SECOND DIVISION
Armada Jr., single.
[G.R. No. 122047. October 12, 2000.]
SPOUSES SERAFIN SI AND ANITA BONODE SI, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
SPOUSES JOSE ARMADA and REMEDIOS ALMANZOR (deceased, and substituted
by heirs: Cynthia Armada, Danilo Armada and Vicente Armada), respondents.
SYNOPSIS
Questioned in this petition is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 30727. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City and nullified the sale of the subject lot by spouses Crisostomo
and Cresenciana Armada to spouses Serafin and Anita Si. Basically, this action
stemmed from a complaint for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Reconveyance of
Title with Damages filed by respondent spouses Jose Armada and Remedios
Almanzor against the spouses Si. Allegedly, the lot sold was part of an undivided
parcel of land owned in common by Crisostomo, Jose and another. Jose Armada
claimed his right of redemption. The trial court found that the disputed land was
not part of an undivided estate. It held that the deeds of absolute sale
technically described the portion sold to each son. The Court of Appeals found
otherwise and ruled: "A careful examination of TCT No. 16007 . . . shows that the
portion sold by virtue of the Deeds of Sale . . . to the Armada brothers do not
appear in the said title, neither does it indicate the particular area sold."
The trial court was correct when it found that the lot in question had already
been partitioned when Escolastica Armada executed three (3) deeds of sale in
favor of her sons, all surnamed Armada. Every portion conveyed to the three
sons was definitely described and segregated. This situation makes inapplicable,
the provisions on the right of redemption of a co-owner in the Civil Code.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEAL BY CERTIORARI; REVIEW OF
EVIDENCE PROPER WHEN FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
CONFLICT WITH THOSE OF THE TRIAL COURT. — In instances when the findings
of fact of the Court of Appeals are at variance with those of the trial court, or
when the inference drawn by the Court of Appeals from the facts is manifestly
mistaken, this Court will not hesitate to review the evidence in order to arrive at
the correct factual conclusion.
2. CIVIL LAW; CO-OWNERSHIP; DEFINITION. — Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code,
there is co-ownership whenever the ownership of an undivided thing or right
belongs to different persons. cEAaIS
3. ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF REDEMPTION; WHEN INAPPLICABLE. — There is no co-
ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already
concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically
described. This situation makes inapplicable the provision on the right of
redemption of a co-owner in the Civil Code.
4. ID.; ID.; ID,; WRITTEN NOTICE OF SALE IS NOT NECESSARY WHEN PARTIES
HAVE ACTUAL NOTICE THEREOF. — Co-owners with actual notice of the sale are
not entitled to written notice. A written notice is a formal requisite to make
certain that the co-owners have actual notice of the sale to enable them to
exercise their right of redemption within the limited period of thirty days. But
where the co-owners had actual notice of the sale at the time thereof and/or
afterwards, a written notice of a fact already known to them, would be
superfluous.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J p:
This petition for certiorari under Rule 45 assails the Decision 1 dated March 25,
1994, of the Court of Appeals and its Resolutions 2 dated March 24, 1995 and
September 6, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 30727. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 113, and nullified the
sale of the subject lot by the spouses Crisostomo and Cresenciana Armada to
spouses Serafin and Anita Si. The dispositive portion of the respondent court's
decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby
REVERSED, and a new one is rendered:
1) Annulling and declaring as invalid the registration of the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated March 27, 1979 executed by Cresenciana V. Alejo in favor of Anita
Bonode Si.
2) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasay City to annul and cancel Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 24751, issued in the name of Anita Bonode Si, married to
Serafin D. Si., Jose R. Armada, married to Remedios Almanzor and Dr. Severo R.
3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Pasay City to reconstitute and revive
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 16007 in the names of Jose, Crisostomo and
Severo, Jr.
4) That plaintiffs be allowed to repurchase or redeem the share corresponding
to the share of Crisostomo Armada within thirty (30) days from notice in writing
by Crisostomo Armada.
5) The defendants-appellees are jointly and severally ordered to pay the
plaintiffs-appellants the sum of P10,000.00 as moral damages.
6) The defendants-appellees are jointly and severally ordered to pay the
plaintiff-appellants the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses and costs of suit.
SO ORDERED." 3
The factual background of the case is as follows:
The 340 square meters of land, situated in San Jose District, Pasay City, the
property in dispute, originally belonged to Escolastica, wife of Severo Armada,
Sr. This was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (17345) 2460.
During the lifetime of the spouses, the property was transferred to their children
and the Registry of Deeds, Pasay City, issued TCT No. 16007 in the names of the
three sons, as follows: "DR. CRISOSTOMO R. ARMADA, married to Cresenciana V.
Alejo, 113.34 Square Meters; JOSE R. ARMADA, married to Remedios Almanzor,
113.33 Square Meters; and DR. SEVERO R. ARMADA, Jr., single, all of legal age,
Filipinos." 4 Annotated also in the title is the total cancellation of said title ". . .
by virtue of the Deed of Sale, (P.E. 77952/T-24751), dated March 28, 1979,
executed by CRESENCIANA V. ALEJO, as attorney-in-fact of CRISOSTOMO R.
ARMADA, conveying 113.34 square meters of the property herein, in favor of
ANITA BONODE SI, married to Serafin D. Si, for the sum of P75,000.00, issuing in
lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 24751, Reg. Book T-102. (Doc. No.
17, Page No. 5, Book No. 253 of Notary Public of Pasay City, Manila, Julian
Florentino)." 5
On April 15, 1980, herein spouses Jose Armada and Remedios Almanzor, filed a
complaint for Annulment of Deed of Sale and Reconveyance of Title with
Damages, against herein petitioners Anita and Serafin Si and Conrado Isada,
brother-in-law of Cresenciana. Isada brokered the sale.
The complaint alleged that Conrado Isada sold Crisostomo's share by making it
appear that Cresenciana, the attorney-in-fact of her husband, is a Filipino citizen,
residing with Isada at No. 13-4th Camarilla Street, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City.
By this time, Crisostomo and Cresenciana had migrated and were already
citizens of the United States of America. It also stated that when petitioners
registered the deed of absolute sale they inserted the phrase ". . . and that the
co-owners are not interested in buying the same in spite of notice to them," and
that petitioners knew of the misrepresentations of Conrado. Further, the
complaint alleged that the other owners, Jose and Severo, Jr., had no written
notice of the sale; and that all upon learning of the sale to the spouses Si, private
respondents filed a complaint for annulment of sale and reconveyance of title
with damages, claiming they had a right of redemption.
Petitioners, on the other hand, alleged that on October 2, 1954, Escolastica, with
the consent of her husband executed three separate deeds of sale (Exhibits 1, 2,
and 3) 6 conveying 113.34 square meters of the property to Severo, and 113.33
square meters each to Crisostomo and Jose. The three deeds of sale particularly
described the portion conveyed to each son in metes and bounds. Petitioners
contend that since the property was already three distinct parcels of land, there
was no longer co-ownership among the brothers. Hence, Jose and Severo, Jr.
had no right of redemption when Crisostomo sold his share to the spouses Si.
Petitioners point out that it was only because the Armada brothers failed to
submit the necessary subdivision plan to the Office of the Register of Deeds in
Pasay City that separate titles were not issued and TCT No. 16007 was issued
and registered in the names of Jose, Crisostomo, and Severo, Jr.
After trial on the merits, the court ruled for petitioners:
"IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the complaint is hereby DISMISSED. With
costs against the plaintiffs." 7
Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 25, 1994, the
appellate court issued the decision now assailed by petitioners. In reversing the
decision of the trial court and ruling for private respondents, the Court of
Appeals found that:
Page 1 of 49 PROPERTY
"A careful examination of TCT No. 16007 (Exh. 'A') shows that the portion sold
by virtue of the Deeds of Sale (Exh. 1, 2, & 3) to the Armada brothers do not
appear in the said title, neither does it indicate the particular area sold.
Moreover, no evidence was presented to show that the Register of Deeds issued
TCT No. 16007 (Exh. 'A') on the basis of the said deeds of Sale. In fact, TCT No.
16007 (Exh. 'A') shows that the lot is co-owned by Jose, Crisostomo and Severo,
Jr. in the proportion of 113.33, 113.34 and 113.33 sq. m. respectively. cADEHI
Furthermore, the evidence on record shows that the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh.
'B'), executed by Cresencia Armada in favor of defendants Si, stated that the
portion sold was the 'undivided one hundred thirteen & 34/100 (113.34) square
meters' of the parcel of land covered by TCT NO. 16007 of the Registry of Deeds
for Pasay City, which means that what was sold to defendants are still
undetermined and unidentifiable, as the area sold remains a portion of the
whole.
Moreover, plaintiff Remedi[o]s Armada testified that on March 27, 1979,
Crisostomo Armada, thru his attorney-in-fact and co-defendant, Cresenciana
Alejo, sold his undivided 113.34 share to defendants, Sps. Si as evidenced by a
Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. 'B'), and presented for registration with the Register
of Deeds (Exh. 'B-1') without notifying plaintiffs of the sale (TSN, pp. 6-8,
December 20, 1988). Instead, it appears that the phrase 'and that the co-owners
are not interested in buying the same inspite of notice to them,' was inserted in
the Deed of Sale (Exh. 'B').
xxx xxx xxx
Otherwise stated, the sale by a (sic) co-owner of his share in the undivided
property is not invalid, but shall not be recorded in the Registry Property, unless
accompanied by an affidavit of the Vendor that he has given written notice
thereof to all possible redemptioners." 8
On August 29, 1994, petitioners' counsel on record, Atty. Roberto B. Yam
received a copy of the CA decision. On October 14, 1994, he filed a motion for
reconsideration, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals on November 21,
1994, for being filed out of time.
On December 5, 1994, petitioners filed their motion for new trial under Section
1, Rule 53 of the Revised Rules of Court. 9 Petitioners presented new evidence,
TCT No. (17345) 2460, registered in the name of Escolastica de la Rosa, married
to Severo Armada, Sr., with annotation at the back stating that the cancellation
was by virtue of three deeds of sale in favor of Escolastica's sons. On March 24,
1995, respondent court denied the motion, reasoning that when the motion was
filed, the reglementary period had lapsed and the decision had become final and
executory. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration of said resolution was denied.
Hence, the present petition, alleging that:
"1. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ruling that a co-
ownership still existed.
"2. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in denying the
Motion for Reconsideration of its Decision of 25 March 1994 on purely technical
grounds.
"3. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in denying the
Motion for New Trial.
"4. Respondent Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering
petitioners to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and the
costs of the suit." 10
In essence, this Court is asked to resolve: (1) whether respondent court erred in
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration and/or the Motion for New
Trial; (2) whether private respondents are co-owners who are legally entitled to
redeem the lot under Article 1623 of the Civil Code; 11 and (3) whether the
award of moral damages, attorney's fees and costs of suit is correct.
The pivotal issue is whether private respondents may claim the right of
redemption under Art. 1623 of the Civil Code. The trial court found that the
disputed land was not part of an undivided estate. It held that the three deeds
of absolute sale 12 technically described the portion sold to each son. The
portions belonging to the three sons were separately declared for taxation
purposes with the Assessor's Office of Pasay City on September 21, 1970. 13
Jose's testimony that the land was undivided was contradicted by his wife when
she said they had been receiving rent from the property specifically allotted to
Jose. 14 More significantly, on January 9, 1995, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay
City cancelled TCT 24751 and issued three new titles as follows: (1) TCT 134594
15 in favor of Severo Armada, Jr.; (2) TCT 134595 16 under the name of Anita
Bonode Si, married to Serafin Si; and (3) TCT 134596 17 owned by Jose Armada,
married to Remedios Almanzor. All these are on record.
However, the Court of Appeals' decision contradicted the trial court's findings.
18
In instances when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are at variance
with those of the trial court, or when the inference drawn by the Court of
Appeals from the facts is manifestly mistaken, this Court will not hesitate to
review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusion. 19 This
we have done in this case. It is our considered view now, that the trial court is
correct when it found that:
"Rightfully, as early as October 2, 1954, the lot in question had already been
partitioned when their parents executed three (3) deed of sales (sic) in favor of
Jose, Crisostomo and Severo, all surnamed Armada (Exh. 1, 2, & 3), which
documents purports to have been registered with the Register of Deeds of Pasay
City, on September 18, 1970, and as a consequence TCT No. 16007 (Exh. A) was
issued. Notably, every portion conveyed and transferred to the three sons was
definitely described and segregated and with the corresponding technical
description (sic). In short, this is what we call extrajudicial partition. Moreover,
every portion belonging to the three sons has been declared for taxation
purposes with the Assessor's Office of Pasay City on September 21, 1970. These
are the unblinkable facts that the portion sold to defendant spouses Si by
defendants Crisostomo Armada and Cresenciana Armada was concretely
determined and identifiable. The fact that the three portions are embraced in
one certificate of title does not make said portions less determinable or
identifiable or distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion over each
portion less exclusive, in their respective owners. Hence, no right of redemption
among co-owners exists." 20 (citation omitted)
". . . [T]he herein plaintiffs cannot deny the fact that they did not have
knowledge about the impending sale of this portion. The truth of the matter is
that they were properly notified. Reacting to such knowledge and notification
they wrote defendant Dr. Crisostomo Armada on February 22, 1979, a portion of
said letter is revealing: 'Well you are the king of yourselves, and you can sell your
share of Levereza." 21 (emphasis omitted)
After the physical division of the lot among the brothers, the community
ownership terminated, and the right of preemption or redemption for each
brother was no longer available. 22
Under Art. 484 of the Civil Code, 23 there is co-ownership whenever the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons. There is
no co-ownership when the different portions owned by different people are
already concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet
technically described. 24 This situation makes inapplicable the provision on the
right of redemption of a co-owner in the Civil Code, as follows:
"Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised
except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or
by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the
Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he
has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners.
The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners."
Moreover, we note that private respondent Jose Armada was well informed of
the impending sale of Crisostomo's share in the land. In a letter dated February
22, 1979, Jose told his brother Crisostomo: "Well you are the king of yourselves,
and you can sell your share of Leveriza." 25 Co-owners with actual notice of the
sale are not entitled to written notice. A written notice is a formal requisite to
make certain that the co-owners have actual notice of the sale to enable them
to exercise their right of redemption within the limited period of thirty days. But
where the co-owners had actual notice of the sale at the time thereof and/or
afterwards, a written notice of a fact already known to them, would be
superfluous. The statute does not demand what is unnecessary. 26
Considering that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that herein
private respondent could redeem the lot bought by petitioners, the issue of
whether the appellate court erred in denying petitioners' motions for
reconsideration and new trial need not be delved into. The same is true with
respect to the questioned award of damages and attorney's fees. Petitioners
filed their complaint in good faith and as repeatedly held, we cannot put a
premium on the right to litigate. acCETD
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated March 25, 1994 and its Resolutions dated March 24, 1995 and September
6, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 30727 are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No.
8023-P is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, Branch 113, promulgated on August 29, 1989, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Page 2 of 49 PROPERTY
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[G.R. No. 153625. July 31, 2006.]
HEIRS OF MARCELINO CABAL, represented by VICTORIA CABAL, petitioner, vs.
SPOUSES LORENZO CABAL 1 and ROSITA CABAL,respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J p:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated September 27, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 64729 which affirmed in toto the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Iba, Zambales (RTC) dated
August 10, 2000 in Civil Case No. RTC-1489-I; and the CA Resolution 3 dated May
22, 2002 which denied the Motion for Reconsideration of Marcelino Cabal
(Marcelino).
The factual background of the case is as follows:
During his lifetime, Marcelo Cabal (Marcelo) was the owner of a 4,234-square
meter parcel of land situated at Barrio Palanginan, Iba, Zambales, described as
Lot G and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 29 of the Registry of
Deeds of Zambales. cEITCA
Sometime in August 1954, 4 Marcelo died, survived by his wife Higinia
Villanueva (Higinia) and his children: Marcelino, Daniel, Cecilio, Natividad, Juan,
Margarita, Lorenzo, Lauro and Anacleto. 5 It appears that sometime in 1949, five
years before he died, Marcelo allowed his son, Marcelino, to build his house on
a portion of Lot G, now the southernmost portion of Lot 1-E of Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 43419. 6 Since then, Marcelino resided
thereon. 7 Later, Marcelino's son also built his house on the disputed property. 8
On August 17, 1964, Marcelo's heirs extra-judicially settled among themselves
Lot G into undivided equal shares of 423.40-square meters each and Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-8635 was issued in their names. 9
On September 17, 1973, Daniel sold 380 square meters of his 423.40-square
meter undivided share to spouses Oscar Merete and Clarita Ebue. 10
On September 12, 1976, the heirs subdivided Lot G into Lot G-1 in favor of
Marcelino, resulting in the issuance of TCT No. T-22656; 11 and Lot G-2 in favor
of Higinia, Daniel, Natividad, Juan, Cecilio, Margarita, Lorenzo, Lauro and
Anacleto, resulting in the issuance of TCT No. 22657. 12
On March 1, 1977, Marcelino mortgaged his share, as described under TCT No.
22656, to the Rural Bank of San Antonio (Zambales), Inc. 13 The mortgage on
the property was subsequently released on December 19, 1983. 14
In the interim, based on consolidated subdivision plan (LRC) Pcd-24078, Lot G-2
was further subdivided and the remaining portion, known as Lot 1 of the
subdivision plan, comprising 3387.20 square meters, became subject of TCT No.
T-24533 with Higinia, Margarita, Natividad, Lorenzo, Daniel, Oscar Merete,
Cecilio, Carmelita C. Pagar, and Anacleto as co-owners.
On August 3, 1978, the co-owners of Lot 1 executed a Deed of Agreement of
Partition with Sale. Lot 1 was subdivided among the co-owners with Higinia,
Margarita, Natividad, Lorenzo, Cecilio, Carmelita C. Pagar and Anacleto,
receiving 423.40 square meters each; Daniel, with 43.4 square meters; and
Oscar Merete, with 380 square meters. 15 In the same deed, Lorenzo bought the
shares of Higinia, Margarita, Daniel and Natividad. 16 Thus, Lorenzo's share in
the co-ownership amounted to 1,737 square meters. Likewise, in the same
deed, Cecilio sold his share to a certain Marcela B. Francia. 17
On January 13, 1982, a land survey was conducted on Lot 1 by Geodetic
Engineer Dominador L. Santos and Junior Geodetic Engineer Eufemio A. Abay
and based on the survey, they submitted subdivision survey plan (LRC) Psd-
307100, designating the shares of Carmelita C. Pagar, Marcela B. Francia,
spouses Oscar Merete and Clarita Ebue, Anacleto, and Lorenzo as Lots 1-A, 1-B,
1-C, 1-D and 1-E, respectively. 18 The subdivision survey plan of Lot 1 was
approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands on May 7, 1982. 19 On June 7,
1990, the co-owners of Lot 1 executed a Subdivision Agreement designating
their shares based on the approved subdivision plan. 20 On July 13, 1993, TCT
No. 43419 covering Lot 1-E was issued in the name of Lorenzo.21
In the meantime, since the subdivision plan revealed that Marcelino and his son
occupied and built their houses on a 423-square meter area located on the
southernmost portion of Lot 1-E and not the adjacent lot designated as Lot G-1
under TCT No. T-22656, 22 the spouses Lorenzo and Rosita Cabal (respondents)
confronted Marcelino on this matter which resulted to an agreement on March
1, 1989 to a re-survey and swapping of lots for the purpose of reconstruction of
land titles. 23 However, the agreed resurvey and swapping of lots did not
materialize 24 and efforts to settle the dispute in the barangay level proved
futile. 25
Hence, on August 10, 1994, respondents filed a complaint for Recovery of
Possession with Damages against Marcelino before the Municipal Trial Court of
Iba, Zambales (MTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 735. They alleged that
Marcelino introduced improvements in bad faith on their land with knowledge
that the adjacent lot is titled in his name. 26
On August 26, 1994, Marcelino filed his Answer with Counterclaim, contending
that respondents have no cause of action against him because he has been in
possession in good faith since 1949 with the respondents' knowledge and
acquiescence. He further avers that acquisitive prescription has set in.27
On January 24, 1997, during the pendency of the trial of the case, Lorenzo died.
Following trial on the merits, the MTC rendered on November 19, 1997 its
Decision 28 in favor of Marcelino, the dispositive portion of which reads: HcISTE
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing premises as adduced by this Court
the plaintiff or their representatives are hereby directed to relinquish the
possession of said property subject matter of this case and deliver the peaceful
possession of the same to the herein defendant or his authorized
representatives, to remove the improvements made thereon within fifteen (15)
days from the receipt of this decision, otherwise, this Court would remove
and/or destroy the same with cost against the plaintiff, further the plaintiff is
hereby ordered to pay the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00),
Philippine Currency representing moral damages and exemplary damages in the
amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00), Philippine Currency, and the
amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), Philippine Currency,
representing attorney's fees.
SO ORDERED. 29
The MTC reasoned that prescription or the length of time by which Marcelino
has held or possessed the property has barred the respondents from filing a
claim.
On December 12, 1997, respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration 30 but
the MTC denied it in its Order dated February 5, 1998. 31
Dissatisfied, respondents filed an appeal with the RTC Branch 70, Iba, Zambales,
docketed as RTC-1489-I. On August 10, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision
setting aside the Decision of the MTC. 32 The dispositive portion of the Decision
states: DEcTIS
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Municipal Trial Court is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE ordering the defendant Marcelino Cabal and all other
persons claiming interest under him to vacate and deliver peaceful possession of
the disputed area of 423 sq. m. within Lot 1-E embraced in TCT No. T-43419 to
the plaintiffs-appellants; to remove all improvements therein introduced by said
defendant or by persons under his direction and authority; to pay the plaintiffs-
appellants P10,000.00 and P5,000.00 by way of moral and exemplary damages,
respectively; to pay plaintiff-appellants attorney's fee in the sum of P20,000.00
and cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED. 33
In reversing the MTC, the RTC held that Marcelino's possession was in the
concept of a co-owner and therefore prescription does not run in his favor; that
his possession, which was tolerated by his co-owners, does not ripen into
ownership.
On August 30, 2000, Marcelino filed a Motion for Reconsideration 34 but the
RTC denied it in its Order dated May 3, 2001. 35
On May 18, 2001, Marcelino filed a petition for review with the CA, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 64729. 36 Marcelino, however, died during the pendency of the
case. On September 27, 2001, the CA rendered its Decision affirming in toto the
Decision of the RTC. 37
In sustaining the RTC, the CA held that Marcelino may have been in good faith
when he started to occupy the disputed portion in 1949 but his occupation in
good faith diminished after Lot G was surveyed when he was apprised of the fact
that the portion he was occupying was not the same as the portion titled in his
name; that from the tenor of the petition for review Marcelino would like to
hold on to both the lot he occupies and Lot G-1, which cannot be allowed since it
will double his inheritance to the detriment of his brother Lorenzo. SCEDaT
On November 13, 2001, Marcelino's counsel filed a Motion for
Reconsideration 38 but the CA denied it in its Resolution dated May 22, 2002. 39
On June 6, 2002, the heirs of Marcelino (petitioners), represented by his widow,
Victoria Cabal, filed the present petition anchored on the following grounds:
I. CONTRARY TO THE COURT OF APPEALS' FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION,
PETITIONER NEVER INTENDED AND NEITHER DOES HE INTEND TO HOLD ON TO
BOTH THE 423 SQUARE METER WITHIN LOT 1-E WHICH HE IS OCCUPYING AND
LOT 1-G (sic). PETITIONER IS ONLY INTERESTED IN THE DISPUTED PROPERTY,
THAT IS, A PORTION OF LOT 1-E BECAUSE THIS IS WHERE HE INTRODUCED
CONSIDERABLE IMPROVEMENTS IN GOOD FAITH.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
WHEN IT RULED THAT THE GOOD FAITH OF PETITIONER ON THE DISPUTED
PROPERTY BEGAN TO DIMINISH AFTER LOT-G WAS SURVEYED. 40
Anent the first ground, petitioners contend that since 1949 Marcelino has
claimed no other portion as his inheritance from Marcelo, except the disputed
lot; that Marcelino believed in good faith that the disputed lot is Lot G-1; that
Marcelino never intended to hold on to both lots since he did not introduce any
improvement on Lot G-1 and he even agreed to a resurvey, swapping of lots and
reconstruction of title after discovery of the mistake in 1989; that Marcelino
wanted the disputed lot because he has introduced considerable improvements
thereon. aHSAIT
On the second ground, petitioners maintain that Marcelino became aware of the
flaw in his title only before the execution of the swapping agreement in March 1,
1989, long after he had introduced considerable improvements in the disputed
lot; that Marcelino should not be faulted for believing that the disputed lot is his
titled property because he is a layman, not versed with the technical description
of properties; that Marcelino should be adjudged a builder in good faith of all
the improvements built on the disputed property immediately prior to the
execution of the swapping agreement and accorded all his rights under the law
Page 3 of 49 PROPERTY
or, alternatively, the swapping of lots be ordered since no improvements have
been introduced on Lot G-1.
Respondents, on the other hand, submit that Marcelino cannot be adjudged a
builder in good faith since he exhibited blatant and deliberate bad faith in
dealing with respondents.
The Court rules in favor of the petitioners.
As a general rule, in petitions for review, the jurisdiction of this Court in cases
brought before it from the CA is limited to reviewing questions of law which
involves no examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the
litigants or any of them. 41 The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts; it is not its
function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. 42 Accordingly, findings of
fact of the appellate court are generally conclusive on the Supreme Court. 43
Nevertheless, jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions in which factual
issues may be resolved by this Court, such as: (1) when the findings are
grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6)
when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9)
when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact
are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion. 44 The Court finds that exceptions (1), (2), (4) and (11)
apply to the present petition. SCaTAc
It is undisputed that Marcelino built his house on the disputed property in 1949
with the consent of his father. Marcelino has been in possession of the disputed
lot since then with the knowledge of his co-heirs, such that even before his
father died in 1954, when the co-ownership was created, his inheritance or
share in the co-ownership was already particularly designated or physically
segregated. Thus, even before Lot G was subdivided in 1976, Marcelino already
occupied the disputed portion and even then co-ownership did not apply over
the disputed lot. Elementary is the rule that there is no co-ownership where the
portion owned is concretely determined and identifiable, though not technically
described, 45 or that said portion is still embraced in one and the same
certificate of title does make said portion less determinable or identifiable, or
distinguishable, one from the other, nor that dominion over each portion less
exclusive, in their respective owners. 46
Thus, since Marcelino built a house and has been occupying the disputed portion
since 1949, with the consent of his father and knowledge of the co-heirs, 47 it
would have been just and equitable to have segregated said portion in his favor
and not one adjacent to it. Undoubtedly, the subdivision survey effected in 1976
spawned the dilemma in the present case. It designated Lot G-1 as Marcelino's
share in the inheritance notwithstanding his possession since 1949 of a definite
portion of Lot G, now the southernmost portion of Lot 1-E.
Marcelino raised the defense of acquisitive prescription, in addition to
possession in good faith, in his Answer to the Complaint in the MTC.
Prescription, in general, is a mode of acquiring or losing ownership and other
real rights through the lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid
down by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner,
public, peaceful, uninterrupted and adverse. 48 Acquisitive prescription is either
ordinary or extraordinary. 49 Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires
possession in good faith and with just title 50 for ten years. 51 In extraordinary
prescription ownership and other real rights over immovable property are
acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years,
without need of title or of good faith. 52
In the present case, the evidence presented during the trial proceedings in the
MTC were sorely insufficient to prove that acquisitive prescription has set in
with regards to the disputed lot. The tax declaration 53 and
receipts 54 presented in evidence factually established only that Marcelino had
been religiously paying realty taxes on Lot G-1. Tax declarations and receipts can
only be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription when coupled
with proof of actual possession. 55 Evidently, Marcelino declared and paid realty
taxes on property which he did not actually possess as he took possession of a
lot eventually identified as the southernmost portion of Lot 1-E of subdivision
plan (LRC) Psd-307100. EDISaA
Furthermore, the Court notes that Marcelino no longer invoked prescription in
his pleadings before the RTC 56 and CA; 57 neither did herein petitioners raise
prescription in their petition 58 and memorandum 59 before this Court. They
only extensively discussed the defense of possession in good faith. They are thus
deemed to have abandoned the defense of prescription.
The Court shall now delve on the applicability of the principle of possession in
good faith.
It has been said that good faith is always presumed, and upon him who alleges
bad faith on the part of the possessor rests the burden of proof. 60 Good faith is
an intangible and abstract quality with no technical meaning or statutory
definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an honest belief, the
absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or to seek an
unconscionable advantage. An individual's personal good faith is a concept of his
own mind and, therefore, may not conclusively be determined by his
protestations alone. It implies honesty of intention, and freedom from
knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon inquiry. 61 The
essence of good faith lies in an honest belief in the validity of one's right,
ignorance of a superior claim, and absence of intention to overreach
another. 62 Applied to possession, one is considered in good faith if he is not
aware that there exists in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which
invalidates it. 63
In the present case, Marcelino's possession of the disputed lot was based on a
mistaken belief that Lot G-1 is the same lot on which he has built his house with
the consent of his father. There is no evidence, other than bare allegation, that
Marcelino was aware that he intruded on respondents' property when he
continued to occupy and possess the disputed lot after partition was effected in
1976.
Moreover, the fact that in 1977 Marcelino mortgaged Lot G-1 subject of TCT No.
22656 is not an indication of bad faith since there is no concrete evidence that
he was aware at that time that the property covered by the title and the one he
was occupying were not the same. There is also no evidence that he introduced
improvements on Lot G-1. In fact, the agreement on March 1, 1989 to a resurvey
and swapping of lots for the purpose of reconstructing the land titles is
substantial proof of Marcelino's good faith, sincerity of purpose and lack of
intention to hold on to two lots.
Thus, the CA's conclusion that Marcelino intended to hold on to both the
disputed lot and Lot G-1 is pure speculation, palpably unsupported by the
evidence on record. Marcelino is deemed a builder in good faith 64 at least until
the time he was informed by respondents of his encroachment on their
property. 65
When a person builds in good faith on the land of another, the applicable
provision is Article 448, which reads: CEDHTa
Article 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works,
sowing or planting, after payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles
546 66 and 548, 67 or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the price of
the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or
planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than
that of the building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the
owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or trees after
proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in
case of disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.
Thus, the owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted
in good faith shall have the right to appropriate as his own the building, planting
or sowing, after payment to the builder, planter or sower of the necessary and
useful expenses, and in the proper case, expenses for pure luxury or mere
pleasure. The owner of the land may also oblige the builder, planter or sower to
purchase and pay the price of the land. If the owner chooses to sell his land, the
builder, planter or sower must purchase the land, otherwise the owner may
remove the improvements thereon. The builder, planter or sower, however, is
not obliged to purchase the land if its value is considerably more than the
building, planting or sowing. In such case, the builder, planter or sower must pay
rent to the owner of the land. If the parties cannot come to terms over the
conditions of the lease, the court must fix the terms thereof. The right to choose
between appropriating the improvement or selling the land on which the
improvement stands to the builder, planter or sower, is given to the owner of
the land. 68
In accordance with Depra v. Dumlao, 69 this case must be remanded to the trial
court to determine matters necessary for the proper application of Article 448 in
relation to Articles 546 and 548. Such matters include the option that
respondents would take and the amount of indemnity that they would pay,
should they decide to appropriate the improvements on the lots.
The Court notes that petitioners' alternative prayer that swapping of lots be
ordered because no improvements have been introduced on Lot G-1. This
cannot be granted. Respondents and Marcelino, petitioners' predecessor-in-
interest, did not pray for swapping of lots in all their pleadings below. Both
parties also did not allege the existence of a swapping agreement in their initial
pleadings, much less pursue the enforcement of the swapping agreement. They
are deemed to have renounced or abandoned any enforceable right they had
under the swapping agreement and the parties cannot be compelled to a
swapping of lots.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 64729 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings
to determine the facts essential to the proper application of Article 448 in
relation to Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 153788. November 27, 2009.]
ROGER V. NAVARRO, petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, Presiding Judge,
RTC Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City, and KAREN T. GO, doing business under
the name KARGO ENTERPRISES, respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari 1 that seeks to set aside the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision 2 dated October 16, 2001 and Resolution 3 dated May 29,
2002 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 64701. These CA rulings affirmed the July 26, 2000 4 and
Page 4 of 49 PROPERTY
March 7, 2001 5 orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Misamis Oriental,
Cagayan de Oro City, denying petitioner Roger V. Navarro's (Navarro) motion to
dismiss.
BACKGROUND FACTS
On September 12, 1998, respondent Karen T. Go filed two complaints, docketed
as Civil Case Nos. 98-599 (first complaint) 6 and 98-598 (second
complaint), 7 before the RTC for replevin and/or sum of money with damages
against Navarro. In these complaints, Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue writs
of replevin for the seizure of two (2) motor vehicles in Navarro's possession.
The first complaint stated:
1. That plaintiff KAREN T. GO is a Filipino, of legal age, married to GLENN O. GO,
a resident of Cagayan de Oro City and doing business under the trade name
KARGO ENTERPRISES, an entity duly registered and existing under and by virtue
of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, which has its business address at
Bulua, Cagayan de Oro City; that defendant ROGER NAVARRO is a Filipino, of
legal age, a resident of 62 Dolores Street, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, where
he may be served with summons and other processes of the Honorable Court;
that defendant "JOHN DOE" whose real name and address are at present
unknown to plaintiff is hereby joined as party defendant as he may be the
person in whose possession and custody the personal property subject matter of
this suit may be found if the same is not in the possession of defendant ROGER
NAVARRO;
2. That KARGO ENTERPRISES is in the business of, among others, buying and
selling motor vehicles, including hauling trucks and other heavy
equipment; SEHACI
3. That for the cause of action against defendant ROGER NAVARRO, it is hereby
stated that on August 8, 1997, the said defendant leased [from] plaintiff a
certain motor vehicle which is more particularly described as follows —
Make/Type FUSO WITH MOUNTED CRANE
Serial No. FK416K-51680
Motor No. 6D15-338735
Plate No. GHK-378
as evidenced by a LEASE AGREEMENT WITH OPTION TO PURCHASE entered into
by and between KARGO ENTERPRISES, then represented by its Manager, the
aforementioned GLENN O. GO, and defendant ROGER NAVARRO . . .; that in
accordance with the provisions of the above LEASE AGREEMENT WITH OPTION
TO PURCHASE, defendant ROGER NAVARRO delivered unto plaintiff six (6) post-
dated checks each in the amount of SIXTY-SIX THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
THIRTY-THREE & 33/100 PESOS (P66,333.33) which were supposedly in payment
of the agreed rentals; that when thefifth and sixth checks, i.e., PHILIPPINE BANK
OF COMMUNICATIONS-CAGAYAN DE ORO BRANCH CHECKS NOS. 017112 and
017113, respectively dated January 8, 1998 and February 8, 1998, were
presented for payment and/or credit, the same were dishonored and/or
returned by the drawee bank for the common reason that the current deposit
account against which the said checks were issued did not have sufficient funds
to cover the amounts thereof; that the total amount of the two (2)
checks, i.e., the sum of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
SIXTY-SIX & 66/100 PESOS (P132,666.66) therefore represents the principal
liability of defendant ROGER NAVARRO unto plaintiff on the basis of the
provisions of the above LEASE AGREEMENT WITH RIGHT TO PURCHASE;
that demands, written and oral, were made of defendant ROGER NAVARRO to
pay the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
SIXTY-SIX & 66/100 PESOS (P132,666.66), or to return the subject motor vehicle
as also provided for in the LEASE AGREEMENT WITH RIGHT TO PURCHASE, but
said demands were, and still are, in vain to the great damage and injury of
herein plaintiff; . . .
4. That the aforedescribed motor vehicle has not been the subject of any tax
assessment and/or fine pursuant to law, or seized under an execution or an
attachment as against herein plaintiff;
xxx xxx xxx
8. That plaintiff hereby respectfully applies for an order of the Honorable Court
for the immediate delivery of the above-described motor vehicle from
defendants unto plaintiff pending the final determination of this case on the
merits and, for that purpose, there is attached hereto an affidavit duly executed
and bond double the value of the personal property subject matter hereof to
answer for damages and costs which defendants may suffer in the event that
the order for replevin prayed for may be found out to having not been properly
issued.
The second complaint contained essentially the same allegations as the first
complaint, except that the Lease Agreement with Option to Purchase involved is
dated October 1, 1997 and the motor vehicle leased is described as follows:
Make/Type FUSO WITH MOUNTED CRANE
Serial No. FK416K-510528
Motor No. 6D14-423403
The second complaint also alleged that Navarro delivered three post-dated
checks, each for the amount of P100,000.00, to Karen Go in payment of the
agreed rentals; however, the third check was dishonored when presented for
payment. 8 SAHIDc
On October 12, 1998 9 and October 14, 1998, 10 the RTC issued writs of replevin
for both cases; as a result, the Sheriff seized the two vehicles and delivered them
to the possession of Karen Go.
In his Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two
complaints stated no cause of action, since Karen Go was not a party to the
Lease Agreements with Option to Purchase (collectively, the lease agreements)
— the actionable documents on which the complaints were based.
On Navarro's motion, both cases were duly consolidated on December 13, 1999.
In its May 8, 2000 order, the RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the
complaints did not state a cause of action.
In response to the motion for reconsideration Karen Go filed dated May 26,
2000, 11 the RTC issued another order dated July 26, 2000 setting aside the
order of dismissal. Acting on the presumption that Glenn Go's leasing business is
a conjugal property, the RTC held that Karen Go had sufficient interest in his
leasing business to file the action against Navarro. However, the RTC held that
Karen Go should have included her husband, Glenn Go, in the complaint based
on Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court (Rules). 12 Thus, the lower court
ordered Karen Go to file a motion for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff.
When the RTC denied Navarro's motion for reconsideration on March 7, 2001,
Navarro filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, essentially contending that the
RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it reconsidered the dismissal of
the case and directed Karen Go to amend her complaints by including her
husband Glenn Go as co-plaintiff. According to Navarro, a complaint which failed
to state a cause of action could not be converted into one with a cause of action
by mere amendment or supplemental pleading.
On October 16, 2001, the CA denied Navarro's petition and affirmed the RTC's
order. 13 The CA also denied Navarro's motion for reconsideration in its
resolution of May 29, 2002, 14 leading to the filing of the present petition.
THE PETITION
Navarro alleges that even if the lease agreements were in the name of Kargo
Enterprises, since it did not have the requisite juridical personality to sue, the
actual parties to the agreement are himself and Glenn Go. Since it was Karen Go
who filed the complaints and not Glenn Go, she was not a real party-in-interest
and the complaints failed to state a cause of action.
Navarro posits that the RTC erred when it ordered the amendment of the
complaint to include Glenn Go as a co-plaintiff, instead of dismissing the
complaint outright because a complaint which does not state a cause of action
cannot be converted into one with a cause of action by a mere amendment or a
supplemental pleading. In effect, the lower court created a cause of action for
Karen Go when there was none at the time she filed the complaints.
Even worse, according to Navarro, the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff
drastically changed the theory of the complaints, to his great prejudice. Navarro
claims that the lower court gravely abused its discretion when it assumed that
the leased vehicles are part of the conjugal property of Glenn and Karen Go.
Since Karen Go is the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, the vehicles subject
of the complaint are her paraphernal properties and the RTC gravely erred when
it ordered the inclusion of Glenn Go as a co-plaintiff.
Navarro likewise faults the lower court for setting the trial of the case in the
same order that required Karen Go to amend her complaints, claiming that by
issuing this order, the trial court violated Rule 10 of the Rules.
Even assuming the complaints stated a cause of action against him, Navarro
maintains that the complaints were premature because no prior demand was
made on him to comply with the provisions of the lease agreements before the
complaints for replevin were filed.
Lastly, Navarro posits that since the two writs of replevin were issued based on
flawed complaints, the vehicles were illegally seized from his possession and
should be returned to him immediately.
Karen Go, on the other hand, claims that it is misleading for Navarro to state
that she has no real interest in the subject of the complaint, even if the lease
agreements were signed only by her husband, Glenn Go; she is the owner of
Kargo Enterprises and Glenn Go signed the lease agreements merely as the
manager of Kargo Enterprises. Moreover, Karen Go maintains that Navarro's
insistence that Kargo Enterprises is Karen Go's paraphernal property is without
basis. Based on the law and jurisprudence on the matter, all property acquired
during the marriage is presumed to be conjugal property. Finally, Karen Go
insists that her complaints sufficiently established a cause of action against
Navarro. Thus, when the RTC ordered her to include her husband as co-plaintiff,
this was merely to comply with the rule that spouses should sue jointly, and was
not meant to cure the complaints' lack of cause of action.
THE COURT'S RULING
We find the petition devoid of merit.
Karen Go is the real party-in-interest
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted
or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e., the party who stands
to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit. 15
Interestingly, although Navarro admits that Karen Go is the registered owner of
the business name Kargo Enterprises, he still insists that Karen Go is not a real
party-in-interest in the case. According to Navarro, while the lease contracts
were in Kargo Enterprises' name, this was merely a trade name without a
juridical personality, so the actual parties to the lease agreements were Navarro
and Glenn Go, to the exclusion of Karen Go.
As a corollary, Navarro contends that the RTC acted with grave abuse of
discretion when it ordered the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff, since this in
Page 5 of 49 PROPERTY
effect created a cause of action for the complaints when in truth, there was
none.
We do not find Navarro's arguments persuasive.
The central factor in appreciating the issues presented in this case is the
business name Kargo Enterprises. The name appears in the title of the Complaint
where the plaintiff was identified as "KAREN T. GO doing business under the
name KARGO ENTERPRISES", and this identification was repeated in the first
paragraph of the Complaint. Paragraph 2 defined the business KARGO
ENTERPRISES undertakes. Paragraph 3 continued with the allegation that the
defendant "leased from plaintiff a certain motor vehicle" that was thereafter
described. Significantly, the Complaint specifies and attaches as its integral part
the Lease Agreement that underlies the transaction between the plaintiff and
the defendant. Again, the name KARGO ENTERPRISES entered the picture as this
Lease Agreement provides:
This agreement, made and entered into by and between: AHDaET
GLENN O. GO, of legal age, married, with post office address at . . ., herein
referred to as the LESSOR-SELLER; representing KARGO ENTERPRISES as its
Manager,
xxx xxx xxx
thus, expressly pointing to KARGO ENTERPRISES as the principal that Glenn O.
Go represented. In other words, by the express terms of this Lease Agreement,
Glenn Go did sign the agreement only as the manager of Kargo Enterprises and
the latter is clearly the real party to the lease agreements.
As Navarro correctly points out, Kargo Enterprises is a sole proprietorship, which
is neither a natural person, nor a juridical person, as defined by Article 44 of the
Civil Code:
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose,
created by law; their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted
according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to
which the law grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of
each shareholder, partner or member.
Thus, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules, 16 Kargo Enterprises cannot be
a party to a civil action. This legal reality leads to the question: who then is the
proper party to file an action based on a contract in the name of Kargo
Enterprises?
We faced a similar question in Juasing Hardware v. Mendoza, 17 where we said:
Finally, there is no law authorizing sole proprietorships like petitioner to bring
suit in court. The law merely recognizes the existence of a sole proprietorship as
a form of business organization conducted for profit by a single individual, and
requires the proprietor or owner thereof to secure licenses and permits, register
the business name, and pay taxes to the national government. It does not vest
juridical or legal personality upon the sole proprietorship nor empower it to file
or defend an action in court.
Thus, the complaint in the court below should have been filed in the name of
the owner of Juasing Hardware. The allegation in the body of the complaint
would show that the suit is brought by such person as proprietor or owner of
the business conducted under the name and style Juasing Hardware. The
descriptive words "doing business as Juasing Hardware" may be added to the
title of the case, as is customarily done. 18[Emphasis supplied.]
This conclusion should be read in relation with Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules,
which states: DECSIT
SEC. 2. Parties in interest. — A real party in interest is the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.
As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will
directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to
Navarro's contention, Karen Go is the real party-in-interest, and it is legally
incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause of action because her
name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in behalf
of Kargo Enterprises. Whether Glenn Go can legally sign the Lease Agreement in
his capacity as a manager of Kargo Enterprises, a sole proprietorship, is a
question we do not decide, as this is a matter for the trial court to consider in a
trial on the merits.
Glenn Go's Role in the Case
We find it significant that the business name Kargo Enterprises is in the name of
Karen T. Go, 19 who described herself in the Complaints to be "a Filipino, of
legal age, married to GLENN O. GO, a resident of Cagayan de Oro City, and doing
business under the trade name KARGO ENTERPRISES". 20 That Glenn Go and
Karen Go are married to each other is a fact never brought in issue in the case.
Thus, the business name KARGO ENTERPRISES is registered in the name of a
married woman, a fact material to the side issue of whether Kargo Enterprises
and its properties are paraphernal or conjugal properties. To restate the parties'
positions, Navarro alleges that Kargo Enterprises is Karen Go's paraphernal
property, emphasizing the fact that the business is registered solely in Karen
Go's name. On the other hand, Karen Go contends that while the business is
registered in her name, it is in fact part of their conjugal property.
The registration of the trade name in the name of one person — a woman —
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the trade name as a property is
hers alone, particularly when the woman is married. By law, all property
acquired during the marriage, whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or both spouses, is presumed
to be conjugal unless the contrary is proved. 21 Our examination of the records
of the case does not show any proof that Kargo Enterprises and the properties
or contracts in its name are conjugal. If at all, only the bare allegation of Navarro
to this effect exists in the records of the case. As we emphasized in Castro v.
Miat: 22
Petitioners also overlook Article 160 of the New Civil Code. It provides that "all
property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal partnership, unless it be
prove[n] that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife". This
article does not require proof that the property was acquired with funds of the
partnership. The presumption applies even when the manner in which the
property was acquired does not appear. 23 [Emphasis supplied.]
Thus, for purposes solely of this case and of resolving the issue of whether Kargo
Enterprises as a sole proprietorship is conjugal or paraphernal property, we hold
that it is conjugal property.
Article 124 of the Family Code, on the administration of the conjugal property,
provides:
Art. 124. The administration and enjoyment of the conjugal partnership
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the
husband's decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years from the date of the
contract implementing such decision. ESTDcC
xxx xxx xxx
This provision, by its terms, allows either Karen or Glenn Go to speak and act
with authority in managing their conjugal property, i.e., Kargo Enterprises. No
need exists, therefore, for one to obtain the consent of the other before
performing an act of administration or any act that does not dispose of or
encumber their conjugal property.
Under Article 108 of the Family Code, the conjugal partnership is governed by
the rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is
expressly determined in this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage
settlements. In other words, the property relations of the husband and wife shall
be governed primarily by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of Gains of the
Family Code and, suppletorily, by the spouses' marriage settlement and by the
rules on partnership under the Civil Code. In the absence of any evidence of a
marriage settlement between the spouses Go, we look at the Civil Code
provision on partnership for guidance.
A rule on partnership applicable to the spouses' circumstances is Article 1811 of
the Civil Code, which states:
Art. 1811. A partner is a co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership
property.
The incidents of this co-ownership are such that:
(1) A partner, subject to the provisions of this Title and to any agreement
between the partners, has an equal right with his partners to possess specific
partnership property for partnership purposes; . . .
Under this provision, Glenn and Karen Go are effectively co-owners of Kargo
Enterprises and the properties registered under this name; hence, both have an
equal right to seek possession of these properties. Applying Article 484 of the
Civil Code, which states that "in default of contracts, or special provisions, co-
ownership shall be governed by the provisions of this Title", we find further
support in Article 487 of the Civil Code that allows any of the co-owners to bring
an action in ejectment with respect to the co-owned property.
While ejectment is normally associated with actions involving real property, we
find that this rule can be applied to the circumstances of the present case,
following our ruling in Carandang v. Heirs of De Guzman. 24 In this case, one
spouse filed an action for the recovery of credit, a personal property considered
conjugal property, without including the other spouse in the action. In resolving
the issue of whether the other spouse was required to be included as a co-
plaintiff in the action for the recovery of the credit, we said:
Milagros de Guzman, being presumed to be a co-owner of the credits allegedly
extended to the spouses Carandang, seems to be either an indispensable or a
necessary party. If she is an indispensable party, dismissal would be proper. If
she is merely a necessary party, dismissal is not warranted, whether or not there
was an order for her inclusion in the complaint pursuant to Section 9, Rule 3.
Article 108 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 108. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract
of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in
this Chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements. CDcaSA
This provision is practically the same as the Civil Code provision it superseded:
Art. 147. The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the rules on the contract
of partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly determined in
this Chapter.
In this connection, Article 1811 of the Civil Code provides that "[a] partner is a
co-owner with the other partners of specific partnership property". Taken with
the presumption of the conjugal nature of the funds used to finance the four
checks used to pay for petitioners' stock subscriptions, and with the
presumption that the credits themselves are part of conjugal funds, Article 1811
makes Quirino and Milagros de Guzman co-owners of the alleged credit.
Page 6 of 49 PROPERTY
Being co-owners of the alleged credit, Quirino and Milagros de Guzman may
separately bring an action for the recovery thereof. In the fairly recent cases
of Baloloy v. Hular and Adlawan v. Adlawan, we held that, in a co-ownership,
co-owners may bring actions for the recovery of co-owned property without
the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit
is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of his co-owners. In the latter
case and in that of De Guia v. Court of Appeals, we also held that Article 487 of
the Civil Code, which provides that any of the co-owners may bring an action for
ejectment, covers all kinds of action for the recovery of possession.
In sum, in suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest.
However, pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and relevant jurisprudence,
any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action, for the recovery of co-
owned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner
who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an
indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties.
They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be accorded in the
suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been
filed for the benefit of all co-owners. 25 [Emphasis supplied.]
Under this ruling, either of the spouses Go may bring an action against Navarro
to recover possession of the Kargo Enterprises-leased vehicles which they co-
own. This conclusion is consistent with Article 124 of the Family Code,
supporting as it does the position that either spouse may act on behalf of the
conjugal partnership, so long as they do not dispose of or encumber the
property in question without the other spouse's consent.
On this basis, we hold that since Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in
the action to recover possession of the leased vehicles, he only needs to be
impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit, based on Section 4, Rule 4 of the
Rules, which states:
Section 4. Spouses as parties. — Husband and wife shall sue or be sued jointly,
except as provided by law.
Non-joinder of indispensable parties
not ground to dismiss action
Even assuming that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, we have
held in a number of cases 26 that the misjoinder or non-joinder of indispensable
parties in a complaint is not a ground for dismissal of action. As we stated
in Macababbad v. Masirag: 27
Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that neither misjoinder nor
nonjoinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action, thus:
Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. — Neither misjoinder nor non-
joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped or
added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any
stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined
party may be severed and proceeded with separately. TAHIED
In Domingo v. Scheer, this Court held that the proper remedy when a party is left
out is to implead the indispensable party at any stage of the action. The court,
either motu proprio or upon the motion of a party, may order the inclusion of
the indispensable party or give the plaintiff opportunity to amend his complaint
in order to include indispensable parties. If the plaintiff to whom the order to
include the indispensable party is directed refuses to comply with the order of
the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or
upon the court's own motion. Only upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey
the order to include or to amend is the action dismissed.
In these lights, the RTC Order of July 26, 2000 requiring plaintiff Karen Go to join
her husband as a party plaintiff is fully in order.
Demand not required prior
to filing of replevin action
In arguing that prior demand is required before an action for a writ of replevin is
filed, Navarro apparently likens a replevin action to an unlawful detainer.
For a writ of replevin to issue, all that the applicant must do is to file an affidavit
and bond, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 60 of the Rules, which states:
Sec. 2. Affidavit and bond. —
The applicant must show by his own affidavit or that of some other person who
personally knows the facts:
(a) That the applicant is the owner of the property claimed, particularly
describing it, or is entitled to the possession thereof;
(b) That the property is wrongfully detained by the adverse party, alleging the
cause of detention thereof according to the best of his knowledge, information,
and belief;
(c) That the property has not been distrained or taken for a tax assessment or a
fine pursuant to law, or seized under a writ of execution or preliminary
attachment, or otherwise placed under custodia legis, or if so seized, that it is
exempt from such seizure or custody; and
(d) The actual market value of the property.
The applicant must also give a bond, executed to the adverse party in double the
value of the property as stated in the affidavit aforementioned, for the return of
the property to the adverse party if such return be adjudged, and for the
payment to the adverse party of such sum as he may recover from the applicant
in the action.
We see nothing in these provisions which requires the applicant to make a prior
demand on the possessor of the property before he can file an action for a writ
of replevin. Thus, prior demand is not a condition precedent to an action for a
writ of replevin.
More importantly, Navarro is no longer in the position to claim that a prior
demand is necessary, as he has already admitted in his Answers that he had
received the letters that Karen Go sent him, demanding that he either pay his
unpaid obligations or return the leased motor vehicles. Navarro's position that a
demand is necessary and has not been made is therefore totally
unmeritorious. acCITS
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for review for lack of
merit. Costs against petitioner Roger V. Navarro.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 166519. March 31, 2009.]
NIEVES PLASABAS and MARCOS MALAZARTE, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS (Special Former Ninth Division), DOMINADOR LUMEN, and AURORA
AUNZO, respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J p:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court are the May 12, 2004 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 43085 and the December 1, 2004 Resolution 2 denying reconsideration of
the challenged decision. THSaEC
The pertinent facts and proceedings follow.
In 1974, petitioners 3 filed a complaint for recovery of title to property with
damages before the Court of First Instance (now, Regional Trial Court [RTC]) of
Maasin, Southern Leyte against respondents. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. R-1949. The property subject of the case was a parcel of coconut land
in Canturing, Maasin, Southern Leyte, declared under Tax Declaration No. 3587
in the name of petitioner Nieves with an area of 2.6360 hectares. 4 In their
complaint, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered confirming their rights
and legal title to the subject property and ordering the defendants to vacate the
occupied portion and to pay damages. 5
Respondents, for their part, denied petitioners' allegation of ownership and
possession of the premises, and interposed, as their main defense, that the
subject land was inherited by all the parties from their common ancestor,
Francisco Plasabas. 6
Revealed in the course of the trial was that petitioner Nieves, contrary to her
allegations in the complaint, was not the sole and absolute owner of the land.
Based on the testimonies of petitioners' witnesses, the property passed on from
Francisco to his son, Leoncio; then to Jovita Talam, petitioner Nieves'
grandmother; then to Antonina Talam, her mother; and then to her and her
siblings — Jose, Victor and Victoria. 7
After resting their case, respondents raised in their memorandum the argument
that the case should have been terminated at inception for petitioners' failure to
implead indispensable parties, the other co-owners — Jose, Victor and Victoria.
In its April 19, 1993 Order, 8 the trial court, without ruling on the merits,
dismissed the case without prejudice, thus:
This Court, much as it wants to decide the instant case on the merits, being one
of the old inherited cases left behind, finds difficulty if not impossibility of doing
so at this stage of the proceedings when both parties have already rested their
cases. Reluctantly, it agrees with the defendants in the observation that some
important indispensable consideration is conspicuously wanting or
missing. CTSDAI
It is not the Court's wish to turn its back on the crucial part of the case, which is
the pronouncement of the judgment to settle the issues raised in the pleadings
of the parties once and for all, after all the time, effort and expense spent in
going through the trial process.
But, rules are rules. They have to be followed, to arrive at a fair and just verdict.
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
". . . Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. — Parties in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants."
What the Court wants to say here is that the instant case should have been
dismissed without prejudice a long time ago for lack of cause of action as the
plaintiffs spouses Marcos Malazarte and Nieves Plasabas Malazarte have no
complete legal personality to sue by themselves alone without joining the
brothers and sisters of Nieves who are as INDISPENSABLE as the latter in the
final determination of the case. Not impleading them, any judgment would have
no effectiveness.
They are that indispensable that a final decree would necessarily affect their
rights, so that the Court cannot proceed without their presence. There are
abundant authorities in this regard. Thus —
"The general rule with reference to the making of parties in a civil action
requires the joinder of all indispensable parties under any and all conditions,
their presence being a sine qua non of the exercise of judicial power. (Borlasa v.
Polistico, 47 Phil. 345, 348) For this reason, our Supreme Court has held that
when it appears of record that there are other persons interested in the subject
matter of the litigation, who are not made parties to the action, it is the duty of
the court to suspend the trial until such parties are made either plaintiffs or
defendants. (Pobre, et al. v. Blanco, 17 Phil. 156). . . . Where the petition failed
to join as party defendant the person interested in sustaining the proceeding in
Page 7 of 49 PROPERTY
the court, the same should be dismissed. . . . When an indispensable party is not
before the court, the action should be dismissed. (People, et al. v. Rodriguez, et
al., G.R. Nos. L-14059-62, September 30, 1959) (sic) CDISAc
"Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action
shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. (Sec. 7, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
The burden of procuring the presence of all indispensable parties is on the
plaintiff. (39 Amjur [sic] 885). The evident purpose of the rule is to prevent the
multiplicity of suits by requiring the person arresting a right against the
defendant to include with him, either as co-plaintiffs or as co-defendants, all
persons standing in the same position, so that the whole matter in dispute may
be determined once and for all in one litigation. (Palarca v. Baginsi, * 38 Phil.
177, 178).
"An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or
subject matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without
inquiring or affecting such interest; a party who has not only an interest of such
a nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or
leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be
wholly inconsistent with equity and good conscience. (67 C.J.S. 892).
Indispensable parties are those without whom no action can be finally
determined." (Sanidad v. Cabataje, * 5 Phil. 204)
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, both the
complaint and the counterclaim in the instant case are ordered DISMISSED
without prejudice. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 9
Aggrieved, petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In the challenged May 12,
2004 Decision, 10 the appellate court affirmed the ruling of the trial court. The
CA, further, declared that the non-joinder of the indispensable parties would
violate the principle of due process, and that Article 487 of the Civil Code could
not be applied considering that the complaint was not for ejectment, but for
recovery of title or a reivindicatory action. 11
With their motion for reconsideration denied in the further assailed December
1, 2004 Resolution, 12 petitioners filed the instant petition.
The Court grants the petition and remands the case to the trial court for
disposition on the merits. TaIHEA
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that any one of the co-owners may bring
an action for ejectment. The article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of
possession, including an accion publiciana and a reivindicatory action. A co-
owner may file suit without necessarily joining all the other co-owners as co-
plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any
judgment of the court in favor of the plaintiff will benefit the other co-owners,
but if the judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the
unimpleaded co-owners. 13
With this disquisition, there is no need to determine whether petitioners'
complaint is one for ejectment or for recovery of title. To repeat, Article 487 of
the Civil Code applies to both actions.
Thus, petitioners, in their complaint, do not have to implead their co-owners as
parties. The only exception to this rule is when the action is for the benefit of
the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and is, thus, entitled to the
possession thereof. In such a case, the action will not prosper unless the plaintiff
impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties. 14
Here, the allegation of petitioners in their complaint that they are the sole
owners of the property in litigation is immaterial, considering that they
acknowledged during the trial that the property is co-owned by Nieves and her
siblings, and that petitioners have been authorized by the co-owners to pursue
the case on the latter's behalf. 15 Impleading the other co-owners is, therefore,
not mandatory, because, as mentioned earlier, the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all.
In any event, the trial and appellate courts committed reversible error when
they summarily dismissed the case, after both parties had rested their cases
following a protracted trial commencing in 1974, on the sole ground of failure to
implead indispensable parties. The rule is settled that the non-joinder of
indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy
is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added
by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage
of the action and/or at such times as are just. If petitioner refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the
complaint/petition for the plaintiff's/petitioner's failure to comply
therewith. 16 AcIaST
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED, and the
case is REMANDED to the trial court for appropriate proceedings. The trial court
is further DIRECTED to decide on the merits of the civil case WITH DISPATCH.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 161916. January 20, 2006.]
ARNELITO ADLAWAN, petitioner, vs. EMETERIO M. ADLAWAN and NARCISA M.
ADLAWAN, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J p:
Assailed in this petition for review is the September 23, 2003 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921 which set aside the September 13,
2002 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil
Case No. CEB-27806, and reinstated the February 12, 2002 Judgment 3of the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392,
dismissing petitioner Arnelito Adlawan's unlawful detainer suit against
respondents Emeterio and Narcisa Adlawan. Likewise questioned is the January
8, 2004 Resolution 4 of the Court of Appeals which denied petitioner' s motion
for reconsideration.
The instant ejectment suit stemmed from the parties' dispute over Lot 7226 and
the house built thereon, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
8842, 5 registered in the name of the late Dominador Adlawan and located at
Barrio Lipata, Municipality of Minglanilla, Cebu. In his complaint, petitioner
claimed that he is an acknowledged illegitimate child 6 of Dominador who died
on May 28, 1987 without any other issue. Claiming to be the sole heir of
Dominador, he executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself Lot 7226 and the
house built thereon. 7 Out of respect and generosity to respondents who are the
siblings of his father, he granted their plea to occupy the subject property
provided they would vacate the same should his need for the property arise.
Sometime in January 1999, he verbally requested respondents to vacate the
house and lot, but they refused and filed instead an action for quieting of
title 8 with the RTC. Finally, upon respondents' refusal to heed the last demand
letter to vacate dated August 2, 2000, petitioner filed the instant case on August
9, 2000. 9
On the other hand, respondents Narcisa and Emeterio, 70 and 59 years of age,
respectively, 10 denied that they begged petitioner to allow them to stay on the
questioned property and stressed that they have been occupying Lot 7226 and
the house standing thereon since birth. They alleged that Lot 7226 was originally
registered in the name of their deceased father, Ramon Adlawan 11 and the
ancestral house standing thereon was owned by Ramon and their mother, Oligia
Mañacap Adlawan. The spouses had nine 12 children including the late
Dominador and herein surviving respondents Emeterio and Narcisa. During the
lifetime of their parents and deceased siblings, all of them lived on the said
property. Dominador and his wife, Graciana Ramas Adlawan, who died without
issue, also occupied the same. 13 Petitioner, on the other hand, is a stranger
who never had possession of Lot 7226.
Sometime in 1961, spouses Ramon and Oligia needed money to finance the
renovation of their house. Since they were not qualified to obtain a loan, they
transferred ownership of Lot 7226 in the name of their son Dominador who was
the only one in the family who had a college education. By virtue of a January
31, 1962 simulated deed of sale, 14 a title was issued to Dominador which
enabled him to secure a loan with Lot 7226 as collateral. Notwithstanding the
execution of the simulated deed, Dominador, then single, never disputed his
parents' ownership of the lot. He and his wife, Graciana, did not disturb
respondents' possession of the property until they died on May 28, 1987 and
May 6, 1997, respectively. ScCIaA
Respondents also contended that Dominador's signature at the back of
petitioner's birth certificate was forged, hence, the latter is not an heir of
Dominador and has no right to claim ownership of Lot 7226. 15 They argued that
even if petitioner is indeed Dominador's acknowledged illegitimate son, his right
to succeed is doubtful because Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana. 16
On February 12, 2002, the MTC dismissed the complaint holding that the
establishment of petitioner's filiation and the settlement of the estate of
Dominador are conditions precedent to the accrual of petitioner's action for
ejectment. It added that since Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana,
who died 10 years thereafter, her legal heirs are also entitled to their share in
Lot 7226. The dispositive portion thereof, reads:
In View of the foregoing, for failure to prove by preponderance of evidence, the
plaintiff's cause of action, the above-entitled case is hereby Ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED. 17
On appeal by petitioner, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC holding that
the title of Dominador over Lot 7226 cannot be collaterally attacked. It thus
ordered respondents to turn over possession of the controverted lot to
petitioner and to pay compensation for the use and occupation of the premises.
The decretal portion thereof, provides:
Wherefore, the Judgment, dated February 12, 2002, of the Municipal Trial Court
of Minglanilla, Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392, is reversed. Defendants-appellees are
directed to restore to plaintiff-appellant possession of Lot 7226 and the house
thereon, and to pay plaintiff-appellant, beginning in August 2000, compensation
for their use and occupation of the property in the amount of P500.00 a month.
So ordered. 18
Meanwhile, the RTC granted petitioner's motion for execution pending
appeal 19 which was opposed by the alleged nephew and nieces of Graciana in
their motion for leave to intervene and to file an answer in intervention. 20 They
contended that as heirs of Graciana, they have a share in Lot 7226 and that
intervention is necessary to protect their right over the property. In addition,
they declared that as co-owners of the property, they are allowing respondents
to stay in Lot 7226 until a formal partition of the property is made.
The RTC denied the motion for leave to intervene. 21 It, however, recalled the
order granting the execution pending appeal having lost jurisdiction over the
case in view of the petition filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals. 22
On September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the RTC
and reinstated the judgment of the MTC. It ratiocinated that petitioner and the
heirs of Graciana are co-owners of Lot 7226. As such, petitioner cannot eject
respondents from the property via an unlawful detainer suit filed in his own
name and as the sole owner of the property. Thus —
WHEEFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision dated September 13,
2002 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 7, in Civil Case No. CEB-
Page 8 of 49 PROPERTY
27806 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the Judgment dated February 12, 2002
of the Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu, in Civil Case No. 392 is
REINSTATED. Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED. 23
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the instant petition.
The decisive issue to be resolved is whether or not petitioner can validly
maintain the instant case for ejectment.
Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole heir
of Dominador. He in fact executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself the
controverted property. In ruling for the petitioner, the RTC held that the
questioned January 31, 1962 deed of sale validly transferred title to Dominador
and that petitioner is his acknowledged illegitimate son who inherited
ownership of the questioned lot. The Court notes, however, that the RTC lost
sight of the fact that the theory of succession invoked by petitioner would end
up proving that he is not the sole owner of Lot 7226. This is so because
Dominador was survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal wife,
Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of Dominador on May 28,
1987. 24 By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of
Lot 7226. 25 The death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make petitioner the
absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the share of Graciana passed to her
relatives by consanguinity and not to petitioner with whom she had no blood
relations. The Court of Appeals thus correctly held that petitioner has no
authority to institute the instant action as the sole owner of Lot 7226. HaIATC
Petitioner contends that even granting that he has co-owners over Lot 7226, he
can on his own file the instant case pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code
which provides:
ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.
This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487
includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of
possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de
reivindicacion). 26 A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of
joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to
have been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be stressed, however, that
where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole
owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should
be dismissed. 27
The renowned civilist, Professor Arturo M. Tolentino, explained —
. . . A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the
other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for
the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that
he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will
not prosper. (Emphasis added) 28
In Baloloy v. Hular, 29 respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title claiming
exclusive ownership of the property, but the evidence showed that respondent
has co-owners over the property. In dismissing the complaint for want of
respondent's authority to file the case, the Court held that —
Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an
action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of
possession, including an accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A co-
owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-
owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the
benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the
others but if such judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of
the unimpleaded co-owners. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone
who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession thereof, the
action will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are
indispensable parties.
In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership
over the subject property and praying that he be declared the sole owner
thereof. There is no proof that the other co-owners had waived their rights over
the subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners
were aware of the case in the trial court. The trial court rendered judgment
declaring the respondent as the sole owner of the property and entitled to its
possession, to the prejudice of the latter's siblings. Patently then, the decision of
the trial court is erroneous.
Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was mandated to
implead his siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties. The respondent
failed to comply with the rule. It must, likewise, be stressed that the Republic of
the Philippines is also an indispensable party as defendant because the
respondent sought the nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based
on Free Patent No. 384019. Unless the State is impleaded as party-defendant,
any decision of the Court would not be binding on it. It has been held that the
absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the
proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment.
The absence of the respondent's siblings, as parties, rendered all proceedings
subsequent to the filing thereof, including the judgment of the court, ineffective
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to
those present. 30
In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful
detainer in his name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs
of Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of self-adjudication over the
disputed property. It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain
the instant action considering that he does not recognize the co-ownership that
necessarily flows from his theory of succession to the property of his father,
Dominador.
In the same vein, there is no merit in petitioner's claim that he has the legal
personality to file the present unlawful detainer suit because the ejectment of
respondents would benefit not only him but also his alleged co-owners.
However, petitioner forgets that he filed the instant case to acquire possession
of the property and to recover damages. If granted, he alone will gain possession
of the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages to the
exclusion of the heirs of Graciana. Hence, petitioner cannot successfully
capitalize on the alleged benefit to his co-owners. Incidentally, it should be
pointed out that in default of the said heirs of Graciana, whom petitioner
labeled as "fictitious heirs," the State will inherit her share 31 and will thus be
petitioner's co-owner entitled to possession and enjoyment of the
property. SaAcHE
The present controversy should be differentiated from the cases where the
Court upheld the right of a co-owner to file a suit pursuant to Article 487 of the
Civil Code. In Resuena v. Court of Appeals, 32 and Sering v. Plazo, 33 the co-
owners who filed the ejectment case did not represent themselves as the
exclusive owner of the property. In Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa
Santiago, 34 the complaint for quieting of title was brought in behalf of the co-
owners precisely to recover lots owned in common. 35 Similarly in Vencilao v.
Camarenta, et al., 36 the amended complaint specified that the plaintiff is one
of the heirs who co-owns the controverted properties.
In the foregoing cases, the plaintiff never disputed the existence of a co-
ownership nor claimed to be the sole or exclusive owner of the litigated lot. A
favorable decision therein would of course inure to the benefit not only of the
plaintiff but to his co-owners as well. The instant case, however, presents an
entirely different backdrop as petitioner vigorously asserted absolute and sole
ownership of the questioned lot. In his complaint, petitioner made the following
allegations, to wit:
3. The plaintiff was the only son (illegitimate) and sole heir of the late
DOMINADOR ADLAWAN who died intestate on 28 May 1987 without any other
descendant nor ascendant . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
5. Being the only child/descendant and, therefore, sole heir of the deceased
Dominador Adlawan, the plaintiff became the absolute owner, and
automatically took POSSESSION, of the aforementioned house and lot. . .
(Emphasis added) 37
Clearly, the said cases find no application here because petitioner's action
operates as a complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership and not in
representation or recognition thereof. Dismissal of the complaint is therefore
proper. As noted by Former Supreme Court Associate Justice Edgrado L. Paras
"[i]t is understood, of course, that the action [under Article 487 of the Civil Code]
is being instituted for all. Hence, if the co-owner expressly states that he is
bringing the case only for himself, the action should not be allowed to
prosper." 38
Indeed, respondents' not less than four decade actual physical possession of the
questioned ancestral house and lot deserves to be respected especially so that
petitioner failed to show that he has the requisite personality and authority as
co-owner to file the instant case. Justice dictates that respondents who are now
in the twilight years of their life be granted possession of their ancestral
property where their parents and siblings lived during their lifetime, and where
they, will probably spend the remaining days of their life.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 23, 2003 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 74921 which reinstated the February 12,
2002 Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court of Minglanilla, Metro Cebu,
dismissing petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 392, and its January 8, 2004
Resolution, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 120864. October 8, 2003.]
MANUEL T. DE GUIA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Former Sixth Division)
and JOSE B. ABEJO, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Hermenegilda Abejo-
Rivera, respondents.
SYNOPSIS
The subject fishpond has a total area of 79,220 square meters, co-owned by
Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego, married to Juan Abejo, and registered in
their names under TCT No. 6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds. Petitioner De
Guia, along with a certain Aniano Vieta, acquired possession of the entire
fishpond by virtue of a document captioned Salin ng Pamumusisyong ng
Palaisdaan (Lease Contract) executed between him and the heirs of Primitiva
Lejano, effective from 30 July 1974 to 30 November 1979 for a consideration of
Pl00,000 with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo Abejo, the sole heir of
Lorenza Araniego Abejo who acquired 1/2 undivided share of the latter by
intestate succession. Teofilo Abejo, now deceased, sold his undivided share in
the fishpond to his son Abejo. Despite the expiration of the lease contract, De
Guia continued to possess the entire fishpond and to derive income therefrom
despite. several demands to vacate by Teofilo Abejo and by his successor-in-
interest, Abejo. The last demand letter was dated 22 November 1983. Abejo
filed his complaint for recovery of possession with damages against De Guia for
the other 1/2 undivided portion of the fishpond which has not been finally
adjudicated for or against him. De Guia offered as evidence of his ownership of
the other undivided portion of the fishpond the verified Complaint for
Page 9 of 49 PROPERTY
Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage and Contract of Lease (Kasunduan ng
Sanglaan and Kasulatan ng Pagbubuwis ng Palaisdaan) with Preliminary
Injunction signed by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano which he filed for himself and
in representation as attorney-in-fact of said heirs. He alleged that he acquired
his 1/2 undivided share in the fishpond from the Lejano Heirs in 1986, and that
they filed the complaint for annulment of said document because Primitiva
Lejano allegedly signed these documents under duress and without
consideration.
The trial court rendered judgment against De Guia, holding: a) that ABEJO has
the right to demand that DE GUIA vacate and surrender an area equivalent to
ABEJO'S. share in the fishpond, but in the meantime, due to lack of evidence of
judicial or extrajudicial partition of the property, DE GUIA was ordered to pay a
reasonable amount as rental for the use of ABEJO's share; (b) that DE GUIA and
the Lejano Heirs as well as their successors-in-interest are not entitled to the
relief prayed for in the amended complaint to annul the Kasunduan ng Sanglaan
and Kasulatan ng Pagbubuwis ng Palaisdaan andDISMISSED the same for lack of
cause of action. The trial court likewise declared the "Kasunduan ng
Sanglaan" as valid and ordered the sheriff to proceed to foreclose the aforesaid
mortgage.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and held, among
others, that: (a) there is no irregularity in the execution of the aforementioned
contract of mortgage; and (b) ABEJO's right over his 1/2 undivided share in the
fishpond justified the action for recovery of possession. The trial court's decision
effectively enforces Abejo's right over the property which was violated by DE
GUIA by possession and use without paying compensation. According to the
Court of Appeals, partition would constitute a mechanical aspect of the decision,
just like accounting when necessary.
On review; the Supreme Court ruled that the petition is partly meritorious, and
held: (a) that any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against
a third person, but also against another co-owner who takes exclusive
possession and asserts exclusive ownership of the property. In the latter case,
however, the only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-
ownership, but the plaintiff cannot recover a material or determinate part of a
common property prior to partition; (b) the courts cannot proceed without the
actual partitioning of the property, hence, judicial or extrajudicial partition is
necessary; (c) despite DE GUIA'S acquisition of his 1/2 undivided share in the
fishpond on Nov. 22, 1983, after the expiration of his lease of the entire
fishpond which was agreed upon by the Lejano heirs and Teofilo Abejo in 1979,
DE GUIA should pay reasonable rent to ABEJO corresponding to the latter's
share of the 1/2 undivided portion computed at the yearly rental of
P825,000.00.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the 22 August 1994
Decision 2 as well as the 27 June 1995 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 39875. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision 3 of the Regional
Trial Court ("trial court") of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 16, in Civil Case No. 8796-
M. The trial court's Decision ordered petitioner Manuel T. De Guia ("DE GUIA")
to turn over to private respondent Jose B. Abejo ("ABEJO") possession of the one
half (½) undivided portion of a fishpond and to pay actual damages and
attorney's fees.
The Antecedents
On 12 May 1986, ABEJO 4 instituted an action for recovery of possession with
damages against DE GUIA. In his complaint, ABEJO alleged that he is the owner
of the ½ undivided portion of a property used as a fishpond ("FISHPOND")
situated in Meycauayan, Bulacan and covered by TCT No. T-6358 of the Bulacan
Register of Deeds. He alleged ownership over approximately 39,611 square
meters out of the FISHPOND's total area of 79,220 square meters. ABEJO further
averred that DE GUIA continues to possess and use the FISHPOND without any
contract and without paying rent to ABEJO's damage and prejudice. ABEJO also
complained that DE GUIA refuses to surrender ownership and possession of the
FISHPOND despite repeated demands to do so after DE GUIA's sublease contract
over the FISHPOND had expired. ABEJO asked the trial court to order DE GUIA to
vacate an approximate area of 39,611 square meters as well as pay damages.
DE GUIA, a lawyer by profession, appeared on his own behalf. He filed his
Answer on 12 January 1990 after the Court of Appeals resolved several issues
concerning the validity of the service of summons on him. In his Answer, DE
GUIA alleged that the complaint does not state a cause of action and has
prescribed. He claimed that the FISHPOND was originally owned by Maxima
Termulo who died intestate with Primitiva Lejano as her only heir. According to
him, ABEJO is not the owner of the entire FISHPOND but the heirs of Primitiva
Lejano who authorized him to possess the entire FISHPOND. He assailed ABEJO's
ownership of the ½ undivided portion of the FISHPOND as void and claimed
ownership over an undivided half portion of the FISHPOND for himself. DE GUIA
sought payment of damages and reimbursement for the improvements he
introduced as a builder in good faith.
The trial court set the pre-trial and required the parties to file their pre-trial
briefs. ABEJO filed his pre-trial brief 5 on 05 April 1990. DE GUIA filed his pre-trial
brief 6 on 31 July 1990. DE GUIA's pre-trial brief raised as the only issue in the
case the amount of damages in the form of rent that DE GUIA should pay ABEJO.
DE GUIA also submitted an Offer to Compromise, 7 offering to settle ABEJO's
claim for P300,000 and to lease the entire FISHPOND to any party of ABEJO's
choice.
Hearing commenced on 30 July 1990. ABEJO rested his case on 4 December
1990. DE GUIA's last witness completed her testimony on 22 November 1991.
The trial court summarized the evidence presented by ABEJO and DE GUIA as
follows:
Evidence adduced from plaintiff shows that there are two parcels of land
covering a fishpond with a total area of 79,220 sq. m. more or less, situated at
Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan and covered by TCT No. 6358 equally owned by
Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego married to Juan Abejo (Exh. A). The one
half undivided portion owned by Lorenza Araniego corresponding to 39,611 sq.
m. was later purchased by plaintiff from his father Teofilo Abejo (Exh. B), the
only heir of the original owner on November 22, 1983. Prior to this sale on July
30, 1974 the whole fishpond (79,220) was the subject of a "Salin ng
Pamumusisyong ng Palaisdaan" executed by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano with
the knowledge and consent of Teofilo A. Abejo in favor of one Aniano Victa and
defendant. The contract provided that the period of lease shall be until
November 30, 1979. When the contract expired and defendant failed to
surrender the fishpond, written demands the last of which was on November 27,
1983 were made for defendants to pay back rental and to vacate the premises in
question (Exh. D & E). Defendant refused to deliver possession and also to pay
the rentals due. In anticipation, however, that defendant will vacate the
fishpond, plaintiff, on December 21, 1983 entered into a two year "Kasunduan
ng Buwisan ng Palaisdaan" with Ruperto C. Villarico for a consideration of
P50,000.00 (Exh. G). This contract, despite its execution and even already
notarized, had to be cancelled and the amount of P50,000.00 returned by
plaintiff to Villarico when the defendant did not heed the demand to vacate the
fishpond. For unpaid rental, actual as well as moral and exemplary damages,
plaintiff asks payment of P450,000.00 and P20,000.00 attorney's fees.
On the other hand, defendant's evidence tends to show that the entire fishpond
with an area of 79,200 sq. m. was leased to him by the heirs of Primitiva Lejano.
Subsequently, defendant became the absolute owner of one half of the
undivided area of the fishpond and he questioned plaintiffs ownership of the
other half as void and fraudulent. As to the area pertaining to plaintiff,
defendant claimed that he introduced improvements worth P500,000 and being
in good faith, he asked that he should be reimbursed by plaintiff. In his pre-trial
brief, however, defendant raised the only issue which is the amount of damages
plaintiff is entitled to in the form of rental. Hence, the thrust of the testimonies
of defendant's witnesses particularly Ben Ruben Camargo and Marta Fernando
Peña was the amount of rental of fishponds in the same locality as the fishpond
in question at a given time. However, the documentary evidence (Exhs. 1 and 2)
in support of their testimony were not offered as evidence. 8
The trial court rendered its decision on 8 June 1992, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
plaintiff and against the defendant and hereby orders that:
1. Defendant shall turn over possession to plaintiff one half undivided portion of
the 79,200 sq. m. fishpond who shall enjoy the benefits and fruits in equal share
with the defendant effective immediately until such time that partition of the
property is effected;
2. Defendant shall pay to plaintiff the amount of P262,500.00 by way of actual or
compensatory damages;
3. Defendant shall pay plaintiff P20,000.00 as and for attorney's fees; and
4. To pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 9
Aggrieved, DE GUIA went to the Court of Appeals insisting the trial court erred in
ordering him to vacate and surrender possession of the ½ undivided portion of
the FISHPOND and to pay actual damages and attorney's fees. The Court of
Appeals found DE GUIA's appeal without merit and affirmed the trial court's
decision. Upon DE GUIA's motion for reconsideration, the appellate court
reduced the compensatory damages from P262,500 to P212,500.
Hence, the instant petition.
The undisputed facts as found by the trial court and adopted in toto by the Court
of Appeals are restated as follows:
1. The subject of the dispute are two undivided parcels of land used as a
fishpond situated in Barrio Ubihan, Meycauayan, Bulacan, originally co-owned
by Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza Araniego married to Juan Abejo.
2. The FISHPOND is registered under the names of Primitiva Lejano and Lorenza
Araniego under TCT No. 6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds as follows:
PRIMITIVA LEJANO, Filipina, of legal age, single — ½ share; and LORENZA
ARANIEGO, Filipina, of legal age, married to Juan Abejo, ½ share, —
3. The FISHPOND has a total land area of approximately 79,220 square meters.
ABEJO is seeking to recover possession of the ½ undivided portion of the
FISHPOND containing 39,611 square meters.
4. DE GUIA (along with a certain Aniano Victa) acquired possession of the entire
FISHPOND by virtue of a document captioned Salin ng Pamumusisyong ng
Palaisdaan ("Lease Contract") executed between him and the heirs of Primitiva
Lejano. The Lease Contract was effective from 30 July 1974 up to 30 November
1979 for a consideration of P100,000.
5. The Lease Contract was executed with the knowledge and consent of Teofilo
Abejo, sole heir of Lorenza Araniego Abejo. Teofilo Abejo acquired Lorenza
Araniego Abejo's ½ undivided share in the FISHPOND by intestate succession.
6. Teofilo Abejo (now deceased) sold his ½ undivided share in the FISHPOND to
his son, ABEJO, on 22 November 1983.
Page 10 of 49 PROPERTY
7. DE GUIA continues to possess the entire FISHPOND and to derive income from
the property despite the expiration of the Lease Contract and several demands
to vacate made by Teofilo Abejo and by his successor-in-interest, ABEJO. The last
demand letter was dated 27 November 1983.
8. ABEJO filed his complaint for recovery of possession with damages against DE
GUIA on 12 May 1986.
9. DE GUIA's claim of ownership over the other ½ undivided portion of the
FISHPOND has not been finally adjudicated for or against him.
DE GUIA offers the verified Complaint for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage
and Contract of Lease with Preliminary Injunction signed by the heirs of Primitiva
Lejano as proof of his ownership of the other undivided half portion of the
FISHPOND. Records show that DE GUIA filed the complaint for himself and as
attorney-in fact of the heirs of Primitiva Lejano ("Lejano Heirs") 10 against
Spouses Teofilo Morte and Angelina Villarico, Spouses Ruperto and Milagros
Villarico, et al. ("Defendants"). The case was raffled to Branch 12 of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, and docketed as Civil Case. No. 86-27-M. The
complaint alleged that DE GUIA acquired his ½ undivided share in the FISHPOND
from the Lejano Heirs in February 1986. DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs sought to
annul the Kasulatan ng Sanglaan and Kasulatan ng Pagbubuwis ng Palaisdaan,
executed on 10 November 1979 by Primitiva Lejano in favor of the Defendants.
DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs claimed that Primitiva Lejano signed these
documents under duress and without consideration.
The trial court rendered judgment 11 on 28 February 1992 against DE GUIA and
the Lejano Heirs as follows:
WHEREFORE, the evidence having shown the plaintiffs, particularly Manuel De
Guia, their successor-in-interest, not entitled upon the facts and the law to the
relief prayed for in the amended complaint, the same is hereby DISMISSED with
costs against said plaintiff. Instead, as prayed for by defendants, judgment is
hereby rendered:
1. Declaring the "Kasulatan ng Sanglaan" (Exhs. "A" & "1") dated November 10,
1979, and the "Kasulatan ng Pagbubuwis ng Palaisdaan" (Exhs. "C" & "3") also
dated November 10, 1979, as valid for all legal intents and purposes;
2. Ordering the Ex-Officio Sheriff, RTC, Bulacan, to proceed with the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the subject real estate mortgage; and
3. Ordering plaintiffs to pay defendants attorney's fees in the amount of
P20,000.00.
SO ORDERED. 12
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court in a Decision dated 30 August 2002
in CA-G.R. CV No. 38031. The Court of Appeals found the claim of force and
intimidation in the execution of the documents as highly improbable since
Primitiva Lejano's son, Renato Davis, witnessed the signing of the documents
and found nothing irregular at the time. The appellate court also held that
assuming Defendants threatened DE GUIA and the Lejano Heirs with immediate
foreclosure, Defendants were merely exercising their legitimate right of
foreclosing the mortgaged property for non-payment of the loan. In addition,
Primitiva Lejano's lawyer and notary public, Atty. Mamerto Abaño, testified that
the parties appeared before him to affirm the contents of the documents. He
also stated that he was present when Defendants paid Primitiva Lejano Davis
and her son Renato. As of this writing, DE GUIA has a pending motion for
reconsideration before the Court of Appeals. In the event the Court of Appeals'
Decision attains finality, DE GUIA may lose whatever right he claims over the
FISHPOND.
The Trial Court's Ruling
The trial court ruled that ABEJO has the right to demand that DE GUIA vacate
and surrender an area equivalent to ABEJO's ½ undivided share in the
FISHPOND. The trial court explained that DE GUIA's sublease contract expired in
1979 and ABEJO acquired his father's share in 1983. However, the trial court
pointed out that ABEJO failed to present evidence of the judicial or extra-judicial
partition of the FISHPOND. The identification of the specific area pertaining to
ABEJO and his co-owner is vital in an action to recover possession of real
property. Nevertheless, the trial court declared that pending partition, it is only
just that DE GUIA pay ABEJO a reasonable amount as rental for the use of
ABEJO's share in the FISHPOND. DE GUIA admitted this obligation when he
raised as sole issue in his pre-trial brief how much rent he should pay ABEJO. DE
GUIA even proposed P300,000 as the reasonable amount but under certain
conditions which ABEJO found unacceptable.
In determining the reasonable rent due to ABEJO, the trial court considered the
Lease Contract between ABEJO and a certain Ruperto C. Villarico which provided
for a yearly rent of P25,000 for ½ undivided portion of the FISHPOND. The trial
court declared that the total amount of rent due is P212,500, computed from
November 1983 when ABEJO became a co-owner of the FISHPOND up to
1991 13 or a period of eight and one half years. The trial court further ordered
DE GUIA to pay an additional P50,000 which represents the amount ABEJO
returned to Ruperto C. Villarico when they cancelled the Lease Contract
between them due to DE GUIA's refusal to vacate the FISHPOND.
Lastly, the trial court ruled that pending partition, ABEJO as co-owner has the
right to possess the FISHPOND and to receive an equal share in the benefits
from the FISHPOND effective immediately. Until there is a partition, and while
there is no contract of lease, the Civil Code provisions on co-ownership shall
govern the rights of the parties.
The Court of Appeals' Ruling
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. The Court of Appeals
debunked DE GUIA's claim that partition and not recovery of possession was the
proper remedy under the circumstances. The Court of Appeals pointed out that
DE GUIA's failure to respect ABEJO's right over his ½ undivided share in the
FISHPOND justifies the action for recovery of possession. The trial court's
decision effectively enforces ABEJO's right over the property which DE GUIA
violated by possession and use without paying compensation. According to the
Court of Appeals, partition would constitute a mechanical aspect of the decision
just like accounting when necessary.
The Court of Appeals likewise rejected DE GUIA's claim that the award of
compensatory damages of P242,000, computed based on the rent stipulated in
the Lease Contract between ABEJO and Ruperto C. Villarico, is grossly exorbitant.
The Court of Appeals clarified that the amount the trial court awarded was
P262,500 and not P242,000 as erroneously alleged by DE GUIA. The Court of
Appeals pointed out that the notarized Lease Contract between ABEJO and
Ruperto C. Villarico carries more evidentiary weight than the testimonies of DE
GUIA's witnesses, Ben Ruben Camargo and Marta Fernando Peña. The Court of
Appeals also upheld the award of attorney's fees since the parties could have
avoided litigation had DE GUIA heeded the justifiable demands of ABEJO. aCATSI
On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals reduced the compensatory
damages from P262,500 to P212,500. The Court of Appeals explained that the
trial court correctly computed the total amount of rent due at P212,500. The
trial court erred, however, in adding the sum of P50,000 representing the rent
for 1983 and 1984 which ABEJO returned to Ruperto C. Villarico. The appellate
court clarified that the sum of P212,500 was arrived at by multiplying the rent of
P25,000 by 8½ years. The 8½ year period already included the two months rent
received from and then subsequently reimbursed to Ruperto C. Villarico.
The Issues
DE GUIA raises the following issues in his Memorandum:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION
DENYING PETITIONER'S PLEA FOR DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE
TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT'S ORDER
DIRECTING PETITIONER TO TURN OVER THE ONE-HALF UNDIVIDED PORTION OF
THE FISHPOND WHICH IS STILL UNDER A STATE OF CO-OWNERSHIP;
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING, IN PART, THE AWARD OF ACTUAL
OR COMPENSATORY DAMAGES DESPITE LACK OF CREDIBLE EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT THE SAME;
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
IN PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S FAVOR. 14
In essence, this Court is asked to resolve: (1) whether an action for recovery of
possession and turn-over of the ½ undivided portion of a common property is
proper before partition; and (2) whether there is sufficient basis for the award of
compensatory damages and attorney's fees.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
First and Second Issues: Cause of Action and Turn-Over of Possession
DE GUIA contends that a co-owner cannot claim a definite portion from the
property owned in common until there is a partition. DE GUIA argues that ABEJO
should have filed an action for partition instead of recovery of possession since
the court cannot implement any decision in the latter case without first a
partition. DE GUIA contends that an action for recovery of possession cannot
prosper when the property subject of the action is part of an undivided, co-
owned property. The procedural mode adopted by ABEJO, which is recovery of
possession, makes enforcement difficult if not impossible since there is still no
partition of the subject property.
Under Article 484 of the Civil Code, "there is co-ownership whenever the
ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different persons." A co-
owner of an undivided parcel of land is an "owner of the whole, and over the
whole he exercises the right of dominion, but he is at the same time the owner
of a portion which is truly abstract." 15 On the other hand, there is no co-
ownership when the different portions owned by different people are already
concretely determined and separately identifiable, even if not yet technically
described. 16
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides, "[a]ny one of the co-owners may bring an
action in ejectment." This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of
possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion
interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of
ownership (accion de reivindicacion). The summary actions of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer seek the recovery of physical possession only. These actions
are brought before municipal trial courts within one year from dispossession.
However, accion publiciana, which is a plenary action for recovery of the right to
possess, falls under the jurisdiction of the proper regional trial court when the
dispossession has lasted for more than one year. Accion de reivindicacion, which
seeks the recovery of ownership, also falls under the jurisdiction of the proper
regional trial court. 17
Any co-owner may file an action under Article 487 not only against a third
person, but also against another co-owner who takes exclusive possession and
Page 11 of 49 PROPERTY
asserts exclusive ownership of the property. 18 In the latter case, however, the
only purpose of the action is to obtain recognition of the co-ownership. The
plaintiff cannot seek exclusion of the defendant from the property because as
co-owner he has a right of possession. The plaintiff cannot recover any material
or determinate part of the property. 19
In Hermogena G. Engreso with Spouse Jose Engreso v. Nestoria De La Cruz and
Herminio De La Cruz, 20 we reiterated the rule that a co-owner cannot recover a
material or determinate part of a common property prior to partition as follows:
It is a basic principle in civil law that before a property owned in common is
actually partitioned, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the entire property. A co-owner has no right to demand a
concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common because
until division is effected his right over the thing is represented only by an ideal
portion.
As such, the only effect of an action brought by a co-owner against a co-owner
will be to obtain recognition of the co-ownership; the defendant cannot be
excluded from a specific portion of the property because as a co-owner he has a
right to possess and the plaintiff cannot recover any material or determinate
part of the property. Thus, the courts a quo erred when they ordered the
delivery of one-half (½) of the building in favor of private respondent.
Indisputably, DE GUIA has been in exclusive possession of the entire FISHPOND
since July 1974. Initially, DE GUIA disputed ABEJO's claim of ownership over the
½ undivided portion of the FISHPOND. Subsequently, he implicitly recognized
ABEJO's ½ undivided share by offering to settle the case for P300,000 and to
vacate the property. During the trial proper, neither DE GUIA nor ABEJO
asserted or manifested a claim of absolute and exclusive ownership over the
entire FISHPOND. Before this Court, DE GUIA limits the issues to the propriety of
bringing an action for recovery of possession and the recovery of compensatory
damages.
Following the inherent and peculiar features of co-ownership, while ABEJO and
DE GUIA have equal shares in the FISHPOND quantitatively speaking, they have
the same right in a qualitative sense as co-owners. Simply stated, ABEJO and DE
GUIA are owners of the whole and over the whole, they exercise the right of
dominion. However, they are at the same time individual owners of a ½ portion,
which is truly abstract because until there is partition, such portion remains
indeterminate or unidentified. 21 As co-owners, ABEJO and DE GUIA may jointly
exercise the right of dominion over the entire FISHPOND until they partition the
FISHPOND by identifying or segregating their respective portions.
Since a co-ownership subsists between ABEJO and DE GUIA, judicial or extra-
judicial partition is the proper recourse. An action to demand partition is
imprescriptible and not subject to laches. 22 Each co-owner may demand at any
time the partition of the common property unless a co-owner has repudiated
the co-ownership under certain conditions. 23 Neither ABEJO nor DE GUIA has
repudiated the co-ownership under the conditions set by law.
To recapitulate, we rule that a co-owner may file an action for recovery of
possession against a co-owner who takes exclusive possession of the entire co-
owned property. However, the only effect of such action is a recognition of the
co-ownership. The courts cannot proceed with the actual partitioning of the co-
owned property. Thus, judicial or extra-judicial partition is necessary to effect
physical division of the FISHPOND between ABEJO and DE GUIA. An action for
partition is also the proper forum for accounting the profits received by DE GUIA
from the FISHPOND. However, as a necessary consequence of such recognition,
ABEJO shall exercise an equal right to possess, use and enjoy the entire
FISHPOND.
DE GUIA further claims that the trial and appellate courts erred when they
ordered the recovery of rent when the exact identity of the portion in question
had not yet been clearly defined and delineated. According to DE GUIA, an order
to pay damages in the form of rent is premature before partition.
We disagree.
The right of enjoyment by each co-owner is limited by a similar right of the other
co-owners. A co-owner cannot devote common property to his exclusive use to
the prejudice of the co-ownership. 24 Hence, if the subject is a residential house,
all the co-owners may live there with their respective families to the extent
possible. However, if one co-owner alone occupies the entire house without
opposition from the other co-owners, and there is no lease agreement, the
other co-owners cannot demand the payment of rent. Conversely, if there is an
agreement to lease the house, the co-owners can demand rent from the co-
owner who dwells in the house.
The co-owners can either exercise an equal right to live in the house, or agree to
lease it. If they fail to exercise any of these options, they must bear the
consequences. It would be unjust to require the co-owner to pay rent after the
co-owners by their silence have allowed him to use the property. 25
In case the co-owners agree to lease a building owned in common, a co-owner
cannot retain it for his use without paying the proper rent. 26 Moreover, where
part of the property is occupied exclusively by some co-owners for the
exploitation of an industry, the other co-owners become co-participants in the
accessions of the property and should share in its net profits. 27
The Lejano Heirs and Teofilo Abejo agreed to lease the entire FISHPOND to DE
GUIA. After DE GUIA's lease expired in 1979, he could no longer use the entire
FISHPOND without paying rent. To allow DE GUIA to continue using the entire
FISHPOND without paying rent would prejudice ABEJO's right to receive rent,
which would have accrued to his ½ share in the FISHPOND had it been leased to
others. 28 Since ABEJO acquired his ½ undivided share in the FISHPOND on 22
November 1983, DE GUIA should pay ABEJO reasonable rent for his possession
and use of ABEJO's portion beginning from that date. The compensatory
damages of P25,000 per year awarded to ABEJO is the fair rental value or the
reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the leased
property, 29 considering the circumstances at that time. DE GUIA shall continue
to pay ABEJO a yearly rent of P25,000 corresponding to ABEJO's ½ undivided
share in the FISHPOND. However, ABEJO has the option either to exercise an
equal right to occupy the FISHPOND, or to file a new petition before the trial
court to fix a new rental rate in view of changed circumstances in the last 20
years.
ABEJO made an extrajudicial demand on DE GUIA by sending the 27 November
1983 demand letter. Thus, the rent in arrears should earn interest at 6% per
annum from 27 November 1983 until finality of this decision pursuant to Article
2209 30 of the Civil Code. Thereafter, the interest rate is 12% per annum from
finality of this decision until full payment. 31
Third Issue: Lack of Credible Evidence to Support Award of Compensatory
Damages
DE GUIA contends the P212,500 in rent awarded to ABEJO is exorbitant. He
assails as doubtful and self-serving evidence the Lease Contract between ABEJO
and Ruperto C. Villarico that served as basis for the yearly rent of P25,000 for
ABEJO's share in the FISHPOND.
DE GUIA says the trial and appellate courts should have given credence to the
testimonies of his witnesses, Ben Ruben Camargo ("Camargo") and Marta
Fernando Peña ("Peña") that rentals of fishponds in the same vicinity are for
much lesser considerations.
This issue involves calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of witnesses. As a rule, a party may raise only questions of law in an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Supreme Court is
not duty-bound to analyze and weigh again the evidence considered in the
proceedings below. 32 More so in the instant case, where the Court of Appeals
affirmed the factual findings of the trial court. 33
It is not true that the trial court disregarded the testimonies of Camargo and
Peña because DE GUIA failed to present documentary evidence to support their
testimonies. Actually, the trial and appellate courts found the testimonies of
Camargo and Peña unconvincing. Judges cannot be expected to rely on the
testimonies of every witness. In ascertaining the facts, they determine who are
credible and who are not. In doing so, they consider all the evidence before
them. 34
We find no cogent reason to overturn the trial and appellate courts' evaluation
of the witnesses' testimonies. We likewise find reasonable the P25,000 yearly
compensation for ABEJO's ½ undivided share in the FISHPOND. Indeed, being a
question of fact, it is for the trial and appellate courts to decide and this Court
will not disturb their findings unless clearly baseless or irrational. The exception
does not obtain in this case.
Fourth Issue: Attorney's Fees
The trial court did not err in imposing attorney's fees of P20,000. Attorney's fees
can be awarded in the cases enumerated in Article 2208 of the Civil Code
specifically:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Where the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate
with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest;
xxx xxx xxx
DE GUIA is a lawyer and he should have known that a co-owner could not take
exclusive possession of a common property. Although DE GUIA offered to settle
the case out of court, such offer was made under conditions not acceptable to
ABEJO. Certainly, ABEJO was still put to unnecessary expense and trouble to
protect his interest under paragraph (2), Article 2208 of the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 22 August 1994 and Resolution dated 27 June
1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 39875 is AFFIRMED with respect
to that portion ordering Manuel T. De Guia to pay Jose B. Abejo compensatory
damages of P212,500 and attorney's fees of P20,000, and MODIFIED as follows:
1. The co-ownership between Manuel T. De Guia and Jose B. Abejo over the
entire FISHPOND covered by TCT No. 6358 of the Bulacan Register of Deeds is
recognized without prejudice to the outcome of CA-G.R. CV No. 38031 pending
before the Court of Appeals and other cases involving the same property;
2. Manuel T. De Guia and Jose B. Abejo shall equally enjoy possession and use of
the entire FISHPOND prior to partition;
3. The compensatory damages of P25,000 per annum representing rent from 27
November 1983 until May 1992 shall earn interest at 6% per annum from 27
November 1983 until finality of this decision, and thereafter at 12% per annum
until full payment;
4. Manuel T. de Guia shall pay Jose B. Abejo a yearly rent of P25,000 from June
1992 until finality of this decision, with interest at 6% per annum during the
same period, and thereafter at 12% interest per annum until full payment;
5. After finality of this decision and for as long as Manuel T. de Guia exclusively
possesses the entire FISHPOND, he shall pay Jose B. Abejo a yearly rental of
P25,000 for the latter's ½ undivided share in the FISHPOND, unless Jose B. Abejo
secures from the proper court an order fixing a different rental rate in view of
possible changed circumstances. ADaSET
SO ORDERED.
Page 12 of 49 PROPERTY
[G.R. No. 78178. April 15, 1988.]
DELIA BAILON-CASILAO, LUZ PAULINO-ANG, EMMA PAULINO-YBANEZ, NILDA
PAULINO-TOLENTINO, and SABINA BAILON, petitioners, vs.THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and CELESTINO AFABLE, respondents.
Veronico E. Rubio for petitioners.
Mario G. Fortes for private-respondent.
DECISION
CORTES, J p:
The fate of petitioners' claim over a parcel of land rests ultimately on a
determination of whether or not said petitioners are chargeable with such
laches as may effectively bar their present action.
The petitioners herein filed a case for recovery of property and damages with
notice of lis pendens on March 13, 1981 against the defendant and herein
private respondent, Celestino Afable. The parcel of land involved in this case,
with an area of 48,849 square meters, is covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. 1771 issued on June 12, 1931, in the names of Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina,
Bernabe, Nenita and Delia, all surnamed Bailon, as co-owners, each with a 1/6
share. Gaudencio and Nenita are now dead, the latter being represented in this
case by her children, Luz, Emma and Nilda. Bernabe went to China in 1931 and
had not been heard from since then [Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, p.
39].
It appears that on August 23, 1948, Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon sold a
portion of the said land consisting of 16,283 square meters to Donato Delgado.
On May 13, 1949, Rosalia Bailon alone sold the remainder of the land consisting
of 32,566 square meters to Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza. On the same date,
Lanuza acquired from Delgado the 16,283 square meters of land which the latter
had earlier acquired from Rosalia and Gaudencio. On December 3, 1975, John
Lanuza, acting under a special power of attorney given by his wife, Ponciana V.
Aresgado de Lanuza, sold the two parcels of land to Celestino Afable, Sr.
In all these transfers, it was stated in the deeds of sale that the land was not
registered under the provisions of Act No. 496 when the fact is that it is. It
appears that said land had been successively declared for taxation first, in the
name of Ciriaca Dellamas, mother of the registered co-owners, then in the name
of Rosalia Bailon in 1924, then in that of Donato Delgado in 1936, then in
Ponciana de Lanuza's name in 1962 and finally in the name of Celestino Afable,
Sr. in 1983.
In his answer to the complaint filed by the herein petitioners, Afable claimed
that he had acquired the land in question through prescription and contended
that the petitioners were guilty of laches. He later filed a third-party complaint
against Rosalia Bailon for damages allegedly suffered as a result of the sale to
him of the land.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision:
1. Finding and declaring Celestino Afable, a co-owner of the land described in
paragraph III of the complaint having validly bought the two-sixth (2/6)
respective undivided shares of Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon;
2. Finding and declaring the following as pro-indiviso co-owners, having 1/6
share each, of the property described in paragraph III of the complaint, to wit:
a. Sabina Bailon
b. Bernabe Bailon
c. Heirs of Nenita Bailon-Paulino
d. Delia Bailon-Casilao;
3. Ordering the segregation of the undivided interests in the property in order to
terminate co-ownership to be conducted by any Geodetic Engineer selected by
the parties to delineate the specific part of each of the co-owners.
4. Ordering the defendant to restore the possession of the plaintiffs' respective
shares as well as all attributes of absolute dominion;
5. Ordering the defendant to pay the following:
a. P5,000.00 as damages;
b. P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and;
c. to pay the costs.
[Decision of the Trial Court, Rollo, p. 37-38].
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower
court insofar as it held that prescription does not lie against plaintiffs-appellees
because they are co-owners of the original vendors. However, the appellate
court declared that, although registered property cannot be lost by prescription,
nevertheless, an action to recover it may be barred by laches, citing the ruling
in Mejia de Lucaz v. Gamponia [100 Phil. 277 (1956)]. Accordingly, it held the
petitioners guilty of laches and dismissed their complaint. Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals. cdrep
The principal issue to be resolved in this case concerns the applicability of the
equitable doctrine of laches. Initially though, a determination of the effect of a
sale by one or more co-owners of the entire property held in common without
the consent of all the co-owners and of the appropriate remedy of the aggrieved
co-owners is required.
The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in Article 493
of the Civil Code.Thus:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. [Emphasis
supplied.]
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole
property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other
co-owners who did not consent to the sale [Punsalan v. Boon Liat, 44 Phil. 320
(1923)]. This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or
other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only
what would correspond to his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in
common. [Ramirez v. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909)]. Consequently, by virtue of
the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect to
their proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in
the sale to private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became
a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land as correctly held by the lower court
since the sales produced the effect ofsubstituting the buyers in the enjoyment
thereof [Mainit v. Bandoy, 14 Phil. 730 (1910)].
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell
his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the
consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, only the rights of
the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the
property.
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the
recovery of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted
the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the
common property as of it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners
who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra.]
Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases
where their consent were not secured in a sale of the entire property as well as
in a sale merely of undivided shares of some of the co-owners is an action for
PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. Neither recovery of
possession nor restitution can be granted since the defendant buyers are
legitimate proprietors and possessors in joint ownership of the common
property claimed [Ramirez v. Bautista, supra].
As to the action for petition, neither prescription nor laches can be invoked.
In the light of the attendant circumstances, defendant-appellee's defense of
prescription is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code,"(n)o
co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may
demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common,insofar as his
share is concerned." [Emphasis supplied.] In Budlong v. Bondoc [G.R. No. L-
27702, September 9, 1977, 79 SCRA 241, this Court has interpreted said
provision of law to mean that the action for partition is imprescriptible or cannot
be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares:
"No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heir so long as he expressly
or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
Furthermore, the disputed parcel of land being registered under the Torrens
System, the express provision of Act No. 496 that "(n)o title to registered land in
derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession" is squarely applicable. Consequently, prescription will not
lie in favor of Afable as against the petitioners who remain the registered
owners of the disputed parcel of land. LibLex
It is argued however, that as to the petitioners Emma, Luz and Nelda who are
not the registered co-owners but merely represented their deceased mother,
the late Nenita Bailon, prescription lies. Respondents bolster their argument by
citing a decision of this Court in Pasion v. Pasion [G.R. No. L-15757, May 31,
1961, 2 SCRA 486, 489] holding that "the imprescriptibility of a Torrens title can
only be invoked by the person in whose name the title is registered" and that
"one who is not the registered owner of a parcel of land cannot invoke
imprescriptibility of action to claim the same."
Reliance on the aforesaid Pasion case is futile. The ruling therein applies only
against transferees other than direct issues or heirs or to complete strangers.
The rationale is clear:
If prescription is unavailing against the registered owner, it must be equally
unavailing against the latter's hereditary successors, because they merely step
into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law (New Civil Code, Article 777;
Old Civil Code,Article 657), the title or right undergoing no change by its
transmission mortis causa. [Atus, et al., v. Nunez, et al., 97 Phil. 762, 764].
The latest pronouncement of this Court in Umbay v. Alecha [G.R. No. 67284,
March 18, 1985, 135 SCRA 427, 429], which was promulgated subsequent to
the Pasion case reiterated the Atus doctrine. Thus:
Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against
his hereditary successors, because they merely step into the shoes of the
decedent by operation of law and are merely the continuation of the personality
of their predecessor-in-interest. [Barcelona v. Barcelona, 100 Phil. 251, 257].
Laches is likewise unavailing as a shield against the action of herein petitioners.
Well-stated in this jurisdiction are the four basic elements of laches, namely: (1)
conduct on the part of the defendant or of one under whom he claims, giving
rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complainant
seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the complainant
having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having been
afforded an opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the
part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he
bases his suit; and, (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is
Page 13 of 49 PROPERTY
accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred [Go Chi Gun, et
al. v. Co Cho, et al., 96 Phil. 622 (1955)].
While the first and last elements are present in this case, the second and third
elements are missing.
The second element speaks of delay in asserting the complainant's rights.
However, the mere fact of delay is insufficient to constitute, laches. It is required
that (1) complainant must have had knowledge of the conduct of defendant or of
one under whom he claims and (2) he must have been afforded an opportunity
to institute suit. This court has pointed out that laches is not concerned with the
mere lapse of time. Thus:
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of
time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been
done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. [Tijam, et al., v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-
21450, April 25, 1968, 23 SCRA 29, 35; Tejido v. Zamacoma, G.R. No. L-63048,
August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA 73, 90]. cdphil
The doctrine of 'laches' or of 'stale demands' is based upon grounds of public
policy which requires for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale
claims and unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is
principally a question of inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to
be enforced or asserted," [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, supra, p. 351. [Emphasis
supplied.]
It must be noted that while there was delay in asserting petitioners' rights, such
delay was not attended with any knowledge of the sale nor with any opportunity
to bring suit. In the first place, petitioners had no notice of the sale made by
their eldest sister. It is undisputed that the petitioner co-owners had entrusted
the care and management of the parcel of land to Rosalia Bailon who was the
oldest among them [TSN, July 27, 1983, p. 14]. In fact, Nicanor Lee, a son of
Rosalia, who was presented as a witness by the plaintiffs-petitioners, testified on
cross-examination that his mother was only the administrator of the land as she
is the eldest and her brothers and sisters were away [TSN, October 5, 1983, p.
15]. Indeed, when Delia Bailon-Casilao left Sorsogon in 1942 after she got
married, it was only in 1983 that she returned. Sabina, on the other hand, is said
to be living in Zamboanga while Bernabe who left for China in 1931 has not been
heard from since then. Consequently, when Rosalia, from whom the private
respondent derived his title, made the disputed sales covering the entire
property, the herein petitioners were unaware thereof.
In the second place, they were not afforded an opportunity to bring suit
inasmuch as until 1981, they were kept in the dark about the transactions
entered into by their sister. It was only when Delia Bailon-Casilao returned to
Sorsogon in 1981 that she found out about the sales and immediately, she and
her co-petitioners filed the present action for recovery of property. The
appellate court thus erred in holding that "the petitioners did nothing to show
interest in the land." For the administration of the parcel of land was entrusted
to the oldest co-owner who was then in possession thereof precisely because
the other co-owners cannot attend to such a task as they reside outside of
Sorsogon where the land is situated. Her co-owners also allowed her to
appropriate the entire produce for herself because it was not even enough for
her daily consumption [TSN, October 5, 1983, pp. 17-18]. And since petitioner
was the one receiving the produce, it is but natural that she was the one to take
charge of paying the real estate taxes. Now, if knowledge of the sale by Rosalia
was conveyed to the petitioners only later, they cannot be faulted for the acts of
their co-owner who failed to live up to the trust and confidence expected of her.
In view of the lack of knowledge by the petitioners of the conduct of Rosalia in
selling the land without their consent in 1975 and the absence of any
opportunity to institute the proper action until 1981, laches may not be asserted
against the petitioners. prLL
The third element of laches is likewise absent. There was no lack of knowledge
or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainants would assert the
right on which they base the suit. On the contrary, private respondent is guilty of
bad faith in purchasing the property as he knew that the property was co-owned
by six persons and yet, there were only two signatories to the deeds of sale and
no special authorization to sell was granted to the two sellers by the other co-
owners.
Even as the land here was misrepresented in the deeds of sale as "unregistered,"
the truth was that Afable already had notice that the land was titled in the name
of six persons by virtue of the Certificate of Title which was already in his
possession even before the sale. Such fact is apparent from his testimony before
the court a quo:
COURT:
Q From whom did you get the certificate of Title?
A When it was mortgaged by Ponciana Aresgado.
Q It was mortgaged to you before you bought it?
A Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, March 5, 1984, p. 12) When cross-examined, he stated:
Q Mr. Witness, the original Certificate of Title was given to you in the year 1974,
was it not?
A 1975.
Q In 1975, you already discovered that the title was in the name of several
persons, is it not?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you discovered that it is in the name of several persons, you filed a case
in court for authority to cancel the title to be transferred in your name, is it not?
A Yes, sir. LLjur
Q And that was denied by the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon because there
was only one signatory to the deed of sale instead of six, was it not?
A Not one but two signatories.
[Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Rollo, p. 35]
Such actual knowledge of the existence of other co-owners in whose names the
lot subject of the sale was registered should have prompted a searching inquiry
by Afable considering the well-known rule in this jurisdiction that:
. . . a person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of
the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further,
except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and
circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make such
inquiry. [Gonzales v. IAC and Rural Bank of Pavia, Inc., G.R. No. 69622, January
29, 1988].
Moreover, the undisputed fact is that petitioners are relatives of his wife. As a
genuine gesture of good faith, he should have contacted the petitioners who
were still listed as co-owners in the certificate of title which was already in his
possession even before the sale. In failing to exercise even a minimum degree of
ordinary prudence required by the situation, he is deemed to have bought the
lot at his own risk. Hence any prejudice or injury that may be occasioned to him
by such sale must be borne by him.
Indeed, aware of the flaws impairing his title, Afable went to the herein
petitioner Delia Bailon-Casilao, asking the latter to sign a document obviously to
cure the flaw [TSN, July 27, 1983, p. 6]. Later, he even filed a petition in the
Court of First Instance to register the title in his name which was denied as
aforesaid.
It may be gleaned from the foregoing examination of the facts that Celestino
Afable is not a buyer in good faith. Laches being an equitable defense, he who
invokes it must come to the court with clean hands. Cdpr
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the challenged
decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE, and the decision of the trial court
is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-33187. March 31, 1980.]
CORNELIO PAMPLONA alias GEMINIANO PAMPLONA and APOLONIA
ONTE, petitioners, vs. VIVENCIO MORETO, VICTOR MORETO, ELIGIO MORETO,
MARCELO MORETO, PAULINA MORETO, ROSARIO MORETO, MARTA MORETO,
SEVERINA MENDOZA, PABLO MENDOZA, LAZARO MENDOZA, VICTORIA TUIZA,
JOSEFINA MORETO, LEANDRO MORETO and LORENZO MENDOZA, respondents.
E.P. Caguioa for petitioners.
Benjamin C. Yatco for respondents.
DECISION
GUERRERO, J p:
This is a petition for certiorari by way of appeal from the decision of the Court of
Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. No. 35962-R, entitled "Vivencio Moreto, et al., Plaintiff-
Appellees vs. Cornelio Pamplona, et al., Defendants-Appellants," affirming the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I at Biñan.
The facts, as stated in the decision appealed from, show that:
"Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife. During their
marriage, they acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba
Friar Land Estate, situated in Calamba, Laguna, containing 781-544 and 1,021
square meters respectively, and covered by certificates of title issued in the
name of "Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega."
"The spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega begot during their marriage
six (6) children, namely, Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all
surnamed Moreto.
"Ursulo Moreto died intestate on May 24, 1959 leaving as his heirs herein
plaintiffs Vivencio, Marcelo, Rosario, Victor, Paulina, Marta and Eligio, all
surnamed Moreto.
"Marta Moreto died also intestate on April 30, 1938 leaving as her heir plaintiff
Victoria Tuiza.
"La Paz Moreto died intestate on July 17, 1954 leaving the following heirs,
namely, herein plaintiffs Pablo, Severina, Lazaro, and Lorenzo, all surnamed
Mendoza.
"Alipio Moreto died intestate on June 30, 1943 leaving as his heir herein plaintiff
Josefina Moreto.
"Pablo Moreto died intestate on April 25, 1942 leaving no issue and as his heirs
his brother plaintiff Leandro Moreto and the other plaintiffs herein.
"On May 6, 1946, Monica Maniega died intestate in Calamba, Laguna.
"On July 30, 1952, or more than six (6) years after the death of his wife Monica
Maniega, Flaviano Moreto, without the consent of the heirs of his said deceased
wife Monica, and before any liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Monica
and Flaviano could be effected, executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona,
married to defendant Apolonia Onte, the deed of absolute sale (Exh. "1")
covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00. The deed of sale (Exh. "1") contained a
description of lot No. 1495 as having an area of 781 square meters and covered
Page 14 of 49 PROPERTY
by transfer certificate of title No. 14570 issued in the name of Flaviano Moreto,
married to Monica Maniega, although the lot was acquired during their
marriage. As a result of the sale, the said certificate of title was cancelled and a
new transfer certificate of title No. T-5671 was issued in the name of Geminiano
Pamplona married to Apolonia Onte (Exh. "A").
"After the execution of the above-mentioned deed of sale (Exh. "1"), the
spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte constructed their house on the
eastern part of lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the time of the sale, pointed to it
as the land which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona. Shortly thereafter, Rafael
Pamplona, son of the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte, also
built his house within lot 1496 about one meter from its boundary with the
adjoining lot. The vendor Flaviano Moreto and the vendee Geminiano Pamplona
thought all the time that the portion of 781 square meters which was the
subject matter of their sale transaction was No. 1495 and so lot No. 1495
appears to be the subject matter in the deed of sale (Exh. "1") although the fact
is that the said portion sold thought of by the parties to be lot No. 1495 is a part
of lot No. 1496.
"From 1956 to 1960, the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonio Onte
enlarged their house and they even constructed a piggery corral at the back of
their said house about one and one-half meters from the eastern boundary of
lot 1496.
"On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the plaintiffs
demanded on the defendants to vacate the premises where they had their
house and piggery on the ground that Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the
lot which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona as the same belongs to the conjugal
partnership of Flaviano and his deceased wife and the latter was already dead
when the sale was executed without the consent of the plaintiffs who are the
heirs of Monica. The spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte refused
to vacate the premises occupied by them and hence, this suit was instituted by
the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking for the declaration of the nullity of the
deed of sale of July 30, 1952 above-mentioned as regards one half of the
property subject matter of said deed; to declare the plaintiffs as the rightful
owners of the other half of said lot; to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the one-
half portion thereof sold to the defendants 'After payment of the other half of
the purchase price'; to order the defendants to vacate the portions occupied by
them; to order the defendants to pay actual and moral damages and attorney's
fees to the plaintiffs; to order the defendants to pay plaintiffs P120.00 a year
from August 1958 until they have vacated the premises occupied by them for
the use and occupancy of the same.
"The defendants claim that the sale made by Flaviano Moreto in their favor is
valid as the lot sold is registered in the name of Flaviano Moreto and they are
purchasers believing in good faith that the vendor was the sole owner of the lot
sold.
"After a relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made by agreement of the
parties, it was found out that there was mutual error between Flaviano Moreto
and the defendants in the execution of the deed of sale because while the said
deed recited that the lot sold is lot No. 1495, the real intention of the parties is
that it was a portion consisting of 781 square meters of lot No. 1496 which was
the subject matter of their sale transaction.
"After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive part thereof
being as follows:
'WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs declaring the deed
of absolute sale dated July 30, 1952 pertaining to the eastern portion of Lot
1496 covering an area of 781 square meters null and void as regards the 390.5
square meters of which plaintiffs are hereby declared the rightful owners and
entitled to its possession.
'The sale is ordered valid with respect to the eastern one-half (1/2) of 1781
square meters of Lot 1496 measuring 390.5 square meters of which defendants
are declared lawful owners and entitled to its possession.
After proper survey segregating the eastern one-half portion with an area of
390.5 square meters of Lot 1496, the defendants shall be entitled to s certificate
of title covering said portion and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9843 of the
office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna shall be cancelled accordingly and new
titles issued to the plaintiffs and to the defendants covering their respective
portions.
'Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 of the office of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna covering Lot No. 1495 and registered in the name of Cornelio Pamplona,
married to Apolonia Onte, is by virtue of this decision ordered cancelled. The
defendants are ordered to surrender to the office of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna the owner's duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 within
thirty (30) days after this decision shall have become final for cancellation in
accordance with this decision.
'Let copy of this decision be furnished the Register of Deeds for the province of
Laguna for his information and guidance.
'With costs against the defendants.' 2
The defendants-appellants, not being satisfied with said judgment, appealed to
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment, hence they now come to
this Court.
The fundamental and crucial issue in the case at bar is whether under the facts
and circumstances duly established by the evidence, petitioners are entitled to
the full ownership of the property in litigation, or only one-half of the same.
There is no question that when the petitioners purchased the property on July
30, 1952 from Flaviano Moreto for the price of P900.00, his wife Monica
Maniega had already been dead six years before, Monica having died on May 6,
1946. Hence, the conjugal partnership of the spouses Flaviano Moreto and
Monica Maniega had already been dissolved. (Article 175, (1) New Civil Code;
Article 1417, Old Civil Code). The records show that the conjugal estate had not
been inventoried, liquidated, settled and divided by the heirs thereto in
accordance with law. The necessary proceedings for the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership were not instituted by the heirs either in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse pursuant to Act 3176 amending
Section 685 of Act 190. Neither was there an extra-judicial partition between the
surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse nor was an ordinary
action for partition brought for the purpose. Accordingly, the estate became the
property of a community between the surviving husband, Flaviano Moreto, and
his children with the deceased Monica Maniega in the concept of a co-
ownership.
"The community property of the marriage, at the dissolution of this bond by the
death of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to the legal partnership and
becomes the property of a community, by operation of law, between the
surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse, or the exclusive property
of the widower or the widow, if he or she be the heir of the deceased spouse.
Every co-owner shall have full ownership of his part and in the fruits and
benefits derived therefrom, and he therefore may alienate, assign or mortgage it
and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, unless personal rights are
in question." (Marigsa vs. Macabuntoc, 17 Phil. 107)
In Borja vs. Addision, 44 Phil. 895, 906, the Supreme Court said that "(t)here is
no reason in law why the heirs of the deceased wife may not form a partnership
with the surviving husband for the management and control of the community
property of the marriage and conceivably such a partnership, or rather
community of property, between the heirs and the surviving husband might be
formed without a written agreement." In Prades vs. Tecson, 49 Phil. 230, the
Supreme Court held that "(a)lthough, when the wife dies, the surviving husband,
as administrator of the community property, has authority to sell the property
without the concurrence of the children of the marriage, nevertheless this
power can be waived in favor of the children, with the result of bringing about a
conventional ownership in common between the father and children as to such
property; and any one purchasing with knowledge of the changed status of the
property will acquire only the undivided interest of those members of the family
who join in the act of conveyance."
It is also not disputed that immediately after the execution of the sale in 1952,
the vendees constructed their house on the eastern part of Lot 1496 which the
vendor pointed out to them as the area sold, and two weeks thereafter, Rafael
who is a son of the vendees, also built his house within Lot 1496. Subsequently,
a cemented piggery coral was constructed by the vendees at the back of their
house about one and one-half meters from the eastern boundary of Lot 1496.
Both vendor and vendees believed all the time that the area of 781 sq. meters
subject of the sale was Lot No. 1495 which according to its title (T.C.T. No.
14570) contains an area of 781 sq. meters so that the deed of sale between the
parties identified and described the land sold as Lot 1495. But actually, as
verified later by a surveyor upon agreement of the parties during the
proceedings of the case below, the area sold was within Lot 1496. cdphil
Again, there is no dispute that the houses of the spouses Cornelio Pamplona and
Apolonia Onte as well as that of their son Rafael Pamplona, including the
concrete piggery coral adjacent thereto, stood on the land from 1952 up to the
filing of the complaint by the private respondents on July 25, 1961, or a period
of over nine (9) years. And during said period, the private respondents who are
the heirs of Monica Maniega as well as of Flaviano Moreto who also died
intestate on August 12, 1956, lived as neighbors to the petitioners-vendees, yet
lifted no finger to question the occupation, possession and ownership of the
land purchased by the Pamplonas, so that We are persuaded and convinced to
rule that private respondents are in estoppel by laches to claim half of the
property in dispute as null and void. Estoppel by laches is a rule of equity which
bars a claimant from presenting his claim when, by reason of abandonment and
negligence, he allowed a long time to elapse without presenting the same.
(International Banking Corporation vs. Yared, 59 Phil. 92)
We have ruled that at the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal partnership was
already dissolved six years before and therefore, the estate became a co-
ownership between Flaviano Moreto, the surviving husband, and the heirs of his
deceased wife, Monica Maniega. Article 493 of the New Civil Code is applicable
and it provides as follows:
"Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the
fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage,
with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership."
We agree with the petitioner that there was a partial partition of the co-
ownership when at the time of the sale Flaviano Moreto pointed out the area
and location of the 781 sq. meters sold by him to the petitioners-vendees on
which the latter built their house and also that whereon Rafael, the son of
petitioners likewise erected his house and an adjacent coral for piggery.
Petitioners point to the fact that spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega
owned three parcels of land denominated as Lot 1495 having an area of 781 sq.
meters, Lot 1496 with an area of 1,021 sq. meters, and Lot 4545 with an area of
544 sq. meters. The three lots have a total area of 2,346 sq. meters. These three
parcels of lots are contiguous with one another as each is bounded on one side
by the other, thus: Lot 4545 is bounded on the northeast by Lot 1495 and on the
Page 15 of 49 PROPERTY
southeast by Lot 1496. Lot 1495 is bounded on the west by Lot 4545. Lot 1496 is
bounded on the west by Lot 4545. It is therefore, clear that the three lots
constitute one big land. They are not separate properties located in different
places but they abut each other. This is not disputed by private respondents.
Hence, at the time of the sale, the co-ownership constituted or covered these
three lots adjacent to each other. And since Flaviano Moreto was entitled to
one-half pro-indiviso of the entire land area or 1,173 sq. meters as his share, he
had a perfect legal and lawful right to dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to
the Pamplona spouses. Indeed, there was still a remainder of some 392 sq.
meters belonging to him at the time of the sale.
We reject respondent Court's ruling that the sale was valid as to one-half and
invalid as to the other half for the very simple reason that Flaviano Moreto, the
vendor, had the legal right to more than 781 sq. meters of the communal estate,
a title which he could dispose, alienate in favor of the vendees-petitioners. The
title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-owner as vendor
pointed out its location and even indicated the boundaries over which the
fences were to be erected without objection, protest or complaint by the other
co-owners, on the contrary they acquiesced and tolerated such alienation,
occupation and possession, We rule that a factual partition or termination of the
co-ownership, although partial, was created, and barred not only the vendor,
Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private respondents herein from
asserting as against the vendees-petitioners any right or title in derogation of
the deed of sale executed by said vendor Flaviano Moreto. LLjur
Equity commands that the private respondents, the successors of both the
deceased spouses, Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega be not allowed to
impugn the sale executed by Flaviano Moreto who indisputably received the
consideration of P900.00 and which he, including his children, benefited from
the same. Moreover, as the heirs of both Monica Maniega and Flaviano Moreto,
private respondents are duty-bound to comply with the provisions of Articles
1458 and 1495, Civil Code, which is the obligation of the vendor of the property
of delivering and transferring the ownership of the whole property sold, which is
transmitted on his death to his heirs, the herein private respondents. The
articles cited provide, thus:
"Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates
himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the
other party to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional."
"Art. 1495. The vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver, as well
as warrant the thing which is the object of the sale."
Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents
received from their deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest included
all the property rights and obligations which were not extinguished by their
parents' death. And under Art. 1311, paragraph 1, New Civil Code, the contract
of sale executed by the deceased Flaviano Moreto took effect between the
parties, their assigns and heirs, who are the private respondents herein.
Accordingly, to the private respondents is transmitted the obligation to deliver
in full ownership the whole area of 781 sq. meters to the petitioners (which was
the original obligation of their predecessor Flaviano Moreto) and not only one-
half thereof. Private respondents must comply with said obligation.
The records reveal that the area of 781 sq. meters sold to and occupied by
petitioners for more than 9 years already as of the filing of the complaint in 1961
had been re-surveyed by private land surveyor Daniel Aranas. Petitioners are
entitled to a segregation of the area from Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9843
covering Lot 1496 and they are also entitled to the issuance of a new Transfer
Certificate of Title in their name based on the relocation survey.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is
hereby AFFIRMED with modification in the sense that the sale made and
executed by Flaviano Moreto in favor of the petitioners-vendees is hereby
declared legal and valid in its entirely.
Petitioners are hereby declared owners in full ownership of the 781 sq. meters
at the eastern portion of Lot 1496 now occupied by said petitioners and
whereon their houses and piggery coral stand.
The Register of Deeds of Laguna is hereby ordered to segregate the area of 781
sq. meters from Certificate of Title No. 9843 and to issue a new Transfer
Certificate of Title to the petitioners covering the segregated area of 781 sq.
meters.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 108228. February 1, 2001.]
SPOUSES MANUEL and SALVACION DEL CAMPO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT
OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF JOSE REGALADO, SR.,respondents.
De Jesus Paguio & Associates for petitioners.
Atty. Alberto L. Deslate for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
A piece of land measuring about 27,179 sq. m. was divided in aliquot shares
under Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 18047 among the Bornales children
who became co-owners thereof. One of the co-owners, Salome, sold a part of
her share to Soledad Daynolo. Soledad mortgaged the property to Jose
Regalado, Sr. Thereafter, in 1948, three of the eight co-owners, including
Salome, sold 24,993 sq. m. to Jose Regalado, Sr. Meanwhile, in 1951, the
property mortgaged to Regalado, Sr. was redeemed by Simplicio Distajo, as heir
of deceased Soledad Daynolo. A deed of discharge of mortgage was issued to
Distajo, who on the same day sold the redeemed property to the herein
petitioners. For his part, Jose Regalado, Sr. caused the reconstitution of OCT No.
18047. As a result, the title to the property was transferred in his name. The
property was subdivided into smaller lots. About ten years later in 1987,
petitioners brought this complaint for repartition, resurvey and reconveyance
against the heirs of now deceased Jose Regalado, Sr. Petitioners claimed to own
1,544-sq. m. of the lot erroneously included in the TCT in the name of Regalado.
Petitioners alleged that they occupied the disputed area as residential dwelling
ever since they purchased the property from the Distajos in 1951. The trial
court, however, dismissed their complaint. It ruled that while Salome could
alienate her pro-indiviso share in the lot, she could not validly sell an undivided
part thereof by metes and bounds to Soledad, from whom the petitioners
derived their title. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision. Hence, this petition.
According to the Supreme Court, Salome's right to sell part of her undivided
interest in the co-owned property was absolute in accordance with the well-
settled doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and
has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in
its enjoyment. The vendee therefore may step into the shoes of the vendor as
co-owner and may acquire a proportionate abstract share in the property held in
common. The Court also ruled that the subject area in this petition had been
effectively segregated from the mother lot even before title was issued in favor
of Regalado in 1977. Since petitioners bought and took possession of the
property in 1951, 26 years had already lapsed; such undisturbed possession of
the co-owned property entitled the possessors to the definite portion of the lot
that they occupied. Failure to disclose the fact of actual physical possession of
the lot by another person constituted fraud, which was what happened in the
case at bar. Therefore, the attendance of fraud in the issuance of title to
Regalado created an implied trust in favor of the petitioners and gave them the
right to seek reconveyance of the parcel wrongfully obtained by the former.
According to the Court, when the right of the true and real owner was
recognized, said action is imprescriptible, being in the nature of a suit for
quieting of title. The petition herein was granted by the Court.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 15
in Civil Case No. V-5369, ordering the dismissal of the action for repartition,
resurvey and reconveyance filed by petitioners.
Pure questions of law are raised in this appeal as the following factual
antecedents are undisputed:
Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and Julita, all surnamed
Bornales, were the original co-owners of Lot 162 of the Cadastral Survey of
Pontevedra, Capiz under Original Certificate of Title No. 18047. As appearing
therein, the lot, which consisted of a total area of 27,179 square meters was
divided in aliquot shares among the eight (8) co-owners as follows:
Salome Bornales 4/16
Consorcia Bornales 4/16
Alfredo Bornales 2/16
Maria Bornales 2/16
Jose Bornales 1/16
Quirico Bornales 1/16
Rosalia Bornales 1/16
Julita Bornales 1/16
On July 14, 1940, Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 for P200.00 to
Soledad Daynolo. In the Deed of Absolute Sale signed by Salome and two other
co-owners, Consorcia and Alfredo, the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad was
described as having more or less the following measurements:
63-1/2 meters from point "9" to "10", 35 meters from point "10" to point "11",
30 meters from point "11" to a certain point parallel to a line drawn from points
"9" to "10"; and then from this "Certain Point" to point "9" and as shown in the
accompanying sketch, and made an integral part of this deed, to SOLEDAD
DAYNOLO, her heirs and assigns. 1
Thereafter, Soledad Daynolo immediately took possession of the land described
above and built a house thereon. A few years later, Soledad and her husband,
Simplicio Distajo, mortgaged the subject portion of Lot 162 as security for a
P400.00 debt to Jose Regalado, Sr. This transaction was evidenced by a Deed of
Mortgage 2 dated May 1, 1947.
On April 14, 1948, three of the eight co-owners of Lot 162, specifically, Salome,
Consorcia and Alfredo, sold 24,993 square meters of said lot to Jose Regalado,
Sr.
On May 4, 1951, Simplicio Distajo, heir of Soledad Daynolo who had since died,
paid the mortgage debt and redeemed the mortgaged portion of Lot 162 from
Jose Regalado, Sr. The latter, in turn, executed a Deed of Discharge of
Mortgage 3 in favor of Soledad's heirs, namely: Simplicio Distajo, Rafael Distajo
and Teresita Distajo-Regalado. On same date, the said heirs sold the redeemed
portion of Lot 162 for P1,500.00 to herein petitioners, the spouses Manuel Del
Campo and Salvacion Quiachon.
Meanwhile, Jose Regalado, Sr. caused the reconstitution of Original Certificate of
Title No. 18047. The reconstituted OCT No. RO-4541 initially reflected the shares
of the original co-owners in Lot 162. However, title was transferred later to Jose
Page 16 of 49 PROPERTY
Regalado, Sr. who subdivided the entire property into smaller lots, each covered
by a respective title in his name. One of these small lots is Lot No. 162-C-6 with
an area of 11,732 square meters which was registered on February 24, 1977
under TCT No. 14566.
In 1987, petitioners Manuel and Salvacion del Campo brought this complaint for
"repartition, resurvey and reconveyance" against the heirs of the now deceased
Jose Regalado, Sr. Petitioners claimed that they owned an area of 1,544 square
meters located within Lot 162-C-6 which was erroneously included in TCT No.
14566 in the name of Regalado. Petitioners alleged that they occupied the
disputed area as residential dwelling ever since they purchased the property
from the Distajos way back in 1951. They also declared the land for taxation
purposes and paid the corresponding taxes.
On April 1, 1987, summons were served on Regalado's widow, Josefina
Buenvenida, and two of her children, Rosemarie and Antonio. Josefina and
Rosemarie were declared in default on May 10, 1989 because only Antonio filed
an answer to the complaint.
During trial, petitioners presented the Deed of Absolute Sale 4 executed
between Soledad Daynolo and Salome Bornales as well as the Deed of
Mortgage5 and Deed of Discharge 6 signed by Jose Regalado, Sr. The Deed of
Absolute Sale 7 showing the purchase by the Del Campos of the property from
the Distajos was likewise given in evidence.
Despite the filing of an answer, Antonio failed to present any evidence to refute
the claim of petitioners. Thus, after considering Antonio to have waived his
opportunity to present evidence, the trial court deemed the case submitted for
decision.
On November 20, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the
complaint. It held that while Salome could alienate her pro-indiviso share in Lot
162, she could not validly sell an undivided part thereof by metes and bounds to
Soledad, from whom petitioners derived their title. The trial court also reasoned
that petitioners could not have a better right to the property even if they were
in physical possession of the same and declared the property for taxation
purposes, because mere possession cannot defeat the right of the Regalados
who had a Torrens title over the land.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, with no
pronouncement as to costs. 8
Petitioners now seek relief from this Court and maintain that:
I.
THE FACT THAT THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PORTION CONSTITUTES A SALE OF A
CONCRETE OR DEFINITE PORTION OF LAND OWNED IN COMMON DOES NOT
ABSOLUTELY DEPRIVE HEREIN PETITIONERS OF ANY RIGHT OR TITLE THERETO;
II.
IN ANY EVENT, HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ALL ESTOPPED FROM
DENYING THE RIGHT AND TITLE OF HEREIN PETITIONERS. 9
In resolving petitioners' appeal, we must answer the following questions: Would
the sale by a co-owner of a physical portion of an undivided property held in
common be valid? Is respondent estopped from denying petitioners' right and
title over the disputed area? Under the facts and circumstances duly established
by the evidence, are petitioners entitled to 'repartition, resurvey and
reconveyance' of the property in question?
On the first issue, it seems plain to us that the trial court concluded that
petitioners could not have acquired ownership of the subject land which
originally formed part of Lot 162, on the ground that their alleged right springs
from a void sale transaction between Salome and Soledad. The mere fact that
Salome purportedly transferred a definite portion of the co-owned lot by metes
and bounds to Soledad, however, does not per se render the sale a nullity. This
much is evident under Article 493 10 of the Civil Code and pertinent
jurisprudence on the matter. More particularly in Lopez vs. Vda. De Cuaycong, et
al. 11 which we find relevant, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bocobo,
held that:
. . . The fact that the agreement in question purported to sell a concrete
portion of the hacienda does not render the sale void, for it is a well-established
principle that the binding force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is
legally possible to do so. "Quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere
potest." (When a thing is of no force as I do it, it shall have as much force as it
can have.) 12
Applying this principle to the instant case, there can be no doubt that the
transaction entered into by Salome and Soledad could be legally recognized in
its entirety since the object of the sale did not even exceed the ideal shares held
by the former in the co-ownership. As a matter of fact, the deed of sale
executed between the parties expressly stipulated that the portion of Lot 162
sold to Soledad would be taken from Salome's 4/16 undivided interest in said
lot, which the latter could validly transfer in whole or in part even without the
consent of the other co-owners. Salome's right to sell part of her undivided
interest in the co-owned property is absolute in accordance with the well-settled
doctrine that a co-owner has full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the
right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute another person in its
enjoyment 13 Since Salome's clear intention was to sell merely part of her
aliquot share in Lot 162, in our view no valid objection can be made against it
and the sale can be given effect to the full extent.
We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of
a particular portion of a co-owned property prior to partition among all the co-
owners. However, this should not signify that the vendee does not acquire
anything at all in case a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact
sold to him. Since the co-owner/vendor's undivided interest could properly be
the object of the contract of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains
by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the vendor had as co-owner, in an
ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction. In
other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and
acquires a proportionate abstract share in the property held in common.
Resultantly, Soledad became a co-owner of Lot-162 as of the year 1940 when
the sale was made in her favor. It follows that Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo
could not have sold the entire Lot 162 to Jose Regalado, Sr. on April 14, 1948
because at that time, the ideal shares held by the three co-owners/vendors
were equivalent to only 10/16 of the undivided property less the aliquot share
previously sold by Salome to Soledad. Based on the principle that "no one can
give what he does not have," 14 Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not legally
sell the shares pertaining to Soledad since a co-owner cannot alienate more than
his share in the co-ownership. We have ruled many times that even if a co-
owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but
not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Since a co-
owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one
co-owner will only transfer the rights of said co-owner to the buyer, thereby
making the buyer a co-owner of the property. 15
In this case, Regalado merely became a new co-owner of Lot 162 to the extent
of the shares which Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could validly convey. Soledad
retained her rights as co-owner and could validly transfer her share to
petitioners in 1951. The logical effect of the second disposition is to substitute
petitioners in the rights of Soledad as co-owner of the land. Needless to say,
these rights are preserved notwithstanding the issuance of TCT No. 14566 in
Regalado's name in 1977.
Be that as it may, we find that the area subject matter of this petition had
already been effectively segregated from the 'mother lot' even before title was
issued in favor of Regalado. It must be noted that 26 years had lapsed from the
time petitioners bought and took possession of the property in 1951 until
Regalado procured the issuance of TCT No. 14566. Additionally, the intervening
years between the date of petitioners' purchase of the property and 1987 when
petitioners filed the instant complaint, comprise all of 36 years. However, at no
instance during this time did respondents or Regalado, for that matter, question
petitioners' right over the land in dispute. In the case of Vda. de Cabrera vs.
Court of Appeals, 16 we had occasion to hold that where the transferees of an
undivided portion of the land allowed a co-owner of the property to occupy a
definite portion thereof and had not disturbed the same for a period too long to
be ignored, the possessor is in a better condition or right than said transferees.
(Potior est condition possidentis). Such undisturbed possession had the effect of
a partial partition of the co-owned property which entitles the possessor to the
definite portion which he occupies. Conformably, petitioners are entitled to the
disputed land, having enjoyed uninterrupted possession thereof for a total of 49
years up to the present.
The lower court's reliance on the doctrine that mere possession cannot defeat
the right of a holder of a registered Torrens title over property is misplaced,
considering that petitioners were deprived of their dominical rights over the said
lot through fraud and with evident bad faith on the part of Regalado. Failure and
intentional omission to disclose the fact of actual physical possession by another
person during registration proceedings constitutes actual fraud. Likewise, it is
fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained to the
prejudice of a third person. 17 In this case, we are convinced that Regalado
knew of the fact that he did not have a title to the entire lot and could not,
therefore, have validly registered the same in his name alone because he was
aware of petitioners' possession of the subject portion as well as the sale
between Salome and Soledad.
That Regalado had notice of the fact that the disputed portion of Lot 162 was
under claim of ownership by petitioners and the latter's predecessor is beyond
question. Records show that the particular area subject of this case was
mortgaged by Soledad and her husband to Jose Regalado, Sr. as early as May 1,
1947 or one year prior to the alienation of the whole lot in favor of the latter.
Regalado never questioned the ownership of the lot given by Soledad as security
for the P400.00 debt and he must have at least known that Soledad bought the
subject portion from Salome since he could not have reasonably accepted the
lot as security for the mortgage debt if such were not the case. By accepting the
said portion of Lot 162 as security for the mortgage obligation, Regalado had in
fact recognized Soledad's ownership of this definite portion of Lot 162. Regalado
could not have been ignorant of the fact that the disputed portion is being
claimed by Soledad and subsequently, by petitioners, since Regalado even
executed a Release of Mortgage on May 4, 1951, three years after the entire
property was supposedly sold to him. It would certainly be illogical for any
mortgagee to accept property as security, purchase the mortgaged property
and, thereafter, claim the very same property as his own while the mortgage
was still subsisting.
Consequently, respondents are estopped from asserting that they own the
subject land in view of the Deed of Mortgage and Discharge of Mortgage
executed between Regalado and petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. As
petitioners correctly contend, respondents are barred from making this
assertion under the equitable principle of estoppel by deed, whereby a party to a
deed and his privies are precluded from asserting as against the other and his
privies any right or title in derogation of the deed, or from denying the truth of
any material fact asserted in it. 18 A perusal of the documents evidencing the
mortgage would readily reveal that Soledad, as mortgagor, had declared herself
absolute owner of the piece of land now being litigated. This declaration of fact
Page 17 of 49 PROPERTY
was accepted by Regalado as mortgagee and accordingly, his heirs cannot now
be permitted to deny it.
Although Regalado's certificate of title became indefeasible after the lapse of
one year from the date of the decree of registration, the attendance of fraud in
its issuance created an implied trust in favor of petitioners and gave them the
right to seek reconveyance of the parcel wrongfully obtained by the former. An
action for reconveyance based on an implied trust ordinarily prescribes in ten
years. But when the right of the true and real owner is recognized, expressly or
implicitly such as when he remains undisturbed in his possession, the said action
is imprescriptible, it being in the nature of a suit for quieting of title. 19 Having
established by clear and convincing evidence that they are the legal owners of
the litigated portion included in TCT No. 14566, it is only proper that
reconveyance of the property be ordered in favor of petitioners. The alleged
incontrovertibility of Regalado's title cannot be successfully invoked by
respondents because certificates of title merely confirm or record title already
existing and cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner or be used
as a shield for the commission of fraud. 20
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30438 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The parties are
directed to cause a SURVEY for exact determination of their respective portions
in Lot 162-C-6. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14566 is declared CANCELLED and
the Register of Deeds of Capiz is ordered to ISSUE a new title in accordance with
said survey, upon finality of this decision.
Costs against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 140422. August 7, 2006.]
MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, ANSELMO A. CRISTOBAL and ELISA CRISTOBAL
SIKAT, petitioners, vs. EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL, JOSE
CRISTOBAL, HEIRS OF NORBERTO CRISTOBAL and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
This Petition assails the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated 22 July 1999 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 56402, affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 156, in Civil Case No. 65035 entitled, "Mercedes
Cristobal, Anselmo A. Cristobal and Elisa Cristobal Sikat vs. Eufrosina Cristobal,
Florencio Cristobal, Jose Cristobal, Heirs of Norberto Cristobal and The Register of
Deeds, San Juan, M.M."
Facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased
Socorro Cristobal, and Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are the legitimate
children of Buenaventura Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal.
On the other hand, private respondents (Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and
Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of Buenaventura Cristobal
resulting from his second marriage to Donata Enriquez.
On 18 June 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land with an
area of 535 square meters located at 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San Juan,
Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 10878-2 (the
subject property).
Sometime in the year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate.
More than six decades later, petitioners learned that private respondents had
executed an extrajudicial partition of the subject property and transferred its
title to their names.
Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle the case
between them and private respondents, but no settlement was reached. Thus, a
Complaint 2 for Annulment of Title and Damages was filed before the RTC by
petitioners against private respondents to recover their alleged pro-indiviso
shares in the subject property. In their prayer, they sought the annulment of the
Deed of Partition executed by respondents on 24 February 1948; the
cancellation of TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, No. 165134 and No. 165135 issued
in the individual names of private respondents; re-partitioning of the subject
property in accordance with the law of succession and the payment of
P1,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages; P300,000.00 as moral
damages; P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal
certificates of Elisa, 3 Anselmo, 4 and the late Socorro 5 were presented. In the
case of Mercedes who was born on 31 January 1909, she produced a
certification 6 issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932
to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and
tear. TCADEc
The testimonies of the parties as summarized by the trial court are as follows:
Witness [petitioner Elisa] further testified that her mother died when she was
only one year and seven months old. She lived with the sister of her father
because the latter married his second wife, Donata Enriquez. Her brother
Anselmo and sister Socorro lived with their father and the latter's family in the
subject property at P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila.
She claimed that when their father died on February 12, 1930, his brother
Anselmo stayed with her and her auntie while Socorro stayed with their eldest
sister, Mercedes, who was then married.
Meanwhile, when her stepmother Donata Enriquez died, the children from the
second marriage lived with them and her aunt Martina Cristobal.
Witness testified that she is now residing at No. 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San
Juan, Metro Manila, the property subject of the present litigation. She has been
living in the said property since 1948. She claimed that there are other houses in
the area particularly those which belong to her half brothers and sisters which
were now converted into factories.
She claimed that out of the five hundred thirty-five (535) square meters she
occupies only thirty-six (36) square meters of the subject lot.
She testified that the [private respondents] divided the property among
themselves without giving the [petitioners] their share. She said that she was
offered by [private respondent] Eufrosina to choose between a portion of the
land in question or money because one of the children of defendant Jose
Cristobal wanted to construct an apartment on the lot. She said that she will
have to ask the opinion of her other brothers and sisters.
Thereafter witness testified that she made an inquiry regarding the land and she
found out that the property belonging to their father Buenaventura Cristobal
had been transferred to the defendants as evidenced by transfer certificates of
title issued under the names of Florencio Cristobal (Exhibit "E"), Norberto
Cristobal (Exhibit "F"), Eufrosina Cristobal (Exhibit "G") and Jose Cristobal
(Exhibit "H").
She declared that she felt bad when she learned that the title to the property
belonging to her father had been transferred to her half brothers and sisters
with the exclusion of herself and the other children from the first marriage.
She filed a petition in the barangay to settle the issue among themselves,
however, no settlement was reached therein. This prompted the [petitioners] to
file the present case.
On cross-examination, [petitioner] Elisa Cristobal Sikat admitted that she was
aware that the subject property was owned by her father Buenaventura
Cristobal even before the latter died. She likewise stated that the [private
respondents] are the ones paying the real estate tax due on the lot.
Ester Santos testified for the [petitioners]. In her "Sinumpaang Salaysay" she
claimed that she was a neighbor of Mercedes, Anselmo, Socorro, Elisa, Norberto,
Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose Cristobal in San Juan, Metro Manila. She said that
she knows that Mercedes, Anselmo, Socorro and Elisa are the children of
Buenaventura Cristobal from the latter's first marriage and the Norberto,
Florencio, Eufrosina, and Jose are the children of Buenaventura Cristobal from
the latter's second marriage.
The said witness testified that Buenaventura Cristobal and his first family lived
right across where she stayed.
Witness corroborated the testimony of Elisa Cristobal Sikat regarding that the
fact that Martina Cristobal is the sister of Buenaventura Cristobal. The said sister
of Buenaventura Cristobal allegedly took care of Elisa. Anselmo and Socorro
were taken care of by Buenaventura Cristobal and the latter's second wife,
Donata Enriquez, at P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila.
When Buenaventura Cristobal died Anselmo was taken care of by Martina
Cristobal together with Elisa. Socorro on the other hand lived with Mercedes
who was then married.
Witness testified that she and Elisa were classmates from Grade I until they
finished high school at the Philippine School of Commerce in Manila.
When the second wife of Buenaventura Cristobal died, Martina Cristobal took
care of Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose Cristobal.
Witness said that the brothers and sisters from the first and second marriages
lived together with their aunt Martina Cristobal for a long time.
When Elisa got married, she and her husband built their house on the lot located
at 194 P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila. Until at present, Elisa and her
family lives in the said vicinity.
Witness Ester Santos declared that the children from the second marriage
namely Norberto, Eufrosina, Florencio and Jose built their houses and factory at
194 P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila.
She said that the children from the first and second marriages of Buenaventura
Cristobal had a harmonious relationship until sometime in 1994 when
[petitioners] and Elisa Cristobal's grandchildren were called "squatters" by the
[private respondents] and their grandchildren for residing in the subject parcel
of land.
On cross-examination, witness Ester Santos said she cannot recall the name of
the first wife of Buenaventura Cristobal and that she only knew them to be
married although she is not aware of the date when they were married.
[Petitioners] presented Jose Cristobal to bolster the claim that they are brothers
and sisters of the [private respondents].
He claimed that the only time when he became aware that [petitioners] are his
brothers and sisters was when he lived with their aunt Martina.
He said that the reason why they were giving a portion of the lot in question to
Elisa Cristobal Sikat was because the [private respondents] want her to have a
piece of property of her own and is not an admission that she is their sister.
[Private respondents] on the other hand presented Eufrosina Cristobal as their
first witness. She testified that her parents, Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata
Enriquez were married on March 24, 1919 at San Felipe Neri, Mandaluyong,
Page 18 of 49 PROPERTY
Metro Manila. Out of the said union, Norberto, Florentino, Eufrosina and Jose
Cristobal were born.
The witness professed that on June 18, 1926, her parents were able to buy a
certain property containing five hundred thirty-five (535) square meters.
Said witness claimed that her brother Norberto died on September 20, 1980
leaving his wife Marcelina and children Buenaflor and Norberto, Jr.
The witness presented marked as Exhibit "33" for Norberto, Exhibit "34" for
Florencio, Exhibit "35" for Eufrosina and Exhibit "36' for Jose the birth
certificates of her brothers and sisters.
On February 24, 1948, Eufrosina admitted having executed an Extrajudicial
Partition (Exhibit "D-4") with her brothers and sisters of the property left by
their parents.
She declared that since her father died in 1930, Elisa, Mercedes, and Anselmo
never asserted their alleged right over the property subject of the present
litigation.
She claimed that the [private respondents] have been paying all the taxes due
on the parcel of land and that title to the property has been subdivided under
their respective names.
On cross-examination, she said that when their parents passed away they were
taken care of by their aunt Martina who was the sister of her father. She
testified that she addressed Elisa Cristobal as "Kaka" and that since the time they
were kids, she had known that the [petitioners] are their brothers and sisters. 7
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a judgment 8 on 11 July 1997,
dismissing the case, ruling that petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the
deceased Buenaventura Cristobal as the baptismal and birth certificates
presented have scant evidentiary value and that petitioners' inaction for a long
period of time amounts to laches.
Not satisfied, petitioners sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which, in its
Decision 9 dated 22 July 1999, ruled that they were able to prove their filiation
with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal thru "other means allowed by the
Rules of Court and special laws," but affirmed the ruling of the trial court barring
their right to recover their share of the subject property because of laches.
Hence, this Petition anchored on the sole ground that:
RESPONDENT COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF
LACHES TO THE CASE AT BAR RESULTING AS IT DOES TO GROSS INJUSTICE AND
INEQUITY WHICH ARE EXACTLY THE VERY EVILS SOUGHT TO BE PREVENTED BY
SUCH PRINCIPLE 10
The petition is impressed with merit. We agree with petitioners that the Court of
Appeals committed reversible error in upholding the claim of private
respondents that they acquired ownership of the entire subject property and
that the claim of petitioners to the subject property was barred by laches.
Before anything else, it must be noted that the title of the original complaint
filed by petitioners before the RTC was denominated as "Annulment of Title and
Damages"; nevertheless, the complaint prayed for the following:
1. Declaring the Extrajudicial Partition executed by the defendants NORBERTO
CRISTOBAL, FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL, EUFROCINA CRISTOBAL and JOSE
CRISTOBAL on February 24, 1948 as null and void for being fraudulent contrary
to law on succession.
2. Canceling the following Transfer Certificates of Titles issued by the Register of
Deeds for the Province of Rizal to wit:
(a) TCT No. 165132 issued in the name of FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL married to
MAURA RUBIO;
(b) TCT No. 165133 issued in the name of NORBERTO CRISTOBAL, married to
PAULINA IBANEZ;
(c) TCT No. 165134 issued in the name of EUFROCINA CRISTOBAL married to
FORTUNATO DELA GUERRA; and
(d) TCT No. 165135 issued in the name of JOSE CRISTOBAL married to ADELAIDA
IBANEZ and/or TCT No. 3993- ( if TCT No. 165035 was cancelled and in lieu
thereof to ISABELITA/MA. VICTORIA, EMMA, MA. CRISTINA, JOSELITO and NELIA,
all surnamed CRISTOBAL and children of JOSE CRISTOBAL, one of the
defendants.)
3. Re-partitioning the subject property left by deceased BUENAVENTURA
CRISTOBAL according to the law on succession applicable at the time of his
death.
4. Awarding ONE-HALF of the subject property to herein plaintiffs as their lawful
portions in the inheritance. DEScaT
5. Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs the following sums of money,
to wit:
a. P1,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages
b. P300,000.00 as moral damages
c. P50,000.00 as attorney's fees
d. P100,000.0 as exemplary damages 11
While the title of the complaint alone implies that the action involves property
rights to a piece of land, the afore-quoted prayer in the complaint reveals that,
more than property rights, the action involves hereditary or successional rights
of petitioners to their deceased father's estate solely, composed of the subject
property.
Thus, even if the original complaint filed by petitioners before the RTC is
denominated as "Annulment of Title and Damages," we find it practicable to rule
on the division of the subject property based on the rules of succession as
prayed for in the complaint, considering that the averments in the complaint,
not the title are controlling. 12
To arrive at the final resolution of the instant Petition and the lone assignment
of error therein, the following need to be resolved first: (1) whether or not
petitioners were able to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura
Cristobal; (2) whether or not the petitioners are bound by the Deed of Partition
of the subject property executed by the private respondents; (3) whether or not
petitioners' right to question the Deed of Partition had prescribed; and (4)
whether or not petitioners' right to recover their share of the subject property is
barred by laches.
Undeniably, the foregoing issues can be resolved only after certain facts have
been established. Although it is settled that in the exercise of the Supreme
Court's power of review, the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are
conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court, there are recognized exceptions
to this rule, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation,
surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the
judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts
are conflicting; (6) when in making the findings the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellee and the appellant; (7) when the findings are contrary to the
trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of facts are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when
the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed
by the parties, which if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion. 13 Since exceptions (4) and (11) are present in the case at bar, this
Court shall make its own determination of the facts relevant for the resolution of
the case.
The initial fact that needs to be established is the filiation of petitioners with the
deceased Buenaventura Cristobal.
Article 172 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
"Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws," may consist
of the child's baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which
the child's name has been entered, common reputation respecting the child's
pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of
proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 14
In the present case, the baptismal certificates of Elisa, 15 Anselmo, 16 and the
late Socorro 17 were presented. Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable
documentary evidence to prove filiation in accordance with the Rules of Court
and jurisprudence. In the case of Mercedes, who was born on 31 January 1909,
she produced a certification 18 issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years
1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to
ordinary wear and tear.
Petitioners likewise presented Ester Santos as witness who testified that
petitioners enjoyed that common reputation in the community where they
reside as being the children of Buenaventura Cristobal with his first wife.
Testimonies of witnesses were also presented to prove filiation by continuous
possession of the status as a legitimate child. 19
In contrast, it bears to point out that private respondents were unable to
present any proof to refute the petitioners' claim and evidences of filiation to
Buenaventura Cristobal.
The foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that petitioners are,
indeed, children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage.
As to the validity of the Deed of Partition of the subject property executed by
the private respondents among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners, the
applicable rule is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, which states:
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a
newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding
section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. (Underscoring supplied)
Under the said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the
proceedings, the extrajudicial settlement is not binding on said persons.20 In the
case at bar, since the estate of the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal is
composed solely of the subject property, the partition thereof by the private
respondents already amounts to an extrajudicial settlement of Buenaventura
Cristobal's estate. The partition of the subject property by the private
Page 19 of 49 PROPERTY
respondents shall not bind the petitioners since petitioners were excluded
therefrom. Petitioners were not aware of the Deed of Partition executed by
private respondents among themselves in 1948. Petitioner Elisa became aware
of the transfer and registration of the subject property in the names of private
respondents only in 1994 when she was offered by private respondent Eufrocina
to choose between a portion of the subject property or money, as one of the
children of private respondent Jose wanted to construct an apartment on the
subject property. 21 This led petitioner Elisa to inquire as to the status of the
subject property. She learned afterwards that the title to the subject property
had been transferred to the names of private respondents, her half brothers and
sisters, to the exclusion of herself and her siblings from the first marriage of
Buenaventura Cristobal. The Deed of Partition excluded four of the eight heirs of
Buenaventura Cristobal who were also entitled to their respective shares in the
subject property. Since petitioners were not able to participate in the execution
of the Deed of Partition, which constitutes as an extrajudicial settlement of the
estate of the late Buenaventura Cristobal by private respondents, such
settlement is not binding on them. 22 As the extrajudicial settlement executed
by the private respondents in February 1948 did not affect the right of
petitioners to also inherit from the estate of their deceased father, it was
incorrect for the trial and appellate court to hold that petitioners' right to
challenge the said settlement had prescribed. Respondents defense of
prescription against an action for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to
Article 494 of the Civil Code, "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing
owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned." In Budlong v.
Bondoc, 23 this Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the
action for partition is imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription. For
Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: "No prescription shall lie in favor
of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership." 24
Considering that the Deed of Partition of the subject property does not affect
the right of petitioners to inherit from their deceased father, this Court shall
then proceed to divide the subject property between petitioners and private
respondents, as the rule on succession prescribes.
It appears that the 535 square meters subject property was a conjugal property
of Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata Enriquez, the second wife, as the
property was purchased in 1926, during the time of their marriage. 25 Upon the
deaths of Buenaventura in 1930 and Donata in 1936, both deaths occurring
before the enactment of the New Civil Code in 1950, all the four children of the
first marriage and the four children of the second marriage shall share equally in
the subject property in accordance with the Old Civil Code. Absent any allegation
showing that Buenaventura Cristobal left any will and testament, the subject
property shall be divided into eight equal parts pursuant to Articles 921 26 and
931 27 of the Old Civil Code on intestate succession, each receiving 66.875
square meters thereof.
At the time of death of Buenaventura Cristobal in 1930, Donata was only
entitled to the usufruct of the land pursuant to Article 834 of the Old Civil Code,
which provides:
ART. 834. A widower or widow who, on the death of his or her spouse, is not
divorced, or should be so by the fault of the deceased, shall be entitled to a
portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way of legitime to each of the
legitimate children or descendants who has not received any betterment.
If only one legitimate child or descendant survives, the widow or widower shall
have the usufruct of the third availment for betterment, such child or
descendant to have the naked ownership until, on the death of the surviving
spouse, the whole title is merged in him.
Donata's right to usufruct of the subject property terminated upon her death in
1936.
Accordingly, the pro-indiviso shares of Buenaventura Cristobal's eight children
and their heirs, by right of representation, upon his death in 1930, are as
follows:
(1) Mercedes Cristobal- 66.875 square meters
(2) Amselmo Crostobal- 66.875 square meters
(3) Socorrro Crostobal- 66.875 square meters
(4) Elisa Crostobal-Sikat- 66.875 square meters
(5) Norberto Cristobal- 66.875 square meters
(6) Florencio Cristobal- 66.875 square meters
(7) Eufrocina Cristobal- 66.875 square meters
(8) Jose Cristobal- 66.875 square meters
The Court will now determine whether petitioners' right to their shares in the
subject property can be barred by laches.
Respondents' defense of laches is less than convincing. Laches is the negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned it or declined to assert it. It
does not involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally an impediment
to the assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become under the
circumstances inequitable or unfair to permit. 28
In our view, the doctrine of laches does not apply in the instant case. Note that
upon petitioner Elisa's knowledge in 1994 that the title to the subject property
had been transferred to the private respondents to the exclusion of herself and
her siblings from the first marriage of Buenaventura Cristobal, petitioners filed in
1995 a petition with their barangay to settle the case among themselves and
private respondents, but since no settlement was had, they lodged a complaint
before the RTC on 27 March 1995, to annul private respondents' title over the
land. There is no evidence showing failure or neglect on their part, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The doctrine of stale
demands would apply only where for the reason of the lapse of time, it would be
inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.
Moreover, absence any strong or compelling reason, this Court is not disposed
to apply the doctrine of laches to prejudice or defeat the rights of an
owner. 29 Laches is a creation of equity and its application is controlled by
equitable considerations. Laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetuate
an injustice. Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful
owners of a property from recovering what has been fraudulently registered in
the name of another. 30
Considering that (1) petitioners were unlawfully deprived of their legal
participation in the partition of the subject property; (2) this case has dragged
on for more than a decade, and (3) undoubtedly, petitioners sustained injury but
the exact amount of which, unfortunately, was not proved, we find it reasonable
to grant in petitioners' favor nominal damages. Nominal damages is adjudicated
in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated and invaded by
defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. 31 Where these are allowed,
they are not treated as an equivalent of a wrong but simply in recognition of the
existence of a technical injury. The amount to be awarded as such damages
should at least be commensurate to the injury sustained by the petitioners
considering the concept and purpose of said damages. 32Such award is given in
view of the peculiar circumstances cited and the special reasons extant in the
present case; 33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court rules as follows:
(1) The Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
(2) Petitioners are RECOGNIZED and DECLARED as children of the late
Buenaventura Cristobal from his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal;
(3) The Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is DECLARED not
binding upon petitioners who were not notified or did not participate in the
execution thereof;
(4) The subject property, covered by TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, 165134, and
No. 165135, in the name of private respondents consisting of 535 square meters
is ORDERED to be partitioned and distributed in accordance with this Decision
and appropriate certificates of title be issued in favor of each of the recognized
heirs of the late Cristobal Buenaventura, and
(5) Petitioners are AWARDED the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND
(P100,000.00) PESOS as damages, to be paid by private respondents.
Costs against private respondents. aTAEHc
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 105608. April 30, 2008.]
TIRSO D. MONTEROSO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, SOLEDAD
MONTEROSO-CAGAMPANG, REYGULA MONTEROSO-BAYAN, PERFECTO L.
CAGAMPANG, SR., SOFIA PENDEJITO VDA. DE MONTEROSO, FLORENDA
MONTEROSO, ALBERTO MONTEROSO, HEIRS OF FABIAN MONTEROSO, JR.,
REYNATO MONTEROSO, RUBY MONTEROSO, MARLENE MONTEROSO-POSPOS,
ADELITA MONTEROSO-BERENGUEL, and HENRIETO MONTEROSO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 113199. April 30, 2008.]
SOFIA PENDEJITO VDA. DE MONTEROSO, SOLEDAD MONTEROSO-
CAGAMPANG, PERFECTO L. CAGAMPANG, SR., REYGULA MONTEROSO-BAYAN,
FLORENDA MONTEROSO, ALBERTO MONTEROSO, RUBY MONTEROSO,
MARLENE MONTEROSO-POSPOS, HENRIETO MONTEROSO, ADELITA
MONTEROSO-BERENGUEL, and REYNATO MONTEROSO, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and TIRSO D. MONTEROSO, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J p:
The Case
Before us are two petitions for review under Rule 45, the first docketed as G.R.
No. 105608, and the second docketed as G.R. No. 113199, both assailing the
Decision 1 dated March 31, 1992 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
15805 which modified the June 9, 1987 Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 4 in Butuan City in Civil Case Nos. 1292 and 1332.
The Facts
It is not unusual. Acrimonious litigation between and among siblings and
immediate relatives over inheritance does occur. It is unfortunate when the
decedent had, while still alive, taken steps to precisely avoid a bruising squabble
over inheritance.
In a sense, Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., a former justice of the peace and
municipal mayor of Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, started it all. During his
lifetime, Don Fabian married twice and sired eight children, four from each
union.
In 1906, Don Fabian married Soledad Doldol. Out of this marriage were born
Soledad, Reygula, Benjamin, and Tirso. On April 8, 1927, Soledad Doldol
Monteroso passed away.
Page 20 of 49 PROPERTY
A little over a year later, Don Fabian contracted a second marriage with Sofia
Pendejito. From this union were born Florenda, Reynato, Alberto, and Fabian, Jr.
After the death of his first wife, but during the early part of his second marriage,
Don Fabian filed before the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Agusan an intestate
proceeding for the estate of his deceased first wife, Soledad D. Monteroso,
docketed as Special Proceeding (SP) No. 309, apparently to obviate any dispute
over the inheritance of his children from his first marriage. Subsequently, the CFI
received — and later approved per an Orden 3 (Order) dated March 11, 1936 —
a Proyecto de Particion 4 (Project of Partition) dated February 21, 1935.
The partition in SP No. 309 covered Parcels F-1 to F-5, and adjudicated to Don
Fabian the whole of Parcels F-1, F-2, and F-3, and one-half of Parcel F-5, while
the intestate estate of Soledad D. Monteroso comprised the whole of Parcel F-4
and one-half of Parcel F-5. The intestate estate of Soledad D. Monteroso was
partitioned and distributed to her four children in equal shares.
Subsequently, a Mocion 5 (Motion) was filed for the delivery to Soledad D.
Monteroso's four children, her legal heirs, their respective shares in her
intestate estate, as adjudicated among them under the duly CFI-approved
Project of Partition.
In the meantime, the children of Don Fabian from his first marriage married
accordingly: The eldest, Soledad to Atty. Perfecto Cagampang, Sr.; Reygula to
Jose Bayan; Benjamin to Mauricia Nakila; and Tirso to Melecia Taña. Benjamin
died on February 1, 1947 leaving behind four children with wife Nakila, namely:
Ruby, Marlene, Adelita, and Henrieto. A year and a half later, or on October 26,
1948, Don Fabian also passed away.
Before and shortly after Don Fabian's demise, conveyances involving certain of
parcels thus mentioned were purportedly made.
The following is an illustration of the lineal relation of the parties or the family
tree of the direct descendants of Don Fabian from his two marriages:
This brings us to the objects of the squabble: the conjugal patrimonies of Don
Fabian from his two successive marriages.
During the lifetime of Don Fabian, the following properties were acquired, viz:
PARCEL F-ONE
A parcel of coconut plantation on sitio Pandanon, Cabadbaran, Agusan described
as follows: North by the property of Telesforo Ago and Gregorio Cupay; East by
Miguel Y Climaco Cabonce, Isidro Maamo and Buenaventura Sandigan and
Pandanon River, and West by Gregorio Axamin, Alex Fores and Ventura Sandigan
with a superficial extension of 10 has. 62 ares and 42 centares.
PARCEL F-TWO
A parcel of coconut land situated on sitio Pandanon, Cabadbaran, Agusan, with a
superficial extension of 6 hectares, 50 ares bearing Tax No. 14801 of the
Municipality of Cabadbaran, Agusan, . . . .
PARCEL F-THREE
A parcel of coconut land under Tax No. 17167 situated on sitio Calibunan,
Cabadbaran, Agusan with superficial extension of 8 hectares and 34 centares . . .
.
PARCEL F-FOUR
A parcel of coconut land under Tax No. 14600 situated on sitio Pandanon,
Cabadbaran, Agusan, with a superficial extension of 27 hectares, 96 ares and 28
centares . . . .
PARCEL F-FIVE
A parcel of residential lot under Tax No. 18477 situated within the Poblacion of
the Municipality of Cabadbaran, Agusan, with a house of strong materials found
on the same lot with a superficial extension of 660 square meters . . . .
PARCEL F-SIX
A parcel of residential lot under Tax No. 5374 situated within the Poblacion of
the Municipality of Cabadbaran, Agusan, with a superficial extension of 3,890
square meters . . . .
PARCEL F-SEVEN
A parcel of coconut and corn land under Tax No. 1769 situated at Ambahan,
Tubay, Agusan, with a superficial extension of 8 hectares . . . .
PARCEL F-EIGHT
A parcel of coconut land situated at Ambahan, Tubay, Agusan, under Tax No.
2944, with a superficial extension of 7 hectares, 59 ares and 96 centares . . . . 6
PARCEL S-ONE
A parcel of land situated at Tagbongabong, Cabadbaran, Agusan under Tax Dec.
No. 5396 with an area of 24 hectares more or less . . . .
PARCEL S-TWO
A parcel of coconut land situated at Dal-as, Bay-ang, Cabadbaran, Agusan under
Tax No. 69 with an area of 24 hectares more or less . . . .
PARCEL S-THREE
A parcel of coconut land situated at Pandanon, Mabini, Cabadbaran, Agusan,
under Tax No. 21639 with an area of 1.4080 hectares more or less . . . .
PARCEL S-FOUR
A parcel of land situated at Mabini, Cabadbaran, Agusan under Tax No. 3367
with an area of 1,000 sq. m. bounded . . . . 7
The "F" designation signified that the covered properties were acquired during
the first marriage, to distinguish them from those acquired during the second
marriage which are designated as "S" properties.
On July 28, 1969, the children of the late Benjamin D. Monteroso, namely: Ruby
Monteroso, Marlene M. Pospos, Henrieto Monteroso, and Adelita Monteroso-
Berenguel, filed with the RTC a Complaint for Recovery of Property with
Damages against their uncle, Tirso D. Monteroso. Docketed as Civil Case No.
1292, and later raffled to Branch 4 of the court, the complaint involved a portion
of Parcel F-4, described in the Project of Partition, as follows:
(1) One parcel of coconut land with the improvements thereon existing, Tax No.
14600 with a superficial extension of 6 hectares, 99 ares and 32 centares,
bounded as follows: on the North, Regula Monteroso; on the East by the
Provincial Road Butuan-Cabadbaran; on the Sourth Tirso Monteroso and on the
West Diego Calo. 8
As the heirs of Benjamin alleged in their complaint, their uncle, Tirso, was
entrusted with the above-described one-fourth portion of Parcel F-4 as part of
the share from the estate of Soledad D. Monteroso allotted to their father per
SP No. 309. However, their uncle refused to surrender and deliver the same
when they demanded such delivery upon their reaching the majority age.
Tirso countered that the portion pertaining to Benjamin was never entrusted to
him; it was in the possession of their sister, Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang,
who was not entitled to any share in Parcel F-4, having previously opted to
exchange her share in said property for another parcel of land,i.e., Parcel F-7,
then being occupied by her.
On April 14, 1970, Tirso, in turn, filed a Complaint for Partition and Damages
with Receivership docketed as Civil Case No. 1332, involving 12 parcels of land
(i.e., Parcels F-1 to F-8 and Parcels S-1 to S-4, mentioned above) against his
stepmother, Pendejito, and all his full and half-siblings and/or their
representatives. The complaint in Civil Case No. 1332 was subsequently
amended to include Perfecto, as co-defendant, and Pendejito, as guardian ad
litem for the minor children of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr., who died in 1970 after
the filing of the complaint.
In Civil Case No. 1332, Tirso, inter alia, alleged the following: (1) the
aforementioned 12 parcels of land belong to the conjugal partnerships of the
first and second marriages contracted by Don Fabian; (2) SP No. 309, which
purportedly judicially settled the intestate estate of his mother, is null and void
for the reason that the project of partition failed to comprehend the entire
estate of the decedent as Parcels F-6, F-7, and F-8 were excluded, thereby
depriving Tirso of his one-fourth share or legitime over the said three parcels of
land; and (3) Parcels S-1 to S-4, having been acquired during the second
marriage of Don Fabian, are not paraphernal properties of Sofia Pendejito Vda.
de Monteroso.
Answering, the defendants in Civil Case No. 1332 contended that Don Fabian
acquired Parcel F-6 during the second marriage, while Parcels F-7 and F-8 were
Don Fabian's exclusive properties having been acquired through a donation from
the heirs of one Benito Tinosa. They further maintained the validity of the
judicial partition under SP No. 309 which operates as res judicata insofar as
Parcels F-1 to F-5 are concerned. In particular, they asserted that Parcels F-1, F-
2, F-3, and one-half of F-5 were adjudicated to Don Fabian as his share in the
conjugal partnership of the first marriage, while Parcel F-4 and the other half of
Parcel F-5 were equally divided among the four children of the first marriage;
that during his lifetime, Don Fabian sold Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, F-7, and F-8 to
Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang; that Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, Tirso D.
Monteroso, and Mauricia Nakila Vda. de Benjamin Monteroso donated Parcel F-
6 to Reygula Monteroso-Bayan; and that Parcels S-1 to S-4 are truly paraphernal
properties of Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso as Parcel S-1 was acquired by
her through a homestead patent, Parcel S-2 through adverse possession, and
Parcels S-3 and S-4 by purchase.
The Initial Ruling of the RTC
Involving practically the same properties and parties, Civil Case Nos. 1292 and
1332 were consolidated and jointly heard. After a long drawn-out trial spanning
almost 15 years, with six different judges successively hearing the case, the RTC,
presided by Judge Miguel Rallos, rendered on July 22, 1985 a
Decision, 9 dismissing Civil Case No. 1292 on the ground of failure to state a
cause of action, but finding, in Civil Case No. 1332, for Tirso.
What appears to be a victory for Tirso was, however, short-lived. Acting on four
separate motions for reconsideration duly filed by the various defendants in Civil
Case No. 1332, a new judge, who took over the case from Judge Rallos who
inhibited himself from the case, rendered a new decision.
The Subsequent Ruling of the RTC
Dated June 9, 1987, the new Decision set aside the July 22, 1985 RTC Decision of
Judge Rallos and gave due course to both Civil Case Nos. 1292 and 1332. In full,
the fallo of the new decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, both complaints in Civil Cases No. 1292 and
1332 are hereby given due course and judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring, confirming and ordering that Lot 380, Pls-736 located at Pandanon,
Cabadbaran, belongs to the children of first marriage and partitioned as per
subdivision survey map made by Geodetic Engineer Antonio Libarios, Exh. '7',
page 72 of the records as follows:
(a.) Lot 380-A, Share of Soledad Monteroso Cagampang with an area of 5.3376
hectares, with technical description therein;
(b.) Lot 380-B, Share of Reygula Monteroso Bayan with an area of 5.3376
hectares, with technical description therein;
Page 21 of 49 PROPERTY
(c.) Lot 380-C, Share of the Heirs of Benjamin D. Monteroso with an area of
5.3376 hectares with technical description therein;
(d.) Lot 380-D, Share of Tirso D. Monteroso with an area of 5.3376 hectares and
Lot 351, Pls-736 with an area of 6,099 sq. meters, with both technical
description therein;
2. It is hereby ordered that Tirso D. Monteroso must deliver, return, relinquish,
cede, waive and/or quit claim immediately the area of 3.7815 hectares being
portion of Lot 380-C, Pls-736 indicated in the subdivision survey plan by Engr.
Libarios, page 72, Records, Civil Case No. 1292, Folio 2, Exh. "V", to the Heirs of
Benjamin D. Monteroso who are absolute owners of Lot 380-C, Pls-736 and to
pay, return and deliver immediately to the said Heirs of Benjamin D. Monteroso
the net income in arrears from 1948 to 1983, the total sum of Two Hundred
Sixty Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Four and 70/100 (P260,844.70) Pesos with
interest of 12% per annum compounded annually from January 1, 1984 up to
the present and until fully paid;
3. It is hereby ordered that Reygula Monteroso Bayan must deliver, return,
relinquish, cede, waive and/or quit claim immediately the area of 1.6128
hectares which is part of Lot 380-C, Pls-736, indicated in the subdivision survey
plan by Engr. Libarios, page 72, Records (Civil Case No. 1292, Folio 2), Exh. 'V', to
the Heirs of Benjamin D. Monteroso who are the absolute owners of Lot 380-C,
Pls-736 and to pay, return and deliver immediately to the said Heirs of Benjamin
D. Monteroso the net income in arrears from 1948 to 1983 the total sum of One
Hundred Six Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty and 40/100 (P106,960.40) Pesos with
interest of 12% per annum compounded annually from January 1, 1984 up to
the present and until fully paid;
4. It is hereby ordered that Soledad Monteroso Cagampang must deliver, return,
relinquish, cede, waive and/or quit claim immediately the area of 1.0929
hectares being portion of Lot 380-C, Pls-736, indicated in the subdivision survey
plan by Engr. Libarios, page 72, Records (Civil Case No. 1292, Folio 2), Exh. 'V', to
her sister Reygula Monteroso Bayan who is the absolute owner of Lot 380-C, Pls-
736 and to pay, return and deliver immediately to the said Reygula Monteroso
Bayan the net income in arrears from 1948 to 1983, the total sum of Seventy
Seven Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Five and 96/100 (P77,625.96) Pesos with
interest of 12% per annum compounded annually from January 1, 1984 up to
the present and until fully paid, subject to deduction of whatever cash advances,
if any, was ever received by Reygula M. Bayan.
5. The three alleged Absolute Sale, Exh. 'C', 'D' and 'E' with all its submarkings
are declared fictitious, simulated and no consideration. It can never be
considered a donation because aside from being inofficious and impairing the
legitime of other heirs, the vendee had not signed therein which could be
considered acceptance and above all, these documents were prepared and
acknowledged by Notary Public squarely disqualified and highly prohibited.
Therefore, all are declared null and void and of no legal effect.
So, parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, F-6, F-7 and F-8 [remain] as part of the intestate estate
of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr.
6. The Register of Deeds and the Provincial Assessor, both in the Province of
Agusan del Norte are hereby ordered to cancel as the same are cancelled and
nullified, all transfer of certificates and tax declarations now in the name of
Soledad Monteroso de Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. which
parcels of land originally were registered and declared in the name of Don
Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., and to register and declare again in the name of Heirs
of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., more particularly the following:
(a.) [TCT No. RT-203] (420) for Lot 432, Cad. 121, with an area of 10.0242
hectares under Tax Dec. No. 02-018-0224, Series of 1980, PIN-02-019-05-050
known as Parcel F-1;
(b.) TCT No. RT-205 (424) for Lot 100, Cad. 121, with an area of 1.9083 hectares
under Tax Dec. No. 02-019-0488, Series of 1980, PIN-02-019-08-002 known as F-
2;
(c.) TCT No. RT-204 (423) for Lot 103, Cad. 121, with an area of 2.8438 hectares
under Tax Declaration No. 02-019-0335, Series of 1980, PIN-02-019-08-017
known as F-2;
(d.) Parcel of coconut land located at Poblacion, Cabadbaran, known as F-3 with
area of 6.3100 hectares under Tax Dec. No. 02-001-1810, Series of 1980 and PIN-
02-001-30-027;
(e.) Residential Lot, known as F-5 located at Poblacion, Cabadbaran under Tax
Dec. No. 18447 then under Tax Dec. No. 1922, containing an area of 660 sq.
meters bounded on the North by Washington Street; on the East by Progresso
Street; on the South by Rizal Street; and on the West by Ramon Cabrera.
(f.) Residential Lot known as F-6 located at Poblacion under Tax Dec. No. 5374,
Series of 1949 and Tax Dec. No. 499, Series of 1954, consisting of 3,890 sq.
meters bounded as follows:
North — Andres Atega
South — Rill
East — Luis Jamboy now Celestino Udarbe,
Sixto Ferrer and New Road
West — Atega Street;
(g.) Coconut land known as F-7, located at Ambajan, Tubay, Agusan del Norte
under Tax Dec. No. 1769, Series of 1955 and Tax Dec. No. 10-03-0273, Series of
1980 with an area of [8.000] hectares;
(h.) Parcel of coconut land known as F-8, located at Ambajan, Tubay, Agusan del
Norte with an area of 7.5996 hectares under Tax Dec. No. 2944 and Tax Dec. No.
10-03-0273, Series of 1980;
(i.) Parcel of S-1, located at Tagbongabong, Cabadbaran under Tax Dec. No.
11506, Series of 1963 with an area of 24 hectares in the name of Sofia Vda. de
Monteroso;
(j.) Parcel of S-2, located at Dal-as, Bay-ang, Cabadbaran, under Tax Dec. No.
1888, Series of 1948, Tax Dec. No. 669, Series of 1952, and subsequently
transferred in fraud of other heirs, in the name of Florenda P. Monteroso under
Tax Dec. No. 11507, Series of 1964, Tax Dec. No. 3381, Series of 1972, Tax Dec.
No. 5036, Series of 1974, Tax Dec. No. 02-006-0047, Series of 1980;
(k.) Parcel of S-3, located at Pandanon, Mabini, Cabadbaran, under Tax Dec. No.
5373, Series of 1949 with an area of 1.4080 hectares and bounded as follows:
North — Pandanon River
South — Crisanto Dolleroso
East — Pandanon River
West — Pandanon River and Peregrino Aznar;
(l.) Parcel S-4, located at Mabini, Cabadbaran, under Tax Dec. No. 3367 with an
area of 1.6500 hectares and bounded as follows:
North — Hrs. of G. Corvera
South — C. Vda. de Alburo
East — Ellodoro Delleroso
West — A. Ventura
7. It is hereby declared that upon the death of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr. on
March 26, 1948, the following are the properties belonging to his intestate
estate:
(a.) Whole parcel Lot 432, F-1;
(b.) Whole parcels Lot 100 and 103, F-2;
(c.) Whole parcel cocoland, Calibunan, F-3;
(d.) One-half (1/2) parcel F-5;
(e.) One-half (1/2) parcel F-6;
(f.) One-half (1/2) parcel F-7;
(g.) One-half (1/2) parcel F-8;
(h.) One-half (1/2) parcel S-1;
(i.) One-half (1/2) parcel S-2;
(j.) One-half (1/2) parcel S-3;
(k.) One-half (1/2) parcel S-4.
8. It is hereby ordered that Lot 432 under TCT [No.] RT-203 (420) with an area of
10.0242 hectares under Tax Dec. No. 02-018-0224 (1980) is hereby divided into
nine (9) equal shares for the eight (8) children of Don Fabian B. Monteroso and
the one-ninth (1/9) share be held in usufruct by the widow Sofia Pendejito
Monteroso during her lifetime.
Sofia Pendejito Monteroso being in possession and enjoying the fruits or income
of F-1 is hereby ordered to pay and deliver immediately to the following heirs
the corresponding amount of net income of F-1, Lot 432, from 1948 to 1983:
(a.) To Soledad Monteroso Cagampang — P78,521.32
(b.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan — P78,521.32
(c.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso — P78,521.32
(d.) To Tirso D. Monteroso — P78,521.32
(e.) To Florenda P. Monteroso — P78,521.32
(f.) To Reynato P. Monteroso — P78,521.32
(g.) To Alberto P. Monteroso — P78,521.32
(h.) To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. — P78,521.32
The above-mentioned [amounts] shall be subject to deduction for whatever cash
advance any heir may have received. Then the net balance of said [amounts]
shall be subject to interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
compounded annually from January 1, 1984 to the present until fully paid.
9. It is hereby ordered that Lot 100 under [TCT No. RT-205] (424) with an area of
1.9083 hectares under Tax Dec. No. 02-019-0488, Series of 1980 and Lot No. 103
under [TCT No. RT-204] (423) with an area of 2.8438 hectares and under Tax
Dec. No. 02-019-0335, Series of 1980, [both known as Parcel F-2,] shall be
divided into nine (9) equal shares for the eight (8) children of Fabian B.
Monteroso, Sr. and one-ninth (1/9) share shall be held in usufruct by the widow,
Sofia P. Monteroso, during her lifetime.
Soledad Monteroso Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. are
ordered to deliver to [their] co-heirs their shares in these parcels of land, F-2,
free from any lien and encumbrances whatsoever, and to pay each of them the
net income in arrears from 1948 to 1983, namely:
(a.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan — P34,976.85
(b.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso — P34,976.85
(c.) To Tirso D. Monteroso — P34,976.85
(d.) To Florenda P. Monteroso — P34,976.85
(e.) To Reynato P. Monteroso — P34,976.85
(f.) To Alberto P. Monteroso — P34,976.85
(g.) To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. — P34,976.85
(h.) To Sofia P. Monteroso (usufruct) — P34,976.85
Page 22 of 49 PROPERTY
The above-mentioned [amounts] shall be subjected to deduction of whatever
amount any heir may have received by way of cash advances.
The net amount shall be subjected to an interest at the rate of twelve percent
(12%) per annum compounded annually from January 1, 1984 to the present or
until fully paid.
10. Soledad Monteroso Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. being
in possession and enjoying the fruits and income of Parcel F-3, are hereby
ordered to pay to the following heirs, the net income in arrears from 1948 to
1983:
(a.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan — P49,727.35
(b.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso — P49,727.35
(c.) To Tirso D. Monteroso — P49,727.35
(d.) To Florenda P. Monteroso — P49,727.35
(e.) To Reynato P. Monteroso — P49,727.35
(f.) To Alberto P. Monteroso — P49,727.35
(g.) To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. — P49,727.35
(h.) To Sofia P. Monteroso (usufruct) — P49,727.35
The above-mentioned [amounts] shall be subject to deduction for whatever cash
advance, if any, such heir may have received. Then the net [amounts] shall be
subject to interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum compounded
annually from January 1, 1984 to the present until fully paid.
Soledad Monteroso Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. are both
ordered to deliver to the above-mentioned co-heirs their respective shares free
from any lien and encumbrances whatsoever.
11. Parcels F-5, F-6, F-7 and F-8 are declared real properties belonging to the
first marriage. Hence one-half (1/2) of each of these four parcels shall equally be
divided by the four (4) children of the first marriage and the other half must be
divided into nine (9) equal shares for the eight (8) children of Fabian B.
Monteroso, Sr., and one-ninth (1/9) shall be held in usufruct by the widow, Sofia
Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso.
Therefore, it is hereby ordered that F-6 is divided as follows:
(a.) To Soledad Monteroso Cagampang 702 sq. m.
(b.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan 702 sq. m.
(c.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso 702 sq. m.
(d.) To Tirso D. Monteroso 702 sq. m.
(e.) To Florenda P. Monteroso 216 sq. m.
(f.) To Reynato P. Monteroso 216 sq. m.
(g.) To Alberto P. Monteroso 216 sq. m.
(h.) To Hrs. of Fabian Monteroso, Jr. 216 sq. m.
(i.) To Sofia P. Monteroso 216 sq. m.
12. It is hereby ordered, that Soledad Monteroso Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto
L. Cagampang, Sr. must deliver to all heirs their respective shares on F-7 and F-8
including usufruct of Sofia P. Monteroso as declared in paragraph five (5) and in
addition, must pay and deliver the net income in arrears from 1948 to 1983,
summarized as follows:
(a.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan P189,665.88
(b.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso P189,665.88
(c.) To Tirso D. Monteroso P189,665.88
(d.) To Florenda P. Monteroso P58,358.73
(e.) To Reynato P. Monteroso P58,358.73
(f.) To Alberto P. Monteroso P58,358.73
(g.) To Hrs. of Fabian Monteroso, Jr. P58,358.73
(h.) To Sofia P. Monteroso (usufruct) P58,358.73
all with interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum compounded
annually from January 1, 1984 to the present until fully paid. However, it is
subject to deduction of whatever cash advances, if ever any heir, may have
received.
13. The Deed of Donation in 1948, Exh. "F", over parcel known as F-5, is declared
null and void because the same was prepared and acknowledged before a
Notary Public disqualified and prohibited to do so under Notarial Law ( Barretto
vs. Cabreza, 33 Phil. Reports 112). Hence, the transfer of tax declaration is
hereby ordered cancelled and the same must be declared again in the name of
the Heirs of Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr. and ordered partitioned in the proportion
stated in paragraph eleven (11) hereof.
14. Parcels of land known as S-1, S-2, S-3 and S-4 are declared conjugal
properties of the second marriage. Hence, one-half (1/2) thereof belongs to
Sofia Pendejito Monteroso and one-half (1/2) shall be equally divided into nine
(9) shares for the eight (8) children of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr. where the
one-ninth (1/9) shall be held in usufruct by Sofia P. Monteroso during her
lifetime.
15. For the net income in arrears of S-1 located at Tagbongabong, Cabadbaran,
from 1948 to 1983, Sofia Pendejito Monteroso is hereby ordered to pay and
deliver to the following heirs the corresponding share:
(a.) To Soledad Monteroso Cagampang P93,998.12
(b.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan P93,998.12
(c.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso P93,998.12
(d.) To Tirso D. Monteroso P93,998.12
(e.) To Florenda P. Monteroso P93,998.12
(f.) To Reynato P. Monteroso P93,998.12
(g.) To Alberto P. Monteroso P93,998.12
(h.) To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. P93,998.12
However, all these amounts shall be subject to deduction, if any cash advance
was ever made or received by any heir.
The above-mentioned [amounts are] subject to an interest at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) compounded annually from January 1, 1948 to the present until
fully paid.
16. The alleged Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Sofia P. Monteroso in favor of
Florenda P. Monteroso over a coconut land located at Dal-as, Bay-ang,
Cabadbaran, consisting of 24 hectares is hereby declared null and void being in
fraud of other heirs. It is clearly inofficious and impairs the legitime of her
brothers, sisters and nephews and nieces. Therefore, the tax declaration in the
name of Florenda P. Monteroso under Tax Dec. No. 11507, Series of 1964, Tax
Dec. No. 3381, Series of 1972, Tax Dec. No. 5036, Series of 1974 and Tax Dec.
No. 02-006-0047, PIN-02-006-02-002 are hereby ordered cancelled and the said
land shall be declared again in the name of Heirs of Fabian B. Monteroso.
Sofia Pendejito Monteroso is not required to render accounting as to the income
of S-2 because the coconut trees therein were planted by her while being
already a widow. One-half (1/2) of the land where the coconut trees are planted
shall be her share and the other one-half (1/2) shall be divided into nine (9)
shares for the eight (8) children of Fabian B. Monteroso including her 1/9
usufruct thereon.
17. Sofia Pendejito Monteroso is hereby ordered to pay and deliver immediately
the net income in arrears of parcel S-3 located at Pandanon to the following
heirs with the corresponding amount:
(a.) To Soledad Monteroso Cagampang P49,349.02
(b.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan P49,349.02
(c.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso P49,349.02
(d.) To Tirso D. Monteroso P49,349.02
(e.) To Florenda P. Monteroso P49,349.02
(f.) To Reynato P. Monteroso P49,349.02
(g.) To Alberto P. Monteroso P49,349.02
(h.) To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. P49,349.02
However, [the] above-mentioned [amounts] shall be subject to deductions, if
any cash advance was ever made or received by any heir.
Then the net amount receivable shall be subject to an interest at the rate of
twelve percent (12%) compounded annually from January 1, 1984 to the present
until fully paid.
18. For the net income in arrears of parcel S-4, located at Mabini, Cabadbaran,
from 1948 to 1983, Sofia P. Monteroso is hereby ordered to pay and deliver to
the following heirs their corresponding shares:
(a.) To Soledad Monteroso Cagampang P6,477.54
(b.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan P6,477.54
(c.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso P6,477.54
(d.) To Tirso D. Monteroso P6,477.54
(e.) To Florenda P. Monteroso P6,477.54
(f.) To Reynato P. Monteroso P6,477.54
(g.) To Alberto P. Monteroso P6,477.54
(h.) To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. P6,477.54
However, all these amounts shall be subject to deductions, if any cash advance
was ever made or received by any heir.
The above-mentioned amount is subject to an interest at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) compounded annually from January 1, 1984 to the present until
fully paid.
Sofia Pendejito Monteroso is ordered to deliver to the above-mentioned heirs
their respective shares free from any lien and encumbrances whatsoever.
19. These cases involved inheritance, hence the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) of Agusan del Norte at Butuan City is hereby notified for prompt, proper
and appropriate action. Likewise, the Provincial Treasurer of Agusan del Norte
and the Municipal Treasurers of Cabadbaran and Tubay are hereby informed
and reminded for their prompt, proper and appropriate action in the assessment
and collection of real estate taxes including transfer's tax.
20. That all the heirs are hereby directed, and ordered to pay all taxes due in
favor of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines within thirty (30)
days from the finality of judgment hereof, otherwise, upon proper application or
manifestation by appropriate or concerned government agency, a portion of the
intestate estate of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., shall be sold at public auction
for such purpose.
21. Under Civil Case No. 1292, Tirso D. Monteroso or his heirs, assigns and
successors-in-interest, is hereby ordered to pay Ruby Monteroso, Marlene
Monteroso-Pospos, Adelita Monteroso-Berenguel and Henrieto Monteroso the
following sums of money:
(a.) P10,000.00 for moral damages;
(b.) P10,000.00 for exemplary damages;
Page 23 of 49 PROPERTY
(c.) P3,000.00 for costs of suit; and
(d.) P10,000.00 for attorney's fees.
22. Under Civil Case No. 1292, Soledad Monteroso de Cagampang and Reygula
Monteroso Bayan are hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay Ruby
Monteroso, Marlene Monteroso-Pospos, Adelita Monteroso-Berenguel and
Henrieto Monteroso the following sums of money:
(a.) P10,000.00 for moral damages;
(b.) P10,000.00 for exemplary damages;
(c.) P2,000.00 for costs of suit; and
(d.) P10,000.00 for attorney's fees.
23. Under Civil Case No. 1332, Soledad Monteroso Cagampang, Atty. Perfecto L.
Cagampang, Sr. and Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso or their heirs, assigns
and successors-in-interest, are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally, unto
and in favor of Tirso D. Monteroso or his heirs, assigns and successors-in-
interest, the following sums of money:
(a.) P20,000.00 for moral damages;
(b.) P20,000.00 for exemplary damages;
(c.) P5,000.00 for costs of suit; and
(d.) P10,000.00 for attorney's fees.
24. It is hereby ordered that a judicial administrator of the intestate estate of
Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr. shall be appointed by this Court upon written
recommendation by all the parties within thirty (30) days from promulgation of
this decision. Should the parties fail to submit unanimously a recommendee, the
Court at its discretion may appoint an administrator, unless none of the parties
appeal this decision and this judgment is complied with by all the parties and/or
so executed in accordance with the provisions of the New Rules of Court.
SO ORDERED. 10
As regards Civil Case No. 1292, the RTC found that the heirs of Benjamin have
indeed been deprived of their inheritance which corresponds to one-fourth
share due their father from the intestate estate of their grandmother, Soledad
D. Monteroso. Thus, the court ordered the equal distribution of Parcel F-4, i.e.,
Lot 380, Pls-736 located in Pandanon, Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, among the
children of the first marriage of Don Fabian, and partitioned it based on the
subdivision survey map prepared by a geodetic engineer.
Turning on the alleged sale of Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, F-7, and F-8 by Don Fabian to
Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, the RTC found the covering three deeds of
absolute sale 11 to be null and void for the reason that the alleged conveyances
were fictitious, simulated, and/or without sufficient consideration. Alternatively,
the RTC ruled that the conveyances, even if considered as donation, would be
inofficious for impairing the legitime of the other compulsory heirs, not to
mention the lack of due acceptance of the donation by Soledad Monteroso-
Cagampang. Adding a vitiating element to the conveyances, as the RTC noted,
was the fact that the corresponding documents were prepared by and
acknowledged before Perfecto, who happened to be the husband of the alleged
vendee, Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang.
The RTC also declared as null and void the donation of Parcel F-5 to Reygula
Monteroso-Bayan owing to clear legal infirmities attaching to the covering deed
of donation. 12 For one, the parcel in question, while purportedly donated free
from any liens or encumbrance, was in fact the subject of a deed of absolute sale
between Don Fabian and the Cagampang spouses. For another, one of the
signatory-donors, Mauricia Nakila, Benjamin's widow, did not have the right to
effect a donation because she was not a compulsory heir of her husband by
representation. The RTC added that the real owners of the rights and interests of
Benjamin over Parcel F-5 are her children as representative heirs.
Finally, the RTC declared the Order dated March 11, 1936 issued in SP No. 309
approving the Project of Partition to be valid, and that it constitutes res
judicata on the affected properties, i.e., Parcel F-4 and one-half of Parcel F-5,
which were equally distributed to the heirs of Soledad D. Monteroso. Pursuing
this point and on the finding that Parcels F-1 to F-8 were acquired during the
first marriage and Parcels S-1 to S-4 during the second, the RTC thus held that
Don Fabian's intestate estate consisted of the whole of Parcels F-1, F-2, and F-3;
and half of Parcels F-5 to F-8 and half of Parcels S-1 to S-4, to be distributed in
accordance with the law on intestate succession. This means, the RTC
concluded, that the estate shall descend to Don Fabian's compulsory heirs and
their representatives, as in the case of the late Benjamin and Fabian, Jr., subject
to accounting of the income or produce of the subject properties for the
applicable period, less advances made or received by any heir, if any.
The Ruling of the CA
From the above June 9, 1987 Decision, Tirso, defendant in Civil Case No. 1292,
appealed to the CA, so did the Cagampang spouses, defendants in Civil Case No.
1332. The other defendants in Civil Case No. 1332, namely: Sofia Pendejito Vda.
de Monteroso, Florenda Monteroso, Alberto Monteroso, Heirs of Fabian
Monteroso, Jr., Reynato Monteroso, and Reygula Monteroso-Bayan, also
interposed their own appeal. The separate appeals were consolidated and
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 15805.
On March 31, 1992, the CA rendered the assailed decision, affirming with
modification the June 9, 1987 RTC Decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified, as follows:
a) In the event that a homestead patent over Parcel S-1 is issued by the Bureau
of Lands pursuant to the patent application of Sofia Pendejito Vda. de
Monteroso, said patent shall issue not in the name of the applicant but in favor
of the eight heirs of Fabian Monteroso, Sr. who thereafter shall be declared
absolute owners of the said parcel of land in the proportion stated in this
decision but who nevertheless shall allow Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso to
exercise during her lifetime usufructuary rights over a portion of the said parcel
of land equivalent to the share therein of each of the heirs of her deceased
husband;
b) The said heirs of Fabian Monteroso, Sr. are hereby declared absolute owners
of Parcel F-6 to the extent of their respective shares therein as presently
individually possessed by them pursuant to an extrajudicial partition of the said
parcel of land which the Court hereby declares as a valid contract among the
said heirs; and
c) With the exception of those pertaining to Parcel F-4 as stated in this decision,
the parties thus found to have unjustly misappropriated the fruits of the subject
parcels of land are hereby directed to render an accounting thereof consistent
with our findings in the case at bar.
With the exception of the foregoing modifications, the decision under review is
hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 13
The CA summarized into three issues the multifarious assignments of errors
raised by the parties, to wit: first, whether or not the intestate estate of Soledad
Doldol Monteroso was settled in SP No. 309, thus according the Project of
Partition approved therein the effect of res judicata; second, whether or not it
was appropriate to partition Parcels F-1, F-2, and F-3, and half of Parcels F-5, F-6,
F-7, F-8, S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4; and third, whether or not Tirso D. Monteroso is
entitled to damages.
The CA resolved the first issue in the affirmative, SP No. 309 being a valid and
binding proceedings insofar as the properties subject thereof are concerned, i.e.,
Parcels F-1 to F-5 of which the whole of Parcel F-4 and one-half of Parcel F-5, as
Soledad D. Monteroso's intestate estate, were distributed to her heirs. This is
not to mention that the authenticity and due execution of the documents filed
or issued in relation therewith — referring to theProyecto de Particion dated
February 12, 1935 which is a carbon copy of the original, the Orden issued by the
CFI on March 11, 1936, and the Mociondated March 18, 1936 — having duly
been established. Affirming the RTC, the CA rejected Tirso's claim that SP No.
309 is void for settling only a part of the estate of Soledad D. Monteroso. The CA
held that partial settlement is not a ground for the nullification of the judicial
partition under either the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 or the present Civil Code.
The appellate court added that the proper remedy in such a situation is to ask
for the partition and the subsequent distribution of the property omitted.
The CA likewise disposed of the second issue in the affirmative, dismissing the
opposition of the Cagampang spouses and Reygulo Monteroso-Bayan who all
claimed ownership over some of the parcels of land on the strength of the deeds
of conveyance executed in their favor. The CA upheld the RTC's finding that the
three deeds of absolute sale in which Don Fabian purportedly sold Parcels F-1, F-
2, F-3, F-7, and F-8 to Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang were infirm. The CA noted
that even the Cagampang spouses recognized these infirmities, and instead of
denying their existence, they tried to justify the same and seek an exception
therefrom.
On the alleged donation of Parcel F-5 by Don Fabian to Reygula Monteroso-
Bayan, the CA likewise agreed with the RTC's finding on the nullity thereof. The
CA pointed out that Reygula Monteroso-Bayan did not controvert the RTC's
finding, except to gratuitously say that the trial court's declaration of nullity was
wrong since nobody questioned the authenticity of the donation in the first
place.
Apropos Parcel S-1, a disposable agricultural land of the public domain which is
the subject of a homestead patent application by Don Fabian, the CA, as
opposed to the RTC's disposition, held that a patent, if eventually issued, ought
to be in the name of the legal heirs of Don Fabian, not of his surviving spouse,
Pendejito. This conclusion, so the CA explained, is in line with the provision of
Section 105 of the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141), as
amended.
As to Parcel S-2, the CA agreed with the RTC that it is a conjugal property
acquired during the second marriage through a deed of sale 14 executed on
August 15, 1947 by Marcelo Morancel. Likewise, the CA said that Parcels S-3 and
S-4 are conjugal properties as no evidence was adduced supporting the alleged
purchase by Pendejito of said properties with her own funds.
Anent the RTC's order partitioning Parcel F-6, the CA agreed with the defendants
in Civil Case No. 1332 that Parcel F-6 has long been partitioned equitably among
all the eight children of Don Fabian. Thus, the CA further modified the RTC on
this point.
On the third and last issues, the CA set aside all awards of actual damages made
by the RTC premised on the income generating capacity of the subject
properties, except that of Parcel F-4, as an order of accounting of the fruits of
the other subject properties unjustly appropriated by them would address the
issue of damages.
It bears to stress at this juncture that, save for the grant of damages and the
disposition of Parcels F-6 and S-1, the CA affirmed the questioned RTC Decision
on all other points. On June 15, 1992, Tirso D. Monteroso thereafter filed before
the Court his partial petition for review under Rule 45, docketed as G.R.
No. 105608.
On the other hand, Pendejito, together with the other defendants in Civil Case
No. 1332, first interposed a joint motion for partial reconsideration, which the
Page 24 of 49 PROPERTY
CA denied per its equally assailed December 16, 1993 Resolution, 15 before
elevating the case via a petition for review under Rule 45, docketed asG.R. No.
113199.
G.R. No. 105608 Denied with Finality
Per its Resolution 16 dated June 29, 1992, the Court denied Tirso D. Monteroso's
petition under G.R. No. 105608 for late payment of fees and non-compliance
with the requirements of the Rules of Court and Circular Nos. 1-88 and 28-91
on the submission of a certified copy of the assailed decision/order and a
certification of non-forum shopping. Another Resolution 17 of August 12, 1992
followed, this time denying with finality Tirso D. Monteroso's motion for
reconsideration filed on July 29, 1992. On August 31, 1992, an Entry of
Judgment 18 was issued.
In net effect, the March 31, 1992 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 15805 is final
and executory as to Tirso D. Monteroso, and the Court need not pass upon the
issues he raised in his petition under G.R. No. 105608, albeit we shall take stock
of his Comment 19 and Memorandum 20 in G.R. No. 113199.
The Issues
Petitioners in G.R. No. 113199 raise the following issues for our consideration:
1. Whether the finding that the Deeds of Sale (Exhibits "C", "D" and "E") were
not supported by valuable consideration and sham, fictitious and simulated is
supported by the evidence.
2. Whether the finding or conclusion that petitioners Spouses Atty. Perfecto and
Soledad Cagampang did not dispute the finding of the trial Court that the Deeds
of Sale in question are sham, fictitious and simulated is supported by evidence.
3. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error in concluding that, "By invoking
the benefits of prescription in their favor, the Cagampang spouses are deemed
to have admitted the existence of a co-ownership."
4. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error in upholding partition as the
proper remedy of private respondent Tirso Monteroso to recover the properties
sold by Fabian Monteroso, Sr. to Soledad D. Monteroso de Cagampang when co-
ownership is not pleaded as theory in the Complaint.
5. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error in holding that the cause of
action of private respondent Tirso Monteroso is not barred by extinctive
prescription and laches.
6. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error in granting reliefs not prayed for
in the Complaint in favor of parties who did not assert or claim such relief, such
as partition and accounting among the parties and the nullification of the
donation in favor of petitioner Reygula Bayan when . . . Tirso Monteroso and the
petitioners herein who are signatories to the Deed of Donation did not question
or ask for the nullification of the donation in favor of Reygula Bayan.
7. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error in ordering the partition of
parcels S-1, S-2, S-3 and S-4 which are admitted in the Complaint to be in the
exclusive, adverse possession of petitioners Sofia vda. de Monteroso, Florenda,
Alberto and Reynato and the Heirs of Fabian Monteroso, Jr. since the death of
Fabian Monteroso, Sr. in 1948, appropriating the harvests unto themselves, to
the exclusion of plaintiff (private respondent Tirso Monteroso) who was
deprived of his share continuously up to the present. 21
The Court's Ruling
After a circumspect consideration of the arguments earnestly pressed by the
parties and in the light of the practically parallel findings of the RTC and CA, we
find the petition under G.R. No. 113199 to be devoid of merit.
It is a rule of long standing that:
[T]he jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the Court of
Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law.
Findings of fact of the latter are conclusive, except in the following instances: (1)
when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 22
None of the above exceptions, however, obtains in the instant case.
First and Second Issues: Simulated Sale
In connection with the first two related issues, petitioners maintain that the CA
erred when it affirmed the RTC's conclusion on the fictitious or simulated
nature, for lack or inadequate consideration, of the Deeds of Sale (Exhibits "C",
"D", and "E"), noting that Tirso failed to present substantial evidence to support
the alleged infirmity of the underlying sale. The fact that one of the lots sold
under Exhibit "C" on May 10, 1939 for PhP2,500 was used as collateral for a
PhP600 loan is not, so petitioners claim, proof that the amount of PhP600
represents the maximum loan value of the property or that the sale in question
is not supported by valuable consideration.
Moreover, petitioners belabored to explain that the trial court erred in
concluding that the property conveyed under Exhibit "C" and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-203 (420) in the name of Soledad
Monteroso-Cagampang, married to Perfecto, was fictitious on the ground that
the certificate did not indicate that it was a conjugal property. Petitioners assert
that the registration of a property only in the name of one of the spouses is not
proof that no consideration was paid therefor. As petitioners would stress, what
determines whether a given property is conjugal or separate is the law itself, not
what appears in the certificate of title.
Lastly, petitioners take exception from the appellate court's posture that the
Cagampang spouses did not dispute the trial court's finding that the deeds of
sale (Exhibits "C", "D", and "E") were simulated and fictitious for lack of
consideration. Petitioners insist that they in fact contested such conclusion of
the RTC in their brief before the CA, adding they only raised the issue of
prescription as an alternative defense without conceding the RTC's findings on
contract infirmity.
We are not persuaded.
The antecedent facts, as borne by the records, strongly indicate the simulated
character of the sale covered by the deeds of absolute sale over Parcels F-1
(Exhibit "C"), F-2 (Exhibit "D"), F-3, F-5, F-7, and F-8 (Exhibit "E"). As found below,
Don Fabian never relinquished possession of the covered properties during his
lifetime. The first deed, Exhibit "E", was executed on May 1, 1939; the
second, Exhibit "C", on May 10, 1939; and the third, Exhibit "D", on September
24, 1939. Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, however, only took possession of the
subject properties after Don Fabian's death in 1948 or nine years after contract
execution. The gap, unexplained as it were, makes for a strong case that the
parties to the sale never intended to be bound thereby.
The more telling circumstance, however, is the fact that Perfecto had judicially
sought the amendment of the corresponding TCTs so that only the name of his
wife, Soledad, shall be inscribed as real party-in-interest on the Memorandum
of Encumbrances at the back portion of the titles. If only to stress the point,
when the deeds were executed in 1939, Soledad and Perfecto Cagampang, the
notarizing officer, were already married.
A property acquired during the existence of a marriage is presumed conjugal.
This postulate notwithstanding, Perfecto Cagampang went out of his way to
make it appear that the subject parcels of land were effectively his wife's
paraphernal properties. No explanation was given for this unusual move.
Hence, we agree with the trial and appellate courts that the unexplained
situations described above sufficiently show that the purported conveyances
were simulated. We also accord credence to Tirso's allegation that the
Cagampang spouses tricked Don Fabian into believing that his creditors were
after the properties which have to be "hidden" by means of simulated
conveyances to Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang. The fact that only one of the
subject lots was used as collateral for a PhP600 loan which the Cagampang
spouses took out does not weaken the conclusion on the simulated character of
the contracts, as logically drawn from the twin circumstances adverted to.
The Court can allow that petitioners indeed attempted to traverse, before the
CA, the RTC's findings on the area of simulated sale and that they only raised the
matter of acquisitive prescription as an alternative defense. However, as we
shall explain shortly, the fact of petitioners having made the attempt aforestated
will not carry the day for them.
Third Issue: Recognition of Co-ownership in Acquisitive Prescription
In its assailed decision, the CA declared, "By invoking the benefits of prescription
in their favor, the Cagampang spouses are deemed to have admitted the
existence of a co-ownership . . . ." The petitioners tag this declaration as flawed
since the benefit of prescription may be availed of without necessarily
recognizing co-ownership. Prescription and co-ownership, they maintain, are so
diametrically opposed legal concepts, such that one who invokes prescription is
never deemed to admit the existence of co-ownership.
Petitioners are mistaken; their error flows from compartmentalizing what the CA
wrote. The aforecited portion of the CA's decision should not have been taken in
isolation. It should have been read in the context of the appellate court's
disquisition on the matter of Tirso being a co-owner of the subject undivided
properties whose rights thereto, as a compulsory heir, accrued at the moment of
death of Don Fabian, vis-à-vis the defense of acquisitive prescription foisted by
the Cagampang spouses. For clarity, we reproduce the pertinent portion of the
assailed decision:
Nor do we find any merit in the third. From the allegation in the Complaint in
Civil Case No. 1332 as well as from the arguments advanced by the parties on
the issues raised therein, this Court is convinced that therein plaintiff Tirso
Monteroso's principal cause of action is unmistakably one for partition which by
its very nature is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches . . . . The only
exception to the rule on the imprescriptibility of an action for partition is
provided in a case where the co-ownership of the properties sought to be
partitioned had been properly repudiated by a co-owner at which instance the
remedy available to the aggrieved heirs lies not in action for partition but for
reconveyance which is subject to the rules on extinctive prescription. By
invoking the benefits of prescription in their favor, the Cagampang spouses are
deemed to have admitted the existence of a co-ownership among the heirs of
Fabian Monteroso, Sr. over the properties forming the decedent's
estate. 23 (Emphasis ours.)
From the foregoing disquisition, what the appellate court tried to convey is clear
and simple: partition is the proper remedy available to Tirso who is a co-owner
of the subject properties by virtue of his being a compulsory heir, like siblings
Soledad, Reygula, and Benjamin, of Don Fabian. The right to seek partition is
imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches. Consequently, acquisitive
prescription or laches does not lie in favor of the Cagampang spouses and
Page 25 of 49 PROPERTY
against Tirso, the general rule being that prescription does not run against a co-
owner or co-heir. The only exception to the imprescriptibility of an action for
partition against a co-owner is when a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership.
Thus, the appellate court ruled that by invoking extinctive prescription as a
defense, the lone exception against imprescriptibility of action by a co-owner,
the Cagampang spouses are deemed to have contextually recognized the co-
ownership of Tirso and must have repudiated such co-ownership in order for
acquisitive prescription to set in. Taking off from that premise, the appellate
court then proceeded to tackle the issue of repudiation by the Cagampang
spouses. Therefore, we hold that the appellate court did not err in finding that
the Cagampang spouses are effectively barred from invoking prescription, given
that the subject properties are conjugal properties of the decedent, Don Fabian,
which cannot be subjected to acquisitive prescription, the necessary
consequence of recognizing the co-ownership stake of other legal heirs.
Fourth and Fifth Issues: Partition Proper, not Barred by Laches nor by
Acquisitive Prescription
Being inextricably intertwined, we tackle both issues together. Petitioners, citing
Article 494 of the Civil Code 24 and Art. 1965 of the Spanish Civil Code, aver that
the right to ask partition is proper only where co-ownership is recognized. They
also suggest that no co-ownership obtains in this case considering that no less
than Tirso avers in his complaint in Civil Case No. 1332 that from the time of Don
Fabian's death in 1948, the lots in question have been in the exclusive, adverse,
and public possession of the Cagampang spouses. Assayed against this
perspective, petitioners submit that partition is not proper, ergo unavailing, but
an action for reconveyance which is subject to the rules on extinctive
prescription.
Corollary to the posture above taken, petitioners assert that there being no co-
ownership over the properties sold by Don Fabian to Soledad Monteroso-
Cagampang, Tirso's cause of action, under the Code of Civil Procedure (Act No.
190) in relation to Art. 1116 of the Civil Code, 25 had already prescribed, either
in 1949, i.e., 10 years after the subject properties were registered in Soledad
Monteroso-Cagampang's name, or in 1958, i.e., 10 years after the cause of
action accrued in 1948 (death of Don Fabian), citing Osorio v. Tan. 26 Tirso's
complaint in Civil Case No. 1332 was commenced in 1970.
Petitioners contend that the evidence adduced clearly demonstrates that
Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang acquired ownership of the subject properties by
virtue of the deeds of sale executed in 1939 by Don Fabian. After the sale, she
registered them under her name and then took exclusive, adverse, and public
possession over them. Thus, they submit that the prescriptive period applicable
to the instant case under Act No. 190 had long expired, adding that the CA erred
in finding that Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang repudiated the co-ownership
only in 1961 when she and the other heirs ignored the demand of Tirso for
partition.
As a final point, petitioners alleged that the exclusion of Tirso from the
enjoyment of the fruits of the subject properties since after the death of Don
Fabian in 1948 is consistent with Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang's claim of
exclusive ownership and dominion.
We cannot subscribe to petitioners' theory.
The fact that Tirso and the other compulsory heirs of Don Fabian were excluded
from the possession of their legitime and the enjoyment of the fruits thereof
does not per se argue against the existence of a co-ownership. While Tirso may
not have expressly pleaded the theory of co-ownership, his demand from, and
act of initiating Civil Case No. 1332 against, the Cagampang spouses for his share
necessarily implies that he was asserting his right as co-owner or co-heir of the
properties unjustly withheld by the Cagampang spouses through the
instrumentality of simulated deeds of sale covering some of the hereditary
properties. By asserting his right as a compulsory heir, Tirso has effectively
brought into the open the reality that the Cagampang spouses were holding
some of the subject properties in trust and that he is a co-owner of all of them
to the extent of his legal share or legitime thereon.
Consequently, we are one with the trial and appellate courts that partition is the
proper remedy for compulsory or legal heirs to get their legitime or share of the
inheritance from the decedent. An action for partition is at once an action for
declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
determinate portion of the properties involved. 27 Also, Sec. 1, Rule 69 of the
Rules of Court pertinently provides:
SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. — A person having
the right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as provided in this
Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an
adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and
joining as defendants all other persons interested in the property. (Emphasis
ours.)
Being a compulsory heir of Don Fabian, Tirso has the right to compel partition of
the properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian as a measure to get
his hereditary share. His right as an heir to a share of the inheritance covers all
the properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian at the moment of
his death, 28 i.e., on October 26, 1948. Before partition and eventual
distribution of Don Fabian's intestate estate, a regime of co-ownership among
the compulsory heirs existed over the undivided estate of Don Fabian. Being a
co-owner of that intestate estate, Tirso's right over a share thereof is
imprescriptible. 29 As a matter of law, acquisitive prescription does not apply
nor set in against compulsory heirs insofar as their pro-indiviso share or legitime
is concerned, unless said heirs repudiate their share. 30 Contrary to petitioners'
stance, reconveyance is not the proper remedy available to Tirso. Be it
remembered in this regard that Tirso is not asserting total ownership rights over
the subject properties, but only insofar as his legitime from the intestate estate
of his father, Don Fabian, is concerned.
Acquisitive prescription, however, may still set in in favor of a co-owner, "where
there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are
apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership." 31 In the instant
case, however, no extinctive or acquisitive prescription has set in against Tirso
and other compulsory heirs in favor of the Cagampang spouses because
effective repudiation had not timely been made against the former. As aptly put
by the appellate court, the repudiation which must be clear and open as to
amount to an express disavowal of the co-ownership relation happened not
when the deeds of absolute sale were executed in 1939, as these could not have
amounted to a clear notice to the other heirs, but in 1961 when the Cagampang
spouses refused upon written demand by Tirso for the partition and distribution
of the intestate estate of Don Fabian. Since then, Tirso was deemed apprised of
the repudiation by the Cagampang spouses.
However, considering that the new Civil Code was already then in effect, Art.
1141 of said Code 32 applies; thus, Tirso has at the very least 10 years and at the
most 30 years to file the appropriate action in court. The records show that
Tirso's cause of action has not prescribed as he instituted an action for partition
in 1970 or only nine years after the considered express repudiation. Besides,
acquisitive prescription also does not lie against Tirso even if we consider that a
valid express repudiation was indeed made in 1961 by the Cagampang spouses
since in the presence of evident bad faith, the required extraordinary
prescription period 33 of 30 years has not yet lapsed, counted from said
considered repudiation. Such would still be true even if the period is counted
from the time of the death of Don Fabian when the Cagampang spouses took
exclusive possession of the subject properties.
Sixth Issue: Partition Proper for Conjugal Properties of Second Marriage
On the ground of prescription under Act No. 190, petitioners assert that Tirso
lost the right to seek the partition of Parcels S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4, he having
admitted, as early as 1948, the adverse, exclusive, and public possession thereof
by Pendejito and her children. This type of possession, they maintain, works as a
repudiation by Pendejito and her children of the co-ownership claim of Tirso.
They further argue that Parcel S-1 pertains to Pendejito as her paraphernal
property since the homestead application therefor was under her name.
We are not persuaded.
Tirso's acknowledgment of Pendejito and her children's possession of Parcels S-
1, S-2, S-3, and S-4 cannot be viewed as the required repudiation to bar Tirso
from pursuing his right to seek partition. Under the law on co-ownership, it
behooves on the person desiring to exclude another from the co-ownership to
do the repudiating. Verily, the records do not show that Pendejito and her
children performed acts clearly indicating an intention to repudiate the co-
ownership and then apprising Tirso and other co-owners or co-compulsory heirs
of such intention.
To be sure, Tirso and his siblings from the first marriage have a stake on Parcels
S-2, S-3, and S-4, even if these parcels of land formed part of the conjugal
partnership of gains of the second marriage. There can be no serious dispute
that the children of the first marriage have a hereditary right over the share of
Don Fabian in the partnership assets of the first marriage.
Anent Parcel S-1, we join the CA in its holding that it belongs to the heirs of Don
Fabian under Sec. 105 of CA 141, which pertinently provides:
Sec. 105. If at any time the applicant or grantee shall die before the issuance of
the patent or the final grant of the land, or during the life of the lease, or while
the applicant or grantee still has obligations pending towards the Government,
in accordance with this Act, he shall be succeeded in his rights and obligations
with respect to the land applied for or granted or issued under this Act by his
heirs in law, who shall be entitled to have issued to them the patent or final
concession if they show that they have complied with the requirements
therefor, and who shall be subrogated in all his rights and obligations for the
purposes of this Act. (Emphasis ours.)
It is undisputed that Don Fabian was the homestead patent applicant who was
subrogated to the rights of the original applicants, spouses Simeon Cagaanan
and Severina Naranjo, by purchasing from the latter Parcel S-1 on May 8, 1943.
Don Fabian cultivated the applied area and declared it for taxation purposes.
The application, however, would be rejected because death supervened. In
1963, Pendejito filed her own homestead application for Parcel S-1.
Assayed against the foregoing undisputed facts in the light of the aforequoted
Sec. 105 of CA 141, the heirs of Don Fabian are entitled to Parcel S-1. Said Sec.
105 has been interpreted in Soliman v. Icdang 34 as having abrogated the right
of the widow of a deceased homestead applicant to secure under Sec. 3 of Act
No. 926, otherwise known as the Public Land Act of 1903, a patent in her own
name, thus:
[W]e should bear in mind that, although Adolfo Icdang was married to plaintiff
when he filed the homestead application, "an applicant may be said to have
acquired a vested right over a homestead only by the presentation of the final
proof and its approval by the Director of Lands". (Ingara vs. Ramelo, 107 Phil.,
498; Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil., 498; Republic vs. Diamon, 97 Phil., 838.) In the
case at bar, the final proof appears to have been presented to, and approved by
the Director of Lands, in 1954, or several years after the death of Adolfo Icdang
and the dissolution of his conjugal partnership with plaintiff herein. Hence, the
land in question could not have formed part of the assets of said partnership. It
belonged to the heirs of Adolfo Icdang, pursuant to section 105
of Commonwealth Act No. 141, reading:
xxx xxx xxx
Page 26 of 49 PROPERTY
It is worthy of notice that, under the Public Land Act of 1903 (Act No. 926,
section 3), "in the event of the death of an applicant prior to the issuance of a
patent, his widow shall be entitled to have a patent for the land applied for issue
to her upon showing that she has consummated the requirements of law for
homesteading the lands", and that only in case the deceased applicant leaves no
widow shall his interest in the land descend and the patent issue to his legal
heirs. Incorporated substantially in section 103 of the Public Land Act of 1919
(Act No. 2874), this policy was changed by Act No. 3517, pursuant to which the
deceased shall be succeeded no longer by his widow, but "by his heirs in law,
who shall be entitled to have issued to them the patent — if they show that
they have complied with the requirements therefor". And this is, in effect, the
rule maintained in the above quoted section 105 of Commonwealth Act No.
141. 35 (Emphasis added.)
It appearing that Don Fabian was responsible for meeting the requirements of
law for homesteading Parcel S-1, said property, following Soliman, cannot be
categorized as the paraphernal property of Pendejito. Thus, the homestead
patent thereto, if eventually issued, must be made in the name of the
compulsory heirs of Don Fabian. Over it, Pendejito shall be entitled, pursuant to
Art. 834 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889, only to a usufructuary right over the
property equal to the corresponding share of each of Don Fabian's compulsory
heirs, i.e., his eight children.
Seventh Issue: Judgment Must not Only be Clear but Must Also be Complete
Petitioners bemoan the fact that both the trial and appellate courts granted
relief and remedies not prayed for by the parties. As argued, Civil Case No. 1292,
initiated by the heirs of Benjamin against Tirso, basically sought recovery of real
properties; while Civil Case No. 1332, a countersuit filed by Tirso, was for
partition and damages, the main thrust of which is to recover his alleged share
from properties in the exclusive possession and enjoyment of other heirs since
the death of Don Fabian in 1948. Thus, petitioners take issue against both
decisions of the trial and appellate courts which ordered partition not only in
favor of Tirso but also in favor of the other petitioners he sued. What is
particularly appalling, according to them, is the order for accounting which no
one requested.
Petitioners' lament, while understandable, is specious. Our judicial system
requires courts to apply the law and grant remedies when appropriately called
for by law and justice. In the exercise of this mandate, courts have the discretion
to apply equity in the absence or insufficiency of the law. Equity has been
defined as justice outside law, being ethical rather than jural and belonging to
the sphere of morals than of law. It is grounded on the precepts of conscience
and not on any sanction of positive law, for equity finds no room for application
where there is law. 36
In the instant case, a disposition only ordering partial partition and without
accounting, as petitioners presently urge, would be most impractical and against
what we articulated in Samala v. Court of Appeals. 37 There, we cautioned
courts against being dogmatic in rendering decisions, it being preferable if they
take a complete view of the case and in the process come up with a just and
equitable judgment, eschewing rules tending to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice.
Surely, the assailed path taken by the CA on the grant of relief not specifically
sought is not without precedent. In National Housing Authority v. Court of
Appeals, where the petitioner questioned the competence of the courts a quo to
resolve issues not raised in the pleadings, and to order the disposition of the
subject property when what was raised was the issue of right to possession, this
Court in dismissing the challenge stated that "a case should be decided in its
totality, resolving all interlocking issues in order to render justice to all
concerned and to end the litigation once and for all." 38 Verily, courts should
always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no
root or branch to bear the seed of future litigation. 39
Eighth Issue: Deed of Donation Null and Void
Finally, as an incidental issue, petitioners asseverate that the deed of donation
(Exhibit "F") executed on September 19, 1948, or after the death of Don Fabian,
in favor of Reygula M. Bayan, is valid, particularly so since Tirso and the heirs of
Benjamin, as represented by their mother, Nakila, do not question the validity of
said deed as they in fact signed the same. That the donated property was the
same property described and included in the deed of sale (Exhibit "E") in favor of
Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang is not, they contend, an invalidating factor since
what Don Fabian sold under Exhibit "E"did not extend beyond his conjugal share
thereon.
Just like the issue of the nullity of the three deeds of absolute sale (Exhibits "C",
"D", and "E") heretofore discussed, we agree with the determination of the RTC
and CA as to the invalidity of the donation of Parcel F-5 to Reygula M. Bayan. We
need not repeat the reasons for such determination, except the most basic. We
refer to the authority of the person who executed the deed of donation. As it
were, the widow of Benjamin, Nakila, signed the deed of donation. She,
however, cannot give consent to the donation as she has no disposable right
thereto. The legal maxim nemo dat quod non habet 40applies to this instance as
Nakila only has usufructuary right equal to the share of her children under Art.
834 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889. Besides, Nakila signed the deed of
donation in her name and not in the name of her children who are the heirs in
representation of their father, Benjamin. Lest it be overlooked, the then minor
children were not under the legal guardianship of Nakila, a situation which thus
disqualifies her from signing on their behalf.
The fact that nobody objected to the donation is of little consequence, for as the
CA aptly observed, "The circumstance that parties to a void contract choose to
ignore its nullity can in no way enhance the invalid character of such contract. It
is axiomatic that void contracts cannot be the subject of ratification, either
express or implied." 41
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 113199 is DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Decision and Resolution dated March 31, 1992 and December 16, 1993,
respectively, of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 15805 are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-29759. May 18, 1989.]
NATIVIDAD DEL ROSARIO VDA. DE ALBERTO, in her individual capacity and as
judicial guardian of the minors ANTONIO ALBERTO, JR. and LOURDES
ALBERTO, petitioners, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO J.
ALBERTO, JR., assisted by his mother as his natural guardian, ANDREA
JONGCO, respondents.
Tañada, Carreon & Tañada for petitioners.
DECISION
BIDIN, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the August 31, 1968 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34750-R ** entitled "Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., thru
his mother as his natural guardian, Andrea Jongco, plaintiff-appellant, vs.
Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto, in her individual capacity and as judicial
guardian of the minors, Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr., defendants-
appellees", reversing the August 10, 1964 Decision *** of the then Court of First
Instance of Manila.
The case originated from a complaint for acknowledgment and partition filed on
September 8, 1960 with the then Court of First Instance of Manila by the herein
private respondent, a minor, 18 years of age, assisted by his mother, Andrea
Jongco, as his natural guardian, against the herein petitioners (Record on
Appeal, pp. 2-8). In the said Complaint, private respondent alleged, in substance,
that in 1941 his alleged father, Antonio C. Alberto, and his mother, Andrea
Jongco, lived together as husband and wife and as a result of which, he was born
on September 10, 1942; that during the time that his alleged father and mother
lived together as husband and wife and up to the time of his birth, both were
single and had no legal impediment to marry each other; that after his birth, his
father and mother continued living together as husband and wife, his father
supporting them and introducing him to the public as his natural child; that even
the family of his father recognized him as such; that on or about the year 1944,
his father and mother separated, and subsequently, his father married herein
petitioner Natividad del Rosario; that as a result of the marriage, two (2)
children were born—herein petitioners Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr.;
that although his father was separated from his mother, he continued to
support him and recognized him as his own child; that on July 3, 1949, his father
died, and without notice to him, petitioner Natividad del Rosario Vda. de
Alberto, on July 17, 1949, instituted before the then Court of First Instance of
Manila an intestate proceedings for the estate of his deceased father, docketed
therein as Special Proceedings No. 9092; that in the said intestate proceedings,
petitioners deliberately omitted him as one of the heirs and for this reason they
succeeded in having the properties of his deceased father adjudicated and
partitioned among themselves; that the said intestate proceedings were
terminated on November 9, 1953; that his father left properties valued at
P74,963.81, and accordingly, as a natural child of his father, he is entitled to at
least P18,000.00; and that he had absolutely no previous knowledge of the
intestate proceedings and came to know about it only recently and thereupon
made a demand from the petitioners who refused to give him his share.
Accordingly, he prays that the petitioners be ordered to acknowledge him as the
natural child of Antonio C. Alberto; that his one-fourth share be turned over to
him; and that petitioners be sentenced to pay him the sum of P5,000.00 as
attorney's fee and the cost of suit (Record on Appeals, pp. 2-9).
On September 21, 1960, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds
that (1) the cause of action is barred by prior judgment; and (2) that the cause of
action is also barred by the statute of limitation (Ibid, pp. 9-19). To this motion,
private respondents filed an opposition on October 22, 1960 (Ibid, pp. 20-58).
On November 11, 1960, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to
Dismiss (Ibid, pp. 97-98).
On November 18, 1964, petitioners filed their Answer to the Complaint (Ibid, pp.
98-102).
On November 23, 1964, private respondent filed his Answer to Defendants'
Counterclaim (Ibid, pp. 102-104). On August 10, 1964, the trial court rendered a
decision in favor of the petitioners (Ibid, pp. 104-123). The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads:
"Considering all the foregoing, the Court orders the dismissal of the complaint
without pronouncement as to the costs. The counterclaim is also dismissed.
SO ORDERED."
Private respondent, not satisfied with the decision, appealed to respondent
Court, and in a Decision promulgated on August 31, 1968 (Ibid, pp. 61-75),
respondent Court reversed the decision of the trial court. The dispositive portion
of the said Decision, reads:
"Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and
another rendered declaring plaintiff Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., an acknowledged
Natural Child of the deceased Antonio C. Alberto; declaring said plaintiff the
owner pro indiviso of one-fifth (1/5) of the hereditary estate of Antonio C.
Alberto; and ordering the defendants to deliver to plaintiff Antonio J. Alberto,
Page 27 of 49 PROPERTY
Jr., his one-fifth (1/5) share in said estate, subject to the usufructuary rights of
defendants Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto pursuant to Articles 834 of the
Old Civil Code, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."
On September 24, 1968, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the
same was denied in a Resolution dated October 14, 1968 (Rollo, p. 77). Hence,
the instant petition.
This Court, in a resolution dated November 27, 1968, resolved to give due
course to the petition (Rollo, p. 91).
Petitioners assigned the following errors:
I they were notified or not, are equally bound (Philippine Savings Bank vs. Lantin,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (TRIAL COURT) HAD NO JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE.
II
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO JR.'S CAUSE OF ACTION WAS
NOT BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT.
III
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO JR.'S CAUSE OF ACTION HAD
NOT YET PRESCRIBED.
IV
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., IN NOT BRINGING
THE INSTANT ACTION FOR AN UNREASONABLE LENGTH OF TIME, WAS GUILTY
OF LACHES.
V November 9, 1953 so that said four years prescriptive period expired on
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
GROSSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT BY BASING
ITS JUDGMENT ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF ANDREA JONGCO AND OTHER WITNESSES OF RESPONDENT
ALBERTO, JR., DESPITE THE SERIOUS CONTRADICTIONS, INCONSISTENCIES AND
IMPROBABILITIES IN THEIR TESTIMONIES AS FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT AND
CATEGORICALLY STATED IN ITS DECISION.
VI
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A GROSS ERROR OF LAW AND A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
WHEN IT ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY DISREGARDED PETITIONERS'
EVIDENCE.
VII
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., WAS AN ACKNOWLEDGED
NATURAL CHILD OF THE DECEASED ALBERTO AND IN DECLARING HIM OWNER
PRO-INDIVISO OF ONE-FIFTH OF THE HEREDITARY ESTATE OF THE DECEASED.
I.
It is the contention of petitioners that inasmuch as the instant case was filed on
September 8, 1960, almost five (5) years after the enactment of R.A. No. 1401 —
creating the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, the questions of paternity
and acknowledgment fall beyond the jurisdictional pale of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and instead comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. While petitioners admitted that this
objection to lack of jurisdiction by the Court of First Instance of Manila over the
subject matter of the present action had not been raised either in the said court
or in the Court of Appeals and is brought to this Court for resolution for the first
time on appeal, they contend that a party may object to the jurisdiction of the
court over the subject matter of the action at any stage of the proceedings, even
for the first time on appeal since lack of jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter cannot be waived. Such contention is untenable.
This Court has already ruled that the question of jurisdiction not raised in the
trial court cannot be raised on appeal (Dalman vs. City Court of Dipolog City,
Branch II, 134 SCRA 243 [1985]). Besides, a party who had voluntarily
participated in the trial, like the herein petitioners, cannot later on raise the
issue of the court's lack of jurisdiction (Philippine National Bank vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 299 [1986]; Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
143 SCRA 470 [1984]; Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 [1968]). Moreover,
there are no more Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts today. Under Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, the functions of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
have been transferred to the Regional Trial Courts (Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo,
143 SCRA 356 [1986]).
II.
Petitioners alleged that the intestate proceedings for the settlement of estate of
the deceased Antonio C. Alberto (Special Proceedings No. 9092) had already
been terminated on November 9, 1953 by the order of distribution directing the
delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto and that in
said proceedings the court also declared who are the heirs of the deceased.
Consequently, the instant case which seeks to secure the recognition of Antonio
J. Alberto, Jr. as an acknowledged natural child of the deceased in order to
establish his rights to the inheritance is already barred by prior judgment
(Petitioners' Brief, p. 47) despite private respondent's insistence that he had no
knowledge or notice of the intestate proceedings of his alleged natural father
(Record on Appeal, p. 21).
Petitioners' submission is impressed with merit.
This Court has invariably ruled that insolvency proceedings and settlement of a
decedent's estate are both proceedings in rem which are binding against the
whole world. All persons having interest in the subject matter involved, whether
124 SCRA 483 [1983]). The court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested,
through the publication of the notice prescribed . . . and any order that may be
entered therein is binding against all of them (Ramon vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 741
[1951] citing in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156). It was ruled further that a
final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to
the land of the estate in the distributees; and that the only instance where a
party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is
when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through
mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better
practice to secure relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within
the reglementary period, instead of an independent action, the effect of which,
if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge to
throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle
properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramon vs. Ortuzar, supra;
Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Caceres, 45 Phil. 895).
III.
As to the issue of prescription, the Civil Code of the Philippines clearly provides:
"Art. 1100.The action for rescission on account of lesion shall prescribe after
four years from the time the partition was made."
Intestate proceedings were terminated as alleged in the complaint itself on
November 9, 1957. Hence, the present action filed on September 8, 1960 and
which has for one of its objects the rescission of the agreement of partition
among the petitioners, as approved by the intestate court, is already barred by
prescription. LLpr
That an action for rescission is also the proper action in case of an alleged
preterition of a compulsory heir by reason of alleged bad faith or fraud of the
other persons interested, which is what the complaint in this case alleges in
substance, is indicated in Article 1104 of the Civil Code as follows:
"Art. 1104.A partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall
not be rescinded, unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the
part of the other persons interested; . . . ."
It has also been ruled by this Court that the four years period provided in Article
1100 of the Civil Code (formerly Art. 1076 of the old Civil Code) should
commence to run from the approval of the agreement of partition by the Court
(Samson vs. Araneta, 60 Phil. 27, 36). Thus, in the case at bar, it is evident that
the action to rescind the Agreement of Partition which was approved by the
Court on November 9, 1953, had already prescribed when respondent filed the
complaint in the case at bar on September 8, 1960.
While as a general rule the action for partition among co-owners does not
prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized (Art.
494, Civil Code), petitioners herein had never recognized respondent as a co-
owner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly. Consequently, the rule on non-
prescription of action for partition of property owned in common (Art. 494) does
not apply to the case at bar.
Moreover, private respondent cannot claim exemption from the effects of
prescription on the plea of minority under the New Civil Code which provides:
"Art. 1108.Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against:
(1)Minors and other incapacitated persons who have parents, guardians or other
legal representatives:
xxx xxx xxx"
Respondent Alberto, Jr. who has a living parent, his mother, Andrea Jongco, who
in fact filed the complaint in the case at bar for him, falls squarely under the
above-cited provision.
Granting arguendo that respondent is a natural child of the deceased Antonio
Alberto, Sr., the action for recognition of natural child may be brought only
during the lifetime of the presumed parent. And if the presumed father or
mother died during the minority of the child, the latter may file the action within
four (4) years from the attainment of majority (Art. 285 [1]). However, if the
minor has a guardian as in this case, prescription runs against him even during
minority (Wenzel, etc., et al. vs. Surigao Consolidated Mining, Inc., 108 Phil. 530
[1960]). In such case, the action for recognition must be instituted within four
(4) years after the death of the natural father (Magallanes, et al. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 795 [1954]). Antonio C. Alberto, Sr., the alleged father,
died on July 3, 1949. The complaint for acknowledgment and partition was filed
eleven (11) years later, on September 8, 1960. Hence, prescription had set in.
Neither can it be claimed that the present action is in substance one for recovery
of property in order to avoid the consequences of prescription, for as correctly
stated by the petitioners, to be entitled to the recovery of the property from the
estate, Alberto, Jr. must first rescind the partition and distribution approved by
the intestate proceedings, otherwise, the recovery of any property from the
Page 28 of 49 PROPERTY
petitioners is not possible. Be that as it may, such partition can no longer be
rescinded having been already barred by the Statute of Limitations.
Furthermore, even granting that Article 1104 of the Civil Code does not apply
and there is an injury to the rights of plaintiff, this action would still not prosper
under Articles 1146 and 1149 of the same Code which provide that the action
must be brought within four and five years, respectively, from the time the right
of action accrues.
IV
Petitioners' claim of laches is likewise tenable. The trial court in its findings
clearly and unmistakably declared that respondent Alberto, Jr. is guilty of laches
as follows:
"About 1944, Andrea Jongco said she learned of Antonio Alberto's marriage to
Natividad del Rosario. Yet, she took no steps to protect the interests of her child,
Antonio, although she was already confronted with the incontrovertible proof of
Antonio's infidelity and the hallowness of his promises.
"It might be that Andrea Jongco was then relying on Antonio Alberto's not
denying that Alberto, Jr. was his child, if such was the case. If this was so,
however, how can we explain her inaction even after the death of Antonio
Alberto in 1949, or until September 8, 1960, when she filed this action, Andrea
kept silent, took no action to have her child recognized as the son of the alleged
father. Her laches, as well as the inherent improbabilities in her testimony
rendered it unworthy of belief.
". . . It is evident that the plaintiff's case is adversely affected by his long delay in
bringing this action. 'Undue delay in the separate enforcement of a right is
strongly persuasive of lack of merit in this claim, since it is human nature for a
person to assert his rights most strongly when they are threatened or invaded.'
(Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435-440)." (Record on Appeal, pp. 108-109).
This Court has consistently declared that laches is the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising
due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that
the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it
(Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 541 [1985]; Tejido vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78
[1985]; De Castro vs. Tan, 129 SCRA 85 [1984]; Medija vs. Patcho, 132 SCRA 540
[1984]; Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Phil., 133 SCRA 800
[1984]; Gumonpin vs. CA, 120 SCRA 687 [1983]).
As pointed out by the trial court, there appears to be no explanation for the
surprising delay in the filing of the complaint in the case at bar except perhaps,
the fact that during the lifetime of the deceased Antonio Alberto, private
respondents were receiving support until the latter died in 1949; but thereafter,
they allowed more than ten years to elapse or until September 8, 1960 before
they filed the present action to assert their rights despite Andrea Jongco's
allegation that they stopped receiving support after Alberto, Sr.'s death. LibLex
On the other hand, there is merit in petitioners' allegations that such delay is
prejudicial to them. Private respondents could have filed the action in 1944
when Andrea Jongco learned of the marriage of the deceased with petitioner
Natividad del Rosario instead of waiting for 16 years when the supposed father's
lips had been sealed by death and possible witnesses like Antonio Alberto, Sr.'s
mother had become too old to give coherent testimony.
On this point, the Supreme Court ruled:
"The assertion of doubtful claims, after long delay, cannot be favored by the
courts. Time inevitably tends to obliterate occurrences from the memory of
witnesses, and even where the recollection appears to be entirely clear, the true
clue to the solution of a case may be hopelessly lost. These considerations
constitute one of the pillars of the doctrine long familiar in equity jurisprudence
to the effect that laches or unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in
seeking to enforce a right is not only persuasive of a want of merit but may,
according to the circumstances, be destructive of the right itself. Vigilantibus
non dormientibus equites subvenit.' (Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435,
reiterated in Edralin vs. Edralin, 1 SCRA 227 [1961]).
The other explanation might have been the minority of Antonio Alberto, Jr. at
the time of his supposed father's death. But such explanation as discussed
earlier is unavailing even in case of prescription under Article 1108 of the Civil
Code where minority does not stop the running of the prescriptive period for
minors who have parents, guardians or legal representatives.
Thus, it is well established that "The law serves those who are vigilant and
diligent and not those who sleep when the law requires them to act (Cui and
Joven vs. Henson, 51 Phil. 606, 610; Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co. vs. Villaluz, Sept.
29, 1951, 90 Phil. 154). "The law does not encourage laches, indifference,
negligence or ignorance. On the contrary, for a party to deserve the
considerations of the courts, he . . . must show that he is not guilty of any of the
aforesaid failings (Samson vs. Yatco, August 28, 1958; 104 Phil. 378).
V.
Finally on the merits of this case, petitioners would have this Court review and
reverse the conclusions of fact of the Court of Appeals. As a general rule, this is a
function this Court does not undertake. The established principle is that the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reviewed on
appeal to this Court; except: (1) when the conclusion is grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly
mistaken, absurd and impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
Court in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case, and the same
are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (6) when
the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary to those of the trial court; (7)
when the findings are without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based (Manlapaz vs. C.A., 147 SCRA 238-239 [1987]; Guita vs. C.A., 139 SCRA 576
[1985]; Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, 147 SCRA 593 [1986]).
It is readily evident that this case falls within one of the recognized exceptions to
the rule, specifically that the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary to
those of the trial court.
At the trial, the lower court in evaluating the evidence presented by the
complainants is of the view that the testimony alone of Andrea Jongco is
sufficient to totally discredit not only her testimony but also her entire case.
Aside from being inherently improbable and the merit of her claim being
adversely affected by her testimony and her long delay in bringing action, her
testimony is contradicted by the testimonies of Jose, Zoilo and Pilar who are
brothers and sister of the deceased Antonio Alberto and who have no pecuniary
interest whatsoever in the outcome of the controversy. They testified that
during the period Andrea Jongco claimed that Antonio Alberto, Sr. lived with
her, the deceased in fact lived with his mother and brothers at the family
residence except for his brief stint with the army (Decision, Civil Case No. 44164;
Record on appeal, pp. 111-112). llcd
More than that, the trial court found among others, that Andrea Jongco has had
five children (aside from her son Antonio) with four different men. The
assumption, therefore, is that she lived with at least four different men without
being married to any of them. Thus, the trial court aptly ruled that "This
propensity to promiscuous relationship with different men, render it unjust to
state with definiteness that any particular person is the father of any one of her
children." (Ibid, p. 121)
Other witnesses are Eufracia Cailan who allegedly took care of Antonio, the
father, since the latter was a child and then of Antonio, the alleged son, and
Encarnacion Peralta, an alleged former lessor of Andrea Jongco and Antonio
Alberto. Their testimonies were, however, found by the trial court to be
inherently improbable, inconsistent with human experience and deliberately
invented to conform with the testimony of Andrea Jongco (Ibid, pp. 109-117).
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in its decision gave more credence to
the testimonies of Eufracia Cailan and Encarnacion Peralta and declared that
their testimonies have sufficiently established the fact that Antonio J. Alberto, Jr.
is the son of the late Antonio C. Alberto and Andrea Jongco which finds further
proof in the birth certificate and the baptismal certificate of Alberto, Jr. (Rollo,
pp. 6-11).
In this connection, it must be stated that in the case of Reyes vs. Court of
Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 (1985), this Court, citing the cases of Bercilles vs. GSIS,
128 SCRA 53; People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349; Cid vs. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434;
Vudaurrazaga vs. C.A., 91 Phil. 492; and Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8 Phil. 135, ruled
that a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated, like in
the instant case, is not competent evidence of paternity.
In casting doubt upon the credibility of petitioner Natividad's testimony, the
Court of Appeals pointed out her serious inconsistency on material points such
as her claim that she was married to the deceased in 1941 and her later
admission in the answer that they were married in 1944.
The record shows, however, that both admissions were correct, the first
marriage was a secret civil marriage celebrated in Pililla, Rizal while the second
was a religious ratification of the former. The lack of marriage certificate as
evidence was also considered by the Court of Appeals as an impairment of
credibility despite a certification to the effect that all pre-war records in the
Municipality of Pililla, Rizal were destroyed during the last war. Said Appellate
Court is of the view that if they did plan to marry secretly at that time, they
could have chosen a city or municipality near Manila and that Pililla must have
been chosen as the place of the supposed marriage so that petitioners could
have an apparent good reason for the non-presentation of the marriage
certificate. cdll
As aptly argued by the petitioners, such conclusion is purely conjectural. Besides
petitioners' reasons for the choice of that place, the celebration of the marriage
was positively confirmed by Damaso Herrera, one of the sponsors thereof.
In any event, it is a fundamental rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the
trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed
unless for strong and cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better
position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses while testifying in the case (People vs. Pimentel, 147 SCRA 29, 30
[1987]; People vs. Grefiel, 125 SCRA 108 [1983]; Chase vs. Buencamino, 136
SCRA 381 [1985]; People vs. Fernandez, 124 SCRA 248 [1983]; Olangco vs. C.F.I.
of Misamis Oriental, 121 SCRA 338 [1983]; Minuchechi vs. C.A., 129 SCRA 479
[1984]).
After a careful review of the records and the evidence presented by the
contending parties, no cogent reasons could be found to justify the reversal of
the findings of the trial court.
In view of the foregoing, there appears to be no need to discuss the last two
assignments of errors.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby Reversed
and the decision of the trial court is Reinstated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 51914. June 6, 1990.]
Page 29 of 49 PROPERTY
MARIA BICARME assisted by her husband JOSE BALUBAR, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and CRISTINA BICARME, respondents.
Paterno Aquino for petitioner.
Demetrio V. Pre for private respondent.
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J p:
This petition seeks to set aside the appealed decision of the lower court 1 as
affirmed by the appellate court on August 28, 1979, directing the amicable
partition of two parcels of land between Cristina Bicarme (private respondent)
and her aunt Maria Bicarme (petitioner), as well as the Resolution, dated
October 5, 1979, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
The affirmed decision of the lower court, rendered on December 22, 1975,
disposes as follows:
"(a) That Maria Bicarme and Cristina Bicarme are the only surviving co-heirs and
co-owners and entitled in equal shares over the parcel of land in litigation and
described under paragraph 3 of the complaint;
"(b) That the alleged deeds of Sale executed by Maria Bicarme covering and
affecting the two parcels of land in suit are declared null and void in so far (sic)
as they affect and/or cover the one-half undivided share and inheritance of
plaintiff Cristina Bicarme;
"(c) Maria Bicarme is ordered to account and/or pay the value corresponding to
the one-half (1/2) undivided shares of Cristina Bicarme in the yearly fruits of the
land and to commence from the filing of this complaint; that is seventy five
bundles of palay valued at P375.00 with legal interest fully paid;
"(d) That the parties are hereby ordered within (15) days from receipt of this
decision to amicably agree upon a written partition and to submit the same for
approval, parties shall appoint a Commissioner to effect and carry out effectively
the partition of the 2 parcels of land in equal parts between the plaintiff and the
defendant;
"(e) Defendant and her hirelings and representatives are forever ordered to
refrain from molesting the Commissioner in the discharge of his duty to partition
said two (2) parcels of land in suit;
"(f) And, Defendant to pay Attorney's fee and cost of this suit.
"SO ORDERED." (pp. 40-41, Record on Appeal)
Petitioner-defendant Maria Bicarme appealed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision; hence, this petition.
The main issue in this case dwells on ownership rights over the litigated parcels
of land.
As established by the trial court, Sps. Juan Bicarme and Florencia Bidaya were
the original co-owners of two parcels of land described as follows:
"1. Cornland in Palao, Bangued, Abra, bounded on the North — Hill, on the East
— Brono Barbero, on the South — Casimiro Palos, and on the West — Clemente
Baldozan, of about 8,721 sq. m., assessed at P400.00 under Tax Dec. No. 7764;
"2. Riceland in Palao, Bangued, Abra, bounded on the North — Macario Bolos,
East — Roberto Bicarme, South — Juliana Baldozan, and West — Telesporo,
about 1,539 sq. m., assessed at P60.00, under Tax Dec. No. 7765;
"xxx xxx xxx" (p. 10, Record on Appeal)
The spouses died intestate and were survived by three children — Victorina
Bicarme, Sebastian Bicarme and Maria Bicarme. Sebastian Bicarme died when he
was a little boy and without any issue. Later, Victorina Bicarme died intestate,
survived by her only daughter, Cristina Bicarme.
Cristina claims that upon the death of her grandparents, Sps. Juan and Florencia,
her mother Victorina and her aunt, Maria, became co-owners or co-heirs of the
litigated parcels of land. Upon the death of her mother, Victorina, Cristina
became co-heirs with Maria, having inherited the share and interest of her
mother corresponding to one-half of the two parcels of land.
Cristina instituted this action for partition, because her aunt, Maria, refused to
share with her the yearly fruits of the disputed parcels of land. Maria, however,
maintains that "she acquired these two parcels of land in 1925 (cornland) and
1926 (riceland) from the deceased spouses Placido Bidaya and Margarita Bose
and since then until the present, had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous,
adverse possession and enjoyment and in the concept of absolute owner
thereof. Maria further claims that Cristina, her niece, never shared or
contributed to the payment of taxes of said two parcels of land; and, finally, that
Cristina Bicarme was presumed already dead" (p. 35, Record on Appeal).
In ruling Maria and Cristina to be co-heirs, the trial court relied on a provision
separately stated in three deeds of sale executed by Maria as follows:
"That I am the sole and absolute owner over the above described
cornland having acquired the same by inheritance from my late father Juan
Bicarme;" (See Exhibits '4', '5', '6', and '7' or Exhibits 'A-1,' 'B-1,' 'C-1', and 'D-1';'"
(p. 37, Record on Appeal, emphasis ours)
The trial court stated that the provision was in the nature of a trust provision in
favor of Cristina as a co-owner/co-heir.
We agree. By admitting that the cornland is inherited property, Maria, in effect,
recognized Cristina's rights thereto as a co-heir/co-owner. As the trial court
theorized:
"xxx xxx xxx
"(6) That Victorina Bicarme and Maria Bicarme never partitioned even orally the
two parcels of lands which were then owned in common by them;
"(7) That even after the death of Victorina Bicarme, the land in suit remained
undivided and were therefore in the possession of Maria Bicarme because her
niece Cristina Bicarme went to Manila and now married and presently residing
at No. 22, 11th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City.
"(8) That without the knowledge and consent of Cristina Bicarme who was then
of legal age, her aunt Maria Bicarme executed on April 27, 1973 a Deed of
absolute Sale (Exhibit 'A') in favor of Marina Pizarro who acquired portion No. 3
of the cornland; on the same date she also executed another Deed of Sale
(Exhibit 'B') in favor of Saturnino Pacopia, who acquired portion No. 2 of the
cornland; and, in June 16, 1965 again Maria Bicarme executed a third Deed of
Sale (Exhibit 'C') in favor of Casimira Pacopia, who acquired portion No. 1 of the
cornland;
"(9) That these three (3) separated (sic) Deeds of Sale all executed by Maria
Bicarme over the cornland have a respective total area of 740 square meters,
more or less, for portion No. 3; 1,836 square meters, more or less for portion
No. 2; and 1,265 square meters, more or less for portion No. 1, or a total area of
3,481 square meters more or less;
"(10) That in these three separate Deeds of Sale, Maria Bicarme expressly
provided the aforesaid trust provision." (pp. 36-37, Record on Appeal, emphasis
ours)
Despite admission during the hearing on the identity of the land in question (see
p. 21, Record on Appeal), Maria's counsel, on appeal, re-emphasized her original
claim that the two parcels of land in her possession were acquired from the Sps.
Placido Biduya and Margarita Bose. However, the private document relative to
the purchase, was not produced at the trial, allegedly because "they were placed
in a trunk in their house which were burned during the Japanese Occupation." In
1945, Maria sold the riceland. No written evidence was submitted. For all legal
intents therefore, the riceland remained inherited property. The identity of the
cornland as inherited property can no longer be disputed, in view of Maria's
admission in the deeds of sale she had executed, containing the trust provisions.
Having established Cristina's co-ownership rights, Maria nonetheless insists that
Cristina's rights are barred by prescription under Secs. 40 and 41 of Act 190
(Code of Civil Procedure, Article 1116, Civil Code) then the applicable law, where
the longest period of both acquisitive and extinctive prescription was only ten
years (Diaz v. Garricho, 103 Phil. 261, 266). In the present case, Cristina, it is
alleged, asserted her claims 34 years after her right of action accrued, as follows:
". . . After Cristina left barrio Palao at the age of eleven (11), she never returned
until she was twenty two (22) years old and married (pp. 32-34, tsn., Nov. 4,
1974). Upon her return her grandmother Florencia Bidaya was already dead (p.
33, id). At that time, Cristina claimed her hereditary share in the lands in
question but her demands were ignored and repudiated by her aunt Maria,
Cristina admitted that ever since the Japanese occupation when she was already
of age, her aunt Maria refused to recognize her rights to said lands (pp. 41-42,
id.). From that moment when Maria ignored and repudiated Cristina's hereditary
rights, Cristina's right of action already accrued and the period of prescription
began to run.
"The instant action was filed only in 1974 (p. 1, Record on Appeal), or some 34
years after it accrued. If she had any rights at all, Cristina slept on her rights. The
present action is unquestionably barred by prescription." (pp. 27-28, Appellants'
Brief)
Against Maria's claims of acquisitive prescription, the lower court ruled that
Maria was as trustee with respect to Cristina's share. As such, prescription, as a
mode of acquiring title, could not apply:
"A co-owner is a trustee for the other co-owner. No one of the co-owners may
acquire exclusive ownership of the common property thru prescription for
possession by one trustee alone is not deemed adverse to the rest (Castrillo vs.
Court of Appeals, 10 SCRA 549; Custodio vs. Casiano, 9 SCRA 841 and, Pascual vs.
Meneses, 20 SCRA 219)." (p. 6, Rollo)
While We agree with the trial court that Maria and Cristina are co-heirs, and that
with respect to them prescription, as a mode of acquisition, cannot apply, We
hasten to elaborate on certain aspects, which need clarification.
It is correct to say that possession by one co-owner (trustee) is not deemed
adverse to the others. In this sense, an action to compel partition will lie at any
time and does not prescribe. It is, however, not legally correct to say that by
virtue of the imprescriptibility of an action for partition, prescription as a mode
of acquiring title, can never be invoked, or in the present case, that Maria, as a
co-owner can never acquire the property by prescription.
An action for partition implies that the thing is still owned in common. If a co-
owner or co-heir holds the property in exclusive adverse possession as owner,
asserting sole and exclusive dominion for the required period, he can acquire
sole title to it as against the co-heirs or co-owners. The imprescriptibility of an
action for partition cannot thus be invoked when one of the co-owners has
possessed the property as exclusive owner, and for a period sufficient to acquire
it by prescription. From the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the
absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share
therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition, but of ownership. (A.
Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil., Ann., Vol. II, pp. 192-193; Bargayo v. Comumot,
40 Phil. 856, at p. 870). In this sense, the trial court erred in saying that there can
be no prescription (as a mode of acquiring title) in favor of a co-owner/trustee.
Having clarified this issue, the main question to be resolved is whether or not
Maria has been in possession of the lands in question under the conditions
required by Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as to uphold acquisitive
prescription in her favor.
Page 30 of 49 PROPERTY
One of the conditions imposed by said section is that the possession must be
adverse against the whole world. In order that a possession may be deemed
adverse to the cestui que trust, or the other co-owner the following must
concur:
". . . (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the cestui que trust or other co-owner, (2) that such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners,
and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing." (A. Tolentino,
Civil Code of the Phils., Ann., Vol. II, p. 193)
In the present case, Maria Bicarme disclaims the co-ownership by denying that
subject properties are the inherited properties. Other than the tax declarations
in her name, there is no written evidence that these were acquired/purchased
from Sps. Placido Biduya and Margarita Bose. Payment of land taxes does not
constitute sufficient repudiation of the co-ownership, as it is not an act adverse
to Cristina's rights. Moreover, Cristina, being a minor, until she claimed her
rights, was not even aware thereof. Neither did Maria make known her
repudiation to Cristina, because all along, Maria presumed her to be dead. Her
refusal to share with Cristina the yearly profits stemmed from Cristina's failure
to share in the yearly taxes. Acquisitive prescription cannot therefore apply in
this case:
"Acts which are adverse to strangers may not be sufficiently adverse to the co-
owners. A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or
profits from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and the planting
of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of
exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear, complete and conclusive
evidence that he exercised acts of possession which unequivocally constituted
an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners." (Mangyan v. Ilan,
28 O.G. 62; Laguna v. Levantino, 40 O.G. (14th Suppl.) 136, cited in A. Tolentino,
Civil Code of the Philippines, Ann., Vol. II, pp. 193-194)
Additionally, it follows that neither can the doctrine on laches apply, for absent
acquisitive prescription, (i.e., where it has not been shown that the possession of
the claimant has been adverse and exclusive and opposed to the right of the
others) the case is not one of ownership, in which case, the doctrine on
imprescriptibility of an actions for partition will apply. Cristina's right to partition
will therefore prosper.
Finally, We eliminate the award on attorney's fees in the absence of any specific
allegation thereon in her complaint, or that the same is covered by any of the
eleven (11) exceptions enumerated in Art. 2208 of the New Civil Code. Even if
We were to concede exercise of judicial discretion in the award of attorney's
fees under Art. 2208, par. 11, this provision "demands a factual, legal or
equitable justification. Without such justification, the award is a conclusion
without a premise, its basis being improperly left to speculation and conjecture."
(Mirasol v. De la Cruz, G.R. L-32552, July 31, 1978; 84 SCRA 337.) Likewise, "the
matter of attorney's fees cannot be touched once and only in the dispositive
portion of the decision. The text itself must expressly state the reason why
attorney's fees are being awarded" (ibid). In the present case, the matter of such
fees was touched but once and appears only in the dispositive portion of the
decision.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for review is DENIED and the appealed decision as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that
the award on attorney's fees is eliminated. Costs against petitioner. This decision
is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-39299. October 18, 1988.]
ISAAC, SEVERINO, MARIA, TELESFORA, FELISA, SERAPIO, SIMEON and
MACARIA, all surnamed PANGAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
TEODORA GARCIA, respondents.
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo for petitioners.
David C. Canta for private respondent.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
The property in question is a parcel of land with an area of 635 square meters
and situated in San Pascual, Obando, Bulacan. 1 It was originally owned by Leon
Hilario and is now being disputed between the herein petitioners, who are his
great grandchildren by his daughter Silvestra, and the private respondent,
Teodora Garcia, who is his granddaughter by his daughter Catalina. 2
In 1964, the petitioners filed an application for the registration of the land in
their names by virtue of their continuous and exclusive possession thereof since
1895, by themselves and their father and grandfather before them. After proper
notices by publication and posting as required the trial court issued an order of
general default, there being no opposition to the application, and proceeded to
hear the evidence of the applicants ex-parte. On the basis thereof, the
application was approved on March 31, 1966.
On June 8, 1966, the herein private respondent filed a petition to set aside the
said decision, which the trial court 3 granted, admitting at the same time her
opposition to the application and setting the case for reception of her evidence.
This evidence sought to show that the land was inherited by Leon Hilario's three
children, but the son, Felicisimo, waived his right thereto and thereby made his
two sisters, Silvestra and Catalina, its exclusive co-owners. As Catalina's
daughter, she was entitled to one-half of the property, the order half going to
Silvestra's heirs, the petitioners herein and the latter's grandchildren. 4
On September 13, 1968, the trial judge issued an order dismissing the opposition
and reinstating his original order of March 31, 1966. 5 His reason was that
whatever rights Teodora might have had over the property had been forfeited
by extinctive prescription because she had left the land in 1942 and had not
since then asserted any claim thereto until 1966.
On appeal to the respondent court, 6 this decision was reversed on the ground
that the appellees had not clearly proved that they had acquired the property by
prescription. Hence, the appellant was entitled to one-half of the property as
heir, conformably to her opposition in the court a quo. Their motion for
reconsideration having denied, they have now come to this Court in a petition
for review by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
The petitioner's position is that the respondent court erred in holding that the
private respondent was entitled to one-half of the land, which she had not lost
by extinctive prescription because it was held by them in trust for her. They also
insist that the appealed decision completely disregarded the factual findings of
the trial court that they had acquired the whole land by virtue of their long,
continued and adverse possession thereof, which should bar any claim by
Teodora to her supposed part ownership.
It is stressed at the outset that the appellate court is not necessarily bound by
the factual findings of the trial court simply because the latter had the
opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility by their
deportment. While this may be a conceded advantage of the trial judge, the
appellate court may still reverse his findings of fact is they are not based on the
evidence submitted or have been reached without considering the matters of
record that might have dictated a different conclusion. The Court of Appeals
precisely is vested with jurisdiction to review questions of fact as decided by the
lower court. It would be evading this responsibility if it should merely adopt the
findings in the decision under review on the convenient justification that the
trial judge had the opportunity, which it did not have, of gauging the realiability
of the witnesses first-hand.
When, therefore, the respondent court accepted the private respondent's
allegation that the land was inherited by the parties from their common
ancestor, Leon Hilario, such finding, based on the record and not rejected but
even assumed by the trial court, did not, in our view, constitute grave abuse of
discretion. And when, on the strength of this finding, it then held that an implied
trust was created between the petitioners who were in possession of the land,
and Teodora Garcia, their aunt and co-heir, that too, as we see it, is not an
arbitrary assumption.
In fact the Court feels this is the more plausible relationship between the
parties, compared to the version offered by the petitioners, who claim they
acquired the property from their grandfather through their father, who
apparently acquired it from his mother, Leon Hilario's daughter. It does not
appear that they have pre-empted the other heirs to the property through any
other mode of acquisition, like sale or some similar exclusive transaction. They
have not submitted any evidence of how they acquired the land from their great
grandfather, confining themselves to the assertion that they have continued his
original possession presumably as heirs of their father, who inherited from his
mother Silvestra, who was the daughter of Hilario. If this be their theory, then
they unavoidably must recognize Teodora Garcia's own claim to the subject
property as she too was an heir, being the daughter of Catalina, who was also a
daughter of Hilario.
The trial court said, however, that assuming Teodora had the right to the
disputed property, the same was forfeited by her through extinctive prescription
by failure to assert it in time. In its original decision, it affirmed the petitioner's
claim that they had acquired ownership over the whole property by their
possession thereof for more than thirty years in concept of owner. Teodora
Garcia apparently did not challenge such ownership and so by her inaction
forever lost the right to do so.
The respondent court, rejecting this contention held that the petitioners'
possession was not for their benefit alone but also in favor of Teodora, who was
a co-heir with them and therefore also a co-owner of the property. In other
words, their possession, while adverse to the rest of the world, was not against
Teodora herself, whose share they held in implied trust for her as a co-owner of
the land, and whose fruits their father shared with her occasionally, or at least
promised her she would get eventually. The Court believes that this, too, is not
an arbitrary conclusion.
To support their claim of exclusive ownership of the entire land,. the petitioners
stress that the property was declared for taxation purposes in the name of
Tomas Pangan, their father, in 1948 and another tax declaration was issued, also
in his name, in 1965. Moreover, real estate taxes were paid by them 1908 to
1914, 1930 to 1932, 1956 to 1957, and 1960 to 1965, whereas Teodora Garcia,
by her own admission, never paid any tax at all on the disputed land. 7
Tax declarations are indicia but not conclusive proof of ownership. 8 If the
property was declared in the name of Tomas Pangan only, it could be that this
was done only for reasons of convenience, more so if it was understood, as the
private respondent did, that he was declaring the property not only for himself
but for herself also as the other co-owner. As for the admitted fact that Teodora
Garcia never actually paid the real estate taxes, the explanation she gave was
that she assumed her share of such taxes was being paid from her share in the
fruits of her portion of the land, which she said she was not getting regularly,
much less in full. We hold that this explanation is also plausible enough.
But for all this, there is still the question of whether or not Teodora Garcia, her
failure to assert her right, allowed the statutory period to lapse, thus enabling
the petitioners to perfect their claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription
and so exclude her from her share in the subject property.
Page 31 of 49 PROPERTY
It is settled rule that possession by one-co-owner will not be regarded as
adverse to the other co-owners but in fact as beneficial to all of them. 9Hence,
as long as his co-ownership is recognized, an action to compel partition will not
prescribe and may be filed at any time against the actual possessor by any of the
other co-owners. 10 However, if the co-owner actually holding the property
asserts exclusive dominion over it against the other co-owners, the corollary of
the rule is that he can acquire sole title to, it after the lapse of the prescribed
prescriptive period. From that moment, the question involved will be one of
ownership and no longer mere partition. 11
According to the petitioners, there was such repudiation which was admitted by
the private respondent herself. Testifying for herself at the hearing on her
opposition in the registration proceedings, she declared:
"ATTY. CANLAS:
"Q. After the death of Tomas Pangan, did you ask the heirs of Tomas Pangan of
your alleged share in the property in question?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. What did they tell you?
"A They said that I have no right to a share and they won't give me my share
"Q. How many years ago did you ask from them?
"A. Immediately after the death of their father.
"Q. That was some 20 years ago?
"A. I do not know how many years ago.
"Q. And during all that span of more than 20 years ago you did not file any
action to recover your share on the land in question?
"A. No sir, it was only this time." 12
For title to prescribe in favor of the co-owner, however, there must be a clear
showing that he has repudiated the claims of the other co-owners and that they
have been categorically advised of the exclusive claim he is making to the
property in question. It is only when such unequivocal notice has been given
that the period of prescription will begin to run against the other co-owners and
ultimately divest them of their own title if they do not seasonably defend it. 13
Adverse possession requires the concurrence of the following circumstances:
1. That the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of
the cestui que trust;
2. That such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que
trust; and
3. That the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive. 14
On the basis of the evidence presented by the parties, the Court is not convinced
that the above requirements have been satisfied. Although there are admittedly
some precedents to the contrary, it would appear that the weight of authority
requires a categorical and final rejection of the co-owners' claim, usually
manifested by a formal legal action, to make the prescriptive period start to run
against the claimant. Thus —
"Filing by a trustee of an action in court against the trustor to quiet title to
property, or for recovery of ownership thereof, held in possession by the former,
may constitute an act of repudiation of the trust reposed on him by the
latter." 15
"The issuance of the certificate of title would constitute an open and clear
repudiation of any trust, and the lapse of more than 20 years, open and adverse
possession as owner would certainly suffice to vest title by prescription." 16
"An action for the reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes within 10 years. And it is from the date of the issuance of such
title that the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of
limitation is counted." 17
"The prescriptive period may only be counted from the time petitioners
repudiated the trust relation in 1955 upon the filing of the complaint for
recovery of possession against private respondents so that the counterclaim of
the private respondents contained in their amended answer wherein they
asserted absolute ownership of the disputed realty by reason of the continuous
and adverse possession of the same is well within the 10-year prescriptive
period." 18
"There is clear repudiation of a trust when one who is an apparent administrator
of property causes the cancellation of the title thereto in the name of the
apparent beneficiaries and gets a new certificate of title in his own name." 19
"It is only when the defendants, alleged co-owners of the property in
question, executed a deed of partition and on the strength thereof obtained the
cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor and the issuance of a
new one wherein they appear as the new owners of a definite area each,
thereby in effect denying or repudiating the ownership of one of the plaintiffs
over his alleged share in the entire lot, that the statute of limitations started to
run for the purposes of that action instituted by the latter seeking a declaration
of the existence of the co-ownership and of their rights thereunder." 20
The established evidence clearly shows that the subject land was inherited by
the petitioners and the private respondent as co-heirs of their common
ancestor, Leon Hilario, whose possession they continued to acquire prescriptive
title over the property. That possession was originally in the name of all the
heirs, including Teodora Garcia, who in fact had been assured by Tomas Pangan,
the petitioners' father that she would get the share to which she was entitled.
The petitioners have not proved that their possession excluded their co-owner
and aunt or that they derived their title from a separate conveyance to them of
the property by Leon Hilario. Parenthetically, such a conveyance, if it existed,
would be questionable as it might have deprived Leon's other children of their
legitime. In any case, the petitioners appear to have arrogated the entire
property to themselves upon their father's death sometime in 1942 or at the
latest in 1965 when they sought to register the land in their names to the
exclusion of Teodora Garcia. The question is, Did such an act begin the period of
extinctive prescription against the private respondent?
Manifestly, the petitioners have acted in bad faith in denying their aunt and co-
heir her legal share to the property they had all inherited from Leon Hilario
through their respective parents. This is regrettable as Teodora Garcia is their
father's first cousin who apparently trusted him and, indeed, relied on his
promise that her share would be protected. Tomas Pangan presumably was
sincere in this assurance, but it was unfortunately not honored by his children
upon his death for they soon dismissed out of hand Teodora Garcia's claim to
the subject property.
In cases where there is a clear showing of imposition and improper motives, the
courts must be vigilant in the protection of the rights of the exploited. 21 So said
the respondent court, and we agree. We note that the private respondent "is a
poor and ignorant 62-year old widow" * whose misplaced trust in her nephews
and nieces is being used now precisely to defeat her claim to the share that she
believes is rightfully hers. It is a sorry spectacle, indeed, to see her own close kin
ganging up on her, so to speak, to deprive her small heritage, and in her old age
at that.
With all this in mind we affirm the finding of the respondent court that there
was no adequate notice by the petitioners to the private respondent of the
rejection of her claim to her share in the subject property. Noticeably absent
here is a categorical assertion by the petitioners of their exclusive right to the
entire property that barred her own claim of ownership of one-half thereof nor
is there any explanation as to why they said she had no right to a share. If this
trusting woman did not immediately take legal action to protect her rights, it
was simply because of forbearance toward her nephews and nieces, let alone
the fact that there was really no casus belli as yet that required her to act
decisively. That legal provocation arose only when the petitioners commenced
the registration proceedings in 1965, and it was from that time she was required
to act, as she did, to protect her interests.
In an earlier case, 22 we stressed that this Court is not only a court of law but
also of justice. Faced with a choice between a decision that will serve justice and
another that will deny it because of a too-strict interpretation of the law, we
must resolve in favor of the former, for the ultimate end of the law is
justice. Bunos judex secundum aequum at bonum judicat stricto juri
praefert. 23 This is a wise maxim we will follow here in ruling for the deprived
and ignorant old widow.
WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision AFFIRMED in full,
with costs against the petitioners. It is ordered.
[G.R. No. 169356. August 28, 2007.]
CARMEN FANGONIL-HERRERA, petitioner, vs. TOMAS FANGONIL, PURA
FANGONIL TINO, MARINA FANGONIL, MARIANO FANGONIL, MILAGROS
FANGONIL-LAYUG and VICTORIA FANGONIL ESTOQUE, 1 respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J p:
In this instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
petitioner assails the (a) Decision issued by the Court of Appeals dated 30
January 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 61990, and (b) the Resolution of the same Court
dated 15 July 2005 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner
urges this Court to modify the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the Decision dated 9 October 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Agoo, La Union, Branch 31 in Special Proceedings Case No. A-806 for Judicial
Partition. The petition prays that the two parcels of land, one located in
Magsaysay, Tubao, La Union, more particularly described as:
A parcel of rice land which the middle portion (15,364 sq. m.) has been included
and situated in Barrio Lloren, Tubao, La Union, declared under Tax Dec. Number
2889. Bounded on the North, by the property of Manuel Ordoña; on the East, by
the property of Severino Padilla, Nicolas Caniero, and Heirs of V. Selga; on the
South, by the properties of Manuel Ordoña and Francisco Padilla; and on the
West, by a river; containing an area of more than two hectares; . . . 2 SAHaTc
and the other in San Nicholas East, Agoo, La Union, designated as:
A parcel of unirrigated rice land without permanent improvements, situated in
Barrio San Nicolas, Agoo, La Union with an area of 10,777 sq. m. (1 Ha. 1,777 sq.
m.) more or less, visible by signs of pilapiles around its perimeter, assessed at
P400.00, declared for tax purposes in my name under Tax Declaration Number
6373, and bounded-on the North, by Donato Eslao; on the East, by the Heirs of
Flaviano Fangonil, and others; on the South, by Eulalio Fangonil; and on the
West, by the heirs of Remgio Boado; . . . . 3
be adjudged solely to petitioner to the exclusion of respondents. In addition,
petitioner requests that another parcel of land located in Poblacion, Tubao, La
Union, be divided in accordance with the manner she proposes.
The following are the antecedent facts:
Petitioner and respondents 4 are children of the late Fabian Fangonil and Maria
Lloren Fangonil 5 of Tubao, La Union. The Fangonil spouses had 7 children:
Tomas, Pura, Marina, Mariano, Milagros, Sinforoso, and Carmen. Fabian died on
1 June 1953, while Maria Lloren died on February 1976. The spouses died
Page 32 of 49 PROPERTY
intestate, leaving an estate consisting of 7 parcels of land herein as part of the estate of the spouses Fangonil to be partitioned and ordered the
specified: STIEHc partition of parcel 1 based on the manner proposed by respondents. It ordered
Parcel 1 – a 1,800 square meter residential land located at Poblacion, Tubao, La the payment of the estate debt to petitioner and her brother in the amount of
Union, which is facing the Town Plaza; P138,100.00, the money equivalent of the P6,100.00 paid by her at the time of
redemption of parcels 6 and 7. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
Parcel 2 – a 922 square meter residential lot located at Barangay Sta. Barbara,
Agoo, La Union; aECTcA WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby adjudicates and
partitions the inherited properties, including the controversial parcels 6 and 7, in
Parcel 3 – a 54,759 square meter agricultural land located at Francia West, accordance with the following:
Tubao, La Union;
FIRST PARCEL
Parcel 4 – an 84,737 square meter agricultural land located at Francia West,
Tubao, La Union; AIDTHC xxx xxx xxx
Parcel 5 – a 5,821 square meter parcel of agricultural land located at Francia Sur, This is divided into two (2) segments, the Eastern Portion and Western
Tubao, La Union; Portion. ACcaET
Parcel 6 – a 17,958 square meter parcel of agricultural land located at The Eastern Portion shall belong to three (3) heirs, namely Tomas Fangonil,
Magsaysay, Tubao, La Union; IEHScT Sinforoso Fangonil represented by Victoria Estoque and Marina Fangonil. The
Western Portion shall belong to two (2) heirs, the Southwestern part belongs to
Parcel 7 – 9,127 square meter parcel of agricultural land located at San Nicolas Pura F. Tino and the Northwestern part belongs to Carmen Fangonil Herrera . . . .
East, Agoo, La Union.
SECOND PARCEL
The only remaining heirs are the 7 children. Prior to an extrajudicial settlement
executed by the heirs in 1983, there was never any settlement of the estate. The xxx xxx xxx
parties do not dispute that the succeeding transactions involving parcels 6 and 7 This parcel goes to Mariano Fangonil and Milagros Fangonil Layug. cADaIH
took place. Fabian Fangonil, with the consent of Maria Lloren Fangonil, obtained THIRD PARCEL
a loan secured by a mortgage over a 15,364 square meter middle portion of the
sixth parcel of land for P1,450.00, executed under a Deed of Mortgage 6 in favor xxx xxx xxx
of Francisca Saguitan on 20 April 1949. A portion of the sixth parcel, with an area A drawing of lots was conducted on April 25, 1997 with respect to parcel 3.
of 4,375 square meters, was sold with a right to repurchase to a certain Parcel 3 was divided into seven by Geodetic Engineer Gerardo Dacayanan. The
Constantino Oribello for P1,450.00 on 15 December 1953. The transaction was result was the following (see also, Order dated April 25, 1997, page 166, Record
under an agreement designated as a Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale 7 between of the case):
Maria Lloren Fangonil, who was a widow by then, and Constantino Oribello. On Lot 1 (A) – Milagros F. Layug cDHAES
the other hand, the seventh parcel of land was sold, with a right to repurchase,
Lot 2 (B) – Tomas Fangonil
by Fabian Fangonil to Quirino Estacio under an agreement denominated as Deed
of Sale with Pacto de Retro 8 on 12 December 1949 for P2,600.00. The total Lot 3 (C) – Mariano Fangonil DHATcE
amount received by the Fangonil spouses for the properties was Lot 4 (D) – Pura F. Tino
P5,500.00. DAaIEc
Lot 5 (E) – Sinforoso Fangonil aHATDI
The parcels above-mentioned were never repurchased or redeemed by the
Lot 6 (F) – Carmen F. Herrera
Fangonil spouses. Prior to foreclosure, the portion of the sixth parcel covered by
a Deed of Mortgage was released from the mortgage on 20 April 1956 upon Lot 7 (G) – Marina Fangonil ICHcaD
petitioner's payment of P1,950.00 to Francisca Suguitan. The portion of the sixth xxx xxx xxx
parcel covered by the Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale was repurchased on 16 FOURTH PARCEL
October 1956 upon petitioner's payment of P1,550.00 to Constantino Oribello.
On the other hand, the seventh parcel subject of the Deed of Sale with Pacto de xxx xxx xxx
Retro was repurchased by petitioner on 13 November 1959 upon the payment The same thing happened. There was a drawing of lots. The result was the
of P2,600.00 to Quirino Estacio. Petitioner paid the total amount of P6,100.00 following:
for the redemption of parcels 6 and 7. Lot 1 (A) – Marina Fangonil aIcDCT
On 14 November 1983, the parties executed an Extrajudicial Settlement and Lot 2 (B) – Carmen F. Herrera
Partial Partition of the estate of the Fangonil spouses covering the seven parcels
of land. Although petitioner signed the extrajudicial settlement, she refused to Lot 3 (C) – Tomas Fangonil HADTEC
accede to the proposed manner of partition of parcel 1. Thereafter, all the heirs Lot 4 (D) – Sinforoso Fangonil
concerned, except petitioner, executed a joint affidavit dated 19 December Lot 5 (E) – Milagros F. Layug EcHIAC
1994, stipulating on the partition of parcel 1. On 2 February 1995 or 11 years
Lot 6 (F) – Pura F. Tino
after the execution of the extrajudicial settlement, petitioner executed an
affidavit 9 refuting the portions pertaining to parcels 6 and 7, on the ground that Lot 7 (G) – Mariano Fangonil cISAHT
her late brother Sinforoso Fangonil who was a Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge xxx xxx xxx
then, committed misrepresentation and convinced her to sign the said
FIFTH PARCEL
settlement. EcDATH
xxx xxx xxx
On 1 March 1995, six of the seven children of the Fangonil spouses, excluding
herein petitioner, filed with the RTC a petition for judicial partition of the seven On May 2, 1997, the drawing of lots on Parcel 5 was conducted. The result was
parcels of land, with prayer for appointment of Marina Fangonil as as follows:
administratrix. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. A-806. Lot 1 – Pura F. Tino THCASc
Petitioner intervened before the trial court to oppose the petition. She likewise Lot 2 – Marina Fangonil
prayed that she be appointed administratrix, claiming exclusive ownership over
parcels 6 and 7. Lot 3 – Milagros F. Layug
The parties agreed to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings, Lot 4 – Sinforoso Fangonil SCHATc
considering there was no disagreement as to the manner of sharing Parcels 2, 3, Lot 5 – Carmen F. Herrera
4, and 5 of the estate. In addition, on 16 September 1996, the respondent heirs Lot 6 – Mariano Fangonil SaHIEA
deposited in court P7,453.00 10 as payment to petitioner and her brother Tomas
Fangonil as the only outstanding debtors of the estate as specified in the 14 Lot 7 – Tomas Fangonil
November 1983 extrajudicial settlement. On 2 September 1998, respondents, SIXTH PARCEL
through counsel, submitted a Manifestation/Motion dated 31 August 1998, xxx xxx xxx
proposing a manner of computation for repayment to petitioner, the pertinent
On August 27, 1998, the drawing of lots was conducted with respect to the
portions of which read: EcIaTA
controversial parcels, the SIXTH PARCEL and the SEVENTH PARCEL. The result on
3. That the currency rate of the Philippine Peso to the U.S. Dollar on November the sixth parcel was as follows:
13, 1959 is P3.90 to U.S. $1.00;
Lot 1 – Pura F. Tino cAEaSC
4. That the currency rate of the Philippine Peso to the U.S. Dollar as of this date
Lot 2 – Sinforoso Fangonil
August 31, 1998 is P42.00 to U.S. $1.00; DcICEa
Lot 3 – Tomas Fangonil AEDHST
5. So that the amount of indebtedness of P6,100.00 on November 13, 1959 has
now the equivalent of P65,790.00 as of 31 August 1998; Lot 4 – Marina Fangonil
5.1 The equivalent amount of P65,790.00 shall be proportionately paid by all the Lot 5 – Carmen F. Herrera (boycotted the draw) ECaAHS
heirs with each and every heir having a share in said indebtedness in the amount Lot 6 – Mariano Fangonil
of P9,398.57; 11 TcEaAS
Lot 7 – Milagros F. Layug SATDEI
On 7 October 1998, the RTC issued an Order generally approving the
xxx xxx xxx
manifestation/motion except for the computation, modifying the amount to
P138,100.00 as the present equivalent of the amount of P6,100.00 previously SEVENTH PARCEL
paid by petitioner to redeem parcels 6 and 7. In its Decision 12 dated 9 October xxx xxx xxx
1998, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents herein and declared parcels 6 and 7

Page 33 of 49 PROPERTY
The draw was made on the same day, August 27, 1998. Just like in the drawing
of lots for the Sixth Parcel, Carmen F. Herrera boycotted the draw. Hence, the
Court ruled that since there are seven rolled papers for the seven heirs to draw,
the last undrawn rolled-paper containing the lot number shall be for Carmen
Herrera. The result for the draw for the SEVENTH PARCEL was as follows:
Lot 1 – Carmen Herrera cIHSTC
Lot 2 – Tomas Fangonil
Lot 3 – Milagros F. Layug CHIaTc
Lot 4 –Marina Fangonil
Lot 5 – Sinforoso Fangonil AHCaES
Lot 6 – Mariano Fangonil
Lot 7 – Pura F. Tino AaDSEC
It should be noted that after the draws on August 27, 1998, Atty. Baltazar,
counsel for [respondents], manifested that he will file a motion as regards the
accounting of the produce of the sixth and seventh parcels. However, what he
filed was the Manifestation/Motion dated August 31, 1998.
The six heirs (excluding Carmen F. Herrera) shall reimburse the amount of
P138,100.00, each one contributing the amount of P19,728.57, to Carmen F.
Herrera. Since the other six heirs did not insist on the accounting of the produce
with respect to parcels 6 and 7, Carmen F. Herrera does not have to render an
accounting. As a matter of fact, this Court, in its Order dated October 7, 1998,
considered the produce of the said two (2) parcels, which she appropriated from
the '50s to the present as interest on her money. 13 DIHETS
Petitioner appealed the above RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, alleging the
unfair and prejudicial manner of partition of parcel 1 and claiming exclusive
ownership over parcels 6 and 7. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal in its
Decision promulgated 30 January 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the October 9, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo,
La Union, Branch 31, in Special Proceeding Case No. A-806, is AFFIRMED in
toto." 14 cCaATD
Under said decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the findings of the
trial court, pronouncing that petitioner failed to adduce any evidence that would
support her claim that the distribution was not equal and prejudicial to her
interest. It concurred with the trial court in concluding that, at the most, she is
only entitled to the reimbursement of the amount she spent for redemption of
the questioned lots in an amount equivalent to what her money commanded
then, stating that petitioner is simply holding the said property in trust for the
other co-heirs. At the same time, it upheld the trial court's finding on the
equivalent of the money which petitioner paid to redeem and repurchase
parcels 6 and 7, but the dispositive portion merely indicated the amount of
P130,100.00.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 30 January 2004 Decision
which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 15 July 2005.
Dissatisfied with the final resolution of the Court of Appeals on the matter,
petitioner now comes before this Court via a Petition for Review under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner insists she is the exclusive owner of
parcels 6 and 7 and rejects the partition of parcel 1 as being unequal and
prejudicial, raising the following issues: IDSaAH
I.
THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE MANNER IN
WHICH PARCEL 1 IS TO BE PARTITIONED BASED ON THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS'
POSITION WHICH IS CLEARLY UNEVEN AND UNFAIR TO THE PETITIONER WHOSE
SHARE WILL THEN BE FOUND AT THE REAR PORTION OF THE SAID LOT.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
PARCELS 6 AND 7 SHALL BE OWNED SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY BY THE
PETITIONER BEING THE ONLY ONE WHO REDEEMED AND REPURCHASED SAID
PARCELS IN THE 1950'S EVEN WHILE THE PARENTS OF THE PARTIES WERE STILL
ALIVE. CAScIH
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' RIGHT TO CLAIM A SHARE IN PARCELS 6 AND 7
HAD LONG PRESCRIBED AS A RESULT OF THEIR INACTION FOR MORE THAN
FORTY (40) YEARS WHERE THEY ALLOWED THE PETITIONER TO EXERCISE FULL
OWNERSHIP OVER SAID PARCELS, EVEN ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT
AT FIRST, THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO REDEEM THE SAID PARCELS.
IV.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' RIGHT TO CLAIM A SHARE IN PARCELS 6 AND 7
HAD LONG BEEN BARRED BY LACHES AS A RESULT OF THEIR INACTION FOR
MORE THAN FORTY (40) YEARS WHERE THEY ALLOWED THE PETITIONER [TO]
EXERCISE FULL OWNERSHIP OVER SAID PARCELS, EVEN ASSUMING WITHOUT
ADMITTING THAT AT FIRST, THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO REDEEM THE SAID
PARCELS. ScaHDT
V.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MONEY EQUIVALENT
OF THE MONEY OF THE OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT WHICH SHE USED TO
REPURCHASE AND REDEEM PARCELS 6 AND 7 IN THE 1950'S WOULD ONLY BE
P138,100.00 IN TODAY'S MONEY, EVEN ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT
THE SAID PARCELS COULD BE REDEEMED BY THE ESTATE OF FABIAN AND MARIA
LLOREN. 15
Petitioner's arguments are fallacious.
With respect to procedural matters, respondents argue that the petition is a
combination of an appeal via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
and an independent civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules
of Court. This is based on the observation that petitioner impleaded the Court of
Appeals as one of the respondents while at the same time raising issues of fact
alone. Respondents posit that these are indicative of an "intention to categorize
the petition to be under both Rules 65 and 45 of the Rules of Court" and should
be dismissed outright. Although petitioner erroneously impleaded the Court of
Appeals as one of the respondents, petitioner clearly and rightly invoked Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court as the remedy availed of. As we held in National
Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals, 16 the appeal from a final
disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45 and not
a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Under Rule 45
of the Revised Rules of Court, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court
of Appeals, regardless of the nature of the action or proceedings involved, may
be appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which would be but a
continuation of the appellate process over the original case. 17 The correct
procedure is not to implead the Court of Appeals. This Court has ruled in several
instances that where the Court of Appeals is impleaded as respondent in the
Petition for Review, and the petition clearly invokes Rule 45, the Court of
Appeals is merely omitted from the title of the case pursuant to Sec. 4 (a) of Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court. 18 The Court of Appeals is herein omitted from
the title of the case, as a liberal interpretation of the rules on technicality, in
pursuit of the ends of justice and equity. 19 HEAcDC
We now discuss respondents' contention that only factual issues have been
brought to this Court.
Under Section 1, Rule 45, providing for appeals by certiorari before the Supreme
Court, it is clearly enunciated that only questions of law may be set
forth. 20 Questions of fact may not be raised unless the case falls under any of
the following exceptions: 21 IaDTES
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or
conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is
based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the
issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the
trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
In this particular instance, we are clearly faced with issues of fact. A question of
fact is involved when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood
of alleged facts or when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole
evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and
relevance of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and
to the whole, and the probabilities of the situation. 22 We find that the only
questions to be resolved are the following: (a) whether or not the respondent
court gravely erred in affirming the partition of parcel 1 in accordance with the
findings of the trial court; and (b) whether or not the respondent court gravely
erred in not finding that exclusive ownership of the properties in question has
been vested in petitioner.
In the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review, this Court is not a trier
of facts, and unless there are excepting circumstances, it does not routinely
undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending
parties during the trial of the case. 23 Factual matters are beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court. 24 In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court, this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law,
not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of are devoid of support by
the evidence on record or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension
of facts. As held in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 25 factual findings
of the Court of Appeals are conclusive 26 on the parties and carry even more
weight when the said court affirms the factual findings of the trial
court. 27 Absent any palpable error or arbitrariness, the findings of fact of the
lower court are conclusive. On this ground alone, the appeal warrants a
dismissal. TEaADS
Setting aside the procedural defects, the appeal must fail based on the merits.
Upon perusal of the records of the case, it is evident to this Court that no cogent
reason exists to disturb the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner contends that the manner of partition of parcel 1 by the RTC, as
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is unfair and prejudicial to her interest.
However, she was not able to adduce substantial evidence aliunde to support
her allegations. Respondents stress that the Fangonil spouses appropriated
portions of Parcel 1 to Carmen, Pura, Tomas, Marina, and Sinforoso, by pointing
out specific areas pertaining to each. Carmen, Tomas, and Marina built their
houses on parcel 1. Prior to the order of partition, an ocular inspection of parcel
1 was conducted by the RTC to determine which manner of partition it would
approve. During said ocular inspection, however, the RTC saw existing structures
upon which the homes of Carmen, Tomas, Marina, and a store of Carmen were
situated. The arrangement was allegedly based on their oral agreement. This
same arrangement allotting an equal area of 362 square meters to each of the
heirs was made the basis of the manner of partition proposed by respondents
and later on approved by both the RTC and Court of Appeals. SEACTH
Page 34 of 49 PROPERTY
Anent the rights of the parties pertaining to parcels 6 and 7, petitioner insists
that her act of paying for the repurchase and release from mortgage of parcels 6
and 7 was on the understanding with her parents that she would thereafter be
the owner thereof. She asserts that her exercise of acts of ownership over
parcels 6 and 7, to the exclusion of her parents and siblings, reveals she is the
exclusive owner of these lots. She cites several circumstances in support of her
contention that respondents never considered parcels 6 and 7 part of the estate
of their parents and are not co-owners thereof. First, petitioner presented real
estate tax receipts indicating that she had been the one paying for the realty
taxes of the property. Secondly, petitioner asserts she has been the only one
hiring tenants for and benefiting from the produce of parcels 6 and 7. Lastly, the
non-attempt of respondents to partition parcels 6 and 7 within 10 years from
the death of the Fangonil spouses, as well as to reimburse her if indeed such was
the agreement, demonstrates that they never considered the said parcels part
of the estate of their parents.
After a thorough examination of the cases cited by petitioner and a painstaking
review of the case records, this Court cannot give credence to petitioner's
stance. The scales of justice overwhelmingly tilt in favor of respondents and
against petitioner's assertion that exclusive ownership of parcels 6 and 7 has
vested in her. The fact that it was petitioner's money that was used for the
repurchase of the properties does not make her the owner thereof, in the
absence of convincing proof that would indicate such. This is more so if other
evidence was adduced to show such is not the case. Neither will petitioner's
exercise of acts of ownership over the properties bring us to that conclusion. It is
evident that petitioner was allowed to maintain possession and enjoy the fruits
of the property only by the mere tolerance of the other co-
owners. 28 Moreover, although we recognize that real estate tax receipts
indicating payment of realty tax and possession of the parcels are indicia of
ownership, such are not conclusive proof of ownership, in the presence of other
circumstances and evidence showing otherwise. 29 As a matter of fact, although
the receipts indicate that the real estate tax payments for parcels 6 and 7 for the
years following their repurchase and release were made by petitioner, the
receipts also state that the declared owner of the properties is still the decedent
Fabian Fangonil. IHEDAT
Petitioner and respondents executed an extrajudicial settlement dated 14
November 1983, wherein it was stipulated that the Fangonil spouses died
intestate, leaving 7 parcels of land in their names. Parcels 6 and 7 were included.
It further stipulated that petitioner and her brother Tomas (now deceased) are
the only creditors of the estate, categorically stating petitioner is a creditor of
the estate in the amount of P8,700.00. This amount represents what was paid
for by her for the repurchase and release from the mortgage lien of parcels 6
and 7 in the 1950s. Pertinent records of the case reveal that the amount actually
advanced for the repurchase was P6,100.00. The aforementioned extrajudicial
settlement, which was later on submitted to the RTC for consideration in the
judicial partition, taken together with petitioner's comment 30 in the same
proceedings, are clear and categorical evidences that the transaction between
petitioner and her parents was a mere loan. Under this extrajudicial settlement,
respondents and petitioner included parcels 6 and 7 as part of the estate of their
deceased parents. It is particularly stated therein that petitioner and her brother
Tomas are the only creditors of the estate. Although petitioner's comment
allegedly maintained her claims on parcels 6 and 7, she categorically admitted
therein that the amount totaling P8,700.00 referred to in the extrajudicial
settlement represents the personal money she used for the redemption of
parcels 6 and 7.
Thus, petitioner is a mere creditor of the estate and not an owner of parcels 6
and 7. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the
proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake, or that
no such admission was made. 31 We find that petitioner's affidavit retracting
her acquiescence to the stipulation on parcels 6 and 7 in the extrajudicial
settlement deserves scant consideration for being self-serving. Absent positive
proof that the earlier statements made by petitioner resulted from palpable
mistake, retractions thereof, especially if unsupported by evidence, lack
credence. 32 EAcTDH
As to the issue of prescription, petitioner's possession of parcels 6 and 7 did not
ripen into sole and exclusive ownership thereof. First, prescription applies to
adverse, open, continuous, and exclusive possession. In order that a co-owner's
possession may be deemed adverse to the other co-owners, the following
elements 33 must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) that such
positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the other co-owners; and
(3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. Clearly, petitioner
cannot claim adverse possession in the concept of an owner where she
voluntarily executed documents stating that she was a mere creditor and/or co-
owner. Mere silent possession by a co-owner; his receipt of rents, fruits or
profits from the property; his erection of buildings and fences and the planting
of trees thereon; and the payment of land taxes cannot serve as proofs of
exclusive ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that
he exercised acts of possession which unequivocably constituted an ouster or
deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners.34 In this case, we find that
petitioner effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-ownership.
Petitioner's only act of repudiation of the co-ownership was when she refused to
honor the extrajudicial settlement in 1994. Alternatively, possession by a co-
owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to the other
co-owners, but in fact as beneficial to all of them. 35 A co-ownership is a form of
trust, with each owner being a trustee for each other. 36 Mere actual possession
by one will not give rise to the inference that the possession was adverse
because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the property. 37 Thus,
as a rule, prescription does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as
he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he cannot acquire by
prescription the share of the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the
co-ownership. 38 An action to demand partition among co-owners is
imprescriptible, and each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
common property. 39
On the matter of laches, we find no sufficient cause to apply the principle of
laches, it being a principle grounded on equity. Laches is the failure or neglect,
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by
exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence
or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or
declined to assert it. 40 Several circumstances must be present. First, there
should exist conduct on the part of the defendant or one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the
complainant seeks a remedy. Second, there is delay in asserting the
complainant's right, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of
defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit.
Third, defendant had no knowledge or notice that the complainant would assert
the right on which he bases his claim. Fourth, the defendant will suffer injury or
prejudice in the event relief is accorded the complainant, or the suit is not held
barred. Petitioner failed to prove the presence of all four established requisites
of laches. Moreover, there is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or
staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its particular
circumstances, with the question of laches addressed to the sound discretion of
the court. 41 Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled
by equitable considerations and should not be used to defeat justice or to
perpetuate fraud or injustice. 42 HIAEcT
Regarding the issue on the computation of the money to be paid to petitioner as
reimbursement for the amount she advanced to repurchase and release parcels
6 and 7 from the mortgage debt, the Court of Appeals adopted the amount as
computed by the RTC based on the present peso money equivalent. 43 There is
a discrepancy between the amount of indebtedness as quoted by the Court of
Appeals from the RTC decision and the amount cited by the Court of Appeals in
the latter part of its decision. However, the amount stated in the paragraph
before the dispositive portion was P130,100.00, without any other indication
that it intended to modify the amount determined by the RTC while the body of
the Court of Appeals decision quoting the RTC decision indicated the amount of
indebtedness as P138,100.00. There was obviously a typographical error, with
the body of the decision stating that the Court of Appeals was affirming the
RTC's manner of computation totaling P138,100.00. Moreover, in the body and
dispositive portion, the Court of Appeals upheld the RTC's decision in toto. Even
then, the amount found by the RTC on the basis of the formula it used in the
Order dated 7 October 1998 was erroneous. 44
Still applying the present peso-dollar exchange rate, a slight modification in the
computation is hereby ordered. The present peso equivalent of the P6,100.00
indebtedness incurred on 13 November 1959 by the Fangonil spouses and
payable to petitioner should be computed based on the following figures:
The currency exchange rate of the Philippine Peso to the United States Dollar in
the 1950s, which is P2.00:$1.00; TcSAaH
Currency exchange rate of the Philippine Peso to the United States Dollar as of
the date of finality of this judgment.
Therefore, the present peso money equivalent of the P6,100.00 should be
derived from the succeeding formula: aTcIAS
[(Current exchange rate of the Philippine Peso to the United States Dollar as of
the date of finality of this judgment divided by the exchange rate in the 1950s)]
multiplied by P6,100.00
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED.
The (a) Decision issued by the Court of Appeals dated 30 January 2004 and (b) its
Resolution dated 15 July 2005 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
dated 23 February 2004 are hereby AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION as to the
amount to be reimbursed to petitioner. The present peso equivalent of the
P6,100.00 indebtedness is hereby ordered reimbursed to petitioner, which
amount shall be computed based on current peso-dollar exchange rates at the
time of finality of judgment, applying the formula below: cSIACD
[(Current exchange rate of the Philippine Peso to the United States Dollar as of
the date of finality of this judgment divided by the exchange rate in the 1950s)]
multiplied by P6,100.00
The equivalent amount shall be proportionately paid by all the heirs with each
and every heir having a share in the said indebtedness. No Costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 81401. May 18, 1990.]
VIRGINIA FRANCO VDA. DE ARCEO, CARMELITA ARCEO, ZENAIDA ARCEO,
ROMEO ARCEO, RODOLFO ARCEO and MANUEL ARCEO,petitioners, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS (Former 16th Division), PEDRO M. ARCEO, SOTERA ARCEO,
LORENZO ARCEO, and ANTONIO ARCEO, respondents.
Ricardo S. Inton and Jose F. Tiburcio for petitioners.
Hermin E. Arceo for private respondents.
DECISION
Page 35 of 49 PROPERTY
SARMIENTO, J p:
The Court grants this petition on a successful demonstration of error committed
by the Court of Appeals. 1
It appears that the spouses Abdon Arceo and Escolastica Geronimo were the
owners of four parcels of unregistered land (six were involved but only four
were disputed) located in Pulilan, Bulacan, identified as lots nos. 2582, 2595,
3054, and 8131. Escolastica died on September 16, 1942 while Abdon passed
away in 1953. They had one son, Esteban, who died on September 2, 1941.
Esteban had five children, Jose, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera. Jose
married Virginia Franco, with whom he fathered six children, Carmelita, Zenaida,
Rodolfo, Manuel, Cesar, and Romeo. 2 Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera are
the private respondents herein while Jose's widow, Virginia (Jose died on March
8, 1970), and their children are the petitioners.
It also appears that on October (or September) 27, 1941, the Arceos executed a
deed of donation inter vivos, marked as exhibit "J", in which the spouses
bestowed the properties in favor of Jose. 3 Since 1942, Jose had been paying
taxes thereon. 4 In 1949, he took personal possession thereof, worked thereon,
and claimed them as owner thereof. 5
It furthermore appears that on August 2, 1950, the spouses executed another
deed of donation inter vivos, marked as exhibit "T", disposing of the properties
further in favor of Jose. 6
On October 3 (or 30), 1941, the Arceo's supposedly signed a deed of
donation mortis causa, marked as exhibit "1" revoking exhibit "J" and giving
away the properties in question in favor of all his grandchildren including Jose. It
seems however that it was notarized only on November 3, 1944, after
Escolastica had died. cdphil
On January 12, 1972, Virginia, together with her children, filed with the cadastral
court 7 an application for registration in their names of lots Nos. 2582, 2595,
3054, and 8131 on the strength of exhibits "J" and "T". Pedro, Antonio, Lorenzo,
and Sotera opposed the application on the basis of exhibit "1". Pedro and
Lorenzo specifically contested the application on lots Nos. 3054 and 8131 on
claims that each of them were entitled to one-third thereof. 8
The cadastral court rejected all three documents and distributed the properties
according to the law on intestate succession. 9
Virginia and her children shortly went to the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the decision of the cadastral court and dismissed the appeal.
On February 15, 1988, Virginia et al. petitioned this Court.
The petitioners argue that the cadastral court was bereft of the power to
determine conflicting claims of ownership, and that its authority was solely to
confirm an existing title, and that anyway, all the lots should have been awarded
to them by virtue of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession since
1941 (1942, when Jose took possession of the parcels) or otherwise, by
acquisitive prescription. 10 They also assert that exhibits "J" and "T" had validly
transferred the subject lands to them.
In their comment, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera contend that the
cadastral court had the jurisdiction to decide questions of ownership of
property; that the issue of prescription was never ventilated below; and that
exhibit "J" had been validly rescinded by exhibit "1".
The parties do not quarrel over the genuineness of all three exhibits but rather,
over the dates thereof. Pedro, et al. allege that exhibit "J" was executed on
September 27, 1941, and not October 27, 1941, and that exhibit "1", the
instrument that revoked it, came later, or on October 3, 1941. Virginia et
al. maintain on the other hand that exhibit "J" was actually made on October 27,
1941, twenty-four days after the execution of exhibit "1", and that assuming
exhibit "1" came earlier, it was notarized, and took effect, only on November 3,
1944, after the death of Escolastica, one of the donors.
Although the parties wrangle over dates, the Court observes that there is no real
question of fact to be resolved in this case. The important question, so we find,
is, based on existing facts, legal in character: Who has the right over lots Nos.
2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131? Cdpr
As we indicated, we find merit in this petition.
The first question must, however, be resolved against the petitioners. We have
held that under Section 2 of the Property Registration Decree, the jurisdiction of
the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land registration court, is no longer as
circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496, the former land registration
law. 11 We said that the Decree "has eliminated the distinction between the
general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction
conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely as a cadastral court."
The amendment was "[a]imed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has
simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the required trial courts
the authority to act not only on applications for 'original registration' but also
'over all petitions filed after original registration of title, with power to hear and
determine all questions arising from such applications or petitions.' " 12 At any
rate, we have also stated that the limited jurisdiction-rule governing land
registration courts is subject to recognized exceptions, to wit, (1) where the
parties mutually agreed or have acquiesced in submitting controversial issues for
determination; (2) where they have been given full opportunity to present their
evidence; and (3) where the court has considered the evidence already of record
and is convinced that the same is sufficient for rendering a decision upon such
controversial issues 13 By the same token, it has been held that the rule is not,
in reality, one of jurisdiction, but rather, of mere procedure, which may be
waived. 14 It is not amiss to state likewise that where the issue, say, of
ownership, is ineluctably tied up with the question of right of registration, the
cadastral court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction over it, as, for instance,
in this case, where both parties rely on their respective exhibits to defeat one
another's claims over the parcels sought to be registered, in which case,
registration would not be possible or would be unduly prolonged unless the
court first decided it.
The next question refers to acquisitive prescription. In support of their claims,
Virginia, et al. cite four events: (1) In 1941, Jose entered upon the properties and
until his death in 1970, worked thereon; (2) Upon his death, they, Virginia, et al.,
divided the same by virtue of an extrajudicial partition; (3) Ever since, Jose had
paid taxes thereon until he died; (4) Pedro, et al., have not lifted a finger to oust
him, Jose, in possession, or otherwise, to impugn his light. Virginia, et al. now
say that barring the above exhibits, they have anyway acquired the parcels by
prescription.
We also regret that one can not agree with this proposition. The petitioners
suppose that the parcels had come under the category of a co-ownership,
following the death of their grandparents, but in that case, it has been held that
in order for prescription to set in, the following requisites must concur: (1) there
is a clear showing that the claimant has repudiated the co-ownership; (2) he has
made known to the rest of the co-owners that he is assuming exclusive
ownership over the property; (3) there is clear and convincing evidence thereof;
and (4) his possession is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious. 15
The evidence for Virginia et al. do not persuade us that they (through Jose) have
acquired the lots by lapse of time. The fact that in 1941, Jose wrested possession
thereof, so we hold, does not amount to adverse possession because as a co-
owner, he had the right of enjoyment, and his use thereof can not by itself
prejudice the light of his fellow co-owners. The fact that he paid taxes thereon is
not controlling either because payment of real estate taxes does not necessarily
confer title upon a claimant. 16 The fact finally that Virginia, et al. had sought to
extrajudicially divide the property is nothing conclusive because there is no
showing that they, Virginia, et al. had made this known to Pedro, et al. Under
these circumstances, we can not validly. say that the lands had devolved on
Virginia, et al. by way of prescription. llcd
We are granting the petition nonetheless on the finding that the lots had been
conferred to Jose by a valid donation inter vivos, that is, exhibit "J".
Other than the claims by Pedro, et al., that exhibit "J" had been revoked by
exhibit "1", exhibit "J" appears to have been executed in compliance with legal
requirements, i.e., as to form and acceptance. 17 It is true that the cadastral
court was supposed to have attributed fraud on the part of Jose in making
Abdon sign the exhibit, 18 (according to Pedro, Abdon affixed his signature
thereon upon "the belief that it was a deed of sale of the land purchased from
one Marciano Santos" 19 ) but as found by the Court of Appeals, it is a theory
that "must be received with a 'grain of salt'," 20 because, for one thing, Jose is
dead, and for another, the petitioners have adduced evidence that exhibit "J"
was genuine. We are bound by the factual finding of the Appellate Court and as
we averred, we are disposing of this question on pure questions of law.
As to exhibit "T", the finding of the Court of Appeals that it was defective is just
as controlling on this Court., that is, that "it was signed by Abdon Arceo after the
death of his wife on September 16, 1942 and does not contain the acceptance . .
. by Jose Arceo." 21
We can not say that exhibit "1" had validly revoked exhibit "J". The weight of
authority is that a valid donation, once accepted, becomes
irrevocable, 22 except on account of officiousness, 23 failure by the done to
comply with charges imposed in the donation, 24 or by reason of
ingratitude. 25 There is simply no proof that Abdon, when he executed exhibit
"1", was in possession of a legal ground for annulment.
We can not thus accept the Court of Appeals' holding that exhibit "1" had
"neutralized the force and effect" 26 of exhibit "J".
It is therefore this Court's ruling that the disposition under exhibit "J" in favor of
Jose (whose rights were transmitted to Virginia, et al.) should be respected.
We find no need in settling the issue of true dates of the parties' exhibits,
because first, it is an issue of fact and second, because whatever their true
dates, there is no obstacle to the validity of the claims of Virginia, et al. prLL
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The court a quo is
ORDERED to distribute the properties covered by the donation inter vivos, dated
October (or September) 27, 1941, exhibit "J", according to the terms and
conditions set forth therein, and in the proportions indicated thereby. No costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 158377. August 4, 2010.]
HEIRS OF JOSE REYES, JR., namely: MAGDALENA C. REYES, OSCAR C. REYES,
GAMALIEL C. REYES, NENITA R. DELA CRUZ, RODOLFO C. REYES, and RODRIGO
C. REYES, petitioners, vs. AMANDA S. REYES, CONSOLACION S. REYES, EUGENIA
R. ELVAMBUENA, LUCINA R. MENDOZA, PEDRITO S. REYES, MERLINDA R.
FAMODULAN, EDUARDO S. REYES, and JUNE S. REYES, respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
The petitioners 1 assail the decision dated July 31, 2002 rendered in C.A.-G.R. CV
No. 53039, 2 by which the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision dated
May 21, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 9, in Malolos, Bulacan. 3
Antecedents
Antonio Reyes and his wife, Leoncia Mag-isa-Reyes (Leoncia), were owners of a
parcel of residential land with an area of 442 square meters, more or less,
Page 36 of 49 PROPERTY
located in Pulilan, Bulacan and covered by Tax Declaration No. 7590. On that
land they constructed their dwelling. The couple had four children, namely: Jose
Reyes, Sr. (Jose, Sr.), Teofilo Reyes (Teofilo), Jose Reyes, Jr. (Jose, Jr.) and
Potenciana Reyes-Valenzuela (Potenciana). Antonio Reyes died intestate, and
was survived by Leoncia and their three sons, Potenciana having predeceased
her father. Potenciana also died intestate, survived by her children, namely:
Gloria Reyes Valenzuela, Maria Reyes Valenzuela, and Alfredo Reyes Valenzuela.
Jose, Jr., and his family resided in the house of the parents, but Teofilo
constructed on the property his own house, where he and his family resided.
On July 9, 1955, Leoncia and her three sons executed a deed
denominated Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli, 4 whereby they sold the land
and its existing improvements to the Spouses Benedicto Francia and Monica
Ajoco (Spouses Francia) for P500.00, subject to the vendors' right to repurchase
for the same amount sa oras na sila'y makinabang. Potenciana's heirs did not
assent to that deed. Nonetheless, Teofilo and Jose, Jr. and their respective
families remained in possession of the property and paid the realty taxes
thereon.
Leoncia and her children did not repay the amount of P500.00. DEHaTC
The Spouses Francia both died intestate (i.e., Monica Ajoco on September 16,
1963, and Benedicto Francia on January 13, 1964).
Alejandro Reyes (Alejandro), the son of Jose, Sr., first partially paid to the
Spouses Francia the amount of P265.00 for the obligation of Leoncia, his uncles
and his father. Alejandro later paid the balance of P235.00. Thus, on August 11,
1970, the heirs of Spouses Francia executed a deed entitled Pagsasa-ayos ng
Pag-aari at Pagsasalin, 5 whereby they transferred and conveyed to Alejandro
all their rights and interests in the property for P500.00.
On August 21, 1970, Alejandro executed a Kasulatan ng Pagmeme-ari, 6 wherein
he declared that he had acquired all the rights and interests of the heirs of the
Spouses Francia, including the ownership of the property, after the vendors had
failed to repurchase within the given period. On the basis of theKasulatan ng
Pagmeme-ari, Tax Declaration No. 3703 covering the property 7 was canceled by
Tax Declaration No. 8715, 8 effective 1971, issued to Alejandro. From then on,
he had paid the realty taxes for the property.
Nevertheless, on October 17, 1970, Alejandro, his grandmother (Leoncia), and
his father (Jose, Sr.) executed a Magkakalakip na Salaysay, 9 by which Alejandro
acknowledged the right of Leoncia, Jose, Jr., and Jose, Sr. to repurchase the
property at any time for the same amount of P500.00.
On October 22, 1970, Leoncia died intestate. 10 She was survived by Jose, Sr.,
Teofilo, Jose, Jr. and the heirs of Potenciana. Even after Leonica's death, Teofilo
and Jose, Jr., with their respective families, continued to reside in the property.
Subsequently, Tax Declaration 1228, 11 under the name of Alejandro, was issued
effective 1980. All of Leoncia's sons eventually died intestate, survived by their
respective heirs, namely:
Name of Decedent Surviving Heirs
Teofilo Romeo Reyes, Leonardo Reyes, and Leonora C.
Reyes
Jose, Jr. Rodrigo Reyes, Nenita Reyes- dela Cruz, Rodolfo
Reyes, Oscar Reyes, Gamaliel Reyes, Magdalena
Reyes (petitioners herein), Efren Reyes and
Amado Reyes dela Cruz
Jose, Sr. Alejandro Reyes (respondents' predecessor) 12
On September 2, 1993, Alejandro also died intestate. 13 Surviving him were his
wife, Amanda Reyes, and their children, namely: Consolacion Reyes, Eugenia
Reyes-Elvambuena, Luciana Reyes-Mendoza, Pedrito S. Reyes, Merlinda Reyes-
Famodulan, Eduardo Reyes and June S. Reyes (respondents herein). ADCTac
In 1994, respondent Amanda Reyes asked the heirs of Teofilo and Jose, Jr., to
vacate the property because she and her children already needed it. After the
petitioners refused to comply, she filed a complaint against the petitioners in
the barangay, seeking their eviction from the property. When no amicable
settlement was reached, the Barangay Lupon issued a certification to file
action to the respondents on September 26, 1994. 14
In the interim, petitioner Nenita R. de la Cruz and her brother Romeo Reyes also
constructed their respective houses on the property. 15
RTC Proceedings and Ruling
On September 28, 1994, the respondents initiated this suit for quieting of title
and reconveyance in the RTC. 16 The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 817-
M-94 and entitled Amanda Reyes, et al. v. Heirs of Jose Reyes, Jr., et al., was later
amended. 17 They alleged that their predecessor Alejandro had acquired
ownership of the property by virtue of the deed Pagsasa-ayos ng Pag-aari at
Pagsasalin executed on August 11, 1970 by the heirs of the Spouses Francia;
that on the basis of such deed of assignment, Alejandro had consolidated his
ownership of the property via his Kasulatan ng Pagmeme-ari; and that under
the Magkasanib na Salaysay, Alejandro had granted to Leoncia, his father Jose,
Sr., and his uncles, Teofilo and Jose, Jr. the right to repurchase the property, but
they had failed to do so.
The respondents prayed for judgment in their favor, as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered:
1.Quieting the title to the property by declaring the plaintiffs (respondents
herein) as the rightful and lawful owners thereof;
2.Ordering the defendants (petitioners herein) to vacate subject premises and
reconvey and or surrender possession thereof to the plaintiffs;
3.Ordering the defendants to recognize the right of the plaintiffs as the lawful
owners of subject property;
4.Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the following:
a.Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00;
b.Exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00;
c.Attorney's fees of P20,000.00, acceptance fee of P10,000.00 and P500.00 per
recorded Court appearance of counsel;
d.The costs of this suit. HaIATC
Plaintiffs further pray for such other relief which the Honorable Court may deem
just and equitable under the premises. 18
In their answer, 19 the petitioners averred that the Kasulatan ng Biling
Mabibiling Muli was an equitable mortgage, not a pacto de retro sale; that the
mortgagors had retained ownership of the property; that the heirs of the
Spouses Francia could not have validly sold the property to Alejandro through
the Pagsasa-ayos ng Pag-aari at Pagsasalin; that Alejandro's right was only to
seek reimbursement of the P500.00 he had paid from the co-owners, namely:
Leoncia, Teofilo, Jose, Jr. and Jose, Sr. and the heirs of Potenciana; and that
Alejandro could not have also validly consolidated ownership through
the Kasulatan ng Pagmeme-ari, because a consolidation of ownership could only
be effected via a court order.
The petitioners interposed a counterclaim for the declaration of the transaction
as an equitable mortgage, and of their property as owned in common by all the
heirs of Leoncia, Teofilo, Jose, Jr. and Jose, Sr.
On May 21, 1996, the RTC ruled in favor of the respondents, declaring that
Alejandro had acquired ownership of the property in 1965 by operation of law
upon the failure of the petitioners' predecessors to repurchase the property;
that the joint affidavit executed by Alejandro, Leoncia and Jose, Jr. and Jose, Sr.,
to extend the period of redemption was inefficacious, because there was no
more period to extend due to the redemption period having long lapsed by the
time of its execution; and that the action should be dismissed insofar as the
heirs of Potenciana were concerned, considering that Potenciana, who had
predeceased her parents, had no successional rights in the property.
Accordingly, the RTC decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence adduced and the law/jurisprudence
applicable thereon, judgment is hereby rendered:
a)sustaining the validity of the "Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli" (Exh. B/Exh.
1) executed on July 9, 1955 by Leoncia Mag-isa and her sons Teofilo, Jose, Sr.
and Jose, Jr., all surnamed Reyes, in favor of Spouses Benedicto Francia and
Monica Ajoco as well as the "Pagsasa-ayos ng Pag-aari at
Pagsasalin" (Settlement of Estate and Assignment) [Exh. C/Exh. 4] executed on
August 11, 1970 by the heirs of spouses Benedicto Francia and Monica Ajoco in
favor of the spouses Alejandro Reyes and Amanda Salonga;
b)declaring the aforementioned "Kasulatan Ng Biling Mabibili Muli" (Exh. B/ Exh.
1) to be a contract of sale with right to repurchase and not an equitable
mortgage;
c)confirming the consolidation of ownership, by operation of law, of spouses
Alejandro M. Reyes and Amanda Salonga over the residential lot mentioned and
referred to in Exhibit B/Exhibit 1 and Exhibit C/Exhibit 4;
d)allowing the registration with the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Bulacan of the "Kasulatan ng Pagmeme-ari" (Document of Ownership) [Exh.
E/Exh. 5] executed by Alejandro M. Reyes on August 21, 1970 or of any
appropriate deed of consolidation of ownership over the residential lot covered
by Exhibit E/Exhibit 5 which the plaintiffs, as eventual owners by succession of
the aforementioned property, may deem proper to execute; EaTCSA
e)ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate
the residential lot subject of the above-entitled case and to restore possession
thereof unto the plaintiffs;
f)directing the defendants (except the heirs of Potenciana Reyes-Valenzuela) to
pay unto the plaintiffs the amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
g)dismissing the complaint in so far as the defendant heirs of Potenciana Reyes-
Valenzuela are concerned as well as their counterclaim for damages and
attorney's fees.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 20
Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the CA.
CA Ruling
In the CA, the petitioners assailed the RTC's dispositions, except the dismissal of
the complaint as against Potenciana's heirs.
In its decision dated July 31, 2002, the CA ruled that the transaction covered by
the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli was not a pacto de retro sale but an
equitable mortgage under Article 1602 of the Civil Code; that even after the
deed's execution, Leoncia, Teofilo, Jose, Jr. and their families had remained in
possession of the property and continued paying realty taxes for the property;
Page 37 of 49 PROPERTY
that the purported vendees had not declared the property for taxation purposes
under their own names; and that such circumstances proved that the parties
envisaged an equitable mortgage in the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli.
The CA observed that the heirs of the Spouses Francia had themselves admitted
in paragraph 5 of the Pagsasa-ayos ng Pag-aari at Pagsasalin that the property
had been mortgaged to their predecessors-in-interest, viz.:
Na, sa oras ng kamatayan ay nakaiwan sila ng isang lagay na lupang nakasanla sa
kanila na makikilala sa kasulatang kalakip nito sa halagang LIMANG DAANG PISO
(P500.00). Ngunit nuong nabubuhay pa ang magasawang Benedicto Francia at
Monica Ajoco ay nakatanggap na ng halagang P265.00 kay Alejandro Reyes —
Filipino, kasal kay Amanda Salonga, may sapat na gulang at naninirahan sa
Pulilan, Bulacan. 21
However, the CA held that the appellants' (petitioners herein) failure to file an
action for the reformation of the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli to reflect
the true intention of the parties within ten years from the deed's execution on
July 9, 1955, pursuant to Article 1144 of the Civil Code, 22 already barred them
from claiming that the transaction executed between Leoncia and her children,
on one hand, and the Spouses Francia, on the other hand, was an equitable
mortgage. The CA agreed with the RTC that the Magkakalakip na Salaysay did
not effectively extend the period for Leoncia and her children to repurchase the
property, considering that the period to repurchase had long lapsed by the time
the agreement to extend it was executed on October 17, 1970. AcISTE
Issues
In this appeal, therefore, the petitioners insist that: 23
I.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that respondents (were) already
barred from claiming that the transaction entered into by their predecessors-in-
interest was an equitable mortgage and not a pacto de retro sale;
II.
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the findings of the court a
quo that the Magkasanib na Salaysay (Joint Affidavit), executed by Alejandro,
Leoncia and Jose, Jr., wherein Leoncia and her children were granted by
Alejandro the right to repurchase the property at anytime for the amount of
P500.00, was of no legal significance.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
A.
The CA correctly concluded that the true agreement of the parties vis-Ã -
vis the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli was an equitable mortgage, not
apacto de retro sale. There was no dispute that the purported vendors had
continued in the possession of the property even after the execution of the
agreement; and that the property had remained declared for taxation purposes
under Leoncia's name, with the realty taxes due being paid by Leoncia, despite
the execution of the agreement. Such established circumstances are among the
badges of an equitable mortgage enumerated in Article 1602, paragraphs 2 and
5 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 1602.The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in any of
the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(2)When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise;
xxx xxx xxx
(5)When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold;
xxx xxx xxx
The existence of any one of the conditions enumerated under Article 1602 of
the Civil Code, not a concurrence of all or of a majority thereof, suffices to give
rise to the presumption that the contract is an equitable
mortgage. 24 Consequently, the contract between the vendors and vendees
(Spouses Francia) was an equitable mortgage.
B.
Are the petitioners now barred from claiming that the transaction under
the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli was an equitable mortgage by their
failure to redeem the property for a long period of time? EICScD
The petitioners contend that prescription, if it must apply to them, should as
well be applied to the respondents, who had similarly failed to enforce their
right under the equitable mortgage within ten years from its execution on July 9,
1955. Consequently, they urge the upholding of the original intention of the
parties to the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli, without taking prescription
into account, because both parties did not enforce their respective rights within
the ten-year prescriptive period, is more in keeping with fairness and equity.
We agree with the petitioners.
Considering that sa oras na sila'y makinabang, the period of redemption stated
in the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli,signified that no definite period had
been stated, the period to redeem should be ten years from the execution of the
contract, pursuant to Articles 1142 and 1144 of the Civil Code. 25Thus, the full
redemption price should have been paid by July 9, 1955; and upon the
expiration of said 10-year period, mortgagees Spouses Francia or their
heirs should have foreclosed the mortgage, but they did not do so. Instead, they
accepted Alejandro's payments, until the debt was fully satisfied by August 11,
1970.
The acceptance of the payments even beyond the 10-year period of redemption
estopped the mortgagees' heirs from insisting that the period to redeem the
property had already expired. Their actions impliedly recognized the continued
existence of the equitable mortgage. The conduct of the original parties as well
as of their successors-in-interest manifested that the parties to the Kasulatan ng
Biling Mabibiling Muli really intended their transaction to be an equitable
mortgage, not a pacto de retro sale.
In Cuyugan v. Santos, 26 the purported buyer under a so-called contract to sell
with right to repurchase also accepted partial payments from the purported
seller. We held that the acceptance of partial payments was absolutely
incompatible with the idea of irrevocability of the title of ownership of the
purchaser upon the expiration of the term stipulated in the original contract for
the exercise of the right of redemption. Thereby, the conduct of the parties
manifested that they had intended the contract to be a mortgage, not a pacto de
retro sale.
C.
When Alejandro redeemed the property on August 11, 1970, he did not thereby
become a co-owner thereof, because his father Jose, Sr. was then still alive.
Alejandro merely became the assignee of the mortgage, and the property
continued to be co-owned by Leoncia and her sons Jose, Sr., Jose Jr., and Teofilo.
As an assignee of the mortgage and the mortgage credit, Alejandro acquired
only the rights of his assignors, nothing more. He himself confirmed so in
the Magkasanib na Salaysay, whereby he acknowledged the co-owners' right to
redeem the property from him at any time (sa ano mang oras) for the same
redemption price of P500.00.
It is worthy to note that Alejandro's confirmation in the Magkasanib na
Salaysay of the co-owners' right to redeem was made despite 15 years having
meanwhile elapsed from the execution of the original Kasulatan ng Biling
Mabibiling Muli (July 9, 1955) until the execution of the Magkasanib na
Salaysay(August 21, 1970). ACDTcE
D.
Neither did the petitioners' failure to initiate an action for reformation within
ten years from the execution of the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli bar
them from insisting on their rights in the property. The records show that the
parties in the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli had abided by their true
agreement under the deed, to the extent that they and their successors-in-
interest still deemed the agreement as an equitable mortgage despite the lapse
of 15 years from the execution of the purported pacto de retro sale. Hence, an
action for reformation of the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muliwas
unnecessary, if not superfluous, considering that the reason underlying the
requirement for an action for reformation of instrument has been to ensure that
the parties to a contract abide by their true intended agreement.
The Kasulatan ng Pagmeme-ari executed by Alejandro on August 21, 1970 was
ineffectual to predicate the exclusion of the petitioners and their predecessors
in interest from insisting on their claim to the property. Alejandro's being an
assignee of the mortgage did not authorize him or his heirs to appropriate the
mortgaged property for himself without violating the prohibition against pactum
commissorium contained in Article 2088 of the Civil Code, to the effect that
"[t]he creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge or
mortgage, or dispose of them[;] [a]ny stipulation to the contrary is null and
void." Aptly did the Court hold in Montevirgen v. Court of Appeals: 27
The declaration, therefore, in the decision of July 1, 1971 to the effect that
absolute ownership over the subject premises has become consolidated in the
respondents upon failure of the petitioners to pay their obligation within the
specified period, is a nullity, for consolidation of ownership is an improper and
inappropriate remedy to enforce a transaction declared to be one of mortgage.
It is the duty of respondents, as mortgagees, to foreclose the mortgage if he
wishes to secure a perfect title to the mortgaged property if he buys it in the
foreclosure sale.
Moreover, the respondents, as Alejandro's heirs, were entirely bound by his
previous acts as their predecessors-in-interest. Thus, Alejandro's
acknowledgment of the effectivity of the equitable mortgage agreement
precluded the respondents from claiming that the property had been sold to
him with right to repurchase. 28
E.
What was the effect of the Magkasanib na Salaysay?
Both the trial court and the CA declared that the Magkasanib na Salaysay, which
extended the redemption period of the mortgaged property, was inefficacious,
because the period to redeem could no longer be extended after the original
redemption period had already expired. CETIDH
In contrast, the petitioners submit that disregarding the Magkasanib na
Salaysay made no sense, considering that the respondents' predecessors-in-
interest admitted therein that the petitioners had a right to redeem the
property.
The respondents counter, however, that the Magkasanib na Salaysay, which
acknowledged the other co-owners' right to redeem the property, was void; that
the petitioners could no longer claim to be co-owners entitled to redeem the
property, because the co-ownership had come to an end by Alejandro having
openly repudiated the co-ownership; that Alejandro's acts of repudiation had
consisted of: (a) redeeming the property from the Spouses Francia;(b) acquiring
the property from the heirs of Spouses Francia by virtue of a deed of assignment
denominated as Pag-aayos ng Pag-aari at Pagsasalin; (c)executing an affidavit
of consolidation of ownership over the property (Kasulatan ng Pagmeme-
ari); (d) applying for the cancellation of the tax declaration of property in the
Page 38 of 49 PROPERTY
name of Leoncia, and the subsequent issuance of a new tax declaration in his
name; (e) his continuous possession of the property from 1955, which
possession the respondents as his heirs had continued up to the present time, or
for a period of almost 50 years already; and(f) the payment of the taxes by
Alejandro and the respondents for more than 30 years without any contribution
from the petitioners; and that such repudiation established that Alejandro and
his successors-in-interest had already acquired sole title over the property
through acquisitive prescription.
The respondents' and the lower courts' positions cannot be sustained.
The provisions of the Civil Code governing equitable mortgages disguised as sale
contracts, like the one herein, are primarily designed to curtail the evils brought
about by contracts of sale with right to repurchase, particularly the
circumvention of the usury law and pactum commissorium. 29 Courts have taken
judicial notice of the well-known fact that contracts of sale with right to
repurchase have been frequently resorted to in order to conceal the true nature
of a contract, that is, a loan secured by a mortgage. It is a reality that grave
financial distress renders persons hard-pressed to meet even their basic needs
or to respond to an emergency, leaving no choice to them but to sign deeds of
absolute sale of property or deeds of sale with pacto de retroif only to obtain the
much-needed loan from unscrupulous money lenders. 30 This reality precisely
explains why the pertinent provision of the Civil Codeincludes a peculiar rule
concerning the period of redemption, to wit:
Art. 1602.The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in any of
the following cases:
xxx xxx xxx
(3)When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another
instrument extending the period of redemption or granting a new period is
executed; EHSTcC
xxx xxx xxx
Ostensibly, the law allows a new period of redemption to be agreed upon or
granted even after the expiration of the equitable mortgagor's right to
repurchase, and treats such extension as one of the indicators that the true
agreement between the parties is an equitable mortgage, not a sale with right to
repurchase. It was indubitable, therefore, that the Magkasanib na
Salaysay effectively afforded to Leoncia, Teofilo, Jose, Sr. and Jose, Jr. a fresh
period within which to pay to Alejandro the redemption price of P500.00.
F.
Did Alejandro and his heirs (respondents herein) acquire the mortgaged
property through prescription?
It is true that Alejandro became a co-owner of the property by right of
representation upon the death of his father, Jose Sr. 31 As a co-owner, however,
his possession was like that of a trustee and was not regarded as adverse to his
co-owners but in fact beneficial to all of them. 32
Yet, the respondents except to the general rule, asserting that Alejandro, having
earlier repudiated the co-ownership, acquired ownership of the property
through prescription.
The Court cannot accept the respondents' posture.
In order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed adverse to that of
the cestui que trust or the other co-owners, the following elements must concur:
1.The co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation of the co-
ownership amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-
owners;
2.Such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que
trust or the other co-owners;
3.The evidence on the repudiation is clear and conclusive; and
4.His possession is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious. 33
The concurrence of the foregoing elements was not established herein. For one,
Alejandro did not have adverse and exclusive possession of the property, as, in
fact, the other co-owners had continued to possess it, with Alejandro and his
heirs occupying only a portion of it. Neither did the cancellation of the previous
tax declarations in the name of Leoncia, the previous co-owner, and the issuance
of a new one in Alejandro's name, and Alejandro's payment of the realty taxes
constitute repudiation of the co-ownership. The sole fact of a co-owner
declaring the land in question in his name for taxation purposes and paying the
land taxes did not constitute an unequivocal act of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the other co-owner and could not constitute adverse possession as
basis for title by prescription. 34 Moreover, according to Blatero v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 35if a sale a retro is construed as an equitable mortgage, then
the execution of an affidavit of consolidation by the purported buyer to
consolidate ownership of the parcel of land is of no consequence and the
"constructive possession" of the parcel of land will not ripen into ownership,
because only possession acquired and enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve
as title for acquiring dominion. 36 EcSCAD
In fine, the respondents did not present proof showing that Alejandro had
effectively repudiated the co-ownership. Their bare claim that Alejandro had
made oral demands to vacate to his co-owners was self-serving and insufficient.
Alejandro's execution of the affidavit of consolidation of ownership on August
21, 1970 37 and his subsequent execution on October 17, 1970 of the joint
affidavit 38 were really equivocal and ambivalent acts that did not manifest his
desire to repudiate the co-ownership.
The only unequivocal act of repudiation was done by the respondents when they
filed the instant action for quieting of title on September 28, 1994, nearly a year
after Alejandro's death on September 2, 1993. However, their possession could
not ripen into ownership considering that their act of repudiation was not
coupled with their exclusive possession of the property.
G.
The respondents can only demand from the petitioners the partition of the co-
owned property and the reimbursement from their co-owners of the amount
advanced by Alejandro to repay the obligation. They may also seek from their
co-owners the proportional reimbursement of the realty taxes paid for the
property, pursuant to Article 488 of the Civil Code. 39 In the alternative, they
may opt to foreclose the equitable mortgage, considering that the petitioners'
period to redeem the mortgaged property, which was ten years from the
execution on October 17, 1970 of the Magkakasanib na Salaysay, had already
long lapsed. We clarify, however, that the respondents may take these recourses
only through the appropriate actions commenced in court.
H.
The petitioners' counterclaim for damages is dismissed for their failure to prove
their entitlement to it. 40
WHEREFORE, we grant the petition for review on certiorari.
The decision dated July 31, 2002 rendered by the Court of Appeals is reversed
and set aside, and another judgment is rendered:
a)Upholding the validity of the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli (Deed of Sale
with Right of Repurchase) executed on July 9, 1955 by Leoncia Mag-isa Reyes
and her sons Teofilo, Jose, Sr. and Jose, Jr., all surnamed Reyes, in favor of the
late Spouses Benedicto Francia and Monica Ajoco as well as thePagsasa-ayos ng
Pag-aari at Pagsasalin (Settlement of Estate and Assignment) executed on
August 11, 1970 by the heirs of the late Spouses Benedicto Francia and Monica
Ajoco in favor of the spouses Alejandro Reyes and Amanda Salonga;
b)Declaring the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibili Muli to be an equitable mortgage,
not a contract of sale with right to repurchase;
c)Finding the Magkakalakip na Salaysay executed on October 17, 1970 by and
among Leoncia Mag-isa Reyes, Jose Reyes, Sr. and Alejandro Reyes valid and
effective; IHAcCS
c)Nullifying the Kasulatan ng Pagmeme-ari executed by Alejandro M. Reyes on
August 21, 1970; and
d)Dismissing the petitioners' counterclaim.
Costs of suit to be paid by the respondents.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 161720. November 22, 2005.]
HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR namely: ESMENIA R. RESTAR, BERNARDITA R.
RENTINO, LUCIA RESTAR, RODOLFO RESTAR, JANET R. RELOJERO, LORNA R.
RAMOS, MANUEL RESTAR, NENITA R. BELLEZA, MIRASOL R. DELA CRUZ,
ROSELLE R. MATORRE, POLICARPIO RESTAR and ADOLFO
RESTAR, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF DOLORES R. CICHON, namely: RUDY R.
CICHON, NORMA C. LACHICA, NILDA C. JUMAYAO, LYDIA C. SANTOS, and
NELSON R. CICHON; HEIRS OF PERPETUA R. STA. MARIA, namely GEORGE STA.
MARIA, LILIA M. MANIAGO, DERLY M. CONCEPCION, GERVY STA. MARIA,
DORY M. INDULO; HEIRS OF MARIA R. ROSE, namely: TERESITA R. MALOCO,
ROLANDO ROSE, EDELYN R. PALACIO and MINERVA R. PASTRANA, DOMINICA
RESTAR-RELOJERO and PACIENCIA RESTAR MANARES,respondents.
Singson Valdez & Associates for petitioners.
Diomedes T. Resurreccion for respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J p:
In 1935, Emilio Restar (Restar) died intestate, leaving eight (8) children-
compulsory heirs, namely: Flores Restar, Dolores Restar-Cichon, Perpetua
Restar-Sta. Maria, Paciencia Restar-Manares, Dominica Restar-Relojero,
Policarpio Restar, Maria Restar-Rose and Adolfo Restar.
In 1960, Restar's eldest child, Flores, on the basis of a July 12, 1959 Joint
Affidavit 1 he executed with one Helen Restar, caused the cancellation of Tax
Declaration No. 6696 2 in Restar's name covering a 5,918 3 square meter parcel
of land, Lot 3177 (the lot), located at Barangay Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan which was
among the properties left by Restar, and the issuance of Tax Declaration No.
11134 in his name.
Flores died on June 10, 1989.
On November 5, 1998, the co-heirs of Flores discovered the cancellation of
Restar's Tax Declaration No. 6696 and the issuance in lieu thereof of Tax
Declaration No. 11134 4 in his name.
On January 21, 1999, the heirs of Flores' sisters Dolores R. Cichon, Perpetua Sta.
Maria, and Maria Rose who had in the meantime died, together with Flores'
surviving sisters Dominica Restar-Relojero and Paciencia Restar-Manares, filed a
Complaint 5 against Flores' heirs for "partition [of the lot], declaration of nullity
of documents, ownership with damages and preliminary injunction" before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aklan.
Flores' brothers Policarpio and Adolfo were impleaded also as defendants, they
being unwilling co-plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs, herein respondents, alleged that, inter alia, during the lifetime of
Flores, they were given their shares of palay from the lot and even after Flores
death up to 1991; after Flores' death in 1989, his widow Esmenia appealed to
them to allow her to hold on to the lot to finance the education of her children,
Page 39 of 49 PROPERTY
to which they (the plaintiffs) agreed on the condition that after the children had
finished their education, it would be divided into eight (8) equal parts; and upon
their demand for partition of the lot, the defendants Heirs of Flores refused,
they claiming that they were the lawful owners thereof as they had inherited it
from Flores. SaITHC
By Answer 6 filed February 23, 1999, the defendants-herein petitioners Heirs of
Flores claimed that they had been in possession of the lot in the concept of
owner for more than thirty (30) years and have been paying realty taxes since
time immemorial. And they denied having shared with the plaintiffs the produce
of the lot or that upon Flores' death in 1989, Esmenia requested the plaintiffs to
allow her to hold on to it to finance her children's education, they contending
that by 1977, the children had already finished their respective courses. 7
The defendants Heirs of Flores further claimed that after World War II and under
the "new Tax Declaration in 1945," Flores caused the transfer of parcels of
ricelands situated in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan to his siblings as their shares from
the estate of their father Restar; 8 and an extra-judicial partition was
subsequently executed on September 28, 1973 by Restar's heirs, which was
notarized by one Atty. Jose Igtanloc, dividing and apportioning among
themselves four (4) parcels of land. 9
The defendant Adolfo Restar, by separate Answer, 10 alleged that the complaint
did not state a cause of action as against him for he interposed no objection to
the partition of the lot among the heirs of Restar.
As for the defendant Policarpio Restar, he in his Amended
Answer 11 acknowledged Flores as the owner of the lot but claimed that a
portion of it, 1,315 square meters, was sold to him as shown by a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated May 14, 1981. 12 He thus prayed that, among other things,
an order for the partition of the lot among Restar's heirs be issued excluding,
however, that portion sold to him by Flores. 13
After trial, Branch 3 of the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan held that Flores' share in Restar's
estate was not the lot but that covered by Cadastral Lot No. 3183. Nevertheless,
the trial court, holding that Flores and his heirs had performed acts sufficient to
constitute repudiation of the co-ownership, concluded that they had acquired
the lot by prescription. 14
Respecting the defendant Policarpio's claim that a portion of the lot was sold to
him, the trial court discredited the same upon noting that Flores' signature in
the purported Deed of Sale differed from those appearing in other documents
submitted by the parties; in 1981, when the said Deed of Sale was alleged to
have been executed, Flores was admittedly paralyzed and bedridden and could
not have written his name in a "straight" manner, as in fact his signature
appearing in at least two documents dated 1980 was "crooked," and there
existed discrepancies in the spelling of Flores' wife's signature which read
"Esmeña" in the deed, and not as "Esmenia." 15
The trial court thus dismissed the complaint by Decision of June 30, 1999. 16
On appeal by the defendants Heirs of Flores and Policarpio Restar, the appellate
court, by Decision of October 29, 2002. 17 reversed the decision of the trial
court, it finding that the defendants Heirs of Flores failed to prove that their
possession of the lot excluded their co-owners or that they derived title to it
from a separate conveyance to them by Restar.
The appellate court further found that there was no adequate notice by Flores
to his other co-heirs/co-owners of the repudiation of the co-ownership and
neither was there a categorical assertion by the defendants of their exclusive
right to the entire lot that barred the plaintiffs' claim of ownership. 18
And the appellate court found it credible for the plaintiffs to have failed to
immediately take legal action to protect their rights on account of forbearance
towards their eldest brother who had asked them to continue cultivating the lot
to support his children's education. 19
Respecting the defendant Policarpio's claim that part of the lot had been sold to
him by Flores, the appellate court sustained the trial court's rejection thereof.
Accordingly, the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED in so
far as plaintiffs-appellants Heirs of Dolores Cichon, et al., are concerned
and DENIED in so far as defendant-appellant Policarpio Restar. The decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 3, dated June 30, 1999
is MODIFIED. The ruling of the said court that the heirs of Flores Restar have
acquired ownership by adverse possession of the land in question, Cadastral Lot
No. 6686, is hereby REVERSED.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)
The appellate court having denied reconsideration of its decision, only the
defendants Heirs of Flores filed the present petition, assigning the following
errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE RULING OF THE
LOWER COURT THAT THE PETITIONERS AS HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR HAVE
ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP BY ADVERSE POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN
QUESTION. TADaES
B. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THERE WAS
ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION ON THE LAND IN QUESTION NOTWITHSTANDING
THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION HAS BEEN DECLARED IN THE NAME OF FLORES
RESTAR, FATHER OF PETITIONERS, AS EARLY AS 1960 AND THAT PETITIONERS
AND THEIR PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN OPEN, CONTINUOUS,
EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION IN THE
CONCEPT OF OWNER FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS. 20
The petition is impressed with merit.
Article 494 of the New Civil Code expressly provides:
ART. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned.
xxx xxx xxx
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners
or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not
prescribe, a co-owner may acquire ownership thereof by prescription 21 where
there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are
apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership. 22
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or
extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in
good faith and with just title for a period of ten years. Without good faith and
just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character which
requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years.
Thus, the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be
ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and
with just title for the time fixed by law.
ART. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are
acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years.
ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need
of title or of good faith.
Resolving the main issue of whether petitioners acquired ownership over the lot
by extraordinary prescription, the appellate court held in the negative.
While this Court is not a trier of facts, if the inference drawn by the appellate
court from the facts is manifestly mistaken, it may, in the interest of justice,
review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct factual conclusions based
on the record. 23
Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, the records of the case amply
support petitioners' claim that the requirements for extraordinary prescription
had been duly met.
When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners of
the lot by intestate succession. Respondents never possessed the lot, however,
much less asserted their claim thereto until January 21, 1999 when they filed the
complaint for partition subject of the present petition. TDcEaH
In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restar's death and exercised
acts of dominion thereon — tilling and cultivating the land, introducing
improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof.
The statutory period of prescription, however, commenced not in 1935 but in
1960 when Flores, who had neither title nor good faith, secured a tax
declaration in his name and may, therefore, be said to have adversely claimed
ownership of the lot. And respondents were also deemed to have been on said
date become aware of the adverse claim. 24
Flores' possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription
after the lapse of thirty years in accordance with the earlier quoted Article 1137
of the New Civil Code.
The following observations of the trial court thus merit this Court's approval.
The evidence proved that as far back as 1959, Flores Restar adjudicated unto
himself the whole land in question as his share from his father by means of a
joint affidavit which he executed with one Helen Restar, and he requested the
Provincial Treasurer/Assessor to have the land declared in his name. It was
admitted by the parties during the pre-trial that this affidavit was the basis of
the transfer of Tax Declaration No. 6686 from Emilio Restar to Flores Restar. So
that from 1960 the land was declared in the name of Flores Restar (Exhibit 10).
This was the first concrete act of repudiation made by Flores of the co-
ownership over the land in question. . . .
Plaintiffs did not deny that aside from the verbal partition of one parcel of land
in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan way back in 1945, they also had an amicable partition
of the lands of Emilio Restar in Cerrudo and Palale, Banga Aklan on September
28, 1973 (exhibit "20"). If they were able to demand the partition, why then did
they not demand the inclusion of the land in question in order to settle once and
for all the inheritance from their father Emilio Restar, considering that at that
time all of the brothers and sisters, the eight heirs of Emilio Restar, were still
alive and participated in the signing of the extra-judicial partition?
Also it was admitted that Flores died only in 1989. Plaintiffs had all the chances
(sic) to file a case against him from 1960, or a period of 29 years when he was
still alive, yet they failed to do so. They filed the instant case only on January 22,
1999, almost ten (10) years after Flores' death.
From the foregoing evidence, it can be seen that the adverse possession of
Flores started in 1960, the time when the tax declaration was transferred in his
name. The period of acquisitive prescription started to run from this date.
Hence, the adverse possession of Flores Restar from 1960 vested in him
exclusive ownership of the land considering the lapse of more than 38 years.
Acquisitive prescription of ownership, laches and prescription of the action for
partition should be considered in favor of Flores Restar and his heirs. 25
While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership
and do not prove title to the land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual
Page 40 of 49 PROPERTY
possession, they constitute evidence of great weight 26 and can be the basis of a
claim of ownership through prescription. 27
As for respondents' claim that they have been receiving shares from the produce
of the land, it was correctly discredited by the trial court.
[P]laintiffs' claim that Flores Restar gave them five to eight gantas each as their
shares in the produce cannot be sustained. A few gantas cannot be considered
one-eight share of sixty (60) cavans of palay produced per cropping. One eight of
sixty cavans would be at least six cavans, not merely gantas after excluding
expenses for cultivation and production. If plaintiffs were to be believed, their
whole 7/8 share of the produce would total two cavans, six gantas only at the
usual rate of 25 gantas per cavan. 28
Unless there are strong and impelling reasons to disturb the trial court's findings
of facts which must, as a matter of judicial policy, be accorded with the highest
respect, they must remain. Respondents have not, however, proffered any
reason warranting the disturbance of the trial court's findings of facts.cCaEDA
Indeed, the following acts of Flores show possession adverse to his co-heirs: the
cancellation of the tax declaration certificate in the name of Restar and securing
another in his name; the execution of a Joint Affidavit stating that he is the
owner and possessor thereof to the exclusion of respondents; payment of real
estate tax and irrigation fees without respondents having ever contributed any
share therein; and continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to the
exclusion of respondents. And Flores' adverse possession was continued by his
heirs.
The appellate court's crediting of respondents' justification for failing to
immediately take legal action to protect their rights — forbearance toward
Flores and/or his wife who asked to be allowed to cultivate the land to support
their children's education — does not impress. For assuming such justification to
be true, why did not any of respondents assail Flores' continuous possession
after his children completed their college education in 1977?
The trial court's finding and conclusion that Flores and his heirs had for more
than 38 years possessed the land in open, adverse and continuous possession in
the concept of owner — which length of possession had never been questioned,
rebutted or disputed by any of respondents, being thus duly supported by
substantial evidence, he and his heirs have become owner of the lot by
extraordinary prescription. It is unfortunate that respondents slept on their
rights. Dura lex sed lex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the June 30, 1999 decision of the trial court is
REINSTATED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 46296. September 24, 1991.]
EPITACIO DELIMA, PACIANO DELIMA, FIDEL DELIMA, VIRGILIO DELIMA,
GALILEO DELIMA, JR., BIBIANO BACUS, OLIMPIO BACUS and PURIFICACION
BACUS, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GELILEO DELIMA (deceased),
substituted by his legal heirs, namely; FLAVIANA VDA. DE DELIMA, LILY D.
ARIAS, HELEN NIADAS, ANTONIO DELIMA, DIONISIO DELIMA, IRENEA DELIMA,
ESTER DELIMA AND FELY DELIMA, respondents.
Gabriel J. Canete for petitioners.
Emilio Lumontad, Jr. for private respondents.
DECISION
MEDIALDEA, J p:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
reversing the trial court's judgment which declared as null and void the
certificate of title in the name of respondents' predecessor and which ordered
the partition of the disputed lot among the parties as co-owners.
The antecedent facts of the case as found both by the respondent appellate
court and by the trial court are as follows:
During his lifetime, Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla
Friar Lands Estate in Cebu by sale on installments from the government. Lino
Delima later died in 1921 leaving as his only heirs three brothers and a sister
namely: Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima. After
his death, TCT No. 2744 of the property in question was issued on August 3,
1953 in the name of "The Legal Heirs of Lino Delima, deceased, represented by
Galileo Delima."
On September 22, 1953, Galileo Delima, now substituted by respondents,
executed an affidavit of "Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs." Based on this
affidavit, TCT No. 2744 was cancelled and TCT No. 3009 was issued on February
4, 1954 in the name of Galileo Delima alone to the exclusion of the other heirs.
Galileo Delima declared the lot in his name for taxation purposes and paid the
taxes thereon from 1954 to 1965.
On February 29, 1968, petitioners, who are the surviving heirs of Eulalio and
Juanita Delima, filed With the Court of First Instance of Cebu (now Regional Trial
Court) an action for reconveyance and/or partition of property and for the
annulment of TCT No. 3009 with damages against their uncles Galileo Delima
and Vicente Delima,. Vicente Delima was joined as party defendant by the
petitioners for his refusal to join the latter in their action.
On January 16, 1970, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners,
the dispositive portion of which states: cdphil
"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the following are the declared
owners of Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate presently
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3009, each sharing a pro-indiviso
share of one-fourth;
1) Vicente Delima (one-fourth)
2) Heirs of Juanita Delima, namely: Bibiano Bacus, Olimpio Bacus and
Purificacion Bacus (one-fourth),
3) Heirs of Eulalio Delima, namely Epitacio, Paciano, Fidel, Virgilio and Galileo Jr.,
all surnamed Delima (one-fourth); and
4) The Heirs of Galileo Delima, namely Flaviana Vda. de Delima, Lily D. Arias,
Helen Niadas, and Dionisio, Antonio, Eotu, Irenea, and Fely, all surnamed Delima
(one-fourth).
"Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3009 is declared null and void and the Register
of Deeds of Cebu is ordered to cancel the same and issue in lieu thereof another
title with the above heirs as pro-indiviso owners.
"After the payment of taxes paid by Galileo Delima since 1958, the heirs of
Galileo Delima are ordered to turn over to the other heirs their respective shares
of the fruits of the lot in question computed at P170.00 per year up to the
present time with legal (interest).
"Within sixty (60) days from receipt of this decision the parties are ordered to
petition the lot in question and the defendants are directed to immediately turn
over possession of the shares here awarded to the respective heirs.
"Defendants are condemned to pay the costs of the suit.
"The counterclaim is dismissed.
"SO ORDERED." (pp. 54-55, Rollo).
Not satisfied with the decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On May 19, 1977, respondent appellate court reversed the trial court's decision
and upheld the claim of Galileo Delima that all the other brothers and sister of
Lino Delima, namely Eulalio, Juanita and Vicente, had already relinquished and
waived their rights to the property in his favor, considering that he (Galileo
Delima) alone paid the remaining balance of the purchase price of the lot and
the realty taxes thereon (p. 26, Rollo).
Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioners alleging that the Court of
Appeals erred:
"1) In not holding that the right of a co-heir to demand partition of inheritance is
imprescriptible. If it does, the defenses of prescription and laches have already
been waived.
"2) In disregarding the evidence of the petitioners." (p. 13, Rollo).
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not petitioners' action
for partition is already barred by the statutory period provided by law which
shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive
prescription to the exclusion of petitioners from their shares in the disputed
property. LLpr
Article 494 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
"Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common,
insofar as his share is concerned.
"Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of
time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a
new agreement.
"A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed
twenty years.
"Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
"No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners
or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership."
As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the
others, but will be held to benefit all. It is understood that the co-owner or co-
heir who is in possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in
representation of his co-owners or co-heirs, if, as such owner, he administers or
takes care of the rest thereof with the obligation of delivering it to his co-owners
or co-heirs, is under the same situation as a depository, a lessee or a trustee
(Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857; Segura v. Segura, No. L-29320, September
19, 1988, 165 SCRA 368). Thus, an action to compel partition may be filed at any
time by any of the co-owners against the actual possessor. In other words, no
prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership (Del Blanco v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, No. 72694, December 1 , 1987, 156 SCRA 55).
However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute
and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein,
the question involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership (De Castro
v. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23; Bargayo v. Camumot, supra; De los Santos v. Santa Teresa,
44 Phil. 811). In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no
longer be invoked or applied when one of the co-owners has adversely
possessed the property as exclusive owner for a period sufficient to vest
ownership by prescription.
It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that of a trustee. In order
that such possession is considered adverse to the cestui que trustamounting to a
repudiation of the co-ownership, the following elements must concur: 1) that
the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui
que trust; 2) that such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to
the cestui que trust; and 3) that the evidence thereon should be clear and
conclusive (Valdez v. Olorga, No. L-22571, May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 71; Pangan v.
Court of Appeals, No. L-39299, October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA 375).
Page 41 of 49 PROPERTY
We have held that when a co-owner of the property in question executed a
deed of partition and on the strength thereof obtained the cancellation of the
title in the name of their predecessor and the issuance of a new one wherein he
appears as the new owner of the property, thereby in effect denying or
repudiating the ownership of the other co-owners over their shares, the statute
of limitations started to run for the purposes of the action instituted by the
latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership and of their
rights thereunder (Castillo v. Court of Appeals, No. L-18046, March 31, 1964, 10
SCRA 549). Since an action for reconveyance of land based on implied or
constructive trust prescribes after ten (10) years, it is from the date of the
issuance of such title that the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of
the statute of limitations is counted (Jaramil v. Court of Appeals, No. L-31858,
August 31, 1977, 78 SCRA 420). LLphil
Evidence shows that TCT No. 2744 in the name of the legal heirs of Lino Delima,
represented by Galileo Delima, was cancelled by virtue of an affidavit executed
by Galileo Delima and that on February 4, 1954, Galileo Delima obtained the
issuance of a new title in his name numbered TCT No. 3009 to the exclusion of
his co-heirs. The issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear
repudiation of the trust or co-ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of
adverse possession by Galileo Delima from February 4, 1954 was sufficient to
vest title in him by prescription. As the certificate of title was notice to the whole
world of his exclusive title to the land, such rejection was binding on the other
heirs and started as against them the period of prescription. Hence, when
petitioners filed their action for reconveyance and/or to compel partition on
February 29, 1963, such action was already barred by prescription. Whatever
claims the other co-heirs could have validly asserted before can no longer be
invoked by them at this time.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals dated May 19, 1977 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 150707. April 14, 2004.]
APOLONIA LL. OCAMPO Now Substituted by MARIANO O. QUIEN, AMELITA Q.
TAN, MILOVAN O. QUIEN, LUISA OCAMPO-LLORIN, MELITA F. OCAMPO, FELIX
OCAMPO JR., RAMON OCAMPO, MIGUEL OCAMPO, JUANA OCAMPO, ANDRES
OCAMPO SR., VIOLETA OCAMPO, MERCEDITA OCAMPO, ANTONIA OCAMPO,
ELISA OCAMPO, BEATRIZ OCAMPO, JUAN JOHNNY OCAMPO, JONAS OCAMPO,
MARIA DOLORES OCAMPO, REBECCA OCAMPO, FIDELA OCAMPO, LUIS
OCAMPO JR. and ERNESTO O. FORTUNO, petitioners, vs. FIDELA LL. OCAMPO,
FELICIDAD LL. OCAMPO, BELEN OCAMPO-BARRITO, VICENTE BARRITO,
NEMESIO LL. OCAMPO, IMELDA OCAMPO and JOSE OCAMPO, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden
of proving it by a preponderance of evidence. In an action involving property,
petitioners should rely on the strength of their own title and not on the alleged
weakness of respondents’ claim.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the October 31, 2001 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR
CV No. 56941. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, with the sole modification that the awards for damages and
attorney’s fees are hereby deleted, the judgment appealed from is, in all other
respects, AFFIRMED. Without costs.” 3
The CA affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision, 4 rendered on October
30, 1996, which decreed thus:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds, holds and declares that
defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, married to Vicente Barrito, are the true and
lawful exclusive owners of the following properties, namely:
(a) A parcel of residential/commercial land situated in the poblacion of Nabua,
Camarines Sur, bounded on the NE by Carmen Ocampo and Alberto Espiritu, on
the SE by the Burgos Street, on the SW by a street, and on the NW by Julian
Ocampo and Carmen Ocampo, containing an area of 1,119 square meters, more
or less, presently covered by TCT No. 13654 in the name of Belen Ocampo-
Barrito, married to Vicente Barrito and previously covered by TCT No. RT-
4389(983) in the name of Fidela Ocampo, declared under TD No. 18856 and
assessed at P17,240.00.
(b) A parcel of residential land situated at San Luis, Nabua, Camarines Sur,
bounded on the North and East by a barrio road, on the South by a creek, and on
the West by Lot 237, with an area of about 300 square meters, declared under
TD No. 19639 with an assessed value of P6,240.00.
(c) A parcel of land situated at Sto. Domingo, Nabua, Camarines Sur, bounded on
the North by Lot 10323, on the East by Lot 9543, on the South by Lot 10325, and
on the West by Lot 10322, with an area of about 4884 square meters, declared
under TD No. 35122 and assessed at P6780.00.
as described and referred to in paragraph 9, sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of
the original complaint and it is hereby ordered that:
1. The complaint and supplemental complaint are dismissed for failure of the
plaintiffs to prove their cause/causes of action by preponderance of evidence
and on the added ground of prescription;
2. The plaintiffs are ordered to pay as their joint and several obligation, to
defendants Fidela Ll. Ocampo, Belen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito, the
total sum of P15,000.00 for attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation and
P50,000.00 for moral damages;
3. The plaintiffs jointly and severally pay the cost of this suit.
4. Upon the finality of this decision, the notice of lis pendens annotated at
plaintiffs’ behest in the Certificates of Title covering the properties in question,
of defendants be cancelled; and the plaintiffs, their agents and representatives
as well as successors-in-interest are ordered to respect the right of ownership of
said defendants thereto, and to vacate and restore the lawful possession of all
portions of said properties to herein defendants, their agents, representatives
and successors-in-interest.” 5
The Facts
The CA adopted the RTC’s summation of facts as follows:
“Notwithstanding its somewhat deficient grammar and syntax, the following
summation of the relevant and material antecedents of the case by the court a
quo, is substantially correct —
‘This is a civil suit for partition and damages filed by plaintiffs against the
defendants.
‘The complaint alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and
Juana Llander-Ocampo, they begot ten (10) children, namely: Fidela, Felix,
Andres, Nemesio, Jose, Apolonia, Felicidad, Luisa, Rosario, and Luis. Of the
aforementioned children, the following are already dead, namely: Felix, who is
survived by his widow, Melita F. Ocampo and children Felix, Jr., Ramon and
Miguel; Andres, who is survived by Juana Ocampo and children Jose, Andres,
Imelda, Violeta and Mercedita; Jose, who is survived by his children Antonia,
Elias and Juan (Johnny); Rosario, who is survived by Ernesto O. Fortuno; Luis,
who is survived by his children Rose, Ricardo, Jonas, Maria Dolores, Rebecca,
Fidela and Luis, Jr.; and Luisa, who is survived by Carlos Llorin and children
Mecita, Manuel, Carlos, Jr., Carmelita and Marilou L. Arellano.
‘The complaint further alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose
Ocampo and Luisa Llander-Ocampo, they acquired several parcels of land and,
upon their death, left the following properties, namely:
(a) A parcel of residential/commercial land situated in the poblacion of Nabua,
Camarines Sur, bounded on the NE by Carmen Ocampo and Alberto Espiritu, on
the SE by the Burgos Street, on the SW by a Street, and on the NW by Julian
Ocampo and Carmen Ocampo, containing an area of 1,119 square meters, more
or less, presently covered by TCT No. RT-4389(983) in the name of Fidela
Ocampo, declared under TD No. 18856 and assessed at P17,240.00;
(b) A parcel of residential land situated at San Luis, Nabua, Camarines Sur,
bounded on the North and East by a barrio road, on the South by a creek, and on
the West by Lot 237, with an area of about 300 square meters, declared under
TD No. 19639 with an assessed value of P6,240.00; and
(c) A parcel of land situated at Sto. Domingo, Nabua, Camarines Sur, bounded on
the North by Lot 10323, on the East by Lot 9543, on the South by Lot 10325, and
on the West by Lot 10322, with an area of about 4,884 square meters, declared
under TD No. 35122 and assessed at P6,780.00.
‘that all the above named parcels of land are actually owned in common by the
children of the late spouses Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander Ocampo although
the land denominated as parcel (a) of the complaint is ostensibly registered in
the name of Fidela Ocampo alone but acknowledged by her as a property owned
in common by all of them, brothers and sisters; that plaintiffs desire to partition
said properties but defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad unlawfully and
unreasonably refuse to do so and moved by a common purpose, both of them
mortgaged to the PNB the land denominated as parcel (a) of the complaint to
secure the payment of a P110,000.00 loan, the proceeds of which were . . .
exclusively to the benefit of said defendants only; that the same defendants
Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo have been receiving the fruits of the
properties to the exclusion of their co-heirs amounting to not less than
P2,000.00 a year; and, that because of their relationship, they undertook earnest
efforts to amicably settle this controversy but because of defendants Fidela
Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo[‘s] utterly unreasonable and unjustified
actuations, the same failed.
xxx xxx xxx
‘In their complaint, plaintiffs pray that judgment be rendered ordering the
partition of the properties described in paragraph 9 of the complaint; ordering
defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo, to release or otherwise cancel
any and all encumbrances on TCT No. RT-4389(983) which they had caused to be
annotated thereon, particularly, the mortgage in favor of the PNB; requiring
Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo to refrain from further encumbering said
properties or otherwise subjecting the same to any lien and for that purpose, a
writ of preliminary injunction to be issued against them to enjoin the
commission of such acts; ordering defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad
Ocampo to submit an accounting of the fruits and other produce they had
received from said properties; further ordering Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad
Ocampo to indemnify plaintiffs the sum of not less than P15,000.00 by way of
attorney’s fees and related expenses of litigation, plus the costs of the suit; and,
further granting plaintiffs such other remedies as may be just and equitable in
the premises.
xxx xxx xxx
‘On 17 December 1987, counsel for plaintiffs filed a Motion to Admit
Supplemental Complaint dated 2 December 1987 which was granted by the
Court as there was no opposition to it.
‘The Supplemental Complaint alleges that defendants Helen Ocampo-Barrito
and Vicente Barrito are spouses; that on 30 September 1987, TCT No. RT-
Page 42 of 49 PROPERTY
4389(983) in the name of defendant Fidela Ocampo and covering the lot
described as parcel (a) in paragraph 9 of the original complaint was cancelled
and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. 1364 was issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-
Barrito, married to defendant Vicente Barrito, on the strength of an allege[d]
Deed of Donation Inter Vivos ostensibly executed by defendant Fidela Ll.
Ocampo in their favor on 13 January 1984; that at the time the Deed of
Donation Inter Vivos was presented for registration and when TCT No. 1364,
Registry of Camarines Sur, was issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, both
the donor and donees were notoriously aware that said parcel of land was
among the lots subject of this Civil Case No. IR-1867 of which the donor Fidela Ll.
Ocampo and the mother of the donees, Felicidad Ll. Ocampo, are defendants,
that said properties were owned by the Ocampo brothers and sisters, and that
the donor Fidela Ll. Ocampo was not the exclusive owner thereof; that the
transfer of defendants Fidela Ll. Ocampo and Belen Ocampo-Barrito of the
ownership over said property now subject of this partition is tainted with fraud,
actual and deliberate, to deprive plaintiffs of their legitimate share therein,
knowing as they do that the same are a co-ownership of the original parties
plaintiffs and defendants herein; that defendants Fidela Ll. Ocampo and the
spouses Belen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito have not acted in good faith,
deliberately causing damage and injury to the plaintiffs by their avaricious desire
to obtain sole ownership of said properties through dubious and illegal means
that the defendant spouses Belen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito, through
dubious means and undue influence over Fidela Ll. Ocampo, a very old spinster
whom they have lately taken into their custody, succeeded in having the latter
execute this supposed deed of donation inter vivos; that defendants have not
acted with justice, honesty and good faith, causing injury to plaintiffs’ rights in a
manner inconsistent with morals and good customs, hence, are liable for moral
damages of not less than P50,000.00; and that to set an example for the public
good and to deter others similarly minded from doing so, defendants should be
assessed exemplary damages of not less than P50,000.00.
‘Plaintiffs pray that judgment be rendered (a) declaring the Deed of Donation
Inter Vivos allegedly executed by Fidela Ll. Ocampo in favor of Belen Ocampo-
Barrito and Vicente Barrito be declare[d] null and void, (b) ordering defendants
Belen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito to reconvey so much of the property
subject thereof as pertain to the plaintiffs, (c) directing defendants, jointly and
severally, to indemnify plaintiffs such amounts as this Honorable Court may
consider fair and reasonable by way of actual, moral and exemplary damages,
inclusive of attorney’s fees and related expenses of litigation, and (d) granting
plaintiffs such other remedies as may be just and equitable in the premises.
xxx xxx xxx
‘As Special Defenses, defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito allege that the original
defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo, her predecessor-in-interest, since 1949 has been
the absolute owner in fee simple of the property by virtue of the issuance of the
certificate of title in her name; that her predecessor-in-interest held the same
certificate of title to the same parcel of land (TCT No. RT-4389(983) free of all
encumbrances and adverse claims and was in notorious, public, and actual
possession of the property in concept of absolute owner from 1949 until 13
January 1984, when said predecessor-in-interest validly conveyed the property
by donation inter vivos which she accepted in the same public instrument; that
TCT No. 1364 was issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito on the strength of
the donation inter vivos executed in her favor by her predecessor-in-interest and
has since 30 September 1987, been the absolute owner thereof; that since 1949
none of the plaintiffs ever questioned the absolute ownership and title of
defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito’s predecessor-in-interest over the property
making the decree of registration incontrovertible; that it is fatal for plaintiffs’
cause of action to allege that defendants exerted ‘undue influence over Fidela Ll.
Ocampo’ for the latter to ‘execute the deed of donation’ while clearly admitting
in both the original and supplemental complaints that defendants are residents
of Mindoro Occidental a far away place from Nabua, Camarines Sur, the place
where the same predecessor-in-interest admittedly resides; and, that Belen
Ocampo-Barrito’s title cannot be collaterally attacked in these supposed
partition proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
‘Defendants pray that the case be dismissed for utter lack of merit and plaintiffs
be ordered to pay defendants the sum of P200,000.00 for moral damages,
P50,000.00 for exemplary damages, P100,000.00 as compensatory damages, to
pay attorney’s fees in the amount of P15,000.00, and for other just and
equitable remedies. DASEac
xxx xxx xxx
‘As the Special and/or Affirmative Defenses, defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo alleges
that she is the true and absolute owner of the real properties described in
paragraph 9 of the original complaint having acquired the same by lucrative title
and has, since becoming owner thereof, been in actual possession thereof
excepting the portion of the lot described in paragraph 9 (a) of the complaint
and covered by ‘Torrens’ title which was and is still being unlawfully occupied by
plaintiffs Quiens; that the properties have been declared for assessment in
defendant’s name as exclusive owner thereof and since her acquisition of said
properties, has paid the taxes thereon; that defendant had exercised
continuously all the legal incidents of ownership on said lands to the exclusion of
and adversely to the public, plaintiffs herein included; that the [D]eed of
Donation Inter Vivos and the subsequent transfer of the property mentioned in
paragraph 9 of the complaint to other defendants Belen Ocamp[o]-Barrito is
valid conveyance which binds the said property; and, that assuming that
plaintiffs have a cause of action, the same is barred by laches.
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo prays that judgment be rendered dismissing the
complaint and ordering plaintiffs to indemnify such sum as will be proved as well
as [s]uch amount as this Court may assess by way of moral and exemplary
damages and costs, including necessary expenses for litigation, and for just and
equitable reliefs.’” 6
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
According to the appellate court, other than the Acknowledgment of Co-
ownership 7 executed by Respondent Fidela Ocampo, no documentary evidence
was offered to establish petitioners’ claim of co-ownership. The CA held that this
piece of documentary evidence could not prevail over the array of testimonial
and documentary evidence that had been adduced by respondents to prove
their defenses. Communal ownership of the property in question was
supposedly not proven, either, by the ancient photograph showing Spouses
Chino Jose and Juana Llander Ocampo with their ten children in front of the
disputed property; or by another picture showing the name “Oniang Ocampo —
1-15-61” engraved on the said house or building.
The court a quo rejected the argument of petitioners that the title to the subject
property had been placed in the name of Fidela, because their parents followed
the Chinese custom of placing properties in the name of the eldest son or
daughter who was single. Petitioners explained that upon the death of the
eldest sibling, the properties would revert to the younger brothers and sisters.
According to the CA, however, not a shred of evidence was adduced to prove
that such a Chinese custom existed or was observed in that place.
The CA also dismissed petitioners’ contention that common ownership was
indicated by the fact that some of the children of Spouses Ocampo stayed and
lived on the subject property. It ruled that fraternal affection could have been
the motive that impelled respondents to allow their relatives to use it.
In contrast to the arguments of petitioners, the CA said that respondents were
able to give clear proof of their ownership of the property: the Transfer
Certificate of Title and the corresponding Tax Declaration in the name of Fidela,
and later of Belen Ocampo-Barrito.
Nevertheless, the CA eliminated the awards for damages and attorney’s fees,
because the trial court had failed to cite the factual, the legal and the equitable
bases therefor.
Hence, this Petition. 8
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
“1. Where the evidence presented, oral and documentary, on the question of
co-ownership, is overwhelming as it is unopposed, unrebutted and
unimpeached, has co-ownership been proved?
“2. Where co-ownership is confirmed by long, public possession by co-owners,
did the courts commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that there is no co-
ownership?
“3. Where the evidence of respondents is weak, puerile and inconsistent, did the
courts commit a grave misapprehension of facts when they gave credence to it?
“4. Where a deed of donation inter vivos entered in bad faith deprives the heirs
of their hereditary shares, is said deed valid?
“5. Where a declaration against interest has not been opposed, assailed,
rebutted or impeached, did the courts commit grave abuse of discretion in
holding there is no such declaration?” 9
At bottom, the question to be resolved in this case is who owns the disputed
property?
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
Main Issue:
Ownership of the Subject Property
At the outset, we clarify that although there were three (3) properties originally
involved in the litigation brought before the RTC, petitioners’ appeal dealt only
with the first one, referred to in the Statement of Facts above — a parcel of
residential/commercial land situated in the poblacion of Nabua, Camarines Sur.
In their CA appeal, petitioners declared that “the focus of this case is on the first
[property] which is located at downtown Poblacion of Nabua and therefore a
valuable piece of property, 1,119 square meters in all.” 10 Because petitioners
had not questioned the RTC Decision with regard to the other properties, then
the adjudication of these matters became final. Thus, only one property is left
for resolution in the present proceedings. 11
Since the original Complaint was an action for partition, this Court cannot order
a division of the property, unless it first makes a determination as to the
existence of a co-ownership. 12 The settlement of the issue of ownership is the
first stage in an action for partition. 13 This action will not lie if the claimant has
no rightful interest in the subject property. Parties filing the action are in fact
required by the Rules of Court 14 to set forth in their complaint the nature and
the extent of their title to the property. It would be premature to effect a
partition thereof until and unless the question of ownership is first definitely
resolved. 15
Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden
of proving it by a preponderance of evidence. 16 Petitioners’ chief evidence of
co-ownership of the property in question is simply the Acknowledgment of Co-
ownership executed by Fidela. As mentioned earlier, both the trial and the
appellate courts were correct in finding that this piece of documentary evidence
Page 43 of 49 PROPERTY
could not prevail over the array of testimonial and documentary evidence that
were adduced by respondents, as will be expounded below.
Petitioners failed to trace the successive transfers of ownership of the
questioned property that eventually led to them. Allegedly, it was originally
owned by their parents — Spouses Ocampo — whose deaths passed it on to the
children. Petitioners, however, presented absolutely no proof of ownership of
their predecessors-in-interest. In insisting that it was so transferred and thus co-
owned, the former rely on the Acknowledgment of Co-ownership executed by
Fidela, their eldest sibling.
On the other hand, Belen clearly traced the basis of her alleged sole ownership
of the property and presented preponderant proof of her claim.
First, she presented a Deed of Absolute Sale of Residential Land, 17 referring to
the subject property, executed between Adolfo Ocampo as seller and Felix
Ocampo as buyer. The document dated July 6, 1948, was signed in the presence
of two witnesses and acknowledged before Juan B. Ballecer, a notary public.
The theory of petitioners is completely demolished by this document, which
they never contested. According to them, the land in question was the conjugal
property of their parents; and that upon the latter’s deaths, the former inherited
it in common. If indeed the land was the conjugal property of Spouses Ocampo,
then petitioners should have presented evidence to prove such ownership by
their alleged predecessors-in-interest. Since the former failed to do so, how then
can they prove the transfer to them of ownership that has not been established
in the first place? It is axiomatic that no one can transfer to another a right
greater than that which one has; 18 thus, the legal truism that the spring cannot
rise higher than its source. 19
Likewise, in this Deed of Absolute Sale, Adolfo Ocampo declared his “exclusive
ownership” of the property, “having been acquired by purchase[;] and [having]
been in [his] continuous, public, peaceful, adverse and material possession for
more than 50 years together with [his] predecessors in rights and interest, in
[the] concept of owner without any claim of other persons.” 20
Second, Respondent Belen proved that on February 10, 1953, this property had
been sold to Fidela by Felix Ocampo for a valuable consideration; and that Fidela
had entered the property, actually occupied it, and exercised all powers of
dominion over it to the exclusion of petitioners.
As proofs of ownership of the property by Fidela, Belen presented Transfer
Certificate of Title No. RT-4389 (983), 21 which named the former as owner in
fee simple; and a Declaration of Real Property, 22 evidencing payment of real
property taxes, also by Fidela as owner.
To prove further that Fidela had exercised dominion over the property, Belen
also presented a Real Estate Mortgage 23 executed by the former as absolute
owner. Fidela had executed it in favor of her sister Apolonia Ocampo, one of the
original petitioners in this case, who is now represented by her heirs. Belen
correctly argues that in agreeing to be a mortgagee, Apolonia admitted and
recognized Fidela as the true owner of the land in question.
The Civil Code provides that an essential requisite of a contract of mortgage is
that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing mortgaged. 24 Co-
ownership cannot be presumed even if only a portion of the property was
mortgaged to Apolonia, because a co-owner may dispose only of one’s interest
in the ideal or abstract part of the undivided thing co-owned with others. 25 The
effect of a mortgage by a co-owner shall be limited to the portion that may be
allotted to that person upon the termination of the co-ownership. 26 In this
case, Fidela mortgaged a definite portion of the property and thus negated any
acknowledgment of co-ownership.
Third, Belen then presented a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos 27 executed on
January 13, 1984, between herself as donee and Fidela as donor. This act shows
the immediate source of the former’s claim of sole ownership of the property.
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of
title to the property from the donor to the donee. 28 Petitioners stubbornly rely
on the Acknowledgment of Co-ownership allegedly executed by Fidela in favor
of her siblings. What they overlook is the fact that at the time of the execution
of the Acknowledgment — assuming that its authenticity and due execution
were proven — the property had already been donated to Belen. The Deed of
Donation, which is the prior document, is clearly inconsistent with the document
relied upon by petitioners. We agree with the RTC’s ratiocination:
“On the claim of plaintiffs that defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo herself made a
written acknowledgment for her co-ownership over all the properties disputed
with plaintiffs in this case, the same cannot be considered as a declaration
against Fidela’s interest since the alleged acknowledgment was written and
executed on 24 December 1985 when she was no longer the owner of the
property as the year previous, on 13 January 1984, she had already donated all
her properties to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, so that, in effect, she had no
more properties with which she can have an interest to declare against.” 29
Petitioners argue that the Acknowledgment of Co-ownership may be considered
as a declaration against interest. A statement may be admissible as such a
declaration if it complies with the following requisites: 1) the declarant is dead
or unable to testify; 2) it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; 3)
at the time of the declaration, the declarant was aware that it was contrary to
his or her interest; and 4) the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed the
declaration to be true. 30
As correctly found by the trial court, however, the Acknowledgment of Co-
ownership could not be a fact against the interest of the declarant, since her
right over the property had already been extinguished by the prior act of
donation. Thus, at the time of the declaration, Fidela could not have
acknowledged co-ownership, as she had no more property against which she
had an interest to declare.
Finally, Belen presented Transfer Certificate of Title No. 13654 31 as proof of her
ownership of the property. To be sure, the best proof of ownership of the land is
the Certificate of Title (TCT). Hence, more than a bare allegation is required to
defeat the face value of respondent’s TCT, which enjoys a legal presumption of
regularity of issuance. 32 It is quite surprising that despite the process of
transfers and titling of the subject property — commencing in 1948 and
eventually leading to the sole ownership of Belen in 1984 33 — it was only after
1984 that petitioners started asserting their claim of co-ownership thereof.
We are not unmindful of our ruling that the mere issuance of a certificate of title
does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-
ownership with persons not named therein. 34 But given the circumstances of
this case, the claim of co-ownership by petitioners has no leg to stand on. Again,
we stress, Belen clearly traced the source of her sole ownership of the property
in question and thereby foreclosed the unproven and unsubstantiated allegation
of co-ownership thereof.
In addition to the TCT presented, Belen offered as evidence the Tax
Declaration 35 indicating that she, as owner, had been paying real estate taxes
on the property, all to the exclusion of petitioners.
On the other hand, petitioners could not show any title, tax receipt or document
to prove their ownership. Having filed an action involving property, they should
have relied on the strength of their own title and not on the alleged weakness of
respondents’ claim. 36
Petitioners assert that their claim of co-ownership of the property was
sufficiently proved by their witnesses — Luisa Ocampo-Llorin and Melita
Ocampo. We disagree. Their testimonies cannot prevail over the array of
documents presented by Belen. A claim of ownership cannot be based simply on
the testimonies of witnesses; much less on those of interested parties, self-
serving as they are.
As to the photographs presented by petitioners to bolster their claim of co-
ownership, we affirm the CA’s disposition showing the flimsiness of their claim
as follows:
“The other piece of documentary evidence presented by appellants really
proved nothing. The ancient photograph showing the spouses Chino Jose and
Juana Llander Ocampo together with their ten children, simply proved that there
was such a picture taking of the spouses with their children. But the photograph
does not prove communal ownership by appellants over the disputed parcels of
land; neither does it prove that the said properties were indeed owned by the
spouses Chino Jose and Juana Ocampo, and then later on transferred to and
commonly owned by their children. By the same token, the picture exhibited by
appellant showing the name ‘Oniang Ocampo — 1-15-61’ (or Apolonia Ocampo,
one of the children of the spouses Chino Jose and Juana) engraved in the house
or building, does not prove communal ownership of the properties in question.
At best, it is susceptible of various meanings, like: that of Oniang Ocampo was
born on 1-15-61, or that she got married on that date, or that she was
celebrating a special event on the date mentioned, or that she even died on the
date mentioned. And even assuming ex gratia argumenti, that the said
engraving proved ownership over the disputed building, some such fact can only
work to the prejudice of herein appellants. Why? Because it would mean that
only Oniang (or Apolonia) was the owner of the building and that the building is
not, therefore, a communal property of the children of the late spouses Chino
Jose and Juana. Adverting to this piece of evidence, the Trial Court postulated —
‘The engravings on the house ‘ONIANG OCAMPO BLDG. — 1-15-61 cannot serve
as evidence that the property is of common ownership. At most, this can only
establish the fact that said building was constructed for a certain ‘Oniang’ on 15
January 1961. If, indeed, the property is of common ownership, there could not
have been any difficulty to engrave thereon ‘HEIRS OF JOSE OCAMPO and
JUANA LLANDER-OCAMPO — 1-15-61’ instead of ‘ONIANG OCAMPO BLDG. — 1-
15-61.’” 37
Neither can we accept petitioners’ contention that co-ownership is shown by
the fact that some of the children of Spouses Ocampo stayed, lived, and even
put up businesses on the property. The appellate court correctly found that
since the litigants in this case were blood relatives, fraternal affection could have
been a good motive that impelled either Belen or Fidela to allow petitioners to
use the property. Without any proof, however, co-ownership among the parties
cannot be presumed.
Neither are we persuaded by the contention that Spouses Ocampo placed the
subject property in the name of only one person in accordance with a Chinese
custom. As mentioned earlier, that custom consisted of placing properties of
parents in the name of the eldest unmarried son or daughter, with the implicit
understanding that ownership thereof would later revert to the siblings.
In contrast to the failure of petitioners to prove that such custom existed and
was practiced in that place, 38 Belen presented evidence that clearly negated
any claim of ownership by the former’s predecessors-in-interest. Having shown
that the property in question was originally owned by one Adolfo Ocampo — not
by Spouses Ocampo, from whom petitioners derive their right — the claim of
custom becomes immaterial.
The fact that Fidela was not presented in court will not necessarily favor
petitioners and prove that the property in question is indeed co-owned. If they
felt that her testimony would prove their cause, then they could have easily
called her as an adverse or a hostile witness. 39 But since respondents were
Page 44 of 49 PROPERTY
confident in the documents they presented in court, they did not see any need
to call her as a witness.
Petitioners also question the motives of Fidela for donating her properties, when
she is still alive and needs money in her old age. They clearly overlook the nature
of a donation.
Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person gratuitously disposes of a thing
or a right in favor of another who accepts it. 40 Once perfected, a donation is
final; its revocation or rescission cannot be effected, absent any legal ground
therefor. 41 A donation may in fact comprehend the entire property of the
donor. 42 At any rate, the law provides that donors should reserve, in full
ownership or in usufruct, sufficient means for their own support and that of all
their relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of the donation, are by law
entitled to be supported by them. 43
In questioning the motives of Fidela for donating the subject property,
petitioners are contradicting even themselves. On the one hand, they assert that
she would not have disposed of her property, since she would need it in her old
age; on the other, they argue that it was not hers alone anyway. It should be
clear that the law protects donors by providing that, without any reservation of
sufficient means for themselves, the donation shall be reduced upon the
petition of any person affected. 44
To be sure, petitioners’ arguments all pertain to circumstances extraneous to
the Deed of Donation itself. The law is clear that when its terms have been
reduced to writing, an agreement must be presumed to contain all the terms
agreed upon; and there can be, between the parties and their successors in
interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written
agreement. 45
Petitioners did not question the consent of Fidela to the donation. Never was
there any intimation that she had either been coerced or defrauded into
entering into it. As all the essential elements of a donation — consent, subject
matter and cause 46 — have been satisfied, we see no reason to entertain any
doubt about the Deed pertaining thereto.
The question of why the land was registered several years after the donation is
purely speculative. What is important is that there was a duly proven Deed of
Donation, which formed the basis of Belen’s claim and led to the registration of
the property in her name.
Petitioners also question Fidela’s filing of an unlawful detainer suit after the date
of the Deed of Donation. Again, we remind petitioners that because this action
involves property, they should rely on the strength of their own title, not on the
alleged weakness of the claim of respondents. At any rate, the burden of proof
of the claim of co-ownership rests on the former.
Moreover, the final resolution of this case entails the review of factual findings
of the courts below. It is a settled doctrine that in a civil case, final and
conclusive are the factual findings of the trial court, if supported by clear and
convincing evidence on record. Usually, the Supreme Court does not review
those findings — especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in this
case. 47 From the records of the present case, no cogent evidence appears that
would impel us to apply the above doctrine differently. The courts below have
not overlooked essential facts that, if considered, may produce a different
outcome. The trial court correctly explained thus:
“This Court from the outset had the opportunity to see and hear the tell-tale
[signs] of truthfulness or perjury — like the flush of face, or the tone of voice, or
the dart of eyes, or the fearful pause [—] and finds that credibility is with the
defendants [herein respondents]. Moreover, the preponderance of evidence is
with defendants whose testimonial evidences are buttressed by their
documentary evidences.” 48
Finally, we agree with the CA in eliminating the awards for damages and
attorney’s fees for respondents’ failure to show any factual, legal or equitable
bases therefor. 49
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
||| (Ocampo v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 150707, [April 14, 2004], 471 PHIL 519-543)
[G.R. No. 152862. July 26, 2004.]
TERESITA S. REYES-DE LEON, petitioner, vs. VICENTE B. DEL
ROSARIO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J p:
This is a petition for review seeking to set aside the 15 August 2000 Order 1 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Cebu City, 7th Judicial Region as well as its 19
February 2002 Order, 2 denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.
The instant case traces its origin to an action for Partition filed by Pantaleon U.
del Rosario and his son, respondent Vicente B. del Rosario, before the Regional
Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 11 of Cebu City. In
the Amended Complaint, 3 petitioner Teresita Reyes-de Leon was impleaded as
a defendant, being one of the heirs of the late spouses Pantaleon S. del Rosario
and Ceferina Llamas. Plaintiffs therein, Pantaleon U. del Rosario and Vicente B.
del Rosario, are cousin and nephew, respectively, of the petitioner. The case
involved several parcels of land collectively grouped as follows: "Tupas
Properties," "Asinan Properties," "Figueroa Property," "Barili Properties,"
"Mambaling Properties," "Negros Properties," and "Other Properties." 4Plaintiffs
therein claimed that petitioner executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of
Vicente B. del Rosario covering all of her shares in the properties sought to be
partitioned. 5
In her Answer dated 10 November 1998, petitioner claimed that she did not
execute any deed of sale in favor of Vicente B. del Rosario. 6 She further averred
that the only portions of her inheritance she ever sold were her shares in the
Asinan and Negros properties, which she sold in favor of Pantaleon U. del
Rosario, and the late Vicente S. del Rosario. 7
In December 1999, petitioner filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of deed
of sale with damages before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. 8 She stated
that on 14 December 1983, she sold her one-half (½) share in the Asinan
Properties to Pantaleon U. del Rosario, respondent's father. 9 However,
petitioner was shocked when, sometime in August 1996, she learned from her
cousins, who were defendants in the initial partition case filed by the
respondent, that respondent Vicente B. del Rosario was claiming all of her
shares in the estate of Ceferina Llamas, her maternal grandmother. The claim is
based on a deed of absolute sale purportedly signed by petitioner on 20 January
1985, 10 which according to her, covers the same Asinan properties sold to
respondent's father and for the same consideration. However, the deed, she
further alleged, fraudulently added the phrase "including any and all of her
shares, rights and interests on all other real estate properties together with their
improvements which she acquired by inheritance from the estate of the late
Ceferina Llamas Vda. De Del Rosario." 11 In addition, petitioner sought to
recover P500,000.00, as moral damages for respondent's refusal to admit the
nullity of the deed, and for his continued and unjust claim over her
properties. aEcSIH
Upon the filing of the Complaint for declaration of nullity, petitioner moved for
the suspension of the partition proceedings. On 19 January 2000, Judge
Victorino U. Montecillo, presiding judge of the partition court, granted the
motion with the following order, to wit:
"In her motion dated December 20, 1999 defendant Teresita de Leon prayed for
the suspension of the trial of this case on the ground that plaintiff Vicente B. del
Rosario would have no cause of action in the instant case should she prevail in
Civil Case No. CEB-24698 wherein she sought to declare as null and void the
deed of sale she allegedly issued in favor of Vicente B. del Rosario. Plaintiffs filed
an opposition stating that by filing Civil Case No. CEB-24698 movant is guilty of
forum shopping and splitting a cause of action. HTSaEC
xxx xxx xxx
Movant's cause of action in Civil Case No. CEB-24698 is entirely different which
cannot and should not be incorporated in the instant case. Since the partition
sought by plaintiffs in the instant case includes the properties subject of Civil
Case No. CEB-24896 there is merit in movant's motion to suspend this case." 12
Meanwhile, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss 13 petitioner's Complaint,
alleging that, having failed to raise the issue of nullity as a compulsory
counterclaim in her Answer in the partition case, petitioner is barred from filing
the action for declaration of nullity following Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court. 14 Furthermore, he alleged that petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping
since the same transactions and essential facts and circumstances are involved
in the action for declaration of nullity and in the partition case. 15
In the interim, the partition case was raffled to Branch 5, RTC Cebu which was
then presided by Judge Ireneo Lee Gako, Jr. In an Order dated 14 July
2000,16 the new partition court set the preliminary conference for the case, and
in fact held a preliminary conference on 29 July 2000. In its Order dated 15
August 2000, 17 the partition court ordered the parties to submit to the court a
list of uncontested properties. As a result of the preliminary conference, the
parties agreed to partition an uncontested portion of the estate. 18
Likewise on 15 August 2000, the Complaint for declaration of nullity was
eventually dismissed by Branch 6, RTC Cebu, this time presided by Judge Ireneo
Lee Gako, Jr. The trial court ratiocinated that the issue of ownership should be
determined and resolved in the partition case. 19 It also noted that the filing of a
separate action to determine the real owner of the properties in issue and
sought to be partitioned would result in multiplicity of suits. 20Petitioner sought
the reconsideration of the Order dated 15 August 2000, but the same was
denied in the trial court's 19 February 2002 Order, issued this time by Judge
Anacleto L. Caminade. 21 Hence, the instant petition.
While the petition was pending, petitioner died and was substituted by her
heirs, namely: Michael Alain Reyes De Leon and Isidro de Leon. 22
Petitioner raises the following issues: 23
I. Whether or not a party raising the defense of inexistence or nullity of deed of
sale in a partition case (which deed is made as one of the bases of the plaintiff's
prayer for partition therein) is barred from filing an entirely separate action for
declaration of nullity of the same deed on the ground of multiplicity of suits and
forum-shopping.
II. Whether or not the final January 19, 2000 Order of the trial court in the
partition case (suspending the proceeding therein on the ground that the
Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale cannot be incorporated in the partition
case) will be adversely affected by the dismissal of the instant case.
On the other hand, respondent submits a lone issue, to wit:
III. Whether or not this petition should be dismissed on the ground of litis
pendentia and forum-shopping because of the pendency of the partition case.
The parties are agreed that the issues of forum-shopping and litis pendentia are
determinative of this case. Essentially, however, the two issues are two sides of
a coin.
The petition which raises only questions of law is devoid of merit.
Page 45 of 49 PROPERTY
Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits in different courts, either
simultaneously or successively, involving the same parties, to ask the courts to
rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the same or substantially
same reliefs, 24 on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition. 25
In the case of Ayala Land, Inc., v. Valisno, 26 we held that:
"Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or
where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.Litis
pendentia requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
1. Identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same
interests in both actions; DEacIT
2. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on
the same facts; and
3. Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such
that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res adjudicata in the other case." 27
As can be clearly seen from the records of the case, the parties in Civil Case CEB-
17236, or the partition case, are likewise the parties in Civil Case CEB-24698, the
action for declaration of nullity. In the latter case, they filed the complaint or
were impleaded, as the case may be, on account of their purported shares in the
very estate sought to be partitioned in the former. In both cases, petitioner
asserted that she did not sell to respondent any of her shares in the estate
except in two properties and on that basis sought the declaration of nullity of
the disputed deed of absolute sale relied upon by the respondent.
Consequently, the determination of ownership in either case would amount
to res judicata in regard to the other.
The question of validity or nullity of the deed of sale, as well as the claim for
damages, is necessarily and logically intertwined with the partition case. Only
the shares in the lots which are determined to have been validly sold to the
respondent may be included in the action for partition. Conversely, shares in the
lots which were not validly disposed of by the petitioner shall have to be
excluded in the order of partition. Indeed, only properties owned in common
may be the object of an action for partition. Put elsewise, an order of partition
presupposes a state of co-ownership as the status quo ante. This is implicit from
Rule 69 28 on Partition which provides in Section 2 thereof that if after trial the
court finds that the plaintiff is entitled to the partition sought, "it shall order the
partition of the real estate among all the parties in interest." Of course, this rule
of procedure carries out the substantial right conferred by the Civil Code on co-
owners. Article 494 of the Code provides that "(e)ach co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
concerned."
The issue of ownership or co-ownership, to be more precise, must first be
resolved in order to effect a partition of properties. This should be done in the
action for partition itself. As held in the case of Catapusan v. Court of
Appeals: 29
"In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the
property, unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-
ownership. The court must initially settle the issue of ownership, the first stage
in an action for partition. Needless to state, an action for partition will not lie if
the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. In fact, Section 1
of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in his complaint the
"nature and extent of his title" to the real estate. Until and unless the issue of
ownership is definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of
the properties. . . ."
In the case of Viloria v. Court of Appeals, 30 the heirs of deceased co-owners of a
parcel of land sought the partition thereof. The surviving co-owner opposed the
action, contending that the deceased co-owners had sold and conveyed their
shares to him prior to their demise. The trial court ruled that the decedents
remained co-owners of the lot as there was no effective conveyance of their
shares which upon their demise were inherited by their heirs. On appeal, the
Court Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court, with the modification that
the deed of sale which defendant therein relied upon was not valid as such since
it merely constituted an express trust. Before this Court, petitioner ascribed to
the appellate court grave error in assuming jurisdiction over the validity of the
deed of sale as it was never raised as an issue in the partition case. We held that:
". . . In the action for partition private respondents claimed that they were co-
owners of the property subject thereof hence entitled to their share, while
petitioner denied their claim by asserting that their rights were supplanted by
him by virtue of the deed of absolute sale. As a result, the issue of co-ownership
and the legality of the 1965 sale have to be resolved in the partition case. As
enunciated in Catapusan v. CA, until and unless the issue of ownership is
definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties.
Thus, the appellate court did not exceed the limits of its jurisdiction when it
ruled on the validity of the 1965 sale." 31
The trial court pursued the same tack in this case. It held that as the partition
court, it should determine and resolve the issue of ownership of the properties
subject of the disputed deed of absolute sale. As it pointed out, petitioner had
already raised the allegation of nullity as a defense. It also agreed with the
respondent that petitioner raised in the partition case the issue of "whether or
not defendant Teresita de Leon validly sold all her shares in the inheritance to
plaintiff Vicente B. del Rosario." 32
Moreover, in the Verification 33 for the Complaint for declaration of nullity,
petitioner claimed that "I have not commenced any other action or court
proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or in any other Tribunals or Agency," and that "to the best of my
knowledge, no such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or in any other Tribunals or Agency." The veracity of these
statements is belied by petitioner herself. In her Complaint, petitioner alleged
that herein respondent is claiming all of her shares in the estate of Ceferina
Llamas, based on a deed of absolute sale purportedly signed by her, 34 and that
she was informed of the existence of the said instrument by her cousins when
the same was alleged in the partition case. 35 She even filed her Answer to
the Amended Complaint and claimed therein that she did not sell any share,
much more all of her shares to respondent. It is thus clear that she was aware of
the partition case and that she even participated therein when she filed
her Complaint.
Doubtlessly, petitioner made a false or untrue certification of non-forum
shopping.
To split the proceedings into declaration of nullity of the deed of sale and trial
for the partition case, or to hold in abeyance the partition case pending
resolution of the nullity case would result in multiplicity of suits, duplicitous
procedure and unnecessary delay, as the lower court observed. 36 The conduct
of separate trials of the parties' respective claims would entail a substantial
duplication of effort and time not only of the parties but also of the courts
concerned. On the other hand, it would be in the interest of justice if the
partition court hears all the actions and incidents concerning the properties
subject of the partition in a single and complete proceeding.
After all, the issue of nullity can be properly ventilated before the partition
court. Thus, even with the dismissal of the action for nullity, petitioner is not
without recourse. She can still dispute the execution of the deed of absolute sale
and assert her rights to the properties subject of the said instrument in the
partition case. There is no need for a separate case to resolve the matter.
In light of the foregoing, it is obvious that petitioner resorted to forum-shopping.
Also present here is litis pendentia. AIHTEa
Petitioner asserts that the action for partition and the declaration of nullity
involve distinct and separate causes of action. While the first calls for the
determination of their respective rights to the inheritance, the second is a
redress for relief for the fraudulent act committed by one party on the property
rights of the other.
At first glance, the second case for declaration of nullity appears to have a
different cause of action. However, a closer examination reveals that the second
case partakes the nature of a compulsory counterclaim.
A compulsory counterclaim, as held in the case of Ponciano v. Parentela, 37 is
any claim for money or other relief which a defending party may have against an
opposing party, which at the time of suit arises out of, or is necessarily
connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
plaintiff's complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that if it is within the
jurisdiction of the court, and does not require for its adjudication the presence
of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction, it must be set
up therein, and will be barred in the future if not set up. 38
For this reason, a compulsory counterclaim cannot be the subject of a separate
action but should instead be asserted in the same suit involving the same
transaction or occurrence which gave rise to it. 39 To determine whether a
counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the following tests: (1)
Are the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the
same? (2) Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claim absent
the compulsory counterclaim rule? (3) Will substantially the same evidence
support or refute plaintiff's claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim? and
(4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? 40 The
instant case reveals affirmative answers to all the foregoing questions.
Clearly, petitioner's action for declaration of nullity and respondent's claim
anent his share in the partition case stemmed from the same disputed deed of
sale. An adjudication of validity or nullity of the deed of sale in any of the two
cases would constitute res judicata. It is beyond doubt that the same evidence
would be utilized by the parties to prove their sides in both cases. The issue of
nullity of the deed of absolute sale is necessarily connected with the partition
case since the resolution thereof will determine the proper shares of the parties
in the estate sought to be partitioned.
Petitioner raised the claim of nullity of the deed of absolute sale merely as a
defense in her Answer to the Amended Complaint, thus:
"6. . . . paragraphs 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, and 21 are all denied because herein
defendant never sold her shares to plaintiff Vicente B. del Rosario. The only
portions of the inheritance she ever sold were the Asinan Properties in favor of
plaintiff Pantaleon U. del Rosario and Negros Properties in favor of the late
Vicente S. Del Rosario;" 41
That is sufficient to contest the validity of the deed of sale for the purpose of
excluding her shares from the coverage of the partition case. But her failure to
set up the corresponding claim for damages in the partition case precludes her
from filing a separate case or pursuing it, as she did with her institution of the
action for declaration of nullity. As a compulsory counterclaim, the same is now
barred. 42
Additionally, petitioner's action for damages pertains to the alleged moral
damages she suffered because of "defendant's refusal to admit the nullity of the
deed of absolute sale, and because of his continued and unjust claim over
plaintiff's properties despite his knowledge of its baselessness, plaintiff suffered
wounded feelings, sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and the like." 43 These are
allegations which are proper subjects of a compulsory counterclaim, which
Page 46 of 49 PROPERTY
should have been raised in the partition case, which unfortunately, she did
not. AScHCD
Now, the second issue raised by the petitioner.
What sets this case apart from the usual is the fact that the partition court itself
initially suspended the proceedings therein after making a pronouncement that
petitioner's cause of action in the second case being different, it ordained that
the second case should not be "incorporated" in the partition case. 44 This is the
thrust of the second issue.
Petitioner claims that the suspension order of the partition court would be
affected by or run counter to the dismissal of the partition case itself. She makes
issue of the fact that respondent did not make any move to set aside the
pertinent order by any mode of relief. She further argues that the order, along
with the partition court's denial of respondent's motion for reconsideration, is
now final and cannot be affected or disturbed by the dismissal of the instant
case.
We are not convinced.
To begin with, the partition court was not in a position to determine the issue of
whether or not petitioner's action for declaration of nullity involves a cause of
action separate or distinct from the cause of action in the partition case pending
before it. The issue was appropriately within the competency of the other RTC
branch before which the action for nullity claim was pending. Out of deference
and respect to its co-equal branch, the partition court could have merely
suspended the proceedings, as it did, in view of the pending action for
declaration of nullity.
Nonetheless, the suspension order issued by Judge Victorino U. Montecillo
presiding over the partition court, as well as his order denying the motion for
reconsideration, 45 are provisional in nature. Both orders have no bearing on
the final outcome of the issues of ownership and nullity of the deed of sale and,
eventually, the decision in the partition case. The partition court could resume
hearing the case, as in fact it did when it called for a preliminary conference on
29 July 2000. 46 Actually, the partition court started to partition the uncontested
portions of the estate, even virtually disregarding the suspension order it issued
earlier. That respondent did not resort to other remedies to set aside the said
orders is of no moment, as the resumption of proceedings and the issuance of
said orders by the new Judge presiding over the partition court have rendered
the 19 January 2000 Order of Judge Montecillo functus oficio. As such, we see no
reason why the dismissal of the nullity case should adversely affect the
proceedings in the partition case.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 30 April 2002 is DENIED.
The 15 August 2000 and the 19 February 2002 Orders of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu, Branch 6 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-24698 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 132518. March 28, 2000.]
GAVINA MAGLUCOT-AW, CATALINA ORCULLO, RICHARD ESTANO, NIDA
MAGLUCOT, MELANIA MAGLUCOT-CATUBIG, EMILIANO CATUBIG, LADISLAO
SALMA, petitioners, vs. LEOPOLDO MAGLUCOT, SEVERO MAGLUCOT,
WILFREDA MAGLUCOT-ALEJO and CONSTANCIO ALEJO, respondents.
Leo B. Diocos for petitioners.
Nito L. Ruperto for private respondents.
SYNOPSIS
In 1952, upon petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639, the then CFI of Negros Oriental
issued an order subdividing said lot into six (6) portions, Lot 1639-A to Lot 1639-
F. Lot 1639-D was issued to Roberto Maglucot. Guillermo, Leopoldo and Severo,
all surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of Lot 1639-D and built houses on their
corresponding leased lots. In 1992, however, said lessees stopped paying rentals
claiming ownership over the subject lot alleging that there was no valid partition
that took place in the absence of a confirmed subdivision plan. The lower court
ruled that there was already a subdivision of Lot 1639. The Court of Appeals,
however, ruled otherwise, hence, this petition for review.
The parties did not object to the Order of Partition and manifested by their
conduct that they have assented thereto. Hence, they cannot thereafter
question the decree. When respondents here have occupied their respective lots
in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan, they cannot, after acquiescing to
the Order for more than 40 years, be allowed to question the binding effect
thereof. The payment of rentals by respondents revealed that they are mere
lessees. As such, the possession of respondents over Lot 1639-D is that of a
holder and not in the concept of an owner.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J p:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision, dated 11 November
1997, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48816 which reversed and set
aside the Decision, dated 13 December 1994, of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
30 of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental in an action for recovery of possession
and damages. cdphil
The core issue in this case is whether a partition of Lot No. 1639 had been
effected in 1952. Petitioners contend that there was already a partition of said
lot; hence, they are entitled to exclusive possession and ownership of Lot No.
1639-D, which originally formed part of Lot No. 1639 until its partition. Private
respondents, upon the other hand claim that there was no partition; hence, they
are co-owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Notably, this case presents a unique situation
where there is an order for partition but there is no showing that the
sketch/subdivision plan was submitted to the then Court of First Instance for its
approval or that a decree or order was registered in the Register of Deeds.
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for recovery of possession and
damages alleging, inter alia, that they are the owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Said lot
was originally part of Lot No. 1639 which was covered by Original Certificate
Title No. 6775 issued in the names of Hermogenes Olis, Bartolome Maglucot,
Pascual Olis, Roberto Maglucot, Anselmo Lara and Tomas Maglucot on 16
August 1927. 1 On 19 April 1952, Tomas Maglucot, one of the registered owners
and respondents' predecessor-in-interest, filed a petition to subdivide Lot No.
1639. 2 Consequently, on 13 May 1952, then CFI of Negros Oriental issued an
order 3 directing the parties to subdivide said lot into six portions as follows:
a) Hermogenes Olis lot 1639-A
b) Pascual Olis lot 1639-B
c) Bartolome Maglucot lot 1639-C
d) Roberto(Alberto) lot 1639-D
Maglucot
e) Anselmo Lara lot 1639-E
f) Tomas Maglucot lot 1639-F. 4
Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of Lot No. 1639-D
(subject lot). Subsequently, Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed Maglucot,
rented portions of subject lot in 1964 and 1969, respectively, and each paying
rentals therefor. Said respondents built houses on their corresponding leased
lots. They paid the rental amount P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma,
who represented the heirs of Roberto Maglucot, petitioners' predecessor-in-
interest. In December 1992, however, said respondents stopped paying rentals
claiming ownership over the subject lot. Petitioners thus filed the complaint a
quo.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The RTC
found the existence of tax declarations in the names of Hermogenes Olis and
Pascual Olis (purported owners of Lot Nos. 1639-A and 1639-B, respectively) 5 as
indubitable proof that there was a subdivision of Lot No. 1639. It likewise found
that Tomas Maglucot, respondents' predecessor-in-interest, took active part in
the partition as it was he, in fact, who commenced the action for partition. 6 The
court a quo cited Article 1431 of the Civil Code which states that "[t]hrough
estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disapproved as against the person relying
thereon." Applying said provisions of law, it held that while there was no court
order showing that Lot No. 1639 was partitioned, its absence could not be used
by Tomas Maglucot, or respondents as his successors-in-interest, to deny the
existence of an approved partition against the other co-owners who claim that
there was one. 7Said court, likewise, ruled that the tax declarations 8 over the
houses of respondents, expressly stating that the same are constructed on the
lots of Roberto Maglucot, constitute a conclusive admission by them of the
ownership of the subject lot by the latter. 9
The dispositive portion of the lower court's decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the plaintiffs against the defendants ordering the latter:
1. To demolish their houses inside lot 1639-D, vacate the premises thereof and
deliver the possession of the same to Plaintiffs;
2. To jointly and solidarily pay plaintiffs the sum of P15,000.00 for attorney's
fees;
3. To each pay plaintiffs the sum of P100.00 every year from 1993 for actual
damages representing the amount of unpaid rentals up to the time they actually
vacate the premises in question;
4. To pay the costs. 10
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled
that the sketch plan and tax declarations relied upon by petitioners are not
conclusive evidence of partition. 11 The CA likewise found that the prescribed
procedure under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court was not followed. It thus declared
that there was no partition of Lot No. 1639.
Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the CA
committed the following reversible errors:
I
IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION PLAINTIFFS HAVING
POSSESSED LOT 1639-D SINCE 1946;
II
IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ESTOPPEL, THE FACT OF PAYMENT OF RENTALS AND
OFFER TO BUY BY THE DEFENDANTS IS ADMISSION THAT THE AREA IN LOT 1639-
D. HAD LONG BEEN ADJUDICATED TO PLAINTIFFS; LibLex
III
IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS NO PRIOR PARTITION, CONTRARY TO THE
FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, AND AGAINST THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, OF
WHICH IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED WOULD CHANGE THE OUTCOME OF THE
CASE;
IV
IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS NO LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE APPLICABLE UNDER
THE PREMISES; THIS WOULD ONLY SHOW THAT THE RECORD OF THE CASE WAS
NOT PROPERLY SCRUTINIZED, AND THE LAW WAS NOT PROPERLY STUDIED;
Page 47 of 49 PROPERTY
ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE AT BENCH THAT THE ORAL AND MUTUAL PARTITION
HAPPENED DURING THE REGIME OF THE OLD RULES OF PROCEDURE; 12
Petitioners maintain that Lot No. 1639 was mutually partitioned and physically
subdivided among the co-owners and that majority of them participated in the
actual execution of the subdivision. Further the co-owners accepted their
designated shares in 1946 as averred by Tomas Maglucot in his petition for
partition. 13 Petitioners opine that in 1952, Tomas Maglucot himself initiated a
court proceeding for a formal subdivision of Lot No. 1639. In said petition, he
averred that only Hermogenes Olis and the heirs of Pascual Olis were not
agreeable to the partition. 14 Petitioners further contend that respondents
admitted in their tax declarations covering their respective houses that they are
"constructed on the land of Roberto Maglucot." 16
For their part, respondents posit three points in support of their position. First,
they emphasize that petitioners failed to show that the interested parties were
apprised or notified of the tentative subdivision contained in the sketch and that
the CFI subsequently confirmed the same. 17 Second, they point to the fact that
petitioners were unable to show any court approval of any partition. 18 Third,
they maintain that Lot No. 1639 remain undivided since to date, OCT No. 6275 is
still an existing and perfectly valid title, containing no annotation of any
encumbrance or partition whatsoever. 19
After a careful consideration of the pleadings filed by the parties and the
evidence on record, we find that the petition is meritorious. As stated earlier,
the core issue in this case is whether there was a valid partition in 1952.
Preliminarily, this Court recognizes that "the jurisdiction of this Court in cases
brought before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the latter are conclusive
except in the following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4)
when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) When the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts
set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on
record." 20 This case falls under exceptions (7), (8) and (10) in that the findings
of facts of the CA are in conflict with that or the RTC, are mere conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which then are based and are premised
on absence of evidence but are contradicted by the evidence on record. For
these reasons, we shall consider the evidence on record to determine whether
indeed there was partition.
In this jurisdiction, an action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, an
order for partition which determines whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and
whether partition is proper; and, second, a decision confirming the sketch or
subdivision submitted by the parties or the commissioners appointed by the
court, as the case may be. 21 The first phase of a partition and/or accounting
suit is taken up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact
exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary
agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end with
a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-
ownership does not exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the
other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in truth exist,
partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits
received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the
latter case, "the parties may, if they are able to agree, make partition among
themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and the court shall confirm
the partition so agreed upon. In either case — i.e., either the action is dismissed
or partition and/or accounting is decreed — the order is a final one, and may be
appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. 22 The second phase commences
when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree upon the partition"
directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the
court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second
stage may well also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself and its
approval by the court after the parties have been accorded opportunity to be
heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto
entitled of their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question."
Such an order is, to be sure, final and appealable. 23
The present rule on the question of finality and appealability of a decision or
order decreeing partition is that it is final and appealable. 23 The order of
partition is a final determination of the co-ownership over Lot No. 1639 by the
parties and the propriety of the partition thereof. Hence, if the present rule
were applied, the order not having been appealed or questioned by any of the
parties to the case, it has become final and executory and cannot now be
disturbed.
The true test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory
or final is: Does it leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to
the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final. The
key test to what is interlocutory is when there is something more to be done on
the merits of the case. 24 An order for partition is final and not interlocutory
and, hence, appealable because it decides the rights of the parties upon the
issue submitted. 25
However, this Court notes that the order of partition was issued when the ruling
in Fuentebella vs. Carrascoso, 26 which held that the order of partition is
interlocutory, was controlling. In addition, the reports of the commissioners not
having been confirmed by the trial court are not binding. 27 In this case, both
the order of partition and the unconfirmed sketch plan are, thus, interlocutory.
Nevertheless, where parties do not object to the interlocutory decree, but show
by their conduct that they have assented thereto, they cannot thereafter
question the decree, 28 especially, where, by reason of their conduct,
considerable expense has been incurred in the execution of the
commission. 29 Respondents in this case have occupied their respective lots in
accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. They cannot after acquiescing to
the order for more than forty (40) years be allowed to question the binding
effect thereof.
This case is to be distinguished from the order in the action for partition
in Arcenas vs. Cinco. 30 In that case, the order was clearly interlocutory since it
required the parties "to submit the corresponding deed of partition to the Court
for its approval." Here, the order appointed two commissioners and directed
them merely to approve the sketch plan already existing and tentatively
followed by the parties.
Under the present rule, the proceedings of the commissioners without being
confirmed by the court are not binding upon the parties. 31 However, this rule
does not apply in case where the parties themselves actualized the supposedly
unconfirmed sketch/subdivision plan. The purpose of court approval is to give
effect to the sketch/subdivision plan. In this case, the parties themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest implemented the sketch plan made
pursuant to a court order for partition by actually occupying specific portions of
Lot No. 1639 in 1952 and continue to do so until the present until this case was
filed, clearly, the purpose of the court approval has been met. This statement is
not to be taken to mean that confirmation of the commissioners may be
dispensed with but only that the parties herein are estopped from raising this
question by their own acts of ratification of the supposedly non-binding
sketch/subdivision plan. cdasia
The records of the case show that sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral
agreement to tentatively partition Lot No. 1639. 32 By virtue of this agreement,
the original co-owners occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639. 33 It was only
in 1952 when the petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639 was filed because two of
the co-owners, namely Hermogenes Olis and heirs of Pascual Olis, refused to
have said lot subdivided and have separate certificates of title. Significantly,
after the 1952 proceedings, the parties in this case by themselves and/or
through their predecessors-in-interest occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639
in accordance with the sketch plan. Such possession remained so until this case
arose, or about forty (40) years later.
From its order in 1952, it can be gleaned that the CFI took notice of the tentative
subdivision plan by oral partition of the parties therein. Further, it appears that
said court was aware that the parties therein actually took possession of the
portions in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. With this factual
backdrop, said court ordered the partition and appointed two (2) commissioners
to approve the tentative sketch/subdivision plan. It would not be unreasonable
to presume that the parties therein, having occupied specific portions of Lot No.
1639 in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan, were aware that it was
that same sketch/subdivision plan which would be considered by the
commissioners for approval. There is no showing that respondents by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest raised any objections. On
the contrary, the records show that the parties continued their possession of the
specific portions of Lot No. 1639 pursuant to the sketch/subdivision plan.
It has been previously held that a co-owner, who, though not a party to a
partition accepts the partition allotted to him, and holds and conveys the same
in severalty, will not be subsequently permitted to avoid partition. 34 It follows
that a party to a partition is also barred from avoiding partition when he has
received and held a portion of the subdivided land especially in this case where
respondents have enjoyed ownership rights over their share for a long time.
Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who
took possession of the portion allotted to them, are estopped to question title to
portion allotted to another party. 35 A person cannot claim both under and
against the same instrument. 36 In other words, they accepted the lands
awarded them by its provisions, and they cannot accept the decree in part, and
repudiate it in part. They must accept all or none. 37 Parties who had received
the property assigned to them are precluded from subsequently attacking its
validity of any part of it. 38 Here, respondents, by themselves and/or through
their predecessors-in-interest, already occupied of the lots in accordance with
the sketch plan. This occupation continued until this action was filed. They
cannot now be heard to question the possession and ownership of the other co-
owners who took exclusive possession of Lot 1639-D also in accordance with the
sketch plan.
In technical estoppel, the party to be estopped must knowingly have acted so as
to mislead his adversary, and the adversary must have placed reliance on the
action and acted as he would otherwise not have done. Some authorities,
however, hold that what is tantamount to estoppel may arise without this
reliance on the part of the adversary, and this is called, ratification or election by
acceptance of benefits, which arises when a party, knowing that he is not bound
by a defective proceeding, and is free to repudiate it if he will, upon knowledge,
and while under no disability, chooses to adopt such defective proceeding as his
own. 39 Ratification means that one under no disability, voluntarily adopts and
gives sanction to some unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without
his sanction would not be binding on him. It is this voluntary choice, knowingly
Page 48 of 49 PROPERTY
made, which amounts to a ratification of what was theretofore unauthorized,
and becomes the authorized act of the party so making the ratification. 40
The records show that respondents were paying rent for the use of a portion of
Lot No. 1639-D. Had they been of the belief that they were co-owners of the
entire Lot No. 1639 they would not have paid rent. Respondents attempted to
counter this point by presenting an uncorroborated testimony of their sole
witness to the effect that the amount so paid to Roberto Maglucot and,
subsequently, to Ruperta Salma were for the payment of real property taxes. We
are not persuaded. It is quite improbable that the parties would be unaware of
the difference in their treatment of their transactions for so long a time.
Moreover, no evidence was ever presented to show that a tax declaration for
the entire Lot No. 1639 has ever been made. Replete in the records are tax
declarations for specific portions of Lot 1639. It is inconceivable that
respondents would not be aware of this. With due diligence on their part, they
could have easily verified this fact. This they did not do for a period spanning
more than four decades.
The payment of rentals by respondents reveal that they are mere lessees. As
such, the possession of respondents over Lot No. 1639-D is that of a holder and
not in the concept of an owner. One who possesses as a mere holder
acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership,
whether his belief be right or wrong. 41 Since the possession of respondents
were found to be that of lessors of petitioners, it goes without saying that the
latter were in possession of Lot No. 1639-D in the concept of an owner from
1952 up to the time the present action was commenced.
Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support the
presumption. 42 Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition
may be presumed. 43 It has been held that recitals in deeds, possession and
occupation of land, improvements made thereon for a long series of years, and
acquiescence for 60 years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was an actual
partition of land either by deed or by proceedings in the probate court, which
had been lost and were not recorded. 44 And where a tract of land held in
common has been subdivided into lots, and one of the lots has long been known
and called by the name of one of the tenants in common, and there is no
evidence of any subsequent claim of a tenancy in common, it may fairly be
inferred that there has been a partition and that such lot was set off to him
whose name it bears. 45
Respondents insist that the absence of any annotation in the certificate of title
showing any partition of Lot No. 1639 and that OCT No. 6725 has not been
canceled clearly indicate that no partition took place. The logic of this argument
is that unless partition is shown in the title of the subject property, there can be
no valid partition or that the annotation in the title is the sole evidence of
partition.
Again, we are not persuaded. The purpose of registration is to notify and protect
the interests of strangers to a given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof,
but the non-registration of the deed evidencing such transaction does not
relieve the parties thereto of their obligations thereunder. 46 As originally
conceived, registration is merely a species of notice. The act of registering a
document is never necessary in order to give it legal effect as between the
parties. 47 Requirements for the recording of the instruments are designed to
prevent frauds and to permit and require the public to act with the presumption
that recorded instruments exist and are genuine. 48
It must be noted that there was a prior oral partition in 1946. Although the oral
agreement was merely tentative, the facts subsequent thereto all point to the
confirmation of said oral partition. By virtue of that agreement, the parties took
possession of specific portions of the subject lot. The action for partition was
instituted because some of the co-owners refused to have separate titles issued
in lieu of the original title. In 1952, an order for partition was issued by the
cadastral court. There is no evidence that there has been any change in the
possession of the parties. The only significant fact subsequent to the issuance of
the order of partition in 1952 is that respondents rented portions of Lot No.
1639-D. It would be safe to conclude, therefore, that the oral partition as well as
the order of partition in 1952 were the bases for the finding of actual partition
among the parties. The legal consequences of the order of partition in 1952
having been discussed separately, we now deal with oral partition in 1946. Given
that the oral partition was initially tentative, the actual possession of specific
portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the oral partition and the
continuation of such possession for a very long period indicate the permanency
and ratification of such oral partition. The validity of an oral partition is already
well-settled. InEspina vs. Abaya, 49 we declared that an oral partition is valid.
In Hernandez vs. Andal, 50 reiterated in Tan vs. Lim, 51 this Court has ruled,
thus:
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of
equity have enforce oral partition when it has been completely or partly
performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and
enforceable at law, equity will proper cases where the parol partition has
actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the
exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each,
recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties
thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases involving an
oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of
ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity
will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with
the possession in severalty. cdphil
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partition may be
sustained on the ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a
tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol partition as to which
possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were
exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be
valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as
between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto
have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty,
exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the
existence of the partition.
A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or
have stated that a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of
the operation of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a
partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of
equity would have regard to enforce such partition agreed to by the parties.
Two more points have constrained this Court to rule against respondents. First,
respondents Wilfreda Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio Alejo offered to buy the
share of Roberto Maglucot. Second, the tax declarations contain statements that
the houses of respondents were built on the land owned by Roberto Maglucot.
On the first point, petitioners presented Aida Maglucot who testified that after
respondents were informed that petitioners were going to use Lot No. 1639-D
belonging to Roberto Maglucot, respondents Wilfreda Maglucot-Alejo and
Constancio Alejo went to the house of said witness and offered to buy the share
of Roberto Maglucot. 52 Aida Maglucot further testified that they refused the
offer because they also intend to use the lot for a residential purpose. 53 This
testimony of Aida Maglucot is unrebutted by respondents, and the CA did not
touch upon this finding of fact. Hence, the offer to buy has been established by
the unrebutted evidence of the petitioners. Why would they give such offer if
they claim to be at least a co-owner of the said lot? In effect, respondents
impliedly admit the title of the petitioners and that they are not co-owners,
much less the sole owners, of Lot No. 1639-D.
On the second point, the existence of Tax Declaration No. 04-557 in the names
of Constancio Alejo and Godofreda Maglucot, 54 Tax Declaration No. 04-87-13 in
the names of Leopoldo Maglucot and Regina Barot, 55 Tax Declaration No. 04-
593 in the names of Severo Maglucot and Samni Posida 56 showing that the
houses of the above-mentioned persons are constructed on the land of Roberto
Maglucot 57 constitute incontrovertible evidence of admission by the same
persons of the ownership of the land by Roberto Maglucot. Tax Declarations are
public documents. Unless their veracity is directly attacked, the contents therein
are presumed to be true and accurate. 58 The lone testimony of Severo
Maglucot that Roberto Maglucot was only made to appear as owner of the land
in their respective declarations because he was the administrator of Lot No.
1639 is uncorroborated and not supported by any other evidence.
No injustice is dealt upon respondents because they are entitled to occupy a
portion of Lot No. 1639, particularly Lot No. 1639-A, in their capacity as heirs of
Tomas Maglucot, one of the original co-owners of Lot No. 1639 in accordance
with the sketch plan of said lot showing the partition into six portions. 59
Finally, this Court takes notice of the language utilized by counsel for petitioners
in their petition for review on certiorari. Thrice in the petition, counsel for
petitioners made reference to the researcher of the CA. First, he alluded to the
lack of scrutiny of the records and lack of study of the law "by the
researcher." 60 Second, he cited the researcher of the CA as having "sweepingly
stated without reference to the record" 61 that "[w]e have scanned the records
on hand and found no evidence of any partition." Finally, counsel for petitioners
assailed the CA decision, stating that "this will only show that there was no
proper study of the case by the researcher." 62
Any court when it renders a decision does so as an arm of the justice system and
as an institution apart from the persons that comprise it. Decisions are rendered
by the courts and not the persons or personnel that may participate therein by
virtue of their office. It is highly improper and unethical for counsel for
petitioners to berate the researcher in his appeal. Counsel for petitioner should
be reminded of the elementary rules of the legal profession regarding respect
for the courts by the use of proper language in its pleadings and admonished for
his improper references to the researcher of the CA in his petition. A lawyer shall
abstain from scandalous, offensive, or menacing language or behavior before
the courts. 63
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET
ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED. dctai
SO ORDERED.
||| (Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot, G.R. No. 132518, [March 28, 2000], 385 PHIL
720-742)
Page 49 of 49 PROPERTY