge therein committed no
error when he admitted and considered the respondents' exhibits in the resolution of
the case, notwithstanding the fact that the same
were not formally offered. Likewise, in Far East Bank & Trust Company v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[39] the Court made reference to said doctrine in
resolving the issues therein. Indubitably, the doctrine laid down in Vda. De Oate still
subsists in this jurisdiction. In Vda. de Oate, we held that:
From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for evidence to be
considered, the same must be formally offered. Corollarily, the mere
fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit
does not mean that it has already been offered as part of the
evidence of a party. In Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles [186 SCRA
385], we had the occasion to make a distinction between
identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an
exhibit. We said that the first is done in the course of the trial and is
accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit while the
second is done only when the party rests its case and not before. A
party, therefore, may opt to formally offer his evidence if he believes
that it will advance his cause or not to do so at all. In the event he
chooses to do the latter, the trial court is not authorized by the Rules
to consider the same.
However, in People v. Napat-a [179 SCRA 403] citing People v.
Mate [103 SCRA 484], we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed
evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by
the trial court provided the following requirements are present,
viz.: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony
duly recorded and, second, the same must have been
incorporated in the records of the case.[40]
From the foregoing declaration, however, it is clear that Vda. de Oate is
merely an exception to the general rule. Being an exception, it may be applied only
when there is strict compliance with the requisites mentioned therein; otherwise, the
general rule in Section 34 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court should prevail.
In this case, we find that these requirements have not been satisfied. The assailed
pieces of evidence were presented and marked during the trial particularly when
Alberto took the witness stand. Alberto identified these pieces of evidence in his direct
testimony.[41] He was also subjected to cross-examination and re-cross examination by
petitioner.[42]But Albertos account and the exchanges between Alberto and petitioner
did not sufficiently describe the contents of the said pieces of evidence presented by
the BIR. In fact, petitioner sought that the lead examiner, one Ma. Anabella A.
Abuloc, be summoned to testify, inasmuch as Alberto was incompetent to answer
questions relative to the working papers.[43] The lead examiner never testified.
Moreover, while Alberto's testimony identifying the BIR's evidence was duly recorded,
the BIR documents themselves were not incorporated in the records of the case.
A common fact threads through Vda. de Oate and Ramos that does not exist at all in
the instant case. In the aforementioned cases, the exhibits were marked at the pre-trial
proceedings to warrant the pronouncement that the same were duly incorporated in
the records of the case. Thus, we held in Ramos:
In this case, we find and so rule that these requirements have been
satisfied. The exhibits in question were presented and marked
during the pre-trial of the case thus, they have been
incorporated into the records. Further, Elpidio himself explained
the contents of these exhibits when he was interrogated by
respondents' counsel...
xxxx
But what further defeats petitioner's cause on this issue is that
respondents' exhibits were marked and admitted during the pre-trial
stage as shown by the Pre-Trial Order quoted earlier.[44]
While the CTA is not governed strictly by technical rules of evidence,[45] as rules of
procedure are not ends in themselves and are primarily intended as tools in the
administration of justice, the presentation of the BIR's evidence is not a mere
procedural technicality which may be disregarded considering that it is the only means
by which the CTA may ascertain and verify the truth of BIR's claims against the
Estate.[46] The BIR's failure to formally offer these pieces of evidence, despite CTA's
directives, is fatal to its cause.[47] Such failure is aggravated by the fact that not even a
single reason was advanced by the BIR to justify such fatal omission. This, we take
against the BIR.
Per the records of this case, the BIR was directed to present its evidence [48] in the
hearing of February 21, 1996, but BIR's counsel failed to appear.[49] The CTA denied
petitioner's motion to consider BIR's presentation of evidence as waived, with a warning
to BIR that such presentation would be considered waived if BIR's evidence would not
be presented at the next hearing. Again, in the hearing of March 20, 1996, BIR's
counsel failed to appear.[50] Thus, in its Resolution[51] dated March 21, 1996, the CTA
considered the BIR to have waived presentation of its evidence. In the same
Resolution, the parties were directed to file their respective memorandum. Petitioner
complied but BIR failed to do so.[52] In all of these proceedings, BIR was duly notified.
Hence, in this case, we are constrained to apply our ruling in Heirs of Pedro Pasag v.
Parocha:[53]
A formal offer is necessary because judges are mandated
to rest their findings of facts and their judgment only and strictly upon
the evidence offered by the parties at the trial. Its function is to enable
the trial judge to know the purpose or purposes for which the
proponent is presenting the evidence. On the other hand, this allows
opposing parties to examine the evidence and object to its
admissibility. Moreover, it facilitates review as the appellate court will
not be required to review documents not previously scrutinized by
the trial court.
Strict adherence to the said rule is not a trivial matter. The Court
in Constantino v. Court of Appeals ruled that the formal offer of
one's evidence is deemed waived after failing to submit it within
a considerable period of time. It explained that the court cannot
admit an offer of evidence made after a lapse of three (3) months
because to do so would "condone an inexcusable laxity if not
non-compliance with a court order which, in effect, would
encourage needless delays and derail the speedy
administration of justice."
Applying the aforementioned principle in this case, we find that the
trial court had reasonable ground to consider that petitioners had
waived their right to make a formal offer of documentary or object
evidence. Despite several extensions of time to make their formal
offer, petitioners failed to comply with their commitment and allowed
almost five months to lapse before finally submitting it. Petitioners'
failure to comply with the rule on admissibility of evidence is
anathema to the efficient, effective, and expeditious
dispensation of justice.
Having disposed of the foregoing procedural issue, we proceed to discuss the merits
of the case.
Ordinarily, the CTA's findings, as affirmed by the CA, are entitled to the
highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is shown that the lower
courts committed gross error in the appreciation of facts.[54] In this case, however, we
find the decision of the CA affirming that of the CTA tainted with palpable error.

It is admitted that the claims of the Estate's aforementioned creditors have been
condoned. As a mode of extinguishing an obligation,[55] condonation or remission of
debt[56] is defined as:
an act of liberality, by virtue of which, without receiving any
equivalent, the creditor renounces the enforcement of the obligation,
which is extinguished in its entirety or in that part or aspect of the
same to which the remission refers. It is an essential characteristic
of remission that it be gratuitous, that there is no equivalent received
for the benefit given; once such equivalent exists, the nature of the
act changes. It may become dation in payment when the creditor
receives a thing different from that stipulated; or novation, when the
object or principal conditions of the obligation should be changed; or
compromise, when the matter renounced is in litigation or dispute
and in exchange of some concession which the creditor receives.[57]
Verily, the second issue in this case involves the construction of Section 79 [58] of the
National Internal Revenue Code[59] (Tax Code) which provides for the allowable
deductions from the gross estate of the decedent. The specific question is whether the
actual claims of the aforementioned creditors may be fully allowed as deductions from
the gross estate of Jose despite the fact that the said claims were reduced or condoned
through compromise agreements entered into by the Estate with its creditors.
Claims against the estate, as allowable deductions from the gross estate under Section
79 of the Tax Code, are basically a reproduction of the deductions allowed under
Section 89 (a) (1) (C) and (E) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 (CA 466), otherwise
known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1939, and which was the first
codification of Philippine tax laws. Philippine tax laws were, in turn, based on the
federal tax laws of the United States. Thus, pursuant to established rules of statutory
construction, the decisions of American courts construing the federal tax code are
entitled to great weight in the interpretation of our own tax laws.[60]
It is noteworthy that even in the United States, there is some dispute as to whether the
deductible amount for a claim against the estate is fixed as of the decedent's death
which is the general rule, or the same should be adjusted to reflect post-death
developments, such as where a settlement between the parties results in the reduction
of the amount actually paid.[61] On one hand, the U.S. court ruled that the appropriate
deduction is the value that the claim had at the date of the decedent's death. [62] Also,
as held in Propstra v. U.S.,[63] where a lien claimed against the estate was certain and
enforceable on the date of the decedent's death, the fact that the claimant subsequently
settled for lesser amount did not preclude the estate from deducting the entire amount
of the claim for estate tax purposes. These pronouncements essentially confirm the
general principle that post-death developments are not material in determining the
amount of the deduction.
On the other hand, the Internal Revenue Service (Service) opines that post-
death settlement should be taken into consideration and the claim should be allowed
as a deduction only to the extent of the amount actually paid.[64] Recognizing the
dispute, the Service released Proposed Regulations in 2007 mandating that the
deduction would be limited to the actual amount paid.[65]
In announcing its agreement with Propstra,[66] the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of
Appeals held:
We are persuaded that the Ninth Circuit's
decision...in Propstra correctly apply the Ithaca Trust date-of-death
valuation principle to enforceable claims against the estate. As we
interpret Ithaca Trust, when the Supreme Court announced the date-
of-death valuation principle, it was making a judgment about the
nature of the federal estate tax specifically, that it is a tax imposed
on the act of transferring property by will or intestacy and, because
the act on which the tax is levied occurs at a discrete time, i.e., the
instance of death, the net value of the property transferred should be
ascertained, as nearly as possible, as of that time. This analysis
supports broad application of the date-of-death valuation rule.[67]
We express our agreement with the date-of-death valuation rule, made pursuant to the
ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in Ithaca Trust Co. v. United States.[68] First. There is
no law, nor do we discern any legislative intent in our tax laws, which disregards the
date-of-death valuation principle and particularly provides that post-death
developments must be considered in determining the net value of the estate. It bears
emphasis that tax burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed, beyond
what the statute expressly and clearly imports, tax statutes being construed strictissimi
juris against the government.[69] Any doubt on whether a person, article or activity is
taxable is generally resolved against taxation.[70] Second. Such construction finds
relevance and consistency in our Rules on Special Proceedings wherein the term
"claims" required to be presented against a decedent's estate is generally construed to
mean debts or demands of a pecuniary nature which could have been enforced against
the deceased in his lifetime, or liability contracted by the deceased before his
death.[71] Therefore, the claims existing at the time of death are significant to, and
should be made the basis of, the determination of allowable deductions.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Decision

dated April 30, 1999 and the Resolution dated November 3, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 46947 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Bureau of
Internal Revenue's deficiency estate tax assessment against the Estate of Jose P.
Fernandez is hereby NULLIFIED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 123206. March 22, 2000
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner,
-versus-
COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS and JOSEFINA P. PAJONAR,
as Administratrix of the Estate of Pedro P. Pajonar, respondents.
RESOLUTION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.: Supr-ema
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the December 21, 1995 Decision[1]of
the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. Sp. No. 34399 affirming the June 7, 1994 Resolution
of the Court of Tax Appeals in CTA Case No. 4381 granting private respondent
Josefina P. Pajonar, as administratrix of the estate of Pedro P. Pajonar, a tax refund in
the amount of P76,502.42, representing erroneously paid estate taxes for the year
1988.
Pedro Pajonar, a member of the Philippine Scout, Bataan Contingent, during the
second World War, was a part of the infamous Death March by reason of which he
suffered shock and became insane. His sister Josefina Pajonar became the guardian
over his person, while his property was placed under the guardianship of the Philippine
National Bank (PNB) by the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 31, in
Special Proceedings No. 1254. He died on January 10, 1988. He was survived by his
two brothers Isidro P. Pajonar and Gregorio Pajonar, his sister Josefina Pajonar,
nephews Concordio Jandog and Mario Jandog and niece Conchita Jandog.
On May 11, 1988, the PNB filed an accounting of the decedent's property under
guardianship valued at P3,037,672.09 in Special Proceedings No. 1254. However, the
PNB did not file an estate tax return, instead it advised Pedro Pajonar's heirs to execute
an extrajudicial settlement and to pay the taxes on his estate. On April 5, 1988,
pursuant to the assessment by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR), the estate of
Pedro Pajonar paid taxes in the amount of P2,557.
On May 19, 1988, Josefina Pajonar filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City for the issuance in her favor of letters of administration of the estate
of her brother. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2399. On July 18,
1988, the trial court appointed Josefina Pajonar as the regular administratrix of Pedro
Pajonar's estate.
On December 19, 1988, pursuant to a second assessment by the BIR for deficiency
estate tax, the estate of Pedro Pajonar paid estate tax in the amount of P1,527,790.98.
Josefina Pajonar, in her capacity as administratrix and heir of Pedro Pajonar's estate,
filed a protest on January 11, 1989 with the BIR praying that the estate tax payment in
the amount of P1,527,790.98, or at least some portion of it, be returned to the
heirs.[3] Jur-is
However, on August 15, 1989, without waiting for her protest to be resolved by the BIR,
Josefina Pajonar filed a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), praying
for the refund of P1,527,790.98, or in the alternative, P840,202.06, as erroneously paid
estate tax.[4] The case was docketed as CTA Case No. 4381.
On May 6, 1993, the CTA ordered the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to refund
Josefina Pajonar the amount of P252,585.59, representing erroneously paid estate tax
for the year 1988.[5]
Among the deductions from the gross estate allowed by the CTA were the amounts of
P60,753 representing the notarial fee for the Extrajudicial Settlement and the amount
of P50,000 as the attorney's fees in Special Proceedings No. 1254 for
guardianship.[6]Juri-ssc
On June 15, 1993, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue filed a motion for
reconsideration[7] of the CTA's May 6, 1993 decision asserting, among others, that the
notarial fee for the Extrajudicial Settlement and the attorney's fees in the guardianship
proceedings are not deductible expenses.
On June 7, 1994, the CTA issued the assailed Resolution[8] ordering the Commissioner
of Internal Revenue to refund Josefina Pajonar, as administratrix of the estate of Pedro
Pajonar, the amount of P76,502.42 representing erroneously paid estate tax for the
year 1988. Also, the CTA upheld the validity of the deduction of the notarial fee for the
Extrajudicial Settlement and the attorney's fees in the guardianship proceedings.
On July 5, 1994, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue filed with the Court of Appeals
a petition for review of the CTA's May 6, 1993 Decision and its June 7, 1994 Resolution,
questioning the validity of the abovementioned deductions. On December 21, 1995,
the Court of Appeals denied the Commissioner's petition.[9]
Hence, the present appeal by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
The sole issue in this case involves the construction of section 79 [10] of the National
Internal Revenue Code[11] (Tax Code) which provides for the allowable deductions from
the gross estate of the decedent. More particularly, the question is whether the notarial
fee paid for the extrajudicial settlement in the amount of P60,753 and the attorney's
fees in the guardianship proceedings in the amount of P50,000 may be allowed as
deductions from the gross estate of decedent in order to arrive at the value of the net
estate.
We answer this question in the affirmative, thereby upholding the decisions of the
appellate courts. J-jlex
In its May 6, 1993 Decision, the Court of Tax Appeals ruled thus:
Respondent maintains that only judicial expenses of the
testamentary or intestate proceedings are allowed as a deduction to
the gross estate. The amount of P60,753.00 is quite extraordinary
for a mere notarial fee.
This Court adopts the view under American jurisprudence that
expenses incurred in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate should
be allowed as a deduction from the gross estate. "There is no
requirement of formal administration. It is sufficient that the expense
be a necessary contribution toward the settlement of the case." [
34 Am. Jur. 2d, p.765; Nolledo, Bar Reviewer in Taxation,
10th Ed. (1990), p. 481 ]
xxx.....xxx.....xxx
The attorney's fees of P50,000.00, which were already incurred but
not yet paid, refers to the guardianship proceeding filed by PNB, as
guardian over the ward of Pedro Pajonar, docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 1254 in the RTC (Branch XXXI) of Dumaguete City.
xxx
xxx.....xxx.....xxx
The guardianship proceeding had been terminated upon delivery of
the residuary estate to the heirs entitled thereto. Thereafter, PNB
was discharged of any further responsibility.
Attorney's fees in order to be deductible from the gross estate must
be essential to the collection of assets, payment of debts or the
distribution of the property to the persons entitled to it. The services
for which the fees are charged must relate to the proper settlement
of the estate. [ 34 Am. Jur. 2d 767. ] In this case, the guardianship
proceeding was necessary for the distribution of the property of the
late Pedro Pajonar to his rightful heirs. Sc-juris
xxx.....xxx.....xxx
PNB was appointed as guardian over the assets of the late Pedro
Pajonar, who, even at the time of his death, was incompetent by
reason of insanity. The expenses incurred in the guardianship
proceeding was but a necessary expense in the settlement of the
decedent's estate. Therefore, the attorney's fee incurred in the
guardianship proceedings amounting to P50,000.00 is a reasonable
and necessary business expense deductible from the gross estate
of the decedent.[12]
Upon a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, the
Court of Tax Appeals modified its previous ruling by reducing the refundable amount
to P76,502.43 since it found that a deficiency interest should be imposed and the
compromise penalty excluded.[13] However, the tax court upheld its previous ruling
regarding the legality of the deductions -
It is significant to note that the inclusion of the estate tax law in the
codification of all our national internal revenue laws with the
enactment of the National Internal Revenue Code in 1939 were
copied from the Federal Law of the United States. [UMALI, Reviewer
in Taxation (1985), p. 285 ] The 1977 Tax Code, promulgated by
Presidential Decree No. 1158, effective June 3, 1977, reenacted
substantially all the provisions of the old law on estate and gift taxes,
except the sections relating to the meaning of gross estate and gift.
[ Ibid, p. 286. ] Nc-mmis
In the United States, [a]dministrative expenses, executor's
commissions and attorney's fees are considered allowable
deductions from the Gross Estate. Administrative expenses are
limited to such expenses as are actually and necessarily incurred in
the administration of a decedent's estate. [PRENTICE-HALL,
Federal Taxes Estate and Gift Taxes (1936), p. 120, 533. ]
Necessary expenses of administration are such expenses as are
entailed for the preservation and productivity of the estate and for its
management for purposes of liquidation, payment of debts and
distribution of the residue among the persons entitled
thereto. [Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Abada, 40 Phil. 124. ] They must
be incurred for the settlement of the estate as a whole. [34 Am. Jur.
 2d, p. 765. ] Thus, where there were no substantial community debts
and it was unnecessary to convert community property to cash, the
only practical purpose of administration being the payment of estate
taxes, full deduction was allowed for attorney's fees and
miscellaneous expenses charged wholly to decedent's estate. [ Ibid.,
citing Estate of Helis, 26 T .C. 143 (A). ]
Petitioner stated in her protest filed with the BIR that "upon the death
of the ward, the PNB, which was still the guardian of the estate,
(Annex 'Z' ), did not file an estate tax return; however, it advised the
heirs to execute an extrajudicial settlement, to pay taxes and to post
a bond equal to the value of the estate, for which the estate paid
P59,341.40 for the premiums. (See Annex 'K')." [p. 17, CTA record.
] Therefore, it would appear from the records of the case that the
only practical purpose of settling the estate by means of an
extrajudicial settlement pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules
of Court was for the payment of taxes and the distribution of the
estate to the heirs. A fortiori, since our estate tax laws are of
American origin, the interpretation adopted by American Courts has
some persuasive effect on the interpretation of our own estate tax
laws on the subject.
Anent the contention of respondent that the attorney's fees of
P50,000.00 incurred in the guardianship proceeding should not be
deducted from the Gross Estate, We consider the same
unmeritorious. Attorneys' and guardians' fees incurred in a trustee's
accounting of a taxable inter vivos trust attributable to the usual
issues involved in such an accounting was held to be proper
deductions because these are expenses incurred in terminating
an inter vivos trust that was includible in the decedent's estate.
(Prentice Hall, Federal Taxes on Estate and Gift, p.120, 861]
Attorney's fees are allowable deductions if incurred for the settlement
of the estate. It is noteworthy to point that PNB was appointed the
guardian over the assets of the deceased. Necessarily the assets of
the deceased formed part of his gross estate. Accordingly, all
expenses incurred in relation to the estate of the deceased will be
deductible for estate tax purposes provided these are necessary and
ordinary expenses for administration of the settlement of the
estate.[14]
In upholding the June 7, 1994 Resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals, the Court of
Appeals held that: Newmiso
2. Although the Tax Code specifies "judicial expenses of the
testamentary or intestate proceedings," there is no reason why
expenses incurred in the administration and settlement of an estate
in extrajudicial proceedings should not be allowed. However,
deduction is limited to such administration expenses as are actually
and necessarily incurred in the collection of the assets of the estate,
payment of the debts, and distribution of the remainder among those
entitled thereto. Such expenses may include executor's or
administrator's fees, attorney's fees, court fees and charges,
appraiser's fees, clerk hire, costs of preserving and distributing the
estate and storing or maintaining it, brokerage fees or commissions
for selling or disposing of the estate, and the like. Deductible
attorney's fees are those incurred by the executor or administrator in
the settlement of the estate or in defending or prosecuting claims
against or due the estate. (Estate and Gift Taxation in the
Philippines, T. P. Matic, Jr., 1981 Edition, p. 176 ).
xxx.....xxx.....xxx
It is clear then that the extrajudicial settlement was for the purpose
of payment of taxes and the distribution of the estate to the heirs.
The execution of the extrajudicial settlement necessitated the
notarization of the same. Hence the Contract of Legal Services of
March 28, 1988 entered into between respondent Josefina Pajonar
and counsel was presented in evidence for the purpose of showing
that the amount of P60,753.00 was for the notarization of the
Extrajudicial Settlement. It follows then that the notarial fee of
P60,753.00 was incurred primarily to settle the estate of the
deceased Pedro Pajonar. Said amount should then be considered
an administration expenses actually and necessarily incurred in the
collection of the assets of the estate, payment of debts and
distribution of the remainder among those entitled thereto. Thus, the
notarial fee of P60,753 incurred for the Extrajudicial Settlement
should be allowed as a deduction from the gross estate.
3. Attorney's fees, on the other hand, in order to be deductible from
the gross estate must be essential to the settlement of the
estate. Acctmis
The amount of P50,000.00 was incurred as attorney's fees in the
guardianship proceedings in Spec. Proc. No. 1254. Petitioner
contends that said amount are not expenses of the testamentary or
 intestate proceedings as the guardianship proceeding was instituted
during the lifetime of the decedent when there was yet no estate to
be settled.
Again , this contention must fail.
The guardianship proceeding in this case was necessary for the
distribution of the property of the deceased Pedro Pajonar. As
correctly pointed out by respondent CTA, the PNB was appointed
guardian over the assets of the deceased, and that necessarily the
assets of the deceased formed part of his gross estate. x x x
xxx.....xxx.....xxx
It is clear therefore that the attorney's fees incurred in the
guardianship proceeding in Spec. Proc. No. 1254 were essential to
the distribution of the property to the persons entitled thereto. Hence,
the attorney's fees incurred in the guardianship proceedings in the
amount of P50,000.00 should be allowed as a deduction from the
gross estate of the decedent.[15]
The deductions from the gross estate permitted under section 79 of the Tax Code
basically reproduced the deductions allowed under Commonwealth Act No. 466 (CA
466), otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1939,[16] and which
was the first codification of Philippine tax laws. Section 89 (a) (1) (B) of CA 466 also
provided for the deduction of the "judicial expenses of the testamentary or intestate
proceedings" for purposes of determining the value of the net estate. Philippine tax
laws were, in turn, based on the federal tax laws of the United States.[17] In accord with
established rules of statutory construction, the decisions of American courts construing
the federal tax code are entitled to great weight in the interpretation of our own tax
laws.[18] Scc-alr
decedent's estate when it appeared that such trustee was appointed for the purpose of
managing the decedent's real estate for the benefit of the testamentary heir. In another
case, the Court disallowed the premiums paid on the bond filed by the administrator as
an expense of administration since the giving of a bond is in the nature of a qualification
for the office, and not necessary in the settlement of the estate.[23] Neither may
attorney's fees incident to litigation incurred by the heirs in asserting their respective
rights be claimed as a deduction from the gross estate.[24]
Coming to the case at bar, the notarial fee paid for the extrajudicial settlement is clearly
a deductible expense since such settlement effected a distribution of Pedro Pajonar's
estate to his lawful heirs. Similarly, the attorney's fees paid to PNB for acting as the
guardian of Pedro Pajonar's property during his lifetime should also be considered as
a deductible administration expense. PNB provided a detailed accounting of
decedent's property and gave advice as to the proper settlement of the latter's estate,
acts which contributed towards the collection of decedent's assets and the subsequent
settlement of the estate.
We find that the Court of Appeals did not commit reversible error in affirming the
questioned resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals.
WHEREFORE, the December 21, 1995 Decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. The notarial fee for the extrajudicial settlement and the attorney's fees in
the guardianship proceedings are allowable deductions from the gross estate of Pedro
Pajonar.
SO ORDERED.

Judicial expenses are expenses of administration.[19] Administration expenses, as an

allowable deduction from the gross estate of the decedent for purposes of arriving at
the value of the net estate, have been construed by the federal and state courts of the
United States to include all expenses "essential to the collection of the assets, payment
of debts or the distribution of the property to the persons entitled to it."[20] In other words,
the expenses must be essential to the proper settlement of the estate. Expenditures
incurred for the individual benefit of the heirs, devisees or legatees are not
deductible.[21] This distinction has been carried over to our jurisdiction. Thus, in Lorenzo
v. Posadas[22] the Court construed the phrase "judicial expenses of the testamentary
or intestate proceedings" as not including the compensation paid to a trustee of the
G.R. No. L-36770, November 4, 1932
LUIS W. DISON, plaintiff-appellant,
-versus-
JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellant.
BUTTE, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga in favor
of the defendant Juan Posadas, Jr., Collector of Internal Revenue, in a suit filed by the
plaintiffs, Luis W. Dison, for the recovery of an inheritance tax in the sum of P2,808.73
paid under protest. The petitioner alleged in his complaint that the tax is illegal because
he received the property, which is the basis of the tax, from his father before his death
by a deed of gift inter vivos which was duly accepted and registered before the death
of his father. The defendant answered with a general denial and with a counterdemand
for the sum of P1,245.56 which it was alleged is a balance still due and unpaid on
account of said tax. The plaintiff replied to the counterdemand with a general denial.
The court a quo held that the cause of action set up in the counterdemand was not
proven and dismissed the same. Both sides appealed to this court, but the cross-
complaint and appeal of the Collector of Internal Revenue were dismissed by this court
on March 17, 1932, on motion of the Attorney-General.1awphil.net
The only evidence introduced at the trial of this cause was the proof of payment of the
tax under protest, as stated, and the deed of gift executed by Felix Dison on April 9,
1928, in favor of his sons Luis W. Dison, the plaintiff-appellant. This deed of gift
transferred twenty-two tracts of land to the donee, reserving to the donor for his life the
usufruct of three tracts. This deed was acknowledged by the donor before a notary
public on April 16, 1928. Luis W. Dison, on April 17, 1928, formally accepted said gift
by an instrument in writing which he acknowledged before a notary public on April 20,
1928.
At the trial the parties agreed to and filed the following ingenious stipulation of fact:
1. That Don Felix Dison died on April 21, 1928;
2. That Don Felix Dison, before his death, made a gift inter vivos in favor of
the plaintiff Luis W. Dison of all his property according to a deed of gift (Exhibit
D) which includes all the property of Don Felix Dizon;
3. That the plaintiff did not receive property of any kind of Don Felix Dison
upon the death of the latter;
4. That Don Luis W. Dison was the legitimate and only child of Don Felix
Dison.
It is inferred from Exhibit D that Felix Dison was a widower at the time of his death.
The theory of the plaintiff-appellant is that he received and holds the property
mentioned by a consummated gift and that Act No. 2601 (Chapter 40 of the
Administrative Code) being the inheritance tax statute, does not tax gifts. The provision
directly here involved is section 1540 of the Administrative Code which reads as
follows:
Additions of Gifts and Advances. — After the aforementioned deductions have
been made, there shall be added to the resulting amount the value of all gifts
or advances made by the predecessor to any of those who, after his death,
shall prove to be his heirs, devises, legatees, or donees mortis causa.
The question to be resolved may be stated thus: Does section 1540 of the
Administrative Code subject the plaintiff-appellant to the payment of an inheritance tax?
The appellant argues that there is no evidence in this case to support a finding that the
gift was simulated and that it was an artifice for evading the payment of the inheritance
tax, as is intimated in the decision of the court below and the brief of the Attorney-
General. We see no reason why the court may not go behind the language in which
the transaction is masked in order to ascertain its true character and purpose. In this
case the scanty facts before us may not warrant the inference that the conveyance,
acknowledged by the donor five days before his death and accepted by the donee one
day before the donor's death, was fraudulently made for the purpose of evading the
inheritance tax. But the facts, in our opinion, do warrant the inference that the transfer
was an advancement upon the inheritance which the donee, as the sole and forced
heir of the donor, would be entitled to receive upon the death of the donor.
The argument advanced by the appellant that he is not an heir of his deceased father
within the meaning of section 1540 of the Administrative Code because his father in
his lifetime had given the appellant all his property and left no property to be inherited,
is so fallacious that the urging of it here casts a suspicion upon the appellants reason
for completing the legal formalities of the transfer on the eve of the latter's death. We
do not know whether or not the father in this case left a will; in any event, this appellant
could not be deprived of his share of the inheritance because the Civil Code confers
upon him the status of a forced heir. We construe the expression in section 1540 "any
of those who, after his death, shall prove to be his heirs", to include those who, by our
law, are given the status and rights of heirs, regardless of the quantity of property they
may receive as such heirs. That the appellant in this case occupies the status of heir
to his deceased father cannot be questioned. Construing the conveyance here in
question, under the facts presented, as an advance made by Felix Dison to his only
child, we hold section 1540 to be applicable and the tax to have been properly
assessed by the Collector of Internal Revenue.

This appeal was originally assigned to a Division of five but referred to the court in
banc by reason of the appellant's attack upon the constitutionality of section 1540. This
attack is based on the sole ground that insofar as section 1540 levies a tax upon
gifts inter vivos, it violates that provision of section 3 of the organic Act of the Philippine
Islands (39 Stat. L., 545) which reads as follows: "That no bill which may be enacted
into law shall embraced more than one subject, and that subject shall be expressed in
the title of the bill." Neither the title of Act No. 2601 nor chapter 40 of the Administrative
Code makes any reference to a tax on gifts. Perhaps it is enough to say of this
contention that section 1540 plainly does not tax gifts per se but only when those gifts
are made to those who shall prove to be the heirs, devisees, legatees or donees mortis
causa of the donor. This court said in the case of Tuason and Tuason vs. Posadas 954
Phil., 289):lawphil.net

When the law says all gifts, it doubtless refers to gifts inter vivos, and
not mortis causa. Both the letter and the spirit of the law leave no room for
any other interpretation. Such, clearly, is the tenor of the language which
refers to donations that took effect before the donor's death, and not to mortis
causa donations, which can only be made with the formalities of a will, and
can only take effect after the donor's death. Any other construction would
virtually change this provision into:

". . . there shall be added to the resulting amount the value of all gifts mortis causa . . .
made by the predecessor to those who, after his death, shall prove to be his . . .
donees mortis causa." We cannot give to the law an interpretation that would so vitiate
its language. The truth of the matter is that in this section (1540) the law presumes that
such gifts have been made in anticipation of inheritance, devise, bequest, or gift mortis
causa, when the donee, after the death of the donor proves to be his heir, devisee or
donee mortis causa, for the purpose of evading the tax, and it is to prevent this that it
provides that they shall be added to the resulting amount." However much appellant's
argument on this point may fit his preconceived notion that the transaction between
him and his father was a consummated gift with no relation to the inheritance, we hold
that there is not merit in this attack upon the constitutionality of section 1540 under our
view of the facts. No other constitutional questions were raised in this case.

The judgment below is affirmed with costs in this instance against the appellant. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-34937, March 13, 1933
CONCEPCION VIDAL DE ROCES and her husband,
MARCOS ROCES, and ELVIRA VIDAL DE RICHARDS, plaintiff-appellants,
-versus-
JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-appellee.
IMPERIAL, J.:
The plaintiffs herein brought this action to recover from the defendant, Collector of
Internal Revenue, certain sums of money paid by them under protest as inheritance
tax. They appealed from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila
dismissing the action, without costs.
On March 10 and 12, 1925, Esperanza Tuazon, by means of public documents,
donated certain parcels of land situated in Manila to the plaintiffs herein, who, with their
respective husbands, accepted them in the same public documents, which were duly
recorded in the registry of deeds. By virtue of said donations, the plaintiffs took
possession of the said lands, received the fruits thereof and obtained the
corresponding transfer certificates of title.
On January 5, 1926, the donor died in the City of Manila without leaving any forced heir
and her will which was admitted to probate, she bequeathed to each of the donees the
sum of P5,000. After the estate had been distributed among the instituted legatees and
before delivery of their respective shares, the appellee herein, as Collector of Internal
Revenue, ruled that the appellants, as donees and legatees, should pay as inheritance
tax the sums of P16,673 and P13,951.45, respectively. Of these sums P15,191.48 was
levied as tax on the donation to Concepcion Vidal de Roces and P1,481.52 on her
legacy, and, likewise, P12,388.95 was imposed upon the donation made to Elvira Vidal
de Richards and P1,462.50 on her legacy. At first the appellants refused to pay the
aforementioned taxes but, at the insistence of the appellee and in order not to delay
the adjudication of the legacies, they agreed at last, to pay them under protest.
The appellee filed a demurrer to the complaint on the ground that the facts alleged
therein were not sufficient to constitute a cause of action. After the legal questions
raised therein had been discussed, the court sustained the demurrer and ordered the
amendment of the complaint which the appellants failed to do, whereupon the trial court
dismissed the action on the ground that the afore- mentioned appellants did not really
have a right of action.
In their brief, the appellants assign only one alleged error, to wit: that the demurrer
interposed by the appellee was sustained without sufficient ground.
The judgment appealed from was based on the provisions of section 1540
Administrative Code which reads as follows:
SEC. 1540. Additions of gifts and advances. — After the aforementioned
deductions have been made, there shall be added to the resulting amount the
value of all gifts or advances made by the predecessor to any those who, after
his death, shall prove to be his heirs, devisees, legatees, or donees mortis
causa.
The appellants contend that the above-mentioned legal provision does not include
donations inter vivos and if it does, it is unconstitutional, null and void for the following
reasons: first, because it violates section 3 of the Jones Law which provides that no
law should embrace more than one subject, and that subject should be expressed in
the title thereof; second that the Legislature has no authority to impose inheritance tax
on donations inter vivos; and third, because a legal provision of this character
contravenes the fundamental rule of uniformity of taxation. The appellee, in turn,
contends that the words "all gifts" refer clearly to donations inter vivos and, in support
of his theory, cites the doctrine laid in the case of Tuason and Tuason vs. Posadas (54
Phil., 289). After a careful study of the law and the authorities applicable thereto, we
are the opinion that neither theory reflects the true spirit of the aforementioned
provision. The gifts referred to in section 1540 of the Revised Administration Code are,
obviously, those donations inter vivos that take effect immediately or during the lifetime
of the donor but are made in consideration or in contemplation of death. Gifts inter
vivos, the transmission of which is not made in contemplation of the donor's death
should not be understood as included within the said legal provision for the reason that
it would amount to imposing a direct tax on property and not on the transmission
thereof, which act does not come within the scope of the provisions contained in Article
XI of Chapter 40 of the Administrative Code which deals expressly with the tax on
inheritances, legacies and other acquisitions mortis causa.
Our interpretation of the law is not in conflict with the rule laid down in the case
of Tuason and Tuason vs. Posadas, supra. We said therein, as we say now, that the
expression "all gifts" refers to gifts inter vivos inasmuch as the law considers them as
advances on inheritance, in the sense that they are gifts inter vivos made in
contemplation or in consideration of death. In that case, it was not held that that kind
of gifts consisted in those made completely independent of death or without regard to
it.
Said legal provision is not null and void on the alleged ground that the subject matter
thereof is not embraced in the title of the section under which it is enumerated. On the
contrary, its provisions are perfectly summarized in the heading, "Tax on Inheritance,
etc." which is the title of Article XI. Furthermore, the constitutional provision cited should
not be strictly construed as to make it necessary that the title contain a full index to all
the contents of the law. It is sufficient if the language used therein is expressed in such
a way that in case of doubt it would afford a means of determining the legislators
intention. (Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, Vol. II, p. 651.) Lastly, the
circumstance that the Administrative Code was prepared and compiled strictly in
accordance with the provisions of the Jones Law on that matter should not be
overlooked and that, in a compilation of laws such as the Administrative Code, it is but
natural and proper that provisions referring to diverse matters should be found. (Ayson
and Ignacio vs. Provincial Board of Rizal and Municipal Council of Navotas, 39 Phil.,
931.)
The appellants question the power of the Legislature to impose taxes on the
transmission of real estate that takes effect immediately and during the lifetime of the
donor, and allege as their reason that such tax partakes of the nature of the land tax
which the law has already created in another part of the Administrative Code. Without
making express pronouncement on this question, for it is unnecessary, we wish to state
that such is not the case in these instance. The tax collected by the appellee on the
properties donated in 1925 really constitutes an inheritance tax imposed on the
transmission of said properties in contemplation or in consideration of the donor's death
and under the circumstance that the donees were later instituted as the former's
legatees. For this reason, the law considers such transmissions in the form of gifts inter
vivos, as advances on inheritance and nothing therein violates any constitutional
provision, inasmuch as said legislation is within the power of the Legislature.
Property Subject to Inheritance Tax. — The inheritance tax ordinarily applies
to all property within the power of the state to reach passing by will or the laws
regulating intestate succession or by gift inter vivos in the manner designated
by statute, whether such property be real or personal, tangible or intangible,
corporeal or incorporeal. (26 R.C.L., p. 208, par. 177.)
In the case of Tuason and Tuason vs. Posadas, supra, it was also held that section
1540 of the Administrative Code did not violate the constitutional provision regarding
uniformity of taxation. It cannot be null and void on this ground because it equally
subjects to the same tax all of those donees who later become heirs, legatees or
donees mortis causa by the will of the donor. There would be a repugnant and arbitrary
exception if the provisions of the law were not applicable to all donees of the same
kind. In the case cited above, it was said: "At any rate the argument adduced against
its constitutionality, which is the lack of Uniformity, does not seem to be well founded.
It was said that under such an interpretation, while a donee inter vivos who, after the
predecessor's death proved to be an heir, a legatee, or a donee mortis causa, would
have to pay the tax, another donee inter vivos who did not prove to he an heir, a
legatee, or a donee mortis causa of the predecessor, would be exempt from such a
tax. But as these are two different cases, the principle of uniformity is inapplicable to
them."
The last question of a procedural nature arising from the case at bar, which should be
passed upon, is whether the case, as it now stands, can be decided on the merits or
should be remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings. According to our view
of the case, it follows that, if the gifts received by the appellants would have the right
to recover the sums of money claimed by them. Hence the necessity of ascertaining
whether the complaint contains an allegation to that effect. We have examined said
complaint and found nothing of that nature. On the contrary, it be may be inferred from
the allegations contained in paragraphs 2 and 7 thereof that said donations inter
vivos were made in consideration of the donor's death. We refer to the allegations that
such transmissions were effected in the month of March, 1925, that the donor died in
January, 1926, and that the donees were instituted legatees in the donor's will which
was admitted to probate. It is from these allegations, especially the last, that we infer a
presumption juris tantum that said donations were made mortis causa and, as such,
are subject to the payment of inheritance tax.
Wherefore, the demurrer interposed by the appellee was well-founded because it
appears that the complaint did not allege fact sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
When the appellants refused to amend the same, spite of the court's order to that effect,
they voluntarily waived the opportunity offered them and they are not now entitled to
have the case remanded for further proceedings, which would serve no purpose
altogether in view of the insufficiency of the complaint.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs of this instance
against the appellants. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Villamor, Ostrand, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers and Buttes, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions, VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting:
I sustain my concurrence in Justice Street's dissenting opinion in the case of Tuason
and Tuason vs. Posadas (54 Phil., 289).
The majority opinion to distinguish the present case from above-mentioned case
of Tuason and Tuason vs. Posadas, by interpreting section 1540 of the Administrative
Code in the sense that it establishes the legal presumption juris tantum that all
gifts inter vivos made to persons who are not forced heirs but who are instituted
legatees in the donor's will, have been made in contemplation of the donor's death.
Presumptions are of two kinds: One determined by law which is also called
presumption of law or of right; and another which is formed by the judge from
circumstances antecedent to, coincident with or subsequent to the principal fact under
investigation, which is also called presumption of man (presuncion de hombre).
(Escriche, Vol. IV, p. 662.) The Civil Code as well as the code of Civil Procedure
establishes presumptions juris et de jure and juris tantum which the courts should take
into account in deciding questions of law submitted to them for decision. The
presumption which majority opinion wishes to draw from said section 1540 of the
Administrative Code can neither be found in this Code nor in any of the aforementioned
Civil Code and Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, said presumption cannot be called
legal or of law. Neither can it be called a presumption of man (presuncion de
hombre) inasmuch as the majority opinion did not infer it from circumstances
antecedent to, coincident with or subsequent to the principal fact with is the donation
itself. In view of the nature, mode of making and effects of donations inter vivos, the
contrary presumption would be more reasonable and logical; in other words,
donations inter vivos made to persons who are not forced heirs, but who are instituted
legatees in the donor's will, should be presumed as not made mortis causa, unless the
contrary is proven. In the case under consideration, the burden of the proof rests with
the person who contends that the donation inter vivos has been made mortis causa.

It is therefore, the undersigned's humble opinion that the order appealed from should
be reversed and the demurrer overruled, and the defendant ordered to file his answer
to the complaint.