Braintree Police Department Report of Investigation

A.
May 2, 2018
Investigation of Braintree Police Department Evidence Room
CLIENT: Town of Braintree, Town Solicitor Lisa Skehill Maki, Esq.
PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL

ATTORNEY WORK PRODUCT
Daniel P. Linskey
Managing Director - Investigations and Disputes Practice, North America
daniel.linskey@kroll.com
10 High Street, 3rd Floor, Boston, MA 02110
T 617.210.7471 | M 857.275.2510
Report of Investigation
Privileged & Confidential

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records, such information, as presented, relies upon the accuracy and completeness of those records,
which have not been corroborated by Kroll. Statements herein concerning financial, regulatory or legal
matters should be understood to be general observations based solely on Kroll’s experience as risk
consultants and may not be relied upon as financial, regulatory or legal advice, which Kroll is not
authorized to provide. All such matters should be reviewed with appropriately qualified advisors in these
areas. THIS REPORT DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A RECOMMENDATION, ENDORSEMENT, OPINION
OR APPROVAL OF ANY KIND WITH RESPECT TO ANY TRANSACTION, DECISION OR
EVALUATION, AND SHOULD NOT BE RELIED UPON AS SUCH UNDER ANY CIRCUMSTANCES.

CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION..................................................................................................................... 1
 Investigative Team.............................................................................................................1
2. RELEVANT PARTIES AND TIMELINE................................................................................... 3

 Relevant Parties................................................................................................................ 3
 Job Descriptions................................................................................................................ 4
 Timeline............................................................................................................................. 8
 Interview List of BPD Sworn Personnel and Civilians......................................................17
 Documentary Evidence....................................................................................................18
3. INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE BPD’S EVIDENCE HANDLING PROCEDURES AND

SECURITY PROGRAM......................................................................................................... 20
 Preliminary Recommendations........................................................................................22
 Additional Department Enhancements............................................................................ 23
4. INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS................................................................................................. 24
 Concerns with Officer Zopatti.......................................................................................... 24
 Lapses in Department Polices & Procedures.................................................................. 40
5. CONCLUSIONS.................................................................................................................... 52
 Overview..........................................................................................................................52
 Lack of Oversight on Behalf of BPD Administration........................................................ 54

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INTRODUCTION
In September 2016, the Town of Braintree, Massachusetts, through Town Solicitor Lisa Skehill Maki
(“Maki”), retained Kroll to conduct an independent administrative investigation of the Braintree Police
Department’s (“BPD” or “Department”) evidence management program. The investigation stemmed from
the findings of an independent audit commenced in July 2016 by Bruce Gordon (“Gordon”) of Narcotics
Audit Solutions in North Attleboro, Massachusetts. Gordon’s audit identified discrepancies and concerns
with the Department’s evidence management program, including unaccounted for cash, narcotics and
firearms, as well as several other concerns, including potentially criminal actions and policy and
procedural shortcomings that required additional investigation.
The Town of Braintree engaged Kroll to review the audit results and assess the Department’s internal
policies and procedures pertaining to evidence handling, processing and storage. Kroll was to conduct a
physical security improvement assessment of the Department’s facility and help develop new policies,
procedures and training for members of the Department based on national standards for best practices.
Kroll was also tasked with identifying any and all factors that may have contributed to the deficiencies in
the proper handling and safeguarding of evidence in the Braintree evidence room. Further, Kroll was to
conduct an investigation into the administrative actions that occurred prior to and subsequent to the death
of former Evidence Officer Susan Zopatti on May 19, 2016.
Kroll’s investigation was conducted parallel to the criminal investigation being conducted by the Office of
Massachusetts Attorney General Maura Healey.
Investigative Team
Kroll’s primary investigative team was led by the following professionals:
Managing Director Daniel Linskey (“Linskey”)

Linskey is a former Superintendent-in-Chief of the Boston Police Department and a 27-year veteran of the
force. He notably led the Boston Police Department through some of the most tragic and contentious
events in the city’s history, including the Boston Marathon bombings and the Occupy Movement. At Kroll,
Linskey serves clients in diverse industries with uncommon experience in investigations, crisis response
and risk management, as well as personal, physical and operational security strategies. Widely respected
for his knowledge of the complexities inherent in law enforcement and homeland security, Linskey has

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also consulted with numerous national and international government agencies on a broad range of
challenges, including large-scale event management, crisis leadership and preparedness, and community
engagement strategies.
Managing Director Katy Shanahan (“Shanahan”)

Since joining Kroll in 2006, Shanahan has worked on, and currently manages, a variety of complex
multijurisdictional investigations on behalf of clients in diverse sectors, including large-scale due diligence
assignments in support of IPOs and other transactional dealings, asset searches, investigations of
employee fraud and misconduct, and theft of intellectual property. Her efforts support her clients’ needs in
crisis management, litigation support and corporate contests. Additionally, she has significant experience
in both cyber security and physical and operational security casework. Prior to joining Kroll, Shanahan
was an investigator with the U.S. Department of Labor’s Office of Labor-Management Standards. There,
she helped promote labor union and labor-management transparency through the enforcement of
reporting and disclosure requirements for unions and their officials, employers, labor relations consultants
and surety companies.
Associate Managing Director John Arvanitis (“Arvanitis”)

Arvanitis joined Kroll after a distinguished 27-year career with the U.S. Justice Department, Drug
Enforcement Administration (“DEA”). He most recently served as Special Agent in Charge of the New
England Field Division as a senior executive service member. In his time with the DEA, Arvanitis
developed and led numerous initiatives focusing on disrupting and dismantling transnational organized
crime syndicates, with an emphasis on their money laundering and other finance-related activities.
Currently as a member of Kroll’s Compliance practice, Arvanitis advises clients worldwide on anti-money
laundering matters and other aspects of compliance programs, bringing impactful and valuable insight to
their challenges via his extensive international and domestic financial investigative experience.

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RELEVANT PARTIES AND TIMELINE

The following contains a description of the relevant parties and a factual timeline of the key facts
developed and observed during Kroll’s investigation:
Relevant Parties
Officer Susan Zopatti (“Officer Zopatti”)
 Susan Marie (née Lawson) Zopatti (formerly known as Susan Hogan) was 50 years old at the
time of her death on May 19, 2016 from an apparent self-inflicted gunshot wound. She had
served as a BPD police officer since 1995 and served as the primary evidence room officer for
the Department since 2013.
Chief Russell Jenkins (“Chief Jenkins”)
 Chief Jenkins served the Braintree Police Department for 34 years as a patrolman, detective,
sergeant, lieutenant and Deputy Chief. As Deputy Chief, Jenkins oversaw and was responsible
for the BPD evidence program. He was appointed Chief on October 17, 2012, serving until his
retirement on October 7, 2016. As Chief, he was responsible for oversight of the entire BPD.
Deputy Chief Wayne Foster (“Deputy Chief Foster”)
 Deputy Chief Foster has served the BPD as a patrolman, sergeant and lieutenant. He was
appointed Deputy Chief on March 20, 2013. As Deputy Chief, he oversaw and was responsible
for the BPD evidence management program. Deputy Chief Foster was placed on paid
administrative leave from the Department on September 26, 2016.
Chief Paul Shastany (“Chief Shastany”)
 Chief Shastany was appointed Interim Chief on October 7, 2016. In early February 2017, he was
named as the official Chief of the Department.

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Bruce Gordon (“Gordon”)
 Gordon was a Major in the Massachusetts State Police and retired in 2010 after nearly 39 years,
according to his self-reported LinkedIn profile.1 He currently runs Narcotics Audit Solutions, based
in North Attleboro, Massachusetts, which conducts audits of evidence rooms for law enforcement
agencies.
Paul McSoley (“McSoley”)
 McSoley has served as administrative and finance director for the BPD since November 1983. In
this role, he is responsible for the annual budget, weekly payrolls, invoice payments and the
handling of seized money payments for the Department. Kroll learned during its investigation that
McSoley had previously been disciplined by the Department in October 1989 for not properly
making deposits of collected funds. This disciplinary action occurred after McSoley failed to
deposit over $1,340.00 in cash and $975.00 in checks over a 14-month period.
Richard Clifford (“Officer Clifford”)
 Officer Clifford served for several years as administrative officer, responsible for coordinating
detail shifts and overtime. He also served as evidence officer, responsible for the Department’s
evidence room immediately prior to Officer Zopatti’s appointment in April 2013.
Chief Paul Frazier (“Chief Frazier”)
 Chief Frazier served as Chief of the BPD from 1993 until Chief Jenkins’ appointment in 2012.
Michael Morrissey (“Morrissey”)
 Morrissey is District Attorney of Norfolk County. He was first elected to the position in November
2010.
Lynn Beland (“Beland”)
 Beland is First Assistant of the Norfolk County District Attorney’s Office.
Job Descriptions
The following job descriptions for Chief and Deputy Chief of the BPD were provided to Kroll for purposes
of this investigation:
Job Description of the Chief – date approved: May 1997
NATURE OF WORK:
This is administrative and technical law enforcement work in the direction of all employees and
activities of the Braintree Police Department. It is the highest position of responsibility as it relates
to the direction of all operations performed by the police department. Work involves the
responsibility for the protection of lives and property in the town through the supervision of all law
1 https://www.linkedin.com/in/bruce-gordon-7bb93734/

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enforcement functions. It involves the efficient operation of the police department through control
of activities and by taking measures to prevent crime and protect lives and property through the
planning of activities and the training, assignment, supervision and discipline of all department
employees.
As per General Law Chapter 41, Section 97A, “The Chief of Police shall be in immediate control
of all town property used by the department and of the police officers and other employees, whom
he shall assign to their respective duties and who shall obey his orders.”
SUPERVISION:
Works independently of direct supervision, but is subject to broad policies established by the
statutes, by-laws, and the Rules and Regulations of the Braintree Police Department written by
the Chief and approved by the Board of Selectmen.
JOB ENVIRONMENT:
Work is performed primarily in an office setting. At times an incumbent in this classification may
be subject to exposure to infectious diseases, hazardous materials, and exposure to all types of
serious affecting personal safety.
ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS:
(The essential functions or duties listed below are intended only as illustrations of the various
types of work that may be performed. The omission of specific statements of duties does not
exclude them from the position if the work is similar, related, or a logical assignment to the
position. Duties are not necessarily in order of importance or frequency of performance.)
 Formulates rules and regulations to govern the activities of employees of the Police
Department.
 Assesses the effectiveness of programs and procedures, making changes where

necessary to improve law enforcement operations.
 Convenes and presides over staff meetings to discuss policies, procedures and trends.
 Oversees the preparation of the Police Department budget and expenditure of funds.
 Ensures that recruit and in-service training programs are planned and conducted.
 Meets with sworn and civilian members of the Police Department, other Town Officials,
Town employees, civic groups and members of the public to discuss issues, explain
policies and procedures, respond to questions and resolve complaints.
 Cooperates with state and federal offices whenever their operations overlap with those of
the Braintree Police Department.
 Performs other related duties as assigned or as the situation dictates within the scope of
this classification.
 Interviews, conducts background investigations and recommends for appointment or

promotion all applicants for positions within the Braintree Police Department.

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 Actively participates in all appraisals of employees within the Braintree Police

Department.
 Actively participates in all appraisals of employees within the police department.
 Regular and predictable attendance.
KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS, AND ABILITY:
Knowledge: Knowledge of the principles and practices of the police administration and the
organization and operation of its bureaus and divisions. Knowledge of Massachusetts General
Laws, particularly the laws of arrest, evidence, and prosecution. Knowledge of the principles of
accidents and crime investigation and the techniques of interrogation. Knowledge of the uses of
the equipment used in law enforcement work, including the types of communications and record
keeping equipment. Working knowledge of labor relations and the collective bargaining process.
Skills: Skill in the maintenance and operation of firearms. Strong leadership, management and
organizational skills are essential.
Ability: Ability to plan, assign, and supervise the work of subordinate police personnel. Ability to
assess the efficiency of the operation of a bureau, division, or program, make recommendations
for change, and effect the changes promptly and tactfully. Ability to adapt established procedures
to specific issues or special conditions. Ability to meet with individuals or groups, including
members of other law enforcement agencies, express oneself clearly, interpret laws, obtain
information through interviews or interrogation and compile reports detailing the essence of what
was learned. Ability to prepare clear and concise reports. Ability to comprehend and at all times
adhere to the Law Enforcement Code of Ethics. Ability to understand written or oral instructions.
Ability to actively work with the community and related social agencies required.
REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS:
Candidates must possess a college degree in law enforcement from an accredited university. A
master’s degree or advanced training in law enforcement management preferred. As an
alternative, applicants shall be a high school graduate with at least ten (10) years of progressively
responsible experience in a law enforcement agency, five of which have been in an administrative
or command position.
Must possess a valid class “D” vehicle operator’s license.
Job Description of the Deputy Chief – date approval: unknown
NATURE OF WORK:
Administrative, supervisory and patrol work in assisting the chief of police in directing the
operations of the police department, in the protection of life and property, and in the prevention
and suppression of crime; all other related work as required. Work requires frequent application of
independent judgment for problems and situations not falling clearly within limitations of
established standards or precedents. Errors could be costly in terms of decreased or less efficient
protection of persons and property, and/or direct financial or legal repercussions and time loss
and delay.

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SUPERVISION:
Works under the general direction of the Chief of Police and in accordance with departmental
rules and regulations.
Supervises 19 full-time employees and up to 57 on call employees.
JOB ENVIRONMENT:
Most work is performed under typical office environment. Occasionally work is performed in the
field under varying weather conditions with occasional moderate physical effort required in
conducting patrols and investigations, and with constant exposure to occupational risks
connected with firearms, crimes in progress, and accident scenes.
ESSENTIAL FUNCTIONS:
(The essential functions or duties listed below are intended only as illustrations of the various
types of work that may be performed. The omission of specific statements of duties does not
exclude them from the position if the work is similar, related, or a logical assignment to the
position. Duties are not necessarily in order of importance or frequency of performance.)
 Supervises, evaluates, reviews and submits to the Chief the appropriate completion of
the tasks assigned to the Administrative Bureau, involving budgetary preparation, record
keeping, public relations, education and training, vehicle and building maintenance and
animal control.
 Responsible for the actions of the personnel assigned to the Administrative Bureau;
oversees the appropriate completion of their assigned tasks, inspects as necessary and
reports to the Chief.
 Completes special projects assigned by Chief; conducts research on a variety of matters

related to law enforcement and the administration of department; composes routine
administrative correspondence including directives to department personnel and new
releases.
 Researches, reviews and critiques collective bargaining issues and may attend
discussions of such issues as a recommending management representative.
 Performs preliminary screening of all applicants for positions with department.
 May have access to department-related confidential information including personnel

records, bid proposals, negotiating positions, and criminal investigations.
 Attends, participates in or makes presentations at meetings of various departmental or

governmental groups, boards, or commissions and shall state of defend departmental
policies or procedures.
 Calls for and presides at Planning and Research Group meetings to discuss matters
relayed for study, reports thereon, and makes recommendations to the Chief of Police.
 Frequent contact with the general public and other town departments requiring
perceptiveness and discretion.

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 Regular and predictable attendance.
KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS AND ABILITY:
Knowledge: Thorough knowledge of the principles and practices of police administration and of
approved police methods and procedures. Thorough knowledge of town, state, and federal laws
and regulations affecting police work.
Skills: Skills in the shooting and operation of firearms.
Ability: Ability to enforce the law impartially and to make sound judgments under stressful
situations. Ability to establish and maintain effective working relationships with town departments,
the general public and other law enforcements officials. Ability to lead and supervise
subordinates. Training and qualifications in the use of firearms. Ability to be certified in CPR and
as a first responder. Possession of a Class III Massachusetts motor vehicle operator’s license.
REQUIRED QUALIFICATIONS:
High School graduation; Associate’s degree, Bachelors degree or specialized training in law
enforcement or related field desirable; five years experience; or any equivalent combination of
education and experience.
Timeline
Background (1993 – 2012)
In 1993, Paul Frazier was appointed Chief of the BPD, a position he held until August 2012. During his
tenure, Chief Frazier issued a Department policy titled “Evidence & Property Control,” which governed the
control and protection of evidence. According to Section G of the Evidence & Property Control Policy, the
following procedures were to be followed concerning the management and oversight of the Department’s
evidence program:
G. Evidence/Property Room Inspections
1. The department’s evidence/property rooms and drug storage areas as well as the property
records and drug records are to be inventoried according to the following schedule:
a. SEMI-ANNUALLY: At least semi-annually, the supervisor of the

Evidence/Property Control Officer shall conduct an investigation of all
departmental evidence and property storage areas to ensure that:
i. Evidence/Property and drugs in custody, and the records relating

thereto, are being maintained in full compliance with the procedures
outlined in this directive and that proper accountability procedures are
being maintained;
ii. Property is properly stored and protected from damage and/or

deterioration;
iii. Property having no further evidentiary value is being disposed of

promptly; and

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iv. The evidence/property rooms are being maintained in a clean and

orderly condition.
b. UNSCHEDULED SEMI-ANNUAL: In addition to and in support of other regularly

scheduled inspections, the Chief of Police shall conduct an unannounced
inspection of the department's property rooms and drug storage areas on, at
least, a semi-annual basis. Accountability and security procedures will be the
primary focus of this inspection.
c. ANNUAL: In order to ensure the integrity of the department's Property

Management System, a supervisor not routinely connected with the
property/evidence function (assigned by the Chief of Police) will conduct a full
inventory and accounting of all property and drugs held by the Department and
will submit a report of his/her findings to the Chief of Police.
d. REASSIGNMENT OF THE EVIDENCE/PROPERTY CONTROL OFFICER: Should the

Evidence/Property Control Officer be reassigned, there shall be an inventory and
inspection of the records of all evidence/ property or drugs in custody by:
The former officer,
ii. The new Evidence/Property Control Officer and

iii. Their supervisor.
By Order Of:
Paul H. Frazier
Chief of Police
June 27, 2004: Russell Jenkins was appointed Deputy Chief under Chief Frazier. According to Chief
Jenkins’ statement to Kroll, from the time then-Deputy Chief Jenkins was appointed to that position, and
throughout his tenure as Chief (2012 – 2016), the BPD did not comply with Section G of the BPD’s
“Evidence & Property Control” policy. Similarly, it was Chief Jenkins’ belief that Section G was never
followed by Department personnel even prior to his assignment as Deputy Chief, despite the
Department’s Rules & Regulations (Rule 10.5 – “Policies and Procedures Compliance”), dated
September 23, 1994, mandating the following: “Officers shall read and be familiar with and comply with
the requirements of the Department’s Policies and Procedures Manual (Appendix A: BPD Rules &
Regulations).
Timeline 2012 - 2017
October 17, 2012: Chief Jenkins was promoted from Deputy Chief to Chief. Until his retirement on
October 6, 2016, Chief Jenkins never revised or replaced the Department’s “Evidence or Property
Control” policy.
January 28, 2013: The Department granted Officer Zopatti an intermittent leave of absence pursuant to
the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) to address a personal medical issue.
March 11, 2013: Deputy Chief Foster is promoted from Lieutenant to Deputy Chief.
March 15, 2013: Deputy Chief Foster sends an email to Karen Shanley, Director of Human Resources for
the Town of Braintree. Kroll notes that, at the time, Officer Zopatti had been out of work and had
exhausted her sick and vacation allotment. She received a sick time donation from other officers so that
she could continue to receive a paycheck. After receiving the donation, Officer Zopatti asked to convert
some of the days into vacation time so that she could take additional vacation in the future.

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*April 8, 2013:2 Officer Zopatti is selected to replace Officer Clifford, who planned to retire from the
Department in September 2013. Officer Clifford had served as both BPD administrative officer,
responsible for scheduling details and overtime, and evidence room officer, responsible for the
Department’s evidence room. In April, Officer Zopatti began working alongside Officer Clifford to train for
both positions. Kroll notes that as part of this reassignment, the Department failed to comply with
“Evidence & Property Control” policy Section G, Subsection D (detailed below):
REASSIGNMENT OF THE EVIDENCE/PROPERTY CONTROL OFFICER: Should the

Evidence/Property Control Officer be reassigned, there shall be an inventory and inspection of the
records of all evidence/ property or drugs in custody by:
i. The former officer [Richard Clifford]3
ii. The new Evidence/Property Control Officer and [Susan Zopatti]
iii. Their supervisor. [Deputy Wayne Foster]
August 2013: Officer Zopatti becomes sole evidence officer for the Department.
August 28, 2013: Officer Zopatti emails Deputy Chief Foster stating that there are concerns with the
evidence room including misplaced and/or missing evidence. She requests an audit of the evidence
room, which is never conducted.
November 25, 2013: Chief Jenkins requests the installation of two new cameras in the evidence room
and an alarm system that sounds in the Department’s operations center. One camera is positioned in the
main evidence room, and a second camera is positioned in the back portion of the evidence room where
high value items are stored. At some point after this date and prior to 2015, a new access control key fob
system is installed on the evidence room door.
January 27, 2014: Officer Zopatti is granted another intermittent leave of absence protected under FMLA
in order to tend to a sick family member.
May 29, 2014: Officer Zopatti is again granted an intermittent leave of absence pursuant to the FMLA to
tend to a sick family member.
On various dates during Officer Zopatti’s tenure as evidence room officer, Lieutenant Ware and Sargent
Querzoli express concerns to Deputy Chief Foster regarding Officer Zopatti’s attendance issues and/or
failure to respond to the District Attorney’s Office’s requests for evidence.
At some point between 2014 and 2015, two female colleagues from the Department meet with Officer
Zopatti and, out of personal concern, confront Officer Zopatti about concerns with her drinking and
personal life.
April 23, 2015: Deputy Chief Foster and Chief Jenkins meet with Officer Zopatti to discuss her attendance
at work and the burden her absence is causing the Department. Chief Jenkins notes that, in 2014, Officer
Zopatti had used 18 sick days, 11 of which were combined with vacation days or other absentee
qualifications, thereby, creating the appearance of a pattern of abuse.
2 Where designated with an asterisk (*), the dates in this timeline are approximations and should more accurately be read as “on or
around” the date indicated.
3 According to Clifford, no audit of the evidence room was conducted upon his appointment as evidence room officer.

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During the week of October 5, 2015, Officer McHugh and Officer Holt request on behalf of the union to
remove Officer Zopatti’s responsibility for scheduling outside details and time off and transfer the role to
Officer Twohig. According to the officers, detail assignments are not properly being added to the time
sheets, and time off requests are not properly being recorded. These issues are attributed to Officer
Zopatti’s continued absenteeism.
October 13, 2015: Chief Jenkins speaks with Officer Zopatti and releases her from overseeing the detail
scheduling and overtime assignments. Officer Zopatti voices to others that she is overwhelmed with the
work requirement in the evidence room. Kroll learns through various interviews that Officer Clifford, the
prior evidence room officer, handled the evidence management program, scheduled outside detail
assignments and wrote grants as part of his responsibility.
December 2015: Gordon sends the Department an advertising brochure for his auditing service. Chief
Jenkins directs Deputy Chief Foster to contact Gordon and arrange for an audit of the evidence room.
These efforts to engage Gordon continue into January 2016.
On or about January 26, 2016: The BPD receives a request to return $1,848 dollars being held as
evidence to a defendant who has a court order for a return of the funds seized. This request results in the
discovery that the money is missing from the evidence room. Although the detectives and supervisor
involved in the arrest and seizure reported in the records management system that they had submitted
the money into evidence for processing, Officer Zopatti states she is unaware of any money having been
entered into evidence on the case. The Department finds no record of the money being entered into
evidence by Officer Zopatti. The detectives are adamant that they placed the funds into the evidence
locker. Deputy Chief Foster, who is in charge of all internal affairs investigations for the Department, does
not commence an internal affairs investigation relative to these missing funds. He assigns Officer Zopatti
(who, according to the detectives, was the only person who could have taken or misplaced the funds) to
look for the missing money in the evidence room. Eventually, Deputy Chief Foster authorizes payment of
the funds to the person making the request, even though the money was never located.
March – May 2016: Officer Zopatti informs co-workers that her mother is selling the house in which they
live and that she will need to find a new place to live.
On or about May 12, 2016, Deputy Chief Foster and Chief Jenkins learn that officers who had prepared
evidentiary rape kits were unable to store the kits in the proper storage refrigerator because the
temporary and secondary refrigerators were full of kits that Officer Zopatti should have removed, logged
as evidence and transferred to the state lab. The rape kits dated back to January 20, 2016. Officer Zopatti
states that she tried to schedule an appointment with the state lab but was unable to do so. However,
immediately after learning of the backlog, Officer Kenneth Bregoli, the current administrative officer, calls
the state lab and schedules an appointment for the next day.
Kroll notes that allowing the rape kits to accumulate and failing to transfer them on a timely basis, as well
as failing to make contact with the state lab, were serious breaches of evidence handling and could have
had a significant impact on some of the most serious investigations conducted by the BPD.
May 12, 2016: Chief Jenkins contacts Human Resources Director Karen Shanley for guidance on how to
remove Officer Zopatti from the evidence room assignment due to concerns with her ability to do the
work. He states that he knows he cannot move her “because she’s on FMLA” but that she “was not doing
her job.” He informs Shanley of the latest concern regarding Officer Zopatti’s handling of the rape kits,
telling Shanley that personnel in the Department were calling Officer Zopatti “the Annie Dookhan [former
state lab chemist sent to prison for manipulating evidence of the Braintree Police Department.” Shanley
explains that the Chief and his administration need to follow certain protocol prior to removing Officer
Zopatti from a union protected position. Shanley asks if there had been prior counseling or disciplinary

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action for the previous shortcomings and if any concerns had been documented in Officer Zopatti’s
personnel file. Shanley informs Chief Jenkins of the appropriate steps for the Department to take in
advance of any adverse personnel action against Officer Zopatti. Koll Notes that Zopatti did not have any
contractual rights to be the evidence officer and could have been given another assignment without
violating the contract.
That afternoon, Chief Jenkins again speaks with Officer Zopatti regarding her work performance and
informs her that the conversation was her final warning. Also present are Deputy Chief Foster and Officer
Ryan McHugh, a union representative. Chief Jenkins expresses his disappointment regarding Officer
Zopatti’s handling of the rape kits and advises Officer Zopatti that the following day, Gordon is to conduct
an audit of the evidence room. Chief Jenkins states that Gordon is coming to the BPD and that Officer
Zopatti must be present to answer any of Gordon’s questions.
May 13, 2016: Officer Zopatti arrives late for the meeting with Gordon. When she arrives, she is wearing
sunglasses and acting in a bizarre manner. Deputy Chief Foster believes he smells alcohol on Officer
Zopatti’s breath and that she is intoxicated while on duty. Deputy Chief Foster informs the Chief of his
concerns. Chief Jenkins seeks guidance from Shanley, who suggests having another supervisor
corroborate Deputy Chief Foster’s concerns and then refer Officer Zopatti to an employee assistance
program (“EAP”). Lieutenant MacAleese and McSoley are asked by Chief Jenkins to corroborate Deputy
Chief Foster’s concerns (i.e. the existence of alcohol on Officer Zopatti’s breath). Although Lieutenant
MacAleese and McSoley are unable to detect an odor of alcohol, Lieutenant MacAleese reports that she
believes Officer Zopatti is “on something.” No one formally confronts Officer Zopatti regarding their
concerns, and no formal action is taken. Officer Zopatti is allowed to leave the BPD and drive herself
home for lunch. Gordon conducts a walk-through of the evidence room with Deputy Chief Foster to
develop an investigative plan and budget for his audit. Shanley calls Chief Jenkins to inquire as to how
the EAP referral went between Chief Jenkins and Officer Zopatti. Shanley is “shocked” to learn that
Officer Zopatti was allowed to leave the Department and that she was not referred to an EAP.
May 16, 2016: Gordon recommends that a secondary lock be installed on a file cabinet housed in Officer
Zopatti’s Evidence Room to which she alone had access and which contained all of the Department’s
financial evidence. Gordon further recommends that Deputy Chief Foster maintain custody of the key to
the second lock so that two people are always required when dealing with financial evidence.
May 17, 2016: Gordon emails Deputy Chief Foster with an estimate for the BPD audit. He indicates that
he could commence work the third or fourth week of June, anticipating that it would take 10 to 15 days,
depending on how the accuracy of the records. That same day, a second lock is placed on the financial
evidence file cabinet by Baystate Locksmith Services. Officer Zopatti is not present at the BPD that day.
May 17, 2016: McSoley sends a request to the Accounting Department for eleven (11) checks to be
issued to the Norfolk District Attorney’s Office for its portion of equitable sharing funds. With the exception
of one (1) case, McSoley requests these payments without making a corresponding deposit on or before
the date the payment was requested. All eleven (11) check requests are for cases that the District
Attorney’s Office had requested its share of the forfeited funds months or years earlier.
Kroll notes that the normal process is for a court order to be sent to the BPD to remove the cash from the
evidence room and deposit it into the Town’s account. McSoley was responsible for presenting the court
order to the evidence officer and having the cash signed out to his custody. He was then required to
deposit the cash into the Town account and request a check for 50% of the funds to be paid to the District
Attorney’s Office for its portion of the equitable sharing funds. The remaining 50% of the funds would
remain in the Town’s account.

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May 18, 2016: Officer Zopatti is shown the secondary lock in the early morning hours and told that both
she and Deputy Chief Foster were required to be present in the future to access any financial evidence
stored in the file cabinet. Later that day, Officer Zopatti leaves work for lunch and does not return to the
BPD.
May 19, 2016: Officer Zopatti is found deceased in her home of a suspected self-inflicted gunshot.
May 26, 2016: Deputy Chief Foster begins cleaning out Officer Zopatti’s desk. He gathers some items and
then stops after he finds a notepad designed to look like the outline of a shooting victim with a red mark
and a hole to store a pen in the chest area. He was startled by the image. He throws the drawing in the
trash, stops his efforts and later instructs Lieutenant MacAleese to clean out Officer Zopatti’s office and
gather her personal effects for her family.
May 28-29, 2016: Over the weekend, while Lieutenant MacAleese clears out Officer Zopatti’s desk, she
discovers loose packages of cocaine from previously sealed evidence bags. Some of the bags are open
and alongside drug paraphernalia, and she finds cocaine powder in the desk drawer. Lieutenant
MacAleese notifies Deputy Chief Foster. Deputy Chief Foster does not respond to the scene.
May 30, 2016: On Monday morning, Lieutenant MacAleese does not see Deputy Chief Foster in his office
and slides the drug evidence in an envelope under Deputy Chief Foster’s office door.
May 30, 2016: Lieutenant MacAleese emails Deputy Chief Foster to notify him that she slid drug evidence
found in Officer Zopatti’s desk under his door. Deputy Chief Foster then forwards Lieutenant MacAleese’s
email to Chief Jenkins stating “FYI.”
May 30, 2016 (or shortly after): Officer Zopatti’s BPD-issued cell phone is provided to Braintree Electric
Light Department (“BELD”) IT Manager Jim Boyle for recycling following Boyle’s meeting with Deputy
Chief Foster and Chief Jenkins. The phone is destroyed. Officer Zopatti’s Department-issued computer is
also cleaned and reassigned to another officer.
Kroll notes that any forensic evidence concerning Officer Zopatti’s activity contained on the devices was,
therefore, compromised or destroyed. There was no discussion with the Massachusetts State Police
Crime Prevention and Control (CPAC) Unit concerning the retention of Officer Zopatti’s phone or
computer despite the CPAC’s ongoing criminal investigation into her death.
*On or about June 2, 2016: Officers Ron Solimini and Kenneth Bregoli are assigned to the evidence room
and tasked with organizing the disorder. Former Evidence Officer Richard Clifford is also hired to train /
assist Officer Solimini with the evidence room.
June 10th 2016: Officer Zopatti’s former husband, Mark Zopatti, turns over to BPD two firearms that he
finds at Officer Zopatti’s home. The firearms were later determined to have been stolen from the BPD
evidence room. Consistent with Chief Jenkins’ and Deputy Chief Foster’s prior inaction, no internal affairs
investigation is opened and no notification is provided to the Norfolk County District Attorney’s Office or
the Massachusetts State Police Crime Prevention and Control (CPAC) Unit. There is also no review of
video from the evidence room and no search warrants sought for Officer Zopatti’s home, camper, vehicle
or bank accounts. (one of the firearms was not logged into evidence until August 11th)*
Kroll notes that since Officers Solimini and Bregoli’s assignment, they have performed yeoman work in
bringing order to the evidence room and have worked tirelessly to locate missing items and documents.
*June 17, 2016: McSoley provides Officer Solimini with several forfeiture requests from the District
Attorney’s Office and asks that he obtain cash from the evidence room to pay the forfeiture amounts

13
owed to the Norfolk County District Attorney’s Office. These forfeiture payments, in fact, had already been
paid to the District Attorney’s Office approximately one month earlier, on May 17, 2016, contrary to best
accounting practices and not the established BPD directive. Officer Solimini conducts a search for the
money in the evidence room and provides McSoley with cash associated with those cases; deposits are
made. McSoley also deposits cash from four cases where records show he had been in possession of the
funds for several months.
On or about June 21, 2016: McSoley asks Officer Solimini to retrieve cash from the evidence room for two
additional forfeiture payments. Officer Solimini is unable to find $1,052.00 in cash associated with Incident
No. 2013-206923. Officer Solimini reports this discrepancy to McSoley, Deputy Chief Foster and Chief
Jenkins.
On or about June 21, 2016: Officer Solimini is attempting to retrieve additional cash for a forfeiture
payment to be made to the District Attorney’s Office, as requested by McSoley. Officer Solimini reports to
Chief Jenkins, Deputy Chief Foster and McSoley that he had discovered a ripped open evidence bag in
the cash drawer for Incident No. 2015-05197. Although $1,408 was supposed to be in the evidence bag,
there remained only $1,028, with $390 missing from evidence. Chief Jenkins authorizes McSoley to pay
the District Attorney’s Office its half ($704) pursuant to the court order and put the remaining cash back in
the evidence room.
On or about June 29, 2016: A women came into the police station to claim $1,000.00 that she had found
at the Burlington Coat Factory and turned into the BPD one year earlier. She had come to the Department
to take ownership of the unclaimed funds. Officer Solimini reports that the money was missing from the
evidence room. This information is communicated to Deputy Chief Foster and Chief Jenkins. Deputy
Chief Foster authorizes McSoley to issue a check to the woman for $1,000 from the Town account. At or
around this time, Deputy Chief Foster also gives Officer Solimini the property printout report for the cash
that was deemed missing the previous January ($1,848) and instructs Officer Solimini to look for the
$1,848, as well as the missing $1,000 from the Burlington Coat Factory.
Kroll notes that although multiple cases of missing and tampered funds were discovered in the financial
cabinet, which was under the sole custody and control of Officer Zopatti until a secondary lock was
installed, and stolen drug evidence was discovered in her desk at the BPD, neither Officer Zopatti’s office
nor the financial evidence locker were secured as potential crime scenes. This act would have been
Deputy Chief Foster’s responsibility as he was in charge of internal affairs investigations. In addition, no
internal affairs investigation or criminal investigation was ever opened by the BPD or authorized by Chief
Jenkins or Deputy Chief Foster. There was no review of video in the evidence room. There was no
notification to the Norfolk County District Attorney’s Office or the Massachusetts State Police Crime
Prevention and Control (CPAC) Unit, which was handling Officer Zopatti’s death investigation. No search
warrants were sought for Officer Zopatti’s home, camper, vehicle or bank accounts, and there was no top-
to-bottom search of the office or its contents, or any effort made to preserve physical evidence in the
financial evidence locker, evidence room or Officer Zopatti’s office.
Additionally, Kroll notes that, from at least October 2012 through June 2016, no audit or review of the
BPD evidence program occurred, as required by Department regulations, to ensure that the Department’s
evidence program was in compliance with the existing rules and regulations of the Department.
July 28, 2016: 61 days after the discovery of drugs in Officer Zopatti’s desk, Gordon begins his audit of
the Department’s evidence room, including a review of seized money, drug evidence, firearms and
property evidence. He immediately identifies multiple items missing from the evidence room, including
cash, firearms and drug evidence, and identifies compromised evidence bags (Appendix B – Gordon’s
Audit Report). Gordon’s audit continues for several weeks. Although there was clear evidence that drugs,

14
money and firearms had been stolen, the audit continued, as did efforts to identify the extent of the thefts
and to determine if losses could be minimized.
*Mid-August 2016: A few days after the audit commences, First Assistant Lynn Beland informs Chief
Jenkins that the District Attorney’s Office had heard about issues with the BPD evidence program and
requested to know if there was any reason for concern. District Attorney Morrissey subsequently informed
Kroll that he was advised by Chief Jenkins that there was an audit being conducted by an outside auditor
and that BPD was trying to locate items that could not be found. District Attorney Morrissey was informed
by Chief Jenkins that the audit report might have included items listed as evidence but never actually
submitted to the evidence room. The District Attorney asked to review cases that may potentially affect
the integrity of those the District Attorney’s Office had prosecuted or were currently prosecuting.
Staff members of the District Attorney’s Office subsequently went to BPD, met with the auditor and
observed some of the evidence. The staff members specifically went to BPD to ensure that everyone was
aware of the impact that compromises to the handling of evidence would have on cases and defendants
in custody. The staff members asked for all tainted cases and immediately notified involved defense
counsel. They also requested an update if anything was discovered that could impact the integrity of the
evidence program or that could affect current or past cases. The District Attorney was not informed of the
recovered stolen drugs and firearms in Officer Zopatti’s desk and trailer.
August 24, 2016: Lieutenant Moschella is assigned, along with Officer Ronald Solimini, to locate cash that
was improperly accounted for or misidentified in Gordon’s audit. Lieutenant Moschella and Officer
Solomini both discover inconsistencies in McSoley’s financial record keeping and make verbal and
electronic requests for missing deposit documents to McSoley. McSoley recommends that they look
through archived documents and claims that he is searching through his files for the documents.
McSoley later admitted to Kroll that he never made those deposits and knew they did not exist when
directing his colleagues to search the archives for the documents.
On or about August 30, 2016: Chief Jenkins informs Braintree Mayor Joseph Sullivan that an audit had
concluded that the Department was missing cash, firearms and narcotics and that some of the missing
items may be attributed to Officer Zopatti.
On or about August 31, 2016: Mayor Sullivan and District Attorney Morrissey notify the Massachusetts
Attorney General of suspected theft from the BPD evidence room and request that the Attorney General’s
Office conduct a criminal investigation.
August 31, 2016: Lieutenant Moschella submits a written report to Chief Jenkins identifying concerns
regarding McSoley’s accounting practices. Specifically, Lieutenant Moschella notes at least six cases
where the Town issued a check to the District Attorney’s Office for its equitable sharing funds without a
corresponding deposit of cash retrieved from the evidence room. Lieutenant Moschella recommends that
a full forensic audit be conducted. Kroll notes that such an audit was never commenced by the
Department. Neither Chief Jenkins nor Deputy Chief Foster notify anyone of the serious accounting
discrepancies discovered by Lieutenant Moschella.
September 14, 2016: BPD releases a copy of Gordon’s audit with a response from the BPD that the audit
was over-inclusive and that due to record keeping errors, some items that were reported as stolen or
missing were actually mislabeled in the Department’s records management system. Eventually, this
determination lowers the number of discrepancies reported in Gordon’s audit report.

15
September 14th, 2016: Local media outlets report on problems with the BPD evidence management
program, including the discovery of stolen cocaine in Officer Zopatti’s desk and the recovery of stolen
firearms in her trailer. District Attorney Morrissey is alerted to the stolen cocaine and firearms through the
media reports and directs his staff to intensify their review and identify any ongoing or previous cases that
were tainted by the compromises. The Attorney General’s Office commences an independent criminal
investigation parallel to the review conducted by the District Attorney’s Office.
September 22, 2016: Chief Jenkins announces that he will retire effective October 7, 2016.
September 26, 2016: Deputy Chief Foster is placed on paid administrative leave from the Department.
September 30, 2016: Kroll is engaged by the Town of Braintree’s Solicitor’s Office to conduct an
independent administrative investigation of the BPD’s internal policies and procedures pertaining to
evidence handling, processing and storing.
October 7, 2016: Chief Jenkins officially retires from the Department, and Chief Shastany is named as
Interim Chief.
December 2016: Chief Shastany requests that Kroll expand the scope of its investigation to include
interviews of all sworn Department personnel in order to allow all personnel the opportunity to provide
information relative to this investigation.
Mid-January 2017: Kroll identifies concerns regarding McSoley’s handling of financial evidence and
accounting practices after reviewing relevant reports and documents. Kroll requests to interview McSoley.
February 10, 2017: Kroll interviews McSoley concerning discrepancies with his accounting practices.
McSoley admits that he did not follow proper procedures and that he had directed payments be made by
the Town of Braintree to the District Attorney’s Office without first obtaining the proper funds from the
evidence room. McSoley attributes his actions to Officer Zopatti’s inconsistent job performance. His
interview raises concerns that he may have knowingly obstructed the investigation into missing funds.
Solicitor Maki and Chief Shastany are notified of Kroll’s concerns.
February 13, 2017: McSoley is placed on administrative leave. Kroll is asked to conduct a complete
forensic audit of the BPD’s handling of and accounting for financial evidence. The investigation finds
gross incompetence with basic accounting practices, knowingly fraudulent submissions of false
documents and lack of candor/interference with two law enforcement investigations.
Kroll’s Investigative Tasks

In conducting this investigation, Kroll’s team of professionals performed the following tasks:
 Conducted a site assessment of the BPD’s main evidence room, two storage containers located
outside in the Department’s parking lot, the overflow storage area in the Department’s garage and
an outside lot containing seized vehicles.
 Reviewed the extent and manner of how evidence is handled, processed and stored in the
evidence facilities.
 Attempted to quantify the amount of evidence being stored in the evidence facilities.
 Reviewed the current physical security program for the evidence facilities.
 Conducted initial interviews of the following witnesses:
o Chief Jenkins

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o Deputy Chief Foster

o BELD IT Manager Jim Boyle
o Lieutenants Karen MacAleese, Michael Want, Sean Lydon, Jeffrey Smith, David
DelPappa, Timothy Calhoon, Kevin Ware and Michael Moschella
 Met with newly-appointed Chief Shastany in October 2016 and provided preliminary
recommendations for immediate consideration regarding the processing, handling and storing of
evidence, as well as enhancing the overall integrity of the Department’s evidence storage
process.
 Worked with Chief Shastany to implement recommendations that could immediately improve the
integrity of the Department’s evidence room.
 Explored various technological enhancements, including those presented at the 2016
International Association of Chiefs of Police Conference, as well as technology deployed at other
Massachusetts police departments.
 Interviewed BELD employee to observe the Department’s current camera deployment and
recovered all video footage for the two cameras in the evidence room back to December 2015.
 Liaised with Department software provider, Pamet, to understand the Department’s current
records management system and gain an understanding of future system updates / releases.
 Received and reviewed Zopatti’s emails.
 Liaised with the Attorney General’s office to ensure that Kroll’s investigation did not intersect with
the criminal investigation.
 Conducted interviews of all sworn personnel, as well as five civilian employees (listed
immediately below).
 Reviewed emails of Chief Jenkins, Deputy Chief Foster and Paul McSoley.
 Conducted a full investigative audit of the BPD’s forfeiture fund back to 2013.
Interview List of BPD Sworn Personnel and Civilians

Personnel Date Personnel Date
Chief Russell Jenkins 10/06/16 Ofr. David Jordan 01/17/17
Deputy Chief Wayne Foster 10/11/16 Ofr. Donald Delaney 01/17/17
BELD IT Manager Jim Boyle 10/18/16 Ofr. Jennifer Zakowsky 01/17/17
Lt. David DelPappa 12/07/16 Ofr. John McNamara 01/17/17
Lt. Jeffrey Smith 12/07/16 Ofr. Kenneth Bregoli 01/17/17
Lt. Karen MacAleese 12/07/16 Ofr. Kevin Timulty 01/17/17
Lt. Kevin Ware 12/07/16 Ofr. Paul Zaniboni 01/17/17
Lt. Michael Moschella 12/07/16 Ofr. Richard Hale 01/17/17
Lt. Michael Want 12/07/16 Ofr. Ryan McHugh 01/17/17
Lt. Sean Lydon 12/07/16 Ofr. Sean Dias 01/17/17
Lt. Timothy Cohoon 12/07/16 Ofr. William Donnellan 01/17/17
Det. Kristine Lydon 01/05/17 Ofr. Zachary Clark 01/17/17
Ofr. Bill Cushing 01/05/17 Sgt. Charles Beta 01/17/17
Ofr. John Hurley 01/05/17 Sgt. Joseph Molloy 01/17/17
Ofr. John Ouellette 01/05/17 Ofr. Blake Holt 01/31/17
Ofr. Meri Golden 01/05/17 Ofr. Brian Kelley 01/31/17

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Personnel Date Personnel Date

Ofr. Mike Arki 01/05/17 Ofr. Brian Stuart 01/31/17
Ofr. Paul Hamilton 01/05/17 Ofr. Brianna Mahoney 01/31/17
Ofr. Preston Williams 01/05/17 Ofr. Corey Chambers_January 2017 01/31/17
Ofr. Robert Chin 01/05/17 Ofr. Derrick Burr 01/31/17
Ofr. Tricia Flaherty 01/05/17 Ofr. John Connolly 01/31/17
Sgt. Brian Adams 01/05/17 Ofr. Matt Columbus 01/31/17
Sgt. Richard Curtin 01/05/17 Ofr. Thomas Flannery 01/31/17
Sgt. Robert Joseph 01/05/17 Sgt. Phillip Yee 01/31/17
Sgt. Ted Querzoli 01/05/17 Staff Executive Paul McSoley 02/10/17
Det. Brian Cohoon 01/12/17 Custodian Ronald Shea 02/16/17
Det. Charles Paris 01/12/17 Det. Thomas Molloy 02/16/17
Det. Mark Sherrick 01/12/17 Ofr. Brian Eng 02/16/17
Det. Matthew Crowley 01/12/17 Ofr. Corey Chambers_February 2017 02/16/17
Det. Matthew Heslam 01/12/17 Ofr. Dan Kallenberg 02/16/17
Det. Nate Killeffer 01/12/17 Ofr. David Littlewood 02/16/17
Ofr. Brendan McLaughlin 01/12/17 Ofr. John Cole 02/16/17
Ofr. Brian Jenkins 01/12/17 Ofr. Joseph Tosone 02/16/17
Ofr. Edwin Woo 01/12/17 Ofr. Keith Connaughton 02/16/17
Ofr. Jack Twohig 01/12/17 Ofr. Richard Seibert 02/16/17
Ofr. Paul Campbell 01/12/17 Ofr. Tim White 02/16/17
Ofr. Peter Gillis 01/12/17 Sgt. James Mosesso 02/16/17
Ofr. Ronald Solimini 01/12/17 Deputy Chief Wayne Foster 03/07/17
Ofr. Steve Wallace 01/12/17 Ofr. Lisa Fahey 03/07/17
Sgt. Sean McConville 01/12/17 Former Evidence Officer Richie Clifford 03/20/17
Det. James Peters 01/17/17 Lt. Michael Moschella 06/19/17
Ofr. Brandon Sullivan 01/17/17 Ofr. Ronald Solimini 06/19/17
Ofr. Corey Hutson 01/17/17 HR Director Karen Shanley 06/29/17
Ofr. David Clark 01/17/17 Det. Mark Sherrick 07/11/17
Documentary Evidence
 Completed Carney Rights forms for sworn personnel
 Transcribed interview of Paul McSoley
 Transcribed interview of Russ Jenkins
 Transcribed interview of Michael Want
 Transcribed interview of Kevin Ware
 Transcribed interview of Timothy Cohoon
 Transcribed interview of Sean Lydon
 Transcribed interview of Michael Moschella
 Transcribed interview of Ted Querzoli
 Transcribed interview of Wayne Foster

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 Roster of Braintree Police Department personnel

 Financial documents
 Reviewed emails to and from Russ Jenkins
 Reviewed emails to and from Sue Zopatti
 Reviewed emails to and from Ted Querzoli
 Reviewed emails to and from Paul McSoley
 Reviewed emails to and from Wayne Foster
 Assorted emails
 Braintree Police Department’s Rules and Procedures
 Assorted Braintree Police Department reports and documents

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INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF BPD’S EVIDENCE HANDLING

PROCEDURES AND SECURITY PROGRAM
Upon commencement of Kroll’s investigation, the team reviewed the policies, practices and procedures of
the BPD evidence program. Kroll further reviewed how evidence was processed before and after Officer
Zopatti’s death and conducted a physical assessment of the evidence room and accompanying access
control systems.
Upon initially inspecting the evidence room, Kroll identified the following concerns that required immediate
recommendations. These concerns included physical conditions that continued to exist even after
Gordon’s audit and presented continuing security deficiencies impacting the integrity of the BPD’s
evidence program, and therefore, needed to be addressed immediately.
 The main evidence room had a drop ceiling that could be accessed easily from the evidence
processing room by simply removing the ceiling tiles.
Photo of drop ceiling of evidence room.

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 The evidence pass-through system consisted of duel-access lockers between the evidence
processing/report writing room and the evidence room. Kroll learned that the largest storage
locker – typically reserved for items of evidence, such as rifles – was large enough to allow
someone to pass through the wall and improperly access the evidence room. Kroll opened the
locker door in the evidence processing/report writing room and easily manipulated the lock on the
opposite side, opening the door into the evidence room side of the pass through. A member of
Kroll’s investigative team successfully passed directly from the evidence processing/report writing
room into the evidence room.
Photo of evidence locker Kroll walked through Photo of lock opened with a finger
 Visitors to the evidence room were not required to sign into a log sheet.
 Large bulk items of drugs were kept in two outside storage trailers in the back of the
Department’s parking lot. The trailers were only secured by a simple padlock. Additionally, the
view to the area was obstructed, especially at night, and was not monitored by any cameras.
There were no alarms on the trailers and no cameras monitoring activity inside them. If someone
was so motivated, they could easily cut the padlock and remove large quantities of drugs
undetected.
Photo of outside bulk storage locker
 While there were two cameras inside the evidence room, the cameras were not monitored in real
time and were recorded and stored offsite by BELD. Additionally, there were no cameras inside
the evidence officer’s office or the processing/report writing room. No one at the police

21
department was able to obtain a live view or aware of how to retrieve video of past recordings. No
one in the BPD ever viewed video of the evidence room, including Chief Jenkins or Deputy Chief
Foster.
 The evidence room has two separate areas, including an inner secured area which houses the
high value items, such as drugs, firearms, money, and jewelry. The camera in that room had not
been functioning for quite some time.
 Although there are current policies within the Department that mandate periodic audits of the
evidence room by the Deputy Chief, Deputy Chief Foster had not performed this role at any point
during his tenure as Deputy Chief. Similarly, Chief Jenkins had never performed this role at any
point as Deputy Chief or Chief of the Department.
 There were no supervisors involved in the evidence submission process. Officers document their
own evidence and submit it into an evidence locker to be processed by the evidence officer.
Often the evidence officers have to repackage items and add additional information to the
processing forms, which could result in discrepancies.
 There was an alarm system that would sound an audible alert at the supervisors’ desk if a door
was forced open. However, the alert at its highest volume was barely audible and many BPD
personnel were unaware of its existence or purpose. While an intrusion would cause the cameras
to record anyone climbing over the ceiling or passing through the large evidence locker, it would
not trigger a motion alarm. Because the cameras were not monitored live or reviewed by BPD
personnel, and as the camera in the high-value evidence area did not properly function, the risk
of detection was negligible.
Preliminary Recommendations
Kroll recommended initial measures to improve the Department’s processing, handling and storing of
evidence, and to enhance the overall integrity of the Department’s evidence storage process. Kroll
subsequently worked with Chief Shastany to implement these recommendations, which included the
following:
 Identify another location within the facility that has solid walls and ceilings or make immediate
security improvements to the current evidence room in order to prevent someone from accessing
the evidence processing room by simply removing the ceiling tiles.
 Immediately install a locking mechanism on the evidence room side to prevent someone from
passing through the evidence room wall from the processing/report writing room.
 Create and enforce a written directive addressing the use of a visitors’ log in the evidence room to
include, at a minimum, the following:
o Require any person (other than evidence officers) entering and departing any storage
area to sign an established visitors’ log, which identifies the individual, date and time of
entry/exit, and purpose for entering the storage area.
o Ensure that all visitors be in the immediate and constant physical presence of evidence
officers.

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 Combine the contents of the two outside storage trailers into one and move the trailer into the
Department’s underground garage. This will help prevent access by non-department personnel,
and an existing camera can constantly monitor the trailer. This also enables the unit to maintain
the current locking system with only authorized personnel allowed access.
 Install cameras covering all areas of the evidence room, processing/report writing room, and
evidence officer’s office. These cameras should be monitored by the Department’s on-duty watch
commander in real time similar to the monitoring of other areas of the facility.
 Identify an appropriate member of personnel to supervise the evidence officers, ensure the
quality of their work and conduct mandated audits. With these audits, the supervisor should
review camera footage to ensure compliance with all rules and regulations.
 All evidence submitted by an officer should be examined and verified by a supervisor prior to
placing it into the evidence locker. The type of evidence, description and quantity should be
standardized within the Department, and it should be documented and submitted by the officer
and the supervisor. Any discrepancies that require repackaging by the evidence officer should be
brought to the attention of a supervisor for review.
 Provide off-site training for new evidence officers.
Additional Department Enhancements

Upon receiving these recommendations, Chief Shastany worked with Kroll and others to identify a new
space within the Department to build an enhanced evidence room that would meet the recommendations
made by Kroll and the current law enforcement best practices. The Department also did the following:
 Enhanced the physical security of the large rifle locker between the processing/report writing
room and the evidence room by adding a lock on the interior door.
 Large bulk items were consolidated from two outside trailers into one trailer. That one trailer was
moved into the Department facility garage, where it is now monitored by two cameras externally
and has internal cameras that can monitor activity. Additionally, the locking mechanism was
changed from one single padlock to two.
 The two current evidence officers attended off-site training regarding best practices for evidence
room operations.
 The Department implemented and is enforcing a visitor log-in procedure in the evidence room.
 The Department installed additional temporary cameras in the existing evidence room that can be
reviewed in real time from the watch commander’s station.
 The Department has conducted audits of the facility in addition to the Gordon Audit.

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INVESTIGATIVE FINDINGS
As a result of our interviews and a review of the evidence, Kroll makes the following findings and
observations:
Concerns with Officer Zopatti

Officer Zopatti’s Notable Decline While Employed at BPD
According to Chief Jenkins’ testimony, Officer Zopatti was hired in October 1995 and, at the time of her
death, had been a member of the BPD for approximately 21 years. Several members of the Department
commented that, prior to recent years, Officer Zopatti was a “good” police officer and “liked the
investigative side” of the work. Lieutenant MacAleese stated that prior to 2012, there “were some periods
where she was good. I think prior to going in there [evidence room], I think she was – she was fine…She
definitely liked the investigative side of work much more and she did very good investigations at some
points.” Chief Jenkins similarly noted:
“I think it – I think if people were honest with you, Dan [Linskey], truthfully, they would tell you with –
and the caveat is, when she came to work, okay? When she came to work, she was a good cop.
She – she was thorough. She did a good investigation. She wrote a good report. She was
compassionate with people. I got a very nice letter from a person. She did a – a sudden death one
day, and – and stayed with the – this – this woman with mental health issues while her family from
Rhode Island responded to help with the – with the – with the deceased person, and she stayed
there and comforted her. So, you know, she was a kind person, you know. You know, she was
always – she always seemed to have a – Well, let me – let me back up. I mean she was – I mean I
think you could call it disgruntled under – under the former administration. I think that under my
administration, she was happier and – and more – yeah, I think she did a good job, you know?”
Time and Attendance Issues
However, during the course of her employment, both Chief Jenkins and Deputy Chief Foster, as well as
several other personnel, noted that Officer Zopatti had issues relative to her time and attendance. Chief
Jenkins said:
“Her one failure I would say or whatever you want to call was she – she – she was a sick time
abuser. She was use – she has no sick time, all right? She was – she would get – you know, she
had a few, you know, memos in her jacket about, you know, not coming to work, that sort of thing. I

24
– I sent her a few as the Deputy Chief for, you know, taking – taking time off…she would take time
owed that she didn’t have. And you know, she would – she would – I know I’m going to get it, I’m
getting it tomorrow or whatever.”
Deputy Chief Foster similarly stated:
“She never had sick time. She was someone who didn’t come to work her whole career. She never
had any sick time built up. So she was getting a four day paycheck every week… She was never
getting a full week’s pay.”
Lieutenant Ware further stated:
“Sue had a – a – a track record from hell. She had a terrible, terrible attendance record, a terrible
performance record, a terrible reputation, and they still put her in [the evidence room].”
Notably, approximately three weeks prior to Officer Zopatti’s selection as evidence room officer (further
detailed below), Deputy Chief Foster sent the following email to Shanley noting that Officer Zopatti
seemed unaware of the extent of her attendance problem and showed no immediate plans to adjust her
behavior:
From: Foster, Wayne

Sent: Friday, March 15, 2013 11:27 AM
To: Shanley, Karen
Subject: Susan Zopatti sick time
Good morning Karen. I have a question for you. Officer Susan Zopatti approached me earlier today
and told me that the first few days, when she was out of work for her medical issue, were taken as
vacation and time owed. She had no sick time at the time. Now that she was able to get some sick
time donated to her, she would like to change those first few days to sick time also and be given
back her vacation and time owed. Can you advise me concerning the answer I should give to her?
Thank you for your assistance.
Appointment as Evidence Room Officer
Chief Jenkins stated Officer Zopatti was appointed in “roughly” June 2013 to replace Officer Clifford with
coordinating Department-wide overtime and detail assignments, as well as handling the care and
maintenance of the BPD evidence room. At that time, Chief Jenkins did not include grant writing in Officer
Zopatti’s job description despite that duty being one of Officer Clifford’s responsibilities.
Deputy Chief Foster stated that the position of evidence room officer was not considered a “CSO” or
specialist position; therefore, the position was given to Officer Zopatti as she was the most senior officer
who applied. Deputy Chief Foster stated that Chief Jenkins appointed Officer Zopatti to this position and
that they had “no choice” because they believed that as stipulated in the union contract, Officer Zopatti
was entitled to the position. Deputy Chief Foster stated of Officer Zopatti:
“She’s – it’s not a – we have specialist positions, and that’s not – that – that way the Chief can pick
whoever he wants for the specialist positions, the Detectives, traffic. I think his – the CSOs are –
are that. This was not a specialist position, so she was a senior Officer that applied. The three
Officers that did apply for it, she was senior of the three, so she had to get it.”
However, Lieutenant Ware, whose duties and responsibilities required daily interaction with the evidence
room officer, was opposed to Officer Zopatti’s placement as evidence room officer and told Kroll the
chief’s decision was motivated by gender:

25
“WARE: I went to deputy – when she was originally put in that job, I went to Deputy Foster and I – I
think I said to him, are you kidding me, and his response was we have to, it’s by seniority, and I –
and that is – that’s completely erroneous and completely wrong, but I’ve realized from working with
Deputy Foster for the last 23 years, that you couldn’t argue with him…He just said we have to, it’s
by seniority, our hands are tied, which is completely false. But I realized I couldn’t – early on, I
couldn’t argue with him so I just walked away.
SHANAHAN: Why do you say that’s false?
WARE: Because it’s a – it’s not – it’s a – it’s a management right that they could put in whoever
they wanted in there regardless of seniority.
Appointment as Evidence Room Officer
Kroll reviewed the BPD contract and found no requirement that the position be given to the applicant with
the most seniority. The only provision in the contract in which seniority is a factor in a job assignment was
Article 29, which provides that if there are not enough volunteer officers trained as communications
officers then the least senior member of the bargaining unit shall be assigned:
Screenshot of Braintree Contract
The contract provides the Chief with authority to determine qualifications, evaluate employee competency
and transfer personnel as needed:

26
Screenshot of Braintree Contract
Lieutenant MacAleese noted that “when she [Officer Zopatti] first went into evidence, she was doing very
good, like – but she was with Mark [Zopatti] then. So she wasn’t separated with Mark when she first went
back there. She – she was doing like very good. But so when she first went back there, she really was
very proactive with that job. She was trying to straighten everything out, and – and it would appear that
she was doing a very good job.” In a subsequent email from Officer Zopatti to Deputy Chief Foster dated

27
August 28, 2013, Officer Zopatti wrote: “This is a challenge, but I am really enthusiastic about this position
and getting is [it] all done!”
Lieutenant MacAleese further testified:
“She looked like she was doing well. I mean I don’t – I don’t know what her job entailed, but like it
looked like she was doing well. She seemed to like it. She was very, like – you know, and I mean
she was at work a lot more then too because her mother wasn’t ill. So she – you know, she
appeared like she was motivated about the job and she wanted the job and she was going to do it.”
Kroll was informed that as Officer Zopatti’s time and attendance issues worsened, the handling and/or
processing of evidence, as well as the physical state of the evidence room, declined significantly. Deputy
Chief Foster noted the following of the evidence room: “So she showed me the room, she – how – how –
it was – like I said, the floor was covered. You couldn’t – you had to step over guns to get into it. And it’s a
small room to begin with. So I saw there was a ton of guns together.” An image taken from the video
footage of the evidence room is as follows:
(November 23, 2015, 2:02:23 p.m.)
Deputy Chief Foster further said:
LINSKEY: At some point it appears there were concerns you had about her ability to be in that
evidence room.
FOSTER: Yes.
LINSKEY: Can you tell me about that?
FOSTER: It was mostly about her performance because she wasn’t coming to work. And at one
point, Lieutenant Ware, who was our Court Prosecutor, came and said that they were – he was
getting complaints from the DA’s office that she wasn’t getting the evidence to the Officers on time.
She wasn’t responding to emails. So I went right to the Chief and I brought it to his attention.
LINSKEY: Tell me about that complaint from – what’s – Lieutenant –
FOSTER: Lieutenant Ware…He was – like I said, he was complaining about – he – he’s Court –
Court Prosecutor. So he was bringing back – relaying complaints from the DA’s Office that they –
she wasn’t returning phone calls and – and they were having trouble getting evidence to Court on –
LINSKEY: Physical evidence, drug evidence, just –
FOSTER: The whole array of evidence.
Lieutenant Ware stated that “midway through her tenure as the evidence officer, the district attorneys
called me in and they basically said you better handle this because if it gets to Michael Morrissey [Norfolk
County District Attorney], there’s going to be a huge problem.” Ware further told Kroll:

28
“She wasn’t answering emails. She wasn’t answering the phone. She wasn’t – and I went to her,
and I said, Sue, if you got to go to the drug lab once a week, go. I need these drug certs to come
back. You know, and – and she just kind of – she was just – you know, and so then I went to – and
I said you got to answer emails from the DA’s, you got to answer the phone. I mean I could never
find her. I’d call from Court, I need this today or the Judge is screaming for my head, I need this.
She’s not in. I’d have to come in, go to Deputy Foster, he’d be pissed off. I spend more time in the
evidence room than she does. He’d find me the disc of some surveillance disc of some case and I’d
run it back over to Court.”
On numerous instances, civilians or officers sought items from the evidence room and were unable to
reach Officer Zopatti. Deputy Chief Foster served as Officer Zopatti’s direct supervisor and could access
the evidence room if Officer Zopatti was unavailable. Subsequently, Sergeant Querzoli was also granted
access to the evidence room if Officer Zopatti was absent. As stated to Kroll, Deputy Chief Foster and/or
Sergeant Querzoli often had to retrieve evidence for officers or empty overfilled evidence submission
lockers as a result of Officer Zopatti’s absenteeism. The following images were taken from video footage
of the evidence room:
(November 23, 2015, 3:01:50 p.m.)
(November 24, 2015, 3:13:16 p.m.)

29
(November 25, 2015, 9:53:02 a.m. – Deputy Chief

Foster enters the evidence room without
closing the door behind him.
(November 25, 2015, 9:53:07 a.m. – Officer Bregoli

follows behind Deputy Chief Foster with a
dolly.)
(November 25, 2015, 9:53:22 a.m. – Door remains ajar

while Deputy Chief Foster and Officer Bregoli
are in the evidence room.

30
Lieutenant Ware stated the following to Kroll:
ARVANITIS: Did you ever have any officers that came to you and complained about the evidence
handling process and the evidence storage process?
WARE: I believe one time the evidence kind of built up out there and –
ARVANITIS: In the lockers?
WARE: Yeah. In the lockers, and we had a – I believe it was either Deputy Chief Foster at the time
or – or it might have been Sergeant Querzoli, I can't remember, had to clean it out and get it all in
there because we – there was stuff on the floor, there was – you know, because her attendance
was atrocious.
ARVANITIS: Do you know what the circumstances were at that time of why it built up?
WARE: Probably because she wasn’t coming into work.
Various personnel informed Kroll that concerns with Zopatti’s work performance were either brought to
the attention of Deputy Chief Foster or observed directly by him. Deputy Chief Foster drafted no reports or
documentation regarding any of the issues but stated to Kroll that he did make verbal reports to Chief
Jenkins. He did not conduct any counseling of her on his own. He did not reprimand her or bring any
disciplinary actions against her.
Lieutenant Ware also stated the following in his testimony:
ARVANITIS: Was she held accountable for the fact that she didn’t come to work at that time?
WARE: No, she was not.
SHANAHAN: How do you know that?
WARE: Because she kept her job. Maybe – maybe if – they might have talked to her in private.
However, nothing seemed to change.
Lieutenant Ware further stated regarding complaints that he made to Deputy Chief Foster:
“I – I told him verbally. Well, the first time – then the second time I went into his office, I had a sit
down session with him, and I said something’s got to be done about Sue. It was behind closed
doors. Something’s got to be done about Sue, she’s not returning emails, she’s not returning phone
calls, I’m not getting the – the discovery, and he basically told me well keep me in the loop because
we can’t touch her because she’s on FMLA. We can’t touch her. And I was – okay.”
First Assistant Lynn Beland spoke to Kroll in a telephonic interview on September 13, 2017 regarding
concerns with the Braintree evidence program. She informed Kroll that there were numerous problems
and complaints from her staff and court personnel about not being able to get evidence needed for
discovery, trials and hearings. First Assistant Beland indicated that the Norfolk District Attorney’s Office
made numerous requests to have the issue addressed through the court liaison and that, although the
liaison appeared to be trying, the situation was not getting better. At one point, the District Attorney’s staff
started going directly to the detectives and officers involved with the case to request evidence and did not
attempt to directly contact Officer Zopatti.
Mounting Personal Issues
Deputy Chief Foster told Kroll that, during Officer Zopatti’s tenure as evidence room officer, her mother
“had some type of blood cancer, and so she applied for and was granted FMLA.” Deputy Chief Foster
noted that Officer Zopatti was taking at least one day a week off to bring her mother into Boston for
treatments and never had accrued sick time.
Chief Jenkins was aware of her attendance issues but told Kroll that he was “trying to – to make it – we –
I was working with her and the union to – to accommodate her, all right?” He further said, “You know, we

31
were just – I – I just – I just didn’t think it was the right thing to do to – to – to take her out of an
assignment that – that I thought was making it easier for her to care for her mother.”
“In addition to her mother’s illness, Officer Zopatti had a niece who was suffering from cancer. Chief
Jenkins stated that at the time, he knew “her mother was dying of cancer. She had a – I think it was
her niece, a young girl, maybe, I don’t know, ten, twelve, fifteen, she had some type of brain tumor
issue I think or some – she had some kind of a serious problem. She was living with her mother,
Zopatti was. And the mother was selling the house and moving, and what I was told was she had –
she – the – she wasn’t moving with her. So she had no place to stay. So it – it – it seemed to me at
the time that, you know, she – I mean, not that it – that it warrants it, but she had some pressures
that…”
During the course of the interviews several people indicated that she was having financial trouble due to
never receiving a full week’s pay. She informed colleagues that she was responsible for the last two years
of her son’s college tuition but did not work any details or overtime to earn extra money. Many weeks she
did not earn a full week’s pay.
Lapses in Officer Zopatti’s Job Performance as Evidence Room Officer
On or about January 26, 2016, the BPD received a request for the return of $1,848 held as evidence.
Although the detectives and supervisor on the case had reported entering the money into evidence, the
money could not be found in the evidence room. Officer Zopatti, as the evidence officer, would have been
responsible for entering the cash into evidence by entering the amount of cash into the property screen
and describing where it was located within the evidence room in the police department evidence tracking
software. Officer Zopatti told Deputy Chief Foster that she had no record of entering the money into
evidence. Deputy Chief Foster stated to Kroll:
“Every piece of evidence in that case, Officer Zopatti had – had put in the evidence room. She had
done the drop down menu. The – the only thing that didn't have a – activity beside it, bringing it in,
was the money. And she said it was never there. And the Detectives said they put it there. And I
know she took – she was like a week, she was in there. She took apart boxes after box. She –
every time I went by the room, she was sitting on the floor going through boxes and boxes of
evidence. And – and it never – it never materialized anywhere. And I think the Chief thought that
maybe when we did the audit that they would find it.”
Officer Zopatti subsequently emailed the following to Deputy Chief Foster:
Aside from Officer Zopatti conducting her own search for the missing money, if the detectives’ statements
were to be believed, Officer Zopatti was the only person that could have taken the money. Officer Zopatti
stated the money was never entered into evidence even though several of the officers involved stated the
evidence was submitted into evidence and properly documented. Kroll notes there was never a formal

32
internal affairs investigation commenced by Deputy Chief Foster, or a criminal investigation initiated, as
Deputy Chief Foster noted to Kroll:
LINSKEY: Did that result in an internal affairs investigation?

FOSTER: I brought it to the Chief’s attention.
LINSKEY: Okay. And so the Chief did the investigation?
FOSTER: You’d have to ask – I don’t know what he did.
LINSKEY: You did not do an investigation?
FOSTER: No, I didn't. I brought it to his attention, and like I said, in – watched Officer Zopatti for
about a week time going through box after box after box in there.
Instead of commencing a criminal and/or internal affairs investigation into the missing cash, Deputy Chief
Foster assigned Officer Zopatti to look for the missing cash despite being told by several officers that they
had turned the cash over to her as the evidence officer. When she was unable to locate the missing cash
in the evidence room, Deputy Chief Foster authorized McSoley to issue a check to the defendant for the
funds out of the Town’s account. Although Deputy Chief Foster stated that he notified Chief Jenkins that
there was cash missing from the evidence room, Chief Jenkins similarly failed to order a criminal and/or
administrative investigation. Despite not being able to locate over $1,800 in seized cash, Officer Zopatti
was not disciplined or transferred from the evidence room, and no formal documentation of the incident
was made.
On or about May 12, 2016, Chief Jenkins learned that officers who had prepared evidentiary rape kits
were unable to store them in the proper storage refrigerator, as both the temporary and secondary
refrigerators were full. It was Department policy for the rape kits to be removed, logged as evidence and
transferred to the state lab in a timely fashion. When asked why the refrigerator was full, Officer Zopatti
stated that she had tried to schedule an appointment with the state lab but was unable to do so. However,
immediately after learning of the backlog, the administrative officer called the state lab and scheduled an
appointment for the next day. Deputy Chief Foster stated:
Another time, Officers came and she – she wasn’t in this day here. Officers come in and they have
a – they went down to the hospital and picked up a – a – a sexual assault kit. It has to go in the
refrigerator until they can get it up to the crime lab for – So we have – I didn't know we had two
refrigerators. At that time, I only knew we had one right out where the lockers are. There’s one
refrigerator. It was full. It had two – it’s a small refrigerator. So it already had two kits in there. So
then someone – I don’t know who told me, but someone said there’s another – there’s another
refrigerator in the evidence room. There was so much stuff in there, you could never – you never
knew it was there. But that was in the room. So I go in there. Now, there’s three rape kits in that
refrigerator. So I called her on the phone, and I said what – what are you doing? So one of them
was like six months old. I said why aren’t you bringing these kits up to the state – State Police lab?
She says I can’t get an appointment. So I said okay, good. I hang up with her. Officer Bregoli calls
up. We get an appointment that afternoon to bring up one – one that afternoon, and you can bring
up the rest of them on Friday. I call her back. And I said, Sue, what the hell are you doing? I got an
appointment today and Friday. She said that’s not the issue. The issue is the refrigerators are too
small. We need bigger refrigerators.
Lieutenant MacAleese also noted:
I guess when we had a sexual assault come in, there wasn’t any room for the rape kit, and I’m – I’m
like how could that be possible. And that’s when like I discovered that she hadn’t brought the rape
kits in to the lab. And it wasn’t – the only way I would know is if there was one that was active that
hadn’t been brought in that the DA was calling about, but these were ones that I think were
anonymous or we had a victim that wasn’t going forward so there wasn’t a rush. Some people
would report something to us but don’t want us to proceed with any part of the investigation… I
think she just said something to me like she didn't have time or something or she couldn’t get an
appointment. I don’t remember what she said.

33
Lieutenant MacAleese followed up internally. She told Kroll: “The deputy had said that – I don’t know if
she was out again, but he said he got the appointments and he and officer Bregoli went in.” However,
Deputy Chief Foster stated that immediately after his phone conversation with Officer Zopatti, he “ran into
the Chief, and I said this is it. It’s done. I’m sick of doing her work. I’m not dealing with her anymore. She’s
not doing anything in there.”
On May 12, 2016, Chief Jenkins called Karen Shanley, HR Director, for guidance on how to remove
Officer Zopatti from the evidence room assignment due to her job performance. According to Deputy
Chief Foster, Shanley told Chief Jenkins “to give her another chance.” Chief Jenkins told Kroll that he did
not make the decision to keep Officer Zopatti in her position “in a vacuum” and that he “did have
consultation with HR.” He said, “They supported my decisions to – to give her another – you know, after I
– I – after I gave her the second counseling, they supported my decision to...give her one more last
chance to – to, you know, shape up.” This conversation was verbal and never put into writing or entered
into her personnel file. Chief Jenkins also stated that he was told that he could not move her while she
was on FMLA because, “I just didn’t think it was the right thing to do...to take her out of an assignment
that...I thought was making it easier for her to care for her mother.”
In Kroll’s interview with Shanley, she said that Chief Jenkins called her to inquire as to removing Officer
Zopatti from the evidence room, stating that “her attendance was bad and he knew that she was on FMLA
and that he couldn’t do anything about it.” She said Chief Jenkins told her that people in the Department
were calling Officer Zopatti “Annie Dookhan [former Massachusetts state lab chemist sent to prison for
manipulating evidence].” Shanley asked Chief Jenkins if he had “talked to her [Officer Zopatti] about her
performance” and said Chief Jenkins told her that he had not had such a conversation. Shanley told Chief
Jenkins that he could not “just take her out without giving her, you know, some counseling, warnings and
that type of thing. You need to do that.” Shanley also provided the following necessary steps for
documenting such warnings, stating: “First, you counsel the person and document that you
counseled…and then if it continues, then it’s a written warning. And then if it continues, there is, um,
some discipline whether it’s a suspension or something like that and then it can lead to termination.”
When asked about any protections against such discipline while on FMLA, Shanley said Officer Zopatti
would “absolutely not” be exempt from written and verbal warnings despite her FMLA status.
On Thursday afternoon, May 12, 2016, Chief Jenkins again spoke with Officer Zopatti about her work
performance and told her to consider this a final chance. Present were Deputy Chief Foster and Officer
Ryan McHugh, a union representative. He expressed his disappointment with the rape kits. Chief Jenkins
stated that he was giving Officer Zopatti one last chance. The Chief also advised her that Gordon would
be by the next day to conduct an audit of the evidence room, and that she needed to be present to
answer any questions.
Officer Zopatti’s Alcohol Use
Chief Jenkins told Kroll that “there was never any indication from anybody that she [Officer Zopatti] had a
drinking problem, a drug problem, or – or – drinking or drugs, whatever – whatever.”
Lieutenant MacAleese stated that Chief Jenkins would ask her about Officer Zopatti’s personal life and
how she was doing periodically. In her interview, Lieutenant MacAleese stated the following:

34

35
Lieutenant Delpappa stated the following during his interview:
Lieutenant Smith stated the following regarding alcohol use by Zopatti during his interview:
Deputy Chief Foster noted that no one had voiced concerns about Officer Zopatti’s alcohol or drug use,
but that after her death, “Lieutenant MacAleese told me that she had concerns about her alcohol intake,
and she – maybe like a year before that had – had – had tried to do an intervention with her. I think she
said she went to like a couple of classes or a couple of AA meetings, and then she stopped. And then
their friendship went down after that.” She told Deputy Chief Foster that Gloria Holstein also participated
in the “intervention.”
Lieutenant MacAleese stated that it was not a formal intervention, but that she and Gloria Holstein had
taken Officer Zopatti out to breakfast and expressed concerns that she needed to get some help.
MacAleese stated the following during her interview:

36
There were a large number of personnel interviewed who believed that Officer Zopatti had a significant
alcohol issue and was either under the influence on duty or had engaged in significant use of alcohol prior
to coming to work or while on duty. Officer Corey Chambers stated the following during his interview:
MR. ARVANITIS: In that time period when you were the aide to the evidence custodian, did you have a
chance to discuss or socialize with Sue Zopatti both internally within the department as well as outside?
OFFICER CHAMBERS: Yes.
MR. ARVANITIS: What did that entail?
OFFICER CHAMBERS: Usually it was -- it would be lunch during the workday or, you know, appetizers or a
drink after work.
MR. ARVANITIS: Did you ever have a chance to see her drink during lunch?
OFFICER CHAMBERS: Can I just talk to you for a second?
MS. PANETTIERE: Sure.
MR. ARVANITIS: Want us to leave. It’s easier, we’ll leave.
MS. PANETTIERE: Okay. (Off the record.)
MR. ARVANITIS: Back on the record, Patrolman Corey Chambers. I think the question that was posed was,
in any social settings or lunches, did you ever see Sue Zopatti drink or did you guys ever have drinks during
the workday?
OFFICER CHAMBERS: I never had drinks during the workday. I did see her consume alcohol during the
workday at a lunch. Sometimes that would -- it might have been towards -- it might have been after her
workday technically ended or she would also commonly, like if we went to lunch, might take what we called
time owed, you know, so instead of coming back and finishing the work day, she would use some of her
comp time for the remainder of what would be her work day.
MR. ARVANITIS: What would she traditionally drink in those instances where she drank?
OFFICER CHAMBERS: White wine.
MR. ARVANITIS: Did you in either capacity as the aide or the -- as an officer of this department, are you
familiar with Sue Zopatti being involved in personal relationships with anyone in the department?
OFFICER CHAMBERS: Like romantic type relationships? Only rumors, not -- I don’t anything for sure.
MR. ARVANITIS: Go ahead.
MR. MCCABE: When you said that, you know, you guys were out, and you know, having lunch or whatever
or -- toward the end of the day and you said she took comp time?
OFFICER CHAMBERS: Sometimes.
MR. ARVANITIS: Yeah. Would you have to do the same thing or --

37
OFFICER CHAMBERS: No, no, I went back to work, and I -- I mean I would just be here until -- I -- see, I
worked like 8:30 to 4:30, and her standard hours were 6:30 to 2:30.
MR. MCCABE: Okay.
OFFICER CHAMBERS: So, you know, even if she was here for the full day, there were two hours at the end
of the day where I was by myself in the office.
MR. MCCABE: So she would -- she would take the comp time and stay where -- wherever you might have
been and then you would come back and finish out your work day?
OFFICER CHAMBERS: No, no, no. She would usually come back with me and then she would leave
because we would always be in the same car.
MR. MCCABE: Okay.
MR. ARVANITIS: What car would you guys be in?
OFFICER CHAMBERS: We always took -- it’s the black unmarked Crown Vic. It’s -- now it’s assigned to
Jack Twohig.
MR. ARVANITIS: So it was a city of Braintree vehicle?
OFFICER CHAMBERS: Correct. I will say that during that timeframe, I mean I never saw her drunk in those
times, and also, you know, for my own purposes, and to realize, you know, I’m brand new and in a sort of --
no -- like a -- kind of a job title that does -- a job position that never previously existed and I’m lucky enough
to be given this opportunity. So to me, as far as I knew, you know, I -- I didn't – was unaware as to whether
rules were being broken or not.
MR. ARVANITIS: Does the department have a standards or conduct or code of ethics that you’re requested
to review and validate with your signature prior to coming on in any capacity internally?
OFFICER CHAMBERS: I don’t recall specifically, and I couldn’t exactly tell you what -- what it is.
MR. ARVANITIS: From the standpoint of, you know, going out for lunch and consuming alcohol in a City of
Braintree vehicle, did you ever think or were you ever advised that that would be a violation of policies or
protocols?
OFFICER CHAMBERS: Was I ever advised, by whom?
MR. ARVANITIS: The rules of engagement, you know, the rules of being a member of this department
during the work day?
OFFICER CHAMBERS: Advised, I don’t recall, but I mean it didn’t particularly sit well with me. I drove the
vehicle, so at least she wasn’t driving, but yeah, I mean it didn’t sit well with me. But like I said, you know,
I’m brand new, lucky enough to get a second chance to go back to the academy. You know, it was a senior
officer that I’m working with. It was kind of a tough spot.
And like I said, a lot of -- I can’t even pinpoint whether she did come back to work when this happened. You
know, I -- I think she may have taken the time owed or it may have been after her work day ended.
MR. ARVANITIS: Did you ever, while she was -- while you were an officer here during the day go to lunch --
I’m sorry -- at any time go -- go to lunch, dinner, social event, her home, see her consume alcohol and then
drive a police or city of Braintree owned vehicle?
OFFICER CHAMBERS: No, as an officer I never saw her drive a -- a department vehicle at all.
Although Officer Zopatti had been known to consume alcohol while on duty, the only instance observed
by Deputy Chief Foster or Chief Jenkins was on May 13, 2016. Specifically, Deputy Chief Foster told Kroll
that on the day Gordon came to do his initial assessment of the BPD, Officer Kenneth Bregoli
“had to call her [Officer Zopatti] to show up, and she showed up with the big sunglasses…that’s the
day I thought I smelled it – it wasn’t – it wasn’t a strong odor of alcohol. I – she was – she had to be
right behind me. I was sitting at my desk and I looking at my computer screen trying to pull up these
reports. And she was like right behind me looking at the reports, and that’s when I could smell it.
But it wasn’t overwhelming or anything. It wasn’t strong.”
Deputy Chief Foster said she appeared “okay” earlier in the morning at the BPD but that she may have
had alcohol at lunch. He said “she came into the room, and she was off the wall. She had these big huge
sunglasses on the whole time she was in the room, and she was talking to Bruce (Gordon) rag time,
mentioning all these Officers, no one’s helping her, and making all sorts of complaints, people’s names.”
Deputy Chief Foster brought his concerns to Chief Jenkins, who told him to “have some more people
confirm it.” Deputy Chief Foster told Kroll that he “went to Lieutenant MacAleese who was the watch
commander that day, and I asked her to go talk to Sue, see if she could smell it off her. And I asked both

38
Paul McSoley and – and Kenny Bregoli who were both close to her. They were – at that time, they –
neither one of them could smell it off her either.” He said no one else could smell the alcohol on her.
Lieutenant MacAleese further told Kroll when asked about Officer Zopatti wearing sunglasses while in the
office:
“The chief had mentioned that to me, that she did, but I didn’t see it, and that was, I think, when
they were asking me if she was drinking that day, I think afterwards because we went into his office
to talk, the deputy, and the chief and I, when I didn’t smell anything. And I know they called Karen
Shanley, the HR director at that point. And – because I always wondered because I said I thought
she was on something, like why not see if we can get her help if she’s on something, but I don’t
know because it was Zoloft I thought, that I don’t know if they had something in place if I had
smelled alcohol that they were going to send her somewhere, but I didn’t smell alcohol.”
According to Deputy Chief Foster, Officer Zopatti was allowed to leave BPD at 2:30 p.m. on her own
accord despite concerns of alcohol use. This incident occurred less than 24 hours after seeking to have
Officer Zopatti reassigned from her duties due to attendance and performance issues, including a failure
to process sexual assault kits, and after Officer Zopatti was given a last chance warning. Deputy Chief
Foster was aware that Officer Zopatti was late for work on that day and had not advised anyone of her
plans to be late to work. Deputy Chief Foster was also aware that Officer Zopatti had to be contacted by
another officer and told to report to work, at which time, when she finally arrived at work, Deputy Chief
Foster believed that Officer Zopatti had alcohol on her breath and was acting erratically. Any of these
actions required Deputy Chief Foster to confront Officer Zopatti, document the actions and bring a formal
complaint against her. They also required that Deputy Chief Foster advise Chief Jenkins that Officer
Zopatti had violated her last chance agreement and, as such, be relieved of her assignment and duty.
Failure to follow these BPD guidelines was a complete abdication of Deputy Chief Foster’s responsibilities
and reflected a complete disregard for any acceptable police management practice.
Lapses in Department Polices & Procedures

Security Lapses in and around the Evidence Room
Kroll learned that there were inadequate security systems, which greatly impacted the integrity of the
evidence room. Chief Jenkins improved security of the evidence room by adding cameras and installing a
key fob system that would track who entered the room and when. Initially Officer Zopatti, Sergeant
Querzoli, Deputy Chief Foster and Chief Jenkins had access to the evidence room. Eventually Chief
Jenkins was removed from having access as an outcome of the Gordon Report. Although the cameras
were deployed for security and integrity purposes, there was no responsibility by BELD or anyone in the
Department to monitor the feed in real time, and recorded video footage could only be reviewed manually
while at BELD and could not be accessed or viewed from anywhere within the Department. No one ever
looked at or reviewed the video to see if the operations of the room were in accordance with policies and
procedures, nor did anyone view the video to see if anyone was tampering with evidence. The camera in
the part of the evidence room where drugs, guns, money and other high value items was not functioning
for a significant period of time. Deputy Chief Foster, who was responsible for the direct oversight of the
evidence room, stated the following regarding the cameras:
MR. LINSKEY: The cameras that were installed, do you know who installed them?
DEPUTY CHIEF FOSTER: No, I don’t. You’d have to ask-- Paul McSoley would know, the administrative
assistant, because he would have the billing and everything.
MR. LINSKEY: Okay. Do you know -- are they monitored by the watch commander? Or -- to her desk?
DEPUTY CHIEF FOSTER: They’re not – they’re not monitored. They’re -- like I said, they’re -- they’re just
recorded.

39
MR. LINSKEY: Can the watch commander review them?

DEPUTY CHIEF FOSTER: The watch commander? No, I don’t think so.
MR. LINSKEY: Who has the ability to review the cameras?
DEPUTY CHIEF FOSTER: I think we would have to call our IT department, which is Braintree Electric Light -
MR. LINSKEY: Okay.
DEPUTY CHIEF FOSTER: -- to do that because I don’t know how long it -- it’s -- it’s stored. They take the
drives out and they -- and they have to put a new one in. They have -- they only have so much storage in it.
MR. LINSKEY: Is there anywhere in the station you could live view it?
DEPUTY CHIEF FOSTER: They would have to go downstairs probably and get the -- the drives that they
took out of it, and insert them. And I have no idea how they do it.
From a review of the video tapes, it was evident to Kroll that the door to the evidence room was often left
open by Officer Zopatti, as depicted in the following images derived from the evidence room video
footage:
(November 17, 2015, 7:58:08 a.m. – Officer Zopatti

enters the evidence room, leaving the door
ajar behind her.)
(November 17, 2015, 7:58:13 a.m. – Door remains

open while Officer Zopatti is in the evidence
room.)

40
(November 19, 2015, 12:58:22 p.m. – Officer Zopatti

exits the evidence room, leaving the door ajar
behind her.)
(November 19, 2015, 12:58:29 p.m. – The evidence

room door remains open after Officer Zopatti
leaves the evidence room.)
(April 21, 2016, 10:19:54 a.m. – Officer Zopatti leaves

the evidence room door ajar as she enters.)

41
(May 3, 2016, 10:47:21 a.m. – Officer Zopatti leaves

the evidence room door ajar as she looks for
property.)
Deputy Chief Foster and other members of the BPD were often viewed walking past the open door:
(November 19, 2015, 12:58:43 p.m.)
(November 24, 2015, 3:16:46 p.m.)

42
(April 21, 2016, 10:16:34 a.m. – Door is ajar, and

Officer Bregoli is seen walking by.)
An automatic door closer was installed on the evidence room door after Officer Zopatti’s died.
There was no camera in Officer Zopatti’s office where she processed much of the evidence. She often left
the door to the evidence room open, which allowed others to go in within signing in.
Officer Zopatti would leave her keys to the evidence room and lockers on the desk of her unlocked office,
which compromised the integrity of the evidence room. On at least two instances, those keys were
utilized to remove property / evidence out of temporary storage lockers by other officers. These instances
were efforts to retrieve items mistakenly placed into evidence.
According to Deputy Chief Foster, he was aware of the drop ceiling in the evidence room and noted that
when the HVAC system was worked on “not too long ago,” the ceiling “was just wide open.” Chief Jenkins
was also aware of the drop ceiling but said he was not aware of anyone ever climbing over.
Chief Jenkins and Deputy Chief Foster were unaware that a person could pass from the evidence
processing/report writing room to the evidence room through the evidence locker.
Although Chief Jenkins installed an alarm system for a breach of the door, the system failed to
adequately address the potential for unauthorized access to the evidence room.
No one ever viewed the video of the evidence room. One of the cameras that oversaw the most critical
area of the evidence room, where the seized cash and drugs were kept, was out of order and never
addressed until Kroll began its investigation.
Lack of Required Periodic Audits of the Evidence Room
As stated by Chief Jenkins in his October 6, 2016 interview with Kroll:
LINSKEY: Do you know if there was certain things that the Deputy’s supposed to do yearly, where
he’s supposed to do a report and an audit to you, did that ever occur?
JENKINS: No. No, it was – again, I – I was the Deputy Chief for – from 2004 to 2012. I never did
one. I was never asked for one. And quite frankly, I wasn’t aware of that policy.
When Officer Zopatti replaced Officer Clifford as evidence room officer, the rules and regulations required
an audit of the evidence room, which the BPD administration failed to do. On August 28, 2013, shortly

43
after starting her position as evidence officer, Officer Zopatti emailed Deputy Chief Foster and notified him
of some issues with misplaced/mislabeled evidence and stated that she “hoped” no evidence was
missing. Officer Zopatti also requested an audit of the evidence room, as shown below:
Deputy Chief Foster took no action in response to Officer Zopatti’s request for an audit, even though it
was his responsibility to initiate audits of the evidence room. He also acknowledged that he did not know
who was responsible for Department-mandated annual audits and did not do any such audits as Deputy
Chief. He said, “I think it says that there should be annual audit in there, but it – I’m telling you, this is the
first audit in the history of the Police Department that I know of.” When asked about quarterly audits,
Deputy Chief Foster said he was unaware of any quarterly audit reports relative to the evidence facility,
but he noted that the Department was slated for two Deputy Chiefs and that he had been the only one for
six years. He clarified that traditionally one Deputy Chief is in charge of patrol and the other is
administrative, which would include the evidence room supervision. Kroll notes that Deputy Chief Foster
was on notice when he accepted the promotion that he would have the responsibility that used to be
performed by two Deputy Chiefs.

44
Kroll notes that of the 293 cases where cash was determined to be missing, 26 of those cases were
entered into evidence by Officer Zopatti between 2013 and 2016. At least three evidence bags holding
cash that had been entered into evidence by Officer Zopatti had also been compromised/ripped open with
money missing. These bags were under the sole custody and control of Officer Zopatti. Because Deputy
Chief Foster did not conduct an audit of the evidence room at the time Officer Clifford left the police
department and Officer Zopatti was assigned as the evidence officer, as required by BPD rules and
regulations, Kroll cannot determine with certainty that Officer Zopatti was solely responsible for the cash
missing in all 293 cases. Kroll can prove that she was responsible for the 26 cases that came into
evidence after Clifford had left.
Lack of Proper Internal Affairs Investigations
In addition to overseeing the evidence room and Officer Zopatti, Deputy Chief Foster was responsible for
internal affairs investigations and ensuring that officers complied with Department rules, regulations and
procedures.
On or about January 26, 2016, the Department received a request for the return of $1,848 from a
defendant with a court order for the return of funds that were being held as evidence. Although the
detectives and supervisor on the case had reported in the records management system that they had
seized $1,848 during the arrest, Officer Zopatti reported that she could not locate the cash in the
evidence room. Officer Zopatti further reported that there was no record in the property management
system of her entering the cash into the evidence room.
Despite these discrepancies, Deputy Chief Foster did not commence an internal affairs investigation
relative to these missing funds nor did he either commence a criminal investigation. Here
was no review of video or statements taken from the officers. Deputy Chief Foster, who
was in charge of the Department’s internal affairs investigations, and was Officer
Zopatti’s direct supervisor, was responsible for investigating the missing funds when it
was brought to his attention. He assigned her to locate the money she was accused of
having misplaced or taken.
Lack of Proper Investigation of Officer Zopatti’s Death
Over the weekend following Officer Zopatti’s death, Lieutenant MacAleese, while sorting through Officer
Zopatti’s office desk, identified loose packets of cocaine and ingestion paraphernalia. Lieutenant
MacAleese told Kroll:
“So I was going through the desk, and it was – it – the office is set up different now. Where the
desk was used to be on the far wall there. So when I had opened that top drawer on the right, the
small drawer, there were the three packets of what appeared to be cocaine to me in there, and –
and it still didn’t dawn on me. I just said, oh my God, like she’s not even putting evidence in. I just –
because I never thought she would cross that line and do something like that, never in a million
years…And I’m just like she has like evidence here. I looked at back of the desk too at that point,
and there were bags of evidence, like I don’t know if it was in a crate or not that hadn’t been put
back in evidence either. And I’m like what’s this stuff doing out here, and could it have been there
like for a while? I don’t know because if I went in there, I wouldn’t see it because she would
be…And then there was one that looked like it was – something was open in there so there was
powdery stuff on the -- inside the desk too…Like call me dumb or whatever, but I’m still in denial,
saying she would do something like that. I mean how could she do something like that? And like I’m
like she’s leaving evidence there. Even with it open, I don’t know what I was thinking. I didn’t really
believe it, or I didn't want to believe it in my friend I guess.”

45
Despite identifying drug paraphernalia and opened evidence bags containing cocaine in Officer Zopatti’s
desk, neither the evidence room nor Officer Zopatti’s office was quarantined or secured as a crime scene.
Jenkins told Kroll:
“Well, now we – now we suspect, you know, some serious problems. And I – I know at some point
in time I – I spoke to the mayor, and I said you know what, I just wanted you know we – you know,
we – we’re – we’re find – we’re finding this out that there may be an issue there. We’re – we’re
going to do this audit, and that’ll – that’ll tell the tale.”
On May 30, 2016, Lieutenant MacAleese slid the drug evidence in an envelope under the door to Deputy
Chief Foster’s office, as she did not see Deputy Chief Foster in his office. On Monday, at 10:10:19 a.m.,
she sent the following email to Deputy Chief Foster, who forwarded the email to Chief Jenkins 26 minutes
later from his iPhone:
From: wfoster@braintreema.gov [mailto:wfoster@braintreema.gov]

Sent: Monday, May 30, 2016 10:36 AM
To: rjenkins@braintreema.gov
Subject: Fwd: Sue's office
FYI
Sent from my iPhone
Begin forwarded message:

From: "MacAleese, Karen" <kmacaleese@braintreema.gov>
Date: May 30, 2016 at 10:10:19 AM EDT
To: "Foster, Wayne" <wfoster@braintreema.gov>
Subject: Sue's office
Deputy, I slipped an envelope under your door containing what I think are drugs. It was in Sue’s
desk drawer. I finished going through her office. I believe everything left is the departments. I also
wanted to know if I could log into her computer account to look at her pictures and to see if there
was anything personal on it the family might want. I took Tuesday off, but will be back Wednesday.
If she has a locker and you give me the combination I will go through it on Wednesday also. I will
then meet Mark with all her personal property. Karen
Incident Report by Lieutenant MacAleese

46
Incident Report by Deputy Chief Foster
As with the previous discoveries of compromised evidence, Deputy Chief Foster should have commenced
an immediate criminal and/or internal investigation or contacted the Norfolk District Attorney’s Office
CPAC Unit and informed them of the discovery of the evidence of stolen drugs in Officer Zopatti’s desk.
Deputy Chief Foster and Chief Jenkins also should have, as soon as possible, notified any courts or
prosecuting agencies impacted by compromises to the integrity to their evidence program. Moreover,
search warrants should have been sought immediately for Officer Zopatti’s home, camper, vehicle and
bank accounts.
Deputy Chief Foster should have also taken custody and control of Officer Zopatti’s computer in the event
that those items had evidentiary value. Instead, on or about May 30, 2016, Deputy Chief Foster and Chief
Jenkins turned over Officer Zopatti’s cell phone to BELD where it was destroyed. Deputy Chief Foster and
Chief Jenkins also requested that Officer Zopatti’s work computer be reissued to another officer. Thus,
failing to properly secure evidence in an ongoing investigation and losing any pertinent evidence
contained on either device.
On August 11, 2016, Officer Zopatti’s husband Mark Zopatti turned over two firearms to the BPD, stating
that he found the firearms in Officer Zopatti’s “vacation trailer.” Chief Jenkins believed the guns were “a
40 caliber Glock. The other one was either 22 or 25 Beretta. They were both found by her separated
husband in her recreational vehicle out in the back – out in the back yard, and he brought them in.” The
following was reported in the BPD property detail report:

47
According to Deputy Chief Foster, both firearms, determined to be a Glock 23 .40 caliber and Beretta 21A
.25 caliber, were formerly stored as evidence in the BPD evidence room but were supposed to have been
returned to their owners, Daniel M. Shaw and Michael Flemmi, according to the narrative included in the
records management system. The BPD determined that Officer Zopatti stole the guns from the evidence
room. Further reported in the BPD property detail reports:
It is Kroll’s opinion that Officer Zopatti’s recreational trailer, and her home, should have been immediately
quarantined and secured as a crime scene. BPD should have at least commenced a criminal and internal
investigation and contacted the Norfolk County District Attorney’s Office to inform them of the discovery of
stolen drugs and firearms by Officer Zopatti. Further, BPD should have immediately notified any courts or
prosecuting agencies potentially impacted by this breach of the BPD evidence program. Search warrants
should have also been sought for Officer Zopatti’s home, camper, vehicle and bank accounts. Deputy
Chief Foster acknowledged that BPD had failed to follow these practices in his testimony:
LINSKEY: When the two firearms that were stolen from the evidence room showed up and you had
determined that there was money stolen from the evidence, was there ever a thought to conduct a
search warrant at her home to look for stolen money or evidence, or to conduct any criminal
investigation of those items?
FOSTER: Not that I know of. Like I said, the guns were here probably a week or more before I
knew they even – they were even returned. So I wasn’t involved in the – I wasn’t in the loop for it
so…
LINSKEY: So no one under you came and said, you know, she had our guns in – in her house,
she’s got money that was stolen, we want to go search the house for evidence of the – of the
crime?
FOSTER: No.
LINSKEY: Would you agree with me you could have probably obtained a search warrant –
FOSTER: Yeah.
LINSKEY: – for that home?
FOSTER: Yeah.
LINSKEY: No one above you said I want to get a search warrant for that house, let’s get an
investigation going. Did anyone contact the CPAC and say we’ve got guns that were stolen from
our property room, we think this might be a motive for the suicide, or, you know, if it hasn’t been
ruled a suicide, potentially somebody who might have been involved with her to take her life if – if,
you know, this audit was going to show that she was feeding evidence out?
FOSTER: I don’t know.
LINSKEY: Okay. And you personally didn't direct anyone to do that or make any of those calls?
FOSTER: No.

48
Incident Report by Officer Solimini
On September 16, 2016, Officer Solimini identified additional drug evidence folders that were not found
during any previous search of her office in Officer Zopatti’s desk. There never was a comprehensive
search for all evidence and items in her office. Lieutenant MacAleese had been directed only to recover
personal effects to return to her family.
Decision to Conduct an Audit by an External Party in lieu of a Proper Independent

Criminal Investigation
By the time the audit commenced on or about July 28, 2016, Deputy Chief Foster and Chief Jenkins had
indisputable evidence of theft from the evidence room including drugs from evidence bags found in
Officer Zopatti’s desk and at least four instances of missing cash and/or compromised evidence bags.
The evidence room was not quarantined or secured and there was no internal affairs investigation or
criminal investigation opened by BPD. Additionally, neither the Norfolk District Attorney’s Office nor the
Massachusetts State Police Crime Prevention and Control (CPAC) Unit handling Officer Zopatti’s death
investigation were notified. No search warrants were sought for Officer Zopatti’s home, camper, vehicle or
bank. Deputy Chief Foster, who was tasked with overseeing the evidence room, did not ensure a
complete search of Officer Zopatti’s office after discovering stolen drugs and drug use in her office. As a
result, it was weeks later that Officer Solimini discovered extensive evidence of other stolen drugs in the
very same desk. This is a dereliction of basic investigative procedures and contrary to acceptable police
management practices. Further, Deputy Chief Foster waited 61 days after the discovery of stolen drugs in
Officer Zopatti’s desk to have Gordon (a private citizen unaffiliated with any law enforcement agency)
commence an audit of the Department’s evidence room, for which Deputy Chief Foster was ultimately
responsible.
Deputy Chief Foster also failed to properly supervise the BPD evidence program and conduct a follow-up
investigation of Officer Zopatti’s death when Officer Solimini discovered several compromised financial
evidence bags that could only have been compromised while in the sole custody and control of Officer
Zopatti. Additionally, Deputy Chief Foster failed to properly supervise the BPD evidence program and
conduct a follow-up investigation of Officer Zopatti’s death when, on the first day of his audit, Gordon
identified multiple items missing from the evidence room, including numerous compromised evidence

49
bags (Appendix B – Gordon’s Audit Report). The room should have been secured, an immediate criminal
investigation launched and notification should have been made to the Norfolk District Attorney’s Office
and the Massachusetts State Police Crime Prevention and Control (CPAC) Unit handling Officer Zopatti’s
death investigation.
Oversight of the Financial Evidence of the Braintree Police Department

As McSoley reported to Chief Jenkins, and Deputy Chief Foster was responsible for ensuring the integrity
of the evidence room, Kroll finds that there was improper supervision of the Braintree evidence program
by Chief Jenkins and Deputy Chief Foster. The evidence shows that McSoley made a significant number
of payments to the Norfolk District Attorney’s Office without retrieving the cash from the evidence room. In
several instances, McSoley made payments to the Norfolk District Attorney’s Office for equitable sharing
funds that were never seized by Braintree and were being held by other police departments or had
already been returned to the defendant. Further, in other instances, McSoley had money transferred to
him from the evidence room by both Officer Zoppatti and Officer Clifford and never deposited the funds.
There is also evidence that McSoley would take custody of the seized cash and request that checks be
cut to the District Attorney’s Office to cover its share of equitable sharing funds. It was found that in those
instances, McSoley often did not make a corresponding deposit to the Town account for a significant
period of time. McSoley employed grossly incompetent accounting practices, submitted fraudulent forms
and caused the Town of Braintree to issue checks for payments of funds that had been stolen, returned to
the defendant or had been seized by another law enforcement agency.

50
CONCLUSIONS
Overview
On September 28, 2012, a chemist from the Massachusetts State Police Crime Laboratory, Annie
Dookhan, was arrested and charged with obstruction of justice for falsifying lab results. The scandal
within the crime laboratory sent shockwaves through the criminal justice community. The Dookhan case
compromised the integrity of the evidence being presented at trials across the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts and significantly undermined the justice system.
On November 22, 2013, Dookhan was sentenced by Judge Carol S. Ball in the Suffolk Superior Court to
three-to-five years’ imprisonment and two years’ probation after pleading guilty to crimes relating to
falsifying drug tests. This sentence was greater than the one-year sentence her defense requested but
less than the five-to-seven year sentence requested by the prosecution. However, Ball said that upward
departure was merited due to the ramifications of Dookhan’s misconduct. Ball wrote, “Innocent persons
were incarcerated, guilty persons have been released to further endanger the public, millions and millions
of public dollars are being expended to deal with the chaos Ms. Dookhan created, and the integrity of the
criminal justice system has been shaken to the core.”4
The Dookhan case put every member of law enforcement, especially those police administrators tasked
with overseeing evidence management programs, that every effort needed to be taken to ensure the
integrity of evidence being utilized in criminal prosecutions. It also put those managers on notice that any
deficiencies discovered in evidence management needed to be immediately addressed both internally
within the department, as well as by any impacted prosecutor’s office, to minimize the impact to the
criminal justice system. Massachusetts dropped more than 21,000 criminal charges as a result of the
Dookhan scandal. Some individuals released went on to engage in additional crimes, including
homicides.
Deputy Chief Foster, as the sworn Deputy Chief of the Braintree Police Department with responsibility for
both internal affairs investigations and the BPD evidence management program, would know that
properly managing and overseeing his duties was integral to the integrity of the work done daily by the
4 http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/2013/11/22/annie-dookhan-former-state-chemist-who-mishandled-drug-
evidence-agrees-plead-guilty/lhg1mwd9U3J8eh4tNBS63N/story.html

51
men and women of the BPD. It is Kroll’s opinion that there was a significant failure of oversight and
security of the BPD evidence program that included inadequate security systems and a failure to conduct
any type of audit and/or review. Numerous warning signs were known but not addressed concerning
Officer Zopatti’s actions and attendance issues or prior incident involving missing money from the
evidence room.
Based on Kroll‘s investigation, witness interviews and review of the evidence, we find that Officer Zopatti,
while under the supervision of Deputy Chief Foster, failed to perform her duties and responsibilities as
BPD evidence officer. Her inability to perform her duties impacted the efficiency and integrity of cases
being prosecuted in Norfolk County. The evidence shows that Officer Zopatti struggled with alcohol and
other personal issues, and that these issues were known to Deputy Chief Foster. Deputy Chief Foster
was responsible for properly supervising the performance and job function of Officer Zopatti. He was
ultimately tasked with overseeing the evidence program and took no steps that a reasonable police
manager would have taken when presented with Officer Zopatti’s email of August 28, 2013 (included as
follows):
Deputy Chief Foster took no action in response to Officer Zopatti’s request for an audit, even though it
was policy that he was obligated to follow. Further, despite being alerted to the discovery of unaccounted
for money and that drugs that were listed as already being destroyed but still present in the evidence
room, he took no action to address the concerns, in direct contrast to minimum best practices of police
management.
As supervisor, Deputy Chief Foster experienced numerous instances when he was concerned with
Officer Zopatti’s performance. Aside from mentioning his concerns to Chief Jenkins, he took no action to

52
address those issues. A reasonable police manager presented with numerous performance issues is
obligated do more than simply have a conversation with the Chief regarding these concerns. Deputy
Chief Foster was obligated to document these issues and take appropriate disciplinary actions such as
counseling or bringing formal internal affairs complaints. This responsibility is clearly stated in the Deputy
Chief’s written job description:
Responsible for the actions of the personnel assigned to the Administrative Bureau;
oversees the appropriate completion of their assigned tasks, inspects as necessary and
reports to the Chief. Deputy Chief’s job description
After Officer Zopatti’s tragic death, evidence quickly came to light that she had been engaged in criminal
activity, involving the possible theft and use of narcotics while on duty at the Braintree Police Department.
While Kroll cannot determine exactly when Officer Zopatti began taking items from the evidence room,
audits were not being conducted, despite her request, thereby, enabling her to engage in misconduct. In
addition to missing/stolen contraband, evidence developed that Officer Zopatti had also compromised
evidence bags under her sole control, including those that contained cash and drugs. Several cases were
discovered in which seized funds were missing. It was later discovered that in addition to stealing drugs
and cash, Officer Zopatti had also stolen firearms, which were later recovered in a camping trailer on her
property. Further, McSoley also received large sums of cash from the evidence room that he did not
deposit until months later, if at all. Despite a lack of or severely delayed deposits, evidence further
showed that McSoley authorized payments to the Norfolk County District Attorney’s Office without ever
receiving/retrieving cash from the evidence room. A significant amount of payments were made to the
District Attorney’s Office for cases where the cash was missing/stolen from the evidence room, was never
seized by the Braintree police or had been returned to the defendant.
As these circumstances and incidents of compromises to the Braintree evidence program were identified,
Deputy Chief Foster failed to secure and preserve evidence and failed to conduct or have conducted a
proper administrative or criminal investigation in keeping with best practices of police management and
police investigations. There were clear failures of supervision and accountability before Officer Zopatti’s
selection as evidence officer, during her tenure as evidence officer and after her death. These failures
resulted in the dismissal of 185 criminal cases in Norfolk County, the loss of $255,063.12 in cash from the
evidence room and the theft and disappearance of multiple firearms and property from the evidence
room. This lack of adequate supervision also tarnished the image of the Braintree Police Department and
its dedicated public servants who work hard to ensure the safety and security of the residents in their
care.
These and other findings and conclusions are highlighted further below.
Lack of Oversight on Behalf of BPD Administration

Officer Zopatti’s Improper Selection as Evidence Room Officer
Although the collective bargaining agreement between the patrol officers and the Town did not expressly
mandate seniority as hiring criteria for the position of evidence officer, Chief Jenkins and Deputy Chief
Foster believed that Officer Zopatti was entitled to the post due to her seniority within the Department.
Regardless of union mandates, however, Kroll understands that a position can be denied if the officer
under consideration does not have an equivalent ability to handle the position’s responsibilities. It is
Kroll’s belief that there should have been a sufficient level of concern from the Deputy Chief and the Chief
as to whether Officer Zopatti’s chronic time and attendance issues would negatively impact her ability to
perform effectively as BPD evidence room officer, which requires near daily attendance to ensure
effective operations. Deputy Chief Foster expressed his concerns over Officer Zopatti’s attendance issues

53
and use of sick time to the town HR Director just three weeks prior to Officer Zopatti’s appointment.
However, when Lieutenant Ware voiced his concerns directly to Deputy Chief Foster, he was rebuked.
At a minimum, Officer Zopatti should only have been allowed to fill the position on an interim basis with
close oversight by Deputy Chief Foster relative to her past time and attendance. Therefore, if they
persisted and impacted the operations of the BPD evidence room, Officer Zopatti should have been
removed immediately. Yet, as noted previously, her time and attendance issues, as well as the state of
the evidence room, worsened during the course of her assignment without a formal response by Deputy
Chief Foster.
Inadequate Oversight of Officer Zopatti and Evidence Room
Deputy Chief Foster improperly believed that Officer Zopatti’s FMLA classification exempted her from
discipline relative to her abuses of sick time and, as such, he took no formal action to document those
abuses. Deputy Chief Foster failed to implement proper supervision when he did not document any of
Officer Zopatti’s performance issues. He took no administrative action and did not address Officer
Zopatti’s failure to perform her duties appropriately. His actions are not in keeping with acceptable police
management practices.
Failure to Adequately Address Officer Zopatti’s Known Struggle with Alcohol Use
Chief Jenkins and Deputy Chief Foster both acknowledged that they never considered Officer Zopatti’s
attendance or performance issues to be related to an issue with alcohol use. However, these statements
were in stark contrast to several members of the Department who believed and had direct knowledge that
Officer Zopatti had waged a long term battle with alcohol abuse. Lieutenant MacAleese also stated that
she had conversations directly with Chief Jenkins regarding Officer Zopatti’s alcohol issue.
Officer Zopatti should have been provided an employee assistance program and/or formal treatment with
her struggles, and BPD administration should have clearly documented all efforts to provide such support
to Officer Zopatti. The inability to identify and address Officer Zopatti’s alcohol issues, including alcohol
use while on duty, constituted a failure to properly manage and supervise personnel.
Failure to Audit and Inspect Evidence Room
When Officer Zopatti replaced Officer Clifford as evidence room officer, the Department’s rules and
regulations required an audit of the evidence room, which Deputy Chief Foster failed to oversee
Moreover, Officer Zopatti requested such an audit in her email to Deputy Chief Foster shortly after she
was assigned to the evidence room in August 2013, and after notifying Deputy Chief Foster of several
evidence irregularities, such as cash and drugs being improperly logged out of evidence and/or
improperly stored in property bins. Officer Zopatti requested the audit and put Deputy Chief Foster on
notice that items had been misplaced and that there was a possibility that evidence was missing. Officer
Zopatti also requested the audit “for the protection of all involved should a problem arise in the future.”
Deputy Chief Foster did nothing in response and never conducted or assigned any member of the
department to conduct an audit of the evidence room in response to Officer Zopatti’s August 28, 2013
request. It is particularly noteworthy that Deputy Chief Foster knew that the BPD evidence room was in
disarray as he witnessed Officer Zopatti going through “boxes and boxes of evidence” and knew that the
BPD evidence room was so cluttered with boxes that he was unaware of a second refrigerator in the
room. Considering Deputy Chief Foster’s appointment during the fallout of the Annie Dookhan case,
which put all reasonable police supervisors on notice that any evidence room issues must be quickly and
thoroughly addressed, these failures are particularly egregious Moreover, the failure to conduct the
required audit of the evidence room at the time Officer Clifford retired and Officer Zopatti was assigned to

54
the evidence room prevented investigators from being able to conclusively determine who was solely
responsible for the loss of the drugs, firearms, and cash from the evidence room.
Chief Jenkins and Deputy Chief Foster repeatedly failed to supervise and implement the Department’s
rules and regulations by not conducting the required audits and inspections of the evidence room.
Failure to Identify and Correct Evidence Room Security / Operations
Under Chief Jenkins’ administration and under Deputy Chief Foster’s supervision, the Department did
install two cameras in the evidence room, as well as a key fob entry system. However, the physical
security of the evidence room was intentionally compromised by Kroll with very little effort. The drop
ceiling within the evidence room and adjoining evidence locker in the processing room could be easily
opened to provide entry into the evidence room. Further, one of the cameras apparently never properly
functioned from its initial installation, resulting in no video surveillance of the narcotics, firearms, currency
and other high value items stored within the evidence room. The cameras were also never viewed, either
live or retroactively, by anyone at BPD; the footage from the one functioning camera was stored at BELD
and never reviewed by BPD or BELD. Similarly, a large amount of valuable drug evidence was kept in an
unmonitored trailer in the station parking lot that was under no video surveillance and only equipped with
a padlock.
Officer Zopatti did not safeguard her set of evidence room keys, and she often left the keys on her desk in
her unlocked office, against Department policy.
Rape kits being held in the evidence room refrigerators dated back to January 20, 2016 and were not
properly processed. Kroll notes that this was a serious breach of evidence handling and could have had a
significant impact on some of the most serious investigations conducted by the BPD. Even without
discipline being meted out for prior performance issues, the severity of this error gravely impacted the
integrity of the evidence program. When confronted on this topic by Deputy Chief Foster, Officer Zopatti
was apparently untruthful when she stated that the backlog of rape kits was due to an inability to schedule
an appointment with the state laboratory. When Deputy Chief Foster learned that Officer Bregoli obtained
an immediate appointment, he did not take any action against Officer Zopatti to remove her from her
position or conduct an investigation into the truthfulness of her statements.
Failure to Address Officer Zopatti’s Time and Attendance Issues
Based on interviews and our review of the evidence, Kroll found that Officer Zopatti had a chronic issue
with time and attendance during her tenure with the BPD. This issue was exacerbated by her personal
and family issues, as well as issues with alcohol abuse. When at work, Officer Zopatti was described by
co-workers and supervisors as being a diligent and effective police officer / investigator. She was also
known for exhibiting compassion and understanding when handling incidents. It appears that Officer
Zopatti felt that the evidence room officer position would afford her the opportunity to address personal
and family issues and minimize the impact of missing time at work. It was reported to Kroll that she was
excited and eager to learn in this new position. She requested training and made documented efforts to
improve the physical state of the evidence room, even requesting early-on a full audit of the evidence
room.
Despite initial eagerness to improve the physical state of the evidence room and effectively perform her
duties, Officer Zopatti’s time and attendance issues continued, adversely affecting her ability to perform
her duties and responsibilities. Kroll determined that outside pressures, including financial challenges
worsened by her absences from work and diminished earnings, adversely impacted her overall personal
and professional well-being.

55
Deputy Chief Foster failed to implement proper supervision when he took no action to address Officer
Zopatti’s time and attendance issues.
Failure to Conduct an Internal Affairs Investigation in January 2016
In January of 2016, Deputy Chief Foster was put on notice that Officer Zopatti could not locate money
from the evidence room when an individual came to retrieve the funds with an order from the court.
Despite assertions by the officers involved in the arrest that the money had been turned over to the
evidence officer, Deputy Chief Foster allowed Officer Zopatti to look for the money. Deputy Chief Foster
also authorized McSoley to issue a check for the lost funds from a Town account. No internal affairs
investigation was conducted to determine what happened to the money. Officer Zopatti was allowed to
remain in the evidence room. The information known to Deputy Foster was that BPD personnel
conducted an arrest and seized money from a suspect. The detectives documented their evidence and
reported that they submitted it to the evidence room. There were three scenarios that could have
occurred: 1. The detectives never submitted the money. 2. The money was received by Zopatti and
accidently misplaced. 3. The money was received by Zopatti, and she illegally took it. Once informed of
the situation, Deputy Chief Foster should have immediately began an investigation. He should have taken
custody of the financial evidence locker and conducted his own search for the money or assigned a
supervisor with that task. If he had conducted such an investigation, he would have likely found that
several of the evidence bags were cut open and compromised. Instead, he had Zopatti who, at best, had
failed to properly intake and safeguard the funds or, at worst, took the money, conduct her own
investigation.
Deputy Chief Foster failed to properly supervise the evidence program and the police department by
failing to conduct an internal affairs investigation when he became aware that there was money missing
from the evidence room.
Failure to Investigate and Notify Proper Agencies / Failure to Secure Crime Scenes
The landmark decision of Brady v. Maryland (“Brady”) is perhaps one of the most significant Supreme
Court decisions to ever impact the criminal justice system. Brady places an affirmative constitutional duty
on a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence to a defendant. This duty has been extended to police
agencies through case law, requiring law enforcement agencies to notify the prosecutor of any potential
exculpatory information, which could tend to change the outcome of a trial. This exculpatory evidence,
often referred to as “Brady Material,” could prove that the accused party is innocent or cast doubt of their
guilt and would include any evidence in the government’s possession that was favorable to the accused
or material to either guilt or punishment, including evidence that may impact the credibility of a witness.
Certainly all of Massachusetts law enforcement was placed on notice of the impact the Dookhan case
had on the justice system. As Deputy Chief with direct oversight of the Braintree evidence program,
Deputy Chief Foster was required to ensure that the information he became aware of regarding missing
or compromised evidence was provided to the District Attorney’s Office immediately.
Similarly, after her death, evidence sufficient to establish probable cause developed that Officer Zopatti
unlawfully stole evidence, including cash, drugs and firearms, from the BPD evidence room.
Circumstantial evidence existed that Officer Zopatti stole controlled substances from the custody of the
BPD and ingested cocaine while at work. Kroll determined that Officer Zopatti committed larceny over
$250 when she removed cash evidence from sealed envelopes stored in the Braintree financial evidence
cabinet over which she had exclusive control. (Note that from former Evidence Room Officer Clifford’s
retirement in August 2013 to just before her death, Officer Zopatti had sole and exclusive access to the
financial evidence cabinet.) In addition, evidence was later discovered that Officer Zopatti stole at least
two firearms that were recovered in a camping trailer on her property. Deputy Chief Foster was Officer
Zopatti’s direct supervisor during these incidents/thefts.

56
Shortly after May 30, 2016, Officer Zopatti’s Department-issued cell phone was provided to Jim Boyle
from BELD for recycling after a meeting with Deputy Chief Foster and Chief Jenkins. The phone was then
destroyed. Around that same time, Officer Zopatti’s Department-issued computer was cleaned and
reassigned to another officer. As a result, any forensic evidence concerning Officer Zopatti’s activity
contained on the devices was compromised or destroyed. As Chief Jenkins and Deputy Chief Foster
failed to secure Officer Zopatti’s cell phone and computer despite an ongoing criminal investigation into
her death and the subsequent discovery of stolen items from the evidence room, Kroll finds that they did
not exercise proper supervision over the Department.
Moreover, in May and June 2016, Deputy Chief Foster was notified of four separate instances of missing
and/or tampered evidence/funds including cocaine from a criminal case that was discovered in Officer
Zopatti’s desk; two criminal cases involving seized cash that was either missing or the evidence bag had
been sliced open and some of the cash removed; and an instance where cash that had been found and
turned into the police department was missing. Despite this information, Deputy Chief Foster failed to
secure as a potential crime scene Officer Zopatti’s office and the financial evidence locker. In addition,
Deputy Chief Foster failed to commence an internal affairs investigation or BPD criminal investigation. He
also failed his Brady obligations to notify the Norfolk County District Attorney’s Office or the
Massachusetts CPAC Unit, which was handling Officer Zopatti’s death investigation. Further, no search
warrants were sought for Officer Zopatti’s home, camper, vehicle or bank accounts, and there was no top-
to-bottom search of the office or its contents. Deputy Chief Foster failed to properly supervise when he
took no administrative or criminal investigative actions. His inaction was inconsistent with basic
investigative procedures and contrary to acceptable police management practices.
On July 28, 2016, upon commencement of the Gordon audit, when multiple items were found to be
missing from the evidence room, including cash, firearms and drug evidence and compromised evidence
bags (Exhibit B – Gordon’s Audit Report), Deputy Chief Foster continued his failure to act appropriately.
No notification was made to the Norfolk County District Attorney’s Office or the Massachusetts CPAC
Unit, and the evidence room and its contents were not secured to protect any forensic evidence. There
was no internal affairs investigation opened nor was there a criminal investigation into the stolen and
compromised evidence. There was no Brady notice given to the judicial system that the integrity of past
or pending cases could be impacted. There were no search warrants sought for Officer Zopatti’s home,
camper, vehicle or bank accounts. Although clear evidence was found that drugs, money and firearms
had been stolen, the audit continued with efforts to identify just how extensive the thefts were and to see
if the losses could be minimized. Deputy Chief Foster failed to properly supervise when he took no
administrative or criminal investigative actions after receiving this information.
On August 11, 2016, Officer Zopatti’s former husband, Mark Zopatti, brought two firearms to the BPD that
he had found at Officer Zopatti’s home. The firearms were later determined to have been stolen from the
BPD evidence room. Once again, there was no notification to the Norfolk County District Attorney’s Office
or the Massachusetts CPAC Unit, and no further investigation occurred. Deputy Chief Foster failed to
properly supervise when he took no administrative or criminal investigative actions after receiving this
information.
Moreover, after the audit commenced, when the Norfolk County District Attorney and First Assistant
informed Chief Jenkins that they had been alerted to concerns with the BPD evidence room and
requested to know if there was any reason for concern, Chief Jenkins advised only that there was an
audit being conducted by an outside auditor and that they were still working on trying to find some items
that could not be located. The Chief further stated that the audit report might have been too inclusive of
information and contained items improperly listed as being in the evidence room that were not. However,
the District Attorney was not informed of the recovered stolen drugs and firearms in Officer Zopatti’s desk
and trailer. Despite the District Attorney requesting to be informed of anything that could impact the

57
integrity of the evidence program or that could affect ongoing and previous cases, Chief Jenkins and
Deputy Chief Foster failed to provide sufficient notification despite being obligated to do so under their
Brady obligations.
Paul McSoley’s Misconduct and Attempted Cover-Up
In August 2016, after several inconsistencies were discovered with McSoley’s financial record keeping,
and after several requests were made, electronically and verbally, for the missing deposit documents,
McSoley suggested that the investigators look through archived documents while he searched through
his files. As McSoley later admitted to Kroll, in fact, he never made those deposits and knew the deposit
slips did not exist when he directed the investigators to search the archives. While McSoley was not a
direct report of Deputy Chief Foster, his actions and activities in handling and dispersing the seized
money was something the Deputy Chief should have exercised a review function over.
Failure to Investigate or Audit McSoley’s Accounting Practices
On August 31, 2016, Lieutenant Moschella submitted a report to Chief Jenkins and Deputy Chief Foster
identifying serious concerns regarding McSoley’s accounting practices, including making payments to the
Norfolk County District Attorney’s Office without depositing the seized funds in the bank. Although
Lieutenant Moschella recommended that a full forensic audit be conducted, an audit was never
commenced. Chief Jenkins and Deputy Chief Foster failed to notify anyone that additional funds from the
law enforcement account may be missing. Chief Jenkins and Deputy Chief Foster again failed to properly
supervise and conduct a proper administrative investigation and criminal investigation after they had been
alerted to McSoley’s accounting discrepancies.

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APPENDIX A: Rules & Regulations of the Braintree Police Department
APPENDIX B: Bruce Gordon’s Audit Report

59
10 High Street, 3rd Floor

Boston, MA 02110
617.210.7471


Braintree Police Department Report of Investigation

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Braintree Police Department Report of Investigation

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A.

PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL

Privileged & Confidential

PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL

2. RELEVANT PARTIES AND TIMELINE................................................................................... 3

3. INITIAL ASSESSMENT OF THE BPD’S EVIDENCE HANDLING PROCEDURES AND

PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL

Managing Director Daniel Linskey (“Linskey”)

PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL

Managing Director Katy Shanahan (“Shanahan”)

Associate Managing Director John Arvanitis (“Arvanitis”)

PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL

RELEVANT PARTIES AND TIMELINE

Chief Russell Jenkins (“Chief Jenkins”)

Deputy Chief Wayne Foster (“Deputy Chief Foster”)

Chief Paul Shastany (“Chief Shastany”)

PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL

Bruce Gordon (“Gordon”)

Paul McSoley (“McSoley”)

Richard Clifford (“Officer Clifford”)

Chief Paul Frazier (“Chief Frazier”)

Michael Morrissey (“Morrissey”)

Lynn Beland (“Beland”)

 Beland is First Assistant of the Norfolk County District Attorney’s Office.

Job Description of the Chief – date approved: May 1997

PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL

 Assesses the effectiveness of programs and procedures, making changes where

 Interviews, conducts background investigations and recommends for appointment or

PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL

 Actively participates in all appraisals of employees within the Braintree Police

 Actively participates in all appraisals of employees within the police department.

 Regular and predictable attendance.

KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS, AND ABILITY:

Must possess a valid class “D” vehicle operator’s license.

Job Description of the Deputy Chief – date approval: unknown

PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL

Supervises 19 full-time employees and up to 57 on call employees.

 Completes special projects assigned by Chief; conducts research on a variety of matters

 Performs preliminary screening of all applicants for positions with department.

 May have access to department-related confidential information including personnel

 Attends, participates in or makes presentations at meetings of various departmental or

PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL

 Regular and predictable attendance.

KNOWLEDGE, SKILLS AND ABILITY:

Skills: Skills in the shooting and operation of firearms.

G. Evidence/Property Room Inspections

a. SEMI-ANNUALLY: At least semi-annually, the supervisor of the

i. Evidence/Property and drugs in custody, and the records relating

ii. Property is properly stored and protected from damage and/or

iii. Property having no further evidentiary value is being disposed of

PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL

iv. The evidence/property rooms are being maintained in a clean and

b. UNSCHEDULED SEMI-ANNUAL: In addition to and in support of other regularly

c. ANNUAL: In order to ensure the integrity of the department's Property

d. REASSIGNMENT OF THE EVIDENCE/PROPERTY CONTROL OFFICER: Should the

The former officer,

ii. The new Evidence/Property Control Officer and

Timeline 2012 - 2017

PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL

REASSIGNMENT OF THE EVIDENCE/PROPERTY CONTROL OFFICER: Should the

i. The former officer [Richard Clifford]3

ii. The new Evidence/Property Control Officer and [Susan Zopatti]

iii. Their supervisor. [Deputy Wayne Foster]

PRIVILEGED & CONFIDENTIAL