Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 90017-18 March 1, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,
vs.
ELENA VERANO Y ABANES, accused-
appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Mariano R. de Joya, Jr. for accused-
appellant.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
ELENA VERANO Y ABANES was
convicted 1 of the crimes of illegal recruitment
in large scale 2 and estafa 3 in two (2)
separate informations 4 filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila and sentenced
thus —
(a) In Crim. Case No. 88-
61017, this court finds the
accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the
crime of illegal recruitment in
large scale as defined under
par. (b) of Art. 38 in relation
to Art. 39 of the New Labor
Code of the Philippines; and
this court hereby sentences
the said accused to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of overseas employment as salesmen in
P100,000.00; and to pay to Bahrain. In consideration thereof, Alfonso,
the offended parties, Arturo
Espiel and Alfonso Abanes,
the sums of P10,000.00, and
P7,150.00 respectively, plus
interest thereon at the legal
rate of 12% per annum from
the date of filing of the
Information on February 22,
1988. The damages due to
the third offended party, Jose
Daep, is taken care of in the
estafa case, Crim. Case No.
88-61018.
(b) In Crim. Case No. 88-
6108, the court finds the
accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the
crime of estafa; and this court
hereby sentences the
accused to suffer an
indeterminate sentence of
SIX (6) YEARS of prision
correccional, maximum
period, as minimum penalty,
to NINE (9) YEARS ofprision
mayor medium period, as
maximum penalty, and to pay
to Jose Daep, the sole
complaining offended party in
this case, the sum of
P15,000.00 as actual
damages plus interest
thereon at the legal rate of
P12% per annum from the
date of filing of the
Information on February 22,
1988.
As found by the trial court, sometime in
October 1987, accused-appellant Elena
Verano y Abanes persuaded the three (3)
private complainants, Jose Daep, Arturo
Espiel and Alfonso Abanes to accept
Arturo and Jose were required to pay
P10,000.00 each to cover the expenses for
the processing of their travel papers, i.e.,
passports, visas and the cost of their plane
tickets, medical examination and recruitment
fees. Jose paid the total amount of
P15,000.00, while Arturo and Alfonso paid
P10,000.00 and P7,150.00 respectively. They
were issued separate receipts by accused-
appellant. 5To further convince them of her
capacity to send them abroad, accused-
appellant even signed a contract of
employment with her as employer and Arturo
as employee. 6
Assured that they could depart for Bahrain on
27 December 1987, Alfonso, Jose and Arturo
went to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
and waited for accused-appellant who was
supposed to meet them there to deliver their
passports, visas and plane tickets. When she
failed to show up, the three (3) recruits
proceeded to her residence and there waited
for her until she returned four (4) days later.
By way of explanation, they were told that
their passports and visas were still being
processed but were promised they were
promised they could leave for their overseas
jobs on 15 January 1988.
Again, the three (3) hopefuls proceeded to
the NAIA but, like before, accused-appellant
failed to show up. This time they were told
that they could definitely leave on 13
February 1988. However, on the appointed
date and time, accused-appellant failed to
show up for the third time. Jose, Arturo and
Alfonso then went to the Western Police
District Headquarters to lodge their complaint.
Accused-appellant was arrested on the same
day and charged with illegal recruitment
committed in large scale, and estafa, with
Jose Daep as the lone complainant in the
latter case. After trial, Elena Verano y Abanes be justified in reversing the judgment of
was found guilty in both cases. conviction. Hence, the appeal must fail.

In her brief filed by the Public Attorney's WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a
office, 7 accused-appellant contends that the quo convicting accused-appellant ELENA
trial court gravely erred when it imposed the VERANO Y ABANES of the crimes of illegal
penalty of life imprisonment for the large scale recruitment committed in large scale (Crim.
illegal recruitment for the reason that it was Case No. 88-61017) and estafa (Crim. Case
too harsh in the light of her good faith in just No. 88-61018) is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs
wanting to help the private complainants against accused-appellant.
secure employment abroad.
SO ORDERED.
However, in her Supplemental Brief and
Reply 8 filed by her counsel de parte, Atty.
Mariano R. de Joya, Jr., accused-appellant
changed her position. 9 Instead of pursuing
her attack on the "harshness" of the penalty
imposed, she now disputes the findings of
fact. Thus she argues that, contrary to the trial
court's findings, she never represented
herself as having the capacity to contract
workers for overseas employment; that she
merely introduced private complainants Jose,
Arturo and Aldonso to a certain Juliet
Majestrado who was the one who claimed to
have such capacity; and, with respect to her
conviction for estafa, she argues that
although she herself issued the receipts
marked Exhs. "C," "E," "E-1," "E-2" and "H,"
she never profited from the money paid as it
was all given to and personally received by
Juliet Majestrado.

Appellant's argument is obviously without

merit in the light of the well-settled doctrine
that findings of fact made by the trial court are
final and conclusive and cannot be reviewed
on appeal. 10 Except for a few recognized
instances,11 which do not apply in the case at
bench, such findings are bindings and will not
be reviewed by us for this Court is not a trier
of facts. The issues raised by appellant are
purely and undisputably factual, as she
herself admits. 12 Considering that none of the
exceptions apply, as aforesaid, we would not
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 78085 October 16, 1989
ROYAL CROWN INTERNATIONALE, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSI0N and
VIRGILIO P. NACIONALES, respondents.
Ceferino Padua Law Office for petitioner.
Acosta & Rico Law Offices for private respondent.
CORTES, J.:
Petitioner Royal Crown Internationale seeks the
nullification of a resolution of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) which affirmed a
decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) holding it liable to pay,
jointly and severally with Zamel-Turbag
Engineering and Architectural Consultant
(ZAMEL), private respondent Virgilio P.
Nacionales' salary and vacation pay
corresponding to the unexpired portion of his
employment contract with ZAMEL.
In 1983, petitioner, a duly licensed private
employment agency, recruited and deployed
private respondent for employment with ZAMEL
as an architectural draftsman in Saudi Arabia. On
May 25, 1983, a service agreement was executed
by private respondent and ZAMEL whereby the
former was to receive per month a salary of
US$500.00 plus US$100.00 as allowance for a
period of one (1) year commencing from the date
of his arrival in Saudi Arabia. Private respondent
departed for Saudi Arabia on June 28,1983.
On February 13, 1984, ZAMEL terminated the
employment of private respondent on the ground
that his performance was below par. For three (3)
successive days thereafter, he was detained at his
quarters and was not allowed to report to work
until his exit papers were ready. On February 16,
1984, he was made to board a plane bound for
the Philippines.
Private respondent then filed on April 23, 1984 a
complaint for illegal termination against
petitioner and ZAMEL with the POEA, docketed as
POEA Case No. (L) 84-04-401.
Based on a finding that petitioner and ZAMEL
failed to establish that private respondent was
terminated for just and valid cause, the Workers'
Assistance and Adjudication Office of the POEA
issued a decision dated June 23, 1986 signed by
Deputy Administrator and Officer-in-Charge
Crescencio M. Siddayao, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the complainant and against
respondents, ordering the latter to pay, jointly
and severally, to complainant the following
amounts:
1. TWO THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FORTY
US DOLLARS (US$2,640.00) or its equivalent in
Philippine currency at the time of payment,
representing the salaries corresponding to the
unexpired portion of complainant's contract;
2. SIX HUNDRED US DOLLARS (US$ 600.00)
less partial payment of FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY-
EIGHT SAUDI RIYALS (SR558), or its equivalent in
Philippine currency at the time of actual payment,
representing the unpaid balance of complainant's
vacation pay;
3. THREE HUNDRED FIFTY US DOLLARS
(US$350.00) or its equivalent in Philippine
currency at the time of actual payment
representing reimbursement of salary deductions
for return travel fund;
4. Ten percent (10%) of the above-stated
amounts, as and for attorney's fees.
Complainant's claim for legal and transportation
expenses are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[POEA Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 34.]
On July 18, 1986, petitioner filed thru its new
counsel a motion for reconsideration which was
treated as an appeal to the NLRC by the POEA.
Petitioner alleged that the POEA erred in holding
it solidarity liable for ZAMEL's violation of private
respondent's service agreement even if it was not
a party to the agreement.
In a resolution promulgated on December 11,
1986, the NLRC affirmed the POEA decision,
holding that, as a duly licensed private
employment agency, petitioner is jointly and
severally liable with its foreign principal ZAMEL
for all claims and liabilities which may arise in
connection with the implementation of the
employment contract or service agreement [NLRC
Decision, pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 26-27].
On March 30, 1987, the NLRC denied for lack of
merit petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Hence, petitioner filed the present petition
captioned as "Petition for Review".
At this point, it is not amiss to note that the filing
of a "Petition for Review" under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court is not the proper means by which
NLRC decisions are appealed to the Supreme
Court. It is only through a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 that NLRC decisions may be
reviewed and nullified on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, in the interest of justice, this Court
opted to treat the instant petition as if it were a
petition for certiorari. Thus, after the filing of
respondents' comments, petitioner's joint reply
thereto, and respondents' rejoinders, the Court
resolved to consider the issues joined and the
case submitted for decision.
The case at bar involves two principal issues, to
wit:
I. Whether or not petitioner as a private
employment agency may be held jointly and
severally liable with the foreign-based employer
for any claim which may arise in connection with
the implementation of the employment contracts
of the employees recruited and deployed abroad;
II. Whether or not sufficient evidence was
presented by petitioner to establish the
termination of private respondent's employment
for just and valid cause.
I.
Petitioner contends that there is no provision in
the Labor Code, or the omnibus rules
implementing the same, which either provides for
the "third-party liability" of an employment
agency or recruiting entity for violations of an
employment agreement performed abroad, or
designates it as the agent of the foreign-based
employer for purposes of enforcing against the
latter claims arising out of an employment
agreement. Therefore, petitioner concludes, it
cannot be held jointly and severally liable with
ZAMEL for violations, if any, of private
respondent's service agreement.
Petitioner's conclusion is erroneous. Petitioner
conveniently overlooks the fact that it had
voluntarily assumed solidary liability under the
various contractual undertakings it submitted to
the Bureau of Employment Services. In applying
for its license to operate a private employment
agency for overseas recruitment and placement,
petitioner was required to submit, among others,
a document or verified undertaking whereby it
assumed all responsibilities for the proper use of
its license and the implementation of the
contracts of employment with the workers it
recruited and deployed for overseas employment
[Section 2(e), Rule V, Book 1, Rules to Implement
the Labor Code (1976)]. It was also required to file
with the Bureau a formal appointment or agency
contract executed by the foreign-based employer
in its favor to recruit and hire personnel for the
former, which contained a provision empowering
it to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with
the foreign principal for any of the violations of
the recruitment agreement and the contracts of
employment [Section 10 (a) (2), Rule V, Book I of
the Rules to Implement the Labor Code (1976)].
Petitioner was required as well to post such cash
and surety bonds as determined by the Secretary
of Labor to guarantee compliance with prescribed
recruitment procedures, rules and regulations,
and terms and conditions of employment as
appropriate [Section 1 of Pres. Dec. 1412 (1978)
amending Article 31 of the Labor Code].
These contractual undertakings constitute the
legal basis for holding petitioner, and other
private employment or recruitment agencies,
liable jointly and severally with its principal, the
foreign-based employer, for all claims filed by
recruited workers which may arise in connection
with the implementation of the service
agreements or employment contracts [See
Ambraque International Placement and Services
v. NLRC, G.R. No. 77970, January 28, 1988, 157
SCRA 431; Catan v. NLRC, G.R. No. 77279, April
15, 1988, 160 SCRA 691; Alga Moher International
Placement Services v. Atienza, G.R. No. 74610,
September 30, 1988].
In a belated attempt to bolster its position,
petitioner contends in its joint reply that the
omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code are
invalid for not having been published in the
Official Gazette pursuant to the Court's
pronouncements in the cases of Tanada v. Tuvera
[G.R. No. 63915, April 25, 1985, 136 SCRA 27;
December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 446]. Petitioner
further contends that the 1985 POEA Rules and
Regulations, in particular Section 1, Rule I of Book
VII** quoted in the NLRC decision, should not
have been retroactively applied to the case at
bar.
But these contentions are irrelevant to the issues
at bar. They proceed from a misapprehension of
the legal basis of petitioner's liabilities as a duly
licensed private employment agency. It bears
repeating that the basis for holding petitioner
jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based
employer ZAMEL is the contractual undertakings
described above which it had submitted to the
Bureau of Employment Services. The sections of
the omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code
cited by this Court merely enumerate the various
documents or undertakings which were
submitted by petitioner as applicant for the
license to operate a private employment agency
for overseas recruitment and placement. These
sections do not create the obligations and
liabilities of a private employment agency to an
employee it had recruited and deployed for work
overseas. It must be emphasized again that
petitioner assumed the obligations and liabilities
of a private employment agency by contract.
Thus, whether or not the omnibus rules are
effective in accordance with Tanada v. Tuvera is
an issue the resolution of which does not at all
render nugatory the binding effect upon
petitioner of its own contractual undertakings.
The Court, consequently, finds it unnecessary to
pass upon both the implications of Tanada v.
Tuvera on the omnibus rules implementing the
Labor Code as well as the applicability of the 1985
POEA Rules and Regulations.
Petitioner further argues that it cannot be held
solidarily liable with ZAMEL since public
respondent had not acquired jurisdiction over
ZAMEL through extra-territorial service of
summons as mandated by Section 17, Rule 14 of
the Rules of Court.
This argument is untenable. It is well-settled that
service upon any agent of a foreign corporation,
whether or not engaged in business in the
Philippines, constitutes personal service upon
that corporation, and accordingly, judgment may
be rendered against said foreign corporation
[Facilities Management Corporation v. De la Osa,
G.R. No. L-38649, March 26, 1979, 89 SCRA 131].
In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that
petitioner is an agent of ZAMEL. The service
agreement was executed in the Philippines
between private respondent and Milagros G.
Fausto, the General Manager of petitioner, for
and in behalf of ZAMEL [Annex "D" of Petition, p.
3; Rollo, p. 37]. Moreover, one of the documents
presented by petitioner as evidence, i.e., the
counter-affidavit of its General Manager Ms.
Fausto, contains an admission that it is the
representative and agent of ZAMEL [See
Paragraph No. 1 of Annex "H" of Petition; Rollo. p.
43].
Considering the foregoing, the Court holds that
the NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
declaring petitioner jointly and severally liable
with its foreign principal ZAMEL for all claims
which have arisen in connection with the
implementation of private respondent's
employment contract.
II.
Petitioner asserts that the NLRC failed to consider
the overwhelming evidence it had presented
before the POEA which establishes the fact that
private respondent was terminated for just and
valid cause in accordance with his service
agreement with ZAMEL.
This assertion is without merit. The NLRC upheld
the POEA finding that petitioner's evidence was
insufficient to prove termination from
employment for just and valid cause. And a
careful study of the evidence thus far presented
by petitioner reveals to this Court that there is
legal basis for public respondent's conclusion.
It must be borne in mind that the basic principle
in termination cases is that the burden of proof
rests upon the employer to show that the
dismissal is for just and valid cause, and failure to
do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal
was not justified and, therefore, was illegal
[Polymedic General Hospital v. NLRC, G.R. No.
64190, January 31, 1985,134 SCRA 420; and also
Article 277 of the Labor Code]. And where the
termination cases involve a Filipino worker
recruited and deployed for overseas employment,
the burden naturally devolves upon both the
foreign-based employer and the employment
agency or recruitment entity which recruited the
worker, for the latter is not only the agent of the
former, but is also solidarily liable with its foreign
principal for any claims or liabilities arising from
the dismissal of the worker.
In the case at bar, petitioner had indeed failed to
discharge the burden of proving that private
respondent was terminated from employment for
just and valid cause. Petitioner's evidence
consisted only of the following documents:
(1) A letter dated May l5, 1984 allegedly
written by an official of ZAMEL, stating that a
periodic evaluation of the entire staff was
conducted; that the personnel concerned were
given a chance to improve; that complainant's
performance was found below par; and that on
February 13,1984, at about 8:30 AM, complainant
was caught on the way out of the office to look
for another job during office hours without the
permission of his supervisor;
(2) A telex message allegedly sent by
employees of ZAMEL, stating that they have not
experienced maltreatment, and that the working
conditions (in ZAMEL) are good;
(3) The signatures of fifteen (15) persons
who allegedly sent the telex message;
(4) A receipt dated February 16, 1984 signed
by complainant, stating that he was paid SR915
representing his salary and SR558, representing
vacation pay for the month of February 1984;
(5) The counter-affidavit of Milagros G.
Fausto, the General Manager of Royal Crown,
stating that complainant was dismissed because
of poor performance, acts of dishonesty and
misconduct, and denying complainant's claim that
his salary and leave pay were not paid, and that
he was maltreated [See POEA Decision, p. 3;
Rollo, p. 32, See also Annexes "E", "F", "F-1 ", "G"
and "H" of Petition; Rollo, pp. 38-43].
Certainly, the telex message supposedly sent by
the employees of ZAMEL is not relevant in the
determination of the legality of private
respondent's dismissal. On the other hand, the
receipt signed by private respondent does not
prove payment to him of the salary and vacation
pay corresponding to the unexpired portion of his
contract.
More importantly, except for its allegation that
private respondent was caught on February
13,1984 on his way out of the office compound
without permission, petitioner had failed to allege
and to prove with particularity its charges against
private respondent. The letter dated May 15,
1984 allegedly written by the Actg. Project
Architect and the counter-affidavit of petitoner's
General Manager merely stated that the grounds
for the employee's dismissal were his
unsatisfactory performance and various acts of
dishonesty, insubordination and misconduct. But
the particular acts which would indicate private
respondent's incompetence or constitute the
above infractions were neither specified nor
described therein. In the absence of any other
evidence to substantiate the general charges
hurled against private respondent, these
documents, which comprise petitioner's evidence
in chief, contain empty and self-serving
statements insufficient to establish just and valid
cause for the dismissal of private respondent [See
Euro-Lines, Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 75782,
December 1, 1987,156 SCRA 78; Ambraque
International Placement and Services v. NLRC,
supra].
The Court is aware of the document attached in
petitioner's manifestation and joint reply which is
purportedly a xerox copy of a statement executed
on December 13, 1987 in Saudi Arabia by private
respondent claiming that the latter had settled
the case with ZAMEL and had "received all [his]
benefits that is salary, vacation pay, severance
pay and all other bonuses before [he] left the
kingdom of Saudi Arabia on 13 Feb. 1984 and
hereby indemnify [ZAMEL] from any claims or
liabilities, [he] raised in the Philippine Courts"
[Annex "A" of petitioner's Manifestation with
Motion to hold in Abeyance; Rollo, p. 82. And also
Annex "A" of petitioner's Joint Reply; Rollo, p.
111].
But the veracity of the contents of the document
is precisely disputed by private respondent. He
claims that he was made to sign the above
statement against his will and under threat of
deportation [See Telex of private respondent their object public order, public policy and good
received by the Supreme Court of the Philippines customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws
on January 14,1988; Rollo, p. 83. And also private or judgments promulgated, or by determination
respondent's Rejoinder, pp. 1-3; Rollo, pp. 139- or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country."
141].
Needless to say, the laws of Saudi Arabia which
Petitioner finally contends that inasmuch as were, incidentally, neither pleaded nor proved by
clause no. 13 of the service agreement provided petitioner, have absolutely no bearing
that the law under which the agreement shall be whatsoever to the case at bar.
regulated was the laws of Saudi Arabia [Annex
"D" of Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 36], public The Court holds, therefore, that the NLRC
respondent should have taken into account the committed no grave abuse of discretion
laws of Saudi Arabia and the stricter concept of amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
morality availing in that jurisdiction for the upholding the POEA's finding of insufficiency of
determination of the legality of private evidence to prove termination for just and valid
respondent's dismissal. cause.
This contention is patently erroneous. The WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the
provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines, its instant petition.
implementing rules and regulations, and
doctrines laid down in jurisprudence dealing with SO ORDERED.
the principle of due process and the basic right of
all Filipino workers to security of tenure, provide
the standard by which the legality of the exercise
by management of its prerogative to dismiss
incompetent, dishonest or recalcitrant
employees, is to be determined. Whether
employed locally or overseas, all Filipino workers
enjoy the protective mantle of Philippine labor
and social legislation, contract stipulations to the
contrary notwithstanding. This pronouncement is
in keeping with the basic public policy of the State
to afford protection to labor, promote full
employment, ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. For
the State assures the basic rights of all workers to
self-organization, collective bargaining, security of
tenure, and just and humane conditions of work
[Article 3 of the Labor Code of the Philippines;
See also Section 18, Article II and Section 3,
Article XIII, 1987 Constitution]. This ruling is
likewise rendered imperative by Article 17 of the
Civil Code which states that laws "which have for
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 77279 April 15, 1988
MANUELA S. CATAN/M.S. CATAN PLACEMENT
AGENCY, petitioners,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION and FRANCISCO D. REYES,
respondents.
Demetria Reyes, Merris & Associates for
petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.
Bayani G. Diwa for private respondent.
CORTES, J.:
Petitioner, in this special civil action for certiorari,
alleges grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the National Labor Relations Commission in an
effort to nullify the latters resolution and thus
free petitioner from liability for the disability
suffered by a Filipino worker it recruited to work
in Saudi Arabia. This Court, however, is not
persuaded that such an abuse of discretion was
committed. This petition must fail.
The facts of the case are quite simple.
Petitioner, a duly licensed recruitment agency, as
agent of Ali and Fahd Shabokshi Group, a Saudi
Arabian firm, recruited private respondent to
work in Saudi Arabia as a steelman.
The term of the contract was for one year, from
May 15,1981 to May 14, 1982. However, the
contract provided for its automatic renewal:
FIFTH: The validity of this Contract is for ONE
YEAR commencing from the date the SECOND
PARTY assumes hill port. This Contract is
renewable automatically if neither of the PARTIES
notifies the other PARTY of his wishes to
terminate the Contract by at least ONE MONTH
prior to the expiration of the contractual period.
[Petition, pp. 6-7; Rollo, pp. 7-8].
The contract was automatically renewed when
private respondent was not repatriated by his
Saudi employer but instead was assigned to work
as a crusher plant operator. On March 30, 1983,
while he was working as a crusher plant operator,
private respondent's right ankle was crushed
under the machine he was operating.
On May 15, 1983, after the expiration of the
renewed term, private respondent returned to
the Philippines. His ankle was operated on at the
Sta. Mesa Heights Medical Center for which he
incurred expenses.
On September 9, 1983, he returned to Saudi
Arabia to resume his work. On May 15,1984, he
was repatriated.
Upon his return, he had his ankle treated for
which he incurred further expenses.
On the basis of the provision in the employment
contract that the employer shall compensate the
employee if he is injured or permanently disabled
in the course of employment, private respondent
filed a claim, docketed as POEA Case No. 84-
09847, against petitioner with respondent
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.
On April 10, 1986, the POEA rendered judgment
in favor of private respondent, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the complainant and against the
respondent, ordering the latter to pay to the
complainant:
1. SEVEN THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
EIGHTY-FIVE PESOS and 60/100 (P7,985.60),
Philippine currency, representing disability
benefits;
2. TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND NINETY-SIX
Philippine pesos and 20/100 (29,096.20)
representing reimbursement for medical
expenses;
3. Ten percent (10%) of the
abovementioned amounts as and for attorney's
fees. [NLRC Resolution, p. 1; Rollo, p. 16].
On appeal, respondent NLRC affirmed the
decision of the POEA in a resolution dated
December 12, 1986.
Not satisfied with the resolution of the POEA,
petitioner instituted the instant special civil action
for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the NLRC.
1. Petitioner claims that the NLRC gravely
abused its discretion when it ruled that petitioner
was liable to private respondent for disability
benefits since at the time he was injured his
original employment contract, which petitioner
facilitated, had already expired. Further,
petitioner disclaims liability on the ground that its
agency agreement with the Saudi principal had
already expired when the injury was sustained.
There is no merit in petitioner's contention.
Private respondents contract of employment can
not be said to have expired on May 14, 1982 as it
was automatically renewed since no notice of its
termination was given by either or both of the
parties at least a month before its expiration, as
so provided in the contract itself. Therefore,
private respondent's injury was sustained during
the lifetime of the contract.
A private employment agency may be sued jointly
and solidarily with its foreign principal for
violations of the recruitment agreement and the
contracts of employment:
Sec. 10. Requirement before recruitment.—
Before recruiting any worker, the private
employment agency shall submit to the Bureau
the following documents:
(a) A formal appointment or agency
contract executed by a foreign-based employer in
favor of the license holder to recruit and hire
personnel for the former ...
xxx xxx xxx
2. Power of the agency to sue and be sued
jointly and solidarily with the principal or foreign-
based employer for any of the violations of the
recruitment agreement and the contracts of
employment. [Section 10(a) (2) Rule V, Book I,
Rules to Implement the Labor Code].
Thus, in the recent case of Ambraque
International Placement & Services v. NLRC [G.R.
No. 77970, January 28,1988], the Court ruled that
a recruitment agency was solidarily liable for the
unpaid salaries of a worker it recruited for
employment in Saudi Arabia.
Even if indeed petitioner and the Saudi principal
had already severed their agency agreement at
the time private respondent was injured,
petitioner may still be sued for a violation of the
employment contract because no notice of the
agency agreement's termination was given to the
private respondent:
Art 1921. If the agency has been entrusted for the
purpose of contra with specified persons, its
revocation shall not prejudice the latter if they
were not given notice thereof. [Civil Code].
In this connection the NLRC elaborated:
Suffice it to state that albeit local respondent M.
S. Catan Agency was at the time of complainant's
accident resulting in his permanent partial
disability was (sic) no longer the accredited agent
of its foreign principal, foreign respondent herein,
yet its responsibility over the proper
implementation of complainant's
employment/service contract and the welfare of
complainant himself in the foreign job site, still
existed, the contract of employment in question
not having expired yet. This must be so, because
the obligations covenanted in the recruitment
agreement entered into by and between the local
agent and its foreign principal are not coterminus
with the term of such agreement so that if either
or both of the parties decide to end the
agreement, the responsibilities of such parties
towards the contracted employees under the
agreement do not at all end, but the same
extends up to and until the expiration of the
employment contracts of the employees
recruited and employed pursuant to the said
recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will
render nugatory the very purpose for which the
law governing the employment of workers for
foreign jobs abroad was enacted. [NLRC
Resolution, p. 4; Rollo, p. 18]. (Emphasis
supplied).
2. Petitioner contends that even if it is
liable for disability benefits, the NLRC gravely
abused its discretion when it affirmed the award
of medical expenses when the said expenses
were the consequence of private respondent's
negligence in returning to work in Saudi Arabia
when he knew that he was not yet medically fit to
do so.
Again, there is no merit in this contention.
No evidence was introduced to prove that private
respondent was not medically fit to work when
he returned to Saudi Arabia. Exhibit "B", a
certificate issued by Dr. Shafquat Niazi, the camp
doctor, on November 1, 1983, merely stated that
private respondent was "unable to walk properly,
moreover he is still complaining [of] pain during
walking and different lower limbs movement"
[Annex "B", Reply; Rollo, p. 51]. Nowhere does it
say that he was not medically fit to work.
Further, since petitioner even assisted private
respondent in returning to work in Saudi Arabia
by purchasing his ticket for him [Exhibit "E";
Annex "A", Reply to Respondents' Comments], it
is as if petitioner had certified his fitness to work.
Thus, the NLRC found:
Furthermore, it has remained unrefuted by
respondent that complainant's subsequent
departure or return to Saudi Arabia on September
9, 1983 was with the full knowledge, consent and
assistance of the former. As shown in Exhibit "E"
of the record, it was respondent who facilitated
the travel papers of complainant. [NLRC
Resolution, p. 5; Rollo, p. 19].
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit, with costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.