Characteristic of Criminal Law

Prospective (Art. 366 of RPC)

- Crimes are PUNISHED under the laws enforced at the time (so your basis of punishment is according to CURRENTLY
APPLICABLE laws)
- EXCEPT: 1) When current laws are like “ok, this law is not applicable to currently pending actions or existing causes of
action” (saving clause), 2) offender is a habitual criminal (habitual offenders can be sentenced with heavier punishments
rather than only be tried or taken into court for the current crime, law is a deterrent)
- EFFECTS of REPEAL: 1) New punishment is lighter- new punishment is enforced, 2) New punishment is heavier- old
punishment (law at time of crime committed) is enforced, 3) New law makes the crime totally fine and no longer punishable,
crime is destroyed (NOTE: Punishment –Penal Laws- is always in favor of offender and against the government.
Reason: to even out the odds between the accused and the power of the State)
- WHEN: 1) Repeal is absolute, no offense anymore, 2) New and old law penalizes the person, old law can be used to “try” the
offender (basis of accusation, not the actual punishment <refer to EFFECTS for actual punishment), 3) if old law does not
criminalize person at the time, new law cannot criminalize said person either (go back to CURRENT APPLICABILITY)

People vs. Crisanto Tamayo

61 Phil 225
Appeal for Dismissal of Action Against Appellant

Facts:
 Defendant-appellant was convicted of a violation of a municipal ordinance
 Conviction resulted and a fine was imposed
 D-A appealed conviction and imposition of fine as during the pendency of this appeal, municipal ordinance in question was
repealed
 Appellant has moved for the dismissal of action against him

Issues:
 Is he still guilty of an ordinance violation?

Principles:
 Two previous cases (US vs. Cuna, and Wing vs. US) say that repeal would not destroy criminal liability (even without a saving
clause)
 Philippine rule is more in conformity with Spain where when an offense ceases to be criminal, prosecution cannot be had (1
Pachecho Commentaries, 296)
 It would be illogical to punish the accused for a crime which no longer exists

Rulings:
 Conduct is no longer deemed a crime
 Very illogical of the court to punish D-A for something which is no longer a crime
 Proceedings against appellant, dismissed, BYE
 Basically, D-A gets off his criminal charges and his fine

General
- law is binding to all those who reside in the Philippines (define “reside”)
- people exempted: 1) sovereigns and other leaders of state, 2) ambassadors, ministers, plenipotentiary, charges d’affaires
(temporarily takes place of ambassadors), (does not include consuls)
- JURISDICTION is the focus

US vs. Sweet
1 Phil. 18
Appeal to the Jurisdiction of the Case
Facts:
 At the time of alleged commission, the D-A was an employee of the US Military force in the Philippine Islands
 Victim/person upon whom act was committed was a PoW under the custody of the US Military authorities

Issues:
  Does the court have jurisdiction over this case:
a. Is the offense committed under the jurisdiction of the Penal Code?
b. If it does indeed fall under the Penal Code, because of the military character of the accused, does this exempt him from the
ordinary jurisdiction of the civil tribunals?

Principles:
 There is no cited law or anything, which would limit the general jurisdiction granted to the Court of First Instance granted by
Art. 136 of United States Philippines Commission
 Therefore, case is open to the application of general jurisdiction

Rulings:
 The court has the jurisdiction over this case
a. True, that it is punishable under Spanish military legislation but this does not automatically mean it is not punishable under
the Penal Code. The two are not mutually exclusive. There is nothing in the language of the article in the Penal Code to
indicate that it does not apply to all persons within the TERRITORIAL jurisdiction of the law. Additionally, how can the
Spanish military legislation (which also, is no longer in force here and which never had any application to the US Army)
have any application to the US Military army
b. Case is open for general application of court jurisdiction
 Appellant may claim that he was merely following his superior’s orders (but this is another topic altogether) but this does not
affect jurisdiction

Territorial
- Penal Code shall be enforced within the Philippine archipelago, its atmosphere, interior waters, maritime zone, and also outside
its jurisdiction like:
a) onboard a Philippine ship or airship
b) forge or counterfeit Philippine islands currency or coin, or obligations and securities issued by the Philippine government
c) introducing said currency/coin to the Philippines
d) while being public officials, shall commit an offense in the exercise of their function
e) commit crimes against national security and law of nations (treason, espionage, etc)

Definition of Felony

People vs Gonzales (1990)

GR NO. 80762
Appeal to the decision of the Court of Appeals
Facts:
 Antecedent Facts:
a. February 21, 1981, Brgy. Captain Paja was awakend by Augusto and Fausta Gonzales with the information that the latter
was surrendering herself for the murder of Peñacerrada.
b. Together with Paja’s nephew, the group went to the municipal bulding to inform the police
c. That same night, they went back to the scene of the crime (the Gonzalez couple’s residence) where they saw the victim’s
dead body
d. Autopsy found 16 stab wounds, 5 of which were fatal, having penetrated the internal organs.
e. February 23, 1981, Augusto surrendred to the Ajuy police for having “been involved” in the murder
f. Before the trial (8 months after the time of murder), Lloyd Huntoria, presented himself as witness to the wife of the victim
and thus, a reinvestigation was launched; naming additional accused as Augusto Gonzales, Custodio Gonzales
Sr., Custodio Gonzales, Jr., Nerio Gonzales and Rogelio Lanida (all pleaded not guilty)
g. Huntoria alleged that he saw all of the accused surrounding the victim on the night of the crime, taking turns stabbing him
 On October 31, 1984, RTC Iloilo found all the accused, except Lanida who remains at larged, guilty beyond reasonable doubt
 Custodio Gonzales Sr. contended that the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of Huntoria’s testimony and in not
appreciating his defense of alibi (alibi being that he was asleep in his house, a kilometre away, at the time of the crime)
 The Court of Appeals rendered a decision on Gonzales Sr.’s appeal: sentenced to reculsion perpetua and to indemnify the
victims’ heirs; so the Court of Appeals (upon 1st appeal) found him still guilty but changed his sentence and punishment

Issue:
 Does the testimony of Huntoria have merit to convict the appellant?

Ruling:
 No. The Supreme Court found Huntoria to be an unreliable witness. Huntoria admitted during cross-examination that he cannot
 determine the group of people stabbing the deceased. He failed to point definitely that appellant also did the crime. As stated in
Arts. 3 and 4 of the Revised Penal Code, for one to be criminally liable, an act should be committed. The SC found no
sufficient proof that appellant has acted.
 His 8-month long wait before reporting to the police what he has witness raised questions on his veracity (accuracy)
 The 5 fatal stab wounds could have been inflicted by any of the 6 of the accused. At one stab wound each, it is possible that the
one accused who did not inflict a fatal wound, could very well be Custodio Sr. It is also possible that all 5 wounds were
inflicted by Fausta, as the coroner admitted that it is possible that there was only one murder weapon.
 Lastly, the SC found Huntoria was an interested witness as he was also the tenant of the deceased. His testimony was sought
to ingratiate himself with the deceased’s family. The SC found appellant’s guilt not proven by reasonable doubt thus
acquitting him.

Elements of a felony (delitos):

 there must be an act or omission
 act or omission is punishable under the RPC
 act or omission is committed by means of deceit or fault

Is an unlawful act, a crime?

All crimes are unlawful, but not all unlawful acts are crimes. A crime would constitute criminal liability whereas not all
unlawful/illegal acts are criminal in nature; unlawful or illegal acts may give rise to civil liability (which would be a settlement
between two private parties). Civil liability would mean payment of damages to the offended party while criminal liability would
result in a sentence/punishment to be rendered to the government (as in a fine or imprisonment).
Civil: RESTITUTION to offended party (to make the victim whole)
Criminal: PUNISHMENT for your crimes

Crimes may either be mala in se or mala prohibita

Mala in se
- wrong in and of itself, causes harm to others
- there must be CRIMINAL INTENT

Mala prohibita
- a regulatory infraction as opposed to a dangerous crime
- intention to commit a crime is not needed
- intention to commit an act may still cause the person to be liable for mala prohibitum
- NOTE: NO CRIMINAL INTENT (but intent is very hard to determine), it is sufficient if the prohibited act was
INTENTIONALLY DONE

“The rule on the subject appears to be, that in acts mala in se, the intent governs but in those mala prohibita, the only
inquiry is, has the law been violated?”

Currently:
 more weight is put on the accused’s history, the intention, etc.
 under Philippine Criminal Law, all acts punishable under RPC are mala in se, as such are called FELONIES, criminal intent
(malus animus) is needed otherwise, there is no crime
 acts punished through Special Penal Laws (standing alone, not amendments to the RPC) are mala prohibitum, as such are called
OFFENSES, criminal intent is not needed because violation of the law is enough

US vs. Go Chico
14 Phil. 128
Appeal to the Decision of the Court

- display of artefacts (flag, coins) depicting the likeness of the flags and artefacts used in the revolt against the United States (face
of Aguinaldo etc)
- intent doesn’t matter, nor does the fact that these artefacts were mere replicas, the effect on those who may see it (it may incite
revolution again) is still the same
- malum prohibitum, in violation of a law, not inherently evil

Facts:
  On or about August 4, 1908, appellant Go Chico displayed on the window of his store, No 89 Calle Rosario, medallions in form
of small buttons, upon which were faces of Emilio Aguinaldo, and the flag or banner or device used during the late insurrection
of the Philippine Islands to designate the identify those in armed insurrection against the United States. Prior to the day
aforementioned, appellant had purchased the stock of goods in said store, of which the medallions formed part, at a public sale
made under authority of the sheriff of the city of Manila. On August 4, appellant was arranging his stocks for the purpose of
displaying them to the public, placing them in his showcase and in one of the windows of his store.
 The appellant states he was ignorant of the law against the display of the medallions and adds that he had no corrupt
intention. He was charged in violation of Sec. 1 of Art. 1696 of the Philippine Commission which provides:

Sec. 1 – Any person who shall expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view on his own premise,
or who shall expose, or cause to be exposed, to public view, either on his own premises or elsewhere, any
flag, banner, emblem, or device used during the late insurrection of the Philippine Islands to designate or
identify those in armed rebellion against the United States, or any flag, banner, emblem, or device used or
adopted at any time by the public enemies of the United States in the Philippine islands for the purposes of
public disorder or of rebellion or insurrection against the authority of the United States in the Philippine
Islands, or any flag, emblem, or device of the Katipunan Society, or which is commonly known as such, shall
be punished by a fine not less than 500 pesos nor more than 5,000 pesos, or by imprisonment for not less than
3 months nor more than 5 years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.

 Go Chico moved to acquit himself on the grounds that (1) criminal intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt upon the
part of the accused before being convicted and; (2) the prohibition of the law is directed against the use of the identical banners,
devices, or emblems actually used during the Philippine insurrection by those in armed rebellion against the United States.

Issue:
 Is intent necessary in conviction of crimes punishable by special laws?
 Are the artifacts displayed by appellant covered under the artifacts specified by the law?

Ruling:
 In the opinion of this court it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with the criminal intent. In many crimes,
made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. If it were not, the
statute as a deterrent influence would be substantially worthless. (Regardless of intent, the effect of the act itself would be the
same)

“As the law stands, knowledge or intention forms no element of the offense. The act alone, irrespective of motive,
constitutes the crime.”
“The wording of the law is such that the intent and the act are inseparable.”

 The words “used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion against
the United States” mean not only the identical flags actually used in the insurrection, but any flag which is of that type. The
description refers not to a particular flag, but to a type of flag. The literal interpretation of a statute may lead to an absurdity, or
evidently fail to give the real intent of the legislature.

People vs. Lacerna

344 Phil. 100
Appeal to the Decision of the Court
- carrying of drugs
- D-A appeals that he should not be charged with drug distribution (but he is guilty of drug possession)

Facts:
 The appellant and the co-accused, the latter having been acquitted, were caught by PNP officers carrying a bag full of
marijuana
 Appellant was found in his possession 18kg of marijuana, giving rise to a presumption that he is the owner of said drugs
 The two accused alleged that they were not privy to the contents of the bag which was given them by their Uncle
 The appellant appeals the court decision to charge him with the “giving away” of drugs (giving away as in appellant giving the
bag to his co-accused)
 Noriel and Marlon Lacerna were inside a taxi when the group of Police Officer Carlito Valenzuela of the Western Police
District signaled the taxi driver to park by the side of the road in lieu of a police checkpoint. P03 Valenzuela asked permission
to search the vehicle. The officers went about searching the luggages in the vehicle. They found 18 blocks wrapped in
newspaper with a distinct smell of marijuana emanating from it. When the package was opened, P03 Valenzuela saw dried
marijuana leaves. According to Noriel and Marlon, the bag was a “padala” of their uncle. Marlon admitted that he was the one
 who gave the 18 bundle blocks of marijuana to his cousin Noriel as the latter seated at rear of the taxi with it. He however
denied knowledge of the contents of the package.
 Marlon was charged before the RTC for “giving away” marijuana to another. Noriel on the other hand was acquitted for
insufficiency of evidence. The court noticed that Noriel manifested “probinsyano” traits and was, thus, unlikely to have dealt in
prohibited drugs.
 Marlon objected on the RTC’s decision, stating that the lower court erred in saying that the act of “giving away to another” is
not defined under R.A. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act. He also said that he was not aware of the contents of the plastic bag
given to him by his uncle. Marlon also raised that his right against warrantless arrest and seizure was violated.

Issues:
 Apellant’s objections:
1) Court is wrong that the act of “giving away to another” is not fully defined in RA 6425
2) Court is not acknowledging truth of his assertion that he had no knowledge of the contents of the bag
3) Court is at fault for convicting him despite prosecutions inability to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
 First Issue- Defense argues marijuana is inadmissible as evidence due to lack of warrant (search and seizure)
 Second Issue- Did the appellant “give away” the illegal drug? (give away = an act short of a sale with no consideration and
where ownership is transferred, like a donation?)
 Third Issue- May the appellant be convicted of illegal possession?

Rulings:
 Court summarized the three objections into the following questions
1) Was the appellants rights violated by a warrantless arrest and seizure? No.
2) Was the trial court correct in convicting appellant for “giving away to another” 18 blocks of marijuana? No.
3) May the appellant be held guilty for drug possession? Yes.
 First Issue- Solicitor General disagrees as a warrant cannot be secured in time to apprehend a moving vehicle. This contention
is inaccurate as there was no probable cause for inspection nor was there evidence to cause a search (eg distinct odor of
marijuana). HOWEVER, the search was perfectly valid as the accused CONSENTED to the search.
 Second Issue- the appellant is not guilty of “giving away to another” the drug bag as it did not constitute a gift nor a premium to
another.
 Third Issue- Appellant is liable for drug possession under Section 8 of Dangerous Drugs Act; the defense failed to give
sufficient reasons to the contrary

Principle:
 First Issue- no probable cause to warrant a search BUT consent made the search okay
 Second Issue- following the court’s logic that D-A really did give away to another the drug bag, then the same would be said
when co-accused surrendered the bag to the police officer, as well as when the officer surrendered same bag to his superior
 Third Issue- D-A’s excuse that the bag was his uncle’s and that he did not know its contents was insufficient and was not
supported by enough evidence (easily fabricated)

Construction of Penal Laws

Sources of Criminal Law
1. The Revised Penal Code
2. Special Penal Laws – Acts enacted of the Philippine Legislature punishing offenses or omissions.

Construction of Penal Laws

1. Criminal Statutes are liberally construed in favor of the offender (reason: to even out the odds between the offender and the
powers of the State). This means that no person shall be brought within their terms who is not clearly within them, nor should
any act be pronounced criminal which is not clearly made so by statute.
2. The original text in which a penal law is approved in case of a conflict with an official translation.
3. Interpretation by analogy has no place in criminal law

US vs. Abad Santos

36 Phil. 243 (1917)
Appeal to the Decision of the Court
Facts:
 Appellant is owner of a printing establishment and is, therefore, required by law to maintain log books of his daily transactions

Abad Santos, the appellant was charged of violating the provision in Internal Revenue Law which
states that it shall keep a day book in which one should enter in detail the amount of money received
in the conduct of the business(Circular No. 467— issued by collector of Internal Revenue). Violation
of any provisions of IRL or any lawful regulation of BIR is stated in Sec. 185 of RA 2339 (Sec 227 of
Admin Code)

 There was a failure to do so on January 5, 1917; no transactions were recorded on that day.
 A bookkeeper is employed by the appellant to handle the books

Issues:
 Appellant contested his fine of 10 pesos and accusation of a violation of the Internal Revenue Law, is he guilty of a violation?

Rulings:
 Accused is acquitted
 Failure to record was due to the bookkeeper’s fault, of which the appellant knew not about
 “We do not believe that a person shall be held criminally liable for the acts of another, they knew nothing about”
 Mere proof of bookkeeper omitting things on that date is not enough to convict the accused
 Courts will not hold a person criminally responsible for the acts of another unbeknownst to them

Go vs Dimagiba
GR No. 151876 (June 21, 2005)
Petition for the Review of Certiorari of the Orders of the RTC of Baguio

Facts:
 Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Petitioner Susan Go thirteen (13) checks which, when presented to the drawee
bank for encashment or payment on the due dates, were dishonored for the reason "account closed”.
 Dimagiba was prosecuted and subsequently convicted by the MTCC (Municipal Trial Court of Cities) for 13 counts of violation
of BP 22 (imprisonment, indemnification, and payment of fine)
 Dimagiba’s appeal was raffled to Branch 4 of the RTC.
 On May 23, 2000, RTC denied said appeal and sustained his conviction
 With no further appeal, RTC issued on February 1, 2001, a Certificate of Finality of Decision
 On Feb. 14, 2001, MTCC issued an order directing Dimagiba’s arrest, as well as a Writ of Execution to enforce his civil
liability
 On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCC Order. He prayed for the recall of the Order
of Arrest and the modification of the final Decision, arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also, should
have been imposed on him. MTCC denied this motion.
 On Otcober 9, 2001, he filed with the RTC of Baguio a Petition for a writ of habeas corpus
 The RTC held that this rule should be retroactively applied in favor of Dimagiba. It further noted that (1) he was a first-time...
offender and an employer of at least 200 workers who would be displaced as a result of his imprisonment; and (2) the civil
liability had already been satisfied through the levy of his properties.
 Petitioner Go filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC orders

Issues:
 Was the decision, amending a final and conclusive decision of Branch 4 MTC, to release Dimagiba under the jurisdiction of the
RTC judge Bracnh 5?
 Was Dimagiba entitled to the beneficent policy?
 Was the fine of 100,000 the correct minimum fine?
 Was due process followed in the hearing and deciding of Dimagiba’s petition for Habeas Corpus
 Summary: was the Petition for habeas corpus validly granted? Was it proper?

Rulings:
  No. RTC-Branch 5 did not have the jurisdiction to modify the lawful judgment because the decision already attained finality
with RTC-Branch 4 (which merely sustained the decision of MTCC Baguio City which had full knowledge of all relevant
circumstances and who imposed penalties within the confines of law)
 No. The Circular is not an amendment to the law but a mere reference as to which penalty should be imposed on the convicted.
 Original indemnification fine and imprisonment sentence is enforceable
 Petition (of Go) was granted
 Petition for habeas corpus of Dimagiba was denied.

People vs. Abello

GR No. 151952
Appeal to the Decision of the Court

Facts:
 Appellant Heracleo Abello y Fortada (Abello) was convicted of one count of rape by sexual assault under RA 8353 and two
counts of sexual abuse under the Child Abuse Law committed against his step daughter, AAA. The following information for
rape was filed against the appellant: (note there are three Informations filed, one for rape and two for sexual assault).

1. “That on or about the 8th day of July 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being a step-father (sic) of victim AAA,4 with lewd design and by
means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously putting his penis inside
the mouth of said AAA, against her will and without her consent”

 The victim was a 21 year old girl who contracted polio when she was just 7 months. On June 30, 1998 at around 4:00 o’clock
morning, AAA was sleeping in their house in Navotas with her sister-in-law and nephew. She was suddenly awakened when
Abello mashed her breast. Come July 2, 1999 at around 3:00 a.m, Abello again mashed the breast of AAA under the same
situation while the latter was sleeping. In these two occasions AAA was able to recognize Abello because of the light coming
from outside. Then on July 8, 1998, at around 2:00 a.m, Abello placed his soft penis inside the mouth of AAA. The victim on
the same date reported the incident to her sister-in-law and mother.
 The RTC found Abello guilty under all three Informations. The CA affirmed Abello’s conviction on appeal and increased
the penalties imposed.
 Abello now appeals his conviction for rape on the ground that the mode of commission provided for in the information is
different from that proven during the trial. He also questions his conviction for sexual abuse since AAA does not fall under
those protected by RA 7610 (Child Abuse Law).

Issues:
 WoN the appellant shall be acquitted due to the difference between the modes of commission provided for in the Information
for rape and that proven at the trial.
 WoN appellant is guilty of sexual abuse under the Child Abuse Law. If he’s not, if he can be liable for an offense other than
that stated in the information.
 WoN the alternative circumstance of stepfather-stepdaughter relationship should be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
 WoN aggravating circumstances not mentioned in the Information can be considered to increase the penalty.

Rulings:
 NO, variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if he fails to object to evidence showing
that the crime was committed in a different manner than what was alleged. The Information alleges “force and intimidation” as
the mode of commission. However, AAA testified during the trial that she was asleep at the time it happened and only awoke to
find Abello’s male organ inside her mouth. This variance is not fatal to Abello’s conviction for rape by sexual assault. A
variance in the mode of commission of the offense is binding upon the accused if he fails to object to evidence showing that the
crime was committed in a different manner than what was alleged. In the present case, Abello did not object to the presentation
of evidence showing that the crime charged was committed in a different manner than what was stated in the Information. Thus,
the variance is not a bar to Abello’s conviction of the crime charged in the Information.
 NO, appellant cannot be held guilty under the Child Abuse Law but he can be held for Acts of Lasciviousness. AAA cannot be
considered a child under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610 which states that “Children” refers to person below 18 years of age or
those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition. AAA was neither below 18 nor was she fully unable to
take care of herself. Though Abello cannot be held liable under RA 7610, he is still liable for acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC. The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information or from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated; the crime committed is determined by the recital of the
 ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information. In the present case, although the two Informations wrongly
designated R.A. No. 7610 as the law violated; the allegations therein sufficiently constitute acts punishable under Article 336 of
the RPC whose elements are:
a. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness;
b. That the offended party is another person of either sex; and
c. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
i. By using force or intimidation; or
ii. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
iii. When the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented.
 NO, the relationship should not be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Though the three Informations all alleged the
stepfather-stepdaughter relationship between AAA and Abello, this modifying circumstance, was not duly proven in the present
case. The prosecution failed to present the marriage contract between Abello and AAA’s mother. If the fact of marriage came
out in the evidence at all, it was only via an admission by Abello of his marriage to AAA’s mother. This admission is
inconclusive. The court is strict on considering relationship as an aggravating circumstance because it increases the imposable
penalty, and hence must be proven by competent evidence.
 NO, the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and knowledge of disability cannot be considered. Although not alleged in
the information, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling was proven during the trial. Additionally, Article 266-B (penalties
for rape) of the RPC recognizes “knowledge by the offender of the mental disability, emotional disorder and/or physical
handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime” as a qualifying circumstance. This knowledge by
Abello of AAA’s polio was also proven during the trial but not alleged in the Information. Though these aggravating and
qualifying circumstances of dwelling and Abello’s knowledge of AAA’s physical disability were not considered in
imposing the penalty, they may be appreciated in awarding exemplary damages.
 Therefore, appellant is found guilty of rape by sexual assault and acts of lasciviousness under Art 266 and 336 of RPC:
1) For the crime of rape, he is sentenced him to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten years of prision mayor, as maximum. He is ordered to pay P30,000.00 as civil liability; P30,000.00 as
moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages;
2) For each count of acts of lasciviousness, he is sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of six months of arresto mayor,
as minimum, to four years and two months of prision correccional, as maximum. He is further ordered to pay AAA the
amounts of P20,000.00 as civil indemnity; P30,000.00 as moral damages and P2,000.00 as exemplary damages, in each
case.