Anda di halaman 1dari 13

[2.2 01] PNB v. HEIRS OF ESTANISLAO MILITAR, ET AL.

GR # 164801 & 165165 | August 18, 2005


Petitioner:​ Philippine National Bank // Spouses Johnny Lucero and Nona Ariete
Respondent: Heirs of Estanislao Militar and Deogracias Militar, represented by Tranquilina Militar //
Tranquilina Militar (deceased), now represented by Azucena Militar, Freddie Militar, Eduardo Militar,
Romeo L. Militar, Nelly Ly Bolanio, Leticia Ly and Delia Ly Si Asoyco
Indispensable and Necessary Parties

FACTS
➢ Deogracias, Glicerio, Tomas and Caridad were heirs of Estanislao Militar. They were he
registered co-owners of Lots no. 3011 and 3017.
➢ Deogracias sold his undivided share in both lots (1941); 3011 à Pedro Golez; 3017 à Sofronio
and Lourdes Lumagbas.
○ Spouses Lumagbas split 3017 into 2: 3017-A and 3017-B
➢ Deogracias remained in lot no. 3011 and 3017-B until his death on March 17, 1964; survived by
Teodorico and Remedios.
○ Glicerio died March 22, 1939; no issue.
○ Tomas died August 20, 1959; survived by Wenceslao and Ladislao.
○ Caridad died April 29, 1957; no issue.
➢ In 1975, there was a Deed of Absolute Sale which (all 4 siblings) purportedly sold Lot no. 3011 to
spouses Jalbuna. In another Deed of Sale, (all except Deogracias) sold Lot no. 3017-B to the
same spouses.
○ Lot no. 3011 was then subdivided into 3011-A and 3011-B, the first registered to Jalbuna
and the second to Golez.
➢ Spouses Jalbuna then mortgaged 3011-B to PNB as security. When they defaulted, PNB
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and sold Lot no. 3017-B at a public auction, with PNB as
the highest bidder.
➢ It was then sold to the spouses Lucero, who later filed an ejectment case against the actual
occupants: Tranquilina, Azucena, Freddie and Eduardo Militar.
➢ Tranquilina, Azucena, Freddie and Eduardo Militar filed a complaint against spouses Jalbuna,
PNB, and spouses Lucero for Reconveyance of Title, Annulment of Sale, Cancellation of Titles
and Damages.
○ Spouses Jalbuna invoked prescription, non-inclusion of indispensable parties and lack of
cause of action since their predecessor, Deogracias, no longer had interest over the
properties.
○ PNB claimed good faith; that the title of the Jalbunas was free from all liens and
encumbrances when they secured the loan, and that it conducted verification and
inspection of the property before granting the loan.
○ Spouses Lucero alleged that the complaint was commenced without the real party in
interest, that the cause of action has prescribed, and that they were innocent purchasers
in good faith and for value.
➢ The trial court dismissed the complaint, because it was not brought in the name of all
indispensable parties and although the two deeds of sale were void, their nullity cannot be
invoked against PNB and spouses Lucero because they were buyers in good faith.
○ Action for reconveyance also prescribed because 14 years since the execution of the
Deeds of Sale covering the disputed property.
➢ The CA reversed the decision of the trial court, because the issue is reconveyance, not the
shares of the respective heirs, that is the issue in a case for partition. Thus, a final determination
can be had despite the non-inclusion of the other heirs.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S
W/N the case was brought by all indispensable parties. – YES
RULING & RATIO
YES
➢ The case was brought by all indispensable parties, even if other heirs of Glicerio, Tomas and
Caridad have not been named as parties therein.
○ the issue is the propriety of reconveyance and not the shares of the respective heirs of
the co-owners.
➢ An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the court's action in the litigation,
and without whom no final determination of the case can be had. The party's interest in the
subject matter of the suit and in the relief sought are so inextricably intertwined with the other
parties' that his legal presence as a party to the proceeding is an absolute necessity. In his
absence, there cannot be a resolution of the dispute of the parties before the court which is
effective, complete, or equitable.
○ determined through the context and by the facts of the particular suit or litigation
○ not indispensable, if his interest in the controversy or subject matter is distinct and
divisible from the interest of the other parties and will not necessarily be prejudiced by a
judgment which does complete justice to the parties in court
➢ Two essential tests of an indispensable party:
○ can relief be afforded the plaintiff without the presence of the other party?
○ can the case be decided on the merits without prejudicing the rights of the other party?
➢ In the case at bar, the ultimate relief sought by the action is the reconveyance of titles to their
rightful owners. Prior to the forgery, the disputed properties were registered in the names of the
co-owners, Glicerio, Tomas and Caridad, whose interests remained undivided.
➢ Thus, if reconveyance of the titles is granted, the titles will revert back to the estates of the
deceased co-owners and not to their individual heirs, whose interests are divisible and may
properly be ventilated in another proceeding.
➢ Therefore, a co-heir may bring such action without necessarily joining all the other co-heirs as
co-plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all.

DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 4, 2004 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 54831 and its resolution dated August 4, 2004, are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

NOTES
W/N PNB is correct in that the heirs of Deogracias has no cause of action since Deogracias sold his
shares. – NO
➢ This argument is proper had Deogracias died ahead of the other co-owners.
➢ However, Glicerio, Tomas and Caridad predeceased Deogracias.
➢ When Glicerio and Caridad died intestate and without issue, their shares in the disputed
properties were inherited by Deogracias and Tomas. It is this portion that respondents, as heirs of
Deogracias, have an interest on and which vested them with personality to institute the present
case.
[ 2.2]
Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc

Doctrine:​ Indispensable parties


Facts:
This case involves the alleged ill-gotten P200 billion of the Marcoses.
With regard to Imee and Bongbong, the court noted that their involvement in the alleged illegal activities
was never established. The Sandiganbayan also held that their relationship to the Marcos spouses was
not enough reason to hold them liable.

Petitioner insisted that there was a preponderance of evidence to show that respondents Marcos siblings
had connived with their parents in acquiring ill-gotten wealth. It pointed out that respondents were
compulsory heirs to the deposed President and were thus obliged to render an accounting and to return
the ill-gotten wealth.

In particular, Imee was accused of dollar salting by using Glorious Sun to import denim fabrics from one
supplier at prices much higher than those paid by other users of similar materials. It was also alleged that
they benefited from the sequestered media networks.

Petitioner, in its third Amended Complaint, prays that the Marcos respondents be made to:
1) Pay for the value of the alleged ill-gotten wealth with interest from the date of acquisition;
2) Render a complete accounting and inventory of all funds and other pieces of property legally or
beneficially held and/or controlled by them
3) Pay actual damages estimated at P200 billion and additional actual damages to reimburse expenses
for the recovery of the alleged ill-gotten wealth
4) Moral, temperate, nominal, exemplary damages, as well as litigation expenses.

Issue​: W/N respondents, as compulsory heirs, are equally obliged to render an accounting and return the
alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses

Ruling:​ Yes.
Unless the executors of the Marcos estate or the heirs are ready to waive in favor of the state their right to
defend the properties found to be ill-gotten in their possession, control or ownership, then they may not be
dropped as defendants in the civil case pending before Sandiganbayan.

In order to reach a final determination of the matters concerning the estate of Ferdinand Marcos, the
present case must be maintained against Imelda and herein respondent Bongbong, as executors of the
Marcos estate. According to Rule 87, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, actions may be commenced to recover
from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon. Actions to recover damages for an injury to person/property
may be commenced against the executors.

Even if it was not proven that respondents conspired in accumulating ill-gotten wealth, they may be in
possession, ownership or control of such properties or the proceeds thereof as heirs of the Marcos
couple. Thus, their lack of participation does not remove the character of the property as ill-gotten.

Disposition:
WHEREFORE​, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is ​PARTIALLY ​GRANTED​. The assailed
Sandiganbayan Resolution dated 6 December 2005 is ​AFFIRMED with ​MODIFICATION​. ​For the reasons
stated herein, respondents Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, and Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr.
shall be maintained as defendants in Civil Case No. 0002 pending before the Sandiganbayan.
SARSABA v. VDA. DE TE
GR # 175910 | July 30, 2009
Petitioner: ​Atty. Rogelio E. Sarsaba
Respondent: ​Fe Vda. de Te, represented by her Attorney-in-Fact, Faustino Castaneda
Consequence of Death of Party

FACTS
- NLRC rendered a decision finding Sereno to have been illegally dismissed by Gasing and ordered
the latter to indemnify the former his monetary claims in the amount of P43,606.47.
- After the Writ of Execution was left unsatisfied, an Alias Writ of Execution was issued. Thus, Atty.
Sarsaba, herein petitioner, accompanied his client, Sereno, to levy a Fuso Truck which was in the
possession of Gasing.
- Respondent Te then filed with the RTC a Complaint for recovery of the truck, for damages with
​ gainst Sereno.
prayer for the delivery of the truck ​pendente lite a
o She is the wife of the late Pedro Te who was the registered owner of the truck.
o It was merely rented from her by Gasing; hence the wrongful assumption re: the
ownership.
o Since neither she or her husband were parties to the case, she should not be made to
answer for the judgment award.
- Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:
o no legal personality to sue à no real interest over the subject property
o allegations do not sufficiently state cause of action
o allegations do not contain sufficient cause of action
o complaint not accompanied by an Affidavit of Merit and Bond that would entitle the
respondent to the delivery of the truck, ​pendente lite
- NLRC also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of
action.
- RTC denied petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss. It also denied the separate motions to dismiss from
NLRC and Lavarez, setting the Pre-Trial Conference in June 2003.
- On 2005, petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss the Case on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction over one of the principal defendants à ​di na-serve-an ng summons si Sereno because he
died before it could be served and to discharge respondent’s attorney-in-fact for lack of legal
personality to sue.
o It turned out that respondent Te died on April 2005. Respondent, through her lawyer,
filed an Opposition. In this, he claimed that the death of respondent did not render
functus officio her right to sue since her attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castaneda, had
long testified on the complaint, for and on her behalf, and submitted documentary
exhibits in support of the complaint.
- RTC denied petitioner’s Omnibus Motion to Dismiss.
o Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Inhibition, claiming that
the judge who issued the Order was biased and partial because her husband was the
defendant in a petition of which the petitioner was counsel.
§ The Judge acted upon the motion for inhibition, and the case was re-raffled to
Branch 18.
o Branch 18 dismissed the Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S
1. W/N the death of Sereno causing the non-service of summons can be ground to dismiss the
complaint as there is lack of jurisdiction over the person of Sereno. – NO
2. W/N the death of Vda. de Te during the pendency of the case sufficient ground to dismiss the
case, as the agency between her and her attorney-in-fact has been extinguished, therefore
removing from the latter his legal personality to prosecute the case. – NO.
RULING & RATIO
1. NO
- Jurisdiction over a party is acquired by service of summons by the sheriff, his deputy or other
proper court officer, either personally by handing a copy thereof to the defendant or by substituted
service.
- On the other hand, summons is a writ by which the defendant is notified of the action brought
against him. Service of such writ is the means by which the court may acquire jurisdiction over his
person.
- The Sheriff’s Return of Service is dated 1997. Here, it was stated that Sereno could not be served
with the copy of the summons because he was already dead. à ​di nga nacquire yung jurisdiction over
the person.
- A motion to dismiss may be filed within the time for but before the filing of an answer to the
complaint or pleading asserting a claim. Among the grounds mentioned is the court's lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defending party.
- As a rule, all defenses and objections not pleaded, either in a motion to dismiss or in an answer,
are deemed waived.
- The exceptions to this rule are:
o when the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter,
o when there is another action pending between the parties for the same cause, or
o when the action is barred by prior judgment or by statute of limitations, in which cases,
the court may dismiss the claim.
- The petitioner only brought up lack of jurisdiction in his Omnibus Motion, not in his Motion to
Dismiss or in his Answer.
- Having failed to invoke this ground at the proper time, that is, in a motion to dismiss, petitioner
cannot raise it now for the first time on appeal.
- Having said this, the complaint against the other defendants cannot be dismissed because the
court's failure to acquire jurisdiction over one's person is a defense which is personal to the person
claiming it.
o It is now impossible for Sereno to invoke the same in view of his death. Neither can
petitioner invoke such ground, on behalf of Sereno, so as to reap the benefit of
having the case dismissed against all of the defendants.

2. NO
- When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules of Court require
a substitution of the deceased.
o In such cases, a counsel is obliged to inform the court of the death of his client and
give the name and address of the latter's legal representative.
- Actions that Survive the Death of the Party
o actions to recover real or personal property or an interest thereon;
o actions to enforce liens thereon; and
o actions to recover damages for an injury to a person or a property.
- The rule on substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process.
o It ensures that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the
suit through his heirs or the duly appointed legal representative of his estate.
o Non-compliance with the Rules results in the denial of the right to due process for the
heirs who, though not duly notified of the proceedings, would be substantially
affected by the decision rendered therein.
o Only when there is a denial of due process, as when the deceased is not represented
by any legal representative or heir, does the court nullify the trial proceedings and the
resulting judgment therein.
- While it appears that respondent's counsel did not make any manifestation before the RTC as to
her death nor did he show any proof that he had been retained by the deceased’s successors, ​such
failure of counsel would not lead to the invalidation of the proceedings and the judgment
rendered thereon if the action survives the death of such party​.
o The trial court's jurisdiction over the case subsists despite the death of the party.
- The purpose behind this rule is the protection of the right to due process of every party to the
litigation who may be affected by the intervening death. The deceased litigants are themselves
protected as they continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal
representative of their estate.
- While it is true that the SPA executed in favor of Faustino has become ​functus officio ​and that the
agency between the respondent and the former has been extinguished due to her death, Faustino
remains to have legal personality to prosecute the case.
o The case at bar is an action for the recovery of a personal property; thus, it survives
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court. It is not extinguished by the
death of a party.
o The proper remedy is the Substitution of Heirs and not the Dismissal.

DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Order dated March 22, 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Digos, Davao del Sur in Civil Case No. 3488, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.

GONZALES v. PAGCOR
GR # 114891 | May 27, 2004
Petitioner: ​Ramon A. Gonzales
Respondent: ​PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION, SPORTS AND GAMES
ENTERTAINMENT CORPORATION, BEST WORLD GAMING AND ENTERTAINMENT
CORPORATION, BELLE JAI-ALAI CORPORATION, and FILIPINAS GAMING ENTERTAINMENT
TOTALIZATOR CORPORATION
Consequence of Death of Party

FACTS
- Ramon Gonzales filed a class suit seeking to restrain PAGCOR from continuing its operations and
prohibit it and its co-respondents from enforcing:
o the "Grant of an Authority and Agreement for the Operation of Sports Betting and
Internet Gambling" executed between PAGCOR and SAGE;
o the "Grant of Authority to Operate Computerized Bingo Games" between PAGCOR
and BEST WORLD; and
o the "Agreement" among PAGCOR, BELLE and FILGAME to conduct jai-alai
operations.
- In the case of Del Mar, the agreement between PAGCOR, BELLE, and FILGAME was held to be
null and void. Thus, the latter submitted that their participation was no longer warranted.
- BEST WORLD then also filed a Comment stating that it is unable to operate its bingo terminals and
bingo games since its closure and shut down by PAGCOR and DILG. Its counsels also filed to
withdraw as counsels. à​ di macontact.
- The parties were then required to submit their Memoranda, but Gonzales failed to submit. This is
only when the Court found out about his death.
- Attys. Imbong and Imbong filed a Motion for Substitution. The Court required the respondents to file
Comments à ​they said there can be no substitution because the two were neither legal
representatives nor heirs of Gonzales.

ISSUE/S
W/N the case at bar should be considered a personal action that was extinguished with the death of
Gonzales. – YES
RULING & RATIO
YES
- The question as to whether an action survives the death of the party or not depends on the nature
of the action and the damage sued for.
- In the case at bar, Gonzales necessarily asserted a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged.
o He claimed to be vindicating his rights as a citizen, taxpayer, and member of the Bar à
non-transferable, unlike claims to money or property
- The movants claim that substitution should be allowed because Gonzales represented citizens and
taxpayers through his class suit, but the Court said that the movants here are not asserting a right
transmitted to them by the death of Gonzales but are seeking to protect their individual interests as
members of the classes alleged to have been represented by Gonzales.

[2.4 02] Manchester v. CA


GR # 75919 | May 7, 1987
Petitioner: ​MANCHESTER DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ET AL.
Respondent: ​COURT OF APPEALS, CITYLAND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, STEPHEN
ROXAS, ANDREW LUISON, GRACE LUISON and JOSE DE MAISIP
Actions: How and When Deemed Commenced

DOCTRINE
The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. An
amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the Court, much less
the payment of the docket fee based on the amounts sought in the amended pleading.

FACTS
➢ The action filed by Manchester Development Corporation was to compel the latter to execute a
deed of sale in their favor + damages.
○ No specific amount mentioned in the prayer, but the body of the complaint totals to P78M
as damages.
➢ However, the respondents claimed that the P3M paid by petitioner was already forfeited.
➢ In filing, the petitioner paid P410 as docket fee, but this assessment was only for actions involving
specific performance, where the amount involved is not capable of pecuniary estimation.
○ The docket fee paid for is being assailed because there is a total of P78M. The docket
fees should be assessed based on that.
➢ Manchester then filed an amended complaint for the inclusion of Philips Wire and Cable Corp. as
co-plaintiff.
○ There was still no amount stated.
➢ The RTC directed Manchester to rectify by stating amounts they were asking for. Then,
Manchester amended to specify P10M.
○ There was still no mention of the damages in the prayer.
➢ Manchester argues that the filing fee should be based on the amended complaint, not the original
complaint, as per ​Magaspi v. Ramolete.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE/S
W/N the amended complaint should be admitted. – NO

RULING & RATIO


NO
➢ A case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of filing
in court.
➢ In the present case, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case by the payment of
only P410.00 as docket fee.
○ The amendment of the complaint thereby does not vest jurisdiction upon the Court.
➢ For all legal purposes there is no such original complaint that was duly filed which could be
amended.
○ Consequently, the order admitting the amended complaint and all subsequent
proceedings and actions taken by the trial court are null and void.

DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied for lack of merit.

[2.4 03] Sun Insurance v. Asuncion

Petitioner:​ SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., (SIOL), E.B. PHILIPPS AND D.J. WARBY

Respondent: HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City and MANUEL CHUA UY PO TIONG

FACTS:
- Petitioner Sun Insurance (SIOL) filed a complaint for the annulment of a decision on the
consignation of fire insurance policy.
- Private Respondent filed a complaint for the refund of premiums and the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment in a civil case against SIOL. In addition, Respondent also claims for damages,
attorney’s fees, litigation costs, etc., however, the prayer did not state the amount of damages sought
although from the body of the complaint it can be inferred to be in amount of P 50 million. Hence,
Respondent originally paid only PhP 210.00 in docket fees.
- The complaint underwent a number of amendments to make way for subsequent re-assessments of
the amount of damages sought as well as the corresponding docket fees. The respondent
demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required.
- Petitioners allege that while it may be true that private respondent had paid the amount of
P182,824.90 as docket fee, and considering that the total amount sought to be recovered in the
amended and supplemental complaint is P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that should be paid by
private respondent is P257,810.49, more or less. Not having paid the same, petitioners contend that
the complaint should be dismissed and all incidents arising therefrom should be annulled. In support
of their theory, petitioners cite the latest ruling of the Court in Manchester Development Corporation
vs. CA.

​ISSUE: Did the Court acquire jurisdiction over the case even if private respondent did not pay the correct
or sufficient docket fees?

RULING: YES. It was held that it is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading,
but the payment of the prescribed docket fee that vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter or nature of the action. Where the filing of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of
the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. Same rule goes for permissive counterclaims, third party
claims and similar pleadings.

The principle in Manchester could very well be applied in the present case. The pattern and the
intent to defraud the government of the docket fee due it is obvious not only in the filing of the original
complaint but also in the filing of the second amended complaint. ​However, in the present case, a more
liberal interpretation of the rules is called for considering that, unlike Manchester, private
respondent demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket
fees as required. The promulgation of the decision in Manchester must have had that sobering influence
on private respondent who thus paid the additional docket fee as ordered by the respondent court. It
triggered his change of stance by manifesting

Nevertheless, petitioners contend that the docket fee that was paid is still insufficient considering the total
amount of the claim. This is a matter which the clerk of court of the lower court and/or his duly authorized
docket clerk or clerk in-charge should determine and, thereafter, if any amount is found due, he must
require the private respondent to pay the same.

[2.4 01] ​MAGASPI V RAMOLETE

Doctrine: A case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the actual date of its
filing in court. When a pleading is amended, the original pleading is deemed abandoned. The additional
docket fee to be paid should thus be based on their amended complaint.

PETITIONERS: MARIO RODIS MAGASPI, JUSTINO R. MAGASPI, BALDOMERA M. ALEJANDRO, and


MANOLITA M. CORTEZ

RESPONDENT: HONORABLE JOSE R. RAMOLETE, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
ESPERANZA V. GARCIA, Clerk of Court of First Instance of Cebu, THE SHELL COMPANY OF THE
PHILIPPINES LIMITED and/or THE SHELL REFINING COMPANY (Phil.) INC., CENTRAL VISAYAN
REALTY & INVESTMENTS CO., INC., CEBU CITY SAVINGS & LOAN ASSOCIATION and the
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
● Magaspi et al filed a complaint for the recovery of ownership and possession of a parcel of land
with damages against Shell and Cebu City Savings Assoc
● Upon filing and the payment of P60 as docketing P10 for sheriff fees, the case was assigned.
● The complaint contains the following:
● Declare TCT 41215 issued in the name of Central Visayan Realty NULL&VOID and OF
NO LEGAL EFFECT
● Plaintiffs in their capacity as heirs of deceased Sps Magaspi be declared as owners of
the land
● Once declared as null and void, The Register of Deeds be ordered to CANCEL the TCT
and issue another in the name of the heirs
● To order the defendants jointly and solidarily to return the ownership and possession of
the lot in question to the herein plaintiffs;
● SEPT 18: Central Visayan Realty filed a motion to compel the plaintiffs to pay the correct amount
for docket fee
● The motion was opposed by the plaintiffs who claimed that the main cause of action was the
recovery of a piece of land and on the basis of its assessed valued, P60.00 was the correct
docketing fee and that although the Revised Rules of Court do not exclude damages in the
computation of the docket fee, damages are nonetheless still to be excluded.
● OCT 5: The presiding judge ordered the Clerk of Court to comment on the motion and the
opposition which it assessed that the correct fees shall be fixed at of P3,164 + P2 Legal
Research fee (the value of the land, which is P17.28K, plus the damages amounting to P3.39M.
● Hence, petitioner shall pay P3,104, net of the 60 already paid.
● However, private respondents filed their respective answers that the same was EXCLUSIVE of
exemplary damages must be included in the computation.
● NOV 3: the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint so as to include the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines as a defendant.
● Nine days after, respondents filed an opposition to the admission of the amended
complaint.
● NOV 16: Judge Canonoy admitted the amended complaint although the plaintiffs had not yet
complied with his Order that they should pay an additional P3,104.00 docket fee.
● APR 3: ​Judge Jose R. Ramolete who had replaced Judge Canonoy, issued the same order.

ISSUE:Whether or not the case may be considered as having been filed and docketed when
P60.00 was paid to the Clerk of Court even on the assumption that said payment was not
sufficient in amount?

HELD: YES.

The rule is well-settled that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of the docket fee regardless of the
actual date of its filing in court. The Court holds that it was docketed upon the payment of P60 although
said amount is insufficient.

The case at bar is not covered by the above rule because the question posed in the ​Malimit a ​ nd
Lee ​cases was the ​timeliness ​of the payment of the docket fee whereas the case at bar has no
reference to the time of payment but concerns the ​amount ​that has to be paid.
Accordingly, the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the case ​and the proceedings thereafter had
were proper and regular.
I​n the case at bar there is an honest difference of opinion as to the correct amount to be paid as
docket fee.

Civil Case No. R-11882 was docketed upon the payment of P60 although said amount is insufficient.

The next question is in respect of the correct amount to be paid as docket fee. Judge Canonoy ordered
the ​payment of P3,104 as additional docket fee based on the original complaint. However, the petitioners
assert as an alternative view, that the docket fee be based on the amended complaint.

The petitioners ​have a point. “When a pleading is amended, the original pleading is deemed abandoned.
The original ​ceases to perform any further function as a pleading. The case stands for trial on the
amended pleading​ o ​ nly.”

On the basis of the foregoing, the additional docket fee to be paid by the petitioners should be based ​on
their amended complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted: the petitioners shall be assessed a docket fee on the basis
of the amended complaint; and after all of the lawful fees shall have been paid, the proceedings in Civil
Case​ ​No. R-11882 shall be resumed.

2.3. Venue of actions


Real and personal actions
• ​United Overseas Bank Phils. V Rosemoore Mining & Development Corp. 518 S 123 (2007)

Doctrine: A personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property or for the enforcement of
some contract or for the recovery of damages for its breach, or the recovery of damages for the
commission of an injury to the person or property.
Real actions are actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be
commenced and tried in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property
involved, or a portion thereof, is situated.
(Case involves one single mortgage contract, properties in different places)

FACTS:
Respondent Rosemoor Mining and Development Corporation (Rosemoor), a Philippine mining
corporation with offices at Quezon City, applied for and was granted by petitioner Westmont Bank credit
facility with long term loan and a revolving credit line. To secure the credit facility, a lone real estate
mortgage agreement was executed in favor of the United Overseas Bank as mortgagee in the City of
Manila. The agreement, however, covered six (6) parcels of land located in Bulacan and Nueva Ecija.

Rosemoor subsequently opened with the Bank four (4) irrevocable Letters of Credit (LCs) totaling to cover
payments by the UO Bank under the LCs, Rosemoor proceeded to draw against its credit facility and
thereafter executed promissory notes. Rosemoor defaulted in the payment of its various drawings under
the LCs and promissory notes. In view of the default, the UO Bank caused the extra-judicial foreclosure
properties.

The foregoing facts led to Rosemoor’s filing of separate complaints against the UO Bank, one before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila (Manila RTC) and the other before the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan (Malolos RTC).
UO Bank filed a motion to dismiss contending that Rose Moore engaged in forum shopping.

ISSUES:
1. WON dismissal of both complaints are proper because there is no forum shopping
2. WON the action to invalidate the foreclosure sale was properly brought in the Malolos RTC even
as regards the properties in Nueva Ecija

HELD: SC AFFIRMED CA.

1.YES. Malolos case was filed for the purpose of restraining the Bank from proceeding with the
consolidation of the titles over the foreclosed Bulacan properties because the loan secured by the
mortgage had not yet become due and demandable. While the right asserted in the Manila case is to
receive the proceeds of the loan, the right sought in the Malolos case is to restrain the foreclosure of the
properties mortgaged to secure a loan that was not yet due.

Moreover, the Malolos case is an action to annul the foreclosure sale that is necessarily an action
affecting the title of the property sold. It is therefore a real action which should be commenced and tried in
the province where the property or part thereof lies.

The Manila case, on the other hand, is a personal action involving as it does the enforcement of a
contract between Rosemoor, whose office is in Quezon City, and the Bank , whose principal office is in
Binondo, Manila. Personal actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal
plaintiffs resides, or where the defendants or any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of the
plaintiff.

2.YES. The action to annul the foreclosure sale was properly brought before the RTC Malolos even if it
included properties in Nueva Ecija.
Actions affecting title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, shall be commenced and tried
in the proper court which has jurisdiction over the area wherein the real property involved, or a portion
thereof, is situated.

The venue of the action for nullification of the foreclosure sale is properly laid with the Malolos RTC even
if two of the properties mortgaged together with the Bulacan properties are situated in Nueva Ecija.
Following the above-quoted provision of the Rules of Court, the venue of real actions affecting properties
found in different provinces is determined by the singularity or plurality of the transactions involving said
parcels of land.

Where said parcels are the object of one and the same transaction, the venue is in the court of any of the
provinces wherein a parcel of land is situated.

In the present case, there is a single transaction. There is only one proceeding sought to be nullified and
that is the extra-judicial mortgage foreclosure sale. And there is only one initial transaction which served
as the basis of the foreclosure sale and that is the single mortgage contract which incidentally included
properties located in different areas

(2.4 04) Heirs of the late Ruben Reinoso Jr versus CA, GR No. 116121, July 18, 2011
Reinoso - Dead Jeepney Passenger
Tapales - Jeepney Owner
Santos - Jeepney Driver
Guballa - Truck Owner
Geronimo - Truck Driver

FACTS:
In June 14, 1979, a collision between a truck and a jeepney in E. Rodriguez, Quezon City caused the
death of Ruben Reinoso, one of the jeepney’s passengers. It was established that the collision was due to
the truck driver’s negligence, who swerved to the left side portion of the road in an attempt to avoid a
wooden barricade, hitting the jeepney as a consequence.

Heirs of Reinoso filed a complaint for damages against Tapales and Guballa. The RTC rendered a
decision in favor of Reinoso’s heirs who are entitled for several damages. RTC also awarded damages to
property in favor of Tapales and against Guballa.

On Appeal by Guballa, the CA set aside and reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint for
damages on the ground of NON-PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES pursuant to the doctrine laid down in
Manchester v CA. In addition, CA ruled that since prescription had set in, petitioners can no longer pay
the required docket fees.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the case due to non payment of docket fees

HELD: Yes. ​In ​Manchester v. Court of Appeals,​ ​it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. HOWEVER, this rule was relaxed two (2) years after
in the case of ​Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,​ wherein the Court decreed that ​where the initiatory
pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee
within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period. This ruling was made on the premise that the plaintiff had demonstrated his willingness to abide
by the rules by paying the additional docket fees required. Where the party does not deliberately intend to
defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying
additional docket fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in ​Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd.,​ and not the strict regulations set in ​Manchester​, will apply. The Court also takes into account the fact
that the case was filed (1979) before the ​Manchester ruling (1987) came out. Even if said ruling could be
applied retroactively, liberality should be accorded to the petitioners in view of the recency then of the
ruling.
It cannot be denied that the case was litigated before the RTC and said trial court had already rendered a
decision. While it was at that level, the matter of non-payment of docket fees was never an issue. It was
only the CA which ​motu propio​ dismissed the case for said reason.
Considering the foregoing, there is a need to suspend the strict application of the rules so that the
petitioners would be able to fully and finally prosecute their claim on the merits at the appellate level
rather than fail to secure justice on a technicality, for, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties, bearing always in mind that
procedure is not to hinder but to promote the administration of justice.

Anda mungkin juga menyukai