G.R. No. 208566
Truth Commission
Belgica vs Executive Sec.
Nov. 19, 2013
These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.
FACTS:
In July 2013, the National Bureau of Investigation was spawned by sworn
affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet
Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from lawmakers and various
government agencies ghost projects. Using dummy NGO’s. . Thus, Criminal
complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5)
lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct
Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released the results of a three-year
audit investigation detailing the irregularities in the release of the PDAF from
2007 to 2009.
Whistle-blowers also alleged that at least P900 million from the Malampaya
Funds had gone into a dummy NGO.
Issue:
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the
principles of/constitutional provisionsamong others, non-delegability of
legislative power?
Held:
Yes. 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar
thereto are unconstitutional.
Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a
restriction to delegate rule-making authority to implementing agencies for the
limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement
(supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual
operation (contingent rule-making).199 The conceptual treatment and
limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the case of People v.
Maceren200 as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation
of the principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the
nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate
legislation" calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of
"the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the
law."
xxxx
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect
the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending
or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by
the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases
supplied)
b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as
it confers post-enactment identification authority to individual legislators,
violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are effectively
allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled
in Philconsa – is lodged in Congress.201 That the power to appropriate must
be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1), Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the
Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To
understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in Bengzon v.
Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of
appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the
public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF
Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which
they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific
project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As these two (2)
acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in
Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual
legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however,
allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability of legislative power,
the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification
feature as herein discussed, as unconstitutional.
Gr No. 192935
Biraogo vs Phil.
Dec 7, 2010
FACTS:
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was
signed by President Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the
Office of the President tasked to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous administration and submit
their findings and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate,
arbitrate, resolve, settle or render awards in disputes between parties. Its job
is to investigate, collect and asses evidences gathered and
make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power to cite
people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if
probable cause exist as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of
law.
Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 1 violates the principle of
separation of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to
appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions; Does the
creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to reorganize as
expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code?
Held:
No. The creation of the PTC does not fall within the ambit of the
power to reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative
Code
Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code contemplates “reorganization”
as limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the
internal organization of the Office of the President Proper by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit
to another; (2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to
any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3) transferring any agency
under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice
versa. Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of
offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions.
These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a
modification or alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office
is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said provision.
Gr. No. 80916
C.T. Torres vs Hibionada
Nov 9, 1990
FACTS:
As agent of Pleasantville Development Corp (Pleasantville), C.T. Torres
Enterprises (Torres) sold a subdivision lot to Diongon. Having completed the
payments on installment, Diongon demanded the delivery of the certificate of
title to the subject land. However, neither Pleasantville nor Torres complied.
This prompted Diongon to file a complaint for specific performance with the
RTC of Negros Occidental.
Torres filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction
to entertain the case, as it was the HLURB, which was the competent body to
hear and decide the case.RTC denied the motion to dismiss on the premise
that pursuant to BP 129, a complaint for specific performance with damages
is a justiciable issue under the New Civil Code and jurisdiction to hear such
issue is vested in the regular courts.
ISSUE
W/N the RTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case
HELD
NO. The RTC failed to consider the express provisions of PD 1344 and related
decrees and erred in supposing that only the regular courts can interpret and
apply the provisions of the Civil Code, to the exclusion of the quasi-judicial
bodies. The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims
resoluble under the Civil Code is out of step with the fast changing times.
There are hundreds of admin bodies now performing this function by virtue of
a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial function is
exercised by them as an incident of the principal power entrusted to them of
regulating certain activities falling under their expertise.
A statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an admin agency over
certain disputes and controversies falling within the agency's special expertise.
The very definition of an admin agency includes its being vested with quasi-
judicial powers. The ever increasing variety of powers and functions given to
admin agencies recognizes the need for the active intervention of the admin
agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge and speed in countless
controversies which cannot possibly be handled by the regular courts.
Gr. No. 90482
Republic of the Phil. Vs CA
Aug 5, 1991
FACTS:
On May 16, 1986 Republic Planters Bank (RPB) filed a complaint in the RTC
for sum of money/delivery of personal property with restraining order and/or
preliminary injunction against Philippine Sugar Commission (PHILSUCOM)
and the National Sugar Trading Corporation (NASUTRA). Before
PHILSUCOM and NASUTRA could answer, a compromise agreement was
submitted and was approved by the lower court. Three orders were issued:
First order – dismissed separate petitions for relief from judgment filed by
different sugarassociations (National Federation of Sugar Cane Planters,
Sugar Central Inc, IndependentSugar Planters)
Second order – granted a second motion to resolve a pending motion for
issuance of a writof execution and allowed the issuance of an alias writ
of execution
Third order – required officers of the RPB to appear before the court to explain
why theyshould not be cited in contempt for defying the alias writ of execution
CA denied the petition for the nullification of the orders because RPB accepted
the appointment as Trustee whose obligation is to pay received benefits by
way of trustee’s fees and cannot question the right of private respondents to
attorney’s fees. SRA may not lawfully bring action on behalf of the Republic
because EO 18 provides that PHILSUCOM remains a judicial entity for 3 years
for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits against it. Petition should
have been filed through the OSG and not through the OGCC; SRA cannot
lawfully represent the Government because it may only perform powers and
functions as may be authorized by the laws which created them. SC required
respondents to comment and issued TRO directing respondent Judge to
desist and refrain from further proceeding in the civil case.
Issue: Whether or not Sugar Regulatory Administration may lawfully bring an
action on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines and that the Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel does have the authority to represent said
petitioner in this case.
Held:
No. Petitioners have no legal personality to initiate petition because SRA is
not a party in the case before the trial court. EO NO. 18 abolished
PHILSUCOM and created SRA but PHILSUCOM was allowed to continue as
a juridical entity for 3 years for the purpose of prosecuting and defending suits
by or against it, under the supervision of the SRA.
Sec 3, EO 18 does not specifically include the power to represent the Republic
nor the power to sue and be sued.
Sec 4, EO 18 – specific functions does not include the power to represent the
Republic
The Charter does not grant the SRA the power to represent the Republic in
Suits filed by or against it. SC says SRA is an administrative agency. As an
Administrative agency, only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law
and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise; government body
charged with administering and implementing particular legislation.
Gr. No. 114714
The Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies vs POEA
April 21, 1995
FACTS:
Petitioner Conference of Maritime Manning Agencies, Inc., an incorporated
association of licensed Filipino manning agencies, and its co-petitioners, all
licensed manning agencies which hire and recruit Filipino seamen for and in
behalf of their respective foreign ship-owner-principals, urge us to annul
Resolution No. 01, series of 1994, of the Governing Board" of the POEA and
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 05.
Petitioners contend that POEA does not have the power and authority to fix
and promulgate rates affecting death and workmen's compensation of Filipino
seamen working in ocean-going vessels; only Congress can.
Governing Board Resolution No. 1: the POEA Governing Board resolves to
amend and increase the compensation and other benefits as specified under
Part II, Section. C, paragraph 1 and Section L, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the
POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers
Issue: whether or not the POEA can promulgate rules by virtue of delegation
of legislative power.
Held:
Yes. The POEA can promulgate rules by virtue of delegation of legislative
power.
The constitutional challenge of the rule-making power of the POEA-based on
impermissible delegation of legislative power had been, as correctly contented
by the public respondents, brushed aside by this Court in Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc. vs. POEA.
The governing Board of the Administration (POEA) shall promulgate the
necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of the adjudicatory
functions of the Administration (POEA).
To many of the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence to provide the required direct and
efficacious not to say, specific solutions. These solutions may, however, be
expected from its delegates, who are supposed to be experts in the particular
fields assigned to them.
While the making of laws is a non-delegable power that pertains exclusively to
Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate the authority
to promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and
effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature finds it impracticable,
if not impossible, to anticipate situations that may be met in carrying the law
into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction to
but in conformity with the standards prescribed by the law. (Principle of
Subordinate Legislation)
That the challenged resolution and memorandum circular, which merely
further amended the previous Memorandum Circular No. 02, strictly conform
to the sufficient and valid standard of "fair and equitable employment
practices" prescribed in E.O. No. 797 can no longer be disputed.
GR No. 110120
Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA
March 16, 1994
FACTS:
The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of
Caloocan was maintaining an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first
securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) from the
Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree No. 1586, and
clearance from LLDA as required under Republic Act No. 4850 and issued a
CEASE and DESIST ORDER (CDO) for the City Government of Caloocan to
stop the use of the dumpsite.
Issue:
Whether or not the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and
desist" order?
Held:
Yes. The LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist"
order. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized
administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850
and its amendatory laws to carry out and make effective the declared national
policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of
the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and
the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due
regard and adequate provisions for environmental management and control,
preservation of the quality of human life and ecological systems, and the
prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and pollution.
Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its
special charter, obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of
the Laguna Lake region from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating
from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. Pursuant to EO 927
Section 4 while it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has
only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law , it is likewise a settled
rule that an administrative agency has also such powers as are necessarily
implied in the exercise of its ex press powers. In the exercise, therefore, of
its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body
with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the
LLDA to issue a "cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. NOTE:
HOWEVER, writs of mandamus and injunction are beyond the power of the
LLDA to issue.
Gr. No. 151908
Smart vs National Telecommunications Commission
August 12, 2003