08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador.

CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113 1

The students of 4C 2015 – Ateneo Law worked hard to make the remedial law digests found K.Procedure before the Ombudsman....................................................................................................43
in this compilation. It is requested that the readers neither remove the names of the makers
1. Sesbreno v. Aglugub, February 28, 2005, A.M. No. MTJ 05-1581 – TANDOC...........43
nor alter the format. Brought to you by: AQUINO ARCEO BASCARA CHAN CORTEZ DE LA
2. Enriquez v. Caminade, A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1966, March 21, 2006 – TEVES..................44
PAZ DEVESA GERALDEZ KING LAGOS LIBONGCO LOPA LUCENARIO MAGTAGNOB MUTI
NARVASA ORTIZ PASCUAL PEREZ DE TAGLE PINERA PUNO QUIJANO-BENEDICTO RAZON L.Power of the Secretary of Justice over Prosecutors....................................................................45
RESPICIO SANCHEZ SANTOS SUPERABLE TANDOC TEVES TIU VELASQUEZ. Thank you!  1. Punzalan v. de la Pena, July 21, 2004, G.R. No. 158543 – TIU.........................................45
2. Dino et al. v. Olivarez, G.R. No. 170447, December 04, 2009 – VELASQUEZ............47
PART II........................................................................................................................................................................49
CONTENTS A.Complaint or Information (Rule 110)...............................................................................................49
a.Sufficiency of Complaint or Information....................................................................................49
F. Creation of the Sandiganbayan...................................................................................................................17
1. People v. Dimaano, 469 SCRA 647 – AQUINO.............................................................49
APPLICABLE LAWS..................................................................................................................................17 2. Sasot v. People, 462 SCRA 138 – ARCEO........................................................................50
1. Section 4, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution..................................................................17 3. Lasoy v. Zenarosa, 455 SCRA 360 – BASCARA............................................................52
2. Presidential Decree 1486 dated June 11, 1978...............................................................17 4. People v. Batin, G.R. No. 177223, November 28, 2007 – CHAN..........................53
3. Presidential Decree 1606 dated December 10, 1978...................................................17 5. People v. Cachapero, G.R. No. 153008, May 20, 2004 – CORTEZ.......................55
4. Presidential Decree 1861...........................................................................................................17 6. Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 189343, July 10, 2013 - DE LA PAZ....57
5. Republic Act 7995 approved March 10, 1995..................................................................17 b.Substitution of Information..............................................................................................................59
6. Republic Act 8249 approved February 5, 1997...............................................................17
1. Saludaga v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 184537, April 23, 2010 – GERALDEZ. 59
G.Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan......................................................................................................17 2. Pacoy v. Cajigal, G.R. NO. 157472, September 28, 2007 – KING.........................61
1. People v. Sandiganbayan, August 25, 2009, G.R. No. 167304 – MAGTAGNOB.........17 c.Amended Information/Amendment............................................................................................63
2. Serrana v. Sandiganbayan, January 22, 2008, G.R. 162059 – MUTI.............................21
1. Cabo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. NO. 169509, June 16, 2006 – LAGOS...................63
3. Esquivel v. Ombudsman, September 17, 2002, G.R. 137237 – NARVASA..................23
2. Kummer v. People, G.R. No. 174461, September 11, 2013 – LIBONGCO........67
H.Dismissal of the Complaint because of inordinate delay.........................................................25
d.Filing of Information if there is pending Motion for Reconsideration.........................68
1.Tatad v. Sandiganbayan, 159 SCRA 70 – ORTIZ......................................................................25
1. Ramiscal v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 172476-99, September 15, 2010 - LOPA
2.Cervantes v. Sandiganbayan, 307 SCRA 149 - PEREZ DE TAGLE....................................26
......................................................................................................................................................................68
I.Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.............................................................................................................28
e.Prescription..............................................................................................................................................70
APPLICABLE LAW.....................................................................................................................................28
1. Panaguiton v. DOJ, G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008 – LUCENARIO......70
i.1. Republic Act No. 6770 otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989.....28 2. People v. Romuladez, G.R. No. 166510, April 29, 2009 – MAGTAGNOB.........72
CASES..............................................................................................................................................................28 3. Disini v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.169823, September 11, 2013 – MUTI........74

1. Department of Justice v. Liwag, February 11, 2005, G.R. No. 149311 – PUNO. 28 f.Control and Direction of Criminal Action...................................................................................77
2. Lazatin v. Desierto, June 5, 2009, G.R. No. 147097 - QUIJANO-BENEDICTO......31 1. Pinote v. Ayco, 477 SCRA 409 – NARVASA....................................................................77
3. Angeles v. Merceditas Gutierrez, G.R. Nos. 189161 & 189173, March 21, 2012 – 2. Bureau of Customs v. Whelan, G.R. No. 190487, April 13, 2011 – ORTIZ......77
RAZON......................................................................................................................................................32 3. Flores v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 188197, August 03, 2010 - PEREZ DE TAGLE...78
4. Busuego v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.196842, October 9, 2013 –
B.Civil Aspect of a Criminal Case (Rule 111)......................................................................................80
RESPICIO.................................................................................................................................................33
a.Rule in Civil Liability Arising from Delict...................................................................................80
J.Review of Decisions of the Ombudsman...........................................................................................37
1. Bun Tiong v. Balboa, G.R. No. 158177, January 28, 2008 – PUNO.....................80
1. Antonino v. Desierto, December 18, 2008, G.R. No. 144492 – SANCHEZ..................37
2. Enemecio v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 146731, January 13, 2004 – b.Independent Civil Action...................................................................................................................82
SANTOS..........................................................................................................................................................38
1. Simon v. Chan, G.R. No. 157547, February 23, 2011 - QUIJANO-BENEDICTO
3. Baviera v. Zoleta, G.R. NO. 169098, October 12, 2006 – SUPERABLE.........................41
......................................................................................................................................................................82
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113 2

c.Death of the Accused............................................................................................................................84

1. Asilo v. People, G.R. Nos. 159017-18, March 09, 2011 – RAZON.............................84 CASES
2. People v. Bayot, G.R. No. 200030, April 18, 2012 – RESPICIO.................................86
1. ISIP V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO.. 170298, JUNE 26, 2007 – CORTEZ
d.Acquittal.....................................................................................................................................................88
Note: Mej magulo siya. sorry! pero keri na ER. pay more attention to MANUEL ISIP's
1. People v. Tirso Velasco, G.R. No. 127444, September 13, 2000 – SANCHEZ 88
ESTAFA CASE (yung P200k ring) kasi yun yung pinaguusapan ng kaso na 'to. The wife's
2. Ching v. Nicdao, G.R. No. 141181, April 27, 2007 – SANTOS...............................89
case (as well as the BP 22 cases)...not so much.
3. Coscoluella v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.No. 191411, July 15, 2013 – SUPERABLE
......................................................................................................................................................................92
Keyword: 7-carat diamond swindled
e.Prejudicial Question.............................................................................................................................94 DOCTRINE:
1. Dreamwork Construction v. Janiola, G.R. No. 184861, June 30, 2009 –  The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is
TANDOC...................................................................................................................................................94 jurisdictional. The place where the crime was committed determines not only the
2. Pimentel v. Pimentel, G.R. No. 172060, September 13, 2010 – TEVES...........95 venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.
3. San Miguel Properties v. Perez, G.R. No.192253, September 18, 2013 – TIU o It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in
......................................................................................................................................................................96 criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of
its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial
Part III.........................................................................................................................................................................98 jurisdiction of the court.
Rule 112- Preliminary Investigation......................................................................................................98  The jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in
the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take
1. Community Rural Bank v. Talavera, 455 SCRA 34 – VELASQUEZ............................98 cognizance of the case.
2. Serag v. Court of Appeals, 473 SCRA 590 – AQUINO......................................................99
3. Soriano v. People, G.R. No.162336, February 1, 2010 – ARCEO.............................100 EMERGENCY DIGEST:
4. Samuel Lee v. KBC Bank, G.R. No. 164673, January 15, 2011 – BASCARA........102 FACTS: JOSE SUED MANUEL
5. Okabe v. Gutierrez, May 27, 2004, G.R.No. 150185 – CHAN....................................104  Petitioner Manuel Isip (MANUEL) was charged with estafa (ESTAFA CASE) before
Rule 113- Arrest............................................................................................................................................106 RTC CAVITE.
 The information alleged that MANUEL swindled from JOSE one 7-carat diamond
1. People v. De Leon , G.R. No. 169858, January 26, 2010 – PINERA........................106
worth P200,000.
2. People v. Laguio, March 16, 2007, G.R. No. 128587 – PINERA...............................109
o MANUEL was supposed to sell the ring and deliver to JOSE the proceeds of
3. Valdez v. People, G.R.170180, November 23, 2007 – DEVESA...............................113
the sale or to return the ring if not sold.
4. Rolito Go v. Court of Appeals, G.R.No.101837, February 11, 1992 - DEVESA. 114
 HOWEVER, according to MANUEL, the transactions took place in JOSE’s
residence in MANILA, and NOT in JOSE’s ancestral house in Cavite .
 RTC Cavite convicted MANUEL for the crime charged. It found that the
transactions involved in these cases were sufficiently shown to have taken
PA RT I . place at complainant JOSE’s ancestral house in Cavite City when the latter was on
leave of absence from the Bureau of Customs where he was connected.
 MANUEL appealed his conviction, arguing that RTC Cavite has no jurisdiction over
A.VENUE IN CRIMINAL CASES IS JURISDICTIONAL the Estafa case against him; but the CA affirmed the RTC’s ruling.

ISSUE: WON RTC Cavite has jurisdiction (YES)

APPLICABLE LAWS
HELD & RATIO: CA ruling is AFFIRMED.
A.1 SECTION 15, RULE 110, RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE  The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is
A.2 SECTION 21, CHAPTER V, REPUBLIC ACT 10175 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS jurisdictional. The place where the crime was committed determines not only the
THE CYBERCRIME , PREVENTION ACT OF 2012 venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.
A.3 SECTION 58, REPUBLIC ACT 9372 OTHERWISE KNOWNAS THE HUMAN  It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in
SECURITY ACT OF 2007 criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its
A.4 ARTICLE 2, REVISED PENAL CODE
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113 3

essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.
 Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined by
the allegations in the complaint or information.
 Here, MANUEL failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the
transaction happened in Manila.
o He argues that since he and his late wife actually resided in Manila,
convenience alone unerringly suggests that the transaction was entered
into in Manila. We are not persuaded.
o The fact that Cavite City is a bit far from Manila does not necessarily mean
that the transaction cannot or did not happen there. Distance will not
prevent any person from going to a distant place where he can procure
goods that he can sell so that he can earn a living.
o It is not improbable or impossible for MANUEL and his wife to have gone,
not once, but twice in one day, to Cavite City if that is the number of times
they received pieces of jewelry from complainant.
COMPLETE DIGEST:
FACTS:
 The checks issued in payment for assorted pieces of jewelry received from JOSE.
Upon presentation for payment with the drawee bank, said checks were
dishonored for insufficiency of funds. And despite JOSE’s repeated demands,
MARIETTA refused to pay.
SPOUSES ISIP were likewise charged before the same court with 5 counts of Estafa.
 Here, the information alleged that the spouses, in conspiracy, received from
JOSE 1 set dome shape ring and earrings worth P120,000 “, with the obligation
of selling the same on commission basis and deliver the proceeds of the sale
thereof or return them if not sold, on or before March 21, 1984, but the herein
accused, once in possession of the said jewelry by means of false pretenses,
with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of confidence, did, then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert them
to their own personal use and benefit”
 The checks used by the SPOUSES to pay the jewelry were dishonored for
insufficiency of funds and has failed to pay despite repeated demands.
 The SPOUSES pleaded NOT guilty.

ESTAFA CASE
Petitioner Manuel Isip (MANUEL) was charged with Estafa 1 before RTC branch 17 Cavite
City- docketed as Criminal Case No. 136-84 (ESTAFA CASE).
 The information alleged that he received from a certain Leonardo Jose (JOSE)
one 7-carat diamond amounting to P200,000 for the purpose of selling the
same on commission basis and to deliver the proceeds of the sale thereof
Crim. Case No.
or return the jewelry if not sold. 146-84
 MANUEL however, “once in possession of the above-described articles, with 147-84
intent to defraud and with grave abuse of confidence, did, then and there, 148-84
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the 149-84
155-84
same to his own personal use and benefit and notwithstanding repeated 156-84
demands made by JOSE for the return of the jewelry or the delivery of the 157-84Date of Commission
proceeds of the sale thereof, failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the 27 March 1984
17 March 1984
latter amounting to P200,000. 30 March 1984
12 March 1984
BP22 CASE 25 March 1984
MANUEL’s wife, Marietta Isip (MARIETTA) was indicted before the same court for 7 29 March 1984
1 April 1984No. of Check
counts2 of violation of B.P. 22. 518672
518644
1 518645
That on or about March 7, 1984, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, received from Leonardo A. Jose one (1) seven carat diamond 030086[5]
(men’s ring), valued at P200,000.00, for the purpose of selling the same on commission basis and to deliver the 518674
proceeds of the sale thereof or return the jewelry if not sold, on or before March 15, 1984, but the herein accused 518646
once in possession of the above-described articles, with intent to defraud and with grave abuse of confidence, did, 518669Amount of Check
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the same to his own P 562,000.000
personal use and benefit and notwithstanding repeated demands made by Leonardo A. Jose for the return of the P50,000.00
jewelry or the delivery of the proceeds of the sale thereof, failed to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the P50,000.00
aforesaid Leonardo A. Jose in the abovestated amount of P200,000.00, Philippine Currency P150,000.00
P95,000.00
2 P90,000.00
P25,000.00
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
o The Prosecution3 as well as the defense 4 presented their version of the
facts.
RTC of Cavite rendered judgment that MARIETTA is guilty if B.P. 22 violations. MANUEL
was acquitted for the B.P. 22 violations BUT was found GUILTY in the ESTAFA CASE.
 The RTC found that the transactions involved in these cases were
sufficiently shown to have taken place at complainant JOSE’s ancestral
house in Cavite City when the latter was on leave of absence from the Bureau
of Customs where he was connected.
 The defense failed to substantially prove its allegations that the
transactions occurred in Manila, particularly in the Towers Condominium,
and that complainant is a resident of Bigasan,Makati.
o It added that the testimony of MARIETTA that the money with which
the complainant initially agreed to finance their transactions was
withdrawn from the Sandigan Finance in Cavite City further refuted
the defense’s claim that the transactions happened in Manila.
o The trial court likewise found the defense’s contention, that the
obligations were already paid and set-off with the turnover to JOSE of
personal and real properties, to be untenable for it is contrary to
human nature to demand payment when the same had already been
made and the alleged set-offs were for other cases which were settled
amicably and subsequently dismissed upon motion of the City
Prosecutor’s Office at the instance of the complainant.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the lower court’s findings.
 MARIETTA already passed away so the CA dismissed the case against her.
 MANUEL’s conviction was affirmed.
MANUEL’S CONTENTION: Before the Supreme Court, MANUEL maintains that the RTC
had no jurisdiction over the estafa charge in THE ESTAFA CASE and it is pure
speculation and conjectural, if not altogether improbable or manifestly absurd, to
3
[NOTE: I only got the pertinent part, in relation to the ESTAFA CASE] In the afternoon of the same day
(March 7, 1984), Mr. Manuel Isip went to complainant’s residence in Cavite City and got from the latter a
men’s ring (7 carats) worth P200,000.00. Mr. Isip signed a receipt with the condition that he return
the ring or deliver the proceeds, if sold, on or before March 15, 1984. March 15, 1984 came, but Mr.
Isip sought an extension which fell due on April 7, 1984. April 7, 1984 came and went by, but Mr. Isip
defaulted (pp. 41-46, tsn, ibid). The above is the subject matter of Criminal Case No. 136-84 for Estafa
against Manuel Isip.
4 
[NOTE: I only got the pertinent part]”…Beginning early 1983, at complainant’s residence at Plaza Tower
Condominium in Manila, appellant Marietta, accompanied by her husband who participated only as a witness, started
having transactions with complainant who, on different dates in February, March and April, 1984 , extended various
amounts to her for which appellant Marietta pledged jewelry which, in turn, were agreed between her and
complainant to be sold on commission and to turn over the proceeds thereof or return the jewelry to complainant
(Tr., Idem, 16-18). In the course of the transactions, appellant Marietta had issued several checks to complainant
as guarantee for the payment of the subject jewelry which have either been paid or redeemed, had returned the
unsold jewelry to complainant and had conveyed, by way of payment for other jewelry, some personal properties,
like brass and antics, and real properties in Balanga, Bataan and Mabalacat, Pampanga, to complainant who caused
the same to be registered in the names of his son, Christian Jose, and his wife, Zenaida Jose (Exhibits 1, 2, 2-A, 3, 4,
5, 6, 6-A, 7, 7-A), with the result that all the obligations of appellants to complainant have already been paid for or
offset…”
4
suppose that any of the essential elements of the Estafa charged in THE ESTAFA
CASE took place in Cavite City.
 First, he states that the residence of the parties is immaterial and that it is
the situs of the transaction that counts. He argues that it is non sequitur that
simply because complainant had an alleged ancestral house in
Caridad, Cavite, complainant actually lived there and had the transactions there
with him when he and his late wife were actual residents of Manila. Mere
convenience suggests that their transaction was entered into in Manila.
o He adds that the source of the fund used to finance the transactions is
likewise inconsequential because it is where the subject item was
delivered and received by petitioner and/or where it was to be
accounted for that determines venue where Estafa, if any, may be
charged and tried.
 Second, he further argues that it does not follow that because complainant may
have been on leave from the Bureau of Customs, the transactions were
necessarily entered into during that leave and in Cavite City.
o He asserts that there is no competent proof showing that during his
leave of absence, he stayed in Cavite City; and that the transactions
involved, including the subject of THE ESTAFA CASE covering roughly
the period from February to April 1984, coincided with his alleged
leave.
ISSUE: WON RTC Cavite has jurisdiction over MANUEL’s ESTAFA CASE (YES, it has
jurisdiction)
HELD: Court of Appeal’s decision is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
The concept of venue of actions in criminal cases, unlike in civil cases, is
jurisdictional. The place where the crime was committed determines not only the
venue of the action but is an essential element of jurisdiction.
 It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in
criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of its
essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court.
 Territorial jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has
jurisdiction to take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed
therein by the accused.
o Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
allegedly committed outside of that limited territory.
Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is
determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it
is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the case.
o However, if the evidence adduced during the trial shows that the
offense was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss
the action for want of jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, we, like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, are convinced that the venue
was properly laid in the RTC of Cavite City.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
 The complainant had sufficiently shown that the transaction covered by THE
ESTAFA CASE took place in his ancestral home in Cavite City when he was on
approved leave of absence from the Bureau of Customs.
 Since it has been shown that venue was properly laid, it is now MANUEL’s task
to prove otherwise, for it is his claim that the transaction involved was entered
into in Manila. The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his
allegations applies.
Here, MANUEL failed to establish by sufficient and competent evidence that the
transaction happened in Manila.
 He argues that since he and his late wife actually resided in Manila, convenience
alone unerringly suggests that the transaction was entered into in Manila. We
are not persuaded.
 The fact that Cavite City is a bit far from Manila does not necessarily mean that
the transaction cannot or did not happen there. Distance will not prevent any
person from going to a distant place where he can procure goods that he can
sell so that he can earn a living. This is true in the case at bar.
 It is not improbable or impossible for MANUEL and his wife to have gone, not
once, but twice in one day, to Cavite City if that is the number of times they
received pieces of jewelry from complainant.
 Moreover, the fact that the checks issued by MANUEL’s late wife in all the
transactions with complainant were drawn against accounts with banks
in Manila or Makati likewise cannot lead to the conclusion that the transactions
were not entered into in Cavite City.
2. LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES V. BELISATA, G.R. NO. 170298, JUNE 26,
2007 - DE LA PAZ
Landbank of the Philippines v. Belisata, G.R. No. 170298, June 26, 2007
DOCTRINE:
 DARAB has the primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
 The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over
cases of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657 - CARP) and
over criminal cases.
 (from the CRIMPRO Tranquil Transcript)
o Special Agrarian Courts, which are RTCs, are given original and
exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit:
 (1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation
to landowners" and
 (2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No.
6657 – CARP]."
EMERGENCY DIGEST
 Spouses Ralla donated land to their daughter, BELISATA.
5
 The parcels of land were subject of Agrarian Reform and, in exchange, the DAR, thru
Landbank, assessed the just compensation due at 200K.
 Belisata felt that the amount was insufficient and filed a PETITION FOR VALUATION
AND PAYMENT OF JUST COMPENSATION against LANDBANK before the DARAB.
They assessed the value at 2M.
 Aggrieved LANDBANK filed ORIGINAL Petition for Determination of Just
Compensation at the same sala of the RTC sitting as SAC.
 This was DISMISSED by RTC AND CA, saying that (the Petition for determination of
just compensation before the RTC sitting as SAC is violative of the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies +) LANDBANK should have appealed with
the DARAB.
ISSUES: WON the dismissal was proper? What is the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a
Special Agrarian Court (SAC)? IMPROPER DISMISSAL. SAC has jurisdiction.
 No need for appeal with the DARAB.
 Under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving
the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR.
 Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are given original
and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases, to wit:
o (1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to
landowners" and
o (2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A. No. 6657]
CARP."
 The provisions of §50 must be construed in harmony with this provision by
considering cases involving the determination of just compensation and criminal
cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the plenitude of power
conferred on the DAR.
 The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be granted jurisdiction over
cases of eminent domain (for such are takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over
criminal cases. The Court recognizes that the determination of just compensation is
a judicial function which is exercised by courts rather than an administrative agency.
COMPLETE
FACTS:
 Spouses Pablo Ralla and Carmen Munoz Ralla had donated their eight (8) parcels of
lot located in Ligao, Albay to their daughter, Rene Ralla Belista. The eight (8) parcels
of lot were placed by the DAR under Agrarian Reform, and BELISATA claimed
payment of just compensation for the conversion. It further appears that the DAR's
evaluation of the subject farms was only P227,582.58, while petitioner Land Bank of
the Philippines (LBP, for brevity) assessed the same at P317,259.31.
 Believing that her lots were grossly underestimated, BELISATA filed a Petition for
Valuation and Payment of Just Compensation against LANDBANK before the DARAB-
Regional Adjudicator for Region V (RARAD-V). IT RULED IN FAVOR OF BELISATA. It
fixed just compensation at P2,896,408.91 PESOS and ordered Land Bank was
ordered to pay the sum minus the sum already remitted. In response to the
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
respective MRs filed by the Parties. The decision was MODIFIED : fixing the sum for
just compensation at P2,540,211.58 Pesos.
 Aggrieved LANDBANK , filed an original Petition for Determination of Just
Compensation at the same sala of the RTC, docketed as Agrarian Case No. 03-06 on
NOV 11 2002. The court DISMISSED THE CASE "for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies and/or comply with Sections 5, 6, and 7, Rule XIX, 2003 DARAB Rules of
Procedure.” LANDBANK ARGUES in an MR "that the DARAB 2003 Rules of
Procedure does not apply to SAC nor its precursor DARAB Case and that the
ground for dismissal of the case is not among the instances when a court may
dismiss a case on its motion."
 CA DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR REVIEW, saying that filing the case before the
RTC without first seeking the intervention of the DARAB is violative of the doctrine
of exhaustion of administrative remedies. An appeal from the adjudicator’s
resolution should first be filed with the DARAB.
ISSUE: WON it is necessary that in cases involving claims for just compensation under
Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 that the decision of the Adjudicator must first be appealed to
the DARAB before a party can resort to the RTC sitting as SAC? NO
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision
dated May 26, 2004 and the Resolution dated July 28, 2004, of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 81096, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 3,
Legaspi City, sitting as Special Agrarian Court, is directed to hear without delay
petitioner's petition for the determination of just compensation.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
 BELISATA contends that the petition for valuation and payment of just compensation
was filed with the DARAB- Regional Adjudicator for Region V (RARAD) on November
11, 2002, long before the effectivity of the 2003 Rules of Procedure; it is the date of
filing of the petition with the DARAB or any of its adjudicators which is the
reckoning date of the applicability of the 2003 DARAB Rules and not the date of
filing with the SAC; that under the 1994 DARAB Rules prevailing at the time of the
filing of the respondent's claim for just compensation, the Rules provided that the
decision of the adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination of just
compensation shall not be appealable to the Board, but shall be brought directly to
the RTC; that it was in the observance of the 1994 DARAB Rules that petitioner
brought the adjudicator's decision to the RTC sitting as SAC.
 LANDBANK claims that petition with the RTC is an original action and, since the case
was filed at a time when appeal to the DARAB Central Office was already provided in
the 2003 DARAB Rules before resorting to judicial action, the RTC correctly
dismissed the petition,
 Sections 50 and 57 of RA No. 6657 provide:
o Section 50. Quasi-judicial Powers of the DAR. – The DAR is hereby vested
with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under
6
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) x x x
o Section 57. Special Jurisdiction. – The Special Agrarian Court shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination
of just compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal
offenses under this Act. x x x
o The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their
special jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for
decision.
o Clearly, under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over
all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those
falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR. Further
exception to the DAR's original and exclusive jurisdiction are all
petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners
and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under RA No. 6657, which
are within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian
Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation cases for the taking of
lands under RA No. 6657 is vested in the courts.
 In Republic v. CA,5 the Court explained:
o Thus, Special Agrarian Courts, which are Regional Trial Courts, are
given original and exclusive jurisdiction over two categories of cases,
to wit:
 (1) "all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners" and
 (2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under [R.A.
No. 6657]."
o The provisions of §50 must be construed in harmony with this provision by
considering cases involving the determination of just compensation and
criminal cases for violations of R.A. No. 6657 as excepted from the
plenitude of power conferred on the DAR. Indeed, there is a reason for this
distinction. The DAR is an administrative agency which cannot be
granted jurisdiction over cases of eminent domain (for such are
takings under R.A. No. 6657) and over criminal cases.
 The Court has upheld the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC, sitting as
SAC, over all petitions for determination of just compensation to landowners in
accordance with Section 57 of RA No. 6657. The Court recognizes that the
determination of just compensation is a judicial function which is exercised by
courts rather than an administrative agency. It would be well to emphasize that
the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is an exercise of the power of eminent
domain by the State. The valuation of property or determination of just
compensation in eminent domain proceedings is essentially a judicial function
which is vested with the courts and not with administrative agencies.
3. BONIFACIO V. RTC OF MAKATI, G.R. NO. 184800, MAY 05, 2010 – GERALDEZ
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
WONINA M. BONIFACIO, JOCELYN UPANO, VICENTE ORTUOSTE AND JOVENCIO
PERECHE, SR., Petitioners, vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI, BRANCH 149,
and JESSIE JOHN P. GIMENEZ, Respondents. (G.R. No. 184800 May 5, 2010) - Geraldez
Emergency Recit:
 The Yunchengcos own Pacific Plans, a preneed company that was not able to fulfill
its obligations and sought a suspension of payments.
 Because of this, petitioners herein, who are officers and trustees of PEPCI (Parents
Enabling Parents Coalition), and who availed of the preneed plans, put up the
website pepcoalition.com, wherein various posts were written against the
Yuchengcos and their companies.
 Gimenez, the representative of the Yuchengcos, filed a complaint for 13 counts of
libel against the PEPCI people in the Makati RTC.
 However, in the original Information that was filed, there was NO:
o allegation of the place of residence of the complainants
o or the place where the article was printed and first published.
 The RTC allowed the formal amendment of the Information, but in the subsequent
one, Gimenez merely alleged that the article was published and first accessed
in Makati.
 These deficiencies were the subject of the PEPCI people’s MOTION TO QUASH.
ISSUES: WON the allegation that that the article was published and first accessed in
Makati was sufficient to confer jurisdiction in RTC Makati? NO
 THE LAW NOW: Venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual
is limited to only either of two places, namely:
o 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission
of the offense; or
o 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.
 CONDITION SINE QUA NON: If the second mode is chosen, the place where the
written defamation was printed and first published should likewise be alleged.
 In the present case, the Amended Information opted to lay the venue by availing of
the second mode.
7
 THE OLD LAW ON LIBEL: Before the amendment of Art. 360 (libel), the rule was that
a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous
article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass
the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a
remote or distant place. HENCE, the law on libel was amended.
 To credit Gimenez’s premise of equating his first access to the defamatory article on
petitioners’ website in Makati with "printing and first publication" would spawn the
very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought to discourage and
prevent.
 Hence, RTC is directed to QUASH the Information.
 [NG: The case didn’t say where you should file a case for internet-based libel].
COMPLETE
Facts:
1. Respondent Gimenez, on behalf of Amabassador Yuchengco, Helen Dee and Malayan
Insurance, filed a 13 cases of libel under Art. 355 and 353 against the officers,
trustees, and a member of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition Inc. (PEPCI), as well as
the administrator of its website, pepcoalition.com. PEPCI also owns a blogspot
account and a yahoo group.
2. PEPCI was formed by a large group of disgruntled planholders of Pacific Plans Inc
(PPI), a wholly owned subsidiary of Grepalife Corp, which is owned by the
Yuchengco Group of Companies (YGC).
a. This was a pre-need educational plans company that wasn’t able to pay its
liabilities when it became due, and eventually sought rehabilitation and
suspension of payments.
3. Gimenez alleges that when he accessed these website in Makati, he was
appalled by the highly derogatory statements and accusations found therein,
attacking the Yuchengco family, YGC, and Malayan.
a. Some of the stuff mentioned were:
Talagang naisahan na naman tayo ng mga Yuchengcos. Nangyari na ang
mga kinatatakutan kong pagbagsak ng negotiation. x x x x x x x x x
For sure may tactics pa silang nakabasta sa atin. Let us be ready for it
because they had successfully lull us and the next time they will try to kill
us na. x x x
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
b. NOTE: The original Information did not contain details as to where the
complainants resided and where the article was printed and first
published.
4. The Makati Prosecutor found probably cause to indict the accused.
5. Several of the accused appealed to the Secretary of Justice, who, in 2007, reversed
the finding of probable cause and directed the withdrawal of the Informations. It
reasoned that “internet libel” was non-existent crime.
6. Meanwhile, in 2006, Petitioners in this case, which are the other accused, filed
with the RTC a Motion to Quash.
a. They allege that the Information failed to allege
i. a particular place within the RTC’s jurisdiction where the subject
article was printed and first published,
ii. or that the parties resided in Makati at the time the article was
printed and first published.
b. The quashing was granted by the RTC.
7. The prosecutor filed an MR, alleging that Helen and Malayan were residents of
Makati, and that even if they weren’t, the defects could be cured by a formal
amendment.
a. RTC granted the MR and ordered the amendment of the Information.
8. NOTE: The new information alleged, inter alia, that the accused “published an article
imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and
published in the said website www.pepcoalition.com, a website accessible in Makati
City, an injurious and defamatory article, which was first published and accessed by
the private complainant in Makati City”.
9. The RTC accepted this to be sufficient in form. RTC denied the MR.
10. Petitioners filed this petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
ISSUES:
1. WON petitioners violated the rule on hierarchy of courts to thus render the petition
dismissible – YES, but an exception is made.
2. WON grave abuse of discretion attended the public respondent’s admission of the
Amended Information. – YES.
8
RATIO:
 In the present case, the substantive issue calls for the Court’s exercise of its
discretionary authority, by way of exception, in order to abbreviate the review
process as petitioners raise a pure question of law involving jurisdiction in criminal
complaints for libel under Article 360 of the RPC–whether the Amended
Information is sufficient to sustain a charge for written defamation in light of
the requirements under Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act (RA)
No. 4363, reading:
o xxx The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations, as provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or
separately with the CFI of the
 province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published
 OR where any of the offended parties actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense: xxx
 Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was
committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential
element of jurisdiction. This principle acquires even greater import in libel cases,
given that Article 360, as amended, specifically provides for the possible
venues for the institution of the criminal and civil aspects of such cases.
 In Macasaet, it was held:
o Whenever possible, the place where the written defamation was
printed and first published should likewise be alleged. That allegation
would be a sine qua non if the circumstance as to where the libel was
printed and first published is used as the basis of the venue of the action.
 It becomes clear that the venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private
individual is limited to only either of two places, namely:
o 1) where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission
of the offense; or
o 2) where the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published.
 The Amended Information in the present case opted to lay the venue by
availing of the second. Thus, it stated that the offending article "was first published
and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City." In other words, it
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
considered the phrase to be equivalent to the requisite allegation of printing
and first publication.
 The rationale for the amendment to Art. 360 by RA 4363 is:
o Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for
libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was
published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed.
Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party
could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the
criminal action in a remote or distant place.
o To forestall such harassment, Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted.
o It lays down specific rules as to the venue of the criminal action so as to
prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from
inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning
complaints filed in remote municipal courts.
 If the circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first published are
used by the offended party as basis for the venue in the criminal action, the
Information must allege with particularity where the defamatory article was
printed and first published, as evidenced or supported by, for instance, the
address of their editorial or business offices in the case of newspapers, magazines or
serial publications. This pre-condition becomes necessary in order to forestall any
inclination to harass.
 To credit Gimenez’s premise of equating his first access to the defamatory
article on petitioners’ website in Makati with "printing and first publication"
would spawn the very ills that the amendment to Article 360 of the RPC sought
to discourage and prevent. It hardly requires much imagination to see the chaos
that would ensue in situations where the website’s author or writer, a blogger or
anyone who posts messages therein could be sued for libel anywhere in the
Philippines that the private complainant may have allegedly accessed the offending
website.
 For the Court to hold that the Amended Information sufficiently vested jurisdiction
in the courts of Makati simply because the defamatory article was accessed therein
would open the floodgates to the libel suit being filed in all other locations where the
pepcoalition website is likewise accessed or capable of being accessed.
 Respecting the contention that the venue requirements imposed by Article 360, as
amended, are unduly oppressive, the Court’s pronouncements in Chavez are
instructive: xxx “These limitations imposed on libel actions filed by private persons
are hardly onerous, especially as they still allow such persons to file the civil or
9
criminal complaint in their respective places of residence, in which situation there is
no need to embark on a quest to determine with precision where the libelous matter
was printed and first published.”
 The RTC is directed to QUASH the Information.
B.JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED
1. REPUBLIC ACT 7691
C.JURISDICTION TO ISSUE HOLD DEPARTURE ORDERS (REGULAR COURTS
DISTINGUISHED WITH THE SANDIGANBAYAN)
1.MONDEJAR V. BUBAN, A.M. NO. MTJ-01-1349, JULY 12, 2001 – KING
Bernadette Mondejar, complainant vs. Judge Marino Buban, MTCC Tacloban
AM No. MTJ-01-1349, July 12, 2001
Doctrine: Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to
criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the
said circular specifically provides that “hold-departure orders shall be issued only in
criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTCs.”
ER:
 ADMIN CASE  Judge Buban of the MTCC Tacloban issued a Hold Departure Order
against Mondejar in connection with a case of violation of BP22 committed by
Mondejar.
 Mondejar filed a complaint with the Court administrator alleging GRAVE
MISCONDUCT on the part of Judge Buban, the judge of MTCC Tacloban.
 SC: Judge Buban is hereby reprimanded. Being an MTCC judge, he had not authority
to issue a HDO. Only the RTC has jurisdiction issue HDOs.
COMPLETE
Facts:
 ADMIN CASE  A complaint by Bernadette Mondejar charged Judge Buban with
gross ignorance of the law, partiality, serious irregularity and grave
misconduct relative to Criminal Case No. 98-07-CR-133 entitled “People of the
Philippines v. Bernadette Mondejar and Arlette Mondejar” for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22.
 The case was exclusively under the jurisdiction of the MTCC.
 Mondejar alleged that Judge Buban, as a judge of MTCC, issued a “hold
department order” against her in violation of Supreme Court Circular No. 39-
97
 The circular states “hold departure orders”(HDO) shall be issued only in criminal
cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts.”
 Judge Buban commented that he was not aware of the Supreme Court Circular.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
o But eventually, when he came to know it he issued an order lifting and
setting aside the HDO.
ISSUE: Who has jurisdiction issue Hold departure orders? RTC
RATIO:
 Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of second level courts. Paragraph No. 1 of the said
circular specifically provides that “hold-departure orders shall be issued only
in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regional trial courts.”
 Clearly then, criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level
courts do not fall within the ambit of the circular, and it was an error on the
part of respondent judge to have issued one in the instant case.
 The Court, in exercising administrative supervision of all lower courts, has not been
remiss in reminding the members of the bench to exert due diligence in keeping
abreast with the development in law and jurisprudence.
 Herein judge, therefore, cannot be excused for his infraction. Judges should always
be vigilant in their quest for new developments in the law so they could discharge
their duties and functions with zeal and fervor.
2.MUPAS V. ESPANOL, A.M. NO. RTJ-04-1850, JULY 14, 2004 – LAGOS
Judge Mupas vs. Judge Espanñ ol
Topic: Hold Departure Order
Doctrine
 Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of second level courts. Criminal cases within the
exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall within the ambit of the circular.
o It is logical to state that the criminal cases must be pending in the sala
of the RTC concerned.
 Section 1 of Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97 states that “Hold-Departure Orders
shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC” the
same should be read that the subject criminal case has been filed and pending with
the RTC.
ER: MTC JUDGE MUPAS SUED EXEC RTC JUDGE ESPANOL
 ADMIN CASE Judge Mupas charged Judge Espanñ ol in her capacity as Executive
Judge, with Gross Ignorance of the Law and Usurpation of Authority.
 MTC Judge Mupas conducted the PI in an estafa case between Bituon et al and
Malihan et al.
o On the same day, she issued a warrant of arrest against the accused and
recommended no bail for their provisional liberty.
 THEREAFTER, Bituon et al filed a motion to transfer Malihan from the
municipal jail to the provincial jail addressed to RTC EXEC JUDGE ESPANOL.
10
o A copy of the motion was sent to Judge Espanñ ol, the Executive Judge of RTC
Dasmarinñ as, Cavite, invoking her supervisory authority over all municipal
jail detainees pursuant to Sec 25 Rule 114.
 Judge Español, in turn, transferred Malihan
o and directed the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation to HOLD
AND PREVENT the departure from the Philippines of Malihan while
the cases are pending.
 Judge Mupas thus alleges that Judge Español’s act of issuing said assailed
orders, despite the fact that the cases are pending with the MTC, constitutes
gross ignorance of the law and usurpation of authority.
 Judge Español argues that the SC Circular 39-97 does not require that the
subject criminal cases be in her court for the issuance of a hold-departure order.
ISSUE: WON Judge Espanñ ol’s order to issue a hold departure order was valid? NOPE
 Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to issue hold-departure orders to criminal
cases within the jurisdiction of second level courts. Criminal cases within the
exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall within the ambit of the circular.
 It is logical to state that the criminal cases must be pending in the sala of the
RTC concerned.
 In this case, at time of the issuance of the hold-departure order, the criminal
cases were only in the preliminary investigation stage in the MTC to determine
whether there is reasonable ground to believe that accused Eva Malihan is guilty of
the offense charged and should be held for trial. Judge Mupas’ findings had not yet
been elevated to and reviewed by the provincial prosecutor.
 Judge Español’s issuance of the hold-departure order was therefore premature
and clearly contravenes the mandate of Circular No. 39-97 proscribing the
precipitate and indiscriminate issuance of hold-departure orders. All told, Judge
Espanñ ol’s claim of good intention finds no convincing justification.
COMPLETE
(Note: The case is long because it discussed other topics. The ER is enough for the assigned
topic.)
Facts:
 Judge Mupas charged Judge Espanñ ol in her capacity as Executive Judge, with Gross
Ignorance of the Law and Usurpation of Authority.
 Private complainants Bituon, Cantada, Mendoza, Callo and Glorioso filed three
separate criminal complaints for syndicated estafa against Malihan, Sinagbulo,
Vargas, Baldovino, Liwanag, Sanchez and Tizon before the MTC.
 Judge Mupas conducted the preliminary investigation and on the same day, she
issued a warrant of arrest against the accused and recommended no bail for their
provisional liberty.
 Private complainants filed a motion to transfer Malihan from the municipal
jail to the provincial jail. Malihan filed an Urgent Motion for Bail.
 Private complainants filed a supplemental pleading adding support as to why
Malihan should be transferred. They then sent copies of the motion to transfer and
supplemental pleading to Judge Espanñ ol, invoking that the Executive Judge has
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
authority to supervise all detainees in the municipal jail of Dasmarinñ as, Cavite under
Section 25 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
 Judge Mupas asked for comment on the petition for bail but Judge Español
issued two orders: 1) transferring Malihan to the Provincial Jail; and 2)
directed the Commissioner on Immigration and Deportation to hold and
prevent the departure from the Philippines of Malihan while the cases are
pending.
 Judge Mupas thus alleges that Judge Español’s act of issuing said assailed
orders, despite the fact that the cases are pending with the MTC, constitutes
gross ignorance of the law and usurpation of authority.
 Judge Espanñ ol claims that the complaint is baseless and retaliatory as it is founded
on intrigue and spite for blowing the whistle concerning Judge Mupas’ activities that
are pernicious to the judiciary.
 Judge Español states that Mupas’ involvement in a “scam in the form of
commissions from bail bond applicants” is the main reason why complainant
clings dearly to the delegated authority in the conduct of preliminary
investigation of cases filed with her court.
o Judge Espanñ ol explains that she was surprised when she was furnished a
copy of the two pleadings relating to cases pending with the MTC, but
admits that she acted on the motions as Executive Judge “in order not to
frustrate the administration of justice.”
o With respect to the transfer order, she claims that under Section 25 of Rule
114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, she has the authority to
supervise all persons in custody.
o As regards the hold-departure order, she argues that she is authorized
under Supreme Court Circular No. 39-97, which does not require that the
subject criminal cases be in her court for the issuance of a hold-
departure order. She argues further that she issued the questioned hold-
departure order based on the allegation of the complaining witnesses
that accused is trying to abscond from prosecution in the criminal
case. Furthermore, she decided to act on the motions because of the fact
that complainant chose to ignore said motions to the prejudice of the
complaining witnesses.
 Subsequently, in a letter dated February 8, 2002, Judge Mupas reiterates her earlier
inquiry in 1999 involving the practice of Judge Espanñ ol in granting bail on cases
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC.
 On May 15, 2002, the OCA treated complainant’s letter as a supplemental complaint
and referred it to Judge Espanñ ol for her comment.
o Judge Espanñ ol maintains that the issue of granting bail is subject of
investigation in A.M. No. MTJ-01-1348.
o She contends that the complaint is frivolous considering that the hold-
departure order she issued against Eva Malihan was sustained by the
prosecutor. She claims that it is complainant Judge who should be
investigated on irregularities in approving bail bonds of detention
prisoners. She avers further that complainant Judge falsified her report on
detention prisoners and purposely delayed the resolution of preliminary
investigation cases until after a considerable period of time which is a clear
11
instance of complainant Judge’s gross abuse of authority and gross
ignorance of the law.
 In her Reply, Judge Mupas brandishes as lies the allegations of Judge Espanñ ol in her
Comment.
o As regards the hold-departure order, complainant Judge claims that the
case was eventually dismissed by the RTC of Imus, Cavite. Lastly, she
claims that Judge Espanñ ol continues to defy the rules on bail since she still
issues release orders on detention prisoners whose cases are filed either
for preliminary investigation or trial in the MTC.
 On February 28, 2004, Judge Mupas filed a supplement to her allegations in the
letter dated February 8, 2002 regarding the practice of Judge Espanñ ol to grant bail in
cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTC. She cites nine cases pending with
the MTC wherein Judge Espanñ ol granted bail and subsequently released the accused
even though the judge where the case is pending is neither absent, unavailable nor
even alleged to be absent or unavailable.
 Judge Mupas emphatically submits that without the necessity of a formal
investigation on the matter, the records of the case involved will bear out the
culpability of Judge Espanñ ol and will more than justify the imposition of the most
severe penalty upon her.
 OCA opines that Judge Espanñ ol’s order to transfer the accused from the municipal
jail to the provincial jail cannot be justified under Section 25 of Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides, in part:
o SEC. 25. Court supervision of detainees. – The court shall exercise
supervision over all persons in custody for the purpose of eliminating
unnecessary detention. The executive judges of the Regional Trial Courts
shall conduct monthly personal inspections of provincial, city and
municipal jails and the prisoners within their respective jurisdictions. They
shall ascertain the number of detainees, inquire on their proper
accommodation and health and examine the condition of the jail
facilities. They shall order the segregation of sexes and of minors from
adults, ensure the observance of the right of detainees to confer privately
with counsel, and strive to eliminate conditions inimical to detainees.
 The OCA expounds that as Executive Judge, Judge Espanñ ol exercises supervision over
all persons in custody for the purpose of eliminating unnecessary detention but the
rule does not give her the authority to arrogate upon herself a power vested upon a
presiding judge of the court where the case is pending. Instead of issuing an order
transferring the accused, the OCA observes that Judge Espanñ ol should have called
the attention of the complainant regarding the motions which allegedly required
immediate action; that there was no showing that she called the attention of
complainant Judge on the alleged motion to transfer accused Eva Malihan, neither
was there any indication that the accused in the subject cases was in a situation
which requires the interference of the Executive Judge. The OCA concludes that
Judge Espanñ ol encroached upon the power of complaining judge when Judge
Espanñ ol took cognizance of the motions not pending in her court.
 With regard to the hold-departure order, the OCA opines that the same cannot
be sustained since it is contrary to the mandates of Supreme Court Circular No.
39-97 inasmuch as at the time of its issuance, no case has yet been filed in the
RTC. It adds that while Section 1 of said circular states that “Hold-Departure Orders
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
shall be issued only in criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Court” the same should be read that the subject criminal case has been filed
and pending with the RTC. In the criminal cases subject of the present
administrative case, there is even no final determination yet of a prima facie case
that would warrant the filing of an information in court. The determination made by
an MTC would still be reviewed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. The OCA
concludes that Judge Espanñ ol went against the injunction in Circular No. 39-97 that
judges of the RTC’s should be cautious and avoid the indiscriminate issuance of hold-
departure orders as this results in inconvenience to the parties affected and is
tantamount to an infringement on the right and liberty of an individual to travel.
 OCA recommends to the Court that: (a) Judge Espanñ ol be admonished for issuing an
order transferring the accused from the municipal jail to the provincial jail; (b) Judge
Espanñ ol be reprimanded for issuing a hold departure order considering that it is not
within her authority to issue hold departure orders in cases pending preliminary
investigation in the MTC; Judge Espanñ ol compulsorily retired from service
on January 9, 2004.
ISSUES:
(1) WON Judge Espanñ ol’s order for the issuance of a hold departure order constitutes
gross ignorance of the law? YES.
(2) Whether Judge Espanñ ol can issue hold departure orders? NO.
HELD: Judge Dolores L. Espanñ ol is found guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and
is FINED Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to be deducted from whatever retirement
benefits due her.
Ratio:
Issuance of Hold Departure Orders (RELEVANT)
 With regard to the hold-departure order, Circular No. 39-97 limits the authority to
issue hold-departure orders to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level
courts. Criminal cases within the exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts do not fall
within the ambit of the circular. It is logical to state that the criminal cases must be
pending in the sala of the RTC concerned.
 In this case, at time of the issuance of the hold-departure order, the criminal cases
were only in the preliminary investigation stage in the MTC to determine whether
there is reasonable ground to believe that accused Eva Malihan is guilty of the
offense charged and should be held for trial. Judge Mupas’ findings had not yet been
elevated to and reviewed by the provincial prosecutor. Judge Espanñ ol’s issuance of
the hold-departure order was therefore premature and clearly contravenes the
mandate of Circular No. 39-97 proscribing the precipitate and indiscriminate
issuance of hold-departure orders. All told, Judge Espanñ ol’s claim of good intention
finds no convincing justification.
Powers and Duties of an Executive Judge (IRRELEVANT)
 The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA, except as to the recommended
penalty. Judge Espanñ ol urges that her conduct was nothing more than the zealous
fulfillment of her duties as Executive Judge of the RTC, Dasmarinñ as, Cavite.
12
 However, it is elementary that an Executive Judge only has administrative
supervision over lower courts. Her function relates only to the management of first
and second level courts, within her administrative area with a view to attaining
prompt and convenient dispatch of its business. Acting as such, she cannot
unilaterally override the MTC’s actions in cases pending with it under the guise of
“administrative supervision,” without running afoul of the orderly administration of
justice. Only when her court’s jurisdiction is appropriately invoked in an appeal or
certiorari and other special civil actions can Judge Espanñ ol judge, in her judicial
capacity, override the lower court’s judgment.
 Although the “Guidelines on the Selection and Designation of Executive Judges and
Defining their Powers, Prerogatives and Duties 5,” the same is a mere reiteration of
what has been in effect before said Circular.
 Administrative Order No. 66, which took effect on July 1, 1975, narrates the specific
power, prerogative and duties of an executive judge. The executive judge has not
been given any authority to interfere with the transfer of detainees in cases handled
by other judges, be it of the first or second level; nor to grant hold-departure orders
in cases not assigned to her sala. The powers of an executive judge relate only to
those necessary or incidental to the performance of his/her functions in relation to
court administration.
 Time and again the Court has adverted to the solemn obligation of judges to be very
zealous in the discharge of their bounden duties. Nonetheless, the earnest efforts of
judges to promote a speedy administration of justice must at all times be exercised
5
SECTION 1. Executive Judges; general powers, prerogatives and duties. – Executive Judges shall, within their
respective area of administrative supervision:
(a) Provide leadership in, and coordinate with the management of the first and second level courts;
(b) Exercise supervision over the judges and personnel;
(c) Balance the workload among the courts and maintain equitable distribution of cases in accordance with
relevant existing issuances;
(d) Recommend and implement policies concerning court operations;
(e) Identify, address and resolve problems in court administration which do not require any intervention by the
Supreme Court or the Court Administrator.
(f) Direct, through the Clerk of Court, the undertaking of staff support activities to improve judiciary services in
accordance with relevant existing issuances;
(g) Initiate, propose, and supervise the implementation of professional development programs for judicial
personnel that the Philippine Judicial Academy, in coordination with the Office of the Court Administrator, may
undertake;
(h) Exercise such other powers and prerogatives as may be necessary or incidental to the performance of their
functions in relation to court administration; and
(i) Perform such other functions and duties as may be assigned by the Supreme Court or the Court
Administrator.
6
IV. Specific Powers, Prerogatives and Duties
The specific powers, prerogatives and duties of the Executive Judge are as follows:
1. To investigate administrative complaints against Municipal and City Judges, and other court personnel within
his administrative area; and to submit his findings and recommendations to the Supreme Court.
10. To visit and inspect municipal and provincial jails and their prisoners as required by Section 1730 of the
Revised Administrative Code and by applicable rules and regulations.
12. To designate, with immediate notice to the Supreme Court, the municipal judge to try cases in other
municipalities within his area of administrative supervision, in case of absence or incapacity of the municipal judge
concerned, which designation shall be effective immediately, unless revoked by the Supreme Court.
13. To assign, with the prior approval of the Chief Justice, Municipal and City Judges to hear and determine
cadastral cases as provided by law.
...
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
with due recognition of the boundaries and limits of their jurisdiction or authority.
Judge Espanñ ol's ardent determination to expedite the case and render prompt
justice may be a noble objective but she did so in a manner which took away from
the complainant MTC judge the initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates
properly belongs to her.
 The Court agrees with the observations of the OCA that Judge Espanñ ol should have
conferred with complainant regarding the criminal cases and relayed her concerns
to the latter, rather than precipitately issuing the assailed orders.
 The Court further notes that, contrary to Judge Espanñ ol’s allegation, complainant did
not choose to simply ignore the pending motion to transfer but, in fact, promptly
directed the Chief of Police to comment thereon.
Appropriate Penalty (NOT SO RELEVANT)
 The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law and
that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction, but only
in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where, however, the
procedure is so simple and the facts so evident as to be beyond permissible margins
of error, to still err thereon amounts to ignorance of the law. [24]
 Considering the Judge Espanñ ol’s ten years of service as a judge, her judicial mind
should have been tempered with the delicate intricacies of the law and procedure.
Judge Espanñ ol’s confusion between her administrative and judicial functions betrays
the degree of her competency and displays her unfamiliarity with basic procedural
rules. Judge Espanñ ol ought to have known the correct procedure to be followed in
order to ensure proper administration of justice with due regard to her
jurisdictional boundaries. She was bound to discharge her duties with competence,
prudence, caution and attention inasmuch as she is a reflection of the entire
judiciary.
 Thus, the Court finds the penalty of admonition and reprimand recommended by the
OCA to be too lenient.
 Besides, the recent cases wherein the penalty of reprimand was imposed on erring
judges for the issuance of hold-departure orders beyond the ambit of Circular 39-97
is not applicable because of the different circumstance in this case where Judge
Espanñ ol precipitately issued orders in criminal cases still undergoing preliminary
investigation in the MTC.
 Under Section 8 of A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC amending Rule 140 of the Rules of Court on
the Discipline of Justices and Judges, which took effect on October 1, 2001, gross
ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge which carries with it a penalty
of either dismissal from service, suspension or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but
not exceeding P40,000.00. However, considering that the incident took place
on September 4, 2001 which is before A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC took effect, the Court
finds that a fine of P5,000.00 is sufficient for unduly transferring the detainee and
arrogating upon herself the authority to issue a hold-departure order.
3. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO V. VASQUEZ, 217 SCRA 633 – LIBONGCO
DOCTRINES
13
 A hold departure order is but an exercise of respondent court's inherent
power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the
case and the person of the accused.
 Parties with pending cases therein should apply for permission to leave the country
from the very same courts which, in the first instance, are in the best position to pass
upon such applications and to impose the appropriate conditions therefor since they
are conversant with the facts of the cases and the ramifications or implications
thereof. Where, as in the present case, a hold departure order has been issued
ex parte or motu proprio by said court, the party concerned must first exhaust
the appropriate remedies therein, through a motion for reconsideration or
other proper submissions, or by the filing of the requisite application for
travel abroad.
o Only where all the conditions and requirements for the issuance of the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus indubitably
obtain against a disposition of the lower courts may our power of
supervision over said tribunals be invoked through the appropriate
petition assailng on jurisdictional or clearly valid grounds their actuations
therein.
ER:
 An information against Miriam was filed with the SB for violation of the Anti-Graft
Law.
o She filed a motion wherein she posted a 15K bond and she stated that
she was putting herself under the custody of the SB.
 She made a public statement that she was going to the US to accept a
fellowship supposedly offered by the JFK school of Government at Harvard.
o HENCE, SB MOTU PROPRIO issued a HDO against Miriam.
 Miriam filed DIRECTLY WITH SC a so-called “Motion to Restrain the
Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, with
Motion to Set Pending Incident for Hearing.”
 Miriam argues that SB did not acquire jurisdiction, and therefore committed
GADALEJ in issuing the HDO.
ISSUE: WON HDO was properly issued? YES, SB properly issued it
RATIO:
 Miriam voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the SB when she
expressly sought leave that she be considered as having placed herself under the
jurisdiction of the SB for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings and
that by said motion she be considered as having placed herself under the custody of
the SB.
o She is effectively estopped from asserting the contrary
 Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from
a general grant of jurisdiction in addition to those expressly conferred to
them. These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the due
administration of justice.
 Miriam does not deny the public statement she made that she had every intention of
leaving the country. We uphold the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and in thereafter
issuing sua sponte the hold departure order, in justified consonance with our
preceding disquisition.
 To reiterate, the hold departure order is but an EXERCISE of respondent
court's INHERENT POWER to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its
jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.
COMPLETE
FACTS
 An information was filed against Miriam Defensor-Santiago (Miriam) with the
Sandiganbayan (SB) for alleged violation of Sec. 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
 An order of arrest was issued against her by Presiding Justice Francis Garchitorena ,
with bail.
 Miriam filed a “Urgent ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond”
o It stated therein that she suffered extensive physical injuries due to a
vehicular collision and as such would not be able to personally appear
in court for an indefinite period.
o SB issued a resolution (RES A) allowing the posting of cash bond was
authorized and physical appearance was temporarily dispensed with.
o Prayer: WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court
that the bail bond she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly
accepted, and that by this motion, she be considered as having placed
herself under the custody of this Honorable Court and dispensing of
her personal appearance for now until such time she will (sic) have
recovered sufficiently from her recent near fatal accident.
 Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez (Conrado) filed with the SB a manifestation that
Miriam appeared in his office, and that she came and left his offices unaided.
 SB issued a resolution setting arraignment, and set aside the RES A, ordering
Miriam’s appearance before the deputy clerk of the First Division.
 Miriam filed a motion that her cash bond be cancelled and that she be allowed
provisional liberty upon a recognizance.
o She contended that the continuance of the bail bond may imply to other
people that she has intentions of fleeing.
 Miriam filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction,
seeking to enjoin the SB and the RTC from proceeding with the criminal cases for
anti-graft and libel, respectively. TRO was issued.
 SB issued an order deferring arraignment until further advised by the SC and the
consideration of her motion to cancel cash bond until further initiative from her
counsel.
 SC dismissed the petition for certiorari and lifted the TRO.
 SB issued a hold departure order against Miriam due to an announcement
made by the latter that she would be leaving for the US to accept a fellowship
supposedly offered by the JFK school of Government at Harvard which was
widely publicized by the media.
 Miriam argues that SB did not acquire jurisdiction, and therefore committed
GADALEJ in issuing the HDO. MR was also dismissed with finality
14
ISSUE: WON the SB properly issued the HDO.
HELD: WHEREFORE, with respect to and acting on the motion now before us for
resolution, the same is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
RATIO:
 Miriam voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the SB when she
expressly sought leave that she be considered as having placed herself under
the jurisdiction of the SB for purposes of the required trial and other
proceedings and that by said motion she be considered as having placed
herself under the custody of the SB
o She cannot now be heard to claim otherwise, she is effectively estopped
from asserting the contrary after she had earlier recognized the
jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise that jurisdiction over the
aforestated pleadings she filed therein.
 Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a
general grant of jurisdiction in addition to those expressly conferred to them.
o These inherent powers are such powers as are necessary for the
ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or essential to the existence,
dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to the due administration of
justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the
execution of their granted powers; and include the power to maintain the
court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants.
 A court of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the
necessary and usual incidental powers it and subject to existing laws and
constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has the power to do
things that are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within
the scope of its jurisdiction.
 Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make interlocutory orders
necessary to protect its jurisdiction. Such being the case, with more reason may a
party litigant be subjected to proper coercive measures where he disobeys a proper
order, or commits a fraud on the court or the opposing party, the result of which is
that the jurisdiction of the court would be ineffectual. What ought to be done
depends upon the particular circumstances.
 Miriam does not deny the public statement she made that she had every
intention of leaving the country. We uphold the course of action adopted by the
Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of such fact of petitioner's plan to go
abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold departure order, in
justified consonance with our preceding disquisition. To reiterate, the hold
departure order is but an exercise of respondent court's inherent power to
preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of its jurisdiction over the case and
the person of the accused.
D.JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE ACCUSED
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
1.VALDEPENAS V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. L-20687, APRIL 30, 1966 – LOPA
MAXIMINO VALDEPENÑ AS, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
No. L-20687. April 30, 1966.
DOCTRINE:
 Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his
apprehension, with or without warrant, or his submission to the jurisdiction
of the court.
 In the case at bar, the case went from CFICACFI CA and the petitioner
never raised the question of jurisdiction over his person. He is deemed,
therefore, to have waived that objection and, hence, to have submitted himself to
the Courts jurisdiction. What is more, his behaviour and every single one of the steps
taken by him before said courts — particularly merely a submission to the
jurisdiction thereof, but, also, that he urged the courts to exercise the authority
thereof over his person.
EMERGENCY DIGEST:
 Ester ULSANO filed with the justice of peace (JOP) a criminal complaint charging
VALDEPENAS with forcible abduction with rape of Ester Ulsano.
o JOP found probable cause and forwarded the complaint to the CFI.
 CFI: VALDEPENAS  Guilty as charged.
 FACTS:
CA: modified the decision, convicting him of abduction with consent.
 Valdepenas filed MR/MNT contesting the findings of CA, to the effect that
complainant was below 18 y/o at the time of the occurrence.
o Motion was granted.
o The decision was set aside and the case was remanded to the CFI.
 CFI rendered decision reiterating findings of CA (convicting him of abduction with
consent.)
o Petitioner again appealed to CA which affirmed the CFI decision.
o MR filed again on the ground that lower court had no jurisdiction over
the person and the subject matter of the action for the offense of
abduction with consent.
 Valdepenas claims – there was no complaint for abduction with consent filed
and that the lower court acquired no jurisdiction over his person or over the crime
of abduction with consent.
ISSUE: WON CFI lacked jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject
matter of the action for the offense of abduction with consent? CFI HAD JURISDICTION!
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
 Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his
apprehension, with or without warrant, or his submission to the jurisdiction
of the court.
15
 In the case at bar, the case went from CFI->CA->CFI-> CA and the petitioner never
raised the question of jurisdiction over his person. He is deemed, therefore, to
have waived that objection and, hence, to have submitted himself to the Courts
jurisdiction.
 What is more, his behaviour and every single one of the steps taken by him before
said courts — particularly merely a submission to the jurisdiction thereof, but, also,
that he urged the courts to exercise the authority thereof over his person.
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
 Jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action· in this case the crime of abduction
with consent is and may be conferred only by law. Under an information for
forcible abduction, the accused may be convicted of abduction with consent.
 A complaint is not a condition precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction. The third
paragraph of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code does not determine the
jurisdiction of the courts over the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of
lasciviousness. It could not affect said jurisdiction, because the same is governed by
the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by the Revised Penal Code, which deals primarily with
the definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to the punishment of the culprits.
The complaint required in said Article 344 is merely a condition precedent to the
exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties.
COMPLETE
- Ester Ulsano, assisted by her mother Consuelo filed with the Justice of the Peace
Court in Piat, Cagayan, a criminal complaint, duly subscribed and sworn to by both,
charging Maximino Valdepenñ as with forcible abduction with rape of Ester Ulsano.
- Justice of the peace of Piat found that there was probable cause and forwarded the
complaint to the CFI Cagayan where information for forcible abduction with rape
was filed. CFI found Valdepenas guilty as charged and sentenced him accordingly.
- On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the
court of first instance, convicted him of abduction with consent and meted out to
him the penalty set forth in the opening paragraph of this decision.
- MR and MNT filed by Valdepenas contesting the finding, made by the Court of
Appeals, to the effect that complainant was below 18 years of age at the time of the
occurrence, said Court granted the motion, set aside its aforementioned decision
and remanded the case to the court a quo for the reception of additional evidence on
said issue.
- Case went back to the CFI, which rendered another decision, reiterating said finding
of the Court of Appeals, as well as its judgment of conviction for abduction with
consent and the penalty imposed therein. Petitioner appealed again to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed that of the court of first instance with costs against the
petitioner.
- Again petitioner filed an MR based, for the first time, upon the ground that the
lower court had no jurisdiction over the person of appellant and over the
subject matter of the action, with respect to the offense of abduction with
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113 16

consent. Upon denial of the motion, petitioner interposed the present appeal by abduction with consent does not exclude the idea of abduction of a virtuous woman
certiorari. of good reputation (U.S. vs. Casten, 34 Phil. 808, 811-812), because the essence of
- the offense is not the wrong done to the woman, but the outrage to the family and
ISSUE: WON CA erred in not reversing the decision of the trial court for lack of the alarm produced in it by the disappearance of one of its members.‰
jurisdiction over the person of the accused and the subject matter of the action for the - The presumption of innocence includes also that of morality and decency, and, as a
offense of abduction with consent consequence, of chastity.

HELD: Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
petitioner Maximino Valdepenas. It is so ordered.
E.JURISDICTION DETERMINED BY THE ALLEGATIONS OF THE COMPLAINT
RATIO:
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON
1.FOZ V. PEOPLE, OCTOBER 9, 2009, G.R. NO. 167764 – LUCENARIO
- Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his apprehension,
with or without warrant, or his submission to the jurisdiction of the court. In the
Foz vs. People
case at bar, the petitioner was brought before the bar of justice, first, before the
justice of the peace court, then before the Court of First Instance, later before the
Doctrine: Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint
Court of Appeals; thereafter back before said Court of First Instance, and then, again,
before the Court of Appeals, and never, within the period of six years that had Emergency Digest: PORTIGO SUED FOZ
transpired until the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, had he questioned the
 Libel case was filed by Doctor PORTIGO against FOZ (columnist) and FAJARDO
judicial authority of any of these three courts over his person. He is deemed,
(editor-publisher) of Panay Newspaper in RTC Iloilo.
therefore, to have waived whatever objection he might have had to the jurisdiction
 PORTIGO was the company physician of San Miguel Corporation (SMC) in Iloilo and
over his person, and, hence, to have submitted himself to the Courts jurisdiction.
an article was published in Panay News calling him arrogant, negligent, and
What is more, his behaviour and every single one of the steps taken by him before
incompetent after an incidence wherein he wrongly diagnosed the wife of an
said courts — particularly merely a submission to the jurisdiction thereof, but, also,
SMC employee which eventually led to her death .
that he urged the courts to exercise the authority thereof over his person.
 In the information, it merely alleged
o that PORTIGO was “a physician and medical practitioner in Iloilo City
JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER
- o AND that the article was “published in Panay News, a daily publication
It is well-settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action · in this case
with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo.”
the crime of abduction with consent is and may be conferred only by law; that the
jurisdiction over a given crime, not vested by law upon a particular court, may not
ISSUE: WON such allegations in the complaint are sufficient to vest the RTC Iloilo with
be conferred thereto by the parties involved in the offense; and that, under an
jurisdiction?
information for forcible abduction, the accused may be convicted of abduction with
HELD/RATIO: NO. RTC Iloilo has no jurisdiction.
consent.
 Jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the
- A complaint is not a condition precedent for the exercise of jurisdiction. The third complaint or information, and the offense must have been committed or any
paragraph of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code does not determine the one of its essential ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of
jurisdiction of the courts over the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of the court.
lasciviousness. It could not affect said jurisdiction, because the same is governed by  Libel shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the CFI of the province or city
the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by the Revised Penal Code, which deals primarily with o where the libelous article is printed and first published
the definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to the punishment of the culprits. o or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the
The complaint required in said Article 344 is merely a condition precedent to the
commission of the offense.
exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. And
 The information in this case failed to allege such requisite facts.
such condition has been imposed out of consideration for the offended woman and
her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through  The allegations in the Information that "Panay News, a daily publication with a
considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region" only
with the scandal of a public trial.
showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable
- The complaint for forcible abduction includes abduction with consent. circulation but did not establish that the said publication was printed and first
- Virginity is an essential ingredient of abduction with consent.·The virginity mentioned published in Iloilo City.
in Article 343 of the Revised Penal Code as an essential ingredient of the crime of
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
o Just because it is of general circulation there does not mean it was first
printed and published there.
 The fact that PORTIGO was a physician in Iloilo does not also necessarily mean
that he is living in Iloilo. It is possible that he works there and has his residence
elsewhere.
COMPLETE
FACTS:
 Doctor PORTIGO was the company physician of the San Miguel Corporation office in
Iloilo City. FOZ and FAJARDO are the columnist and editor-publisher respectively of
the Panay News.
 An article entitled “MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN” was published in the
opinion section of Panay News on July 5, 1994 which portrayed PORTIGO as wanting
in high sense of professional integrity, trust and responsibility expected of him as a
physician.
 The article primarily contained an account of the experience of patient Lita
PAYUNAN, a wife of a SMC employee, when she had a check up with PORTIGO. Some
contents of the article:
o After consultation, PORTIGO put her under observation and took 7 months
to conclude that she had rectum myoma and must undergo an operation
o The family engaged the services of Dr. Celis and a Dr. de los Reyes at
Doctor's Hospital. PORTIGO allegedly got mad that PAYUNAN chose a
surgeon without seeking his recommendation.
o PAYUNAN was operated on but afterwards readmitted for having difficulty
urinating and defacating. second operation was conducted this time by the
surgeon recommended by PORTIGO.
o The results were devastating! PAYUNAN woke to find out her anus and
vagina closed and a hole with a catheter punched on her right side.
This was also followed by the news that she had cancer.
o Dr. Portigo recommended another operation, this time to bore another hole
on the left side of Lita. But a Dr. Rivera to whom he made the referral
frankly turned it down because it would only be a waste of money since the
disease was already on the terminal state.
o SMC and PAYUNAN spent some P150,000.00 to pay for the wrong
diagnosis of the company physician.
o PAYUNAN later on died.
o Lita is not alone. Society is replete with similar experience where
physicians treat their patients for profits. Where physicians prefer to act
like agents of multinational corporations prescribing expensive drugs seen
if there are equivalent drugs sold at the counter for much lower price. Yes,
Lita, we also have hospitals, owned by a so-called charitable religious
institutions and so-called civic groups, too greedy for profits. Instead of
promoting baby-and mother-friendly practices which are cheaper and
more effective, they still prefer the expensive yet unhealthy practices.
 An information for libel was filed in RTC Iloilo against FOZ and FAJARDO.
 RTC Iloilo convicted FOZ and FAJARDO.
o MR with RTC denied.
17
 CA affirmed. CA MR also affirmed.
 Hence, the present Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari with the SC.
 PORTIGO asserts that the element of defamatory imputation was satisfied when he
was portrayed as an incompetent doctor and an opportunist who enriched himself
at the expense of the poor.
 FOZ contends good faith to serve the public good and that it was in the opinion page.
Hence, there was no malice.
 Solicitor General claims that FOZ and FAJARDO are raising questions of fact (to
determine whether or not there was malice) which is misplaced in a Rule 45 petition
for review.
 FOZ and FAJARDO filed a reply stating that their petition does not require the
evaluation of evidence submitted in court; that malice, as an element of libel, has
always been discussed whenever raised as an issue via a petition for review
on certiorari. They also raise for the first time the issue that the information
charging them with libel did not contain allegations sufficient to vest
jurisdiction in the RTC of Iloilo City.
 The SC decided the case based on the jurisdictional issue raised in the reply.
ISSUE: WON the complaint sufficiently alleged facts to give RTC Iloilo jurisdiction  NO.
HELD: CA decision set aside on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of RTC Iloilo. Case
dismissed without prejudice.
RATIO:
SC has consistently held that lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged may be raised
or considered motu proprio by the court at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal.
Moreover, jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred
upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is
conferred by the sovereign authority which organized the court, and is given only by law
in the manner and form prescribed by law.
In Macasaet vs. People, the Court held that:
 It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in criminal
cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial jurisdiction in
criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to take cognizance or
to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused. Thus, it cannot take
jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly committed outside of
that limited territory.
 Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a court over the criminal case is determined
by the allegations in the complaint or information. And once it is so shown, the
court may validly take cognizance of the case. However, if the evidence
adduced during the trial show that the offense was committed somewhere
else, the court should dismiss the action for want of jurisdiction.
In this regard, Art. 360 of the RPC provides the following rules on jurisdiction over
defamation cases, as summarized in Agbayani vs. Sayo:
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113 18

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the F. CREATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN
criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city
where the libelous article is printed and first published.
2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be APPLICABLE LAWS
filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at
the time of the commission of the offense. 1. SECTION 4, ARTICLE XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of 2. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1486 DATED JUNE 11, 1978
the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First 3. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1606 DATED DECEMBER 10, 1978
Instance of Manila. 4. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1861
4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the 5. REPUBLIC ACT 7995 APPROVED MARCH 10, 1995
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where 6. REPUBLIC ACT 8249 APPROVED FEBRUARY 5, 1997
he held office at the time of the commission of the offense.

In this case, the information should therefore show that Iloilo City was where the libelous
article was first printed and published, or was where PORTIGO resided at the time.
However, it failed to do so.
The information provided:
 That on or about the 5th day of July, 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this court, both the accused as columnist and Editor-Publisher,
respectively, of Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation
in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously with malicious intent of impeaching the virtue, honesty,
integrity and reputation of Dr. Edgar Portigo, a physician and medical
practitioner in Iloilo City, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing
said Dr. Edgar Portigo to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in
the regular issue of said daily publication on July 5, 1994, a certain article entitled
"MEET DR. PORTIGO, COMPANY PHYSICIAN,"
 The allegations in the Information that "Panay News, a daily publication with a
considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and throughout the region" only
showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in considerable
circulation but did not establish that the said publication was printed and first
published in Iloilo City.
 Just because the publication is of general circulation somewhere does not
mean that it was first printed or published there.
 The Information filed against petitioners failed to allege the residence of Dr.
Portigo. While the Information alleges that "Dr. Edgar Portigo is a physician and
medical practitioner in Iloilo City," such allegation did not clearly and positively
indicate that he was actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of
the offense. It is possible that Dr. Portigo was actually residing in another place.
 One who transacts business in a place and spends considerable time thereat does
not render such person a resident therein. Where one may have or own a business
does not of itself constitute residence within the meaning of the statute. Pursuit of
business in a place is not conclusive of residence there for purposes of venue.
G.JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN
1. PEOPLE V. SANDIGANBAYAN, AUGUST 25, 2009, G.R. NO. 167304 – MAGTAGNOB
Topic: Sandiganbayan Jurisdiction
DOCTRINE
 Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
enumerated by the same law.
 Members of the sangguniang panlungsod are particularly enumerated therein
(Section 4a).
EMERGENCY DIGEST
Quick Facts:
 AMANTE was a MEMBER OF THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD of Toledo City in
Cebu.
o She got cash advance to defray SEMINAR EXPENSES of the Committee on
Health and Environment Protection.
o 2 years have lapsed, and Amante still has not made any liquidation.
 The City Auditor sent a demand letter asking Amante to settle her unliquidated
cash advance.
o (The COA submitted an investigation report to the OMB-Visayas
recommending that Amante be further investigated.)
o The OMB-Visayas recommended that an Information for Malversation of
Public Funds be filed against her.
 LATER, the Prosecutor, finding probable cause, filed an Information with the SB
accusing Amante for VIOLATION of THE AUDITING CODE of the Philippines.
 Amante filed a MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT and MOTION FOR
REINVESTIGATION on the ground that SB does NOT HAVE JURISDICTION because
Amante falls under Salary Grade 26.
 SB agreed and DISMISSED the case for lack of jursidiction.
ISSUE: WON Sandiganbayan has Jursidiction? YES, SB HAS JURISDICTION.
RATIO:
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
 In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses, the
latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch
occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. However,
the law is not devoid of exceptions.
 Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
enumerated by the same law.
 Members of the sangguniang panlungsod are particularly enumerated therein
(Section 4a). 7 By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law,
Amante, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the
alleged commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade.
 Moreover, under Section 4(a), the following offenses are specifically enumerated:
violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code.
 In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the offense in this case
(Auditing Code Violation) Section 4(b) provides that:
o b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
 A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those
public officials enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may
not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A.
No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also
with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office.
o The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are
limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public
official or employee's office.
 This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information is
intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while
the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official
functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused
7
RA 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following people:
o (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as grade “27” and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act
No. 6758), specifically including:
 (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
 (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.
 (c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
 (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
 (e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
 (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office
of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;
 (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
o (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade “27” and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;
o (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
o (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade “27” and higher under the Compensation and
o
Position Classification Act of 1989.
19
not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to
have been indicted for “an offense committed in relation” to his office.
Doctrine:
 Under Section 4(b) of RA 8249, as long as the offense charged in the information is
intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated while
the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official
functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused
not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to
have been indicted for “an offense committed in relation” to his office.
COMPLETE DIGEST:
FACTS:
 Victoria Amante was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City,
Province of Cebu. Amante was able to get hold of a cash advance in the amount of
P71,095.00 under a disbursement voucher to defray seminar expenses of the
Committee on Health and Environmental Protection, which she headed. After
almost two years since she obtained the said cash advance, no liquidation was
made. As such, Toledo City Auditor Manolo V. Tulibao issued a demand letter to
Amante asking the latter to settle her unliquidated cash advance within 72 hours
from receipt of the same demand letter.
 The Commission on Audit submitted an investigation report to the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas (OMB-Visayas), with the recommendation that
Amante be further investigated to ascertain whether appropriate charges could be
filed against her under P.D. No. 1445, otherwise known as The Auditing Code of the
Philippines.
 The OMB-Visayas issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an Information
for Malversation of Public Funds against Amante. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP), upon review of the OMB-Visayas' Resolution, prepared a
memorandum finding probable cause to indict Amante.
 The OSP filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan accusing Victoria Amante of
violating Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445 (Auditing Code).
 The case was raffled to the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter,
Amante filed with the said court a MOTION TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT AND
MOTION FOR REINVESTIGATION stating that the Decision of the OMB-Visayas
arose from an incomplete proceeding in so far as Amante had already liquidated
and/or refunded the unexpected balance of her cash advance, which at the time of
the investigation was not included as the same liquidation papers were still in the
process of evaluation by the Accounting Department of Toledo City and that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the said criminal case because
Amante was then a local official who was occupying a position of salary grade
26, whereas Section 4 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8249 provides that the
Sandiganbayan shall have original jurisdiction only in cases where the
accused holds a position otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, R.A. No. 6758.
 The OSP filed its Opposition arguing that Amante's claim of settlement of the cash
advance dwelt on matters of defense and the same should be established during the
trial of the case and not in a motion for reinvestigation. As to the assailed
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the OSP contended that the said court has
jurisdiction over respondent Amante since at the time relevant to the case,
she was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, therefore,
falling under those enumerated under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249. According
to the OSP, the language of the law is too plain and unambiguous that it did not
make any distinction as to the salary grade of city local officials/heads.
 Sandiganbayan- dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: WON SB has jurisdiction over a case involving a sangguniang panlungsod member
where the crime charged is one committed in relation to office, in violation of the
Auditing Code of the philippines, but not for violation of RA 3019, RA 1379 or any of the
felonies mentioned in chapter II, section 2, title VII of the RPC – YES, Sandiganbayan has
Jurisdiction.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the Petition dated April 20, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) dated February 28, 2005 is NULLIFIED
and SET ASIDE. Consequently, let the case be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for
further proceedings.
RATIO:
The applicable law in this case is Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of
R.A. No. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again amended on February
5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. The alleged commission of the offense, as shown in the
Information was on or about December 19, 1995 and the filing of the Information was on
May 21, 2004. The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined
at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the
offense. The exception contained in R.A. 7975, as well as R.A. 8249, where it expressly
provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases involving
violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII
of the Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved
herein is a violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the
opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two provisions states:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials
occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
The present case falls under Section 4(b) where other offenses and felonies
committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved. Under
the said provision, no exception is contained. Thus, the general rule that jurisdiction of a
court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action,
not at the time of the commission of the offense applies in this present case. Since the
present case was instituted on May 21, 2004, the provisions of R.A. No. 8249 shall
govern. Verily, the pertinent provisions of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by R.A. No. 8249 are
20
the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction
in all cases involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the principal accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent,
acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional
director and higher, otherwise classified as grade “27” and higher, of the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department
heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade “27” and
up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade “27” and higher
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of
this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
 The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4(a), the following offenses are specifically
enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code.
 In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction over the said offenses,
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive
branch occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions.
 Those that are classified as Grade 26 and below may still fall within the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the positions thus
enumerated by the same law.
 Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors,
members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers ,
and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank; PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers
of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials
and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and
presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. In
connection therewith, Section 4(b) of the same law provides that other offenses or
felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a)
in relation to their office also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
 By simple analogy, applying the provisions of the pertinent law, Amante,
being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod at the time of the alleged
commission of an offense in relation to her office, falls within the original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
 Petitioner is correct in disputing the above ruling of the Sandiganbayan. Central to
the discussion of the Sandiganbayan is the case of Inding v. Sandiganbayan where
this Court ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(a)(1) of
P. D. No. 1606, as amended are included within the original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan regardless of salary grade.
 In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod with Salary Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019.
In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the said public official, this
Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4(a)(1)
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically
enumerated and not on Section 4(b) where offenses or felonies involved are those
that are in relation to the public officials' office.
 Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, provides that:
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.
 A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that
those public officials enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of
R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised
Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to their office.
The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to
21
those that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's
office. This Court had ruled that as long as the offense charged in the information
is intimately connected with the office and is alleged to have been perpetrated
while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his
official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the
accused not have committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is
held to have been indicted for “an offense committed in relation” to his office.
 Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, where the crime involved was
murder, this Court held that:
o The phrase “other offenses or felonies” is too broad as to include the
crime of murder, provided it was committed in relation to the accused’s
official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the
offender – that is, whether he is one of those public officers or
employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x.
 Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan, where the public official was charged
with grave threats, this Court ruled:
o x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations
that the accused, petitioner herein, took advantage of his official functions
as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the
crime of grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code
against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a municipal councilor.
 Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information
filed against respondent Amante for violation of The Auditing Code of the
Philippines reveals that the said offense was committed in relation to her office,
making her fall under Section 4(b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended.
 In the offenses involved in Section 4(a), it is not disputed that public office is
essential as an element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and
felonies involved in Section 4(b), it is enough that the said offenses and felonies
were committed in relation to the public officials or employees' office. In
expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation to
office, this Court held:
o In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on
the scope and reach of the term “offense committed in relation to [an
accused’s] office” by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla v.
Hilario [90 Phil 49 (1951)], and to an exception to that principle which
was recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle
set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as
committed in relation to the accused’s office if “the offense cannot
exist without the office” such that “the office [is] a constituent
element of the crime x x x.”
o In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that
“although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the]
abstract,” the facts in a particular case may show that x x x the offense
therein charged is intimately connected with [the accused’s] respective
offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused] had
no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices.
 Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provision of Section 4(b) does not
mention any qualification as to the public officials involved. It simply stated,
public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same section.
Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except
those specifically enumerated.
2. SERRANA V. SANDIGANBAYAN, JANUARY 22, 2008, G.R. 162059 – MUTI
DOCTRINE: See sentences in bold below.
ER:
 SERANA, a student regent of UP, discussed with former Pres. Estrada the
renovation of Vinzons Hall in UPD.
o She then formed OSRFI with her relatives and received P15M under
OSRFI’s name.
o The funds was allegedly sourced from the Office of the President for the
proposed renovation.
 The next student regent along with other students filed a COMPLAINT FOR
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS AND PROPERTY with the Office of the
Ombudsman.
 SERANA was indicted.
 SERANA MOVED TO QUASH the information on the ff. grounds:
o (1) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa;
o (2) she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her
tuition fees;
o (3) the offense charged was not committed in relation to her office;
o (4) the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not
from the government.
ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction in this case? YES, SB has jurisdiction
(1) The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public
officials in relation to their office. Estafa is one of those “other felonies” included in
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606.
 The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that
o (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned
in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that
o (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
(2) It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
 While the first part of Sec. 4(A) covers only officials with S.G. 27 and higher, its
second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may
not be of S.G. 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed
under the jurisdiction of the said court.
 This includes Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions
or foundations. SERANA falls under this category.
22
o The Board of Regents performs functions similar to those of a board
of trustees of a non-stock corporation.
(3) Jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information. The information
alleged in no uncertain terms that the offense was committed in relation to her office.
(4) Source of funds is a defense that should be raised during trial on the merits.
COMPLETE
FACTS:
 Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana (“SERANA”) was a senior student of the
University of the Philippines-Cebu. She was appointed by then President Joseph
Estrada (“ESTRADA”) as a student regent of UP.
 SERANA discussed with ESTRADA the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP
Diliman. SERANA, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the SEC the Office
of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (“OSRFI”).
 ESTRADA gave P15M to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed
renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information, was the Office of
the President.
 The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.
 The succeeding student regent and the Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a
system-wide alliance of student councils within the state university, consequently
filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of
the Ombudsman.
 The Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict SERANA
and her brother for estafa.8
 SERANA moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does
not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in her
capacity as UP student regent.
o SERANA’s arguments: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over estafa; (b) she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid
her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged was not committed in relation to
her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President
Estrada, not from the government.
8
The Information reads: That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH
EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public officer, being then the Student Regent of the University of the
Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in
relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE
IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
government by falsely and fraudulently representing to former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the
renovation of the Vinzons Hall of the University of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as "President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student Hall," and for which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the
amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and
the latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused
Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS ( P15,000,000.00),
which check was subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated
for their personal use and benefit, and despite repeated demands made upon the accused for them to return
aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused to do so to the damage and prejudice of the government in
the aforesaid amount. CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
 The Ombudsman opposed the motion.
o Ombudsman’s arguments: Section 4(b) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in relation to office". As a
member of the BOR, SERANA had the general powers of administration
and exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Compensation is not an
essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been
interpreted to include allowances.
 The Sandiganbayan denied SERANA’s motion for lack of merit. Accused-
movant’s claim is of no moment, in view of the express provision of Section 4 of
Republic Act No. 8249.9
o It is very clear from the said provision that the Sandiganbayan has original
exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses involving the officials enumerated in
subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the primordial
consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of their
responsibilities and functions.
o A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the UP reveals that the
Board of Regents, to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively
exercises the general powers of administration and corporate powers
in the university. It is well-established in corporation law that the
corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board of trustees
in the case of non-stock corporations. It is unmistakably evident that the
Board of Regents of the UP is performing functions similar to those of the
Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the
conclusion that being a member of such board, SERANA undoubtedly falls
within the category of public officials upon whom this Court is vested with
original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not
occupy a position classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher.
o Finally, this court (Sandiganbayan) finds that SERANA’s contention that the
same of P15M was received from former President Estrada and not from
the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that should be properly
ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case.
 SERANA filed a MR which was denied with finality.
ISSUE: WON Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the person of SERANA and the offense
charged in the information. - YES
RATIO:
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to quash is not correctible by certiorari . (not the
issue in this case, so brief lang)
9
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(A) x x x
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)
23
 Well-established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied,
the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without
prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to
quash. Remedial measures as regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to
quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed. If the court, in denying the motion to
dismiss or motion to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. We do not find the
Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by R.A.
No. 3019, as amended.
SERANA’s contention: the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of
R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended).
 Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No.
3019, as amended, that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
 Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960.
The said law represses certain acts of public officers and private persons alike which
constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto. It does not contain
an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa.
SERANA’s contention: Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, estafa is not among those
crimes cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
 We note that in hoisting this argument, SERANA isolated the first paragraph of
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said
provision.
o The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive
a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion.
Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et
absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid
inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.
 Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads: B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple
or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
 Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by
public officials in relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to
exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606.
Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies.
 The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that
o (a) the offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned
in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that
o (b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.
Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer.
SERANA’s contention: She is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or
remuneration as a UP student regent
 The 1987 Constitution does not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied
definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and jurisprudence.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
 In Aparri v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that: A public office is the right,
authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is
invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and
Officers,] Sec. 1). In Laurel v. Desierto, the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of
a public office above.
SERANA’s contention: She is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a
regular tuition fee-paying student.
 This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction
over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606.
 In Geduspan v. People, We held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only
officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes
other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and
higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of
the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is
placed there by express provision of law.
 Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with
jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-
owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out,
the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-
stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public
officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
 Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of
public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.
 Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in
an individual of some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.
o The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV
of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate governmental function by
providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and
arts, and giving professional and technical training. 49 Moreover, UP is
maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is not a
corporation created for profit.
The offense charged was committed in relation to public office, according to the
Information.
SERANA’s contention: Even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan
would still not have jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed in relation
to her office. According to her, she had no power or authority to act without the approval
of the BOR. She adds there was no Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to
contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not ratified by the governing
body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in
relation to public office.
 It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information.
24
 In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that SERRANO,
being then a student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her official
functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of
her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a
private individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the
government x x x."
 Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan
when it did not quash the information based on this ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should be raised during trial on the merits.
SERANA’s contention: The amount came from President Estrada’s private funds and not
from the government coffers.
 The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the President and not
its then occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Again, the Court sustains the
Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the P15M is a matter of defense that
should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case.
3. ESQUIVEL V. OMBUDSMAN, SEPTEMBER 17, 2002, G.R. 137237 – NARVASA
Esquivel v. Ombudsman, Sandiganbayan, People of the Philippines
Topic: Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
DOCTRINE:
 R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,provides that it is only in cases where
“none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or
higher”that “exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper regional trial
court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.”
ER: EDUARDO SUED ESQUIVELS
 PO2 EDUARDO alleges that the ESQUIVELS brought him to the municipal hall where
he was mauled and threatened because he was one of the officers who raided a
jueteng den connected to mayor ESQUIVEL.
o Prior to his release, he was forced to sign a statement that he was in good
physical condition.
 EDUARDO & CATACUTAN filed their respective complaint-affidavits before the
PNP-CIDG,
o which was later forwarded to Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for
appropriate action.
 After investigation, Deputy Ombudsman issued the herein assailed resolution
recommending that the ESQUIVELS be indicted for less serious physical
injuries and grave threats.
 Thereafter, informations for less serious physical injuries and grave threats were
filed before the Sandiganbayan, which assumed jurisdiction over the case.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
 BRGY CAPTAIN was now questioning the SB’s jurisdiction, saying that he is a mere
Brgy captain  he is outside the SB’s jurisdiction
ISSUE: WON the SB was correct in assuming jurisdiction over the case against the
municipal mayor and the barangay captain? YES!
 Under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a salary grade of 27,
and it had been previously held by this Court that municipal mayors fall under the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
 Neither can Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not
a municipal mayor, he is outside the SB’s jurisdiction.
o Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused of Mayor Esquivel,
whose position falls under salary grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed
no grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction over said criminal
case.
 R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,provides that it is only in cases where
“none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade
‘27’ or higher”that “exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal
circuit court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as
provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.”
 In this case, one of the accused falls under SB’s jurisdiction. Hence, SB has
jurisdiction over Brgy Captain too.
COMPLETE
Facts:
 PO2 Herminigildo C. Eduardo (EDUARDO) and SPO1 Modesto P. Catacutan
(CATACUTAN) filed their respective complaint-affidavits before the PNP –
I. Powers of the Ombudsman
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG).
 They charged herein petitioners Antonio Prospero Esquivel (“ESQUIVEL”)
municipal mayor of Jaen and his brother, Mark Anthony “Eboy”
Esquivel (“EBOY”), barangay captain of barangay Apo, Jaen, with alleged
illegal arrest, arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder, and grave
threats.
o Also included in the charges were other police and LTO officers of the Jaen
Municipal Police Force for dereliction of duty.
 At about 12:30 p.m., EDUARDO was about to eat lunch at his parents’
house at Jaen when ESQUIVEL and EBOY arrived with police officers and
disarmed EDUARDO.
o They then forced him to board their vehicle and brought him to the Jaen
Municipal Hall.
 While they were on their way to the town hall, ESQUIVEL mauled him with the use of
a firearm and threatened to kill him. ESQUIVEL pointed a gun at him and said,
“Putang-ina mo, papatayin kita, aaksidentihin kita dito, bakit mo ako kinakalaban!”
 Upon reaching the municipal hall, EBOY shoved EDUARDO inside an adjacent hut.
ESQUIVEL then ordered one of the officers to kill him, saying “Patayin mo na iyan
at gawan ng senaryo at report.”
25
 At this point, according to CATACUTAN, he arrived to verify what happened to his
teammate EDUARDO, but ESQUIVEL likewise threatened him and ordered one of the
officers of the Jaen Police Station to file charges against EDUARDO. He once again
struck EDUARDO in the nape with a handgun, while EBOY was holding the latter.
 EDUARDO then fell and lost consciousness. When he regained his consciousness, he
was told that he would be released. Prior to his release, however, he was forced to
sign a statement in the police blotter that he was in good physical condition.
 EDUARDO told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most likely maltreated and
threatened because ESQUIVEL believed he was among the law enforcers who
raided a jueteng den in Jaen that same day. He surmised that the mayor disliked
the fact that he arrested members of crime syndicates with connections to the
mayor. He also presented a medical certificate showing the injuries he suffered and
other documentary evidence.
 After the initial investigation, the PNP-CIDG forwarded the pertinent records to
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate action.
 Deputy Ombudsman issued the impugned resolution recommending that the
ESQUIVEL BROTHERS be indicted for the crime of less serious physical injuries, and
ESQUIVEL alone for grave threats. Ombudsman Desierto approved.
 Thereafter, separate informations for less serious physical injuries against the
ESQUIVEL BROTHERS and for grave threats against ESQUIVEL alone were filed with
the Sandiganbayan.
Is the Ombudsman guilty of GADLEJ?
Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming jurisdiction
over Criminal Cases? [Our topic]
 The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the
appropriate courts.
 Settled is the rule that the Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers without good
and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.
 Consistent policy of non-interference in the determination of the Ombudsman
regarding the existence of probable cause, provided there is no grave abuse in the
exercise of such discretion.
 In this case, petitioners utterly failed to establish that the Ombudsman acted
with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the disputed resolution and order.
 There was no abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, much less grave
abuse in disregarding PO2 Eduardo’s admission that he was in good physical
condition when he was released from the police headquarters.
o Admission was never brought up during the preliminary investigation.
o The records show that no such averment was made in petitioners’ counter-
affidavit[ nor was there any document purporting to be the exculpatory
statement attached therein as an annex or exhibit.
o Petitioners only raised this issue in their motion for reconsideration.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
II. Sandiganbayan’s Jurisdiction
 Petitioners allege that the positions of municipal mayors and barangay captains are
not mentioned therein, they claim they are not covered by said law under the
principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
 We already held that municipal mayors fall under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
 Nor can Barangay Captain Mark Anthony Esquivel claim that since he is not a
municipal mayor, he is outside the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.
 R.A. 7975, as amended by R.A. No. 8249,provides that it is only in cases where
“none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade ‘27’ or
higher”that “exclusive original jurisdiction shall be vested in the proper regional trial
court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.”
 Note that under the 1991 Local Government Code, Mayor Esquivel has a salary grade
of 27.
 Since Barangay Captain Esquivel is the co-accused of Mayor Esquivel, whose
position falls under salary grade 27, the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of
discretion in assuming jurisdiction over said criminal case.
H.DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT BECAUSE OF INORDINATE DELAY
1.TATAD V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 159 SCRA 70 – ORTIZ
Doctrine: The inordinate delay in terminating the preliminary investigation and filing
the information is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed right of the petitioner to
due process and to a speedy disposition of the cases against him
 PD 911 prescribes a 10-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under
preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While this period fixed
by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it cannot be disregarded or
ignored completely, with absolute impunity.
ER: 1) PSD; 2) TANODBAYAN; 3) CIS
 1974, Antonio de los Reyes, Executive Assistant of the Department of Public
Information, filed a report with the Legal Panel- Presidential Security Demand,
charging Tatad, the Secretary of the Department, with violations of the ANTI
GRAFT LAW.
o No action was taken on the report.
 5 years later (1979), de los Reyes filed a complaint with Tanodbayan, alleging
the same things. Within the same year, Tatad resigned.
 It was only after Tatad’s resignation was accepted by Marcos when the Tanodbayan
referred the complaint to the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) for fact
finding investigation.
26
 In June 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the
filing of charges for graft and corruption against Tatad.
 By 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were already with the Tanodbayn
and the case was already for disposition.
o However, it was only in 1985 (3 years delay in the preliminary
investigation) that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan,
recommending the filing of the corresponding criminal informations
against the accused Francisco Tatad.
 Thereafter, 5 criminal informations were later filed with the Sandiganbayan.
o (3 informations for failure to file SALN, the other two relate to bribery and
giving undue advantage to a private corporation)
 Tatad filed a MOTION TO QUASH the information based on the alleged violation
of due process and his right to a speedy disposition of casesDENIED BY SB.
 Hence, Certiorari (65) with the SC.
ISSUE: WON Tatad was deprived of his constitutional right to due process and the right to
"speedy disposition" of the cases against him as guaranteed by the Constitution? YES, his
right was violated
 The long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan in the instant case is violative of the constitutional right of the accused
to due process.
 PD 911 prescribes a 10-day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under
preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While this period fixed
by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it cannot be disregarded or
ignored completely, with absolute impunity.
 Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the conduct of
preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time limitation
prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is part of the
procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental law.
COMPLETE
Facts:
In 1974, Antonio de los Reyes (Head Executive Assistant of Department of Public
Information) filed a formal report with the Legal Panel, Presidential Security Command
against Tatad (who was then Secretary of the Dept. of Public Information). Allegations
therein relate to alleged violations of RA 3019 (anti-graft). No action was taken on said
report. 5 years later (1979), Tatad resigned from his post as department head. 2 months
later, de los Reyes filed a complaint with the Tanodbayan against Tatad alleging the same
things. In 1980, the resignation of Tatad was accepted by Pres. Marcos. In the same year,
the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) for fact
finding investigation. Thereafter, an investigation report was made stating that based on
evidence gathered, Tatad violated RA 3019.
Tatad filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that he has immunity from
prosecution (PD 1791). This was denied. So pleadings were instead submitted. By 1982,
all affidavits and counter-affidavits were already with the Tanodbayan for final
disposition. Note that it was only in 1985 when the Tanodbayan made a resolution
recommending that informations be filed with the Sandiganbayan against Tatad. 2
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
months after, Five informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan (3 informations for
failure to file SALN, the other two relate to bribery and giving undue advantage to a
private corporation).
Tatad filed a motion to quash with the Sandiganbayan alleging, among other things, that
the prosecution deprived him of due process of law and of the right to a speedy
disposition of the cases filed against him, amounting to loss of jurisdiction to file the
information and that the offenses charged had already prescribed. On the other hand,
Tanodbayan submitted that based on jurisprudence, the filing of the complaint with them
interrupted that prescription period so the offenses are not really prescribed yet.
Moreover, Tanodbayan pointed out that a law such as BP 195, extending the period of
limitation with respect to criminal prosecution, unless the right to acquittal has been
acquired, is constitutional.
Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash. It held that based on the Rule 117 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the defect in the information can be cured by
amendment. So several months after this resolution, an amended information was filed
by the Tanodbayan changing the dates of the commission of the offenses.
MR filed by Tatad – also denied. Hence, this certiorari and prohibition (Rule 65) was filed
with the SC. Tatad claims that the Tanodbayan culpably violated the constitutional
mandate of due process and speedy disposition of cases in unduly prolonging the
termination of the preliminary investigation and in filing the corresponding
information only after more than a decade from the alleged commission of the
purported offenses, which amounted to loss of jurisdiction and authority to file the
informations.
The Sandiganbayan dismissed this by saying that the applicability of the authorities cited
by Tatad to the case at bar was "nebulous;" that it would be premature for the court to
grant the "radical relief" prayed for at this stage of the proceeding; that the mere
allegations of "undue delay" do not suffice to justify acceptance thereof without any
showing "as to the supposed lack or omission of any alleged procedural right granted or
allowed to the respondent accused by law or administrative fiat" or in the absence of
"indubitable proof of any irregularity or abuse" committed by the Tanodbayan in the
conduct of the preliminary investigation; that such facts and circumstances as would
establish petitioner's claim of denial of due process and other constitutionally
guaranteed rights could be presented and more fully threshed out at the trial.
ISSUE: Was Tatad deprived of his constitutional right to due process and the right to
"speedy disposition" of the cases against him as guaranteed by the Constitution? (YES)
Held: In a number of cases, the SC has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief"
and to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full-blown trial
where it is clear that the accused has been deprived of due process of law or other
constitutionally guaranteed rights. Of course, it goes without saying that in the
application of the doctrine enunciated in those cases, particular regard must be taken of
the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.
 A review of the facts at hand cannot but leave the impression that political
motivations played a vital role in activating and propelling the prosecutorial process
27
in this case. First, the complaint came to life only after Tatad had a falling out
with President Marcos. Second, departing from established procedures prescribed
by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and
counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the
Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for
finding investigation and report.
 SC held that there was a blatant departure from the established procedure as a
dubious, but revealing attempt to involve an office directly under the President in
the prosecution was politically motivated.
 Prosecutors should not allow, and should avoid, giving the impression that their
noble office is being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for political ends
or other purposes alien to, or subversive of, the basic and fundamental objective of
serving the interest of justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all
litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong, powerless or mighty. Only by
strict adherence to the established procedure may the public's perception of the
impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced.
LONG DELAY
 Moreover, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation
cannot be justified on the basis of the facts on record.
 PD 911 prescribes a10 day period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under
preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While this period fixed
by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it cannot be disregarded or
ignored completely, with absolute impunity. It certainly cannot be assumed that
the law has included a provision that is deliberately intended to become
meaningless and to be treated as a dead letter.
 The long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan in the instant case is violative of the constitutional right of the accused
to due process. Substantial adherence to the requirements of the law governing the
conduct of preliminary investigation, including substantial compliance with the time
limitation prescribed by the law for the resolution of the case by the prosecutor, is
part of the procedural due process constitutionally guaranteed by the fundamental
law. Not only under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but under the
constitutional guarantee of "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16
of the Bill of Rights (both in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions), the inordinate
delay is violative of the petitioner's constitutional rights. A delay of close to three (3)
years cannot be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance
obtaining in the case at bar. It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating
the preliminary investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete
absence of a preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the
information. True — but the absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected
by giving the accused such investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a
preliminary investigation cannot be corrected, for until now, man has not yet
invented a device for setting back time.
2.CERVANTES V. SANDIGANBAYAN, 307 SCRA 149 - PEREZ DE TAGLE
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
May 18, 1999
DOCTRINE: It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as
mandated by the Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to
the delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to
causes directly attributable to him.
ER: ALMENDRAS COMPLAINED AGAINST TAPANG, THEN SP FILED INFO AGAINST
CERVANTES 6 years later
 ALMENDRAS filed a complaint with the TANODBAYAN against Tapang for
falsification of Almendras’ salaysay.
o He mentioned that help was sought from Cervantes in such falsification.
 AFTER 6 YEARS, the Special Prosecution officer filed an information in the
Sandiganbayan (SB) against Cervantes for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019.
o Cervantes filed an MR with the Office of the Special Prosecutor (denied).
 Then he filed a MOTION TO QUASH with the SB for, inter alia, the case having
prescribed due to unreasonable delay in the resolution of the preliminary
investigation  SB DENIED.
 Hence, Cervantes filed a special civil action for CERTIORARI & PROHIBITION with
preliminary injunction with the SC to annul the SB’s order denying the motion to
quash.
ISSUE: WON SB acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to quash for
violation of the right to speedy disposition of the case. YES, GADLEJ, Cervantes’ right to
speedy disposition of the case was violated!
 The SB and Special Prosecutor try to justify the inordinate delay in the
resolution of the complaint by stating that “no political motivation appears to
have tainted the prosecution of the case.” (referring to jurisprudence that
seemed to name that as an additional standard, aside from a delay, to quash
the case on the ground of inordinate delay). The SC said NO WAY is that
meritorious.
 It is the duty of the prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated
by the Constitution, regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the
delay or that the delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due
to causes directly attributable to him.
 Thus, the SC annulled the order of the SB and Cervantes ended up winning. Case
against him in the SB was dismissed 
COMPLETE
Facts:
 On March 6, 1986, one Pedro Almendras filed with the Office of the Tanodbayan
(predecessor of the Ombudsman) a sworn complaint against Alejandro Tapang for
falsification of complainant's "salaysay" alleging that Alejandro Tapang made
complainant sign a piece of paper in blank on which paper a "salaysay" was later
inscribed stating that complainant had been paid his claim in the amount of
P17,594.00, which was not true.
28
o In the said complaint, Pedro Almendras mentioned that he sought the
help of petitioner Elpidio C. Cervantes who worked as analyst in the
office of labor arbiter Teodorico L. Ruiz
 Cervantes filed with the office of the Tanodbayan an affidavit stating that he had
nothing to do with the blank paper that Almendras signed.
 More than six (6) years after the filing of the initiatory complaint with the
Tanodbayan, Special Prosecution Officer filed with the Sandiganbayan, assigned to
the First Division, an Information charging petitioner Elpidio C. Cervantes, together
with Teodorico L. Ruiz and Alejandro Tapang with violation of Section 3 (e), Republic
Act 3019.
o Cervantes filed a motion for reconsideration with the Office of the Special
Prosecutor reiterating that he never met complainant Almendras [OMB
denied]
o Cervantes filed with the Sandiganbayan, Manila, a "motion to defer
arraignment due to pendency of reinvestigation or motion to quash and
motion to recall warrant of arrest" on the ground that
 (a) petitioner filed with the office of the Special Prosecutor a
motion for reinvestigation;
 (b) that the case against Cervantes "has prescribed" due to
unreasonable delay in the resolution of the preliminary
investigation, and
 (c) that the acts charged in the information do not constitute an
offense
ISSUE:
1. Whether the acts charged in the information filed against petitioner for violation of
Section 3 (e), R. A. 3019 do not constitute an offense [NOT RULED UPON]
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying
his motion to quash for violation of the right to speedy disposition of the case.
[YES – INORDINATE DELAY IS MENTIONED IN THE RATIO]
HELD: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition and ANNULS the minute
resolution of the Sandiganbayan, dated December 24, 1992, in Criminal Case No. 17673.
The Court directs the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case, with costs de oficio.
The temporary restraining order heretofore issued is made permanent.
Ratio:
Issue 1
We deem it unnecessary to resolve the first issue in view of the foregoing ruling.
Issue 2
 We find petitioner's contention meritorious.
 He was deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case, a right guaranteed
by the Constitution.
o It took the Special Prosecutor (succeeding the Tanodbayan) six (6) years
from the filing of the initiatory complaint before he decided to file an
information for the offense with the Sandiganbayan.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
o The letter complaint was filed with the Tanodbayan on March 6, 1986. The
affidavit of the petitioner was filed therein on October 16, 1986.
o The Special Prosecutor resolved the case on May 18, 1992.
 In their comment to the petition at bar, the Sandiganbayan and the Special
Prosecutor try to justify the inordinate delay in the resolution of the complaint
by stating that “no political motivation appears to have tainted the prosecution
of the case” in apparent reference to the case of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, where the
Court ruled that the “long delay (three years) in the termination of the preliminary
investigation by the Tanodbayan" was violative of the Constitutional right of “speedy
disposition” of cases because “political motivations played a vital role in activating
and propelling the prosecutorial process in this case.”
 The Special Prosecutor also cited Alvizo vs. Sandiganbayan (footnote 220 SCRA 55,
64) alleging that, as in Alvizo, the petitioner herein was “insensitive to the
implications and contingencies thereof by not taking any step whatsoever to
accelerate the disposition of the matter.”
 We cannot accept the Special Prosecutor’s ratiocination. It is the duty of the
prosecutor to speedily resolve the complaint, as mandated by the Constitution,
regardless of whether the petitioner did not object to the delay or that the
delay was with his acquiescence provided that it was not due to causes directly
attributable to him.
 Consequently, we rule that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in not
quashing the information for violation of petitioner’s Constitutional right to the
speedy disposition of the case in the level of the Special Prosecutor, Office of the
Ombudsman.
I.JURISDICTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN
APPLICABLE LAW
I.1. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770 OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE OMBUDSMAN ACT
OF 1989
CASES
1. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE V. LIWAG, FEBRUARY 11, 2005, G.R. NO. 149311 –
PUNO
DOJ v LIWAG, LACSON & AQUINO
DOCTRINE: Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and authorizes him to take over,
at any stage, from any investigatory agency, the investigation of such cases. The power of
the Ombudsman to investigate cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not co-equal
with other investigative bodies, such as the DOJ.
ER: OMB  NBI
29
 Mary Ong filed with the OMB a complaint affidavit against Lacson et al for
kidnapping and murder. The OMB ordered Lacson et al to file their counter-
affidavits.
 Lacson et al filed the counter-affidavits and prayed that the case be dimissed.
 Months later, Mary Ong executed a sworn statement before the NBI regarding
the same matter.
o NBI Director ordered DOJ Sec. Perez to form a panel of prosecutors.
o The panel sent a subpoena to Lacson et al with an order to submit
counter-affidavits.
o Lacson et al filed a MTD citing the pending case with the OMB.
 DOJ panel denied so Lacson et al filed PETITION FOR PROHIBITION on the
ground that the DOJ has no jurisdiction over the matter.
 Judge Liwag granted Lacson’s petition so DOJ appealed to SC
ISSUE: WON DOJ has authority to conduct preliminary investigation even if there is
pending case in OMB about same subject matter and same parties? NONE
HELD: DOJ has no jurisdiction. OMB has jurisdiction. No concurrent jurisdiction
 Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and authorizes him to
take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency, the investigation of such
cases. This power to take over a case at any time is not given to other investigative
bodies. All this means that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not co-equal with other investigative
bodies, such as the DOJ.
 The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In contrast, the DOJ is an
extension of the executive department, bereft of the constitutional independence
granted to the Ombudsman.
COMPLETE
FACTS
Mary Ong filed a complaint-affidavit before the Ombudsman against PNP General Panfilo
M. Lacson, and other high-ranking officials of the PNP for kidnapping and murder.
She alleged that she was a former undercover agent of the Presidential Anti-Organized
Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group,
The Ombudsman found the complaint-affidavit sufficient in form and substance and
required Lacson et al to file their counter-affidavits on the charges. Lacson et al
submitted their counter-affidavits and prayed that the charges against them be
dismissed.
Subsequently, Mary Ong and other witnesses executed sworn statements before the
NBI, alleging the same facts and circumstances she revealed in her complaint-
affidavit before the Ombudsman.
NBI Director Reynaldo Wycoco wrote a letter to Secretary of Justice Hernando Perez and
recommended the investigation of Lacson, Aquino, other PNP officials.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
Thus, a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a subpoena to Lacson et al. The subpoena
required Lacson et al to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence at the
scheduled preliminary investigation on the complaint filed by the NBI at the DOJ Multi-
Purpose Hall.
Prior to the preliminary investigation, Lacson and Aquino manifested in a letter that:
1. the DOJ panel of prosecutors should dismiss the complaint filed since there was
also a pending case before the Ombudsman alleging a similar set of facts against
the same respondents.
2. according to the Court’s ruling in Uy v. Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman has
primary jurisdiction over criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and,
in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, he may take over, at any stage, from
any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases
involving public officials, including police and military officials such as private
respondents.
The DOJ construed the letter as a motion to dismiss and denied such on the basis that
under the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, an MTD is not allowed.
Lacson and Aquino filed before the RTC Manila a PETITION FOR PROHIBITION
arguing that the DOJ has no jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation on
the complaints submitted by Mary Ong and the other witnesses.
This was granted by Judge Liwag who issued an Order that prohibited the DOJ from
conducting the preliminary investigation against Lacson and Aquino. A Writ of
Preliminary Injunction was likewise issued by the trial court.
Judge Liwag reasoned that since the OMB has assumed jurisdiction over the parties and
the subject matter, the DOJ cannot insist on conducting a preliminary investigation on the
same matter under the pretext of a shared and concurrent authority. In the final analysis,
the resolution on the matter by the Ombudsman is final. Thus, the other investigative
agencies of the Government have no power and right to add an input into the
Ombudsman’s investigation.
Furthermore, Judge Liwag argued that rudimentary common sense and becoming respect
for power and authority would require the DOJ panel to desist from interfering with the
case already handled by the Ombudsman. The DOJ panel consists of deputized
prosecutors by the Ombudsman. Since that is the truth, the exercise by the principal of
the powers negates absolutely the exercise by the agents of a particular power and
authority. The hierarchy of powers must be remembered. The principle of agency must
be recalled.
DOJ appealed directly to the SC on the basis of GADLEJ.
30
ISSUE: Whether the DOJ has jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation despite
the pendency before the Ombudsman of a complaint involving the same accused, facts,
and circumstances.
HELD: No. OMB has jurisdiction. No concurrent jurisdiction with DOJ.
RATIO
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
 DOJ appealed to the SC without filing an MR of the RTC order on the ground that
it was imperative for them to do so for the sake of the speedy administration of
justice and that this is all the more compelling, in this case, considering that this
involves the high-ranking officers of the PNP and the crimes being charged have
already attracted nationwide attention.
SC RULING: Allowed since time is of the essence in this case. At stake here may
not only be the safety of witnesses who risked life and limb to give their statements to the
authorities, but also the rights of Lacson et al who may need to clear their names and
reputations of the accusations against them. The rules of procedure are not to be applied
when such application would clearly defeat the very rationale for their conception and
existence.
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
 The authority of the DOJ to conduct a preliminary investigation is based on the
provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code under Chapter I, Title III, Book IV,
governing the DOJ, which states:
Section 1. Declaration of policy. – It is the declared policy of the State
to provide the government with a principal law agency which shall be
both its legal counsel and prosecution arm; administer the criminal
justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof
consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders
and administration of the correctional system; . . .
Section 3. Powers and Functions. – To accomplish its mandate, the
Department shall have the following powers and functions:
...
(2) Investigate the commission of crimes, prosecute offenders
and administer the probation and correction system;
...
Furthermore, Section 1 of the Presidential Decree 1275, effective April 11, 1978,
provides:
Section 1. Creation of the National Prosecution Service; Supervision
and Control of the Secretary of Justice. – There is hereby created and
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
established a National Prosecution Service under the supervision and
control of the Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the Prosecution
Staff in the Office of the Secretary of Justice and such number of
Regional State Prosecution Offices, and Provincial and City Fiscal’s
Offices as are hereinafter provided, which shall be primarily
responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all cases involving
violations of penal laws.
Section 15, Republic Act No. 6640, known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. – The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any
person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; ….
Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution specifically vests in the Office of the
Ombudsman the plenary power to investigate any malfeasance, misfeasance or
non-feasance of public officers or employees.
To discharge its duty effectively, the Constitution endowed the Office of the
Ombudsman with special features which puts it a notch above other grievance-
handling, investigate bodies.
1. The OMB is independent and insulated from the intrusions of partisan politics.
Thus, the Constitution provided for stringent qualification requirements for the
selection of the Ombudsman and his deputies, i.e., they should be natural-born
citizens, of recognized probity and independence and must not have been
candidates for any elective office in the immediately preceding election. The
Ombudsman and his deputies were given the rank and salary equal to that of
the Chairman and Members, respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions,
with a prohibition for any decrease in their salary during their term of office.
They were given a fixed term of seven years, without reappointment. Upon their
cessation from office, they are prohibited from running for any elective office in
the immediately succeeding election. Finally, unlike other investigative bodies,
the Constitution granted the Office of the Ombudsman fiscal autonomy. Clearly,
all these measures are intended to enhance the independence of the Office
of the Ombudsman.
2. The OMB serves as the principal and primary complaints and action
center for the aggrieved layman baffled by the bureaucratic maze of
procedures. It was vested with the power to investigate complaints against a
public office or officer on its own initiative, even without a formal
31
complaint lodged before it. It can inquire into acts of government agencies
and public servants based on reports in the media and those which come
to his attention through sources other than a complaint. The method of
filing a complaint with the Ombudsman is direct, informal, speedy and
inexpensive. All that may be required from a complainant is sufficient
information detailing the illegal or improper acts complained of. The ordinary
citizen, who has become increasingly dependent on public agencies, is put to
minimal expense and difficulty in getting his complaint acted on by the Office of
the Ombudsman. Vis-aà -vis other prosecutors, the exercise by the Ombudsman
of its power to investigate public officials is given preference over other bodies.
3. Section 15(1) of Republic Act No. 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and authorizes
him to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency, the
investigation of such cases . This power to take over a case at any time is not
given to other investigative bodies. All this means that the power of the
Ombudsman to investigate cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not
co-equal with other investigative bodies, such as the DOJ. The Ombudsman
can delegate the power but the delegate cannot claim equal power.
Therefore, while the DOJ has general jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation of cases involving violations of the Revised Penal Code, this general
jurisdiction cannot diminish the plenary power and primary jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman to investigate complaints specifically directed against public officers
and employees.
The Office of the Ombudsman is a constitutional creation. In contrast, the DOJ is an
extension of the executive department, bereft of the constitutional independence granted
to the Ombudsman.
The Doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction is not applicable. While the doctrine of
concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter, the
settled rule is that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others. In the present case, initial
complaint was filed with the OMB. Hence, it has the authority to proceed with the
preliminary investigation to the exclusion of the DOJ.
OTHER MATTERS (I included the listing of other cases mentioned just in case Atty.
Tranquil asks)10
10
In Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), the Court upheld the special
authority of the PCGG to conduct the preliminary investigation of ill-gotten wealth cases pursuant to Executive
Order No. 1, issued by then President Aquino, creating the PCGG. While the Court emphasized in Cojuangco that
the power of the Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary investigation over said cases is not exclusive but a shared
authority, the complaints for the alleged misuse of coconut levy funds were filed directly with the PCGG. No
complaint was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman. Moreover, a close scrutiny of said case will disclose that the
Court recognized the primary, albeit shared, jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate all ill-gotten wealth
cases. In fact, it ordered the PCGG to desist from proceeding with the preliminary investigation as it doubted the
impartiality of the PCGG to conduct the investigation after it had previously caused the issuance of sequestration
orders against petitioner’s assets.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
NOTE: SC said none of the cases previously decided by this Court involved a factual
situation similar to that of the present case.
In the past, the complaint was never filed ahead with the Office of the Ombudsman
for preliminary investigation. Hence, there was no simultaneous exercise of power
between two coordinate bodies and no risk of conflicting findings or orders
PLUS: Allowing the DOJ to assume jurisdiction over the case would not promote an
orderly administration of justice. It would go against the multiplicity of proceedings,
cause undue difficulties to the respondents who would have to appear and defend his
position before every agency or body where the same complaint was filed, and leave
hapless litigants at a loss as to where to appear and plead their cause or defense. Should
the two bodies exercising jurisdiction at the same time come up with conflicting
resolutions, this would be greatly problematic. Also, the second investigation would
entail an unnecessary expenditure of public funds, and the use of valuable and limited
resources of Government, in a duplication of proceedings already started with the
Ombudsman.
2. LAZATIN V. DESIERTO, JUNE 5, 2009, G.R. NO. 147097 - QUIJANO-BENEDICTO
LAZATIN VS. DESIERTO as OMBUDSMAN and SANDIGANBAYAN (2009)
Doctrine: OSP is "merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may
only act under the supervision and control, and upon authority of the Ombudsman
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 6770, the
Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public
officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient.
EMERGENCY
In Sanchez v. Demetriou, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission filed a complaint with the DOJ against
petitioner Mayor Sanchez for the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. After the DOJ panel prosecutors
conducted the preliminary investigation, a warrant of arrest was issued and the corresponding Informations were
filed in court by the DOJ prosecutors. Petitioner claimed that it is only the Ombudsman who has the power to
conduct investigation of cases involving public officers like him. The Court reiterated its previous ruling that the
authority to investigate and prosecute illegal acts of public officers is not an exclusive authority of the Ombudsman
but a shared authority. However, it will be noted that the complaint for preliminary investigation in that case was
filed solely with the DOJ.
In Aguinaldo v. Domagas, a letter-complaint charging petitioners with sedition was filed with the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor in Cagayan. After investigation by the DOJ panel of prosecutors, the corresponding
Information was filed in court. The pertinent issue raised by petitioners was whether the prosecutors can file the
said Information without previous authority from the Ombudsman. The Court ruled in the affirmative and
reiterated its ruling regarding the shared authority of the DOJ to investigate the case. Again, it should be noted that
the complaint in that case was addressed solely to the provincial prosecutor.
The same factual scenario obtains in the cases of Natividad v. Felix and Honasan v. Panel of Investigating
Prosecutors of the DOJ where the letter-complaint against petitioners public officers were brought alone to the
DOJ prosecutors for investigation.
32
 This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, praying that the Ombudsman's
disapproval of the Office of the Special Prosecutor's (OSP) Resolution recommending
dismissal of the criminal cases filed against Lazatin.
 Congressman Lazatin et al. were accused of ILLEGAL USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS under
Article 220 of the RPC and violation of Section 3, (a) and (e) of RA3019.
o The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by of
his Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) for 1996, i.e., he was
both proponent and implementer of the projects funded from his CDF.
 A preliminary investigation was conducted and the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau (EPIB) issued a Resolution recommending the filing of cases.
 The OMB approved the resolution and 28 Informations were filed against Lazatin
et al. before the SANDIGANBAYAN.
o Lazatin and his co-petitioners filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which were granted by the
Sandiganbayan.
 ***The OSP submitted to the OMB its Resolution and recommended the
DISMISSAL of the cases for lack or insufficiency of evidence.
 ***However, instead of dismissing the case, OMB ordered the Office of the Legal
Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP Resolution.
o The OLA recommended that the OSP Resolution be disapproved
and the OSP be directed to proceed with the trial of the cases.
 OMB adopted the OLA Memorandum, and disapproved the OSP Resolution.
 Hence, case in SB continued.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Ombudsman had authority to overturn the Office of the Special
Prosecutor's (OSP) Resolution - YES
2. Whether RA 6770 (Ombudsman's Act) is unconstitutional - NO
3. Whether the Ombudsman acted with GADLEJ – NO
RATIO:
 The Court held in Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera, basing its ratio decidendi on its
ruling in Acop and Camanag, that the OSP is "merely a component of the Office of
the Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control, and
upon authority of the Ombudsman" and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power
to preventively suspend is lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy
Ombudsman.
 The Court's ruling in Acop that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute based
on R.A. No. 6770 was authorized by the Constitution was also made the foundation
for the decision in Perez v. Sandiganbayan, where it was held that the power to
prosecute carries with it the power to authorize the filing of informations,
which power had not been delegated to the OSP.
 It is, therefore, beyond cavil that under the Constitution, Congress was not
proscribed from legislating the grant of additional powers to the Ombudsman or
placing the OSP under the Office of the Ombudsman.
COMPLETE DIGEST:
Facts:
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
The Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman filed a
Complaint-Affidavit charging Lazatin et al. with Illegal Use of Public Funds as defined
and penalized under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Section 3,
paragraphs (a) and (e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended.
The complaint alleged that there were irregularities in the use by Congressman Carmello
F. Lazatin of his CDF for 1996, i.e., he was both proponent and implementer of the
projects funded from his CDF; he signed vouchers and supporting papers pertinent to the
disbursement as Disbursing Officer; and he received, as claimant, 18 checks amounting to
P4,868,277.08. Lazatin, with the help of petitioners Marino A. Morales, Angelito A. Pelayo
and Teodoro L. David, was allegedly able to convert his CDF into cash.
A preliminary investigation was conducted and the Evaluation and Preliminary
Investigation Bureau (EPIB) issued a Resolution recommending the filing against herein
petitioners of 14 counts each of Malversation of Public Funds and violation of Section 3
(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The Ombudsman approved the resolution and 28 Informations were
filed against Lazatin et al. before the Sandiganbayan.
Lazatin and his co-petitioners filed their respective Motions for
Reconsideration/Reinvestigation, which were granted by the Sandiganbayan (3rd
Division). The Sandiganbayan also ordered the prosecution to re-evaluate the cases
against petitioners.
The OSP submitted to the Ombudsman its Resolution and recommended the dismissal of
the cases for lack or insufficiency of evidence. The Ombudsman, however, ordered the
Office of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP Resolution. The OLA recommended
that the OSP Resolution be disapproved and the OSP be directed to proceed with the trial
of the cases. The Ombudsman adopted the OLA Memorandum, and disapproved the OSP
Resolution and ordered the aggressive prosecution of the subject cases. The cases were
then returned to the Sandiganbayan for the continuation of criminal proceedings.
Issue:
Whether the Ombudsman had authority to overturn the Office of the Special Prosecutor's
(OSP) Resolution - YES
Whether RA 6770 (Ombudsman's Act) is unconstitutional - NO
Whether the Ombudsman acted with GADLEJ - NO
Held:
In view of the foregoing, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Ratio:
The Court held in Office of the Ombudsman v. Valera, basing its ratio decidendi on its
ruling in Acop and Camanag, that the OSP is "merely a component of the Office of the
Ombudsman and may only act under the supervision and control, and upon authority of
the Ombudsman" and ruled that under R.A. No. 6770, the power to preventively suspend
is lodged only with the Ombudsman and Deputy Ombudsman. The Court's ruling in Acop
that the authority of the Ombudsman to prosecute based on R.A. No. 6770 was
authorized by the Constitution was also made the foundation for the decision in Perez v.
33
Sandiganbayan, where it was held that the power to prosecute carries with it the power
to authorize the filing of informations, which power had not been delegated to the OSP. It
is, therefore, beyond cavil that under the Constitution, Congress was not proscribed from
legislating the grant of additional powers to the Ombudsman or placing the OSP under
the Office of the Ombudsman.
Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution and RA 6770, the
Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute any act or omission of a public
officer or employee when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient. It has been the consistent ruling of the Court not to interfere with the
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers as long as his rulings
are supported by substantial evidence. Envisioned as the champion of the people and
preserver of the integrity of public service, he has wide latitude in exercising his powers
and is free from intervention from the three branches of government. This is to ensure
that his Office is insulated from any outside pressure and improper influence. The Court
can only overturn the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause, if it is clearly proven that
the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion.
3. ANGELES V. MERCEDITAS GUTIERREZ, G.R. NOS. 189161 & 189173, MARCH
21, 2012 – RAZON
Angeles v. Gutierrez
G.R. No. 189161 & 181973 March 21, 2012
Doctrine: The determination by the Ombudsman of probable cause or of whether there
exists a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed, and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof, is usually done after the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. However, a preliminary investigation is by no means mandatory.
Emergency Digest:
Facts: Judge Angeles filed a criminal complaint against Velasco before the Ombudsman.
Ombudsman dismissed the complaint without preliminary investigation. Judge Angeles
filed a petition for certiorari before the SC alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Ombudsman.
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed gadlej in dismissing the complaint
outright? NO
Ratio: As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of
its investigative and prosecutorial powers without good and compelling reasons. Such
reasons are clearly absent in the instant Petition.
The determination by the Ombudsman of probable cause or of whether there exists a
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof, is usually done after the conduct of a preliminary investigation.
However, a preliminary investigation is by no means mandatory. The Ombudsman has
full discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be filed, including whether a
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
preliminary investigation is warranted. The Court therefore gives due deference to the
Ombudsman’s decision to no longer conduct a preliminary investigation in this case on
the criminal charges levelled against respondent Velasco.
COMPLETE
Facts:
 Judge Angeles filed a criminal Complaint against respondent Velasco with the
Ombudsman alleging the following acts allegedly committed in his capacity as a
prosecutor:
o 1. Giving an unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to the
accused in a criminal case for smuggling by failing to present a
material witness;
o 2. Engaging in private practice by insisting on the reopening of child
abuse cases against petitioner;
o 3. Falsifying a public document to make it appear that a clarificatory
hearing on the child abuse Complaint was conducted.
 In the questioned Joint Order, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges
against respondent Velasco. It found that after evaluation of the facts and
evidence presented by complainant, there was no cause to conduct a
preliminary investigation or an administrative adjudication with regard to the
charges.
 MR was filed. Denied by Ombudsman. Thus, this petition for certiorari alleging
gadlej on the part of the Ombudsman.
Issue: Whether or not the Ombudsman committed gadlej in dismissing the complaint
outright? NO
Held: WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the Petition for Certiorari filed by Judge Adoracion G.
Angeles. We AFFIRM the two Joint Orders of the Ombudsman in Case Nos. OMB-C-C-07-
0103-C and OMB-C-A-O7-0117-C dated 21 March 2007 and 30 June 2008, respectively.
Ratio:
 As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of its
investigative and prosecutorial powers without good and compelling reasons. Such
reasons are clearly absent in the instant Petition.
 In Esquivel v. Ombudsman, the Court explained thus:
o The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding
information with the appropriate courts. Settled is the rule that the
Supreme Court will not ordinarily interfere with
the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory
powers without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.
Said exercise of powers is based upon the constitutional mandate and the
court will not interfere in its exercise. The rule is based not only upon
respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman, but upon practicality as well.
Otherwise, innumerable petitions seeking dismissal of investigatory
34
proceedings conducted by the Ombudsman will grievously hamper the
functions of the office and the courts, in much the same way that courts
will be swamped if they had to review the exercise of discretion on the part
of public prosecutors each time they decided to file an information or
dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. (Emphasis supplied;
citations omitted.)
 In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto, the Court further
clarified the plenary powers of the Ombudsman. The Court emphasized that if the
latter, using professional judgment, finds a case dismissible, the Court shall respect
that finding, unless the exercise of such discretionary power was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.
 The determination by the Ombudsman of probable cause or of whether there
exists a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed, and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof, is usually done after the conduct of
a preliminary investigation. However, a preliminary investigation is by no
means mandatory.
 The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman Rules of
Procedure), specifically Section 2 of Rule II, states:
o Evaluation. — Upon evaluating the complaint, the investigating officer shall
recommend whether it may be:
 a) dismissed outright for want of palpable merit;
 b) referred to respondent for comment;
 c) indorsed to the proper government office or agency which has
jurisdiction over the case;
 d) forwarded to the appropriate officer or official for fact-finding
investigation;
 e) referred for administrative adjudication; or
 f) subjected to a preliminary investigation.
 Thus, the Ombudsman need not conduct a preliminary investigation upon
receipt of a complaint. Should investigating officers find a complaint utterly
devoid of merit, they may recommend its outright dismissal. Moreover, it is also
within their discretion to determine whether or not preliminary investigation
should be conducted.
 The Court has undoubtedly acknowledged the powers of the Ombudsman to
dismiss a complaint outright without a preliminary investigation in The
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto
 Ombudsman has full discretion to determine whether a criminal case should be
filed, including whether a preliminary investigation is warranted. The Court
therefore gives due deference to the Ombudsman’s decision to no longer
conduct a preliminary investigation in this case on the criminal charges levelled
against respondent Velasco.
4. BUSUEGO V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. NO.196842, OCTOBER 9,
2013 – RESPICIO
Emergency
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
 Alfredo is a chickboy. He is a public officer working in a hospital (Chief of Hospital).
 Sometime in 1983, Rosa unearthed photographs of, and love letters addressed to
Alfredo from, other women.
 Later, Rosa left for the US to work there as a nurse.
 Rosa learned that a certain Emy Sia (Sia) was living at their conjugal home.
 The wife filed a case of concubinage and VAWC before the ombudsman.
 Ombudsman went into Preliminary Investigation.
 In the course thereof, the procedural issue of Rosa’s failure to implead Sia and de
Leon as respondents cropped up.
 The Ombudsman, ultimately, found probable cause to indict only Alfredo and Sia of
Concubinage and directed the filing of an Information against them in the
appropriate court
 Alfredo now comes to us on PETITION FOR CERTIORARI alleging grave abuse
of discretion in the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause to indict him and
Sia for Concubinage.
 Alfredo’s contention: Alfredo claims that the Ombudsman should have referred
Rosa’s complaint to the Department of Justice (DOJ), since the crime of Concubinage
is not committed in relation to his being a public officer.
ISSUE:
(1) WON OMB can conduct PI over public officer not in relation to official functions? YES
(2) WON the case should undergo PI by DOJ? DOJ CAN PI, but once OMB enters, DOJ
is excluded
RATIO:
 OMB has jursidiction to PI cases cognizable by sandiganbayan. This case is
cognizable by sandiganbayan.
 The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public
officers or employees is concurrent with other government investigating
agencies such as provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the
Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable
by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any investigating
agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
COMPLETE
FACTS:
 Before us is a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the Resolution of
the Ombudsman which directed the filing of an Information for Concubinage under
Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner Alfredo Romulo A. Busuego
(Alfredo).
 We chronicle the facts thus.
 Private respondent Rosa S. Busuego (Rosa) filed a complaint for: (1) Concubinage
under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code; (2) violation of Republic Act No. 9262
(Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children); and (3) Grave Threats under
Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, before the Office of the Ombudsman against
her husband, Alfredo
 In her complaint, Rosa painted a picture of a marriage in disarray.
35
 She and Alfredo were married with two (2) sons, . Sometime in 1983, their marriage
turned sour. At this time, Rosa unearthed photographs of, and love letters addressed
to Alfredo from, other women. Rosa confronted Alfredo who claimed ignorance of
the existence of these letters and innocence of any wrongdoing.
 Purportedly, Alfredo very rarely stayed at home to spend time with his family. He
would come home late at night on weekdays and head early to work the next day; his
weekends were spent with his friends, instead of with his family. Rosa considered
herself lucky if their family was able to spend a solid hour with Alfredo.
 Around this time, an opportunity to work as nurse in New York City, United States of
America (US) opened up for Rosa. Rosa informed Alfredo, who vehemently opposed
Rosa’s plan to work abroad. Nonetheless, Rosa completed the necessary
requirements to work in the US and was scheduled to depart the Philippines in
March 1985.
 Before leaving, Rosa took up the matter again with Alfredo, who remained opposed
to her working abroad. Furious with Rosa’s pressing, Alfredo took his loaded gun
and pointed it at Rosa’s right temple, threatening and taunting Rosa to attempt to
leave him and their family. Alfredo was only staved off because Rosa’s mother
arrived at the couple’s house. Alfredo left the house in a rage: Rosa and her mother
heard gun shots fired outside.
 Because of that incident, Rosa acted up to her plan and left for the US. While in the
US, Rosa became homesick and was subsequently joined by her children who were
brought to the US by Alfredo. Rosa singularly reared them: Alfred, from grade school
to university, while Robert, upon finishing high school, went back to Davao City to
study medicine and lived with Alfredo.
 During that time his entire family was in the US, Alfredo never sent financial
support. In fact, it was Rosa who would remit money to Alfredo from time to time,
believing that Alfredo had stopped womanizing. Rosa continued to spend her annual
vacation in Davao City.
 Sometime in 1997, Rosa learned that a certain Emy Sia (Sia) was living at their
conjugal home. When Rosa asked Alfredo, the latter explained that Sia was a nurse
working at the Regional Hospital in Tagum who was in a sorry plight as she was
allegedly being raped by Rosa’s brother-in-law. To get her out of the situation,
Alfredo allowed Sia to live in their house and sleep in the maids’ quarters. At that
time, Rosa gave Alfredo the benefit of the doubt.
 In October 2005, Rosa finally learned of Alfredo’s extra-marital relationships.
Robert, who was already living in Davao City, called Rosa to complain of Alfredo’s
illicit affairs and shabby treatment of him. Rosa then rang up Alfredo which, not
surprisingly, resulted in an altercation. Robert executed an affidavit, corroborating
his mother’s story and confirming his father’s illicit affairs:
1. In varying dates from July 1997 to January 1998, Robert found it strange that Sia slept
with his father in the conjugal bedroom.
2. He did not inform his mother of that odd arrangement as he did not want to bring
trouble to their family.
3. Eventually, Sia herself confirmed to Robert that she was Alfredo’s mistress.
4. During this period of concubinage, Sia was hospitalized and upon her discharge, she
and Alfredo resumed their cohabitation.
5. The relationship between Alfredo and Sia ended only when the latter found another
boyfriend. 6. His father next took up an affair with Julie de Leon (de Leon) whom Robert
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
met when de Leon fetched Alfredo on one occasion when their vehicle broke down in the
middle of the road.
7. Robert read various Short Message Service (SMS) exchanges between Julie and Alfredo
on Alfredo’s mobile phone.
8. On 23, 24, 30 and 31 December 2004, de Leon stayed in Rosa’s and Alfredo’s conjugal
dwelling and stayed in the conjugal room the entire nights thereof.
 The househelpers, Melissa S. Diambangan and Liza S. Diambangan, likewise executed
a joint affidavit in support of Rosa’s allegations:
1. They had seen Sia sleep and stay overnight with Alfredo in the conjugal bedroom.
2. Sia herself, who called Alfredo "Papa," confirmed the two’s sexual relationship.
3. On 23, 24, 30 and 31 December 2004, de Leon stayed in the conjugal dwelling and slept
overnight with Alfredo in the conjugal room.
 As a result, Rosa and their other son Alfred forthwith flew to Davao City without
informing Alfredo of their impending return. Upon Rosa’s return, she gathered and
consolidated information on her husband’s sexual affairs.
 Pursuant to her charges of violation of Republic Act No. 9262 and Grave Threats,
Rosa averred that during the course of their marriage, apart from the marital
infidelity, Alfredo physically and verbally abused her and her family. On one occasion
after Rosa confirmed the affairs, Alfredo threatened their family, including other
members of their household that he will gun them down should he chance upon
them in Tagum City. Lastly, on 22 March 2006, Alfredo purportedly dismissed house
helper Liza Diambangan and threatened her.
ISSUE
The Ombudsman did not refer the complaint to the Department of Justice, considering
that the offense of Concubinage is not committed in relation to his office as Chief of
Hospital;
RATIO
 We sustain the Ombudsman.
 Alfredo claims that the Ombudsman should have referred Rosa’s complaint to the
Department of Justice (DOJ), since the crime of Concubinage is not committed in
relation to his being a public officer. This is not a new argument.
 The Ombudsman’s primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, to conduct
preliminary investigation of crimes involving public officers, without regard to its
commission in relation to office, had long been settled in Sen. Honasan II v. The
Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ,17 and affirmed in subsequent cases:
 The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the
Sandiganbayan Law, as amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive
jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public officers or employees. The
authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees is concurrent with other government investigating agencies such as
provincial, city and state prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of
its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over,
at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of
such cases.
 In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any
investigation of cases against public officers involving violations of penal laws but if
36
the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the respondent
Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.
 Thus, with the jurisprudential declarations that the Ombudsman and the DOJ have
concurrent jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigation, the respective heads of
said offices came up with OMB-DOJ Joint Circular No. 95-001 for the proper
guidelines of their respective prosecutors in the conduct of their investigations, to
wit:
OMB-DOJ JOINT CIRCULAR NO. 95-001Series of 1995
ALL GRAFT INVESTIGATION/SPECIAL PROSECUTIONOFFICERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN
TO: ALL REGIONAL STATE PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, PROVINCIAL/CITY
PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS, STATE PROSECUTORS ANDPROSECUTING
ATTORNEYS OF THE DEPARTMENT OFJUSTICE.
SUBJECT: HANDLING COMPLAINTS FILED AGAINST PUBLICOFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES,
THE CONDUCT OFPRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION, PREPARATION OFRESOLUTIONS AND
INFORMATIONS AND PROSECUTION OF CASES BY PROVINCIAL AND CITY
PROSECUTORS AND THEIR ASSISTANTS.
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
In a recent dialogue between the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE, discussion centered around the latest pronouncement of the SUPREME
COURT on the extent to which the OMBUDSMAN may call upon the government
prosecutors for assistance in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases
cognizable by his office and the conditions under which he may do so. Also discussed was
Republic Act No. 7975 otherwise known as "AN ACT TO STRENGTHEN THE FUNCTIONAL
AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED" and its implications on the
jurisdiction of the office of the Ombudsman on criminal offenses committed by public
officers and employees.
Concerns were expressed on unnecessary delays that could be caused by discussions on
jurisdiction between the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, and by procedural conflicts in the filing of complaints against public officers and
employees, the conduct of preliminary investigations, the preparation of resolutions and
informations, and the prosecution of cases by provincial and city prosecutors and their
assistants as DEPUTIZED PROSECUTORS OF THE OMBUDSMAN.
Recognizing the concerns, the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and the DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, in a series of consultations, have agreed on the following guidelines to be
observed in the investigation and prosecution of cases against public officers and
employees:
1. Preliminary investigation and prosecution of offenses committed by public officers and
employees IN RELATION TO OFFICE whether cognizable by the SANDIGANBAYAN or the
REGULAR COURTS, and whether filed with the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN or with the
OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL/CITY PROSECUTOR shall be under the control and
supervision of the office of the OMBUDSMAN.
2. Unless the Ombudsman under its Constitutional mandate finds reason to believe
otherwise, offenses NOT IN RELATION TO OFFICE and cognizable by the REGULAR
COURTS shall be investigated and prosecuted by the OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL/CITY
PROSECUTOR, which shall rule thereon with finality.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
3. Preparation of criminal information shall be the responsibility of the investigating
officer who conducted the preliminary investigation. Resolutions recommending
prosecution together with the duly accomplished criminal informations shall be
forwarded to the appropriate approving authority.
4. Considering that the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN has jurisdiction over public officers
and employees and for effective monitoring of all investigations and prosecutions of
cases involving public officers and employees, the OFFICE OF THE PROVINCIAL/CITY
PROSECUTOR shall submit to the OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN a monthly list of
complaints filed with their respective offices against public officers and employees.
xxxx
 A close examination of the circular supports the view of the respondent Ombudsman
that it is just an internal agreement between the Ombudsman and the DOJ.
 Sections 2 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure on
Preliminary Investigation, effective December 1, 2000, to wit:
SEC. 2. Officers authorized to conduct preliminary investigations –
The following may conduct preliminary investigations:
(a) Provincial or City Prosecutors and their assistants;
(b) Judges of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;
(c) National and Regional State Prosecutors; and
(d) Other officers as may be authorized by law.
Their authority to conduct preliminary investigation shall include all crimes cognizable
by the proper court in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
SEC. 4. Resolution of investigating prosecutor and its review. - If the investigating
prosecutor finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he shall prepare the resolution
and information. He shall certify under oath in the information that he, or as shown by
the record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his
witnesses; that there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof; that the accused was informed of the
complaint and of the evidence submitted against him; and that he was given an
opportunity to submit controverting evidence. Otherwise, he shall recommend the
dismissal of the complaint.
Within five (5) days from his resolution, he shall forward the record of the case to the
provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his
deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt
thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action.
No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor
without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or
chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.
Where the investigating prosecutor recommends the dismissal of the complaint but his
recommendation is disapproved by the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy on the ground that a probable cause exists,
the latter may, by himself file the information against the respondent, or direct another
37
assistant prosecutor or state prosecutor to do so without conducting another preliminary
investigation.
If upon petition by a proper party under such rules as the Department of Justice may
prescribe or motu proprio, the Secretary of Justice reverses or modifies the resolution of
the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, he shall direct the prosecutor
concerned either to file the corresponding information without conducting another
preliminary investigation, or to dismiss or move for dismissal of the complaint or
information with notice to the parties. The same Rule shall apply in preliminary
investigations conducted by the officers of the Office of the Ombudsman.
confirm the authority of the DOJ prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigation of
criminal complaints filed with them for offenses cognizable by the proper court within
their respective territorial jurisdictions, including those offenses which come within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan; but with the qualification that in offenses
falling within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the prosecutor shall, after
their investigation, transmit the records and their resolutions to the Ombudsman or his
deputy for appropriate action. Also, the prosecutor cannot dismiss the complaint without
the prior written authority of the Ombudsman or his deputy, nor can the prosecutor file
an Information with the Sandiganbayan without being deputized by, and without prior
written authority of the Ombudsman or his deputy.
xxxx
To reiterate for emphasis, the power to investigate or conduct preliminary investigation
on charges against any public officers or employees may be exercised by an investigator
or by any provincial or city prosecutor or their assistants, either in their regular
capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors. The fact that all prosecutors are in
effect deputized Ombudsman prosecutors under the OMB-DOJ circular is a mere
superfluity. The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to
conduct the preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ’s
authority to act as the principal law agency of the government and investigate the
commission of crimes under the Revised Penal Code is derived from the Revised
Administrative Code which had been held in the Natividad case citation omitted as not
being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the conduct
of the preliminary investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the
first place. However, the Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdiction at any stage of
the investigation. (Emphasis supplied).
In Honasan II, although Senator Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan was a public officer who was
charged with coup d’etat for the occupation of Oakwood on 27 July 2003, the preliminary
investigation therefor was conducted by the DOJ. Honasan questioned the jurisdiction of
the DOJ to do so, proferring that it was the Ombudsman which had jurisdiction since the
imputed acts were committed in relation to his public office. We clarified that the DOJ and
the Ombudsman have concurrent jurisdiction to investigate offenses involving public
officers or employees. Nonetheless, we pointed out that the Ombudsman, in the exercise
of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at
any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the investigation of such
cases. Plainly, applying that ruling in this case, the Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction,
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
albeit concurrent with the DOJ, over Rosa’s complaint, and after choosing to exercise such
jurisdiction, need not defer to the dictates of a respondent in a complaint, such as
Alfredo. In other words, the Ombudsman may exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the
DOJ.
J.REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF THE OMBUDSMAN
1. ANTONINO V. DESIERTO, DECEMBER 18, 2008, G.R. NO. 144492 – SANCHEZ
DOCTRINE: While the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence of probable
cause is not absolute, nonetheless, petitioner must prove that such discretion was gravely
abused in order to warrant the reversal of the Ombudsman's findings by this Court
ER:
 Presidential Proclamation 168 reserved a parcel of land in General Santos for
recreation and health purposes to be administered by the city, and also
prohibiting its alienation.
o This land was subdivided into 3 (Lots Y-1; Y-2 and X).
 However, Pres. Marcos issued Proclamation 2273 which stated that lots Y-1 and Y-2
are open to disposition under CA 141 (Public Land Act).
o After this, 16 people (private respondents), applied for Miscellaneous
Sales Patents over Lot X.
 The city mayor and the DENR executive Director for General Santos approved the
applications, and TCTs were issued to the private respondents.
 Antonino, the former Congresswoman of the 1st district of South Cotabato filed a
complaint-affidavit with the Ombudsman for VIOLATION OF RA 3019 +
MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS thru falsification of public documents.
 OMBUDSMAN DECISION: CHARGES DISMISSEDMayor Nunez, et al. regularly
performed their duties [January 20, 1999].
 The MR [filed: Feb 4, 2000] of Antonino was also denied, because the OMB already
lost its jurisdiction.
 Hence, Antonino files a R65 petition.
ISSUE: WON the OMB committed GADLEJ.
HELD: NO GADLEJ. Antonino loses. WHY?
1. [Procedural] Antonino failed to establish that she timely filed her MR. Section 27 of
RA 6770 (OMB Act) provides MRs must be filed within five (5) days after receipt
of written notice. Antonino failed to establish in her MR why she didn’t file her MR
within 5 days from receipt of the decision.
a. Antonino did not proffer any explanation at all for the late filing of the
motion for reconsideration. Petition dismissed.
2. [Substantive] Although the OMB is granted the power to investigate and prosecute
the act of any public employee, it can still be reviewed if it’s GAD.
a. While the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence of
probable cause is not absolute, nonetheless, petitioner must prove
38
that such discretion was gravely abused in order to warrant the
reversal of the Ombudsman's findings by this Court.
b. The alleged grave abuse of discretion imputed to the Ombudsman is found
wanting in this case. Thus, this Court finds no reason to deviate from the
general rule.
COMPLETE
FACTS:
 Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was issued by then President Diosdado
Macapagal on October 3, 1963 (Record, pp. 23-24). The pertinent provision of which
states that:
o do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for recreational and
health resort site purposes, under the administration of the municipality of
General Santos, subject to private rights, if any there be, a certain parcel of
land of the public domain
 The property subject of Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was thereafter
subdivided into three lots, namely: Lot Y-1 with an area of 18,695 square meters, Lot
X containing 15,020 square meters and Lot Y-2 with 18,963 square meters, or a total
of 52,678 square meters which is still equivalent to the original area.
o However, on February 25, 1983, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 2273 amending Proclamation No. 168, which
excluded Lots Y-1 and Y-2 from the recreational and health purposes.
 On July 23, 1997, the 16 private respondents applied for Miscellaneous Sales Patent
over portions of Lot X.
o On August 2, 1997, respondent City Mayor Rosalita T. Nunñ ez, assisted by
respondent City Legal Officer Pedro Nalangan III issued 1 st Indorsements
(refer to application documents, Record, pp. 421-500) addressed to
CENRO, DENR for portions of Lot X applied by private respondents and
stated therein that “this office interposes no objection to whatever legal
proceedings your office may pursue on application covering portions thereof
after the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22 excluded Lot X,
MR-1160-D from the coverage of the Compromise Judgment dated May 6,
1992 per said court’s order dated July 22, 1997.”
o The parcels of land were sold.
 Antonino (former 1st district congresswoman) filed a complaint-affidavit with the
OMB.
o Against the respondents together with Cesar Jonillo (Jonillo), Renato
Rivera (Rivera), Mad Guaybar, Oliver Guaybar, Jonathan Guaybar, Alex
Guaybar, Jack Guiwan, Carlito Flaviano III, Nicolas Ynot, Jolito Poralan,
Miguela Cabi-ao, Jose Rommel Saludar, Joel Teves, Rico Altizo, Johnny
Medillo, Martin Saycon, Arsenio de los Reyes, and Jose Bomez (Mad
Guaybar and his companions), Gen. Jose Ramiscal, Jr. (Gen. Ramiscal),
Wilfredo Pabalan (Pabalan), and Atty. Nilo Flaviano (Atty. Flaviano)
(indicted) for violation of Paragraphs (e), (g) and (j), Section 3 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, and for malversation of public funds or
property through falsification of public documents.
 OMB RESOLUTION on JANUARY 20, 1999: CHARGES DISMISSED
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
o The Ombudsman also ruled that the Order of Judge Adre was made in
accordance with the facts of the case, while Diaz, Borinaga, Momongan and
Cruzabra were found to have regularly performed their official functions.
Accordingly, the charges against the respondents were dismissed
 On FEBRUARY 4, 2000, Antonino filed an MR. It was DENIED.
o The Ombudsman held that since the criminal Informations were already
filed against the aforementioned indicted and the cases were already
pending before the Sandiganbayan and the regular courts of General Santos
City, the Ombudsman had lost jurisdiction over the said case.
 Antonino files the 65 petition.
ISSUE: WON the OMB committed GADLEJ in denying the MR. (NO)
HELD: All told, the Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the criminal complaint against respondents. WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No
costs.
RATIO:
- Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (The Ombudsman Act of 1989)[22] provides:
o SEC. 27. Effectivity and Finality of Decisions. — (1) All provisionary
orders of the Office of the Ombudsman are immediately effective and
executory.
o A motion for reconsideration of any order, directive or decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman must be filed within five (5) days after receipt
of written notice and shall be entertained only on any of the following
grounds:
o (1) New evidence has been discovered which materially affects the order,
directive or decision;
o (2) Errors of law or irregularities have been committed prejudicial to the
interest of the movant. The motion for reconsideration shall be resolved
within three (3) days from filing: Provided, That only one motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained.
- Other than the statement of material dates wherein petitioner claimed that she
received through counsel the assailed Resolution of the Ombudsman on January 21,
2000, she failed to establish that her Motion for Reconsideration was indeed
filed on time, and thus, failed to refute the assertion of the respondents based on
the aforementioned Certification that petitioner was personally served a copy of the
assailed Resolution on February 24, 1999.
- There are a number of instances when rules of procedure are relaxed in the interest
of justice. However, in this case, petitioner did not proffer any explanation at all
for the late filing of the motion for reconsideration.
- After the respondents made such allegation, petitioner did not bother to respond
and meet the issue head-on. We find no justification why the Ombudsman
entertained the motion for reconsideration, when, at the time of the filing of the
motion for reconsideration the assailed Resolution was already final.
- [Substantive]
o Under Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and
pursuant to R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate
39
and prosecute any act or omission of a public officer or employee when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.
Well-settled is the rule that this Court will not ordinarily interfere with the
Ombudsman's exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers
without good and compelling reasons that indicate otherwise.
 Of course, this rule is not absolute. The aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when
the finding of the Ombudsman is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, as what the
petitioner did in this case, consistent with our ruling in Collantes
v. Marcelo, where we laid down the following exceptions to the
rule:
1. When necessary to afford adequate protection to the
constitutional rights of the accused;
2. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice
or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
3. When there is a prejudicial question that is sub judice;
4. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority;
5. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation;
6. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
7. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
8. Where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution;
9. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by
the lust for vengeance;
10. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the
accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been
denied.
- While the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence of probable cause is
not absolute, nonetheless, petitioner must prove that such discretion was gravely
abused in order to warrant the reversal of the Ombudsman's findings by this Court.
- The alleged grave abuse of discretion imputed to the Ombudsman is found
wanting in this case. Thus, this Court finds no reason to deviate from the
general rule.
2. ENEMECIO V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, G.R. NO. 146731, JANUARY 13, 2004 –
SANTOS
Enemecio vs Office of the Ombudsman and Servando Bernante
AGUSTINA M. ENEMECIO vs. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS) and
SERVANDO BERNANTE.
Doctrine: Jurisprudence now holds that where the findings of the Ombudsman on the
existence of probable cause in criminal cases is tainted with GRAVE ABUSE OF
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
DISCRETION amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court under Rule 65. Since Enemecio filed
a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals, instead of the Supreme Court, she
availed of a wrong remedy in the wrong forum. Hence, the instant petition should be
dismissed outright. Also, APPEALS from decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary actions should be brought to the Court of Appeals
under Rule 43.
ER:
 ENEMECIO works at the CEBU STATE COLLEGE. She filed an administrative
complaint to the dean of the school against BERNANTE (an assistant professor)
for gross misconduct, falsification, malversation, dishonesty and defamation.
 The dean indorsed the complaint to the Ombudsman.
 ENEMECIO also filed with the ombudsman a criminal complaint against BERNANTE
for FALSIFICATION OF A PUBLIC DOCUMENT.
 ENEMECIO said that BERNANTE caused a spray painting of obscene words
against her in the walls of the school.
o Also claimed that BERNANTE shouted defamatory words against her.
o She further alleged that BERNANTE made it appear that he was on leave
but he was in prison. BERNANTE denied all the allegations.
 The OMBUDSMAN dismissed the ADMIN complaint AND the CRIMINAL complaint
against BERNANTE, finding no probable cause to indict BERNANTE for falsification
of public document.
o MR by ENEMECIO denied.
 ENEMECIO filed a petition for certiorari with the COURT OF APPEALS
Dismissed.
o MR denied.
 Thus, ENEMECIO filed a pet rev with CA. CA dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (The
CA said that the power to review decisions of the OMBUDSMAN in criminal cases is
retained by the SC).
ISSUE: WON a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed before the Court of Appeals is
the proper remedy to question the dismissal of a criminal complaint filed with the
Ombudsman? NO.
 Jurisprudence now holds that where the findings of the Ombudsman on the
existence of probable cause in criminal cases is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court under Rule 65.
 Since Enemecio filed a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals, instead
of the Supreme Court, she availed of a wrong remedy in the wrong
forum. Hence, the instant petition should be dismissed outright.
 Also, Appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
actions should be brought to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.
FACTS:
40
 Petitioner Agustina M. Enemecio (“Enemecio”) is a utility worker at the Cebu
State College of Science and Technology, College of Fisheries Technology (“CEBU
STATE COLLEGE”) Cebu.
 Private respondent Servando Bernante (“Bernante”) is an Assistant Professor IV
of CEBU STATE COLLEGE.
 Enemecio filed an administrative complaint for gross misconduct, falsification
of public documents, malversation, dishonesty and defamation against
BERNANTE before the Office of the Executive Dean of CEBU STATE COLLEGE.
 The Dean indorsed the complaint to the Office of the Ombudsman for the
Visayas (Ombudsman) Enemecio also filed with the Ombudsman
a criminal complaint against BERNANTE for falsification of public document.
 Ombudsman ordered Enemecio to submit her affidavit and the affidavits of her
witnesses.
 After Enemecio submitted the required affidavits, the Ombudsman ordered
Bernante to submit his counter-affidavit.
 The administrative complaint and criminal complaint was jointly tried by the
Ombudsman.
 Enemecio alleged that Bernante had caused the spray-painting of obscene and
unprintable words against her on the walls of the CEBU STATE COLLEGE
Carmen Campus.
 Enemecio claimed that Bernante also shouted defamatory words against her
while she was inside the school premises.
 Enemecio further asserted that Bernante made it appear in his leave application
that he was on forced leave and on vacation leave for a certain time but in truth
he was serving a 20-day prison term because of his conviction of slight physical
injuries.
 Bernante was able to receive his salary during that time since then CEBU STATE
COLLEGE Superintendent approved Bernante’s application for leave.
 Enemecio contended that Bernante was not entitled to receive salary for that
period because of his “falsified leave applications.”
 BERNANTE DID NOT DENY HE WAS IN PRISON. He maintained that he received
his salary for that period because of his duly approved leave applications.
 He further alleged that ENEMECIO filed the criminal and admin complaints
against him in retaliation for the case he filed against Enemecio’s friends.
 BERNANTE denied he was behind the spray-painting of obscenities against
ENEMECIO on the walls of the school campus.
 OMBUDSMAN DISMISSED THE ADMIN COMPLAINT AGAINST BERNANTE. It
said that that there is no regulation restricting the purpose or use of an
employee’s earned leave credits. Considering that the application for leave filed
by BERNANTE was duly approved by the appropriate official concerned, it
matters not how he utilizes his leave for it is not a requirement that the
specifics or reasons for going on leave be spelled out in such application. It
further said that the evidence is insufficient to prove that BERNANTE was the
one who sprayed on the wall, there was no witness.
 Regarding the complainant’s allegation that BERNANTE defamed the former by
uttering slanderous words, it appears that only the incident occurring on March
10, 1998 was corroborated by the testimony of witness Delfin Buot. Witness
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
Buot testified that he was about (3) meters from the BERNANTE when the latter
shouted the words ‘buricat’ (whore) ‘putang ina’ and ‘maot’ (snob) to
ENEMECIO. However, the circumstances of the utterance, particularly the time
and the relation of the protagonists involved, leads us to conclude that the same
is removed from the official functions of the respondent as a professor of the
school. Stated otherwise, the act of the respondent was not in relation to his
official functions. In the case of Palma vs. Fortich, et al., 147 SCRA 397, the
Supreme Court ruled that:
 In administrative actions against municipal officers, the Supreme Court in Festijo v.
Crisologo, et al. (17 SCRA 868, 869 [1966]), classified the grounds for suspension
under two categories, namely: (1) those related to the discharge of the functions of
the officer concerned (neglect of duty, oppression, corruption or other forms of
maladministration of office and (2) those not so connected with said
functions. Under the second category, when the crime involving moral turpitude is
not linked with the performance of official duties, conviction by final judgment is
required as a condition precedent to administrative action.
 Therefore, inasmuch as the oral defamation charge is now pending before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court in Cebu, the matter of BERNANTE’s administrative
culpability is still premature to be determined.
 ON THE SAME DATE, the OMBUDSMAN dismissed the criminal complaint against
BERNANTE finding no probable cause to indict BERNANTE for falsification of public
document.
 MR by ENEMECIO DENIED.
 ENEMECIO filed certiorari with the CA. it was dismissed for being filed out of time.
They also stated that the proper remedy was petition for review under Rule 43
and not certiorari under 65.
 ENEMECIO filed a MR, he argued that the CA should not have relied on the case of
FABIAN (pet review not rule 65).
 The Court of Appeals denied Enemecio’s MR.
 Petition for review in the CA. CA dismissed the petition
 The Court of Appeals clarified that Fabian does not apply to Enemecio’s petition
assailing the dismissal of the criminal complaint against Bernante.
o The appellate court stated that what Fabian declared void was Section 27
of RA 6770, which authorized appeals to the Supreme Court from
decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases.
o Under the Fabian ruling, the appellant should take such appeal in
administrative disciplinary cases to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43.
o The Court of Appeals added that it follows that the power to review
decisions of the Ombudsman in criminal cases is retained by the
Supreme Court under Section 14 of RA 6770. Thus, the appellate court
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUES: WON a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed before the CA is the proper
remedy to question the dismissal of a criminal complaint filed with the Ombudsman?
HELD: NO. Enemecio filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 questioning the Ombudsman’s Resolution dated 13 January 2000 and Order dated 28
41
February 2000 dismissing the criminal case against Bernante. Thus, the Prefatory
statement of Enemecio’s Petition in the Court of Appeals states:
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify the
Resolution dated 13 January 2000 and the Order dated 28 February 2000 both issued by
the Public Respondent in the Ombudsman Case docketed as … and entitled, “Agustina
Enemecio vs. Servando Bernante, Asst. Professor IV, CSCST- College of Fisheries
Technology, Carmen, Cebu”, for being a manifest and grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess of jurisdiction. The Resolution dated 13 January 2000 dismissed the criminal
complaint for malversation and falsification of public documents filed against herein
Private Respondent while the Order dated 28 February 2000 denied herein Petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration. Certified machine copies of the aforesaid Resolution and
Order are hereto appended as Annexes “A” and “B” respectively. (Emphasis supplied)
The CA dismissed Enemecio’s petition and denied her MR. Enemecio now comes to
this Court via this petition for review, claiming that “what was involved in the petition
before the CA was the administrative, not the criminal case.” Enemecio thus stresses
that “there is no reason for the Court of Appeals to say that the petition concerned the
criminal case.”
We cannot countenance the sudden and complete turnabout of Enemecio and her
counsel, Atty. Terence L. Fernandez. Atty. Fernandez’s conduct has fallen far too short of
the honesty required of every member of the Bar.
It is clear from the records that Atty. Fernandez filed with the Court of Appeals
a certiorari petition assailing the Ombudsman’s Resolution and Order dismissing
the criminal case, not the administrative case against Bernante. For this reason, the CA
in its 7 December 2000 Resolution rectified itself and stated that Fabian does not apply
to Enemecio’s petition as the Fabian ruling applies only to administrative disciplinary
actions. Atty. Fernandez’s attempt to mislead this Court in a last ditch effort to secure a
decision favorable to his client’s cause does not escape our attention. As an officer of the
court, Atty. Fernandez is duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court to
which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken as attorney, and not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice. He must always bear in mind that good faith and
honorable dealings with judicial tribunals are primary obligations of an attorney. He
must always remember to deal with courts with truthfulness and not to trifle with court
proceedings. For this, Atty. Fernandez should be admonished not to commit similar acts
again.
Even if we consider Enemecio’s petition before the Court of Appeals as questioning
the dismissal of the administrative case against Bernante, the action must also
fail. Appeals from decisions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
actions should be brought to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43. The only provision
affected by the Fabian ruling is the designation of the Court of Appeals as the proper
forum and of Rule 43 as the proper mode of appeal. All other matters in Section 27 of RA
6770, including the finality or non-finality of decisions of the Ombudsman, remain valid.
In any event, jurisprudence now holds that where the findings of the Ombudsman
on the existence of probable cause in criminal cases is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the aggrieved party may file a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court under Rule 65. Since Enemecio filed
a certiorari petition before the Court of Appeals, instead of the Supreme Court, she
availed of a wrong remedy in the wrong forum. Hence, the instant petition should be
dismissed outright.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
NOT REM RELATED:
EVEN CONSIDERING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE CASE, we find no grave abuse of
discretion in the Ombudsman’s determination of whether there exists a prima facie case
against Bernante.
Under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of
falsification of public documents through an untruthful narration of facts are: (a) the
offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) the
offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated; (c) the facts
narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (d) the perversion of truth in the
narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent to injure a third person.
As the Ombudsman correctly pointed out, Enemecio failed to point to any law
imposing upon Bernante the legal obligation to disclose where he was going to spend his
leave of absence. “Legal obligation” means that there is a law requiring the disclosure of
the truth of the facts narrated. Bernante may not be convicted of the crime of falsification
of public document by making false statements in a narration of facts absent any legal
obligation to disclose where he would spend his vacation leave and forced leave.
In PCGG v. Desierto the Court ruled that the Ombudsman has the discretion to
determine whether a criminal case, given the facts and circumstances, should be filed or
not. The Ombudsman may dismiss the complaint forthwith if he finds it insufficient in
form or substance. On the other hand, he may continue with the inquiry if he finds
otherwise. If, in the Ombudsman’s view, the complaint is sufficient in form and
substance, he may proceed with the investigation. In fact, the Ombudsman has the power
to dismiss a complaint outright without going through a preliminary investigation.
Our evaluation of the records leads us to the conclusion that the Ombudsman has
carefully studied the merits of the criminal complaint. Where the Ombudsman has
thoroughly examined the merits of the complaint, it would not be right to subject the
private respondent to an unnecessary and prolonged anguish.
3. BAVIERA V. ZOLETA, G.R. NO. 169098, OCTOBER 12, 2006 – SUPERABLE
MANUEL BAVIERA, petitioner, vs. ROLANDO B. ZOLETA, in his capacity as Graft
Investigation and Prosecution Officer II; MARY SUSAN S. GUILLERMO, in her
capacity as Director, Preliminary Investigation and Administrative Adjudication
Bureau-B; PELAGIO S. APOSTOL, in his capacity as Assistant Ombudsman, PAMO;
ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO, in his capacity as Assistant Ombudsman for the Military
and Other Law Enforcement Offices; and MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ (Then)
Undersecretary, Department of Justice, respondents. October 12, 2006. (NONS)
NSS: Haba ng facts! Pero not really relevant sa atin. LOL
DOCTRINE: Appeals of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman finding probable cause
or lack of probable cause involving criminal cases are filed with the Supreme Court via a
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.
EMERGENCY RECIT
FACTS:
42
 Baviera filed a case against several individuals, alleging that Standard Chartered
defrauded him and others by soliciting funds in unregistered and unauthorized
foreign stocks and securities
 In connection with this, Baviera applied for and was granted a Hold-Departure Order
issued by the DOJ against the individuals, including Sridhar Raman (CFO of Standard
Chartered).
 Raman was able to fly out of the country despite the HDO due to the verbal
order given by Acting Secretary Merceditas Guiterrez.
 Because of this, Baviera initiated a criminal complaint against Gutierrez for
violations of the Anti-Graft and Corruption Act.
 The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause.
 Baviera filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the COURT OF
APPEALS.
o The CA dismissed this on the ground that the proper remedy is certiorari
under 65 filed with the SC.
ISSUE: Whether the proper appeal was a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 filed
before the SC? YES!
 It was already established in previous cases that when what is involved is a decision
of the Ombudmsan involving a criminal complaint, the proper remedy is a Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court.
 It is only when the decision being questioned involves administrative
disciplinary complaints that the CA has jurisdiction over the complaint.
COMPLETE
FACTS:
Background Facts
 Manuel Baviera filed several complaints against the officers or directors of Standard
Chartered Bank, including Sridhar Raman (Indian national, Chief Financial Officer of
Standard Chartered) before the SEC (violation of Securities and Regulations Code),
BSP (violation of banking laws), AMLC (money laundering), NLRC (illegal dismissal),
(syndicated estafa) and BIR (tax fraud).
 Baviera was a former employee and an investor of the bank, and he alleged
that Standard Chartered defrauded him and others by soliciting funds in
unregistered and unauthorized foreign stocks and securities.
 On September 18, 2003, Baviera requested the Secretary of Justice to issue a
Hold-Departure Order (HDO) against respondents in those cases, including
Raman.
 On September 26, 2003, Secretary Datumanong of the DOJ issued the HDO, which
was served on the Bureau of Immigration and the HDO was implemented.
 Secretary Datumanong left for a conference in Vienna, Austria and
Undersecretary Merceditas Gutierrez was designated as Acting Secretary.
 On September 28, 2003, Raman was supposed to go to Singapore but he was
apprehended in NAIA pursuant to the HDO. But the next day, Raman was able to
leave on an 8:15am Singapore flight.
 This was because Acting Secretary Gutierrez had verbally allowed the departure of
Raman because of the strong representations of Raman’s counsel.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
Criminal Complaint of Baviera filed before the Ombudsman
 Because of this, on October 3, 2003, Baviera filed a Complaint-Affidavit with the
Ombudsman, charging Undersecretary Gutierrez for violation of Section 3(a),
(e), and (j) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019, as amended.
 Baviera alleged that the acts of Gutierrez were illegal, highly irregular and
questionable: she interceded on behalf of the Indian national, gave the verbal
instructions on September 29 (6:15am) when the office was still closed, there was
no written application for the temporary stay of the HDO, among others. All in all,
the acts of Gutierrez show ‘arrogance of power and insolence of office, thereby
extending unwarranted preference, benefits and advantage to Raman.’
 In her Counter-Affidavit, respondent Gutierrez denied the allegations against her.
She averred that she did not violate any law or rule, in allowing Raman to leave the
country. She merely upheld his rights to travel as guaranteed under the Constitution.
Moreover, the DOJ may allow persons covered by HDOs to travel abroad, for a
specific purpose and for a specific period of time. In fact, no prejudice resulted
because Raman immediately came back to the Philippines after his business trip on
October 2, 2003.
 In his Reply-Affidavit, Baviera alleged that the complaint stemmed from Gutierrez’
abuse of her discretionary powers in allowing an individual to travel despite the
HDO.
 On October 5, 2003, Raman et. al. filed a MR of the HDO. On October 17, 2003,
Secretary Datumanong lifted the HDO.
 On June 22, 2004, Graft Investigation and Prosecutor Officer Rolando Zoleta
recommended that the criminal complaint agaisnt Gutierrez be dismsissed for
insufficiency of evidence. According to the Senate deliberations on Sec. 3(a) of 3019,
consideration is required before a criminal complaint for influence peddling can
prosper. No proof was shown that Gutierrez received consideration for allowing
Raman to leave despite the HDO. No injury likewise resulted to any party because
Raman immediately returned to the Philippines.
 Because the recommendation that the case be dismissed was approved, Baviera filed
a MR of the resolution on Aug. 2, 2004. Zoleta recommended that the MR be denied
for lack of merit, and Deputy Ombudsman Casimiro approved this.
 Thus, on November 16, 2004, Baviera filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in the CA, assailing the resolutions of the
Ombudsman.
Improper Appeal
 On January 7, 2005, the CA dismissed the petition because the proper appeal
should be a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court
pursuant to Enemecio v. Office of the Ombudsman, reiterated in Perez v. Ombudsman
and Estrada v. Desierto.
 Baviera filed a MR, contending that petition before the CA is proper pursuant to
Fabian v. Desierto. This is because the Office of the Ombudsman is a quasi-judicial
agency, and under BP 129, the CA has concurrent jurisdiction with the SC over
petitions for certiorari under Rule 65 (following the heirarchy of courts).
 The CA denied the MR. The ruling in Fabian is only applicable in appeals from
resolutions of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. The
remedy of the aggrieved party from resolutions of the Ombudsman in criminal
cases is to file a petition for certiorari in this Court, and not in the CA. The
43
applicable rule is that enunciated in Enemecio v. Ombudsman,23 later reiterated in
Perez v. Office of the Ombudsman24 and Estrada v. Desierto.25
 Baviera went to the Supreme Court with a petititon for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 assailing the CA rulings.
ISSUE: Whether the proper appeal in criminal cases decided by the Office of the
Ombudsman was a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court – YES
HELD: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. The assailed Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.
RATIO:
 In Estrada v. Desierto, the Court reiterated its ruling in Kuizon v. Ombudsman. There,
the Court cited Fabian v. Desierto where it was stated that the CA’s jurisdiction
extends only to decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases. Thus:
o In appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative
disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Sec. 27 of R.A. 6770 that stated that an
appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a decision in an
administrative disciplinary action is unconstitutional.
o It cannot be taken into account where an original action for certiorari
under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as from
an incident in a criminal action. In fine, we hold that the present petition
should have been filed with this Court.
 Kuizon and Mendoza-Arce v. Ombudmsan reiterated the rule that the remedy of
aggrieved parties from resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman finding
probable cause in criminal cases or non-administrative cases, when tainted
with grave abuse of discretion, is to file an original action for certiorari with
the SC. Perez v. Ombudsman stated the rule that in cases when the aggrieved party
is questioning the Office of the Ombudsman’s finding of lack of probable cause,
the proper remedy is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 filed with the SC.
On whether there was grave abuse of discretion? NO!
 Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman’s exercise of power must have
been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner, which must be so patent and gross as
to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
 Baviera’s petition failed to establish probable cause for violations of R.A. No. 3019.
Indeed, in the absence of a clear case of abuse of discretion, this Court will not
interfere with the exercise of the Ombudsman’s discretion, who, based on his own
findings and deliberate consideration of the case, either dismisses a complaint or
proceeds with it.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
K.PROCEDURE BEFORE THE OMBUDSMAN
1. SESBRENO V. AGLUGUB, FEBRUARY 28, 2005, A.M. NO. MTJ 05-1581 – TANDOC
Doctrine: Administrative Order No. 8 entitled Clarifying and Modifying Certain Rules of
Procedure of the Ombudsman provides “that all prosecutors are now deputized
Ombudsman prosecutors.”
ER:
 Sesbreno filed a complaint against Judge Aglubub for gross negligence of the law.
 The admin complaint springs from the different charges 11 in a criminal case filed by
Sesbreno against officers of Traffic Managment Unit of San Pedro, Laguna.
 This case was raffled to Judge Aglubub’s branch.
 The Judge dismissed one of the charges, which is the violation of R.A 10, for lack of
probable cause.
 Sesbreno’s Urgent Manifestation of the RA 10 12 charge and prayer for arrest warrants
to issue were also dismissed/denied.
 Judge Aglubub ordered that the records of the case be sent to the Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office (PPO) for review (instead of the Ombudsman).
 Sesbreno argues that since the charge of violation of RA 10 is cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, the Office of the Ombudsman has the primary jurisdiction to review
the resolution of dismissal.
ISSUE: WON the judge was correct in sending the records for review to the PPO instead of
the Ombudsman?
 Yup. This issue is answered by Administrative Order No. 8 entitled Clarifying and
Modifying Certain Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, which provides “that all
prosecutors are now deputized Ombudsman prosecutors .”
 Moreover, “[R]esolutions in Ombudsman cases against public officers and employees
prepared by a deputized assistant prosecutor shall be submitted to the Provincial or
City Prosecutor concerned who shall, in turn, forward the same to the Deputy
Ombudsman of the area with his recommendation for the approval or disapproval
thereof.
o The Deputy Ombudsman shall take appropriate final action thereon,
including the approval of its filing in the proper regular court or the
dismissal of the complaint, if the crime charged is punishable by
prision correccional or lower, or fine of not more than P6,000.00 or
both.
o Resolutions involving offenses falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan shall be forwarded by the Deputy Ombudsman with
his recommendation thereon to the Office of the Ombudsman.”
FACTS:
11
Falsification, Grave Threats and Usurpation of Authority
12
Usurpation of Public Authority
44
- Peter L. Sesbrenñ o filed a Verified Complaint dated March 2, 2004 against respondent
judge, Hon. Gloria B. Aglugub, charging the latter with Gross Ignorance of the Law,
Neglect of Duty and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service relative to
Criminal Case No. 39806
-Sesbreno filed three (3) separate complaints against Enrique Marcelino (Marcelino),
Susan Nunñ ez (Nunñ ez), Edna Tabazon (Tabazon) and Fely Carunungan (Carunungan), all
from the Traffic Management Unit of San Pedro, Laguna, for Falsification, Grave Threats
and Usurpation of Authority
- The three (3) cases were assigned to respondent judge’s branch and subsequently
consolidated for disposition
-After conducting a preliminary examination, respondent judge issued a Consolidated
Resolutiondated May 6, 2003, dismissing the cases for Falsification and Grave Threats for
lack of probable cause, and setting for arraignment the case for Usurpation of Authority
-complainant Sesbreno filed a Private Complainants’ Urgent Manifestation dated
February 6, 2004 alleging that the accused were also charged with violation of Republic
Act No. 10 (R.A. 10) and praying that warrants of arrest be likewise issued against all of
the accused
- Acting upon this manifestation, respondent judge issued an Order dated February 12,
2004 stating that a charge for violation of R.A. 10 was indeed alleged in the complaint for
Usurpation of Authority but was not resolved due to oversight. However, since the statute
only applies to members of seditious organizations engaged in subversive activities
pursuant to People v. Lidres, and considering that the complaint failed to allege this
element, respondent judge found no probable cause and dismissed the charge for
violation of R.A. 10. Further, citing Sec. 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure (Rules), respondent judge denied complainant’s prayer for the issuance of
warrants of arrest against the accused and ordered the records forwarded to the
Provincial Prosecutor’s Office (PPO) for review.
During the hearing of the case on February 14, 2004, Tabazon, Carunungan and Nunñ ez
did not appear. Atty. Sesbrenñ o, however, did not move for the issuance of warrants of
arrest against them. Neither did he object to the cancellation of the scheduled hearing.
- Complainant Sesbreno contends that respondent judge violated Sec. 6(b), Rule 112 of
the Rules when she refused to issue warrants of arrest against the accused. Complainant
also faults respondent judge for allegedly motu proprio reconsidering her Consolidated
Resolution dated May 6, 2003 and failing to order its transmittal to the Office of the
Ombudsman within ten (10) days.
-In her Comment With Motion To Dismiss The Administrative Complaint dated March 26,
2004, respondent judge counters that the issuance of a warrant of arrest is discretionary
upon the judge.
Since she found no indication that the accused would abscond, she found it unnecessary
to issue the warrant. Moreover, under Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, the PPO has been designated as the Deputized Ombudsman
Prosecutor. The PPO can take action on similar cases for review and appropriate action.
Thus, she acted in accordance with law when she forwarded the records of the case to the
PPO for review and not to the Office of the Ombudsman as complainant insists.
ISSUES:
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
1. WON the judge was correct in elevating the records to the PPO instead of
Ombudsman for review. –yes
2. WON the judge erred in refusing to issue the warrant of arrest. –nope, discretionary
on the part of the judge
RATIO:
1. This brings us to the issue of whether respondent should have transmitted her Order
dated February 12, 2004 dismissing the charge of violation of R.A. 10 to the Office of the
Ombudsman instead of the PPO. Complainant asserts that since the charge of violation of
R.A. 10 is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, the Office of the Ombudsman has the primary
jurisdiction to review the resolution of dismissal.
This issue is answered by Administrative Order No. 8 entitled Clarifying and Modifying
Certain Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, which provides “that all prosecutors are
now deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.”
 Moreover, “[R]esolutions in Ombudsman cases against public officers and employees
prepared by a deputized assistant prosecutor shall be submitted to the Provincial or
City Prosecutor concerned who shall, in turn, forward the same to the Deputy
Ombudsman of the area with his recommendation for the approval or disapproval
thereof.
o The Deputy Ombudsman shall take appropriate final action thereon,
including the approval of its filing in the proper regular court or the
dismissal of the complaint, if the crime charged is punishable by prision
correccional or lower, or fine of not more than P6,000.00 or both.
o Resolutions involving offenses falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan shall be forwarded by the Deputy Ombudsman with his
recommendation thereon to the Office of the Ombudsman.”
Thus, respondent judge did not err and was, in fact, merely acting in accordance with law
when she forwarded the case for violation of R.A. 10 to the PPO. The fact that the PPO
remanded the case to the court for further proceedings instead of forwarding the same to
the Deputy Ombudsman as required by Administrative Order No. 8 is quite another
matter. In any event, respondent judge should have taken the necessary steps to remedy
the lapse in order to preclude delay in the disposition of the case
2.A careful consideration of the records as well as the pertinent rules reveals that there is
nothing in the Rules of Criminal Procedure which requires a judge to issue a warrant of
arrest for the non-appearance of the accused during the trial. Hence, its issuance rests on
the sound discretion of the presiding judge. More so in this case, the private prosecutor
did not move for the issuance of such warrant.
45
It is thus not obligatory but merely discretionary upon the investigating judge to issue a
warrant for the arrest of the accused even after having personally examined the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions for the determination
of whether probable cause exists. Whether it is necessary to place the accused in custody
in order not to frustrate the ends of justice is left to the judge’s sound judgment.
2. ENRIQUEZ V. CAMINADE, A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1966, MARCH 21, 2006 – TEVES
IMELDA ENRIQUEZ v. JUDGE ANACLETO CAMINADE (A.M. No. RTJ-05-1966)
TOPIC: Criminal Proceedings under the Ombudsman
DOCTRINE:
 Under the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, the accused has 15 days to move
for a reconsideration or a reinvestigation of an adverse resolution in a preliminary
investigation. But the Rules of Court (which is used by prosecutors) there is no
corresponding provision.
ER:
 Imelda Enriquez filed a case against Judge Anacleto Caminade for gross ignorance of
the law
 In a murder case against Que and Apura, Judge Anacleto denied the motion to issue a
warrant of arrest against the former (Que and Apura) because, according to Judge
Anacleto, there was no PI because Que and Apura were denied their opportunity
to file either MR or Petition for Review before the information was filed in the
Court.
 Because of this, the prosecutor was unable to file a criminal information against Que
and Apura.
 Anacleto cited the ruling in Sales v. Sandiganbayan, which held that:
o 1. The filing of the motion of reconsideration is an integral part of the
preliminary investigation.
o 2. Information filed without first affording xxx accused his right to file a
motion for reconsideration is tantamount to the a [sic] denial of the
right to a preliminary investigation.
 OCA reported that the issue was not actually an error of judgment, but
misappropriation of the rules of criminal procedure, thus Anacleto was guilty of
gross ignorance of the law.
ISSUE: WON filing of the MR is an integral part of the preliminary investigation? NO
 In truth, the application was not on point. A careful study of Sales reveals that Sales
applies specifically to preliminary investigations conducted before the
Ombudsman.
o That case was decided in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the
Ombudsman, granting the accused 15 days to move for a reconsideration
or a reinvestigation of an adverse resolution in a preliminary investigation.
 Obviously, the criminal case filed before Judge Anacleto’s court was NOT
covered by the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman but by the Rules of
Court, which had no corresponding provision.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
 Anacleto's was found to be guilty of gross ignorance of the law.
COMPLETE
FACTS
Imelda S. Enriquez, mother of a murder victim in a criminal case, filed a verified
complaint against Judge Anacleto Caminade (Anacleto) for gross misconduct, knowingly
rendering an unjust judgment, and gross ignorance of the law and procedure in the case
of "People of the Philippines v. Sherwin Que @Bungol, Anthony John Apura."
Anacleto denied the motion to issue a warrant of arrest against Que and Apura, his
reasoning being that there was no preliminary investigation against Que and Apura as
they were denied the opportunity to file a motion for reconsideration or petition for
review before the information was filed in court. Anacleto not only denied the warrant of
arrest, he also remanded the case back to the Prosecutor for the completion of
preliminary investigation.
Due to Anacleto's ruling, the prosecutor was unable to file a criminal information
before the expiration of the 15-day period which allowed the accused, by the Rules of
Court, to move for a reconsideration or petition for review of an adverse "resolution."
In his defense, Anacleto cited Sales v. Sandiganbayan, which ruled that:
1. The filing of the motion of reconsideration is an integral part of the preliminary
investigation.
2. Information filed without first affording xxx accused his right to file a motion for
reconsideration is tantamount to the a [sic] denial of the right to a preliminary
investigation.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) stated in its report the issue raised by
Enriquez is not an error of judgment, nor to one pertaining to the exercise of sound
judicial discretion by Anacleto. Rather, the issue is whether respondent complied
with procedural rules so elementary that to digress from them amounts to either
ignorance or negligence. Since the procedure for the institution of criminal
actions is basic and clearly expressed in the Rules of Court, Judge Anacleto's Order is
deemed to have been attended by gross ignorance of the law.
ISSUE: WON Anacleto was guilty of gross ignorance of law. (Y-E-S)
HELD: WHEREFORE, Judge Anacleto L. Caminade is found guilty of gross ignorance of the
law, for which he is FINED in the amount of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000). He is
STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more
severely in the future.
RATIO:
A perusal of the Order issued by Anacleto, showed that he remanded the criminal case to
the city prosecutor for the completion of the preliminary investigation based on this
Court’s ruling in Sales v. Sandiganbayan. He failed to read the case in its entirety, or he
grossly misapprehended the doctrine it had laid down.
A careful study of Sales reveals that it applies specifically to preliminary
investigations conducted before the Ombudsman. That case was decided in
accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman, granting the accused
46
15 days to move for a reconsideration or a reinvestigation of an adverse resolution
in a preliminary investigation. Obviously, the criminal case filed before
respondent’s court was not covered by the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman
but by the Rules of Court, which had no corresponding provision. Thus, Anacleto's
application of Sales was not in point.
As aptly pointed out by the OCA, the termination of a preliminary investigation upon the
filing of an information in court is a well-established procedural rule under the Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Anacleto clearly strayed from the well-trodden path when he
grossly misapplied the ruling of the Court in Sales. Since a preliminary investigation in
the criminal case was held, that stage of the legal process was already completed.
L.POWER OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE OVER PROSECUTORS
1. PUNZALAN V. DE LA PENA, JULY 21, 2004, G.R. NO. 158543 – TIU
ER:
 One evening, Dencio was in front of a store when the group of Rainer and Randall
Punzalan and 14 others came by. The group bullied Dencio, ganged up on him, and
eventually beat him up.
o Dencio was able to flee, but the group chased him.
 While running away, Dencio encountered Michael Plata’s driver, Cagara, who had a
gun with him.
o Dencio got the gun in order to scare the group that was chasing him. But
Michael tried to intervene and while trying to retrieve the gun from Dencio,
the firearm went off and hit Rainier on the thigh.
 Thereafter, Dencio, Cagara, and Michael ran away, while the group chased them and
threatened to kill them.
 In a later event, Rosalinda Punzalan, allegedly approached Cagara in the
Prosecutor’s Office and insulted his credibility and dignity for everyone to
hear.
 Several complaints were filed before the Prosecutor’s office, but 3 became the
highlight of this case:
o (1) Attempted homicide filed by Rainier against Michael,
o (2) Attempted murder filed by Dencio against the Punzalans and 14
others; and
o (3) Grave oral defamation filed by Cagara against Rosalinda Punzalan, the
mother.
 The Assistant City Prosecutor dismissed the (1) Attempted murder and (3) Grave
oral defamation complaints.
 Upon REVIEW by the Justice Secretary, the Resolution was reversed, with the
charges being downgraded to Attempted homicide and Slight oral defamation,
respectively.
 Naturally, the Punzalans filed an MR, which led to the Justice Secretary reversing
his former Resolution and the withdrawal of the Informations.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
 Dencio and Cagara filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which reversed the
Justice Secretary, forcing the Punzalans to file a Rule 45 certiorari with the SC.
ISSUE: Whether there was sufficient probable cause to sustain the foregoing
complaints? No.
 Under the Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice exercises the
power of direct control and supervision over the decisions or resolutions of
the prosecutors.
 In connection with this, the determination of probable cause during a
preliminary investigation or reinvestigation is recognized as an executive
function exclusively of the prosecutor.
 An investigating prosecutor is under no obligation to file a criminal action where he
is not convinced that he has the quantum of evidence at hand to support the
averments. Thus, the question of whether or not to dismiss a complaint is
within the purview of the functions of the prosecutor and, ultimately, that of
the Secretary of Justice.
In this case, the Justice Secretary ruled that Rosalinda’s statements did not make out a
case for oral defamation and the case filed by Dencio could be threshed out in the case
filed by Rainier against Michael, as Dencio was a part thereof.
COMPLETE
Facts: The Punzalan and the Plata families were neighbors in Hulo Bliss, Mandaluyong
City. At around 11PM of 13 Aug 1997, Dencio dela Penñ a (Dencio), a house boarder of the
Platas, was in front of a store near their house when a group composed of Rainier and
Randall Punzalan, along with 14 others arrived. Ricky Eugenio shouted at Dencio, “Hoy,
kalbo, saan mo binili and sumbrero mo? Dencio, “Kalbo nga ako, ay pinagtatawanan pa
ninyo ako.”
- Irked by the response, Jose Gregorio slapped Dencio while Rainier punched
him in the mouth. The group then ganged up on Dencio. Eventually, somebody
shouted, “Yariin na ‘yan! Thereafter, Alex Ofrin kicked Dencio and tried to stab
him with a balisong but missed. Dencio fled, but the group chased him.
- While Dencio was fleeing, he met Cagara, the Platas’ family driver, who was carrying a
gun. Dencio grabbed the gun and pointed it to the group chasing him to scare them.
Michael Plata, who was nearby, intervened and tried to wrestle the gun away from
Dencio.
- [NOTE] The gun accidentally went off and hit Rainier on the thigh. Shocked, Dencio,
Cagara, and Michael ran towards the latter’s house and locked themselves in. The group
ran after them and when they got to the Platas’ house, shouted, “Lumabas kayo d’yan,
putang ina ninyo! Papatayin namin kayo!” Dencio, Cagara, and Michael left the house
through the back door and proceeded to the police station to seek assistance.
- As a result of the incident, the following criminal charges were filed:
47
 By Rainier: Attempted homicide against Michael
 By Rainer: Illegal possession of firearm against Cagara
 By Michael, Cagara, and Dencio: Grave oral defamation, Grave threats, Robbery,
Malicious mischief, and slight physical injuries against the Punzalans
 By Dencio: Attempted murder against Rainier, Randall, and 14 others
 By Dencio: Grave threats against Alex Ofrin
 By Cagara: Grave oral defamation against Rosalinda Punzalan
- In their counter-affidavit, the Punzalans argued that the charges against them were
fabricated in order to dissuade them from testifying in the Attempted Homicide and
Illegal Possession of Firearm cases instituted by Rainier against Michael and Cagara,
respectively.
- Later, Cagara also filed a complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against Rosalinda
Punzalan, mother of Rainier, alleging that Rosalinda approached him in the Office of the
City Prosecutor and within hearing distance of other people, told him, “Hoy Robert,
magkanong ibinigay ng mga Plata sa iyo sa pagtestigo? Dodoblehin ko at ipapasok pa kita
ng trabaho. The alleged statements were denied by Rosalinda.
- [NOTE] The Mandaluyong City Assistant City Prosecutor dismissed the following
complaints:
 By Dencio: Attempted murder against Rainier, Randall, and 14 others – because
Dencio’s claim that he accidentally shot Rainier forms part of the defense in the
Attempted homicide case against Michael
 By Cagara: Grave oral defamation against Rosalinda because Cagara failed to
show that the alleged defamatory statements would cast dishonor, discredit or
contempt upon him.
- Dencio and Cagara separately appealed to the DOJ. Justice Secretary Artemio
Tuquero issued a Resolution modifying Joint Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor
by ordering, among others – [NOTE] (1) that the charge of Grave Oral Defamation against
Rosalinda be downgraded to Slight Oral Defamation; (2) that the charge of Attempted
Murder against Rainier, Randall, and 14 others be downgraded to Attempted Homicide;
and (3) that the charge of Grave Threats against Alex Ofrin be downgraded to Other Light
Threats. The Assistant City Prosecutor was directed to file the corresponding
Informations.
- Rosalinda, Rainier, and Randall, together with their co-respondents, filed separate
MRs. The Justice Secretary set aside his earlier Resolution and directed the withdrawal
of the Informations against the movants.
 The Oral Defamation case should be dismissed, as the alleged defamatory
statements were uttered without malice since Rosalinda was then in a state of
shock and anger.
 The Attempted Homicide case filed by Dencio should also be dismissed, as the
allegations in support thereof should first be threshed out in the trial of the
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
Attempted Homicide case filed by Rainier against Michael. Also, Dencio failed to
prove that Rainier, Randall, and his companions intended to kill him.
- Dencio and Cagara filed an MR of the foregoing Resolution, but the same was denied.
- Thus, Dencio and Cagara filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, praying for the
reinstatement of the first Justice Secretary Resolution. The CA reinstated the Slight oral
defamation case, as well as the Attempted homicide case, but affirmed the withdrawal of
the Other light threats against Alex Ofrin.
- The Punzalans filed an MR before the CA, but the same was denied. Thus, they filed a
Rule 45 certiorari before the SC.
Issue: Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to sustain a finding of probable cause
against Rosalinda for Slight Oral Defamation and against Randall and Rainier for
Attempted Homicide? No. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Justice Secretary, directing the
withdrawal of the informations for slight oral defamation and attempted homicide is
REINSTATED.
Held: We now resolve whether the Justice Secretary committed GADALEJ in his
Resolutions.
- Under the Revised Administrative Code, the Secretary of Justice exercises the power
of direct control and supervision over the decisions or resolutions of the prosecutors.
- “Supervision and control” includes the authority to act directly whenever a
specific function is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; to direct the
performance of duty; and to approve, revise or modify acts and decision of
subordinate officials or units.
- People v. Peralta: The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range
of discretion – the discretion of whether, what and whom to charge, the exercise of
which depends on a variety of factors which are best appreciated by prosecutors.
- Hegerty v. Court of Appeals: A public prosecutor, by the nature of his office, is
under no compulsion to file a criminal information where no clear legal justification
has been shown, and no sufficient evidence of guilt nor prima facie case has been
presented by the petitioner. The determination of probable cause during a
preliminary investigation or reinvestigation is recognized as an executive
function exclusively of the prosecutor. An investigating prosecutor is under no
obligation to file a criminal action where he is not convinced that he has the
quantum of evidence at hand to support the averments. Prosecuting officers
have equally the duty not to prosecute when after investigation or reinvestigation
they are convinced that the evidence adduced was not sufficient to establish a
prima facie case. Thus, the determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests
primarily with the prosecutor who is vested with discretion in the discharge of this
function.
- [IMPORTANT] Thus, the question of whether or not to dismiss a complaint is
within the purview of the functions of the prosecutor and, ultimately, that of
the Secretary of Justice.
48
- Samson, et al. v. Guingona: The Court will not interfere in the conduct of
preliminary investigations or reinvestigations and leave to the investigating
prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the exercise of determination of what
constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause for the filing of
information against an offender. Moreover, his findings are not subject to review
unless shown to have been made with grave abuse.
- In this case, the reasons of the Justice Secretary in directing the withdrawal of the
informations for slight oral defamation and for attempted homicide is determinative of
whether or not he committed grave abuse of discretion.
- First, in the charge of slight oral defamation, the records show that the defamatory
remarks were uttered within the Office of the City Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City.
While the CA stated that the assessment of the credibility of witnesses is best left to
the trial court in view of its opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of
the witnesses on the stand; it is the City Prosecutor, the proper officer at the time of
the occurrence of the incident, who is the best person to observe the demeanor and
conduct of the parties and their witnesses and determine probable cause whether
the alleged defamatory utterances were made within the hearing distance of third
parties. The investigating prosecutor found that no sufficient evidence existed. The
Justice Secretary affirmed the decision of the City Prosecutor.
- Second, in charge of attempted homicide, the Justice Secretary resolved to dismiss
the complaint because it was in the nature of a countercharge. The DOJ had already
directed that Dencio be likewise investigated for the charge of attempted homicide
in connection with the shooting incident that occurred, making him a party to the
case filed by Rainier against Michael. This resulted in the Resolution of the Justice
Secretary that the complaint of Dencio should be threshed out in the proceedings
relevant to the shooting incident that resulted in the serious injury of Rainier.
- In the case at bar, therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not commit grave abuse of
discretion contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals.
2. DINO ET AL. V. OLIVAREZ, G.R. NO. 170447, DECEMBER 04, 2009 – VELASQUEZ
Dinñ o et al. v. Olivarez, G.R. No. 170447, December 04, 2009
*Yung 2nd issue pertinent. I included the 1 st issue because they also talk about the actions
of the prosecutor and Im not sure Sir will ask about it or not but I wont include it in the
emergency.
Emergency Recit:
 Dino filed a complaint for vote buying against Olivarez. Assistant City Prosecutor
Pablo found probable cause as stated in a Joint Resolution.
 Olivares filed before the Law Department of COMELEC an appeal of the Resolution
and a MOTION TO REVOKE THE AUTHORITY OF THE PROSECUTOR.
 The Law Dept agreed with him and sent a letter to the city prosecutor ordering
it to send the records to it and suspend the implementation of the resolution.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
 Olivares filed a motion to quash (information contained more than one offense)
which was opposed by the prosecutor and the prosecutor filed an amended
complaint. Motion to quash was denied.
 Olivares likewise opposed the admission of the amended information, saying
that it the prosecutor was no longer empowered to amend the informations,
since the COMELEC had already directed it to transmit the entire records of the
case and suspend the hearing of the cases before the RTC until the resolution
of the appeal before the COMELEC en banc.
Issue: Whether the city prosecutor still had authority to file the amended
information. NO
 Being mere deputies or agents of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
provincial or city prosecutors deputized by it are expected to act in accord with and
not contrary to or in derogation of its resolutions, directives or orders in relation to
election cases that such prosecutors are deputized to investigate and prosecute—
they must proceed within the lawful scope of their delegated authority.
 When the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Law Department, acting with
authority of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc, directs the City
Prosecutor of Paranñ aque to transmit the entire records of the case to the Law
Department, Commission on Elections, by the fastest means available and to
suspend further implementation of the questioned resolution until final resolution
of said appeal by the COMELEC En Banc, it has the effect of suspending the authority
of the City Prosecutor to prosecute the case.
 In filing the Amended Informations despite the order to hold the proceedings in
abeyance until final resolution of said appeal, the City Prosecutor clearly exceeded
the legal limit of its delegated authority—any action made by the City Prosecutor in
relation to the two criminal cases subsequent to the issuance of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) order, like the filing of the amended informations and the
amended informations themselves, is void and of no effect.
 Informations filed in court sans lawful authority are nothing but mere scraps of
paper which have no value.
 The trial court’s knowledge that the filing of the amended informations was done by
the public prosecutor in excess of his delegated authority no longer gives it the
discretion as to whether or not to accept the amended informations—the only
option it had was not to admit the amended informations as a sign of respect to the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) which already had taken cognizance of the
accused’s appeal.
COMPLETE
Facts:
 Dinñ o and Comparativo filed a complaint for vote buying against the respondent
Pablo Oivares. Assistant City Prosecutor Pablo Medina (Pablo) found probable cause.
Two informations were filed in the RTC of Paranñ aque against Pablo Olivares charging
him with violation of Sec 261, paragrapsh a,b and k of Article 22 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
 Olivares filed before the Law Department of the COMELEC an appeal of the Joint
Resolution of the Porsec with Motion to Revoke Continuing Authority. They argued
49
that the pendency of the appeal of the Joint Resolution should prevent the filing of
the Informations until the COMELEC had resolved the appeal.
 The Law Department sent a letter to the city prosecutor ordering the latter to transit
the records and suspend the implementation of the Joint Resolution until the
resolution of the appeal before the COMELEC. (Medyo naignore siya)
 Olivares filed a Motion to Quash (more than one offense charged in information).
Pablo filed an Opposition and Motion to Admit amended Informations. (Articl 261
par a in relation to b na lang).
 Olivares filed and opposition raising the fact that the city prosec was no longer
empowered to amend the information since COMELEC already ordered it to transmit
the records and suspend the hearings of the cases in the RTC.
 Judge denied Motion to Quash. Olivares failed to appear before RTC for arrignemnt.
Warrant issued.
 Law Department of Comelec filed a Manifestation and Motion revoking the delegated
authority to the city prosec. COMELEC Resolution also directed the Law Dept to
handle the prosection of the case and to hold abeyance proceedings until the appeal
has been acted upon by the Commission. (Walang sinabo anong ginawa ng court.
Certiorari lang agad si Olivares).
 Olivares filed Certiorari before the CA. CA agreed with Olivares (wala nang powers si
prosec to continue with the case. Lack of power= lack of legal basis for the judge to
admit amended infos and order to arrest).
Issue:
1) Whether the city prosecutor still had authority to file the amended information.
2) Whether it was proper for the judge to issue the warrant. IMPORTANT
Held: Petition Granted. (Dinñ o won).
Ratio:
FIRST ISSUE:
 COMELEC is empowered to investigate and prosecute election offenses and that
Chief State Prosecutor, the provincial prosecutors and city prosecutors, acting on its
behalf, must proceed within the lawful scope of their delegated authority.
 Furthermore, Section 10 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that the
COMELEC is empowered to revise, modify and reverse the resolution of the Chief
State Prosecutor and/or provincial/city prosecutors. (By appeal within 10 days from
receipt of their resolution
 Be that as it may, this Court finds that the public prosecutors, in filing the Amended
Informations, did not exceed the authority delegated by the COMELEC.
o The Resolution of the COMELEC revoking the deputation was issued on
April 4, 2005.
o The Amended informartion was filed on October 28, 2004.
o Although a letter was earlier sent by the Law Department, it did not revoke
the continuing authority granted to the city prosec.
o Letter:“In this connection, you are hereby directed to transmit the entire
records of the case to the Law Department, Commission on Elections,
Intramuros, Manila by the fastest means available. You are further directed
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
to suspend further implementation of the questioned resolution until final
resolution of said appeal by the Comelec En Banc.
 The filing of the Amendment was not made in defiance of the instructions of
COMELEC.
o If it hadn’t filed the amended informations, the case would have been
dismissed.
o The instructions of the COMELEC were clearly intended to allow sufficient
time to reconsider the merit of the Joint Resolution and not to have the
prosec abandon the case.
o If the case were dismissed, the appeal before the COMELEC would also be
dismissed and the COMELEC would only be foreced to re-file the case
(waste of tume and money, dely in administration of justice).
o The actions of the prosec were not intended to disobey the COMELEC.
SECOND ISSUE:
 The judge properly ordered the arrest because there was failure on the part of the
accused to appear for arraignment.
o The filing of an information initiates criminal action. When the accused is
arrested the court acquires jurisdiction over the person.
o Arraignment would then follow. Rule 116, Sec 11: Arraignment may be
suspended upon motion of the proper party: a petition for review of the
resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the DOJ, or the Office of
the Pres. Provided the suspension shall not exceed 60 days.
o So, the suspension is not indefinite in case of an appeal before the DOJ.
o In this case, the appeal was filed on October 7, 2004. The arraignment was
re-scheduled to February 1, 2005 due to motion to quash. Respondednt
failed to appear. Reset arraignment to March 9, 2005.
It was only on March 9, 5 MONTHS AFTER APPEAL WAS FILED when the Judge held
arraignment and ussed the Bench Warrant of Arrest.
PA RT I I
A.COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION (RULE 110)
A.SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION
1. PEOPLE V. DIMAANO, 469 SCRA 647 – AQUINO
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDGARDO DIMAANO
50
Emergency Recit: Maricar charged her father with two counts of rape and one count of
attempted rape. In the complaint for attempted rape, it was stated that “the accused
tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rape Maricar”. He pleaded not guilty. However, both the trial
court and Court of Appeals found him guilty of all charges. Edgardo appealed to the SC
saying that Maricar was only pressured by her mother to file the action. Also, he said that
the trial court should have considered the Complaint Agreement between him and the
complainant. For CrimPro purposes, the issue is the sufficiency of the complaint for
attempted rape. The SC found Edgardo guilty of rape but acquitted him for the crime of
attempted rape. The complaint [reproduced below] failed to allege specific acts
constituting the elements of of rape. Neither does it constitute sufficient allegation of
elements for crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of Lasciviousness. The acts or omissions
complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged.
Facts:
 Maricar was 10 years old when she was first sexually abused in the morning of
September 1993. A few days later, Edgardo again ravished her. On December 29,
1995, the same thing happened. The last sexual assault happened in the
afternoon of January 1, 1996.
 Maricar Dimaano charged her father, Edgardo with two (2) counts of rape and
one (1) count of attempted rape. [AA: For CrimPro, we only need to take a look
at the contents of the 3rd complaint (on attempted rape).]
 That on or about the 1 st day of January 1996, in the Municipality of Paranaque,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, try and attempt to rape one Maricar Dimaano y
Victoria, thus commencing the commission of the crime of Rape, directly by
overt acts, but nevertheless did not perform all the acts of execution which
would produce it, as a consequence by reason of cause other than his
spontaneous desistance that is due to the timely arrival of the complainant's
mother.
 Edgardo pleaded not guilty to the charges. He contended though that he could
not have raped complainant because he was always in the office from 7:00 a.m.
until 9:00 p.m. waiting to be dispatched to another assignment overseas.
 The trial court found the testimony of Maricar to be spontaneous and credible.
It found the delay in reporting the rape understandable due to the fear
complainant had of her father who had moral ascendancy over her. Also, the
quarrel between complainant's parents was not sufficient motive for the wife to
lodge a serious charge of rape against appellant. It disregarded the Compromise
Agreement and the Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Sumbong since complainant was
not assisted by a lawyer when she signed the same.
 The Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the decision of the trial court
 Edgardo contends that if complainant's accusations were true, then she could
have reported them to the authorities when she accompanied him to Paranaque
Police Station and the Barangay Hall of San Antonio or to their relatives when
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
she had the opportunity to do so. He also argues that had the trial court
considered the Compromise Agreement and Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-
uurong ng Sumbong, it would have known that complainant was only pressured
by her mother into filing the complaint.
Issue: (For CrimPro) Whether the complaint for attempted rape was sufficient.
Other issue: Whether the court should have considered the Compromise Agreement.
Held: GUILTY of the crime of rape. ACQUITTED for attempted rape.
Ratio:
 This credibility given by the trial court to the rape victim is an important aspect
of evidence which appellate courts can rely on because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses, particularly their demeanor, conduct and
attitude during direct and cross-examination by counsel
 It is likewise well established that the testimony of a rape victim is generally
given full weight and credit, more so if she is a minor.
 Contrary to Edgardo’s assertion, Maricar's credibility was not diminished by her
failure to report the sexual abuses to the authorities and her relatives despite
opportunities to do so. Delay in reporting the rape incidents, especially in the
face of threats of physical violence, cannot be taken against the victim, more so
when the lecherous attacker is her own father.
 Edgardo's reliance on complainant's affidavit of desistance deserves scant
consideration. A survey of our jurisprudence reveals that the court attaches no
persuasive value to a desistance, especially when executed as an afterthought.
 Maricar repudiated the affidavit of desistance in open court by stating that no
lawyer assisted her when she affixed her signature and had shown her resolve
to continue with the prosecution of the cases.
 Hence, under the above circumstances, we affirm the trial court's conviction in
Criminal Case Nos. 96-125 and 96-150 for the crimes of rape committed in
September 1993 and on December 29, 1995. However, we acquit appellant in
Criminal Case No. 96-151 for the crime of attempted rape for failure to allege in
the complaint the specific acts constitutive of attempted rape.
 For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense,
and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is
not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged
or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the
crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or
omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to
enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper
judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately
and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. Every element of the
offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are
51
necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the
definitions and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging
the elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the nature
of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably prepare his
defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent knowledge of
the facts that constitute the offense.
Notably, the above-cited complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned does not
allege specific acts or omission constituting the elements of the crime of rape. Neither
does it constitute sufficient allegation of elements for crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of
Lasciviousness.
2. SASOT V. PEOPLE, 462 SCRA 138 – ARCEO
MELBAROSE and ALLANDALE SASOT v. PEOPLE
EMERGENCY DIGEST
NBA PROPERTIES, a US corp., filed a complaint before the NBI against the
SASOTs for violation of Art. 189 of the RPC on unfair competition. NBI discovered that the
SASOTs are manufacturing and distributing counterfeit “NBA” garment products. In a SPA,
Rick Welts, Pres. of NBA, constituted the law firm of Ortega as attorney-in-fact in filing
the case. It was notarized, certified, and authenticated in New York. Welts executed a
Complaint-Affidavit before a Notary Public of New York. Prosec. Gutierrez recommended
the filing of Information. The SASOTs filed a Motion to Quash in the RTC on the grounds:
(1) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and (2) Lack of jurisdiction over
the offense charged or the person of the accused.
ISSUE: WON the complaint is sufficient. (YES) RATIO: Sec. 3, Rule 117 of the
1985 Rules enumerates the grounds for quashing an information, but there is no mention
of the defect in the complaint filed before the fiscal as ground for a motion to quash.
Doctrine: Under Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules, a complaint is substantially sufficient if
it states the known address of the respondent, it is accompanied by complainant’s affidavit
and his witnesses and supporting documents, and the affidavits are sworn to before any
fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or in their
absence or unavailability, a notary public who must certify that he personally examined the
affiants and that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits. All these have been duly satisfied in this case. The absence of an oath in the
complaint does not necessarily render it invalid, as it is a mere defect of form. Welts’s
Complaint-Affidavit contains an acknowledgement by a Notary Public Brown of New York
that the same has been subscribed and sworn to before her, duly authenticated by the
Phil. Consulate. While the copy on record of the complaint-affidavit appears to be merely
a photocopy, Prosec. Gutierrez stated that complainant’s representative will present the
authenticated notarized original in court, and Prosec. Guray manifested that the original
copy is already on hand. Records show that there are other documents from which the
prosecutor based his recommendation. If the information is valid on its face, and there is
no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of
public prosecutor, as in the present case, the trial court should respect such
determination.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
COMPLETE DIGEST
FACTS:
 The NBI conducted an investigation pursuant to a complaint by NBA PROPERTIES
against the SASOTs for violation of Art. 189 of the RPC on unfair competition. In its
Report, the NBI stated:
o that NBA PROPERTIES is a U.S. corporation and is the registered owner of NBA
trademarks and names of basketball teams such as BULLS, SUNS, CAVS, etc,
which are used on hosiery, footwear, shirts, sweatshirts, and other garments,
which are allegedly registered with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer.
o that the SASOTs are engaged in the manufacture, printing, sale, and distribution
of counterfeit “NBA” garment products.
 Hence, it recommended SASOTs’ prosecution for unfair competition under
Art. 189 of the RPC.
 In a SPA, Rick Welts, as President of NBA PROPERTIES,
o constituted the law firm of Ortega, Del Castillo, Bacorro, Odulio, Calma &
Carbonell, as the company’s attorney-in-fact in the filing of criminal, civil and
administrative complaints, among others.
 The SPA was notarized by Nicole Brown of New York and certified by
Goodman, Clerk of the Supreme Court of of New York.
 Consul Rebong of the Consulate General of the Philippines, New York,
authenticated the certification.
o Welts also executed a Complaint-Affidavit before Notary Public Nicole J. Brown
of the State of New York.
 Prosec. Gutierrez recommended the filing of an Information against the SASOTs for
violation of Art. 189 of the RPC. It reads:
o That on or about May 9, ‘97 and on dates prior thereto, in the City of Manila, and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, ALLANDALE SASOT and MELBAROSE SASOT
of Allandale Sportslines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
manufacture and sell various garment products bearing the appearance of “NBA”
names, symbols and trademarks, inducing the public to believe that the goods
offered by them are those of “NBA” to the damage and prejudice of the NBA
Properties, Inc., the trademark owner of the “NBA”.
 Before arraignment, the SASOTs filed a Motion to Quash on the grounds:
o That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
o This honorable court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged or the person
of the accused.
 SASOTs argue that: (1) the complaint must be sworn to before the prosecutor and
the copy appears to be only a fax transmittal; (2) complainant is a foreign
corporation not doing business in the Philippines, and cannot be protected by
Philippine patent laws since it is not a registered patentee; and (3) they have been
using the business name “ALLANDALE SPORTSLINE” since 1972, and their designs
are original.
52
 Prosec. Guray commented that he has the original of the complaint, that complainant
has an attorney-in-fact to represent it, and that the State is entitled to prosecute the
offense even without the private offended party.
 RTC denied SASOTs’ motion to quash. CA dismissed SASOTs’ Rule 65 certiorari and
MR. SASOTs went to SC via Rule 65.
ISSUES:
1. WON it is proper to quash the information on the grounds of (a) defect in the
complaint filed before the fiscal; or (b) lack of capacity to sue. (NO)
2. WON the complaint in this case is sufficient. (YES)
3. WON the capacity to sue of NBA Properties is relevant. (NO)
HELD: Petition DENIED. Records REMANDED to the RTC of Manila.
RATIO:
1. Sec. 3, Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of CrimPro, which was then in force at the
time the alleged criminal acts were committed, enumerates the grounds for quashing an
information.13 Nowhere in the foregoing provision is there any mention of the defect in
the complaint filed before the fiscal and the complainant’s capacity to sue as grounds for
a motion to quash.
2. Under Sec. 3, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of CrimPro, a complaint is
substantially sufficient if:
 it states the known address of the respondent,
 it is accompanied by complainant’s affidavit and his witnesses and supporting
documents, and
 the affidavits are sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government
official authorized to administer oath, or in their absence or unavailability, a
notary public who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and
that he is satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their
affidavits.
All these have been duly satisfied in the complaint filed before Prosec. Atty. Gutierrez.
Even the absence of an oath in the complaint does not necessarily render it invalid. Want
of oath is a mere defect of form, which does not affect the substantial rights of the
defendant on the merits.
In this case, Welts’s Complaint-Affidavit contains an acknowledgement by
Notary Public Brown of New York that the same has been subscribed and sworn to before
her on Feb. 12, ‘98, duly authenticated by the Phil. Consulate. While the copy on record of
the complaint-affidavit appears to be merely a photocopy thereof, Prosec. Gutierrez
13
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense; (b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged or the person of the accused; (c) That the officer who filed the information had no
authority to do so; (d) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form; (e) That more than one
offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;
(f) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished; (g) That it contains averments which, if true, would
constitute a legal excuse or justification; and (h) That the accused has been previously convicted or in jeopardy of
being convicted, or acquitted of the offense charged.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
stated that complainant’s representative will present the authenticated notarized
original in court, and Prosec. Guray manifested that the original copy is already on hand.
The prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the performance of his
duties and functions, which in turn gives his report the presumption of accuracy.
Moreover, records show that there are other supporting documents from which
the prosecutor based his recommendation, to wit:
(1) NBI Report containing an account of the investigation and the subsequent search
and seizure of several items from SASOTs.
(2) The letter from the law firm of Ortega to the NBI, seeking assistance in stopping
the illegal manufacture and sale of “fake products bearing the ‘NBA’ trademark, and
in prosecuting the proprietors of said factory;” and
(3) The Joint Affidavit of Malicse and Bal-ot of the Pinkerton Consulting Services,
which was certified to by Prosec. Gutierrez, attesting to their findings that SASOTs
were found to be manufacturing, printing, selling, and distributing counterfeit “NBA”
garment products.
Consequently, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of
manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of public prosecutor,
as in the present case, the trial court should respect such determination.
3. More importantly, the crime of Unfair Competition punishable under Art. 189 of
the RPC is a public crime. It is essentially an act against the State and it is the latter
which principally stands as the injured party. The complainant’s capacity to sue in such
case becomes immaterial.
In La Chemise Lacoste v. Fernandez, the Court ruled that: What preceded this
petition for certiorari was a letter-complaint filed before the NBI charging Hemandas
with a criminal offense, i.e., violation of Art. 189 of the RPC. If prosecution follows after
the completion of the preliminary investigation being conducted by the Special
Prosecutor the information shall be in the name of the People and no longer the
petitioner which is only an aggrieved party since a criminal offense is essentially an act
against the State. It is the latter which is principally the injured party although there is a
private right violated. Petitioner's capacity to sue would become, therefore, of not much
significance in the main case. We cannot allow a possible violator of our criminal statutes
to escape prosecution upon a far-fetched contention that the aggrieved party or victim of
a crime has no standing to sue. ... In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the
present suit before our courts for unfair competition or infringement of trademarks of a
foreign corporation, we are moreover recognizing our duties and the rights of foreign
states under the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property to which the
Philippines and France are parties. We are simply interpreting and enforcing a solemn
international commitment of the Philippines embodied in a multilateral treaty.
3. LASOY V. ZENAROSA, 455 SCRA 360 – BASCARA
Doctrine: If the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may
immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide the matter according to law,
53
the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the
language of the statute in the information. The information will be sufficient if it
describes the crime defined by law.
Quick Facts:
Marcelo and Felix were charged in an information for illegal sale of 42.410 grams of
dried marijuana. Upon arraignment, they pleaded guilty and were convicted by the RTC
Quezon on July 16, 1996 sentenced to a jail term of 6 months to 1 day. It turned out that
the Information reflected a much lesser quantity—42.410 GRAMS instead of
42.410 Kilos. The People of the Philippines filed two separate motions.
1. Motion to admit amended information
2. Motion to set aside arraigment and decision of the Trial Court
The Trial Court first denied the Motion to Amend the information but later on granted
the Motion to Set Aside the Arraigment and the Trial Court’s decision. The Information
was amended to reflect the correct amount of marijuana and was assigned to another
branch of RTC Quezon City. Both accused filed a Motion to Quash which was denied by
the Trial Court. MR denied as well.
Issue: After an information has been filed and the accused had been arraigned, pleaded
guilty and were convicted and after they had applied for probation, may the information
be amended and the accused arraigned anew on the ground that the information was
allegedly altered/tampered with?—NO
Ratio: An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of
the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. In other words, if the offense is
stated in such a way that a person of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is
meant, and the court can decide the matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is
that the information is valid. It is not necessary to follow the language of the statute in
the information. The information will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined by
law. The inescapable conclusion is that the first information is valid inasmuch as it
sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the purpose of
the law, that is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge against them, is
reasonably complied with. The belated move on the part of the prosecution to have the
information amended defies procedural rules, the decision having attained finality after
the accused applied for probation and the fact that amendment is no longer allowed at
that stage.
Facts:
 Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa were charged in an information for illegal sale
of 42.410 grams of dried marijuana.
 Upon arraignment, they pleaded guilty and were convicted by the RTC Quezon
on July 16, 1996 sentenced to a jail term of 6 months to 1 day
 Marcelo and Felix applied for probation.
 Thereafter, the People of the Philippines filed two separate motions. First, to
admit an amended information and second, to set aside the arraigment of the
accused as well as the decision of the trial court dated July 16, 1996. In
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
plaintiff’s motion to admit amended information, it alleged that the information
was wrong stating that instead of 42.410 grams, it should have been 42.410
kilos.
 The Trial Court first denied the Motion to Amend the information.
 However, another Order of the same date was issued by the trial court granting
the Motion to Set Aside the Arraigment and the decision dated July 16, 1996.
 The Information was amended to reflect the correct amount of marijuana and
was assigned to another branch of RTC Quezon City.
 Both accused filed a Motion to Quash which was denied by the Trial Court. MR
denied as well.
 The accused insisted on the validity of the first information, whereas
respondents Republic of the Philippines asserted that the accused were
arraigned under an invalid information. Alleging that there being an alteration
on the first information, hence it failed to reflect the true quantity of drugs
caught in possession of the accused, the prosecution insisted that the first
information under which accused were arraigned is invalid.
Issue: After an information has been filed and the accused had been arraigned, pleaded
guilty and were convicted and after they had applied for probation, may the information
be amended and the accused arraigned anew on the ground that the information was
allegedly altered/tampered with?—NO
Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Orders
dated 14 February 1997 and 16 April 1997 issued by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 76, are set aside. Criminal Case No. Q-96-67572 is ordered Dismissed.
Accused Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa are forthwith ordered released from
detention unless there may be valid reasons for their further detention.
Ratio:
 FIRST, it cannot be denied that the request for appropriate inquest proceedings
stated that the accused were apprehended for illegal sale of forty-five kilos of
marijuana. Also, in the joint affidavit of the poseur-buyer, and arresting officer
stated that the accused were caught with approximately 45 kilos of dried
marijuana. For some unknown reasons, however, the Information filed against
the accused reflected a much lesser quantity, i.e., 42.410 grams.
 The question is whether this is sufficient to consider the first Information under
which the accused were arraigned invalid.
o Section 4. Information defined. – An information is an accusation in
writing charging a person with an offense subscribed by the fiscal and
filed with the court.
 An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of
the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof.
 In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of ordinary
intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide the
matter according to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is
valid. It is not necessary to follow the language of the statute in the
54
information. The information will be sufficient if it describes the crime defined
by law.
 The inescapable conclusion is that the first information is valid inasmuch as it
sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was committed. Verily the
purpose of the law, that is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge
against them, is reasonably complied with.
 Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information
is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by
the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.
Bonus : Double Jeopardy
 SECOND, and with respect specifically to the trial court’s point of view that the
accused cannot claim their right against double jeopardy because they
“participated/acquiesced to the tampering,” we hold that while this may not be
far-fetched, there is actually no hard evidence thereof. Worse, we cannot
overlook the fact that accused were arraigned, entered a plea of guilty and
convicted under the first information. Granting that alteration/tampering took
place and the accused had a hand in it, this does not justify the setting aside of
the decision dated 16 July 1996. The alleged tampering/alteration allegedly
participated in by the accused may well be the subject of another inquiry.
 The belated move on the part of the prosecution to have the information
amended defies procedural rules, the decision having attained finality after the
accused applied for probation and the fact that amendment is no longer allowed
at that stage.
 In Sanvicente v. People, this Court held that given the far-reaching scope of an
accused’s right against double jeopardy, even an appeal based on an alleged
misappreciation of evidence will not lie.
o The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the
trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, such as where the prosecution was denied the
opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a sham.
 There is, therefore, no question that the amendment of an information by
motion of the prosecution and at the time when the accused had already been
convicted is contrary to procedural rules and violative of the rights of the
accused.
4. PEOPLE V. BATIN, G.R. NO. 177223, NOVEMBER 28, 2007 – CHAN
People v. Batin
DOCTRINE: - Evidentiary facts need not be alleged in the information because these
are matters of defense. Informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons
therefor could be proved during the trial.
ER
An Information was filed against Castor and Neil Batin. The Information stated that they
“with treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, and with evident premeditation,
attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the person of one EUGENIO REFUGIO
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
xxx.” The RTC convicted them of murder, qualified by treachery. CA affirmed, with
modifications.
ISSUE - Whether the honorable court of appeals and the trial court gravely erred in
appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery. NO!!!
RATIO
- According to Castor, the allegation therein that the accused “with treachery x x
x, attack, assault and employ personal violence” is a mere conclusion of law.
Hence, it did not satisfy the test of sufficiency of Information as provided in
Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court.
- SC does not agree. It cited cases wherein the Information contained mere
allegations of treachery. In these cases, the SC stated that these Informations
were sufficient so the accused were convicted with the crimes and the
qualifying circumstance of treachery was also included.
- Evidentiary facts need not be alleged in the information because these are
matters of defense. Informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons
therefor could be proved during the trial.
FACTS (the only real important part here is the allegation of treachery in the information
AND the conviction by the RTC and the CA of the Batins with Murder qualified by treachery.
The facts have been included just in case you want to know what happened)
- An Information against Castor and Neil Batin was filed by the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City. It alleged:
o “That on or about the 21st day of October, 1994, in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring together,
confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, with
treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, and with evident
premeditation, attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the
person of one EUGENIO REFUGIO y ZOSA, by then and there shooting
him with a handgun, hitting him on the right side of his stomach,
thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which were
the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of said Eugenio Refugio y Zosa, in such
amount as may be awarded under the provisions of the Civil Code.”
(Important!)
- Castor and Neil Batin entered pleas of not guilty
- The prosecution’s version of the facts: (NOT IMPORTANT)
o Before the shooting, Josephine, Eugenio’s wife, was at home and when
she looked out of the window, she saw Castor Batin washing his feet at
a nearby faucet while angrily muttering the words “mga matatandang
kunsintidor, dapat manahimik na.” Castor then walked towards the
street
o Josephine went to the street because of a feeling of uneasiness. She
found her husband leaning against the mango tree so she told Eugenio
to go home.
55
o As she was talking with Eugenio, she saw Neil Batin standing at the
gate of the Batin compound. Neil Batin was looking towards her and
her husband. Afterwards, Neil took a gun from one of the parked cars.
o She saw Castor going towards Neil and heard Castor shout “Huwag!”
Castor grabbed the gun from Neil but Castor followed Neil behind the
parked car and handed the gun back to him.
o Josephine then heard Castor ordering Neil: “Sige, banatan mo na.” Neil
then fired twice so Josephine and Eugenio fell to the ground.
o Eugenio was rushed to the Quezon City General Hospital where he
died.
- The defense’s version of the facts: (NOT IMPORTANT)
o Neil Batin claimed that he was cleaning the family taxicab when he
found a short gun (“de bola”). He picked the gun and concealed it. He
then drove to Tondo to fetch his younger brother. Afterwards, they
went to Valenzuela to get his clothes from his cousin. They then went
home.
o Neil said that Castor was outside talking with a man. He then decided
to take the gun from the taxicab and he tucked it in his waistline.
While he was standing there, he suddenly felt the impulse of drawing
the gun from his waistline. He thus drew the gun and turned around
but he accidentally pulled the trigger causing the gun to fire twice.
- The testimonies of the defense’s two other witnesses were inconsistent. For
example, Maricon Pantoja contradicted herself when she said during the trial
that she, Neil and Castor were outside the house when Neil drew the gun.
However, in her affidavit, she alleged that they went outside when they heard
gunshot.
- RTC ruled against the Batins and found them guilty of murder, qualified by
treachery.
- CA affirmed, with modifications.
- Castor brought the case to the SC.
ISSUE – Whether the honorable court of appeals and the trial court gravely erred in
appreciating the aggravating circumstance of treachery. NO!!!
HELD - WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming with modification
the conviction of accused-appellant Castor Batin for murder is AFFIRMED with FURTHER
MODIFICATION as to the amount of the moral damages, which is hereby reduced to
P50,000.00.
RATIO (only the part relevant to the topic is included)
- According to the trial court, treachery was attendant in the killing of Eugenio
because Castor ordered Neil to fire at Eugenio after they clearly saw that he was
still leaning against the mango tree and being restrained by Josephine who had
her arms on his shoulders.
o Accused insured their safety from any defensive or retaliatory act of
Eugenio
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
- Castor does not refute the above findings of the trial court that treachery was
sufficiently proven during trial. However, he claims that the qualifying
circumstance of treachery was not specifically alleged in the Information.
o According to Castor, the allegation therein that the accused “with
treachery x x x, attack, assault and employ personal violence” is a
mere conclusion of law. Hence, it did not satisfy the test of
sufficiency of Information as provided in Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110
of the Rules of Court. 14
- SC DOES NOT AGREE WITH CASTOR
o Balitaan v. CFI of Batangas
 The main purpose of requiring the various elements of a
crime to be set forth in an Information is to enable the
accused to suitably prepare his defense.
 As a general rule, matters of evidence, as distinguished from
facts essential to the description of the offense, need not be
averred. For instance, it is not necessary to show on the face
of an information for forgery in what manner a person is to
be defrauded, as that is a matter of evidence at the trial.
o People v. Lab-eo
 Wilson was indicted for murder even though the treachery
was alleged in the Information in the following manner:
 “That the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior
strength and craft attended the commission of the
offense.”
 The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a
person of common understanding to know the charge
against him, and the court to render judgment properly. The
rule is that qualifying circumstances must be properly
pleaded in the Information
o In People v. Opuran, the Information is sufficient even though
treachery was alleged in the following manner:
 “with deliberate intent to kill and treachery”
 “with attendant qualifying circumstance of treachery”
Evidentiary facts need not be alleged in the information because these are matters
of defense. Informations need only state the ultimate facts; the reasons therefor
could be proved during the trial.
5. PEOPLE V. CACHAPERO, G.R. NO. 153008, MAY 20, 2004 – CORTEZ
14
SEC. 8. Designation of the offense.—The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given
by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating
circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the
statute punishing it.
SEC. 9. Cause of the accusation.—The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying
and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the
language used in the statute but in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what
offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce
judgment.
56
People v. Cachapero (G.R. No. 153008, May 20, 2004)
DOCTRINE:
 Time is not an essential element of rape. Information that states
the approximate rather than the precise time it was committed is sufficient in
form.
 Any perceived formal defect in the information must be raised before
arraignment, either through a bill of particulars or a motion to quash;
otherwise, objection to such defect shall be considered waived.
EMERGENCY DIGEST:
FACTS: RTC Tarlac convicted accused Larry Cachapero (LARRY) for rape. The information
filed against the accused alleged, "That sometime in March 1998, in the Municipality of
Camiling, Province of Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
by means of force and intimidation succeed in having sexual intercourse with Anna
Laurence Toledo, a 7-year old minor.” On appeal, he argues that the Information was
fatally defective for failing to state the precise hour when the crime was committed.
ISSUE: W/N the court properly convicted the accused despite the prosecution’s failure to
state the precise date of commission of the alleged rape (NO)
HELD & RATIO: Appeal has NO merit; Conviction for statutory rape is AFFIRMED. The
Information in this case alleged that the crime was committed "sometime in March 1998"
which, according to private complainant, was more or less at the closing of the school
year. Being reasonably definite and certain, this approximation sufficiently meets the
requirement of the law. After all, Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court merely
requires that the information must state, among others, the approximate time of the
commission of the offense.
COMPLETE DIGEST:
FACTS:
An information for rape was filed against accused Larry Cachapero (LARRY), which
charged:
 “That sometime in March 1998, in the Municipality of Camiling, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously by
means of force and intimidation succeed in having sexual intercourse with Anna
Laurence Toledo, a 7-year old minor."
LARRY pleaded not guilty. RTC Tarlac convicted him for rape.
 On appeal, LARRY contended that time is a material ingredient of rape, and
argued that the Information was fatally defective for failing to state the precise
hour when the crime was committed. Such infirmity, he added, jeopardized his
right to be properly informed of the charge against him.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
 Both the prosecution15 and defense16 presented their verison of the story.
ISSUE:
W/N the trial court erred in finding the information sufficient to support a judgment of
conviction despite the prosecution’s failure to state the precise date of commission of the
alleged rape- it being an essential element of the crime charged (NO, trial court DID NOT
err, conviction IS proper.)
HELD: Appeal is DENIED, RTC decision is AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
The time of occurrence is not an essential element of rape. This being so,
its precise date and hour need not be alleged in the complaint or
information. Section 11 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides:
"SEC. 11. Date of commission of the offense. – It is not necessary to
state in the complaint or information the precise date the offense
was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the
offense. The offense may be alleged to have been committed on a date
as near as possible to the actual date of its commission."(Italics
supplied)
15
"Sometime in March 1998, complainant Anna Toledo, who was seven (7) years old, went to play with Lorena
Cachapero and Dino Cachapero at a nearby house in Barrio Bancay 1st, Camiling, Tarlac.
"During that occasion, appellant Larry Cachapero, brother of Lorena, made her lie down and removed her shorts
and panty. He inserted his penis into her sexual organ and she felt pain. Larry told her not to tell her parents
because he might be scolded.
"On September 2, 1998, witness Conchita Donato was conducting a remedial class in Reading to her Grade I and II
students. While they were reading the word ‘tagtuyot’ or ‘saluyot,’ one of her students Jocelyn Meneses told her
that Anna was sexually abused by ‘Manong Larry.’
"She then ordered the students to leave the room and asked Jocelyn and Anna to stay behind. She confronted Anna
and asked her the truth. Anna covered her face with her two hands, cried, and said yes. The teachers had a
conference, after which they decided to report the matter to the parents of Anna.
"On September 3, 1998, Anna’s mother brought her to the Camiling District Hospital where she was examined. Dr.
Mercedes B. Gapultos, a Medico Legal Officer, examined Anna and came out with the following report… testified
that she found old hymenal lacerations and that it may be caused by many factors like penetration of the hymen by
a hard object, or by an object forcibly entered."
16
"Accused Larry Cachapero testified that at the time of the alleged incident, he was in their house together with
his father and mother. He denied seeing the private complainant on that day. He alleged the case was filed against
[him] because of the long standing feud between his mother and the mother of the private complainant."
57
The Information in this case alleged that the crime was committed "sometime in March
1998" which, according to private complainant, was more or less at the closing of the
school year.
 Being reasonably definite and certain, this approximation sufficiently meets the
requirement of the law.
 After all, Section 6 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court merely requires that
the information must state, among others, the approximate time of the
commission of the offense.
Moreover, objections as to the form of the complaint or information cannot be made
for the first time on appeal.

If the present appellant found the Information insufficient, he should have
moved before arraignment either for a bill of particulars, for him to be
properly informed of the exact date of the alleged rape; or for the quashal of
the Information, on the ground that it did not conform with the prescribed
form.

Having failed to pursue either remedy, he is deemed to have waived objection
to any formal defect in the Information.
By cross-examining the prosecution witnesses and presenting evidence for the defense,
LARRY’s counsel actively took part in the trial. Furthermore, the defense never objected
to the presentation of the prosecution evidence proving that the offense had been
committed in March 1998.
 LARRY has not shown that he was deprived of a proper defense, for he was in
fact able to foist an alibi. It cannot be said, therefore, that his constitutionally
protected right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him has been violated.
*SIDE ISSUE: W/N the private complainant’s testimony, which was tainted with material
inconsistencies, should not have been received by the trial court with precipitate credulity
(NO, it was PROPER for the court to receive the testimony)
LARRY’s contentions are unconvincing. It is well-established that the testimony of a
rape victim is generally given full weight and credit, more so if she is a minor.
 The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity has been abused
deserves full credit, as her willingness to undergo the trouble and the
humiliation of a public trial is an eloquent testament to the truth of her
complaint.
 In so testifying, she could only have been impelled to tell the truth, especially in
the absence of proof of ill motive.
To be sure, the victim’s testimony was not flawless or perfect in all aspects. We must
remember, however, that it was the narration of a minor who barely understood sex and
sexuality. Hence, in assessing her testimony, it would not be fair to apply the standards
used for adults.
 Indeed, she fully understood the defilement of her person, even if she was at a
loss for the right words with which to describe the horrid details. It was for this
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
reason that the prosecutor had to ask leading questions, which are allowed
under Section 10 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, the account given by the victim, stating the essential fact that LARRY had
carnal knowledge of her, refers to details that are not in any way affected or obscured by
the supposed contradictions- whether or not she bled after the rape or how soon she
informed her mother of the incident.
What further buttressed the story of private complainant were Dr. Gapultos’ medical
findings that there were old lacerations in her hymen. Although not indispensable to a
rape conviction, such findings were credible physical evidence of forcible defloration,
among others.
6. BACASMAS V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 189343, JULY 10, 2013 - DE LA
PAZ
Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 189343, July 10, 2013
DOCTRINE: An information is sufficient even if you do not state the exact date of the
commission of the crime, when the date and time of the commission of the crime is not a
material ingredient. A violation of RA 3019 3e does not need a statement of the EXACT
DATE because the date is not a material ingredient of the crime.
A violation of RA 3019 3e may be committed in three ways. The use of the three phrases
– "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and "inexcusable negligence"  in the same
Information does not mean that three distinct offenses were thereby charged but only
implied that the offense charged may have been committed through any of the modes
provided by the law. In addition, there was no inconsistency in alleging both the presence
of conspiracy and gross inexcusable negligence, because the latter was not simple
negligence. Rather, the negligence involved a willful, intentional, and conscious
indifference to the consequences of one’s actions or omissions.
EMERGENCY DIGEST: Bacamas, Gaviol, and Cesa all worked for the City Government of
Cebu. A surprise audit was conducted and found that there was a shortage of 9M pesos
because of the failure to follow the procedure and the excessive granting of cash
advances. The information was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the violation of RA 3019
– corrupt practices. SB found them guilty. They filed MRs alleging the insufficiency of the
information. SB ruled that the information was sufficient.
WON the information is sufficient? YES
It is not necessary to state the precise date when the offense was committed, except
when it is a material ingredient thereof. Here, the date is not a material ingredient of
the crime, not having been committed on one day alone, but rather within a period
of time ranging from 20 September 1995 to 5 March 1998. Hence, stating the exact
dates of the commission of the crime is not only unnecessary, but impossible as well.
The Information is sufficient, because it adequately describes the nature and cause of the
accusation against petitioners, namely the violation of the aforementioned law. The use
of the three phrases – "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and "inexcusable
negligence"  in the same Information does not mean that three distinct offenses were
thereby charged but only implied that the offense charged may have been committed
through any of the modes provided by the law. In addition, there was no inconsistency in
alleging both the presence of conspiracy and gross inexcusable negligence, because the
58
latter was not simple negligence. Rather, the negligence involved a willful, intentional,
and conscious indifference to the consequences of one’s actions or omissions.
COMPLETE DIGEST
FACTS
Bacamas (Cash Division Chief) Gaviola (City Administrator) and Cesa (City Treasurer) all
worked for the City government of Cebu. By virtue of their positions, they are involved in
the process of approving and releasing cash advances for the City. PLEASE CHECK
FOOTNOTE FOR THE PROCEDURE.17
There was a surprise audit conducted by the COA. The examination revealed an
accumulated shortage of P9,810,752.60 from 20 September 1995 to 5 March 1998 from
the cash and accounts of Gonzales. The team found that Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca
failed to follow the above-mentioned procedure. The irregularities with the finances were
manifested in the following: additional cash advances were granted even if previous cash
advances had not yet been liquidated, cash advance vouchers for salaries were not
supported by payrolls or lists of payees, and cash advances for salaries and wages were
not liquidated within five days after each 15th day or end-of-the-month pay period.
The report stated that Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca not only signed, certified, and
approved the cash advance vouchers, but also signed and countersigned the checks
despite the deficiencies, which amounted to a violation of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7160;
Presidential Decree No. (P.D.) 1445; and the circulars issued by the Commission on Audit
(COA), specifically COA Circular Nos. 90-331, 92-382 and 97-002. 23 According to the COA,
the violation of the foregoing laws, rules, and regulations facilitated the loss of a huge
amount of public funds at the hands of Gonzales.
AN INFORMATION WAS FILED WITH THE SB against Bacasmas, Gaviola, Cesa, and Jaca,
to wit:
That on or about the 5th and subsequent thereto, at Cebu City, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named
accused, ALAN C. GAVIOLA, EUSTAQUIO B. CESA, BENILDA N. BACASMAS and
EDNA J. JACA, public officers, being then the City Administrator, City Treasurer,
17
A written request for a cash advance is made by paymaster Luz Gonzales (Gonzales), who then submits it to
Cash Division Chief Bacasmas for approval. Once the latter approves the request, she affixes her initials to the
voucher, which she forwards to City Treasurer Cesa for his signature in the same box. By signing, Bacasmas and
Cesa certify that the expense or cash advance is necessary, lawful, and incurred under their direct supervision.
Thereafter, the voucher is forwarded to City Accountant Edna C. Jaca (Jaca) for processing and pre-audit. She also
signs the voucher to certify that there is adequate available funding/budgetary allotment; that the expenditures
are properly certified and supported by documents; and that previous cash advances have been liquidated and
accounted for. She then prepares an Accountant’s Advice (Advice).
This Advice is returned with the voucher to the Chief Cashier for the preparation of the check. After it has been
prepared, she affixes her initials to the check, which Cesa then signs. Afterwards, City Administrator Gaviola
approves the voucher and countersigns the check.
The voucher, the Advice, and the check are then returned to the Cash Division, where Gonzales signs the receipt
portion of the voucher, as well as the Check Register to acknowledge receipt of the check for encashment.
Upon receipt of the check, Gonzales encashes it at the bank, signs the voucher, and records the cash advance in her
Individual Paymaster Cashbook. She then liquidates it within five days after payment.
A report of those cash advances liquidated by Gonzales is called a Report of Disbursement (RD). An RD must
contain the audit voucher number, the names of the local government employees who were paid using the money
from the cash advance, the amount for each employee, as well as the receipts. The RDs are examined and verified
by the City Auditor and are thereafter submitted to the Cash Division for recording in the official cash book.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
Cash Division Chief and City Accountant, respectively, of the Cebu City
Government, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to Office,
conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other
[sic], with deliberate intent, with manifest partiality, evident bad faith and with
gross inexcusable negligence, did then and there allow LUZ M. GONZALES,
Accountant I, Disbursing Officer-Designate of the Cebu City Government, to
obtain cash advances despite the fact that she has previous unliquidated cash
advances, thus allowing LUZ M. GONZALES to accumulate Cash Advances
amounting to NINE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED TEN day of March 1998, and for
sometime prior THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY-TWO PESOS AND 60/100
(P9,810,752.60), PHILIPPINE CURRENCY, which remains unliquidated, thus
accused in the performance of their official functions, had given unwarranted
benefits to LUZ M. GONZALES and themselves, to the damage and prejudice of
the government, particularly the Cebu City Government.
SB found that the accused, as public officers, had acted with gross inexcusable negligence
by religiously disregarding the instructions for preparing a disbursement voucher and by
being totally remiss in their respective duties and functions under the Local Government
Code of 1991. Their gross inexcusable negligence amounted to bad faith, because they
still continued with the illegal practice even if they admittedly had knowledge of the
relevant law and COA rules and regulations. The Sandiganbayan held that the acts of the
accused had caused not only undue injury to the government because of
the P9,810,752.60 shortage, but also gave unwarranted benefit to Gonzales by allowing
her to obtain cash advances to which she was not entitled. Lastly, it found conspiracy to
be present in the acts and omissions of the accused showing that they had confederated,
connived with, and mutually helped one another in causing undue injury to the
government through the loss of public money.
The accused individually filed their Motions for Reconsideration impugning the
sufficiency of the Information and the finding of gross inexcusable negligence, undue
injury, and unwarranted benefit.
SB resolved that the information was sufficient because the three modes of violating
Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 commonly involved willful, intentional, and conscious acts or
omissions when there is a duty to act on the part of the public official or employee.
Furthermore, the three modes may all be alleged in one Information. The Sandiganbayan
held that the accused were all guilty of gross inexcusable negligence. Claiming that it was
the practice in their office, they admittedly disregarded the observance of the law and
COA rules and regulations on the approval and grant of cash advances. The anti-graft
court also stated that the undue injury to the government was unquestionable because of
the shortage amounting to P9,810,752.60. Finally, the Sandiganbayan decided that
although the criminal liability of Jaca was extinguished upon her death, her civil liability
remained. Hence, the Motions for Reconsideration were denied.
Thus the present PET. For REVIEW on CERTIORARI before this court.
59
ISSUE: WON THE INFORMATION WAS SUFFICIENT? The Information specified when
the crime was committed, and it named all of the accused and their alleged acts or
omissions constituting the offense charged.
HELD: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the 07 May 2009 Decision and 27 August
2009 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Crim. Case No. 26914 are AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
Cesa and Gaviola question the sufficiency of the Information on three grounds:
1. it did not specify a reasonable time frame within which the offense was
committed, in violation of their right to be informed of the charge against them;
2. not all of the accused were named, as Gonzales was not charged in the
Information; and
3. the Information did not specify an offense, because negligence and conspiracy
cannot co-exist in a crime.
THE INFORMATION IS SUFFICIENT.
1. it is not necessary to state the precise date when the offense was committed, except
when it is a material ingredient thereof. The offense may be alleged to have been
committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. Here, the
date is not a material ingredient of the crime, not having been committed on one
day alone, but rather within a period of time ranging from 20 September 1995 to 5
March 1998. Hence, stating the exact dates of the commission of the crime is not only
unnecessary, but impossible as well. That the Information alleged a date and a period
during which the crime was committed was sufficient, because it duly informed
petitioners that before and until 5 March 1998, over nine million pesos had been taken
by Gonzales as a result of petitioners’ acts. These acts caused undue injury to the
government and unwarranted benefits to the said paymaster.
2. The Information charges petitioners with violating Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 18, to wit:
Cesa contends that Gonzales should have been included in the Information, because the
latter incurred cash shortages and allegedly had unliquidated cash advances. Cesa is
wrong. The Information seeks to hold petitioners accountable for their actions, which
allowed Gonzales to obtain cash advances, and paved the way for her to incur cash
shortages, leading to a loss of over nine million pesos. Thus, the Information correctly
excluded her because her alleged acts did not fall under the crime charged in the
Information.
3. The Information sufficiently specified the offense that violated Section 3(e) of R.A.
3019, the essential elements of which are as follows:
18
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful.
xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions;
2. The accused must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence; and
3. The action of the accused caused undue injury to any party, including the
government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of the functions of the accused.
The Information is sufficient, because it adequately describes the nature and cause of the
accusation against petitioners, namely the violation of the aforementioned law. The use
of the three phrases – "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith" and "inexcusable
negligence"  in the same Information does not mean that three distinct offenses were
thereby charged but only implied that the offense charged may have been committed
through any of the modes provided by the law. In addition, there was no inconsistency in
alleging both the presence of conspiracy and gross inexcusable negligence, because the
latter was not simple negligence. Rather, the negligence involved a willful, intentional,
and conscious indifference to the consequences of one’s actions or omissions.
NOTE:
1.Petitioners committed gross negligence amounting to bad faith when they approved and
disbursed the cash advances in violation of law and rules and regulations. The concerned
City Officials signed, certified and approved the disbursements/cash advance vouchers,
and signed and countersigned the corresponding checks despite the deficiencies which
are violations of laws, rules and regulations mentioned in the preceding paragraphs. The
accountable officer was able to accumulate excess or idle funds within her total control
and disposal, resulting in the loss of public funds, due to the flagrant violations by the
concerned city officials of the abovementioned laws, rules and regulations.
2. Petitioners’ acts show that they were unified in illegally approving irregular cash
advance vouchers in
order to defraud the government. Clearly, they were in cahoots in granting the cash
advances to Gonzales. By these acts, petitioners defrauded the government of such a
large sum of money that should not have been disbursed in the first place, had they been
circumspect in performing their functions.
3. The third element of the offense is that the action of the offender caused undue injury
to any party, including the government; or gave any party any unwarranted benefit,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his or her functions. Here, the Sandiganbayan
found that petitioners both brought about undue injury to the government and gave
unwarranted benefit to Gonzales.
B.SUBSTITUTION OF INFORMATION
1. SALUDAGA V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 184537, APRIL 23, 2010 –
GERALDEZ
60
QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO, Petitioners, vs. The HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, 4th DIVISION and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
(G.R. NO. 184537 April 23, 2010) - Geraldez
Emergency Recitation: Petitioners herein are the subjects of Informations filed with the
Sandiganbayan. Quintin Saludaga was Mayor of Municipality of Lavezares, Northern
Samar, and SPO2 Fiel Genio is a policeman. In both allegations, they were being accused
of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019 (Anti-graft and Corrupt Act) for awarding a Pakyaw
Contract for the Construction of Barangay Day Care Centers in 2 Barangays (P48,500
each). The contracts were awarded without competitive public bidding and given to
Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and non-accredited NGO.
The first information alleged a violation of Sec. 3(e) by causing undue injury to the
government. This was quashed on the ground that the damages caused were
unsubstantiated. The Special Prosecutor refiled the case, again alleging a violation of Sec.
3(e), but this time by giving unwarranted benefit or advanted to a private person.
Saludaga and Genio claim that they should be subject to another preliminary
investigation, since this new information consituted a substitution, or at the very least, a
substantial amendment.
Held: R.A. 3019, Section 3, paragraph (e), as amended, provides as one of its elements
that the public officer should have acted by causing any undue injury to any party,
including the Government, or by giving any private party unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions. An accused may be charged
under either mode or under both should both modes concur. As such, Petitioners’
contention that "in substitution of information another preliminary investigation is
entailed and that the accused has to plead anew to the new information" is not applicable
to the present case because, as already stated, there is no substitution of information
there being no change in the nature of the offense charged. There is also no substantial
amendment, as all the underlying facts, as well as the evidentiary requirements for the
prosecution and defense, remain the same.
The Real McCoy:
Facts:
1. Petitioners herein are the subjects of Informations filed with the
Sandiganbayan. Quintin Saludaga was Mayor of Municipality of Lavezares,
Northern Samar, and SPO2 Fiel Genio is a policeman. In both allegations, they
were being accused of violating Section 3(e) of RA 3019 (Anti-graft and Corrupt
Act) for awarding a Pakyaw Contract for the Construction of Barangay Day Care
Centers in 2 Barangays (P48,500 each). The contracts were awarded without
competitive public bidding and given to Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor
and non-accredited NGO.
2. An Information was filed in the Sandiganbayan charging Saludaga and Genio for
having violated Section 3(e) of RA 3019, by causing undue injury to the
government.
a. The Third Division granted a Motion to Quash and dismiss the
information for “failure to allege and prove the amount of actual
damages caused to the government.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
3. The Special Prosecutor amended the information and re-filed it with the
Sandiganbayan.
4. The second Information now charges the Petitioners with violating (still) Sec.
3(e) of RA 3019, but now by giving unwarranted benefit or advanted to a
private person (Legua), to the prejudice of the government.
5. Saludaga and Genio filed a Motion for Preliminary Investigation. They claim that
a failure by the prosecution to conduct a new preliminary investigation before
the filing of the second Inofrmation violates the law, as the latter charges a
different offense.
a. They argue that a substitution took place of the first information.
b. Assuming there was no substitution, there was at least a substantial
amendment.
c. They further claim that newly discovered evidence mandates re-
examination of the finding of probable cause to file the case.
6. The SB Fourth Division denied the petitioners’ motion. It reasoned that the
second information did not change the nature of the offense. The MR was also
denied.
7. As such, they filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, preliminary
injunction, and TRO.
Issues:
The core issue is whether or not the two (2) ways of violating section 3(e) of Republic Act
3019, namely: (a) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (b)
by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference constitute
two distinct and separate offenses that would warrant a new or another preliminary
investigation. – NOPE.
Ratio:
We find no merit in this petition.
Petitioners were charged with a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 or the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The essential elements of the offense are as follows:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable
negligence; and
3. That his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions.
R.A. 3019, Section 3, paragraph (e), as amended, provides as one of its elements that the
public officer should have acted by causing any undue injury to any party, including the
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Government, or by giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his functions. The use of the disjunctive term "or" connotes
that either act qualifies as a violation of Section 3 paragraph (e), or as aptly held in
Santiago, as two (2) different modes of committing the offense. This does not however
indicate that each mode constitutes a distinct offense, but rather, that an accused may be
charged under either mode or under both.
Contrary to the argument of petitioners, there is no substituted information. The
Information dated August 17, 2007 filed in Criminal Case No. SB-08 CRM 0263 charged
the same offense, that is, violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Only the
mode of commission was modified. While jurisprudence, the most recent being Talaga, Jr.
v. Sandiganbayan, provides that there are two (2) acts or modes of committing the
offense, thus: a) by causing any undue injury to any party, including the government; or
b) by giving any private party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference, it does
not mean that each act or mode constitutes a distinct offense. An accused may be charged
under either mode or under both should both modes concur.
Petitioners’ reliance on the Teehankee v. Madayag, ruling that, "in substitution of
information another preliminary investigation is entailed and that the accused has to
plead anew to the new information" is not applicable to the present case because, as
already stated, there is no substitution of information there being no change in the nature
of the offense charged.
Consequently, petitioners cannot invoke the principle that failure to conduct a new
preliminary investigation is tantamount to a violation of their rights. While it is true that
preliminary investigation is a statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused
before trial, the denial of petitioners’ claim for a new investigation, however, did not
deprive them of their right to due process. An examination of the records of the case
discloses that there was a full-blown preliminary investigation wherein both petitioners
actively participated.
Anent the contention of petitioners that the information contained substantial
amendments warranting a new preliminary investigation, the same must likewise fail.
Petitioners erroneously concluded that giving undue injury, as alleged in the first
Information, and conferring unwarranted benefits, alleged in the second Information, are
two distinct violations of, or two distinct ways of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019, and that such shift from giving undue injury to conferring unwarranted benefit
constituted, at the very least, a substantial amendment. It should be noted that the
Information is founded on the same transaction as the first Information, that of entering
into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of barangay day care centers for barangays
Mac-Arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern Samar. Thus, the evidentiary
requirements for the prosecution and defense remain the same.
There was no modification in the nature of the charged offense. Consequently, a new
preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the petitioners.
Finally, the third assigned error, that newly discovered evidence mandates due re-
examination of the finding of prima facie cause to file the case, deserves scant
consideration.
The Pornelos (COA auditor) affidavit, which petitioners claim as newly-discovered, was
executed by affiant way back in November 29, 2000, as correctly found by the
Sandiganbayan. Clearly, it cannot be considered as newly found evidence because it was
already in existence prior to the re-filing of the case.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
Case law has it that the determination of probable cause against those in public office
during a preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the Office of the
Ombudsman. Without good and compelling reasons, the Court cannot interfere in the
exercise by the Office of the Ombudsman of its investigatory and prosecutory powers.
There is no grave abuse of discretion here that would warrant the exercise of Rule 65
certiorari in this case.
2. PACOY V. CAJIGAL, G.R. NO. 157472, SEPTEMBER 28, 2007 – KING
Pacoy v Judge Cajigal, People of the Philippines, Escueta
GR No. 157472
September 28, 2007
Doctrine: A change in the caption of the Information from homicide to murder is only a
formal amendment considering that the allegations in the information remained the
same.
ER:
An information for Homicide was filed against SSGT Pacoy alleging that he shot 2LT.
Frederick Esqueta using an armalite. It was also alleged that there was the qualifying
circumstance of in disregard of his rank. SGGT Pacoy pleaded not guilty. After
arraignment though, the title of the offense Homicide in the information was ordered
changed to Murder. Pacoy now contends that this puts him in double jeopardy as the
homicide case was dismissed without his consent. He also alleged that the amendment
was substantial. Hence it cannot be made after a plea has been given. And that the
aggravating circumstance of in disregard of rank does not qualify Homicide to Murder.
SC: No double jeopardy. There was merely a formal amendment. The homicide case was
not dismissed upon the changing of the title to Murder. Hence, no GADALEJ on the part of
the judge.
Facts:
 An information for Homicide was filed against SSGT. Pacoy.
 “ . . . shot his commanding officer 2Lt. Frederick Esquita with his armalite rifle
hitting and sustaining upon 2Lt. Frederick Esquita multiple gunshot wounds on
his body which caused his instantaneous death. With the aggravating
circumstance of killing, 2Lt. Frederick Esquita in disregard of his rank.”
 He pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
 Pretrial conference and trial was set on October 8, 2002.
 However, on the same day after the arraignment, the judge issued another Order, likewise
dated September 12, 2002, directing the trial prosecutor to correct and amend the
Information to Murder in view of the aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank
alleged in the Information. (mali naman talaga. Hindi naman qualifying circumstance ang
in disregard of rank)
 Acting upon such Order, the prosecutor entered his amendment by crossing out the word
“Homicide” and instead wrote the word “Murder” in the caption and in the opening
paragraph of the Information.
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 The accusatory portion remained exactly the same as that of the original Information for
Homicide, with the correction of the spelling of the victim’s name from “ Escuita” to
“Escueta.”
 On the date of pretrial conference, SSGT. Pacoy was to be re-arraigned for the crime of
murder.
 Counsel for petitioner objected on the ground that the latter would be placed in double
jeopardy, considering that his Homicide case had been terminated without his express
consent, resulting in the dismissal of the case. As petitioner refused to enter his plea on
the amended Information for Murder, the public respondent entered for him a plea of not
guilty.
 On October 28, 2002, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with Motion to Suspend
Proceedings Pending the Resolution of the Instant Motion on the ground of double
jeopardy. Pacoy alleged that in the Information for Homicide, he was validly indicted and
arraigned before a competent court, and the case was terminated without his express
consent; that when the case for Homicide was terminated without his express consent,
the subsequent filing of the Information for Murder in lieu of Homicide placed him in
double jeopardy.
 The motion to quash was denied. There was no double jeopardy yet as stated by the RTC.
 Motion to Inhibit with MR was filed. Motion to Inhibit was denied.
 But the MR was granted. The judge found that a close scrutiny of Article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code shows that “disregard of rank” is merely a generic mitigating
circumstance which should not elevate the classification of the crime of homicide to
murder. Hence, he ordered that it be changed to Homicide.
 A petition for certiorari was alleging GADALEJ on the judge.
 Pacoy alleges that:
 despite having entered his plea of not guilty to the charge of Homicide, the
judge ordered the amendment of the Information from Homicide to Murder
because of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of “disregard of rank,”
which is in violation of Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure;
 disregard of rank is only a generic aggravating circumstance which serves to
affect the penalty to be imposed upon the accused and does not qualify the
offense into a more serious crime;
 that even assuming that disregard of rank is a qualifying aggravating
circumstance, such is a substantial amendment which is not allowed after
petitioner has entered his plea.
 considering that the original Information for Homicide filed against him was
terminated without his express consent; thus, prosecuting him for the same
offense would place him in double jeopardy.
 In his Comment, the Solicitor General argues that:
 The judge's Order reinstating the Information to Homicide after
initially motu proprio ordering its amendment to Murder renders herein
petition moot and academic;
 that petitioner failed to establish the fourth element of double jeopardy,
i.e., the defendant was acquitted or convicted, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his consent;
 SSGT Pacoy confuses amendment with substitution of Information;
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
 The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 mandated an
amendment of the Information as provided under Section 14, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure;
 amendments do not entail dismissal or termination of the previous case.
Issue: Whether the amendment of the title HOMICIDE to MURDER violated the rights of
the accused against double jeopardy? No.
Ratio:
the change of the offense charged from Homicide to Murder is merely a formal
amendment and not a substantial amendment or a substitution.
Pacoy is confused with the provisions below. He based his action on Section 14, Rule 110
which was erroneous.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court:
If it appears at anytime before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the
filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with section 19, Rule 119,
provided the accused shall not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may require the
witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
The applicable provision is Section 19, Rule 119, which provides:
SEC. 19.- When mistake has been made in charging the proper offense - When it becomes
manifest at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the
proper offense and the accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other
offense necessarily included therein, the accused shall not be discharged if there appears
good cause to detain him. In such case, the court shall commit the accused to answer for
the proper offense and dismiss the original case upon the filing of the proper
information.
Evidently, the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, applies only when the offense
charged is wholly different from the offense proved, i.e., the accused cannot be convicted
of a crime with which he was not charged in the information even if it be proven, in which
case, there must be a dismissal of the charge and a substitution of a new information
charging the proper offense.
Section 14 does not apply to a second information, which involves the same offense or an
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information. In
this connection, the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some
of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of
those constituting the latter.
There was no change in the recital of facts constituting the offense charged or in the
determination of the jurisdiction of the court. The averments in the amended
Information for Murder are exactly the same as those already alleged in the original
Information for Homicide, as there was not at all any change in the act imputed to
petitioner, i.e., the killing of 2Lt. Escueta without any qualifying circumstance. Thus, we
63
find that the amendment made in the caption and preamble from “Homicide” to “Murder”
as purely formal.
Section 14, Rule 110 also provides that in allowing formal amendments in cases in which
the accused has already pleaded, it is necessary that the amendments do not prejudice
the rights of the accused. The test of whether the rights of an accused are prejudiced by
the amendment of a complaint or information is whether a defense under the complaint
or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment
is made; and when any evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the
complaint or information.[22] Since the facts alleged in the accusatory portion of the
amended Information are identical with those of the original Information for Homicide,
there could not be any effect on the prosecution's theory of the case; neither would there
be any possible prejudice to the rights or defense of petitioner.
While the respondent judge erroneously thought that “disrespect on account of rank”
qualified the crime to murder, as the same was only a generic aggravating circumstance,
we do not find that he committed any grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
amendment of the Information after petitioner had already pleaded not guilty to the
charge of Homicide, since the amendment made was only formal and did not adversely
affect any substantial right of petitioner.
NOT YET TOPIC:
It is the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal or termination of the case
that bars further prosecution for the same offense or any attempt to commit the same or
the frustration thereof; or prosecution for any offense which necessarily includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
The respondent judge's Order dated September 12, 2002 was for the trial prosecutor to
correct and amend the Information but not to dismiss the same upon the filing of a
new Information charging the proper offense.
Section 14 does not apply to a second information, which involves the same offense or an
offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information. In
this connection, the offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some
of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or
information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of
those constituting the latter.
Homicide is necessarily included in the crime of murder; thus, the respondent judge
merely ordered the amendment of the Information and not the dismissal of the original
Information. To repeat, it was the same original information that was amended by
merely crossing out the word “Homicide” and writing the word “Murder,” instead, which
showed that there was no dismissal of the homicide case.
A reading of the Order dated December 18, 2002showed that the respondent judge
granted petitioner's motion for reconsideration, not on the ground that double jeopardy
exists, but on his realization that “disregard of rank” is a generic aggravating
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
circumstance which does not qualify the killing of the victim to murder. Thus, he rightly
corrected himself by reinstating the original Information for Homicide. The requisite of
double jeopardy that the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second is not
present, considering that petitioner was neither convicted nor acquitted; nor was the
case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
C.AMENDED INFORMATION/AMENDMENT
1. CABO V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO. 169509, JUNE 16, 2006 – LAGOS
Cabo vs Sandiganbayan
Topic: Amended Information/ Complaint
(sorry, long case)
Doctrine:
Rule 110 Sed. 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave court, at any time before the accused
enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be
made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights
of the accused.
Amendment of an information after the accused has pleaded thereto is allowed, if the
amended information merely states with additional precision something which is already
contained in the original information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for
conviction for the crime charged.
ER
 Cabo, the Business Manager of Orient Integrated Development Consultancy, Inc
was charged of violating Sec 3(b) of RA 3019, along with Balahay, then Mayor of
Barobo, Surigao del Sur. An information was filed in the Sandiganbayan (SB).
Needing to travel abroad, Cabo asked permission from the Sandiganbayan,
which the latter granted deemed Cabo conditionally arraigned. Additionally, SB
gave the condition that if the need to amend the information arises, Cabo shall
waive her right to object under Sec 14 Rule 110 of ROC and under double
jeopardy.
 Upon her return, she and Balahay were rearraigned, Cabo, reiterating her not
guilty plea in her previous conditional arraignment. Balahay, then filed a motion
to quash the information on the ground that it does not charge any offense;
arguing that the information failed to allege that Balahay had to intervene in the
said contract under the law, in his official capacity as municipal mayor. SB
sustained the contention but did not order the quashal of the information.
Instead, it directed the prosecution to amend the information.
 Upon filing of the amended information, Cabo motioned to cancel her second
arraignment on the ground that the amended information pertained to Balahay
alone and that there could be no substantial amendments after a plea has been
made. She also claimed double jeopardy. The SB denied her motion and her
subsequent MR. Thus this petition for certiorari in the SC.
 Issue: Whether the amendment was proper? YES
64
 The original information can be cured by amendment even after she had
pleaded thereto, since the amendments ordered by the court below were only
as to matters of form and not of substance. What the Sandiganbayan ordered
was for the amendment of the information pursuant to the express provision of
Section 4, Rule 117, which states:
o SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the motion to
quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information
which can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an
amendment be made.
 If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect
by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the
amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect
despite the amendment.
o SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After
the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be
made with leave of court and when it can be done without
causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
 An amendment is only in form when it merely adds specifications to
eliminate vagueness in the information and does not introduce new and
material facts.
 Amendment of an information after the accused has pleaded thereto is
allowed, if the amended information merely states with additional
precision something which is already contained in the original
information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction
for the crime charged.
 In the case at bar, an examination of the two informations in this case would
justify the preceding observation. While the first information alleged that
Balahay committed the offense “with the use of his influence as such public
official” “together with” Cabo, the amended information stated that he did so “in
the performance of his official functions, taking advantage of his official
position, with grave abuse of authority” while “conspiring and confederating”
with Cabo.
Facts
 On June 26, 2004, an information for violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 or
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was filed against Cabo and her co-
accused Bonifacio C. Balahay.
o Alleged that Balahay, then Mayor of Barobo, Surigao del Sur, received
and accepted P104,162.31 from Cabo, Business Manager of Orient
Integrated Development Consultancy, Inc. Balahay in consideration of
the said accused having officially intervened in the undertaking by the
OIDCI of such contract for consultancy services with the Municipality
of Barobo.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
 Claiming that she was deprived of her right to a preliminary investigation as she
never received any notice to submit a counter-affidavit or countervailing
evidence to prove her innocence, Cabo filed a motion for reinvestigation before
the 4th division of the Sandiganbayan.
o Sandiganbayan granted the motion for reinvestigation
 Cabo then filed a motion seeking the court’s permission to travel abroad.
o Sandiganbayan, likewise, granted the motion and stated in its order
that since the reinvestigation is still pending and the accused have not
yet been arraigned, should the accused fail to return to the Philippines,
Cabo shall be deemed conditionally arraigned. If upon such
reinvestigation/review, it shall be found that there is no probable
cause to proceed against said accused, the conditional arraignment
this morning shall be with no force and effect. However, if it should be
found that there is a need to amend the present indictment or to pave
the way for the filing of some other indictment/s, then the accused
shall waive her right to object under Section 14, Rule 110 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure and her constitutional right to be
protected against double jeopardy.
 Cabo returned from abroad. The Special Prosecutor concluded its
reinvestigation and found probable cause to charge her with violation of Section
3(b) of R.A. No. 3019
o Cabo filed an MR but it was denied
 Thus, the Sandiganbayan set anew the arraignment of Cabo and her co-accused.
 On the day of the arraignment, Cabo asked if she can reiterate her plea of not
guilty previously entered during her conditional arraignment so that she may
be excused from attending the scheduled arraignment but the Sandiganbayan
seemed to not act on it.
 Cabo’s co-accused, Balahay failed to appear for arraignment. Sandiganbayan
ordered the arrest of Balahay as well the confiscation of his bail bond. Upon
motion for reconsideration of Balahay, however, the Sandiganbayan recalled the
warrant for his arrest and reinstated the bail bond. His arraignment was
subsequently reset for November 30, 2004
 On November 24, 2004, Balahay, filed a motion to quash the information on the
ground that the same does not charge any offense.
o While Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019 penalizes the act of “(d)irectly or
indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage,
or benefit, for himself or for another, from any person, in connection
with any transaction between the Government and any other party,
wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene
under the law,” the information alleged only in general terms that
Balahay “intervened in the undertaking by the OIDCI of such contract
for consultancy services with the Municipality of Barobo.” In other
words, the information failed to allege that Balahay had to intervene in
the said contract under the law, in his official capacity as municipal
mayor.
 Sandiganbayan sustained Balahay’s contention that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute the offense of violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No.
3019. Apart from the failure to allege that Balahay had to officially intervene in
65
the transaction pursuant to law, it also failed to allege that Balahay accepted and
received the money “for himself or for another.” The information was thus
defective in that it failed to allege every single fact necessary to constitute all
the elements of the offense charged.
o However, did not order the immediate quashal of the information. It
held that under Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, “if the
motion to quash is based on the ground that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense x x x the (c)ourt should not
quash the information outright, but should instead direct the
prosecution to correct the defect therein by proper amendment. It is
only when the prosecution fails or refuses to undertake such
amendment, or when despite such amendment the information still
suffers from the same vice or defect,” that the court would be finally
justified in granting the motion to quash. The Sandiganbayan thus
gave the prosecution a period of 15 days from notice within which to
file an amended information that is sufficient as to both form and
substance.
 the prosecution filed an amended information which incorporated all the
essential elements of the crime charged, to wit:
o That … BALAHAY, a high ranking public official, in the performance of
his official functions, taking advantage of his official position, with
grave abuse of authority, and committing the offense in relation to his
office, conspiring and confederating with JOCELYN CABO, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive and accept the
amount of (P104,162.31) for his own benefit or use from said
JOCELYN CABO, Business Manager of Orient Integrated Development
Consultancy, Inc. (OIDC), a consultancy group charged with
conducting a feasibility study for the Community-Based Resource
Management Project of the Municipality of Barobo, with accused Cabo
giving and granting said amount to accused Balahay in consideration
of the contract for said feasibility study, which contract accused
Balahay in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.
 Consequently, Balahay was sent a notice for his arraignment on the amended
information. Cabo was likewise notified of her re-arraignment.
o However, Cabo filed a Motion to Cancel Second Arraignment on the
ground that the amended information pertained to Balahay alone.
Cabo claimed that she could no longer be re-arraigned on the
amended information since substantial amendment of an information
is not allowed after a plea had already been made thereon.
 the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed resolution denying Cabo’s motion
for lack of merit, to wit:
o [T]he arraignment of accused Cabo on the original information was
only conditional in nature and that the same was resorted to as a mere
accommodation in her favor to enable her to travel abroad without
this Court losing its ability to conduct trial in absentia in the event she
decides to abscond. However, as clearly stated in the Court’s Order,
accused Cabo agreed with the condition that should there be a need to
amend the information, she would thereby waive, not only her right to
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
object to the amended information, but also her constitutional
protection against double jeopardy. Now that the original information
has been superseded by an amended information, which was
specifically filed by the prosecution, and thereafter admitted by this
Court, on the basis of Section 4, Rule 117 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, accused Cabo is already estopped from raising any
objection thereto.
 Cabo filed a motion for reconsideration, on the additional ground that double
jeopardy had already set in. She asserted that her conditional arraignment
under the original information had been validated or confirmed by her formal
manifestation, wherein she reiterated her plea of “not guilty.” Thus, her
arraignment on the original information was no longer conditional in nature
such that double jeopardy would attach.
 The Sandiganbayan denied Cabo’s motion for reconsideration. Consequently,
Cabo filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court alleging that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in
holding that her arraignment on the original information was conditional in
nature and that a re-arraignment on the amended information would not put
her in double jeopardy.
Issues:
Whether double jeopardy would attach on the basis of the “not guilty” plea entered by
Cabo on the original information, considering that her arraignment, which was initially
conditional in nature, was ratified when she confirmed her “not guilty” plea by means of
a written manifestation? NO.
Whether the amendment was proper? YES.
Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
Ratio:
No double jeopardy without a valid information and a criminal case that was not
dismissed nor terminated
 At any rate, with or without a valid plea, still Cabo cannot rely upon the
principle of double jeopardy to avoid arraignment on the amended information.
It is elementary that for double jeopardy to attach, the case against the accused
must have been dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent
by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid information sufficient in form
and substance and the accused pleaded to the charge.[25] In the instant case,
the original information to which Cabo entered a plea of “not guilty” was
neither valid nor sufficient to sustain a conviction, and the criminal case was
also neither dismissed nor terminated. Double jeopardy could not, therefore,
attach even if Cabo is assumed to have been unconditionally arraigned on the
original charge.
66
 It should be noted that the previous information in Criminal Case No. 27959
failed to allege all the essential elements of violation of Section 3(b), R.A. No.
3019. It, in fact, did not charge any offense and was, to all intents and purposes,
void and defective. A valid conviction cannot be sustained on the basis of such
information. Cabo was resultantly not placed in danger of being convicted
when she entered her plea of “not guilty” to the insufficient indictment.
Formal amendments may be done after plea [RELEVANT]
 Moreover, there was no dismissal or termination of the case against Cabo.
What the Sandiganbayan ordered was for the amendment of the
information pursuant to the express provision of Section 4, Rule 117,
which states:
o SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.- If the motion to
quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or
information which can be cured by amendment, the court shall
order that an amendment be made.
 If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense,
the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect
by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the
amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect
despite the amendment.
 The Sandiganbayan correctly applied the foregoing provision when Cabo’s co-
accused filed a motion to quash the original information on the ground that the
same does not charge an offense. Contrary to Cabo’s submission, the original
information can be cured by amendment even after she had pleaded thereto,
since the amendments ordered by the court below were only as to matters of
form and not of substance. The amendment ordered by the Sandiganbayan did
not violate the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, which provides:
o SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. – A complaint or
information may be amended, in form or in substance, without
leave court, at any time before the accused enters his plea. After
the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be
made with leave of court and when it can be done without
causing prejudice to the rights of the accused.
 In Poblete v. Sandoval, the Court explained that an amendment is only in form
when it merely adds specifications to eliminate vagueness in the
information and does not introduce new and material facts.
 Amendment of an information after the accused has pleaded thereto is
allowed, if the amended information merely states with additional
precision something which is already contained in the original
information and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction
for the crime charged.
 In the case at bar, while certain elements of the crime charged were missing in
the indictment, the amended information did not change the nature of the
offense which is for violation of Section 3(b), R.A. No. 3019. The amended
information merely clarified the factual averments in the accusatory portion of
the previous information, in order to reflect with definiteness the essential
elements of the crime charged.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
 An examination of the two informations in this case would justify the preceding
observation. While the first information alleged that Balahay committed the
offense “with the use of his influence as such public official” “together with”
Cabo, the amended information stated that he did so “in the performance of his
official functions, taking advantage of his official position, with grave abuse of
authority” while “conspiring and confederating” with Cabo. Then too, while it
was averred previously that Balahay received and accepted the money from
Cabo, with the latter “giving and granting the said amount to accused Balahay in
consideration of the said accused having officially intervened in the undertaking
by the OIDCI of such contract for consultancy services”, the amended
information simply specified that Balahay received the money “for his own
benefit or use” and that the contract mentioned in the first information was one
that Balahay, “in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.”
 Consequently, even if we treat Cabo’s arraignment on the original information
as “unconditional,” the same would not bar the amendment of the original
information under Section 14, Rule 110. Re-arraignment on the amended
information will not prejudice Cabo’s rights since the alterations introduced
therein did not change the nature of the crime.
 As held in People v. Casey:
o The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of
an information has been said to be whether a defense under the
information as it originally stood would be available after the
amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have
would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in
the other. A look into Our jurisprudence on the matter shows that an
amendment to an information introduced after the accused has
pleaded not guilty thereto, which does not change the nature of the
crime alleged therein, does not expose the accused to a charge which
could call for a higher penalty, does not affect the essence of the
offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to
meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not
of substance – not prejudicial to the accused and, therefore, not
prohibited by Section 13 (now Section 14), Rule 110 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
 Likewise, it is not necessary, as Cabo suggests, to dismiss the original complaint
under the last paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, which states:
o If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been
made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the
original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense in accordance with section 11, Rule 119,
provided the accused would not be placed in double jeopardy. The
court may require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at
the trial.
 The afore-cited rule is inapplicable to the case at bar for the simple reason that
there was no mistake in charging the proper offense in the original information.
As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan:
o It is hardly necessary for this Court to order the dismissal of the
original information and then direct the filing of a new one “charging
67
the proper offense”. The reason for this is obvious. The prosecution
did not commit a mistake in charging the proper offense; rather, it
merely failed to file an information sufficient to charge the offense it
intended to charge, namely, violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019.
Section 14, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure
apparently relied upon by accused Cabo contemplates a situation
where the accused will be charged with an offense different from or is
otherwise not necessarily included in the offense charged in the
information to be dismissed by the Court. In the case at bar, however,
accused Cabo will not be charged with a different offense or with an
offense that is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the
original information, but with the very same offense that the
prosecution intended to charge her in the first place, that is, violation
of Section 3(b) of R.A. No. 3019.[28]
 All told, the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
ordered the re-arraignment of Cabo on the amended information. Double
jeopardy did not attach by virtue of Cabo’s “conditional arraignment” on the
first information. It is well-settled that for a claim of double jeopardy to
prosper, the following requisites must concur:
o (1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
o (2) the same is filed before a court of competent jurisdiction;
o (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges; and
o (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise
dismissed or terminated without his express consent.
 The first and fourth requisites are not present in the case at bar.
Cabo’s conditional arraignment was had a condition that on amendment of the
information, she will waive any objection under sec 14 rule 110 and under double
jeopardy.
 Initially, it must be pointed out that the Sandiganbayan’s practice of
“conditionally” arraigning the accused pending reinvestigation of the case by
the Ombudsman is not specifically provided in the regular rules of procedure.
In People v. Espinosa, however, the Court tangentially recognized the practice of
“conditionally” arraigning the accused, provided that the alleged conditions
attached thereto should be “unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened.”
The Court ventured further by requiring that said conditions be expressly
stated in the order disposing of the arraignment. Otherwise, it was held that the
arraignment should be deemed simple and unconditional.
 In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan Order dated May 14, 2004 unequivocally
set forth the conditions for Cabo’s arraignment pending reinvestigation of the
case as well as her travel abroad.
o Among the conditions specified in said order is “if it should be found
that there is a need to amend the present indictment x x x, then the
accused shall waive her right to object under Section 14, Rule 110 of
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure and her constitutional right to
be protected against double jeopardy.”
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
o Cabo was duly assisted by counsel during the conditional arraignment
and was presumably apprised of the legal consequences of such
conditions. In fact, she signed the minutes of the proceedings which
could only signify her informed acceptance of and conformity with the
terms of the conditional arraignment.
 Thus, Cabo cannot now be allowed to turn her back on such conditions on the
pretext that she affirmed her conditional arraignment by means of a written
manifestation. To begin with, there is no showing that the Sandiganbayan ruled
on her written manifestation and motion that she be allowed to merely confirm
her previous plea on the original information. It is likewise doubtful that Cabo
may legally confirm her conditional arraignment by means of a mere written
motion or manifestation. Section 1(b), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court explicitly
requires that “(t)he accused must be present at the arraignment and must
personally enter his plea.”
2. KUMMER V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 174461, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 – LIBONGCO
Kummer v People
ER:
- Leticia and Johan were charged with the murder of Jesus. They were both found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
- Leticia contends she was not arraigned on the amended information for which
she was convicted. Her argument was that the flawed understanding of the
rules on amendment and misconception on the necessity of arraignment in
every case.
Issues:
Whether what was involved in this case was a formal amendment
Whether arraignment was necessary
- A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of
time is not great, is more formal than substantial. Such an amendment would
not prejudice the rights of the accused since the proposed amendment would
not alter the nature of the offense.
- The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment
of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or
information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made, when any evidence the accused might have would no
longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the
accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information, as
amended.
- The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or
complaint. This, however, pertains only to substantial amendments and to
formal amendments that do not charge an offense different from that charged in
the original complaint or information, do not alter the theory of the
prosecution, do not cause any surprise and affect the line of defense and do not
68
adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused, such as an amendment in
the date of the commission of the offense.
Facts:
- On 19 June 1998, between 9 and 10 pm, Jesus Mallo, Jr. (Jesus), accompanied by
Amiel Malana (Amiel), went to the house of Leticia Kummer (Leticia).
o Leticia opened the door. At this point, her son and co-accused, Johan,
shot Jesus twice. Both Jesus and Amiel ran. When Amiel turned, he
saw Leticia leveling and firing her gun at Jesus, hitting him at the back
and causing him to fall flat on the ground.
o Leticia and Johan scoured the pathway up to the place where Jesus
was laying flat. When they saw Jesus was dead, they put down their
guns and flashlight and pulled Jesus 3 to 4 meters away from the
house.
- The following morning, policeman Danilo Pelovello (Danillo) went to Leticia’s
house and informed her that Jesus was found dead in front of her house. Danilo
conducted an investigation through inquiries among the neighbors, who denied
having knowledge of the incident.
- Prosecution filed an information for homicide against Leticia and Johan. Both
accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty. They waived the pre-tiral and
the trial on the merits followed.
o Leticia denied the charge and claimed that they were all asleep at the
house in the evening of homicide. She claimed that they were
awakened by the sound of stones being thrown at their house, a gun
report and the banging at their door.
o Believing it was the NPA, Johan got a gun and fired twice outside to
scare the people causing the disturbance. The ruckus continued, so
Johan got a shotgun and fired it. The noise stopped and they all went
back to sleep.
- RTC found prosecution’s evidence persuasive, and found both Leticia and Johan
guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
- Leticia contended before the CA that the RTC committed reversible errors in its
appreciation of the evidence. CA rejected petitioners arguments and affirmed
the RTC judgment.
- On appeal, one of Leticia’s contentions was that she was not arraigned on the
amended information for which she was convicted. Her argument was that the
flawed understanding of the rules on amendment and misconception on the
necessity of arraignment in every case.
Issue:
Whether what was involved in this case was a formal amendment
Whether arraignment was necessary
Ratio:
In this case, a change of date is a formal amendment
- Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the ROC permits a formal amendment of a complaint even
after the plea but only if it is made with leave of court.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
o It also provided that it can be done without causing prejudice to the
right of the accused.
- Section 14. Amendment or substitution. A complaint or information may be
amended, in form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the
accused enters his plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment
may only be made with leave of court and when it can be done without causing
prejudice to the rights of the accused. However, any amendment before plea,
which downgrades the nature of the offense charged in or excludes any accused
from the complaint or information, can be made only upon motion by the
prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court. The court
shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be
furnished all parties, especially the offended party. If it appears at any time
before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense,
the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a
new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Section 19, Rule 119,
provided the accused [would] not be placed in double jeopardy. The court may
require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial.
- A mere change in the date of the commission of the crime, if the disparity of
time is not great, is more formal than substantial. Such an amendment would
not prejudice the rights of the accused since the proposed amendment would
not alter the nature of the offense.
- The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment
of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or
information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the
amendment is made, when any evidence the accused might have would no
longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the
accused might have would be inapplicable to the complaint or information, as
amended.
- It is not even necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time
at which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient
of the offense. The act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as
near to the actual date at which date the offense was committed as the
information will permit. Under the circumstance, the precise time is not an
essential ingredient of the crime of homicide.
Arraignment is not necessary
- Arraignment is indispensible in bringing the accused to court and in notifying
him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The importance of
arraignment is based on the constitutional right of the accused to be informed
o Procedural due process requires that the accused be arraigned so that
he may be informed of the reason for his indictment, the specific
charges he is bound to face and the corresponding penalty that could
be possibly meted against him.
- The need for arraignment is equally imperative in an amended information or
complaint. This, however, pertains only to substantial amendments and to
formal amendments that do not charge an offense different from that charged in
the original complaint or information, do not alter the theory of the
69
prosecution, do not cause any surprise and affect the line of defense and do not
adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused, such as an amendment in
the date of the commission of the offense.
- An amendment after the plea and during trial, in accordance with the rules,
does not call for a second plea since the amendment is only as to form. The
purpose of an arraignment is to inform the accused of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him, has already been attained when the accused was
arraigned the first time.
D.FILING OF INFORMATION IF THERE IS PENDING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
1. RAMISCAL V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NOS. 172476-99, SEPTEMBER 15,
2010 – LOPA
BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 172476-99. September 15, 2010.
DOCTRINE:
- The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, sanction the immediate filing
of an information in the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even during
the pendency of a motion for reconsideration. Neither can it bar the arraignment of
the accused, which in the normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the
filing of the information.
- The court must proceed with the arraignment of an accused within 30 days from the
filing of the information or from the date the accused has appeared before the court in
which the charge is pending.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
Ramiscal was a retired AFP officer and former president of AFP-Retirement and
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). During his incumbency, the BOD of AFP-RSBS
approved the acquisition of 15,020 sq. m. of land for development as housing projects. On
August 1, 1997 AFP-RSBS as represented by Ramiscal Jr., and Flaviano the attorney-in-
fact of 12 individual vendors executed and signed a bilateral Deed of Sale (1st Deed) over
the subject property at the agreed price of P 10,500.00 per sq. m. After the payment @ P
10,500.00 per sq. m., Flaviano executed and signed a unilateral Deed of Sale (2nd Deed)
over the same property with a purchase price of P 3,000.00 per sq. m. Thereafter the 2nd
Deed was presented by Flaviano for registration which became the basis of the Certificate
of Title of the said property.
Ombudsman found Ramiscal et. al. probably guilty of violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA
3019 and falsification of public documents and filed in the Sandiganbayan 12
informations for violations of the same. 1st MR: panel of prosecutors still found probable
cause. Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the recommendation of the
panel of prosecutors, forwarded the same to the Sandiganbayan. 2nd MR was filed. Upon
receipt of the final findings of the Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
arraignment of petitioner. Ramiscal refused to enter e plea = plea of guilty and SB denied
petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his second motion
for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his second motion
for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him? NO!
- The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, sanction the immediate filing
of an information in the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even during
the pendency of a motion for reconsideration. Neither can it bar the arraignment of
the accused, which in the normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the
filing of the information.
- Military was not manifested before the Sandiganbayan as a final disposition of
The court must proceed with the arraignment of an accused within 30 days from the
filing of the information or from the date the accused has appeared before the court in
which the charge is pending.
FACTS:
- Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), with the rank of Brigadier General, when he served as President of
the AFP-Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP- RSBS) from 5 April 1994 to
27 July 1998.
- During Ramiscal’s term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees approved the
acquisition of 15,020 square meters of land situated in General Santos City for
development as housing projects.
- AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, as attorney-in-fact of
the 12 individual vendors, executed and signed bilateral deeds of sale over the subject
property, at the agreed price of P10,500.00 per square meter. Ramiscal forthwith
caused the payment to the individual vendors of the purchase price of P10,500.00 per
square meter of the property.
- Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same property. The
unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of only P3,000.00 per square meter
instead of the actual purchase price of P10,500.00 per square meter. Flaviano
presented the unilateral deeds of sale for registration. The unilateral deeds of sale
became the basis of the transfer certificates of title issued by the Register of Deeds of
General Santos City to AFP-RSBS.
- Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the first district of South
Cotabato, which includes General Santos City, filed in the Ombudsman a complaint-
affidavit against Ramiscal, along with 27 other respondents, for (1) violation of
Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act;
and (2) malversation of public funds or property through falsification of public
documents.
- Ombudsman found Ramiscal et. al. probably guilty of violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019
and falsification of public documents and filed in the Sandiganbayan 12 informations
for violations of the same.
70
- Ramiscal filed his first MR of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him.
Sandiganbayan disposed of petitioner’s first MR.
- The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP) recommended that petitioner be
excluded from the informations. On review, the Office of Legal Affairs (OMB-OLA)
recommended the contrary, stressing that petitioner participated in and affixed his
signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements,
vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the subject property. The memoranda of
OMB-OSP and OMB-OLA were forwarded for comment to the Office of the
Ombudsman for Military (OMB-Military). OMB-Military adopted the memorandum
of OMB-OSP recommending the dropping of petitioner’s name from the
informations. Acting Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio approved the
recommendation of the OMB-Military. However, the recommendation of the OMB-
petitioner’s first motion for reconsideration.
- A panel of prosecutors was tasked to review the records of the case. After thorough
review, the panel of prosecutors found that petitioner indeed participated in and
affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various
agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the property at the price of
P10,500.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors concluded that probable
cause existed for petitioner’s continued prosecution. Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas
N. Gutierrez approved the recommendation of the panel of prosecutors. Upon
receipt of the final findings of the Ombudsman, the Sandiganbayan scheduled the
arraignment of petitioner.
- Meanwhile, on 26 January 2006, petitioner filed his second motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him.
- On 26 February 2006, petitioner was arraigned. For his refusal to enter a plea, the
Sandiganbayan entered in his favor a plea of not guilty. On 9 March 2006, petitioner
filed a motion to set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his second motion
for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him.
- The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner’s 2nd MR of the Ombudsman’s finding
of probable cause against him was a prohibited pleading. The Sandiganbayan
explained that whatever defense or evidence petitioner may have should be ventilated
in the trial of the case. In its assailed 5 April 2006 Resolution, the Sandiganbayan
denied for lack of merit petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment
ISSUES: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment pending resolution of his second motion
for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him? NO!
HELD: No!
RATIO:
- The Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman, as amended by
Administrative Order No. 15, Series of 2001, sanction the immediate filing of an
information in the proper court upon a finding of probable cause, even during the
pendency of a motion for reconsideration. If the filing of a motion for reconsideration
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
of the resolution finding probable cause cannot bar the filing of the corresponding
information, then neither can it bar the arraignment of the accused, which in the
normal course of criminal procedure logically follows the filing of the information.
- Under Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8493, otherwise known as the Speedy Trial Act of
1998, the court must proceed with the arraignment of an accused within 30 days from
the filing of the information or from the date the accused has appeared before the
court in which the charge is pending, whichever is later. The 30-day period shall be
counted from the time the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused,
which is when the accused appears before the court.
- Under Section 7, Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,
petitioner can no longer file another motion for reconsideration questioning yet again
the same finding of the Ombudsman.
- The Court does not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s finding of probable
cause. The Ombudsman is endowed with a wide latitude of investigatory and
prosecutory prerogatives in the exercise of its power to pass upon criminal
complaints.
- suspended when the party “instituted judicial proceedings for investigation and
While it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine whether or not a
criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with
said court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full
control of the case. Absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not
interfere with the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction and control over a case properly filed
before it. The Sandiganbayan is empowered to proceed with the trial of the case in the
manner it determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination
of the case. There being no showing of grave abuse of discretion on its part, the
Sandiganbayan should continue its proceedings with all deliberate dispatch.
- The mere filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does not
by itself merit a suspension of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan unless a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued
against the Sandiganbayan.
E.PRESCRIPTION
1. PANAGUITON V. DOJ, G.R. NO. 167571, NOVEMBER 25, 2008 – LUCENARIO
Panaguiton vs. DOJ
Emergency Recitation:
 CAWILI and his business associate TONGSON filed 3 checks in favor of
PANAGUITON as payment for a loan.
 1993 - The 3 checks were dishonored and they didn’t pay. PANAGUITON filed a
complaint for violation of BP 22 with the QC Prosector’s Office.
 1995 – DOJ found probable cause against CAWILI only and dismissed against
TONGSON.
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o PANAGUITON appealed the dismissal against TONGSON
 1997 – Chief State Prosecutor ordered reinvestigation against TONGSON.
 1999 – Assistant Prosecutor did not conduct the reinvestigation and ordered
the case dismissed against TONGSON on the ground of prescription. Basis was
that Act No. 3326 provides that the action for violation of special acts (i.e. BP
22) prescribed in 4 years, and such period is interrupted only when
proceedings are instituted. In this case, the cause of action accrued in 1993
when the checks bounced. So now it has prescribed.
 PANAGUITON contends that the period has been interrupted since he already
instituted proceedings when he filed a complaint with the Prosecutor’s office.
 ISSUE: W/N the action has prescribed.  NO
 HELD: Case has not prescribed!
Ratio:
Act No. 3326 provides that the period of 4 years is interrupted by the institution of
proceedings. We have to understand that in 1926 when it was passed, the justice of the
peace had the function of performing preliminary investigation. Hence, the period was
punishment” since this was the first step taken in the investigation or examination of
offenses partakes the nature of a judicial proceeding. But this is no longer the current
procedure! The SC explained beautifully:
 While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act
No. 3326 appear before "investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the
subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for
purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive
branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either executive
or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and
judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification,
any kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person
which may ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll
prescription.
Reason for this interpretation: The injured party cannot be deprived the right to
obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. When he
initiated the proceedings with the prosecutor’s office, it was not his fault that it took the
office all those years to act on it.
FACTS:
 1992 – Rodrigo CAWILI borrowed various sums of money amounting
to P1,979,459.00 from Luis PANAGUITON.
 Jan. 8, 1993 – Both CAWILI and his business associate Ramon TONGSON issued
and signed 3 checks to cover the amount. These, however, were dishonored for
inusfficiency of funds or closure of account. PANAGUITON made a demand for
payment but to no avail.
 Aug. 24, 1995 – PANAGUITON filed a complaint for violation of BP 22 against
CAWILI and TONGSON before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
 During the preliminary investigation, only TONGSON appeared and filed his
counter-affidavit. He claimed that he had been unjustly included as party-
respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to Cawili in the latter's
personal capacity. Moreover, like petitioner, he had lent various sums to Cawili
and in appreciation of his services, he was offered to be an officer of Roma Oil
Corporation. He averred that he was not Cawili's business associate; in fact, he
himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of B.P. Blg.
22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that
his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
 PANAGUITON countered by presenting several documents showing Tongson's
signatures, which were purportedly the same as the those appearing on the
checks. He also showed a copy of an affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson
himself had claimed to be Cawili's business associate.
 Dec. 6, 1995 – City Prosecutor III Eliodoro V. Lara found probable cause only
against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson.
 Case vs. CAWILI was pursued. PANAGUITON filed a partial appeal with DOJ with
respect to the dismissal of the case vs. TONGSON.
 July 11, 1997 - Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zunñ o directed the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against
Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).
 March 15, 1999 - Assistant City Prosecutor Ma. Lelibet S. Sampaga (ACP
Sampaga) dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the
matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. She stated that :
o The case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as
amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall
prescribe after four (4) years. In this case, the four (4)-year period
started on the date the checks were dishonored, or on 20 January
1993 and 18 March 1993. The filing of the complaint before the
Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not interrupt the
running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial,
and not administrative proceedings. Thus, considering that from 1993
to 1998, more than four (4) years had already elapsed and no
information had as yet been filed against Tongson, the alleged
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 imputed to him had already prescribed.
 PANAGUITON appealed to DOJ – but DOJ ruled that the action has prescribed.
On MR, DOJ reversed and found that it had not prescribed. But on another MR,
DOJ again reversed and found that the action has prescribed.
 Basis of DOJ: Zaldivia v. Reyes, a case involving the violation of a municipal
ordinance, in declaring that the prescriptive period is tolled only upon filing of
the information in court.
 PANAGUITON contends that what is applicable in this case is Ingco v.
Sandiganbayan, wherein this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with
the fiscal's office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of
the prescriptive period.
 Petitioner also notes that the Ingco case similarly involved the violation of a
special law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, petitioner notes. He argues that sustaining the DOJ's and
72
the Court of Appeals' pronouncements would result in grave injustice to him
since the delays in the present case were clearly beyond his control
ISSUE: W/N the action for violation of BP 22 has prescribed  NO.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals
dated 29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
resolution of the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the
petitioner.
RATIO:
Act No. 3326 entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable
to offenses under special laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods. The
pertinent provisions read:
 Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided
in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after
four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but
less than two years; (c) x x x
 Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation
and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against
the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed
for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
We agree that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P.
Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more
than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes
in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the
time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, we cannot uphold the position that only
the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.
HISTORY:
When Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of
criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law,
"institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the
prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace
for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.
But the procedure is different now! In People v. Olarte, SC held that the filing of the
complaint in the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary
examination or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the
criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed
cannot try the case on the merits. In addition, even if the court where the complaint or
information is filed may only proceed to investigate the case, its actuations already
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
represent the initial step of the proceedings against the offender, and hence, the
prescriptive period should be interrupted.
In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which involved violations
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019) and the Intellectual Property
Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both special laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive
period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation
against the accused.
In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources
Corporation, et al., the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation
conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised
Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation
conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive
period.
The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case53 is instructive, thus:
While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of
Act No. 3326 appears before "investigation and punishment" in the old
law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the
charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of
the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood
either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment
stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding
instituted against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his
prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.
Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication
on account of delays that are not under his control.
A clear example would be this case, wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24
August 1995, well within the four (4)-year prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed
his appeals and his motions for reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against
Tongson. He went through the proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However,
from the time petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City
Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an
aggregate period of nine (9) years had elapsed. Clearly, the delay was beyond petitioner's
control. After all, he had already initiated the active prosecution of the case as early as 24
August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its
misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on
their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer
unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the
accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
2. PEOPLE V. ROMULADEZ, G.R. NO. 166510, APRIL 29, 2009 – MAGTAGNOB
People v Romualdez
73
Topic: Prescription
EMERGENCY DIGEST
Quick Facts:
Romualdez was charged with violation of Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The
information from 1976 to February 1986, Romualdez, being then the governor of Leyte,
used his influence (brother-in-law or Marcos) and held another position as ambassador
to China, Saudi Arabia and USA while still performing his duties as Governor. He also
received compensation for his services.
Romualdez moved to quash the information on the ground of prescription, saying that
the 15-year prescriprion under the Anti-Graft law has lapsed. The preliminary
investigation of the case for an offense committed on or about and during the
period from 1976 to February 1986 commenced only in May 2001 after a Division
of the Sandiganbayan referred the matter to the Office of the Ombudsman.
Sandiganbayan- quashed the info on another ground (mentioned also in the motion), but
did not find merit on the argument of prescription.
Romualdez did not appeal the decision of not finding merit on the argument of
prescription as the information was still quashed.
People appealed. Subsequently, the court found GADLEJ in the act of Sandiganbayan in
quashing the information.
Romualdez appealed and again raised the argument that the action is already barred by
prescription.
Issue: W/N The action has prescribed. – YES, it has prescribed.
Ratio:
The act complained of happened during the period of 1976 until February 1986.
However, the subject criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan only on 5
November 2001, following a preliminary investigation that commenced only on 4 June
2001. The time span that elapsed from the alleged commission of the offense up to the
filing of the subject cases is clearly beyond the 15 year prescriptive period provided
under Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 3019.
Even though the PCGG had attempted to file similar criminal cases against Romualdez on
22 February 1989, said cases were quashed based on prevailing jurisprudence that
informations filed by the PCGG and not the Office of the Special Prosecutor/Office of the
Ombudsman are null and void for lack of authority on the part of the PCGG to file the
same. Hence, it did not toll the running of the prescriptive period.
The rule is that for criminal violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft law), the
prescriptive period is tolled only when the Office of the Ombudsman receives a
complaint or otherwise initiates its investigation.
Doctrine:
 For criminal violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the prescriptive period (15 years)
is tolled only when the Office of the Ombudsman receives a complaint or
otherwise initiates its investigation.
 The action intiated by the PCGG did not toll the running of the prescriptive
period because it is not a proper body.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
COMPLETE DIGEST:
Facts:
The Office of the Ombudsman charged Romualdez before the Sandiganbayan with
violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), as amended, otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Information reads:
That on or about and during the period from 1976 to February 1986 or sometime prior
or subsequent thereto xxx accused Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, a public officer being
then the Provincial Governor of the Province of Leyte, while in the performance of his
official function, committing the offense in relation to his Office, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and criminally with evident bad faith, cause undue injury to the
Government in the following manner: accused public officer being then the elected
Provincial Governor of Leyte and without abandoning said position, and using his
influence with his brother-in-law, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, had himself
appointed and/or assigned as Ambassador to foreign countries, particularly the People's
Republic of China (Peking), Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Jeddah), and United States of
America (Washington D.C.), knowing fully well that such appointment and/or assignment
is in violation of the existing laws as the Office of the Ambassador or Chief of Mission is
incompatible with his position as Governor of the Province of Leyte, thereby enabling
himself to collect dual compensation from both the Department of Foreign Affairs and the
Provincial Government of Leyte in the amount of US $276,911.56 or its equivalent
amount of P5,806,709.50 xxx to the damage and prejudice of the Government in the
aforementioned amount of P5,806,709.50.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Romualdez moved to quash the information on two grounds, namely: (1) that the facts
alleged in the information do not constitute the offense with which the accused was
charged; and (2) that the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by
prescription.
(will focus on Prescription)
To support his prescription argument, Romualdez posited that the 15-year
prescription under Section 11 of R.A. 3019 had lapsed since the preliminary
investigation of the case for an offense committed on or about and during the
period from 1976 to February 1986 commenced only in May 2001 after a Division
of the Sandiganbayan referred the matter to the Office of the Ombudsman. He
argued that there was no interruption of the prescriptive period for the offense because
the proceedings undertaken under the 1987 complaint filed with the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) were null and void pursuant to the Supreme
Court's ruling in Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG and Cruz, Jr. [sic]. He likewise argued that the
Revised Penal Code provision that prescription does not run when the offender is absent
from the Philippines should not apply to his case, as he was charged with an offense not
covered by the Revised Penal Code; the law on the prescription of offenses punished
under special laws (Republic Act No. 3326) does not contain any rule similar to that
found in the Revised Penal Code.
74
The People opposed the motion to quash. On the issue of prescription, the People argued
that Section 15, Article XI of the Constitution provides that the right of the State to
recover properties unlawfully acquired by public officials or employees, from them or
from their nominees or transferees, shall not be barred by prescription, laches or
estoppel, and that prescription is a matter of technicality to which no one has a vested
right.
Sandiganbayan - granted Romualdez' motion to quash in the first Resolution assailed in
this petition on the ground that the information did not constitute the offense charged.
BUT Sandiganbayan found no merit in Romualdez' prescription argument.
People filed an MR re quashal on the ground that the information did not constitute the
offense charged- Sandiganbayan denied the MR. (NOTE: Romualdez did not appeal re his
prescription argument which the Sandiganbayan found not to have merit).
People filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 (NOT re prescription) Romualdez
responded with a Motion to Dismiss with Comment Ad Cautelam, wherein he xxx
likewise raised before this Court his argument that the criminal action or liability had
already been extinguished by prescription, which argument was debunked by the
Sandiganbayan.
The Court ruled in favor of People, granting the petition for certiorari. The Decision then
proceeded to determine that the quashal of the information was indeed attended with
grave abuse of discretion, the information having sufficiently alleged the elements of
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, the offense with which Romualdez was charged.
Romualdez filed a Motion for Reconsideration, placing renewed focus on his
argument that the criminal charge against him had been extinguished on account
of prescription.
Court- denied Romualdez’s MR, saying “We did not rule on the issue of prescription
because the Sandiganbayan's ruling on this point was not the subject of the People's
petition for certiorari. While Romualdez asserted in his Motion to Dismiss Ad Cautelam
filed with us that prescription had set in, he did not file his own petition to assail this
aspect of the Sandiganbayan ruling, hence he is deemed to have accepted it; he cannot
now assert that in the People's petition that sought the nullification of the Sandiganbayan
ruling on some other ground, we should pass upon the issue of prescription he raised in
his motion.”
Hence this second motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether the action against Romualdez has already prescribed. – YES, it has prescribed.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the Second Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision
dated 23 July 2008 and the Resolution dated 9 September 2008 in the instant case are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Petition is HEREBY DISMISSED. No pronouncements as
to costs.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
RATIO:
Romualdez was charged with violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, committed “on or about and during the period from 1976 to
February 1986”. However, the subject criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan
only on 5 November 2001, following a preliminary investigation that commenced only on
4 June 2001. The time span that elapsed from the alleged commission of the offense up to
the filing of the subject cases is clearly beyond the 15 year prescriptive period provided
under Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 3019.
Admittedly, the PCGG had attempted to file similar criminal cases against
Romualdez on 22 February 1989. However, said cases were quashed based on prevailing
jurisprudence that informations filed by the PCGG and not the Office of the Special
Prosecutor/Office of the Ombudsman are null and void for lack of authority on the part of
the PCGG to file the same. This made it necessary for the Office of the Ombudsman as the
competent office to conduct the required preliminary investigation to enable the filing of
the present charges.
The initial filing of the complaint in 1989 or the preliminary investigation by
the PCGG that preceded it could not have interrupted the 15-year prescription
period under Rep. Act No. 3019. As held in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, the investigatory
power of the PCGG extended only to alleged ill-gotten wealth cases, absent previous
authority from the President for the PCGG to investigate such graft and corruption cases
involving the Marcos cronies. Accordingly, the preliminary investigation conducted by the
PCGG leading to the filing of the first information is void ab initio, and thus could not be
considered as having tolled the 15-year prescriptive period, notwithstanding the general
rule that the commencement of preliminary investigation tolls the prescriptive period.
After all, a void ab initio proceeding such as the first preliminary investigation by the
PCGG could not be accorded any legal effect by this Court.
The rule is that for criminal violations of Rep. Act No. 3019, the prescriptive
period is tolled only when the Office of the Ombudsman receives a complaint or
otherwise initiates its investigation. As such preliminary investigation was
commenced more than fifteen (15) years after the imputed acts were committed, the
offense had already prescribed as of such time.
Further, the flaw was so fatal that the information could not have been cured or
resurrected by mere amendment, as a new preliminary investigation had to be
undertaken, and evidence had again to be adduced before a new information could be
filed. The rule may well be that the amendment of a criminal complaint retroacts to the
time of the filing of the original complaint. Yet such rule will not apply when the original
information is void ab initio, thus incurable by amendment.
The situation herein differs from that in the recent case of SEC v. Interport, where the
Court had occasion to reexamine the principles governing the prescription of offenses
punishable under special laws. Therein, the Court found that the investigative
proceedings conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission had tolled the
prescriptive period for violations of the Revised Securities Act, even if no subsequent
criminal cases were instituted within the prescriptive period. The basic difference lies in
75
the fact that no taint of invalidity had attached to the authority of the SEC to conduct such
investigation, whereas the preliminary investigation conducted herein by the PCGG is
simply void ab initio for want of authority.
Indeed the Court in 2006 had the opportunity to favorably rule on the same issue of
prescription on similar premises raised by the same respondent. In Romualdez v. Marcelo
as in this case, the original preliminary investigation was conducted by the PCGG, which
then acted as complainant in the complaint filed with the Sandiganbayan. Given that it
had been settled that such investigation and information filed by the PCGG was null and
void, the Court proceeded to rule that “[i]n contemplation of the law, no proceedings exist
that could have merited the suspension of the prescriptive periods.” Besides, the only
proceeding that could interrupt the running of prescription is that which is filed or
initiated by the offended party before the appropriate body or office. Thus, in the case
of People v. Maravilla, this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint with the municipal
mayor for purposes of preliminary investigation had the effect of suspending the period
of prescription. Similarly, in the case of Llenes v. Dicdican, this Court held that the filing of
a complaint against a public officer with the Ombudsman tolled the running of the period
of prescription.
In the case at bar, however, the complaint was filed with the wrong body, the
PCGG. Thus, the same could not have interrupted the running of the prescriptive
periods.
It would be specious to fault Romualdez for failing to challenge the Sandiganbayan’s
pronouncement that prescription had not arisen in his favor. The Sandiganbayan quashed
the information against him, the very same relief he had sought as he invoked the
prescription argument. Why would Romualdez challenge such ruling favorable to him on
motion for reconsideration or in a separate petition before a higher court?
Notably, private respondent had already raised the issue of prescription in the very
first responsive pleading he filed before the Court – the Motion to Dismiss with Comment
Ad Cautelam dated 14 April 2005.
3. DISINI V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R. NO.169823, SEPTEMBER 11, 2013 – MUTI
Muti: Long and kagulo yung case. Tried my best to explain. First ER is in my own words. The
expanded ratio is in the court’s words just in case you don’t want my own words lol. 
ER: DISINI, a close associate of Marcos and husband of Imelda’s first cousin, was charged
in two informations for the crime of corruption of public officials under RPC and
violation of R.A. 3019. In summary, the informations provide that DISINI had offered,
promised and given gifts and presents to Marcos in consideration of obtaining for Burns
& Roe and Westinghouse the contracts, respectively, to do the engineering and
architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP (Power Plant in Bataan). Disini moved
to quash the information on the ground of prescription, among others. Issue is whether
the offenses charged in the informations have prescribed. NO!
Impt dates for reference:
1974: contracts were awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse
1982: effectivity of B.P. 195
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
1986: PCGG investigation led to the discovery of the unlawful act
1991: filing of criminal complaint
R.A. 3019 provides that the prescriptive period is 15 yrs. However, Pacificador case
provides that the 15yr-period would not apply to crimes committed prior to the
effectivity of B.P. 195 which amended the period from 10 to 15 yrs. The information
alleged that the crime was committed from 1974 to 1986. Thus, the prescription period
in this case should be 10yrs.
Now, when will the 10yr start to run? Commission of crime. If not known, from the time
of discovery. Disini contends that it should start in 1974 when the contracts were
awarded. SC says no. During the Marcos regime, no person would dare to assail the
legality of those contracts so they were assumed regular. Further, the unlawful acts were
only discovered by the PCGG in its investigation in 1986. Therefore, 1986 is the starting
point.
Lastly, when is it interrupted? Filing the complaint or information in the office of the
public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation. Here, the complaint was
filed in 1991. Only five years have (1986-1991). NO PRESCRIPTION!
Expanded emergency ratio
1) Period of prescription (10 yrs)
RPC: 15 yrs. R.A. 3019: 15 yrs din but prior to its amendment, the prescriptive period
was only 10 years. It became settled in People v. Pacificador, however, that the longer
prescriptive period of 15years would not apply to crimes committed prior to the
effectivity of B.P. 195, which was approved in 1982, because the longer period could not
be given retroactive effect for not being favorable to the accused. Thus, with the
information alleging the period from 1974 to 1986 as the time of the commission of the
crime charged, the applicable prescriptive period is 10 years.
2) When prescription starts to run (1986)
RPC: day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents. R.A. No. 3019: day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
DISINI argues that the prescriptive period began to run from 1974, the time when the
contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse.
Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widely-known nature of the PNPPP, the
unlawful acts or transactions in relation to it were discovered only through the PCGG’s
exhaustive investigation. Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a
public character, enjoyed the presumption of their execution having been regularly done
in the course of official functions. Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no
person would have dared to assail the legality of the transactions, it would be
unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior
to 1986.
3) When prescriptive period is interrupted (1991)
Prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person. The prevailing rule is that irrespective of whether the offense charged is
punishable by the RPC or by a special law, it is the filing of the complaint or information
in the office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the preliminary investigation that
interrupts the period of prescription.
76
Consequently, prescription did not yet set in because only five years elapsed from 1986,
the time of the discovery of the offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of
the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman.
FACTS:
 The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations charging DISINI in the
Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, penalized under Article 212 in
relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (First case/Criminal Case No.
28001), and with a violation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act 3019 (R.A. No. 3019),
also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Second case/Criminal Case
No. 28002).
Gist of information for first case:
 HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with the then President
Marcos, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offer, promise and
give gifts and presents to Marcos xxx all for and in consideration of accused Disini
seeking and obtaining for Burns and Roe and Westinghouse Electrical Corporation
(Westinghouse), the contracts to do the engineering and architectural design and to
construct, respectively, the Project,
o said Ferdinand E. Marcos, taking undue advantage of his position and
committing the offense in relation to his office and in consideration of the
aforesaid gifts and presents, did award or cause to be awarded to said
Burns and Roe and Westinghouse, the contracts to do the engineering and
architectural design and to construct the Project, respectively, which acts
constitute the crime of corruption of public officials.
Gist of information for second case:
 HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring together and confederating with MARCOS, being
then the close personal friend and golfing partner of Marcos, and being further the
husband of the first cousin of then First Lady Imelda and family physician of the
Marcos family, taking advantage of such close personal relation, intimacy and free
access, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally, in connection with the
Philippine Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP)Project ("PROJECT") of the National Power
Corporation (NPC) at Morong, Bataan:
o request and receive from Burns and Roe, a foreign consultant, the total
amount of $1,000,000.00,more or less, and also from Westinghouse
Electric Corporation(WESTINGHOUSE), $17,000,000.00, more or less, both
of which entities were then having business, transaction, and application
with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, all for and in
consideration of accused DISINI securing and obtaining, the contract for
the said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do the engineering and
architectural design, and construct, respectively, the said PROJECT xxxx
 DISINI filed a motion to quash, alleging that the criminal actions had been
extinguished by prescription, and that the informations did not conform to the
prescribed form. The Prosecution opposed the motion to quash.
 DISINI voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to obtain the Sandiganbayan’s
favorable action on his motion for permission to travel abroad. He then entered a
plea of not guilty to both informations.
 The Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated its first assailed resolution denying
the motion to quash. Motion for reconsideration was also denied.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
ISSUE: Whether the offenses charged in the informations have prescribed – NO! (there
are a number of crimpro issues but this case is under prescription so I will only tackle the
prescription part)
RATIO:
 In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be considered, namely: (1)
the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time when the period of
prescription starts to run; and (3) the time when the prescriptive period is
interrupted.
The period of prescription for the offense charged
 The crime of corruption of public officials charged in the first case is punished by
Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code with the" same penalties imposed upon the
officer corrupted." Conformably with Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code, 27 the
period of prescription for this specie of corruption of public officials charged against
Disini is 15 years.
 As for the second case, Disini was charged with a violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No.
3019. By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in
15 years.
o Prior to the amendment, the prescriptive period was only 10 years. It
became settled in People v. Pacificador, 28 however, that the longer
prescriptive period of 15years would not apply to crimes committed prior
to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on
March 16, 1982, because the longer period could not be given retroactive
effect for not being favorable to the accused. With the information alleging
the period from 1974 to February1986 as the time of the commission of
the crime charged, the applicable prescriptive period is 10 years in
order to accord with People v. Pacificador .
The time when the period of prescription starts to run
 For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof provides that
prescription starts to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents.
 As to offenses punishable by R.A. No. 3019, Section 2 of R.A. No. 3326 29 states:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The time when the prescriptive period is interrupted
 The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
Application to the case at bar:
 Xxx we held in a catena of cases, that if the violation of the special law was not
known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the
discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime which is the
subject herein, commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the
77
Committee made an exhaustive investigation. When the complaint was filed in 1997,
only five years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in. The rationale
for this was succinctly discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans, that "it was well-high impossible for the State, the
aggrieved party, to have known these crimes committed prior to the 1986 EDSA
Revolution, because of the alleged connivance and conspiracy among involved public
officials and the beneficiaries of the loans." In yet another pronouncement, in the
2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R.
No. 130817), the Court held that during the Marcos regime, no person would have
dared to question the legality of these transactions.
 Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive period began to
run from 1974, the time when the contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded to
Burns & Roe and Westinghouse. Although the criminal cases were the offshoot of the
sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth instead of behest loans like in
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the
connivance and conspiracy among the public officials involved and the beneficiaries
of the favors illegally extended rendered it similarly well-nigh impossible for the
State, as the aggrieved party, to have known of the commission of the crimes charged
prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986. Notwithstanding the highly publicized and
widely-known nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or transactions in relation to it
were discovered only through the PCGG’s exhaustive investigation, resulting in the
establishment of a prima facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case No.
0013 against Disini. Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a
public character, enjoyed the presumption of their execution having been regularly
done in the course of official functions. 32
 Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to
assail the legality of the transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the
discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986.
 We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their records transmitted
by the PCGG to the Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991for the conduct the
preliminary investigation.33 In accordance with Article 91 of the Revised Penal
Code34 and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, 35 the filing of the
criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively interrupted the
running of the period of prescription. According to Panaguiton:
o In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which
involved violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No.
3019) and the Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293), which are both
special laws, the Court ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by
the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the
accused.
 In the more recent case of Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport
Resources Corporation, the Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the
investigation conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of
the Revised Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts
the prescriptive period.
o The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive,
thus: While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
2 of Act No. 3326 appears before" investigation and punishment" in the old
law, with the subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the
charge for purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of
the executive branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood
either executive or judicial in character: executive when it involves the
investigation phase and judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment
stage. With this clarification, any kind of investigative proceeding instituted
against the guilty person which may ultimately lead to his prosecution
should be sufficient to toll prescription.
 The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense charged is
punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the
complaint or information in the office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the
preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of prescription. Consequently,
prescription did not yet set in because only five years elapsed from 1986, the time of
the discovery of the offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of the
criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman.
F.CONTROL AND DIRECTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION
1. PINOTE V. AYCO, 477 SCRA 409 – NARVASA
State Prosecutor Pinote v. Judge Ayco
Topic: Control and Direction of Criminal Action
ER: Judge allowed the defense to present 2 witnesses in the absence of the State
prosecutor. Allowed the latter to cross-examine them though, but prosecutor refused—
saying the proceedings mentioned are void. Filed a complaint against Judge for gross
ignorance of the law, and abuse of authority.
As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and
direction of the public prosecutor. Crimes are an affront to the Philippine People as a
whole, and this is the reason why a public prosecutor is necessary – to protect state
interest, vindicate the rule of law. Judge’s act of allowing the presentation of the defense
witnesses in the absence of complainant public prosecutor is a clear transgression of the
Rules which could not be rectified by subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to
cross-examine the witnesses. Judge Ayco is hereby ordered to pay a fine of P5,000.00
with warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
Facts:
Judge Roberto L. Ayco (RTC) allowed the defense in “People v. Vice Mayor Salvador
Ramos” for violation of Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, to present
evidence, consisting of the testimony of two witnesses, even in the absence of State
Prosecutor Pinote who was prosecuting the case.
State Prosecutor Pinote was undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart
Center in Quezon City at such times.
On the subsequent scheduled hearings of the criminal case, State Prosecutor Pinote
refused to cross-examine the two defense witnesses, despite being ordered by Judge
Ayco, he maintaining that the proceedings conducted in his absence were void.
78
State Prosecutor Pinote subsequently filed a Manifestation saying Judge Ayco’s act
of allowing the defense to present evidence in his absence was erroneous and highly
irregular. He thus prayed that he should not be “coerced” to cross-examine those two
defense witnesses and that their testimonies be stricken off the record.
 Judge Ayco, instead considered the prosecution to have waived its right to cross-
examine the two defense witnesses.
Prosecutor Pinote filed against Judge Ayco a complaint for “Gross Ignorance of the
Law, Grave Abuse of Authority and Serious Misconduct.”
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA): finds respondent to have breached Rule
110 Sec 519 and accordingly recommends that he be reprimanded.
SC:
 As a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and
direction of the public prosecutor.
 If the schedule of the public prosecutor does not permit, however, or in case
there are no public prosecutors, a private prosecutor may be authorized in
writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecution
Office to prosecute the case, subject to the approval of the court.
o Once so authorized, the private prosecutor shall continue to prosecute
the case until the termination of the trial even in the absence of a
public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise
withdrawn.
 Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a
whole and not merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the
complaining witness.
o This is the reason why a public prosecutor is necessary – to protect
state interest, vindicate the rule of law.
 Judge’s act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the absence
of complainant public prosecutor is a clear transgression of the Rules which
could not be rectified by subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to cross-
examine the witnesses.
19
Sec. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions. - All criminal actions commenced by a
complaint or information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule or in the event of lack of public prosecutors,
the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the Prosecution Office
or the Regional State Prosecution Office to prosecute the case subject to the approval of the
Court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private prosecutor shall
continue to prosecute the case up to the end of the trial even in the absence of a public
prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
2. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS V. WHELAN, G.R. NO. 190487, APRIL 13, 2011 –
ORTIZ
DOCTRINES:
 A criminal case may be dismissed after an initial finding of probable cause by
the prosecutor, the issuance of an information, and a complaint has been filed in
court, when the Secretary of Justice reconsiders the existence of probable cause
and orders the withdrawal of the information.
 An MR on a criminal case without the public prosecutors participation will not
be acted on.
 Government agencies and instrumentalities should be represented in cases by
the OSG.
ER: MSPI caused the importation of bet slips and facilitated its release from Clark Special
Economic Zone, without paying duties and taxes. Bureau of Customs filed a criminal
complaint against the officers of MSPI before the DOJ. The state prosecutor found
probable cause and recommended the filing of informations against them with the CTA.
The Secretary of Justice reversed the finding of the State Prosecutor and ordered the
withdrawal of the information. BoC filed MR to the SOJ, denied. BOC, elevated the matter
to CA. Meanwhile, the Prosecutor filed before the CTA a Motion to Withdraw Information
with Leave of Court. BoC filed an oppostion. CTA granted the prosecutor’s motion to
withdraw and dismissed the complaint. BoC filed a MR to CTA, CTA merely noted the MR
without action
ISSUE: w/n CTA gravely abused its discretion by merely noting without action
petitioner‘s MR. (NO)
 All criminal actions commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted
under the direction and control of public prosecutors. In the prosecution of
special laws, the exigencies of public service sometimes require the designation
of special prosecutors from different government agencies to assist the public
prosecutor. The designation does not, however, detract from the public
prosecutor having control and supervision over the case.
Facts:
Mark Sensing Philippines, Inc. (MSPI) caused the importation of 255, 870,000 pieces of
finished bet slips and 205, 200 rolls of finished thermal papers from June 2005 to
January 2007. MSPI facilitated the release of the shipment from the Clark Special
Economic Zone (CSEZ), where it was brought, to the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO) for its lotto operations in Luzon. MSPI did not pay duties or taxes,
prompting the Bureau of Customs (petitioner) to file, under its Run After The Smugglers
(RATS) Program, a criminal complaint before the Department of Justice against herein
respondents MSPI Chairman Peter Sherman, Managing Director Michael Whelan, Country
Manager Atty. Ofelia B. Cajigal and Finance Manager and Corporate Secretary Teodoro B.
Lingan, along with Erick B. Ariarte and Ricardo J. Ebuna and Eugenio Pasco, licensed
customs broker who acted as agents of MSPI, for violation the Tariff and Customs Code of
the Philippines.
The state prosecutor found probable cause against respondents and accordingly
recommended the filing of Information against them.
Respondents filed a petition for review before the Secretary of Justice during the
pendency of which the Information was filed before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).The
information charged forty (40) unlawful importations of 255, 870 pieces of finished
79
printed bet slips and 205, 200 rolls of finished thermal papers from Australia worth
around $1.2 M imported and delivered from Clark Special Economic Zone to the PCSO
with taxes worth around Php 15.9 M.
However, the Secretary of Justice reversed the State Prosecutor’s Resolution and
accordingly directed the withdrawal of the Information. Bureau of Customs filed an MR
to SoJ which was denied.
Bureau of Customs elevated the case by petition for certiorari to the CA while the
Prosecutor Lao-Tamano filed before the CTA a Motion to Withdraw Information with
Leave of Court to which petitioner filed an Opposition.
Respondents, on their part, moved for the dismissal of the Information. CTA granted the
withdrawal and dismissed the information. Bureau of Custom’s MR to CTA was noted
without action.
Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether the CTA gravely abused its discretion by merely noting without action
petitioner‘s MR. (NO)
Held:
It is well-settled that prosecution of crimes pertains to the executive department of the
government whose principal power and responsibility is to insure that laws are faithfully
executed. Corollary to this power is the right to prosecute violators. All criminal actions
commenced by complaint or information are prosecuted under the direction and control
of public prosecutors. In the prosecution of special laws, the exigencies of public service
sometimes require the designation of special prosecutors from different government
agencies to assist the public prosecutor. The designation does not, however, detract from
the public prosecutor having control and supervision over the case.
The CTA noted without action petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration. By merely noting
without action petitioner‘s motion for reconsideration, the CTA did not gravely abuse its
discretion. For, as stated earlier, a public prosecutor has control and supervision over the
cases. The participation in the case of a private complainant, like petitioner, is limited to
that of a witness, both in the criminal and civil aspect of the case.
Parenthetically, petitioner is not represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
in instituting the present petition, which contravenes established doctrine that "the OSG
shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and
its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation, or matter requiring the
services of lawyers.
IN FINE, as petitioner’s MR of the CTA Resolution did not bear the imprimatur of the
public prosecutor to which the control of the prosecution of the case belongs, the present
petition fails.
3. FLORES V. GONZALES, G.R. NO. 188197, AUGUST 03, 2010 - PEREZ DE
TAGLE
DOCTRINE: THE TRIAL COURT IS NOT BOUND TO ADOPT THE RESOLUTION OF THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, IN SPITE OF BEING AFFIRMED BY THE APPELLATE COURTS, SINCE IT IS MANDATED TO
INDEPENDENTLY EVALUATE OR ASSESS THE MERITS OF THE CASE AND IT MAY EITHER AGREE OR
DISAGREE WITH THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE. RELIANCE ON THE
RESOLUTION OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ALONE WOULD BE AN ABDICATION OF THE TRIAL COURT’S
DUTY AND JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE A PRIMA FACIE CASE.
*A lot of procedural stuffs happened in this case. FYI.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
ER:
Facts
 Flores files a complaint affidavit against Lim before the City Prosecutor of Cebu
City for estafa. [DENIED – NO PROBABLE CAUSE]
o Flores – MR [DENIED]
 Flores – Petition for Review with SOJ [DENIED]
o Flores – MR [GRANTED!!]
o Prosecutor ordered to file the case with the MTTC. Prosecutor files
case with the MTCC
 Lim – MR with SOJ to annul the above order [GRANTED!]
o Prosecutor files Motion to Withdraw with MTCC [DENIED!]
 MTCC explains that it can decide w/n there is probable cause
by its own self.
 Lim – MR
 Flores – certiorari with the CA to annul order of the SOJ which led to the Motion
to Withdraw
o DENIED
 Flores – Rule 45 to the SC
 MTCC – suspends proceedings in anticipation of final ruling of CA certiorari
case.
Issue (main):
 WHETHER OR NOT THE JUNE 20, 2007 RESOLUTION OF THE MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT, DENYING RESPONDENT LIM’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW
INFORMATION AND FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE, RENDERED THE
DISPOSITION OF THE PETITION BEFORE [THE] COURT OF APPEALS
ACADEMIC [yes]
Held:
 The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, in
spite of being affirmed by the appellate courts, since it is mandated to
independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case and it may either agree
or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance on
the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would be an abdication of the
trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case
 This was precisely what the MTCC did when it denied the Motion to Withdraw
Information in its June 20, 2007 Resolution, and it correctly did so. In view of
the above disquisitions, and while the disposition of the issue of whether or not
the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion in not finding
probable cause against Lim may be persuasive, the MTCC is not bound to
dismiss the case or to withdraw the Information. For these reasons, the petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals has effectively become moot and
academic.
COMPLETE
Facts:
80
 Flores filed a complaint affidavit against Lim for estafa before the City
Prosecutor of Cebu City.
o Basically, Flores alleged that Lim tricked him and his fellow
incorporators of Enviroboard Manufacturing (EMI) into buying several
pieces of compact processing equipment from a company called
Compak. It turned out that Lim was connected to Bendez International
(Bendez), which was the exclusive distributor of Compak equipment.
o Lim allegedly lied about the price of the equipment and
misrepresented that he cancelled the sale of one of the equipment
when, actually, he didn’t!
 The City Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution dated January 16, 2005
dismissing the complaint for lack of probable cause.
o MR of Flores DENIED.
 Petition for Review of Flores to Secretary of Justice DENIED.
o MR of Flores was GRANTED!
 Thus, due to the MR of Flores, the SOJ directed the Prosecutor to file the case in
the MTCC. So it was filed with the MTCC.
 Meanwhile, Lim files an MR with the SOJ regarding the order that compelled the
Prosecutor to file the case with the MTCC. GRANTED!!
o Flores filed a petition for certiorari with the CA to annul this.
 While the CA certiorari case was pending, the Prosecutor filed a Motion to
Withdraw in the MTCC to comply with the SOJ’s order (from Lim’s MR).
o MTCC denies!! It explains that it has already acquired jurisdiction and
therefore can determine for itself whether there is probable cause or
not. It is not bound by the SOJ’s determination it says.
 Lim then MR’s this order of the MTCC
 Finally, the MTCC suspends its proceedings while the CA certiorari case
remains pending.
 Eventually, the CA rules that the last order of the SOJ (granting Lim’s MR and
ultimately leading to the Motion to Withdraw) was perfectly valid.
o Flores, aggrieved, files a Rule 45 Petition for Review on certiorari to
challenge this ruling.
Issues
I. WHETHER OR NOT THE JUNE 20, 2007 RESOLUTION OF THE MUNICIPAL
TRIAL COURT, DENYING RESPONDENT LIM’S MOTION TO WITHDRAW
INFORMATION AND FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE, RENDERED THE
DISPOSITION OF THE PETITION BEFORE [THE] COURT OF APPEALS
ACADEMIC? [Yes]
II. WHETHER OR NOT THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE COULD RULE IN A
PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION ON THE VALIDITY, WEIGHT, ADMISSIBILITY,
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
AND MERITS OF PARTIES’ DEFENSES, EVIDENCE, AND ACCUSATION? 20 [not
ruled upon; see footnote for what the court said]
Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The petition for certiorari before the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 02726 is declared MOOT AND ACADEMIC.
Consequently, the assailed Decision dated March 6, 2008 and the Resolution dated May
28, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in the said case are SET ASIDE.
Ratio:
 [O]nce a complaint or information is filed in Court, any disposition of the case
as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound
discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of
the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court, he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is
within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence.
 A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court
who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done
before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after
a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed
the records of the investigation.
 As jurisdiction was already acquired by the MTCC, this jurisdiction is not lost
despite a resolution by the Secretary of Justice to withdraw the information or
to dismiss the case, notwithstanding the deferment or suspension of the
arraignment of the accused and further proceedings, and not even if the
Secretary of Justice is affirmed by the higher courts
 In order therefor to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary
of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial
court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from
entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when
the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter
should be left entirely for the determination of the Court
 Verily, it bears stressing that the trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution
of the Secretary of Justice, in spite of being affirmed by the appellate courts,
since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case
and it may either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary
of Justice. Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would be
an abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima
facie case. Thus, the trial court may make an independent assessment of the
merits of the case based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or
evidence appended to the Information; the records of the public prosecutor
which the court may order the latter to produce before it; or any evidence
already adduced before the court by the accused at the time the motion is filed
by the public prosecutor. The trial court should make its assessment separately
and independently of the evaluation of the prosecution or of the Secretary of
20
Suffice it to state that these matters are best addressed to the MTCC, where they will be thoroughly ventilated
and threshed out in the resolution of Lim’s motion for reconsideration of the MTCC June 20, 2007 Resolution, and
eventually, if the trial court denies the motion, during the trial on the merits before it.
81
Justice. This assessment should be embodied in the written order disposing of
the motion to dismiss or the motion to withdraw the information.
 This was precisely what the MTCC did when it denied the Motion to Withdraw
Information in its June 20, 2007 Resolution, and it correctly did so. In view of
the above disquisitions, and while the disposition of the issue of whether or not
the Secretary of Justice acted with grave abuse of discretion in not finding
probable cause against Lim may be persuasive, the MTCC is not bound to
dismiss the case or to withdraw the Information. For these reasons, the petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals has effectively become moot and
academic upon the issuance by the MTCC of its June 20, 2007 Resolution. The
March 6, 2008 Decision and the May 28, 2009 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals affirming the Secretary of Justice will really make no difference
anymore.
B.CIVIL ASPECT OF A CRIMINAL CASE (RULE 111)
A.RULE IN CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM DELICT
1. BUN TIONG V. BALBOA, G.R. NO. 158177, JANUARY 28, 2008 – PUNO
BUN TIONG v BALBOA
ER
Sps. Balboa filed complaint for sum of money with the RTC against Sps. Bun Tiong. Then
they ALSO filed a SECOND case for BP 22 in the MTC.
The MTC case acquitted Caroline and no indemnity was ordered paid to Sps. Balboa.
The RTC case found Sps. Bun Tiong civilly liable for amount claimed. This was affirmed by
CA.
Sps Bun Tiong filed present case claiming that the CA erred by not taking cognizance of
the MTC case thereby allowing double recovery and forum shopping.
SC ruled that when the case was filed, the rule applicable was Section 1, Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules of Court which allowed separate actions for the recovery of the criminal and
civil liability of the party. (VERSUS PRESENT RULE: deemed instituted na together)
CONCLUSION: since the civil case was filed first, it may proceed independently of the
criminal (BP 22) case. No forum shopping and no double recovery on the civil liability.
FACTS
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
In Feb 1997, Sps.Balboa filed with the RTC Manila a complaint for Collection of Sum of
Money (P5,175,250) against Sps. Bun Tiong. The amount covered three post dated checks
issued by Caroline.
Five months after, separate criminal complaints for BP 22 were also filed against Caroline
with the MTC of Manila by the Sps. Balboa.
The RTC Manila found Sps. Bun Tiong liable and dismissed their counterclaim. Caroline
appealed the decision to the CA which affirmed the RTC decision. (SA RTC liable for the
amount)
However, in 2001, the MTC acquitted Caroline since her guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt. She was merely found civilly liable for the amounts of the issued
checks. Sps. Bun Tiong sought partial reconsideration of the MTC decision and prayed for
the deletion of the award of civil indemnity. This was denied so they appealed to the RTC
as an appellate court. The appeal was granted and the award of civil indemnity was
deleted. (Sa MTC acquitted of ALL liability)
Sps. Bun Tiong filed a Rule 45 petition questioning the RTC decision which made them
liable.
ISSUE:
1. Whether the CA erred in allowing Balboa to recover twice for the
same obligation when it failed to take cognizance of the MTC case
– NO.
2. Whether action of filing cases in the MTC and RTC constitute
forum shopping – NO.
HELD: Petition Denied.
RATIO
ON FORUM SHOPPING
Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings grounded on
the same cause, on the supposition that one or the other court would render a favorable
disposition. It is usually resorted to by a party against whom an adverse judgment or
order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to seek and possibly to get a favorable
opinion in another forum, other than by an appeal or a special civil action for certiorari.
There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of the parties
or, at least, of the parties who represent the same interest in both actions; (2) identity of
the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is founded on the same set of facts;
and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars, such that any judgment rendered in the
other action will amount to res judicata in the action under consideration or will
constitute litis pendentia.
SC BEFORE RULED (old rule)
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In Hyatt Industrial Manufacturing Corp. v. Asia Dynamic Electrix Corp., the Court
ruled that there is identity of parties and causes of action between a civil case for the
recovery of sum of money as a result of the issuance of bouncing checks, and a criminal
case for the prosecution of a B.P. No. 22 violation. Thus, it ordered the dismissal of the
civil action so as to prevent double payment of the claim.
The Court stated:
x x x The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the
offender to deter him and others from committing the same or similar
offense, to isolate him from society, reform or rehabilitate him or, in
general, to maintain social order. The purpose, meanwhile, of the civil
action is for the restitution, reparation or indemnification of the
private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by
reason of the delictual or felonious act of the accused. Hence, the relief
sought in the civil aspect of I.S. No. 00-01-00304 and I.S. No. 00-01-
00300 is the same as that sought in Civil Case No. MC 01-1493, that is,
the recovery of the amount of the checks, which, according to
petitioner, represents the amount to be paid by respondent for its
purchases. x x x
In Hyatt and Silangan, the Court applied Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97
effective September 16, 1997, which provides:
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such action
separately shall be allowed or recognized.
This was later adopted as Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. No
reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed.
Upon filing of the aforesaid joint criminal and civil actions, the offended party
shall pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved, which shall be
considered as the actual damages claimed. Where the complaint or information also
seeks to recover liquidated, moral, nominal, temperate or exemplary damages, the
offended party shall pay the filing fees based on the amounts alleged therein. If the
amounts are not so alleged but any of these damages are subsequently awarded by the
court, the filing fees based on the amount awarded shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment.
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and
criminal actions.
BUT THE ABOVE IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE SINCE CASE WAS FILED PRIOR
TO SC CIRCULAR
The complaint for sum of money was filed before the criminal case and PRIOR to the
adoption of Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on September 16, 1997. Thus, at the time
of filing, the governing rule is Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of Court, to wit:
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised
Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of
the accused.
Under the foregoing rule, an action for the recovery of civil liability arising from an
offense charged is necessarily included in the criminal proceedings, unless:
(1) there is an express waiver of the civil action, or
(2) there is a reservation to institute a separate one, or
(3) the civil action was filed prior to the criminal complaint.
Since the Balboa’s instituted the civil action prior to the criminal action, then the
collection case filed with the RTC may proceed independently of Criminal Cases Nos.
277576 to 78, and there is no forum shopping to speak of.
ON CIVIL LIABILITY
Even under the amended rules, a separate proceeding for the recovery of civil liability in
cases of violations of B.P. No. 22 is allowed when the civil case is filed ahead of the
criminal case. Thus, in the Hyatt case, the Court noted, viz.:
x x x This rule [Rule 111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure ] was
enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22 cases as creditors
actually use the courts as collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is charged in
criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a criminal
charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is not
even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is expected to
significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection based on
dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases. Instead
of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a single suit
shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the Rules is to
discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the reservation
83
of a separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a separate civil case
after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate
proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even
then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. We have
previously observed that a separate civil action for the purpose of recovering the amount
of the dishonored checks would only prove to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming
for both parties and would further delay the final disposition of the case. This multiplicity
of suits must be avoided. Where petitioners’ rights may be fully adjudicated in the
proceedings before the trial court, resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is
clearly unwarranted.
B.INDEPENDENT CIVIL ACTION
1. SIMON V. CHAN, G.R. NO. 157547, FEBRUARY 23, 2011 - QUIJANO-
BENEDICTO
HEIRS OF SIMON VS. CHAN (2011)
Doctrine: There is no independent civil action to recover the civil liability arising from
the issuance of an unfunded check prohibited and punished under BP 22.
EMERGENCY DIGEST
Eduardo Simon was charged by Elvin Chan of violating BP 22 in the MeTC of Manila.
More than three years after, Chan commenced a civil action in the MeTC for the collection
of the principal amount of P 336,000 coupled with an application for a writ of
preliminary attachment. Chan argued that BP 22 falls under Art. 33 of the Civil Code in
fraud, for such offense to be civilly tried independently. MeTC granted the writ of
preliminary attachment and was implemented (Simon's Nissan car was attached). Simon
filed an urgent MTD on the ground of litis pendentia (Criminal case). MeTC granted the
MTD. MR denied. RTC upheld the dismissal of the case. CA reversed the decision and
remanded the case to the trial court. CA held that the civil case is an independent civil
action for damages on account of fraud under Article 33 of the Civil Code and may
proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing.
Issue:
Whether or not Chan’s civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check was an
independent civil action. - NO
The Court reversed the CA's decision. There is no independent civil action to recover the
value of a bouncing check issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court, effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the
offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
to include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed. xxx
Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of any
assumed vested right, because the new rule was adopted from Supreme Court Circular
57-97 that took effect on November 1, 1997, which states that:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the
following rules and guidelines shall henceforth be observed in the filing and
prosecution of all criminal cases under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which penalizes
the making or drawing and issuance of a check without funds or credit:
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed
to necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized.
Chan’s separate civil action to recover the amount of the check involved in the
prosecution for the violation of BP 22 could not be independently maintained under both
Supreme Court Circular 57-97 and the aforequoted provisions of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, notwithstanding the allegations of fraud and deceit.
COMPLETE DIGEST:
Facts:
The Office of the City Prosecutor filed an information in the MeTC Manila charging the
late Eduardo Simon with a violation of BP 22. 21 More than three years later Elvin Chan
filed in the MeTC of Pasay City a civil action for the collection of the principal amount of
P336,000.00, coupled with an application for a writ of preliminary attachment. MeTC in
Pasay City issued a writ of preliminary attachment, which was implemented through the
sheriff attaching a Nissan vehicle of Simon. Simon filed an urgent motion to dismiss with
application to charge plaintiff’s attachment bond for damages, pertinently averring:
xxx
On the ground of litis pendentia, that is, as a consequence of the pendency of another
action between the instant parties for the same cause before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila, Branch X (10) entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Simon", docketed
thereat as Criminal Case No. 275381-CR, the instant action is dismissable under Section
1, (e), Rule 16, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, xxx
MeTC Pasay granted the MTD (on the ground of litis pendentia) and the application to
charge Chan's bond for damages. It held that even assuming the correctness of Chan’s
submission that the case for sum of money is one based on fraud and hence falling under
Article 33 of the Civil Code, still prior reservation is required by the Rules,
"In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
21
That sometime in December 1996 in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue to Elvin Chan to apply on account or for value
Landbank Check No. 0007280 dated December 26, 1996 payable to cash in the amount of P336,000.00 said
accused well knowing that at the time of issue she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the
drawee bank for payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check when presented for payment
within ninety (90) days from the date thereof was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for Account
Closed and despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Elvin Chan the amount of the
check or to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
84
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal
action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of criminal case
provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall
proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence."
RTC in Pasay City upheld the dismissal of Chan’s complaint, and affirming MeTC's
decision in toto. CA overturned RTC decision. It quoted the case of DMPI Employees
Credit Association vs. Velez, where the SC pronounced that only the civil liability arising
from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the
offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. Speaking through Justice Pardo, the
Court held:
"There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil action
under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The reservation
and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability
arising from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under
Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act
or omission which may be prosecuted separately without a reservation".
Rule 111, Section 3 reads:
Sec. 3. When civil action may proceed independently. In the cases provided in Articles 32,
33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil action may be
brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended
party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action.
CA held that the changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to
independent civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to
this case. CA also denied the MR.
Issue:
Whether or not Chan’s civil action to recover the amount of the unfunded check was an
independent civil action. - NO
Held:
Wherefore, petition for review on certiorari granted. CA decision reversed and set aside.
MTC decision reinstated.
Ratio:
The issue was settled by the Court in Banal vs. Judge Tadeo Jr. where the Court stated
that:
xxx
Civil liability to the offended party cannot thus be denied. The payee of the check is
entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless check was issued.
Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to recompense. xxx
However, there is no independent civil action to recover the value of a bouncing check
issued in contravention of BP 22. This is clear from Rule 111 of the Rules of Court,
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
effective December 1, 2000, which relevantly provides:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - (a) When a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action. xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file such civil action separately
shall be allowed. xxx
Section 3. When civil action may proceed independently. – In the cases provided in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the independent civil
action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the
criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no case, however,
may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in
the criminal action.
The provisions of the ROC, even if not yet in effect when Chan commenced the civil case
on August 3, 2000, are nonetheless applicable. The retroactive application of procedural
laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel adversely affected, nor is it
constitutionally objectionable. As a general rule, no vested right may attach to, or arise
from, procedural laws. Any new rules may validly be made to apply to cases pending at
the time of their promulgation, considering that no party to an action has a vested right
in the rules of procedure, except that in criminal cases, the changes do not retroactively
apply if they permit or require a lesser quantum of evidence to convict than what is
required at the time of the commission of the offenses, because such retroactivity would
be unconstitutional for being ex post facto under the Constitution.
Moreover, the application of the rule would not be precluded by the violation of any
assumed vested right, because the new rule was adopted from Supreme Court Circular
57-97 that took effect on November 1, 1997. The Circular states that:
Any provision of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the following
rules and guidelines shall henceforth be observed in the filing and prosecution of all
criminal cases under BP. 22 which penalizes the making or drawing and issuance of a
check without funds or credit:
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to
necessarily include the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil
action separately shall be allowed or recognized. xxx
3. Where the civil action has heretofore been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet
commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the
court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial of both actions shall
proceed in accordance with the pertinent procedure outlined in Section 2 (a) of Rule 111
governing the proceedings in the actions as thus consolidated.
Circular No. 57-97 specifically states that the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22 shall
be deemed to include the corresponding civil action. It also requires the complainant to
pay in full the filing fees based on the amount of the check involved. Generally, no filing
fees are required for criminal cases, but because of the inclusion of the civil action in
complaints for violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the payment of docket fees upon the
filing of the complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog court dockets which are filled
85
with B.P. 22 cases as creditors actually use the courts as collectors. Ordinarily no filing fee
is charged in criminal cases for actual damages, the payee uses the intimidating effect of a
criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court
is not even informed thereof. The inclusion of the civil action in the criminal case is
expected to significantly lower the number of cases filed before the courts for collection
based on dishonored checks. It is also expected to expedite the disposition of these cases.
Instead of instituting two separate cases, one for criminal and another for civil, only a
single suit shall be filed and tried. It should be stressed that the policy laid down by the
Rules is to discourage the separate filing of the civil action. The Rules even prohibit the
reservation of a separate civil action, which means that one can no longer file a separate
civil case after the criminal complaint is filed in court. The only instance when separate
proceedings are allowed is when the civil action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even
then, the Rules encourage the consolidation of the civil and criminal cases. Where
petitioners’ rights may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial court,
resort to a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted. In view of this
special rule governing actions for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code cited by
the trial court will not apply to the case at bar.
A perusal of the Civil Case and the Criminal Case ineluctably shows that all the elements
of litis pendentia are present. First, the parties involved are the same. Secondly, the
information and the complaint in both alleged that Simon had issued Landbank Check
No. 0007280 worth P336,000.00 payable to "cash," thereby indicating that the rights
asserted and the reliefs prayed for, as well as the facts upon which the reliefs sought were
founded, were identical in all respects. And, thirdly, any judgment rendered in one case
would necessarily bar the other by res judicata; otherwise, Chan would be recovering
twice upon the same claim.
C.DEATH OF THE ACCUSED
1. ASILO V. PEOPLE, G.R. NOS. 159017-18, MARCH 09, 2011 – RAZON
Asilo v. People
G.R. Nos. 159017-18 March 9, 2011
Doctrine: Death of the accused before final judgment extinguishes the criminal liability
as well as the civil liability arising from the crime, but the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source
of obligation other than delict.
Emergency Digest:
Facts: Visitacion Bombasi (“BOMBASI”) is the lessee of a store near the public market in
Laguna. Prior to the termination of the lease contract, Mayor Comendador
(“COMENDADOR”) wrote BOMBASI and ordered that they demolish their store, but the
latter refused to do so. BOMBASI reasoned that there was no legal basis for the ejectment
because the lease contract is still binding. Instead of filing an unlawful detainer case
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
against BOMBASI in order that they can litigate in court, COMENDADOR ordered the
demolition of the store with all their improvements and goods therein. Thus, BOMBASI
filed a case for damages before the RTC against Comendador and other officials of the
municipality. Likewise, a criminal case was filed against them.
Pending judgment, COMENDADOR died. The lower court found COMENDADOR guilty of
the charges, but dismissed the criminal case against him but adjudged him solidarily
liable for damages with other co-defendants. MR was denied. Thus, an appeal of the
decision was filed questioning the judgment for civil liability.
Issue: Whether or not civil liability not arising from crime is extinguished by the death of
the accused? NO
Ratio: Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case could have
extinguished the civil liability if the same arose directly from the crime committed.
However, in this case, the civil liability is based on another source of obligation, the law
on human relations. In causing or doing the forcible demolition of the store in question,
the individual natural defendants did not only act with grave abuse of authority but
usurped a power which belongs to our courts of justice; such actuations were done with
malice or in bad faith and constitute an invasion of the property rights of plaintiff(s)
without due process of law.
Complete Digest:
Facts:
 Visitacion Bombasi’s late mother entered into a lease agreement with the
municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna for a lot and store. The contract has a
duration of 20 years.
 BOMBASI took over the store when her mother died. A fire razed the public
market but the store remained intact. Yet, prior to the termination of the lease
contract, Mayor COMENDADOR wrote a letter for BOMBASI to vacate the store
in order for the municipality to reconstruct the public market.
 BOMBASI refused to heed the request and challenged COMENDADOR to file an
unlawful detainer case so they can litigate in court. But instead of filing a case in
court, COMENDADOR ordered the demolition of the store by virtue of a
resolution from the Sanguniang Bayan authorizing COMENDADOR to demolish
the store being occupied by BOMBASI using legal means.
 Thereafter, municipal administrator ASILO wrote BOMBASI directing her to
vacate as demolition will take place the following day. BOMBASI replied alleging
that there is no legal right to demolish the store in the absence of a court order
and that the Resolutions did not sanction the demolition of her store but only
the filing of an appropriate unlawful detainer case against her. She further
replied that if the demolition will take place, appropriate administrative,
criminal and civil actions will be filed against COMENDADOR, ASILO and all
persons who will take part in the demolition.
 Demolition happened. Thus, a case for damages was filed against the
municipality, COMENDADOR, and other municipal officials.
86
 Thereafter, a criminal complaint for violation of Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act was filed against them. Sandiganbayan consolidated the civil and criminal
cases.
 During pendency of case, one of the accused died. Thus, case against him was
dismissed without objection from prosecution.
 Thereafter, COMENDADOR likewise died. Sandiganbayan rendered decision
finding accused guilty of the charges in the criminal case. In the civil case,
COMENDADOR is adjudged solidarily liable for damages in favor of BOMBASI.
 COMENDADOR’s wife questioned the liability despite death, alleging the death
extinguished even the civil liability. Sandiganbayan denied the same in MR.
Thus, petitions for review on certiorari before SC.
Issue: Whether or not civil liability not arising from crime is extinguished by the death of
the accused? NO
Held: WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the Decision of the
Sandiganbayan dated 28 April 2003 is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. The
Court affirms the decision finding the accused Paulino S. Asilo, Jr. and Demetrio T.
Comendador guilty of violating Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. We declare the
finality of the dismissal of both the criminal and civil cases against Alberto S. Angeles as
the same was not appealed. In view of the death of Demetrio T. Comendador pending
trial, his criminal liability is extinguished; but his civil liability survives. The Municipality
of Nagcarlan, Paulino Asilo and Demetrio T. Comendador, as substituted by Victoria Bueta
Vda. De Comendador, are hereby declared solidarily liable to the Spouses Bombasi for
temperate damages in the amount of P200,000.00 and moral damages in the amount of
P100,000.00.
Ratio:
 Death of Mayor Comendador during the pendency of the case could have
extinguished the civil liability if the same arose directly from the crime
committed. However, in this case, the civil liability is based on another source of
obligation, the law on human relations. In causing or doing the forcible
demolition of the store in question, the individual natural defendants did not
only act with grave abuse of authority but usurped a power which belongs to
our courts of justice; such actuations were done with malice or in bad faith and
constitute an invasion of the property rights of plaintiff(s) without due process
of law.
 The Court is in one with the prosecution that there was a violation of the right
to private property of Bombasi. The accused public officials should have
accorded due process of law guaranteed by the Constitution and New Civil
Code. The Sangguniang Bayan Resolutions as asserted by the defense will not,
as already shown, justify demolition of the store without court order. This Court
in a number of decisions held that even if there is already a writ of execution,
there must still be a need for a special order for the purpose of demolition
issued by the court before the officer in charge can destroy, demolish or remove
improvements over the contested property. The pertinent provisions are the
following:
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
Before the removal of an improvement must take place, there must be a special
order, hearing and reasonable notice to remove. Section 10(d), Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court provides:
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. – When the
property subject of execution contains improvements constructed or planted by
the judgment obligor or his agent, the officer shall not destroy, demolish or
remove said improvements except upon special order of the court, issued upon
motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed
to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court.
The above-stated rule is clear and needs no interpretation. If demolition is
necessary, there must be a hearing on the motion filed and with due notices to
the parties for the issuance of a special order of demolition. This special need
for a court order even if an ejectment case has successfully been litigated,
underscores the independent basis for civil liability, in this case, where no case
was even filed by the municipality.
 The requirement of a special order of demolition is based on the rudiments of
justice and fair play. It frowns upon arbitrariness and oppressive conduct in the
execution of an otherwise legitimate act. It is an amplification of the provision
of the Civil Code that every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.
Notably, the fact that a separate civil action precisely based on due process
violations was filed even ahead of the criminal case, is complemented by the
fact that the deceased plaintiff Comendador was substituted by his widow,
herein petitioner Victoria who specified in her petition that she has "substituted
him as petitioner in the above captioned case." Section 1, Rule III of the 1985
Rules in Criminal Procedure mentioned in Bayotas is, therefore, not applicable.
Truly, the Sandiganbayan was correct when it maintained the separate
docketing of the civil and criminal cases before it although their consolidation
was erroneously based on Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606 which
deals with civil liability "arising from the offense charged."
 It must be noted that when Angeles (first accused who died) died, a motion to
drop him as an accused was filed by his counsel with no objection on the part of
the prosecution. The Sandiganbayan acted favorably on the motion and issued
an Order dismissing all the cases filed against Angeles. On the other hand, when
Mayor Comendador died and an adverse decision was rendered against him
which resulted in the filing of a motion for reconsideration by Mayor
Comendador’s counsel, the prosecution opposed the Motion specifying the
ground that the civil liability did not arise from delict, hence, survived the death
of the accused. The Sandiganbayan upheld the opposition of the prosecution
which disposition was not appealed. Civil liability of Mayor Comendador
survived his death; and that of Angeles could have likewise survived had it not
87
been for the fact that the resolution of the Sandiganbayan that his death
extinguished the civil liability was not questioned and lapsed into finality.
2. PEOPLE V. BAYOT, G.R. NO. 200030, APRIL 18, 2012 – RESPICIO
EMERGENCY
Accused convicted Rape. Appealed CA. Died while on CA.
What happens?
Crime Dissolved. Civil Liab ex delicato dissolved.
Note sources of obligation: Law, delict (criminal and civil ex delicto liability), quasi
delict, contract, quasi contract
Civil Liab from other causes of action still alive (that from Law, quasi delict,
contract, quasi contract. E.g., in the civil code fraud and injury also liable damages
—this one arises from law)
Prescription of Civil Liab from causes of action other than delict is tolled by the
filing of the Crim case.
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision[1] dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 affirming with modification the Decision [2] dated 31 July
2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental, 6 th Judicial
Region, Branch 61, in Criminal Case No. 98-2025, finding herein appellant Nelson Bayot y
Satina (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, committed
against AAA,[3]
Appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina was charged with Rape
the RTC convicted appellant of the crime of rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amount ofP40,000.00 as indemnity with costs.
Aggrieved, appellant appealed the aforesaid RTC Decision to this Court by filing a
Notice of Appeal dated 6 September 2000. [7] In light, however, of this Court’s
pronouncement in People v. Mateo,[8] the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals for
intermediate review per Resolution[9] dated 4 October 2004.
In a Decision dated 9 May 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed appellant’s
conviction with the modification increasing the award of indemnity from P40,000.00
toP50,000.00. It likewise awarded moral damages in favor of AAA in the amount of
P50,000.00.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
However, in a letter dated 29 May 2006, [11] Dr. Juanito S. Leopando, Penal
Superintendent IV of the New Bilibid Prison, informed the Court of Appeals that
appellant died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on 4 December 2004. Attached in his
letter is the original copy of appellant’s Certificate of Death. [12]
Nonetheless, the Public Attorney’s Office still appealed, on behalf of appellant, the
aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision to this Court via a Notice of Appeal[13] dated 31 May
2006, which was given due course by the Court of Appeals per Resolution[14] dated 19
January 2007. The Court of Appeals also directed the Chief of the Judicial Records
Division to forward the entire records of the case to this Court.
ISSUE:
what happens when the accused dies on appeal?
RATIO
Taking into consideration appellant’s death, this Court will now determine its effect
to this present appeal.
Appellant’s death on 4 December 2004, during the pendency of his appeal
before the Court of Appeals, extinguished not only his criminal liability for the crime of
rape committed against AAA, but also his civil liability solely arising from or based on
said crime.[15]
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, specifically provides
the effect of death of the accused on his criminal, as well as civil, liability. It reads thus:
Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. –
Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only
when the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment; [Emphasis supplied].
Applying the foregoing provision, this Court, in People v. Bayotas,[16] which
was cited in a catena of cases,[17] had laid down the following guidelines:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only
the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on
the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso
strictiore.”
88
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of [the] accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x xxx xxx
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2
above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but
only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be
enforced either against the executor/administrator or the
estate of the accused, depending on the source of
obligation upon which the same is based as explained
above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture
of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the
criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with [the] provisions of
Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid
any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription.[18]
From the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal
of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil liability ex delicto.
The rationale, therefore, is that the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is
no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for
recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the
criminal case.[19]
Evidently, as this Court has pronounced in People v. Olaco and People v.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
Paniterce,[20] it is already unnecessary to rule on appellant’s appeal. Appellant’s appeal
was still pending and no final judgment had been rendered against him at the time of his
death. Thus, whether or not appellant was guilty of the crime charged had become
irrelevant because even assuming that appellant did incur criminal liability and civil
liability ex delicto, these were totally extinguished by his death, following the provisions
of Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and this Court’s ruling in People v. Bayotas.
In the same breath, the appealed Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 – finding appellant guilty of the crime of rape,
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay AAA P50,000.00 as
indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages – had become ineffectual.
D.ACQUITTAL
1. PEOPLE V. TIRSO VELASCO, G.R. NO. 127444, SEPTEMBER 13, 2000 –
SANCHEZ
People v. Velasco
DOCTRINE:
Remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on
certiorari cannot be had unless there is a finding of mistrial
ER:
[Super short facts, tons of JJ—look at Ratio and talk about Hammurabi and Thomas a
Becket; this case also cited two US cases, but they didn’t apply. Look at Ratio.]
There was a shooting in Bulacan which killed Alex Vinculado and injured his twin and
uncle. The RTC decided that Diego (alleged gunman + bodyguard) is guilty of murder,
while Mayor Galvez was acquitted. The People now appeal the acquittal of Galvez. ISSUE:
W/NOT an acquittal may be appealed (NO). HELD: The rule is that a remand to a trial
court of a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot
be had unless there is a finding of mistrial. The doctrine that "double jeopardy may not
be invoked after trial" may apply only when the Court finds that the “criminal trial was a
sham” because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case
was denied due process.
In this case, the judge clearly decided and weighed all the pieces of evidence. There was
no mistrial.
FACTS:
- There was a shooting in Bulacan which killed Alex Vinculado and injured his
twin brother and uncle.
o 3 criminal Informations were filed—1 for homicide and 2 for
frustrated homicide against Galvez (Mayor of San Ildefonso Bulacan)
and Diego (alleged bodyguard)
o These were withdrawn and a 4 sets of Informations were filed for
MURDER and FRUSTRATED MURDER, including a violation of
unauthorized carrying of firearm outside his residence.
- Case was transferred to Manila, and RTC DECIDED:
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o The trial court found the accused Godofredo Diego guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crimes of murder and double frustrated
murder.
o However, it acquitted Mayor Honorato Galvez of the same charges due
to insufficiency of evidence. It also absolved him from the charge of
illegal carrying of firearm upon its finding that the act was not a
violation of law.
- The acquittal is now challenged via Petition for Certiorari (65)
ISSUE:
- W/NOT certiorari is proper to question the acquittal of an accused (Yes, for this
case only. Exceptional circumstances)
- W/NOT a judgment of acquittal may be reviewed by the SC (NO. This is double
jeopardy)
HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
RATIO:
[1st issue]
- The recent untimely demise of respondent Galvez at the hands of alleged
assassins (not discounting too the earlier dismissal of respondent judge from
the service) may arguably have rendered these matters moot and academic,
thus calling for a dismissal of the petition on this basis alone.
- The Court however is not insensitive to nor oblivious of the paramount nature
and object of the pleas forcefully presented by the Government considering
especially the alleged new directions in American jurisprudence taken by the
doctrine of double jeopardy.
[2nd issue]
- [The Court went into a huge JJ discussion about the history and etymology of
jeopardy, lol. It cited Justinian, The Code of Hammurabi, St. Jerome, King Henry
II & Thomas a Becket]
- At this juncture, it must be explained that under existing American law and
jurisprudence, appeals may be had not only from criminal convictions but also,
in some limited instances, from dismissals of criminal charges, sometimes
loosely termed "acquittals." But this is so as long as the judgments of dismissals
do not involve determination of evidence, such as when the judge:
o (a) issues a post-verdict acquittal, i.e., acquits the defendant on a
matter of law after a verdict of guilty has been entered by a trier of
facts (a jury);
o (b) orders the dismissal on grounds other than insufficiency of
evidence, as when the statute upon which the indictment was based is
defective;
o […]
o Interestingly, the common feature of these instances of dismissal is
that they all bear on questions of law or matters unrelated to a factual
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
resolution of the case which consequently, on appeal, will not involve a
review of evidence. Its logical effect in American law is to render
appeals therefrom non-repugnant to the Double Jeopardy Clause.
- The People cite two US Cases to subject Velasco to a second trial, (WHICH
ULTIMATELY FAILED): [These cases allowed an appeal despite acquittal]
o Wilson – involved an appeal by Government of a post-verdict ruling of
law issued by the trial judge resulting in the acquittal of the defendant
due to pre-indictment delay (a delay between the offense and the
indictment prejudiced the defendant) after a verdict of guilty had been
entered by the jury. But it was not an acquittal that involved “factual
resolution.” It was one anchored on an extraneous cause. The acquittal
was not based on evidence.
o US v. Scott – involved an accused who, having been indicted for several
offenses, himself moved for the dismissal of two (2) counts of the
charges on the ground that his defense was prejudiced by pre-
indictment delay. The trial judge granted the motion. Government
appealed the dismissals but the appellate court rejected the appeal on
the basis of double jeopardy. This time the US Supreme Court
reversed, holding that "(w)here a defendant himself seeks to avoid his
trial prior to its conclusion by a motion for a mistrial, the Double
Jeopardy Clause is not offended by a second prosecution. Such a
motion by the defendant is deemed to be a deliberate election on his
part to forego his valued right to have his guilt or innocence
determined by the first trier of facts."
 The inapplicability of this ruling to the case at bar is at once
discernible. The dismissal of the charges against private
respondent Galvez was not upon his own instance; neither
did he seek to avoid trial, as it was in Scott, to be considered
as having waived his right to be adjudged guilty or innocent.
Here, trial on the merits was held during which both
government and accused had their respective day in court.
- Under Philippine law, the requisites of double jeopardy are:(a) a valid complaint
or information; (b) before a competent court before which the same is filed; (c)
the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and, (d) the defendant was acquitted,
or convicted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated
without his express consent.
o It bears repeating that where acquittal is concerned, the rules do not
distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the trial court or on appeal
from a judgment of conviction. This firmly establishes the finality-of-
acquittal rule in our jurisdiction. Therefore, as mandated by our
Constitution, statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final
and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it
happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals.
- However, the rule is that a remand to a trial court of a judgment of acquittal
brought before the Supreme Court on certiorari cannot be had unless there is a
finding of mistrial. The doctrine that "double jeopardy may not be invoked after
trial" may apply only when the Court finds that the “criminal trial was a sham”
90
because the prosecution representing the sovereign people in the criminal case
was denied due process.
- The petition at hand which seeks to nullify the decision of respondent judge
acquitting the accused Honorato Galvez goes deeply into the trial court's
appreciation and evaluation in esse of the evidence adduced by the parties. A
reading of the questioned decision shows that respondent judge considered the
evidence received at trial.
o These consisted among others of the testimonies relative to the
positions of the victims vis-à-vis the accused and the trajectory,
location and nature of the gunshot wounds, and the opinion of the
expert witness for the prosecution.
o While the appreciation thereof may have resulted in possible lapses in
evidence evaluation, it nevertheless does not detract from the fact that
the evidence was considered and passed upon.
This consequently exempts the act from the writ’s limiting requirement of excess or lack
of jurisdiction. As such, it becomes an improper object of and therefore non-reviewable
by certiorari. To reiterate, errors of judgment are not to be confused with errors in the
exercise of jurisdiction.
2. CHING V. NICDAO, G.R. NO. 141181, APRIL 27, 2007 – SANTOS
SAMSON CHING vs. CLARITA NICDAO and HON. COURT OF APPEALS (2007)
DOCTRINE: Civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal:
1. where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt;
2. where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but
only civil in nature; and
3. where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the criminal act of which the
accused is acquitted.
ER: Nicdao was charged eleven (11) counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP)
22. The MTC found her of guilty. The RTC affirmed. Nicdao filed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals. CA reversed the decision and acquitted Nicdao. Ching is now appealing the civil
aspect of the case to the Supreme Court.
Ching argues that notwithstanding respondent Nicdao’s acquittal by the CA, the Supreme
Court has the jurisdiction and authority to resolve and rule on her civil liability. He
anchors his contention on Rule 111, Sec 1B: The criminal action for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil action,
and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized.
Moreover, under the above-quoted provision, the criminal action for violation of BP 22
necessarily includes the corresponding civil action, which is the recovery of the amount
of the dishonored check representing the civil obligation of the drawer to the payee.
Nicdao contends: the CA’s decision is equivalent to a finding that the facts upon which her
civil liability may arise do not exist. The instant petition, which seeks to enforce her civil
liability based on the eleven (11) checks, is thus allegedly already barred by the final and
executory decision acquitting her.
Issue: WON Ching may appeal the civil aspect of the case within the reglementary period?
YES and WON Nicdao civilly liable? NO.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
Held:
Ching is entitled to appeal the civil aspect of the case within the reglementary period.
“Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Extinction of the penal
action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
Ching correctly argued that he, as the offended party, may appeal the civil aspect of the
case notwithstanding Nicdao’s acquittal by the CA. The civil action was impliedly
instituted with the criminal action since he did not reserve his right to institute it
separately nor did he institute the civil action prior to the criminal action.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the
civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of
acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party,
the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil
aspect of the case within the period therefor.
NO. NICDAO is not civilly liable. A review of the case leads to the conclusion that Nicdao’s
acquittal likewise carried with it the extinction of the action to enforce her civil liability.
There is simply no basis to hold respondent Nicdao civilly liable to Ching. CA’s acquittal of
respondent Nicdao is not merely based on reasonable doubt. Rather, it is based on the
finding that she did not commit the act penalized under BP 22. In particular, the CA found
that the P20,000,000.00 check was a stolen check which was never issued nor delivered
by Nicdao to Ching. CA did not adjudge her to be civilly liable to petitioner Ching. In fact,
the CA explicitly stated that she had already fully paid her obligations. The finding
relative to the P20,000,000.00 check that it was a stolen check necessarily absolved
respondent Nicdao of any civil liability thereon as well. The acquittal carried with it the
extinction of her civil liability as well.
FACTS: (dami kwento from direct examination to cross examination)
 CHING, a Chinese national, filed criminal complaints for eleven (11) counts of
violation of BP 22 against respondent NICDAO. Consequently, eleven (11)
Informations were filed with the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Province of Bataan
 At about the same time, fourteen (14) other criminal complaints, also for
violation of BP 22, were filed against respondent NICDAO by Emma NUGUID,
said to be the common law spouse of petitioner CHING. Allegedly fourteen (14)
checks, amounting to P1,150,000.00, were issued by respondent Nicdao to
Nuguid but were dishonored for lack of sufficient funds. The Informations were
filed with the same MCTC.
 At her arraignment, NICDAO entered the plea of "not guilty" to all the charges. A
joint trial was then conducted for the criminal cases.
 In the criminal cases, CHING and Imelda Yandoc, an employee of the Hermosa
Savings & Loan Bank, Inc., were presented to prove the charges against NICDAO
 CHING averred that the checks were issued to him by NICDAO as security for
the loans that she obtained from him.
 Their transaction began sometime in October 1995 when NICDAO with her
husband, proprietor/manager of Vignette Superstore, approached him to
borrow money in order for them to settle their financial obligations. They
agreed that NICDAO would leave the checks undated and that she would pay the
91
loans within one year. However, when CHING went to see her after the lapse of
one year to ask for payment, NICDAO allegedly said that she had no cash.
 CHING claimed that he went back to NICDAO several times more but every time,
she would tell him that she had no money.
 THEN, Nicdao allegedly got mad at him for being insistent and challenged him
about seeing each other in court.
 Because of Nicdao's alleged refusal to pay her obligations, CHING deposited the
checks that she issued to him. The checks were dishonored by the bank for
being "DAIF."
 Shortly thereafter, CHING and NUGUID wrote a demand letter to NICDAO which,
however, went unheeded.
 Accordingly, they separately filed the criminal complaints against NICDAO.
 Another witness presented by the prosecution was IMELDA, an employee of the
bank. She basically testified that the checks issued by NICDAO bounced.
 NICDAO ‘s DEFENSE. They had several witnesses including Nicdao. NICDAO
stated that she only dealt with NUGUID, she denies that she borrowed money
from CHING. She admitted however, that she obtained a loan from NUGUID but
only for 2.1 Million and the same was already fully paid.
 In addition, Nicdao also presented and identified several cigarette wrappers at
the back of which appeared computations. She explained that Nuguid went to
the grocery store everyday to collect interest payments. The principal loan
was P2,100,000.00 with 12% interest per day. Nuguid allegedly wrote the
payments for the daily interests at the back of the cigarette wrappers that she
gave to Nicdao.
 With respect to the P20,000,000.00 check, Nicdao admitted that the signature
thereon was hers but denied that she issued the same to Ching. Anent the other
ten (10) checks, she likewise admitted that the signatures thereon were hers
while the amounts and payee thereon were written by either Jocelyn Nicdao or
Melanie Tolentino, who were employees of Vignette Superstore and authorized
by her to do so.
 NICDAO claims that she was told by her employee that one of her checks was
missing. She could not explain how it came to CHING’s possession. (that was the
20,000,000 check presented to the bank that CHING says that NICDAO allegedly
owes – apparently nanakaw daw accdg to NICDAO)
 MCTC disbelieved Nicdao’s claim that the P20,000,000.00 check was the same
one that she lost in 1995. It observed that ordinary prudence would dictate that
a lost check would at least be immediately reported to the bank to prevent its
unauthorized endorsement or negotiation. Nicdao made no such report to the
bank. Even if the said check was indeed lost, the MCTC faulted Nicdao for being
negligent in keeping the checks that she had already signed in an unsecured
box.  NICDAO CONVICTED OF 14 COUNTS OF BP 22.
 Appeal to RTC. Affirmed.
 Appeal to CA. Reversed.  NICDAO ACQUITTED. Nicdao fully paid the loans and
NUGUID befriended NICDAO to gain access to Vignette Superstore where
NICDAO’s blank and pre-signed checks were kept. In essence CA stated that the
20M check was stolen from Nicdao.
 With the finding that respondent Nicdao had fully paid her loan obligations to
Nuguid, the CA declared that she could no longer be held liable for violation of
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
BP 22. It was explained that to be held liable under BP 22, it must be
established, inter alia, that the check was made or drawn and issued to apply on
account or for value. According to the CA, the word "account" refers to a pre-
existing obligation, while "for value" means an obligation incurred
simultaneously with the issuance of the check. In the case of respondent
Nicdao’s checks, the pre-existing obligations secured by them were already
extinguished after full payment had been made by respondent Nicdao to
Nuguid. Obligations are extinguished by, among others, payment.
 CHING appeals to the SC. He urges the Court to review the findings of facts
made by the CA as they are allegedly based on a misapprehension of facts and
manifestly erroneous and contradicted by the evidence.
 Ching argues that notwithstanding Nicdao’s acquittal by the CA, the Supreme
Court has the jurisdiction and authority to resolve and rule on her civil liability.
He invokes Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court and SC Circular No
57-97.22
 NICDAO says that it is barred under Section 2(b), Rule 111 of the Revised Rule
of Court23. She states that the CA has already made a finding to the effect that
the fact upon which her civil liability might arise did not exist.
ISSUES: 1) WON CHING can appeal the civil liability? YES
2) WON NICDAO is civilly liable? – NO.
HELD/RATIO:
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
Notwithstanding Nicdao’s acquittal, petitioner Ching is entitled to appeal the civil aspect
of the case within the reglementary period. "every person criminally liable for a felony is
also civilly liable." Under the pertinent provision of the Revised Rules of Court, the civil
action is generally impliedly instituted with the criminal action. At the time of petitioner
Ching’s filing of the Informations against Nicdao the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted.
22
SEC. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes the recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32,
33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. x x x
SC Circular 57-97
1. The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 shall be deemed to necessarily include the
corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized. x x
x
23
SEC. 2. Institution of separate of civil action. - Except in the cases provided for in Section 3 hereof, after the
criminal action has been commenced, the civil action which has been reserved cannot be instituted until final
judgment in the criminal action.
xxxx
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.
92
As a corollary to the above rule, an acquittal does not necessarily carry with it the
extinguishment of the civil liability of the accused. Section 2(b) of the same Rule, also
quoted earlier, provided in part:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the
civil might arise did not exist.
It is also relevant to mention that judgments of acquittal are required to state "whether
the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or
merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment
shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist."
In Sapiera v. Court of Appeals, the Court enunciated that the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal: (a) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt; (b)
where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but
only civil in nature; and (c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the
criminal act of which the accused is acquitted.
Thus, under Article 29 of the Civil Code –
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his
guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond
to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court
shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from
the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
Moreover, the civil action based on the delict is extinguished if there is a finding in the
final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability
may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the act or omission imputed
to him.
If the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but the court renders judgment on the
civil aspect of the criminal case, the prosecution cannot appeal from the judgment of
acquittal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. However, the aggrieved party,
the offended party or the accused or both may appeal from the judgment on the civil
aspect of the case within the period therefor.
THUS, CHING correctly argued that he, as the offended party, may appeal the civil
aspect of the case notwithstanding Nicdao’s acquittal by the CA. The civil action
was impliedly instituted with the criminal action since he did not reserve his right
to institute it separately nor did he institute the civil action prior to the criminal
action.
Following the long recognized rule that "the appeal period accorded to the accused
should also be available to the offended party who seeks redress of the civil aspect of the
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
decision," the period to appeal granted to petitioner Ching is the same as that granted to
the accused. With petitioner Ching’s timely filing of the instant petition for review of the
civil aspect of the CA’s decision, the Court thus has the jurisdiction and authority to
determine the civil liability of Nicdao notwithstanding her acquittal.
2nd ISSUE: The acquittal oft Nicdao likewise effectively extinguished her civil liability
A review of the case leads to the conclusion that respondent Nicdao’s acquittal likewise
carried with it the extinction of the action to enforce her civil liability. There is simply no
basis to hold respondent Nicdao civilly liable to petitioner Ching. First, the CA’s acquittal
of respondent Nicdao is not merely based on reasonable doubt. Rather, it is based on the
finding that she did not commit the act penalized under BP 22. In particular, the CA found
that the P20,000,000.00 check was a stolen check which was never issued nor delivered
by respondent Nicdao to petitioner Ching. As such, according to the CA, petitioner Ching
"did not acquire any right or interest over Check No. 002524 and cannot assert any cause
of action founded on said check," and that respondent Nicdao "has no obligation to make
good the stolen check and cannot, therefore, be held liable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22."
With respect to the ten (10) other checks, the CA established that the loans secured by
these checks had already been extinguished after full payment had been made by
respondent Nicdao. In this connection, the second element for the crime under BP 22, i.e.,
"that the check is made or drawn and issued to apply on account or for value," is not
present.
Second, in acquitting respondent Nicdao, the CA did not adjudge her to be civilly liable to
petitioner Ching. In fact, the CA explicitly stated that she had already fully paid her
obligations.
3. COSCOLUELLA V. SANDIGANBAYAN, G.R.NO. 191411, JULY 15, 2013 –
SUPERABLE
G.R. No. 191411 || RAFAEL L. COSCOLLUELA, Petitioner, vs. SANBIGANBAYAN (FIRST
DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191871 || EDWIN N. NACIONALES, ERNESTO P. MALVAS, and JOSE MA. G.
AMUGOD, Petitioners, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (FIRST DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, OFFICE OF
THE OMBUDSMAN, Respondents. July 15, 2013. (NONS)
DOCTRINE: Under Rule 111, Sec. 2 of the Rules, the acquittal in the criminal case will bar
a subsequent civil action only when the judgment explicitly declares that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Thus, absent any
declaration from the court, the aggrieved party is not precluded from instituting a
subsequent civil action.
EMERGENCY RECIT
FACTS: The Ombudsman Office in Visayas received a letter complaint in 2003 about the
alleged anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural equipment amounting to PhP
20M. The Ombudsman investigated this and a recommendation that charges be filed
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against Coscolluela (the Governor of Negros Occidental who caused the purchase),
Nacionales, Amugod and Malvas. However, it was only in 2009 that Acting Ombudsman
Casimiro approved the recommendation, and the Information was only filed in that year.
Coscolluela, et. al. filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that their right
to speedy disposition of cases was violated due to to the eight year delay. The
Sandiganbayan denied this.
ISSUE: Whether Coscolluela, et. al.’s acquittal will bar a civil action for recovery?
NO!
HELD: While it is true that Coscolluela, et. al. were acquitted (due to the long delay), this
does not mean that a subsequent civil action arising from a delict will be barred. Under
the Rules, only when the judgment of acquittal states that the act or omission from which
the civil liability did not exist will there be a bar. Here, no party was given the chance to
present evidence. Thus, the Court cannot make a pronouncement on whether
Coscolluela, et. al. actually committed the acts or omissions from which civil liability may
arise. Hence, the Province of Negros Occidental is not precluded from instituting a
subsequent civil action.
FACTS:
 Rafael Coscolluela was the governor of the Negros Occidental, serving three terms
until June 30, 2001. During his tenure, Edwin Nacionales served as his Special
Projects Division Head, Jose Amugod as Nacionales’ subordinate, and Ernesto Malvas
as Provincial Health Officer.
 The Visayas Ombudsman office received a letter complaint on November 9, 2001,
requesting them to investigate the anomalous purchase of medical and agricultural
equipment for PhP 20million, which happened around a month before Coscolluela’s
term ended.
 The Final Evaluation Report was issued on April 16, 2002 which upgraded the
complaint to a criminal case. As a result, Coscolluela, et. al. submitted their counter-
affidavits.
 On March 27, 2003, Graft Investigation Officer Canñ ares prepared a resolution finding
probable cause against Coscolluela et. al. for violation of Sec. 3(3) of R.A. No. 3019
and recommended the filing of the Information. This was submitted to Deputy
Ombudsman for Visayas Miro, who then recommended the approval of the
information on June 5, 2003. However, it was only on May 21, 2009, that Acting
Ombudsman Casimiro approved the Information. The Information was only
filed before the Sandiganbayan on June 19, 2009.
 Coscolluela, et. al. only learned of the Canñ ares resolution and the filing of the
Information after they received a copy of the latter shortly after its filing with the
Sandiganbayan.
 Coscolluela, et. al. filed a Motion to Quash on the ground that his right to speedy
disposition of cases was violated when the charges against him were resolved 8
years after the original complaint was initiated.
 The Ombudsman filed their Opposition, explaining that the delay was due to the fact
that the Information had to go through careful review and revision before its
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
approval. Coscolluela, et. al. never even raised any objections to the delay in the
proceedings.
 The Sandiganbayan denied the Motion to Quash for lack of merit because the
preliminary investigation was actually resolved 1 year and 4 months from the filing
of the original complaint. As these issuances had to undergo careful review and
revision through the various levels of the said office, the period of delay – i.e., from
March 27, 2003 to May 21, 2009, or roughly over six (6) years – cannot be deemed
as inordinate and as such, Coscolluela, et. al.’s constitutional right to speedy
disposition of cases was not violated.
 Coscolluela, et. al. filed a MR, arguing that the two time periods should not be
considerated as distinct and separate, and thus the eight year delay was prejudicial
to their right to speedy disposition of cases. This was denied, hence this petition to
the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: (Not important) Whether Coscolluela et. al.’s right to speedy disposition of cases
was violated? – YES;
(Relevant to Civil Aspect of a Criminal Case) Whether Coscolluela, et. al. can still be
civilly liable because of their acquittal – YES!
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions dated
October 6, 2009 and February 10, 2010 of the First Division of the Sandiganbayan are
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is likewise ordered to DISMISS Crim.
Case No. SB-09-CRM-0154 for violation of the Constitutional right to speedy disposition
of cases of petitioners Rafael L. Coscolluela, Edwin N. Nacionales, Dr. Ernesto P. Malvas,
and Jose Ma. G. Amugod, without prejudice to any civil action which the Province of
Negros Occidental may file against petitioners.
RATIO:
(Not relevant to topic)
Coscolluela, et. al.’s Right to Speedy Disposition of Cases was violated.
 A person’s right to the speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
 This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but
extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as all
proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial. In this accord, any party to a case may
demand expeditious action to all officials who are tasked with the administration of
justice.
 Jurisprudence dictates that the right is deemed violated only when the proceedings
are attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified
postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or even without cause or
justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having
his case tried.
 Hence, in the determination of whether the defendant has been denied his right to a
speedy disposition of a case, the following factors may be considered and balanced:
(1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or failure to
assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
 Here, it is clear that Coscolluela, et. al.’s rights were violated.
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 First, it is observed that the preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted
amount of time to complete. Under the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman, the conduct of preliminary investigation is only terminated once
Ombudsman approves the recommendation of filing the Information or dismissing
it. Here, the investigated was only terminated on May 21, 2009 when Ombudsman
Casimiro approved the filing of the Information.
 Second, the delay in the Ombudsman’s resolution of the case remains unjustified.
The Office of the Ombudsman has the inherent duty not only to carefully go through
the particulars of case but also to resolve the same within the proper length of time.
Its dutiful performance should not only be gauged by the quality of the assessment
but also by the reasonable promptness of its dispensation. There was extraordinary
complication (e.g. difficult case, etc), which could justify why there was an eight year
delay in the preliminary investigation proceedings.
 Third, the Court deems that Coscolluela, et. al. cannot be faulted for their alleged
failure to assert their right to speedy disposition of cases. Coscolluela, et. al. were
unaware that the investigation against them was still on-going. Again, they were only
informed that there was actually a case when they were notified of the Information
filed before the Sandiganbayan. Peculiar to this case, Coscolluela, et. al. were only
asked to comment and not file counter-affidavits, which is the proper procedure to
follow in a preliminary investigation. They had no reason to believe that the case
was still pending before the Ombudsman.
 It was the Office of the Ombudsman’s responsibility to expedite the same within the
bounds of reasonable timeliness in view of its mandate to promptly act on all
complaints lodged before it. Coscolluela, et. al. had no obligation to follow up on the
prosecution of their case
 Fourth, the Court finally recognizes the prejudice caused to Coscolluela, et. al. by the
lengthy delay in the proceedings against them.
 Lest it be misunderstood, the right to speedy disposition of cases is not merely
hinged towards the objective of spurring dispatch in the administration of justice
but also to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding a criminal prosecution
suspended over him for an indefinite time. Akin to the right to speedy trial, its
"salutary objective" is to assure that an innocent person may be free from the
anxiety and expense of litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined
within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and
consideration of whatsoever legitimate defense he may interpose.
 It is the government that bears the burden of proving its case beyond reasonable
doubt. The passage of time may make it difficult or impossible for the government to
carry its burden. Closely related to the length of delay is the reason or justification of
the State for such delay. Different weights should be assigned to different reasons or
justifications invoked by the State.
 Because of the long delay in the resolution of the cases, the Sandiganbayan
committed grave abuse of discretion when it refused to quash the Information.
The acquittal of Coscolluela, et. al. does not mean that they are not civilly liable.
 While Coscolluela, et. al. are acquitted, it does not necessarily follow that they are
entirely exculpated from any civil liability, assuming that the same is proven in a
subsequent case which the Province may opt to pursue.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
 Under Rule 111, Sec. 2 of the Rules, the acquittal in the criminal case will bar a
subsequent civil action only when the judgment explicitly declares that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
 As stated in the case of Abejuela v. People, citing Banal v. Tadeo, Jr.:
o "While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by law, it
gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime but
because it caused damage to another. Viewing things pragmatically, we
can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability is really the
obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole the damage
caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done intentionally
or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law."
 Here, the dismissal was due to the violation of Coscolluela, et. al.’s right to speedy
disposition of cases. No party was given the chance to present evidence. Thus, the
Court is unable to make a definite pronouncement as to whether Coscolluela,
et. al indeed committed the acts or omissions from which any civil liability on
their part might arise as prescribed under Section 2, Rule 120.
 Thus, the Province is not precluded from instituting a subsequent civil case based on
the delict if only to recover the amount of P20,000,000.00 in public funds
attributable to petitioners’ alleged malfeasance.
E.PREJUDICIAL QUESTION
1. DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION V. JANIOLA, G.R. NO. 184861, JUNE 30,
2009 – TANDOC
Dream Works filed a BP 22 case against Janiola. Janiola subsequently instituted a civil
complaint for rescission against Dream Works. Janiola sought to suspend the proceeding
in the criminal case since there was a prejudicial question in the civil case. According to
Janiola, the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related
such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the
accused would necessarily be determined. Was there prejudicial question? Nope. For two
reasons:
1. Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as that
which must precede the criminal action and which requires a decision
before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action with which
said question is closely connected. The civil action must be instituted
prior to the institution of the criminal action.
2. It must be emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge (B.P. 22) is
the issuance of a bad check. this Court has held in a long line of cases that the
agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to the
prosecution for violation of BP 22.
FACTS:
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-Dreamworks filed a criminal information for violation of BP 22 against private
respondent Janiola with the MTC on February 2, 2005
-On September 20, 2006, private respondent Janiola, joined by her husband, instituted a
civil complaint against petitioner Dreamworks by filing a Complaint dated August 2006
for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties, as well as for
damages
-Janiola filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 2007 in Criminal Case Nos.
55554-61, alleging that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or
intimately related such that in the resolution of the issues in the civil case, the guilt or
innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.
-Dreemworks opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an
undated Comment/Opposition to Accused’s Motion to Suspend Proceedings based on
Prejudicial Question on the grounds that: (1) there is no prejudicial question in this case
as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a
separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22;
and (2) Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states that one of the elements of a
prejudicial question is that “the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action”; thus,
this element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case
-MTC granted the suspension
ISSUE: W/on the suspension was proper.
HELD: Nope
RATIO:
- Under the amendment, a prejudicial question is understood in law as
that which must precede the criminal action and which requires a
decision before a final judgment can be rendered in the criminal action
with which said question is closely connected. The civil action must be
instituted prior to the institution of the criminal action.
=Sec. 7 of Rule 111, which applies here and now provides:
SEC. 7. Elements of prejudicial question.—The elements of a prejudicial
question are: (a) the previously instituted civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner interprets Sec. 7(a) to mean that in order for a civil case to create a
prejudicial question and, thus, suspend a criminal case, it must first be established that
the civil case was filed previous to the filing of the criminal case. This, petitioner argues,
is specifically to guard against the situation wherein a party would belatedly file a civil
action that is related to a pending criminal action in order to delay the proceedings in the
latter.
On the other hand, private respondent cites Article 36 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 36. Pre-judicial questions which must be decided before any criminal
prosecution may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of
court which the Supreme Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in
conflict with the provisions of this Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
Private respondent argues that the phrase “before any criminal prosecution may be
instituted or may proceed” must be interpreted to mean that a prejudicial question exists
when the civil action is filed either before the institution of the criminal action or during
the pendency of the criminal action. Private respondent concludes that there is an
apparent conflict in the provisions of the Rules of Court and the Civil Code in that the
latter considers a civil case to have presented a prejudicial question even if the criminal
case preceded the filing of the civil case.
We cannot agree with private respondent.
it is a basic precept in statutory construction that a “change in phraseology by
amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of
the provision from that it originally had.” In the instant case, the phrase, “previously
instituted,” was inserted to qualify the nature of the civil action involved in a prejudicial
question in relation to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed by
the insertion of “subsequent” directly before the term criminal action. There is no other
logical explanation for the amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and
criminal actions, that the civil action must precede the criminal action
- Here, the civil case was filed two (2) years after the institution of the criminal complaint
and from the time that private respondent allegedly withdrew its equipment from the job
site. Also, it is worth noting that the civil case was instituted more than two and a half (2
½) years from the time that private respondent allegedly stopped construction of the
proposed building for no valid reason. More importantly, the civil case praying for the
rescission of the construction agreement for lack of consideration was filed more than
three (3) years from the execution of the construction agreement.
-Evidently, as in Sabandal, the circumstances surrounding the filing of the cases involved
here show that the filing of the civil action was a mere afterthought on the part of private
respondent and interposed for delay. And as correctly argued by petitioner, it is this
scenario that Sec. 7 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court seeks to prevent. Thus, private
respondent’s positions cannot be left to stand.
- Moreover, The Resolution of the Civil Case Is Not Determinative of the Prosecution
of the Criminal Action
-Undeniably, the fact that there exists a valid contract or agreement to support
the issuance of the check/s or that the checks were issued for valuable consideration
does not make up the elements of the crime. Thus, this Court has held in a long line of
cases that the agreement surrounding the issuance of dishonored checks is irrelevant to
the prosecution for violation of BP 22. In Mejia v. People, we ruled:It must be
emphasized that the gravamen of the offense charge is the issuance of a bad check
2. PIMENTEL V. PIMENTEL, G.R. NO. 172060, SEPTEMBER 13, 2010 – TEVES
Joselito PIMENTEL v. Maria Chrysantine PIMENTEL and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Topic: Prejudicial Question
ER: Maria filed a case for frustrated parricide against Joselito, dated August 30, 2004,
raffled on October 25, 2004 in the RTC QC. Subsequently, she filed a case for
annulment of marriage, dated November 4, 2004, filed on November 5, 2004. Joselito
received the summons for annulment on February 7, 2005, THUS, on the 11th he filed a
motion to suspend proceedings in the RTC of QC, claiming that the filing of the annulment
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case raised a prejudicial question against him. (annulment was filed in Antipolo) RTC and
CA would rule that there was no such prejudicial question.
Was there a prejudicial question? NOPE. First, as provided by the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, one of the elements is that the civil case is filed before the criminal case. This
was not fulfilled, as the information for frustrated Parricide was filed before the civil case
for annulment of marriage.
Second, the issues of anulment are not intimately intertwined with that of parricide, thus
there is no prejudicial question to speak of. There is a prejudicial question when a civil
action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue
which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the
guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The main issue in annulment is the
existence of psychological capacity such that he would be incapable of performing
the essential obligations of marriage, whilst the main issue in parricide is whether or
not the victim was killed by the accused.
COMPLETE
FACTS:
Maria Chrysantine Pimentel (Maria) filed a case for frustrated parricide against Joselito
Pimentel (Joselito), dated August 30, 2004 before the RTC of Quezon City and raffled
to Branch 223 on October 25, 2004. Subsequently, she filed a case for annulment of
marriage, dated November 4, 2004, filed on November 5, 2004. Joselito received
summons for the annulment on February 7, 2005.
Thus, on February 11, 2005, Joselito filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings
before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. He
asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element
in parricide, the outcome of the Civil Case would have a bearing in the criminal case filed
against him before the RTC Quezon City. The RTC dismissed the petition for lack of merit,
and on appeal to the CA, it was also denied.
ISSUE: Whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial
question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide
against petitioner.
HELD: Petition has no merit. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20
March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.
RATIO: The civil case must be instituted FIRST, before the criminal case. As provided by
the Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, the elements for a
prejudicial question are:
i. the previously instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue raised in the subsequent criminal action; and
ii. the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed. [emphasis supplied]
In this case, the first element was clearly lacking as Information for frustrated Parricide
was dated on August 30, 2004 and raffled to the RTC Q.C. on October 25, 2004.
Meanwhile, the civil action was dated on November 4, 2004 and subsequently filed on
November 5, 2004. It is clear that the civil case was filed after the filing of the criminal
case. Thus, the requirement in Sec. 7, Rule 111 was not met.
Assuming arguendo that the civil case for annulment was filed before the criminal case of
parricide, the petition would still fail. A prejudicial question when a civil action and a
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must
be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the
issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
In parricide, the key element is the relationship between the offender and the victim,
punishing any person “who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or descendants, or his spouse.” However, the issue
in the annulment of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the parricide case.
The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue
in parricide is whether the accused killed the victim. In this case, since Joselito was
charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he performed all the acts of
execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioner’s will.
At the time of the commission of the alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were
married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the petition in Civil Case
No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the
time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner
and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the
time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
3. SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES V. PEREZ, G.R. NO.192253, SEPTEMBER 18,
2013 – TIU
ER: San Miguel Properties and BF Homes entered into contracts of sale while the latter
was under receivership and represented by Atty. Orendain. BF Homes sold 130
residential lots to San Miguel, which sales were embodied in 3 transactions. All the TCTs
covered by the first 2 transactions were duly delivered to San Miguel, but the TCTs falling
under the 3rd transaction were withheld by BF Homes because Atty. Orendain allegedly
was no longer its receiver at the time of such transaction. For failure to deliver the TCTs
despite repeated demands, San Miguel filed complaint-affidavit with the Las Pinñ as City
Prosecutor for violation of PD 957. At the same time, San Miguel filed an action for
specific performance with the HLURB. The Prosecutor dismissed the complaint because
there existed a prejudicial question, requiring the suspension of the criminal action until
the issue of BF Homes’ liability is first determined by the HLURB. San Miguel brought the
issue first to the DOJ and later to the CA, which all affirmed the Prosecutor, leading to San
Miguel filing the case with the SC. Meanwhile, while the HLURB was inclined to dismiss
the specific performance case before it, the Office of the President ordered it to rule
thereon. Can the HLURB case – an administrative case – be a prejudicial question to
the PD 957 case – a criminal case? Yes. The essential elements of a prejudicial question
are provided in Section 7, Rule 111 of the Rules: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent
criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the
criminal action may proceed. True, the concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil
action and a criminal case. But contrary to San Miguel’s submission that there could be
no prejudicial question to speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question
arose was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB raises a prejudicial
question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the charge for the
criminal violation of Sec. 25 of PD 957. [IMPORTANT] This is true simply because the
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action for specific performance was an action civil in nature but could not be instituted
elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and
original.
Facts: Petitioner San Miguel Properties Inc. (San Miguel) purchased from B.F. Homes, Inc.
(BF Homes), then represented by Atty. Florencio B. Orendain (Orendain) as its duly
authorized rehabilitation receiver, 130 residential lots situated in BF Homes Paranñ aque
for about 106M. The transactions were embodied in 3 separate deeds of sale. The TCTs
covering the lots bought under the 1 st and 2nd deeds were fully delivered to San Miguel
Properties, but the TCTs purchased under the 3 rd deed of sale were not delivered to San
Miguel.
- BF Homes claimed that it withheld the delivery of TCTs because Atty. Orendain had
ceased to be its rehabilitation receiver at the time of the transactions after being replaced
as receiver by FBO Network Management pursuant to an order from the SEC. Essentially,
BF Homes refused to deliver the despite demands.
- Thus, San Miguel filed a complaint-affidavit in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las
Pinñ as City (OCP Las Pinñ as) charging the directors and officers of BF Homes with non-
delivery of titles in violation of Sec. 25, in relation to Sec. 39, of PD 957.
- [NOTE] At the same time, San Miguel sued BF Homes for specific performance in the
HLURB, praying to compel BF Homes to release the TCTs in its favor.
- In their joint counter-affidavit, the directors and officers of BF Homes refuted San
Miguel’s assertions by contending, among others that: xxx (c) the claim should have been
brought to the SEC because BF Homes was under receivership; (d) in receivership cases,
it was essential to suspend all claims against a distressed corporation in order to enable
the receiver to effectively exercise its powers free from judicial and extra-judicial
interference that could unduly hinder the rescue of the distressed company; and (e) the
lots involved were under custodia legis in view of the pending receivership proceedings,
necessarily stripping the OCP Las Pinñ as of the jurisdiction to proceed in the action.
- The SEC eventually terminated BF Homes’ receivership.
- The OCP Las Pinñ as rendered its Resolution, dismissing San Miguel’s criminal complaint
for violation of PD 957 on the ground (a) that no action could be filed by or against a
receiver without leave from the SEC that had appointed him; (b) that the implementation
of the provisions of PD 957 exclusively pertained under the jurisdiction of the HLURB; (c)
that there existed a prejudicial question necessitating the suspension of the
criminal action until after the issue on the liability of the distressed BF Homes was
first determined by the SEC en banc or by the HLURB; and (d) that no prior resort to
administrative jurisdiction had been made; (e) that there appeared to be no probable
cause to indict respondents for not being the actual signatories in the three deeds of sale.
- San Miguel appealed the resolutions of the OCP Las Pinñ as to the DOJ, but the DOJ
Secretary denied the appeal, agreeing with the OCP Las Pinñ as because there is still
pending complaint for specific performance where the HLURB is called upon to inquire
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
into, and rule on, the validity of the sales transactions involving the lots in question and
entered into by Atty. Orendain for and in behalf of BF Homes.
- Undaunted, San Miguel elevated the DOJ’s resolutions to the CA on certiorari and
mandamus, contending that the DOJ Secretary had acted with GADALEJ. The CA affirmed
the DOJ and held that while the general rule is that the rule on prejudicial question
applies to civil and criminal actions only, an exception to such rule is provided in
Quiambao vs. Osorio, where an issue in an administrative case was considered a
prejudicial question to the resolution of a civil case which, consequently, warranted the
suspension of the latter until after termination of the administrative proceedings.
- In the meantime, the HLURB Arbiter ruled that the HLURB was inclined to suspend the
proceedings until the SEC resolved the issue of Atty. Orendain’s authority to enter into
the transactions in BF Homes’ behalf. The HLURB Board of Commissioners agreed with
the same, citing the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
- San Miguel Properties appealed to the Office of the President (OP), which
reversed the HLURB Board’s ruling and remanded the case back to the HLURB.
Issue: Whether or not the HLURB administrative case brought to compel the delivery of
the TCTs could be a reason to suspend the proceedings on the criminal complaint for the
violation of Sec. 25 of PD 957 on the ground of a prejudicial question? Yes. Action for
specific performance, even if pending in the HLURB, an administrative agency, raises a
prejudicial question BF Homes’ posture that the administrative case for specific
performance in the HLURB posed a prejudicial question that must first be determined
before the criminal case for violation of Sec. 25 of PD 957 could be resolved.
Held: A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the
resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in the criminal case, and
the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is determinative of the criminal
case, but the jurisdiction to try and resolve it is lodged in another court or tribunal. It is
based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but is so intimately connected with
the crime that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. The rationale behind
the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid conflicting decisions.
- The essential elements of a prejudicial question are provided in Section 7, Rule
111 of the Rules of Court, to wit: (a) the previously instituted civil action
involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the
subsequent criminal action, and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
- The concept of a prejudicial question involves a civil action and a criminal
case. Yet, contrary to San Miguel’s submission that there could be no prejudicial
question to speak of because no civil action where the prejudicial question
arose was pending, the action for specific performance in the HLURB raises a
prejudicial question that sufficed to suspend the proceedings determining the
charge for the criminal violation of Sec. 25 of PD 957. [IMPORTANT] This is
true simply because the action for specific performance was an action civil in
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nature but could not be instituted elsewhere except in the HLURB, whose
jurisdiction over the action was exclusive and original.
- [IMPORTANT] A prejudicial question need not conclusively resolve the guilt
or innocence of the accused. It is enough for the prejudicial question to simply
test the sufficiency of the allegations in the information in order to sustain the
further prosecution of the criminal case. A party who raises a prejudicial
question is deemed to have hypothetically admitted that all the essential
elements of the crime have been adequately alleged in the information,
considering that the Prosecution has not yet presented a single piece of
evidence on the indictment or may not have rested its case. A challenge to the
allegations in the information on the ground of prejudicial question is in effect a
question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.
- In this case, the determination of whether the proceedings ought to be suspended
because of a prejudicial question rested on whether the facts and issues raised in the
pleadings in the specific performance case were so related with the issues raised in the
criminal complaint for the violation of PD 957, such that the resolution of the issues in
the former would be determinative of the question of guilt in the criminal case. An
examination of the nature of the two cases involved is thus necessary.
- An action for specific performance is the remedy to demand the exact
performance of a contract in the specific form in which it was made, or
according to the precise terms agreed upon by a party bound to fulfill it.
Evidently, before the remedy of specific performance is availed of, there must
first be a breach of the contract. The remedy has its roots in Article 1191 of the
Civil Code.
- Accordingly, the injured party may choose between specific performance or
rescission with damages. As presently worded, Article 1191 speaks of the
remedy of rescission in reciprocal obligations within the context of Article 1124
of the former Civil Code which used the term resolution. The remedy of
resolution applied only to reciprocal obligations, such that a party’s breach of
the contract equated to a tacit resolutory condition that entitled the injured
party to rescission. The present article, as in the former one, contemplates
alternative remedies for the injured party who is granted the option to pursue,
as principal actions, either the rescission or the specific performance of the
obligation, with payment of damages in either case.
- On the other hand, PD 957 is a law that regulates the sale of subdivision lots
and condominiums in view of the increasing number of incidents wherein "real
estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged
on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly" the
basic requirements and amenities, as well as of reports of alarming magnitude
of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous
subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver
titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances.
- PD 957 authorizes the suspension and revocation of the registration and
license of the real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators, and/or
sellers in certain instances, as well as provides the procedure to be observed in
such instances; it prescribes administrative fines and other penalties in case of
violation of, or non-compliance with its provisions.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
- Conformably with the foregoing, the action for specific performance in the
HLURB would determine whether or not San Miguel Properties was legally
entitled to demand the delivery of the remaining TCTs, while the criminal action
would decide whether or not BF Homes’ directors and officers were criminally
liable for withholding the TCTs. The resolution of the former must obviously
precede that of the latter, for should the HLURB hold San Miguel Properties to
be not entitled to the delivery of the TCTs because Atty. Orendain did not have
the authority to represent BF Homes in the sale due to his receivership having
been terminated by the SEC, the basis for the criminal liability for the violation
of Sec. 25 of PD 957 would evaporate, thereby negating the need to proceed
with the criminal case.
PA RT I I I
RULE 112- PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
1. COMMUNITY RURAL BANK V. TALAVERA, 455 SCRA 34 – VELASQUEZ
Community Rural Bank v. Talavera, 455 SCRA 34
Emergency Recit (Read the whole case na rin para suave recit, short lang naman):
Community filed and administrative case against Judge Talavera (RTC 28, Cabanatuan).
Community filed a complaint for estafa against several accused (unnamed). The judge
issued a warrant of arrest. The accused filed a motion for reinvestigation with the judge
(beforehand, they already appealed the findings of the fiscal in the preliminary
investigation). There was no notice and there was no hearing. A reinvestigation was
granted and was conducted, again without notice. The Resolution recommended
dismissal. The Judge dismissed, again without notice and hearing.
Issue: Did the judge commit gross ignorance of the law? Yes
Ratio: Dept. Order No. 223 states that A motion for reinvestigation may be filed based on
newly discovered evidence and must be filed before the DOJ Secretary rules on an appeal
from the resolution of the preliminary investigation. In this case, nagrule na yung DOJ
and wala ring newly discovered evidence. The reinvestigation was filed 3 months after
the decision of the DOJ. The case also discussed that judges should be cautious in
granting reinvestigations because a preliniary investigation “is not the occasion for a full
and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence, which needs to be presented only to
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed, and that the
99
accused is probably guilty thereof.” Regarding motion to dismiss: inadpot lang nung judge
yung resolution kahit sabi lang “lack of absence” tapos sa order ng judge to dismiss sabi
lang meritorious without discussing why. He should have ecercised discretion and
showed that he analyzed before deciding. Lack of notice and hearing: deprivation of right
to due process.
Facts:
 Community Rural Bank filed an estafa complaint against several individuals
(unnamed in the case) in the office of the prosecutor. 6 informations were filed
after the preliminary investigation and 2 of which were raffled to the
respondent judge Talavera.
 The judge issued a warrant of arrest with no bail after the appeal of the finding
of the Fiscal with the DOJ was denied, MR also denied. Thereafter, the accused
filed a Motion for Reinvestigation to Lift the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest.
However, the Bank nor tits counsel was furnished a copy of the motion and
there was also no hearing on the motion.
 Despite this, the judge still granted the Reinvestigation. (Patay ka boy). The
reinvestigation was conducted but again, the Bank was not notified of the
proceeedings.
 The joint resolution of the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Caballero reversed
the earlier findings of the Investigating Fiscal. On the same day, a Motion to
Dismiss was filed by Caballero.
 Neither the bank now counsel was notified of the Motion and neither was there
a hearing. (At this point, he’s just asking for it). The motion to Dismiss was
granted and the accused were released.
 The Bank filed an MR with Opposition/Comment to the Motion to Dismiss and
Omnibus Motion for the Reinstatement of the Criminal Information and for the
Recall of Order for Release (Basically an MR on all the things the Judge f-ed up.)
arguing that it had been deprived of due process. MR was denied. Hence, the
administrative case.
Issue: Did the judge commit gross ignorance of the law?
Held: GUILTY. Fined 20,000 and sternly warned that a repetition of the same shall be
dealt with more severely.
Ratio:
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
 Judge should not have entertained the Motion for Reinvestigation. The DOJ
Secretary Cuevas already denied the appeal which established the prima facie
evidence against the accused.
o Dept. Order No. 223 (Rules Governing Appeals from Resolutions in
Preliminary investigations or Reinvestigations): “A motion for
reinvestigation may be filed based on newly discovered evidence and
must be filed before the DOJ Secretary rules on an appeal from the
resolution of the preliminary investigation
o In this case, the Motion for Reinvestigation was filed after the DOJ had
already denied the appeal. (In fact 3 months after the denial)
o There was no newly found evidence.
 The court should have exercised “great restraint” in granting the reinvestigation
o Preliminary Investigation is prefatory and inquisitorial. It is not a trial
of the case on the merits and has no purpose eexcept to determine
whether a crime has been committed, and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty of that crime. [26] A
preliminary investigation is not the occasion for a full and exhaustive
display of the parties’ evidence, which needs to be presented only to
engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed,
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. [27]
 It was wrong to grant the Motion to Dismiss:
o The Judge merely relied on the resolution of the Prosec which merely
recommended the dismissal of the case for alleged insufficiency of
evidence.
o The Judge’s order merely said: the MTD is meritorious and granted,
release the prisoners unless they are being detained for some other
lawful cause”
o The order “does not demonstrate and independent evaluation or
assessment of evidence. The dismissal as not shown to be based upon
the judge’s own individual conviction that there was no viable case.”
o Discretion should be exercised! This is because dismissing the case is
equivalent to a disposition of the case which is clearly within the
exclusive jurisdiction and competence of the court.
We don’t even need to talk about the lack of notice and hearing. Sobrang lala lang nun.
“Elementary due process mandates that the other party be notified of the adverse action
of the opposing party”
2. SERAG V. COURT OF APPEALS, 473 SCRA 590 – AQUINO
100
SEBASTIAN SERAG, LINO NAPAO, THOMIX SEGUMALIAN, JOSE OLIVER SEGUMALIAN,
RODOLFO TALANQUINES, ROQUE SANMILLAN, EDGAR STA. CRUZ, ELEAZAR SANÑ OL,
NEMESIO PANUGOT, TEODORICO DELA CRUZ, VICENTE DELA CRUZ, ABRAHAM DELA
CRUZ and MARILYN SILFAVAN , petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MA. DAISY SIBYA ,
respondents.
Emergency Recit: Sibya was shot dead in front of his house. His driver Salamat was
wounded. The Provincial Prosecutor filed two Informations: Murder and Attempted
Murder. The Secretary of Justice downgraded the charges from Murder to Homicide and
Attempted Murder to Attempted Homicide. The private complainant filed an MR.
Meanwhile, the trial court admitted the second amended information. The accused were
arraigned. Subsequently, the Secretary granted the private complainant’s MR and ordered
the Provincial Prosecutor to withdraw the second amended information and to file, in
lieu thereof, the separate Informations for Murder and Attempted Murder, respectively.
Issue: Whether the Secretary erred when in acted on the MR despite knowing that the
accused was already arraigned based on the second amended information. The SC held
that under Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70, the Secretary of Justice may resolve the said
motion despite the arraignment of the petitioners:
SECTION 7. Action on the petition.—The Secretary of Justice may dismiss the
petition outright if he finds the same to be patently without merit or manifestly
intended for delay, or when the issues raised therein are too unsubstantial to
require consideration. If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the
appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused
had already been arraigned. Any arraignment made after the filing of the
petition shall not bar the Secretary of Justice from exercising his power of
review.
Facts:
 Atty. Jesus Sibya, Jr., a mayoralty candidate in San Joaquin, Iloilo was shot to
death in front of his residence. His driver, Norberto Salamat III, was also
wounded. The Criminal Investigation and Detection Group in Iloilo City filed a
criminal complaint for murder and attempted murder against Lino Napao, then
incumbent mayor of San Joaquin, and Sebastian Serag. 1
 The Provincial Prosecutor filed two Informations (1) for Murder with the Use of
Unlicensed Firearms, and (2) Attempted Murder with the Use of Unlicensed
Firearms against Serag and Napao and seven unidentified persons. 2
 Norberto Salamat III and Ma. Daisy Sibya, the widow of the deceased, filed
before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor a Supplemental Complaint for
murder, frustrated murder and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866.
 Accused Juan Napao and the 14 other additional accused filed on August 16,
2002, a petition for review.
 Pending the resolution by the Secretary of Justice of the said petition for review,
the proceedings were suspended.
 Subsequently, however, the arraignment of the accused was set on May 21,
2002. It was, thereafter, reset to June 6, 2002 which, by agreement of the
prosecution and the defense, was “intransferrable” in character. It turned out
that the day before (May 20, 2002), the Secretary of Justice, in a Resolution,
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
affirmed the Joint Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor, downgrading the
charges from Murder to Homicide, and from Attempted Murder to Attempted
Homicide,
 The Provincial Prosecutor filed a Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended
Information for homicide and attempted homicide in the two cases, and for the
court to admit the said second Amended Informations. The private prosecutors
opposed the motion and moved for deferment, contending that the private
complainant had earlier filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution,
and that it would be premature for the Provincial Prosecutor to file a motion for
the admission of the Second Amended Information and for the court to admit
the same.
 However, the RTC verbally granted the motion of the Provincial Prosecutor, and
admitted the Second Amended Information for Homicide
 RTC issued its Order granting the motion of the Provincial Prosecutor for the
admission of the Second Amended Information for Homicide, and ordered the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 926 without prejudice to its re-filing
 the Information was re-filed in the MTC. Taking into account the finding of the
Secretary of Justice, the court held that the finding of probable cause for murder
against the accused did not bar it from admitting the Second Amended
Information for Homicide. Likewise, the pendency of the private complainant’s
motion for the reconsideration of the May 20, 2002 Resolution of the Secretary
of Justice was not a valid reason for the deferment of the arraignment of the
accused for homicide.
 The private complainant insisted that the admission by the RTC of the Second
Amended Information downgrading the crime charged therein to Homicide and
the arraignment of the accused therein on June 6, 2002 were premature since
the Secretary of Justice had not yet resolved her motion for reconsideration of
the May 20, 2002 Resolution.
 the Secretary of Justice granted the MR of the private complainant, setting aside
Resolution No. 258. He further declared that he was not proscribed from taking
cognizance of and resolving the private complainant’s MR notwithstanding the
arraignment of the accused. He directed the Provincial Prosecutor to withdraw
the Second Amended Information for Homicide and Attempted Homicide and to
file, in lieu thereof, separate Informations for Murder and Attempted Murder,
respectively, against the said accused.
Issues: (1)Whether the Secretary committed GADLEJ when it acted on the MR and
reversed his first Resolution. (2) Whether the Secretary erred when in acted on the MR
despite knowing that the accused was already arraigned based on the second amended
information.
Held: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Ratio:
 A motion is considered moot when it no longer presents a justiciable
controversy because the issues involved have become academic or dead. Courts
will not determine a moot question in which no practical relief can be granted.
However, the Court will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is
capable of repetition, yet evading review.
 The People of the Philippines was not estopped by the Prosecutor’s insistence
that the petitioners and the other accused be arraigned on June 6, 2002 despite
101
the pending petition for review of Juan Napao, et al. and the motion for
reconsideration of the private respondent before the Secretary of Justice.
 The fact of the matter is that during the hearing of June 6, 2002, the Prosecutors
moved for the deferment of the consideration of the Provincial Prosecutor’s
motion for the withdrawal of the Second Amended Information for homicide
because, in the meantime, the private complainant had filed a motion for the
reconsideration of the Justice Secretary’s Resolution. The latter cannot be
stripped of his authority to act on and resolve the motion of the private
complainant on the Prosecutor’s insistence that the accused be arraigned on
June 6, 2002.
 Indeed, under Section 7 of DOJ Circular No. 70, the Secretary of Justice may
resolve the said motion despite the arraignment of the petitioners:
 SECTION 7. Action on the petition.—The Secretary of Justice may dismiss the
petition outright if he finds the same to be patently without merit or manifestly
intended for delay, or when the issues raised therein are too unsubstantial to
require consideration. If an information has been filed in court pursuant to the
appealed resolution, the petition shall not be given due course if the accused
had already been arraigned. Any arraignment made after the filing of the
petition shall not bar the Secretary of Justice from exercising his power of
review.
3. SORIANO V. PEOPLE, G.R. NO.162336, FEBRUARY 1, 2010 – ARCEO
EMERGENCY DIGEST
The Office of Special Investigation (OSI) of BSP sent a letter to Chief State
Prosec. Zunñ o of DOJ. It attached 5 affidavits, which allegedly served as bases for filing
criminal charges for Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents and for Violation
of RA 337 against Soriano. These 5 affidavits stated that Sps. Carlos appeared to have a
loan of P8 million with the RBSM, but had never applied for nor received such loan; that
it was Soriano, president of RBSM, who facilitated and received the loan; and that it had
never been authorized by the Board of Directors and no report was submitted to the BSP.
The OSI letter, which was not subscribed under oath, requested that a preliminary
investigation be conducted and criminal charges be filed. Prosec. Fonacier conducted the
preliminary investigation. 2 separate informations were filed against Soriano before the
RTC. Soriano moved to quash these informations on the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction over the offense. He alleged that the letter transmitted by BSP to DOJ
constituted the complaint and hence was defective for failure to comply with the
requirements of Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of the RoC (address of Soriano and oath and
subscription).
Issue: WON the complaint complied with the requirements under Sec. 3(a),
Rule 112. Held: YES. Doctrine: We held in Soriano v. Casanova that the letters
transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ were not intended to be the complaint, as envisioned
under the Rules. They did not contain averments of personal knowledge of the events
and transactions constitutive of any offense. The letters merely transmitted for
preliminary investigation the affidavits of people who had personal knowledge of the acts
of Soriano. We ruled that these affidavits, not the letters transmitting them, initiated the
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
preliminary investigation. Since these affidavits were subscribed under oath by the
witnesses who executed them before a notary public, then there was substantial
compliance with Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
FACTS:
The Office of Special Investigation (OSI) of BSP transmitted a letter to Chief
State Prosec. Zunñ o of the DOJ. It attached 5 affidavits, which would allegedly serve as
bases for filing criminal charges for Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents
and for Violation of Sec. 83 of RA 337 against Soriano. These 5 affidavits, along with
other documents, stated that spouses Carlos appeared to have an outstanding loan of P8
million with the Rural Bank of San Miguel Bulacan (RBSM), but had never applied for nor
received such loan; that it was Soriano, president of RBSM, who facilitated and received
the loan; and that the P8 million loan had never been authorized by RBSM's Board of
Directors and no report thereof had ever been submitted to the Department of Rural
Banks, Supervision and Examination Sector of the BSP. The letter of the OSI, which was
not subscribed under oath, requested that a preliminary investigation be conducted and
the corresponding criminal charges be filed against Soriano at his last known address.
State Prosec. Fonacier proceeded with the preliminary investigation. The
investigating officer found probable cause and filed 2 separate informations against
Soriano before the RTC of Malolos. The 1st Information was for estafa through falsification
of commercial documents, under Art. 315, par. 1(b), of the RPC. The 2 nd Information was
for violation of Sec. 83 of RA 337 (prohibition against DOSRI loans). It alleged that, as
Pres. of RBSM, Soriano indirectly secured an P8 million loan with RBSM, for his personal
benefit, without the written consent of the bank's Board of Directors, without entering
the transaction in the bank's records, and without transmitting a copy of the transaction
to the supervising department of the bank.
Soriano moved to quash these informations on two grounds:
1. That the court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged; - (a) the letter
transmitted by BSP to DOJ constituted the complaint and hence was
defective for failure to comply with the mandatory requirements of Sec.
3(a), Rule 112 (statement of address of petitioner and oath and
subscription); (b) the OSI officers were not authorized by the BSP Gov. and
Monetary Board to file the complaint.
2. That the facts charged do not constitute an offense. – Estafa under par. 1(b) of
Art. 315 of the RPC is incompatible with the violation of DOSRI law. If he
acquired the loan as DOSRI, he owned the loaned money and therefore, cannot
misappropriate or convert it as in estafa.
RTC denied the Motion to Quash. CA denied Soriano’s petition for certiorari. It
held that the BSP letter was not a complaint, but a transmittal letter only, which need not
comply with Sec. 3(a) of Rule 112. It held that the affidavits attached to the letter should
be treated as the complaint-affidavits, which complied with the requirements set out in
the RoC – subscribed and sworn to before a notary public and certified by State Prosec.
Fonacier, who personally examined the affiants and was convinced that the affiants fully
understood their sworn statements. Soriano went to SC via Rule 65.
102
ISSUE: WON the complaint complied with the mandatory requirements under Sec. 3(a),
Rule 112 of the RoC and Sec. 18, (c),(d) of RA 7653. (YES).
*Note: Soriano moved to withdraw this issue from the petition due to the promulgation of
Soriano v. Casanova, which ruled on the validity of the attached sworn affidavits. But, the
SC still proceeded to rule on the same.
HELD: Petition is DENIED. Decision and Resolution of CA are AFFIRMED.
RATIO:
In Soriano v. Casanova, We held that the affidavits attached to the BSP
transmittal letter complied with the mandatory requirements under the Rules of Court.
To be sure, the BSP letters involved in Soriano v. Casanova are not the same as the BSP
letter involved in this case. However, they are similar in the sense that they are all signed
by the OSI officers, they were not sworn to by the said officers, they all contained
summaries of their attached affidavits, and they all requested the conduct of a
preliminary investigation and the filing of criminal charges against Soriano. Thus, the
principle of stare decisis dictates that the ruling in Soriano v. Casanova be applied in this
case.
We held in Soriano v. Casanova that the letters transmitted by the BSP to the DOJ
were not intended to be the complaint. They did not contain averments of personal
knowledge of the events and transactions constitutive of any offense. The letters merely
transmitted for preliminary investigation the affidavits of people who had personal
knowledge of the acts of Soriano. We ruled that these affidavits, not the letters
transmitting them, initiated the preliminary investigation. Since these affidavits were
subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed them before a notary public, then
there was substantial compliance with Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
In Santos-Concio v. DOJ, instead of a transmittal letter from the BSP, the Court
was faced with an NBI-NCR Report with affidavits of witnesses as attachments. Ruling on
the validity of the witnesses’ sworn affidavits as bases for a preliminary investigation, we
held:
 “The Court is not unaware of the practice of incorporating all allegations in a
“complaint-affidavit,” but it does not pronounce strict adherence to only one
approach. The private offended party or relative of the deceased may not even
have witnessed the fatality, in which case the peace officer or law enforcer has
to rely chiefly on affidavits of witnesses. The Rules do not preclude the
attachment of a referral or transmittal letter similar to that of the NBI-NCR.
 Thus, in Soriano v. Casanova, the Court held:
o ... The letters clearly stated that what the OSI of the BSP and the LIS of the
PDIC did was to respectfully transmit to the DOJ for preliminary
investigation the affidavits and personal knowledge of the acts of the
petitioner. These affidavits were subscribed under oath by the witnesses
who executed them before a notary public. Since the affidavits, not the
letters transmitting them, were intended to initiate the preliminary
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113 103

investigation, we hold that Sec. 3(a), Rule 112 of the RoC was substantially elements for a violation of Section 83, even if petitioner did not secure the loan
complied with. in his own name.
o A complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal need
not be filed by the offended party, unless the offense subject thereof is one 2. A special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a
that cannot be prosecuted de oficio. motion to quash. The proper procedure is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial
 A preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed on the basis of an affidavit without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his
of any competent person, without the referral document, like the NBI-NCR motion to quash and if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal
Report, having been sworn to by the law enforcer as the nominal complainant. therefrom in the manner authorized by law.
To require otherwise is a needless exercise. The cited case of Oporto, Jr. v.
Monserate does not appear to dent this proposition. After all, what is required 3. We find no compelling reason to grant the injunctive relief sought by Soriano.
is to reduce the evidence into affidavits, for while reports and even raw
information may justify the initiation of an investigation, the preliminary
4. SAMUEL LEE V. KBC BANK, G.R. NO. 164673, JANUARY 15, 2011 – BASCARA
investigation stage can be held only after sufficient evidence has been gathered
and evaluated.
Samuel Lee v. KBC Bank, G.R. No. 164673, January 15, 2011
Quick Facts: Midas Corporation obtained two loans from KBC Bank. Both were covered
Anent the contention that there was no authority from the BSP Governor or the
by a promissory notes and deeds of assignment which transferred to KBC all of Midas’
Monetary Board to file a criminal case against Soriano, we held that the requirements of
rights to purchase orders issued by Otto Versand, a German company. When Midas
Sec. 18, par. (c) and (d) of RA 7653 did not apply because the BSP did not institute the
defaulted in paying the loans, Otto Versand (via facsimile) disclaimed the purchase
complaint but merely transmitted the affidavits of the complainants to the DOJ. Since the
orders and said that it never issued such orders. Lee and Lim were charged of Estafa. The
offenses for which Soriano was charged were public crimes, it can be initiated by “any
State Prosecutor found probable cause and so two informations for estafa were filed
competent person” with personal knowledge of the acts committed by the offender.
against Lee and Lim. Lee and Lim filed a petition for review with the DOJ challenging the
Thus, the witnesses who executed the affidavits clearly fell within the purview of “any
State Prosecutor’s resolution saying that the findings were only based on the facsimile
competent person” who may institute the complaint for a public crime.
message received from Otto Versand, which constituted hearsay evidence. A motion to
withdraw the cases for Estafa was filed. This was initially granted but was subsequently
OTHER DOCTRINES:
set aside by the CA.
Issue: Whether or not the admissibility of the facsimile message is a matter best
1. The informations filed against Soriano do not negate each other. A loan transaction
ventilated in a full blown trial and not in a preliminary investigation – YES
under the DOSRI law (violation of Sec. 83 of RA 337) could be the subject of Estafa under
Ratio: Whether the facsimile message is admissible in evidence and whether the element
Art. 315 (1) (b) of the RPC.
of deceit in the crime of estafa is present are matters best ventilated in a full-blown trial,
not in the preliminary investigation. In Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas, the Court held
 The bank money which came to the possession of Soriano was money held in
that: [A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display
trust by him for the bank, in his fiduciary capacity as the President of said bank.
of [the prosecution’s] evidence. The presence or absence of the elements of the
It is not accurate to say that petitioner became the owner of the P8 million
crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon
because it was the proceeds of a loan. The loan was supposed to be for “Enrico
after a full-blown trial on the merits. In fine, the validity and merits of a party’s
Carlos”. Thus, Soriano remained the bank’s fiduciary with respect to that money,
defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are
which makes it capable of misappropriation or conversion in his hands.
better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.
 The next question is whether there can also be, at the same time, a charge for
DOSRI violation in such a situation wherein the accused bank officer did not
Facts
secure a loan in his own name, but was alleged to have used the name of
 Midas Diversified Export Corporation (Midas) obtained a $1.4 M loan from KBC
another person in order to indirectly secure a loan from the bank. We answer
Bank N.V. (KBC Bank), a Belgian company.
this in the affirmative. The prohibition in Section 83 is broad enough to cover
various modes of borrowing. It covers loans by a bank director or officer (like  Samuel U. Lee (Lee), assistant treasurer and director of Midas, executed a
herein petitioner) which are made either: (1) directly, (2) indirectly, (3) for promissory note in favor of KBC Bank and a deed of assignment transferring to
himself, (4) or as the representative or agent of others. The foregoing KBC Bank all of Midas’s rights over a purchase order issued by Otto Versand, a
information describes the manner of securing the loan as indirect; names German company, which covered a shipment of girl’s basic denim jeans
petitioner as the benefactor of the indirect loan; and states that the amounting to $1.8 M.
requirements of the law were not complied with. It contains all the required  Midas obtained another loan, amounting to $65K from KBC Bank.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
 Maybelle L. Lim (Lim), treasurer and assistant secretary of Midas, executed a
promissory note in favor of KBC Bank and a deed of assignment transferring all
of Midas’ rights over another purchase order which covered a shipment of
boy’s bermuda jeans amounting to $841K
 Midas was considered in default in paying both loans.
 When KBC Bank sent a letter to Otto Versand verifying the validity of the
purchase orders, Versand sent a facsimile message to KBC Bank stating that it
did not issue the purchase orders and that it would not pay Midas any amount.
 The manager of the corporate division of KBC Bank, Liza Pajarillo, charged Lee
and Lim of estafa.
 In his Resolution, State Prosecutor Josefino A. Subia (State Prosecutor Subia)
found the existence of probable cause and recommended that two counts of
estafa be filed against Lee and Lim.
 Accordingly, two informations for estafa against Lee and Lim were filed with the
RTC.
 After finding probable cause, Judge Winlove M. Dumayas (Judge Dumayas) of
the RTC issued warrants of arrest against Lee and Lim.
 Lee and Lim filed a petition for review with the Department of Justice.
o They challenged State Prosecutor Subia’s Resolution and Order
denying their motion for reconsideration and claimed that the
resolutions merely relied on hearsay evidence which cannot be the
basis for a finding of probable cause
 In his Resolution, Secretary Hernando B. Perez (Secretary Perez) directed the
withdrawal of the informations filed against Lee and Lim. Secretary Perez held
that the facsimile message constituted hearsay evidence and therefore
inadmissible as evidence
 KBC Bank filed a motion for reconsideration with the Department of Justice.
 Lee and Lim had not been arraigned. In a motion filed with the RTC, Assistant
City Prosecutor Nora C. Sibucao (Assistant City Prosecutor Sibucao) prayed for
the withdrawal of the informations filed against Lee and Lim.
 Judge Dumayas granted Assistant City Prosecutor Sibucao’s motion to withdraw
the informations against Lee and Lim.
 KBC Bank filed with the Court a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
 In a Resolution, the Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals pursuant
to Section 6, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court
 In its Decision, the Court of Appeals set aside Judge Dumayas’ Order. It held that
the trial judge practically concurred with the findings of the Secretary of Justice,
contrary to the well-reasoned findings of the investigating prosecutor and
emphasized that a preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence but for the presentation of such
evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Issue: Whether or not the admissibility of the facsimile message is a matter best
ventilated in a full blown trial and not in a preliminary investigation – YES
104
Held: WHEREFORE, THE PETITION IS DENIED. THE COURT AFFIRMS THE 10
FEBRUARY 2004 DECISION AND 27 JULY 2004 RESOLUTION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS IN CA-G.R. SP NO. 78004. THE CASE IS REMANDED TO THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH 58, MAKATI CITY FOR
EVALUATION ON WHETHER PROBABLE CAUSE EXISTS TO HOLD THE ACCUSED FOR
TRIAL.
Ratio:
 Whether the facsimile message is admissible in evidence and whether the
element of deceit in the crime of estafa is present are matters best ventilated in
a full-blown trial, not in the preliminary investigation.
 In Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas, the Court held that:
o [A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of [the prosecution’s] evidence. The presence or
absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and
is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown
trial on the merits.
o In fine, the validity and merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as
well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better
ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation level.
Bonus
 Judge Dumayas failed to make his own evaluation in granting the motion to
withdraw the informations. Judge Dumayas’ Order states in full:
o This Court, after an in-depth scrutiny of the arguments raised by the
prosecution and private complainant, finds the contentions of the
prosecution to be sufficient and meritorious.
o Accordingly, the Motion to Withdraw Information filed by the
Prosecution is hereby granted and the two (2) informations for the
crime of Estafa penalized under par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code
are hereby withdrawn from the docket of this court.
 Once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound
discretion of the court. The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice, since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess
the merits of the case. Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice
alone would be an abdication of its duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima
facie case. The trial court may make an independent assessment of the merits
of the case based on the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or
evidence appended to the Information; the records of the public prosecutor,
which the court may order the latter to produce before the court; or any
evidence already adduced before the court by the accused at the time the
motion is filed by the public prosecutor.
 In the present case, Judge Dumayas did not positively state that the evidence
against Lee and Lim is insufficient (2) include a discussion of the merits of the
case (3) assess whether Secretary Perez’s conclution is supported by evidence
(4) look at the basis of Secretary Perez’s recommendation (5) embody his
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
assessment in the order and (6) state his reasons for granting the motion to
withdraw in the informations.
Judge Dumayas’ failure to make his own evaluation of the merits of the case violates KBC
Bank’s right to due process and constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Judge Dumayas’
order granting the motion to withdraw the information is void.
5. OKABE V. GUTIERREZ, MAY 27, 2004, G.R.NO. 150185 – CHAN
Okabe v. Gutierrez
DOCTRINE - In determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the
arrest of the accused, the judge should not rely solely on the report of the investigating
prosecutor.
- The judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint,
affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of
stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or
upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor.
ER
Cecilia Maruyama executed an affidavit-complaint and filed the same with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Pasay. It charged Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal
Okabe with Estafa. It was alleged that Maruyama entrusted money to Teresita, who was
engaged in the business of “door-to-door delivery” from Japan to the Philippines. Teresita
failed to deliver the money and even denied having received it. After a while, Teresita
returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal.
After the preliminary investigation, the 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Vibandor came out
with a resolution finding probable cause. The resolution and the Information were
approved by the City Prosecutor so the Information was filed in the RTC of Pasay. The
only documents that were submitted along with the Information were the affidavit-
complaint of Maruyama and the resolution of Vibandor. RTC issued a warrant for
Teresita’s arrest.
Teresita filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to defer
proceedings/arraignment alleging that the only documents appended to the Information
submitted were Maruyama’s affidavit-complaint and the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor. However, arraignment proceeded and Teresita refused to enter her plea. RTC
entered a plea of not guilty. There was a rule 65 petition to the CA and the CA affirmed
the RTC’s finding of probable cause.
ISSUE – Whether the resolution and the affidavit-complaint submitted were sufficient.
NO!!!
RATIO - In determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of
the accused, the judge should not rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor.
It is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary
investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. What is required, rather, is that
the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits,
105
counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if
any) upon which to make his independent judgment or upon which to verify the findings
of the prosecutor.
FACTS
- Cecilia Maruyama executed an affidavit-complaint and filed the same with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City. The affidavit- complaint charged
Lorna Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe with estafa.
- Maruyama alleged that:
o She entrusted Y11,410,000 to Teresita, who was engaged in the
business of “door-to-door delivery” from Japan to the Philippines.
o Teresita failed to deliver the money and, at first, denied receiving the
said amount. Teresita returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal
- During the preliminary investigation, Maruyama submitted the affidavit of her
witnesses and other documentary evidence.
- 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Vibandor came out with a resolution finding
probable cause for estafa. Attached to the resolution was the Information and
Maruyama’s affidavit-complaint. The City Prosecutor approved the resolution
and the Information.
- Information against the petitioner was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay
City.
o Appended to the Information were:
 The affidavit-complaint of Maruyama
 The resolution of Investigating Prosecutor Vibandor
- The trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of Teresita. The latter posted a
bond, which was duly approved by the Presiding Judge of Branch 79 of the RTC
of Quezon City. This approved bond was transmitted to the RTC of Pasig.
- The trial court issued an order setting the petitioner’s arraignment and pre-
trial. An ex part motion for the issuance of the hold departure order was also
filed by the private prosecutor. This was granted by the court.
- Teresita filed a verified motion for judicial determination of probable
cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment alleging that the only
documents appended to the Information submitted were Maruyama’s
affidavit-complaint and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor.
o Teresita claims that the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant,
the counter-affidavit, and the other evidence adduced by the parties
should have been attached.
o She claims that the documents submitted were not enough on which
the trial court could base a finding of probable cause.
o Lim v. Felix and Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals states that the following
should be submitted to the trial court to enable it to determine the
presence or absence of probable case
 (a) copies of the affidavits of the witnesses of the
complainant;
 (b) the counter-affidavit of Okabe and those of her
witnesses;
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
 (c) the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the
preliminary investigation; and
 (d) other documents presented during the said investigation.
- Teresita filed a Very Urgent Motion to Lift/Recall Hold Departure Order. The
private prosecutor opposed Teresita’s motions. The hearing of the motions was
reset.
- Teresita filed a manifestation objecting to her arraignment prior to the
resolution of her pending motions. The arraignment was again reset.
- Teresita filed a motion for the postponement of her arraignment alleging that,
in case the trial court ruled adversely thereon, she would refuse to enter a plea.
This was denied by the court. The court stated that the denial was due to its
finding of probable cause for the petitioner’s arrest and that Teresita’s motion
for a determination of probable cause was made after the court had already
found probable cause and issued a warrant of arrest.
- On the day of arraignment, Teresita refused to plead and left the courtroom
because of her counsel’s advice. The court entered a plea of not guilty.
- Rule 65 to CA with a plea for a writ of preliminary injunction
o CA partially granted the petition in that the assailed order of the trial
court denying Teresita’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
o However, the appellate court cited the ruling of this Court in
Cojuangco, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan. Thus, the appellate court affirmed
the assailed order of the RTC, based on the respondent judge’s
personal examination of respondent Maruyama’s affidavit-
complaint, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor and the
Information approved by the city prosecutor, a finding of
probable cause was in order.
- Teresita filed a motion for partial reconsideration contending that the CA erred
in applying the ruling of this court in Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA instead of Section 26,
Rule 114 or the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Teresita posited that the
said rule had superseded the ruling in the Cojuangco case.
o However, CA held that the rule cannot be applied retroactively because
petitioner posted bail before the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
took effect.
- Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari to the SC
ISSUE – Whether the honorable court of appeals made a reversible error in ruling that
respondent court complied with the constitutional requirements on the issuance of
warrant of arrest without probable cause, when the respondent court merely relied on
[the] (i) complaint-affidavit of cecilia maruyama; (ii) resolution of the investigating
prosecutor; and (iii) criminal information. YES!!!
HELD - IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The assailed Orders dated
August 25 and 28, 2000 and the Warrant of Arrest issued by the respondent judge in
Criminal Case No. 00-0749 are SET ASIDE. The records are REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 119. The respondent judge is hereby DIRECTED to
determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
106
petitioner based on the complete records, as required under Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
RATIO
- Section 6, Rule 112
o Before the RTC judge issues a warrant of arrest, the judge must make a
personal determination of the existence or non-existence of probable
cause for the arrest of the accused.
- The duty to make such determination is personal and exclusive to the issuing
judge.
- Section 1, Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
o The investigating prosecutor, in conducting a preliminary
investigation of a case cognizable by the RTC, is tasked to determine
whether there is probable cause.
- If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause for the filing of the
Information against the respondent, he executes a certification at the bottom of
the Information that there is a reasonable ground to believe that the offense
charged has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
Such certification of the investigating prosecutor is, by itself, ineffective.
- The task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is to
determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused.
o Probable cause is meant such set of facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the
offense charged in the Information or any offense included therein has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
- In determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the
arrest of the accused, the judge should not rely solely on the report of the
investigating prosecutor.
- It is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during
the preliminary investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge.
o What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient
supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-
affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of
stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent
judgment or upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor.
- Section 8(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
o Information or complaint filed in court shall be supported by the
affidavits and counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses,
together with the other supporting evidence of the resolution.
- If the judge is able to determine the existence or non-existence of probable
cause on the basis of the records submitted by the investigating prosecutor,
there would no longer be a need to order the elevation of the rest of the records
of the case. However, if the judge finds the records and/or evidence submitted
by the investigating prosecutor to be insufficient, he may order the dismissal of
the case. The judge may even call the complainant and his witness to
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
themselves answer the court’s probing questions to determine the existence of
probable cause.
- Section 6, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
o Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information,
the judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor
and its supporting evidence.
o If he finds probable cause, he shall issue a warrant of arrest, or a
commitment order if the accused has already been arrested pursuant
to a warrant.
o In case of doubt on the existence of probable cause, the judge may
order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five (5)
days from notice and the issue must be resolved by the court within
thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint of information.
- In this case, only the resolution and the affidavit-complaint were
submitted. The affidavits of Lorna Tanghal and the document signed by her
covering the amount of US$1,000 are important as they would enable the judge
to properly determine the existence of probable cause.
o First. When respondent Maruyama handed the money to the
petitioner, she did not require the latter to sign a document
acknowledging receipt of the amount. The petitioner avers that it is
incredible that Maruyama would entrust P3,993,500 in Japanese Yen
to her without even requiring her to sign a receipt.
o Second. The affidavit of Hermogena Santiago, a witness of the
respondent, is unreliable, because it is based on information relayed
to her by Lorna Tanghal.
o Third. The affidavit of Marilette G. Izumiya, another witness of the
respondent, is also unreliable, as it was based on information relayed
to her by Thelma Barbiran.
o Fourth. There is no indication in the resolution of the investigating
prosecutor that the petitioner received the fax message of Lorna
Tanghal.
o Fifth. The private complainant claims that the petitioner tried to
reimburse the P3,993,500 by remitting US$1,000 to her. However, the
latter admitted in her affidavit-complaint that the document
evidencing the remittance was signed by Lorna Tanghal, not by the
petitioner.
o Sixth. In her counter-affidavit, the petitioner alleged that respondent
Maruyama had no case against her because the crime charged in the
latter’s affidavit-complaint was the same as that filed against her in
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Bulacan, which was withdrawn by the
complainant herself.
o Seventh. The investigating prosecutor stated in his resolution that the
private complainant established the element of deceit. However, the
crime charged against the petitioner as alleged in the Information is
estafa with abuse of confidence.
107
RULE 113- ARREST
1. PEOPLE V. DE LEON , G.R. NO. 169858, JANUARY 26, 2010 – PINERA
PEOPLE V DE LEON (2010)
DOCTRINE: A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are
resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of
their criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proved to be
an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to
constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.
EMERGENCY RECIT:
De Leon was convicted under the DDA in the RTC, for selling and possession of shabu. He
assails his conviction, claiming that the buy-bust operation against him was against the
law. He also claims that the chain of custody was not established.
According to the prosecution, an informant told the police that de Leon was selling
Shabu. Thereafter, Police Senior Inspector Nilo Wong formed a team for a buy-bust
operation with PO2 Magcalayo as poseur-buyer and SPO3 Mario Concepcion, PO2
Fernando Salonga, PO2 Cesar Collado, PO2 Edmund Paculdar, and PO1 Emeterio
Mendoza as team members. Wong then handed to PO2 Magcalayo 2 pieces of PhP 100
bills as buy-bust money and on which PO2 Magcalayo wrote his initials "NM." The team
proceeded to Sarmiento St., Barangay Sta. Monica, Novaliches, Quezon City, where the
informant introduced PO2 Magcalayo to De Leon as a buyer of shabu. De Leon handed
him a plastic of shabu and in exchange, the operative handed him P200 in marked bills.
After the exchange, de Leon was arrested by police officers.
The plastic of shabu was brought by the police officers to the police station where one of
the police officers placed his initials on the plastic. It was subsequently turned over to a
police investigator who sent it to the crime lab. A forensic investigator conducted
examinations on it and determined that it was shabu
In his defense, de Leon claims that he was going around looking for a loan, and was
suddenly arrested by the police officers. De Leon claims that the buy-bust operation was
full of irregularities, hence his arrest was illegal. He notes that the Pre-Operation Report
was full of discrepancies and that the Joint Sworn Affidavit of Apprehension of the
policemen who arrested him failed to mention that they placed their markings on the
plastic sachets.
Issue: Was the buy-bust operation valid?- Yes, VALID
 Such irregularities cannot overturn the finding of the presence in this case of
the elements of violation to the DDA. A buy-bust operation is a form of
entrapment whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of
trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of their criminal plan.
In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and has been proved to be an effective
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to constitutional
and legal safeguards is undertaken.
 Here, the buy-bust operation conducted by the police officers, who made use of
entrapment to capture appellant in the act of selling a dangerous drug, was
valid and legal. Moreover, the defense has failed to show any evidence of ill
motive on the part of the police officers. Even de Leon himself declared that it
was the first time he met the police officers during his cross-examination. There
was, therefore, no motive for the police officers to frame up de Leon.
 Likewise, the identity of de Leon as the person who sold the dangerous drugs to
the policeman and the one in possession of the shabu cannot be doubted
anymore. Such positive identification prevails over his defenses of denial and
alibi.
OTHER Issue: Was the chain of custody rule followed?- YES
A close examination of the law reveals that it admits of certain exceptions. Thus, contrary
to the assertions of de Leon, Sec. 21 of the DDA need not be followed as an exact science.
Non-compliance with Sec. 21 does not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is essential is "the preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
In the instant case, there was substantial compliance with the law and the
integrity of the drugs seized from appellant was preserved. The chain of custody of the
drugs subject matter of the case was shown not to have been broken. The factual milieu
of the case reveals that after the policeman seized and confiscated the dangerous drugs,
as well as the marked money, de Leon was immediately arrested and brought to the
police station for investigation, where the sachet of suspected shabu was marked with
the officer’s initials. Immediately thereafter, the confiscated substance, with a letter of
request for examination, was submitted to the PNP Crime Lab for examination to
determine the presence of any dangerous drug. Per the report, the specimen submitted
contained shabu, a dangerous drug. The examination was conducted by a Forensic
Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Lab, whose stipulated testimony clearly established
the chain of custody of the specimens he received. Thus, it is without a doubt that there
was an unbroken chain of custody of the illicit drug purchased from de Leon.
FACTS:
 2 informations were filed against De Leon for the possession of Shabu, in
violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. the possession of
Shabu. On Feb. 16, 2004, he was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty" to the
charges against him. After the pre-trial conference, trial on the merits ensued.
 During the trial, the parties agreed to stipulate on the testimonies of Engr.
Leonard Jabonillo, the Forensic Chemist, and Police Officer 1 (PO1) Oliver
Estrelles24, the police investigator of these cases. The prosecution thereafter
24
that he was the investigator of these cases and in connection with the investigation conducted by him, he
received the evidence, namely: the Joint Affidavit of Apprehension executed by PO2 Noel Magcalayo and PO2 Cesar
Collado marked as Exhibit "E" and "E-1"; that likewise prepared the request for examination marked as Exhibit "A"
and submitted the specimen to the Crime Laboratory and received the Chemistry Report marked as Exhibit "C";
that he received the Pre-Operation Report marked as Exhibit "E" as well as the buy bust money marked as Exhibits
"F" and "F-1", that he prepared the letter request to the City Prosecutor Office marked as Exhibit "G"; and that
Exhibit "A" contains superimposition of the date thereof." (Order dated September 14, 2004).
108
presented PO2 Noel Magcalayo as its witness. The defense, on the other hand,
presented Rodante De Leon, the accused himself.
 The Prosecution’s Version of Facts
o a confidential informant arrived at the office of the Station Anti-Illegal
Drug Special Operation Task Force at the Novaliches Police Station in
QC and reported the illegal activities of a person named Rodante De
Leon. Thereafter, Police Senior Inspector Nilo Wong formed a team for
a buy-bust operation with PO2 Magcalayo as poseur-buyer and SPO3
Mario Concepcion, PO2 Fernando Salonga, PO2 Cesar Collado, PO2
Edmund Paculdar, and PO1 Emeterio Mendoza as team members.
Wong then handed to PO2 Magcalayo 2 pieces of PhP 100 bills as buy-
bust money and on which PO2 Magcalayo wrote his initials "NM."
o The team proceeded to Sarmiento St., Barangay Sta. Monica,
Novaliches, Quezon City, where the confidential informant introduced
PO2 Magcalayo to De Leon as a buyer of shabu. PO2 Magcalayo asked
De Leon if he had shabu and the latter answered in the affirmative and
asked him how much he would buy. PO2 Magcalayo handed the money
and, in return, appellant handed him 1 plastic sachet. He then
scratched his head, which was the pre-arranged signal that the
transaction was consummated, and thereafter arrested appellant. He
recovered the buy-bust money from appellant as PO2 Collado
approached them and handcuffed appellant. Upon frisking appellant,
PO2 Collado discovered another plastic sachet on the person of
appellant.
o De Leon was brought to the police station for investigation. PO2
Collado then placed his initials on the sachet he found on appellant.
The evidence was subsequently turned over to the police investigator,
PO1 Estrelles, who prepared a request for its laboratory examination.
o PO2 Collado, PO1 Mendoza, PO2 Paculdar, and PO2 Magcalayo then
brought the transparent plastic sachets containing the white
crystalline substance subject of the buy-bust operation to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, Eastern Police
District on St. Francis Street, Mandaluyong City for examination. Engr.
Jabonillo, a Forensic Chemical Officer, conducted a qualitative
examination on the specimens, which yielded positive results for
Shabu
 Version of the Defense
o De Leon testified that, prior to his arrest, he was a police officer of
Station 7, Araneta, Cubao, QCand had been connected with the PNP for
10 years. He allegedly went to Brgy. Sta Monica to look for a kumpadre
from whom he intended to borrow money when a policemen accosted
him and poked their guns at him. The policemen asked him to sit
down. He told SPO3 Concepcion, whom he knew, that he was a police
officer but he was told to shut up and to explain his side at the police
station instead.
o Upon arrival at the station, his wallet, with his I.D. and police badge,
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
were taken from him. PO2 Magcalayo told him that he had a fake
police I.D. When appellant tried to explain himself, PO2 Magcalayo
allegedly kicked him saying, "Hindi na uso ang pulis, sundalo na ang
nakaupo ngayon."
 The following night, he was presented on inquest during which he was charged
with violation of Secs. 5 and 11 of RA 9165. He denied all the charges against
him claiming that the alleged shabu came from the arresting police officers. He
did not file a case against them, because he had no money and because he knew
that he was not guilty.
 On cross-examination, appellant further testified that he was a follow-up
operative at the Station Investigation Division of Police Station 7. He admitted
that he was separated from the service because he was absent without official
leave due to a business problem he had to attend to. He likewise said that he did
not know his arresting officers, whom he saw then for the first time, and that he
was not familiar with RA 9165.
 RTC convicted the appellant. Ruling of the Trial Court. CA affirmed the judgment
of the trial court. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal of the decision of the
CA.
HELD: CA’s Decision finding appellant Rodante De Leon y Dela Rosa guilty of the crimes
charged is AFFIRMED.
1) Whether the lower court was able to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
 It is a fundamental rule that findings of the trial court which are factual in
nature and which involve the credibility of witnesses are accorded with respect,
when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts, and speculative,
arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from such findings. The
reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the
credibility of witnesses having heard their testimonies and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.
 In the prosecution for the crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs, the Court has
reiterated the essential elements in People v. Pendatun, to wit:
(1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another; and
(2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a prohibited
drug.
o Therefore, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence
of the corpus delicti. Corpus delicti is the body or substance of the
crime, and establishes the fact that a crime has actually been
committed. It has two elements, namely: (1) proof of the occurrence of
a certain event; and (2) some person’s criminal responsibility for the
act.
 In the instant case, the prosecution sufficiently established the elements of the
crime. Appellant sold and delivered the shabu for PhP 200 to PO2 Magcalayo
posing as buyer; the said drug was seized and identified as a prohibited drug
and subsequently presented in evidence; there was actual exchange of the
marked money and contraband; and finally, appellant was fully aware that he
was selling and delivering a prohibited drug. De Leon was positively identified
109
as the seller and the source of the plastic sachet which contained Shabu
2) Whether the chain of custody was clearly established- YES
 It is elementary that, in every prosecution for the illegal sale of prohibited
drugs, the presentation of the drug as evidence in court is material. It is,
therefore, essential that the identity of the prohibited drug be established
beyond doubt. What is more, the fact that the substance bought during the buy-
bust operation is the same substance offered in court should be established.
The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.
 To ensure that the chain of custody is established, the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 9165 provide:
o SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or
Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs,
Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals,
Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory
equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper
disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control
of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where the search warrant
is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items
 A close examination of the law reveals that it admits of certain exceptions. Sec.
21 of the foregoing law need not be followed as an exact science. Non-
compliance with Sec. 21 does not render an accused’s arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is essential is "the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as
the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the
accused."
 In the instant case, there was substantial compliance with the law. The chain of
custody of the drugs subject matter of the case was shown not to have been
broken. It was proven that PO2 Magcalayo seized and confiscated the dangerous
drugs, as well as the marked money, appellant was immediately arrested and
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
brought to the police station for investigation, where the sachet of suspected
shabu was marked with "NM." Immediately thereafter, the confiscated
substance, with a letter of request for examination, was submitted to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination to determine the presence of any dangerous
drug. The examination was conducted by one Engr. Jabonillo 25 whose stipulated
testimony clearly established the chain of custody of the specimens he received.
Thus, it is without a doubt that there was an unbroken chain of custody.
 the prosecution was able to prove that appellant is guilty of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs with moral certainty. In the prosecution for illegal possession
of dangerous drugs, the following elements must be proved with moral
certainty:
(1) that the accused is in possession of the object identified as a
prohibited or regulatory drug
(2) that such possession is not authorized by law
(3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug
o Here, appellant was caught in actual possession of the prohibited
drugs without showing any proof that he was duly authorized by law
to possess them. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, there is
prima facie evidence of animus possidendi on appellant’s part. As held
by this Court, the finding of a dangerous drug in the house or within
the premises of the house of the accused is prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi and is enough to convict in the
absence of a satisfactory explanation.
3) Whether the buy-bust operation was valid

Appellant further argues that the buy-bust operation was full of irregularities,
rendering it illegal.

The arguments are specious. Such irregularities cannot overturn the finding of
the presence in this case of the elements of violations of Secs. 5 and 11, Art. II of
RA 9165.

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means are
resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the
execution of their criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal and
has been proved to be an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers,
provided due regard to constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken. 23

In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that the buy-bust operation
conducted by the police officers, who made use of entrapment to capture
appellant in the act of selling a dangerous drug, was valid and legal. Moreover,
the defense has failed to show any evidence of ill motive on the part of the
police officers. Even appellant himself declared that it was the first time he met
the police officers during his cross-examination. There was, therefore, no
25
that he is a Forensic Chemist of the PNP, that his Office received the request for laboratory examination marked
as Annex "A"; that together with the said request was a plastic sachet marked as Exh. "B" which contained 2 plastic
sachets marked as Exhibits "B-1" and "B-2"; that he conducted the requested laboratory examination and, in
connection therewith he submitted a Chemistry Report marked as Exhibit "C", the finding thereon showing the
specimen positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride(SHABU) was marked as Exhibit "C-1" and the signature
of said police officer was marked as Exhibit "C-2"; that he then issued a Certification marked as Exhibits "D" and
"D-1" and thereafter turned over the specimen to the evidence custodian x x x. (Order dated September 14, 2004).
110
motive for the police officers to frame up appellant.

Likewise, the identity of appellant as the person who sold the dangerous drugs
to PO2 Magcalayo and the one in possession of the shabu cannot be doubted
anymore.
Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse appellant of such a grave offense, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings of the trial
court with respect to the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over appellant’s bare
allegation.
2. PEOPLE V. LAGUIO, MARCH 16, 2007, G.R. NO. 128587 – PINERA
G.R. No. 128587 March 16, 2007
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LAGUIO
DOCTRINE:
 It is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a
felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting
officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in
flagrante delicto arrest. Hence the warrantless arrest was illegal.
 Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case
at bar, the trial court granted private respondent's demurrer to evidence and
acquitted him of all the three charges for lack of evidence, because the unlawful
arrest resulted in the inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an invalid
warrantless search. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal
arrest is likewise unlawful. Therefore, the evidence obtained was illegal.
EMERGENCY DIGEST:
Facts: Police operatives sent an entrapment to catch Redentor Teck (alias “Frank”) and
Joseph Junio selling drugs. They were previously identified by SPO2 De Dios et. Al as the
source of their shabu. Caught in the act, the two were arrested. They did not disclose
their source of shabu, but they admitted working for Lawrence Wang’s modeling agency.
They also disclosed that they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu early the following
morning, and that their employer (Wang) could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment
in Malate, Manila. The police operatives decided to look for Wang to shed light on the
illegal drug activities of Frank and Junio.
Under surveillance, Wang came out of the apartment and walked towards a
parked BMW car. On nearing the car, police officers approached Wang, introduced
themselves, asked his name and, upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang, immediately
frisked him and asked him to open the back compartment of the BMW car. When frisked,
they found an unlicensed pistol. At the same time, in his car were bags of shabu,
P650,000.00 cash, electronic and mechanical scales and an unlicensed handgun.
3 informations were filed against Wang(Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act,
Illegal Possession of Firearms and Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban). Wang filed a
Demurrer to Evidence, praying for his acquittal and the dismissal of the three cases
against him for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and the inadmissibility of the
prosecution’s evidence against him. RTC Judge Laguio granted the demurrer.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
Issue: Whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in
this case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant.
Held:
 Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer may arrest
a person without a warrant under these grounds: (a) arrest of a suspect in
flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where, based on personal knowledge of
the arresting officer, there is probable cause that said suspect was the author of
a crime which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who has
escaped from custody serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending.
 For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto under
paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)
such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
o The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did not
manifest any suspicious behavior on the part of private respondent
Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the attention of the
police. He was merely walking from his apartment and was about to
enter the parked BMW car when the police operatives arrested him,
frisked and searched his person and commanded him to open the
compartment of the car, which was later on found to be owned by his
friend, David Lee. He was not committing any visible offense then.
Therefore, there can be no valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto
under paragraph (a) of Section 5. It is settled that "reliable
information" alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious
enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting
officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would
justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
 Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph (b) of Section
5. What is clearly established from the testimonies of the arresting officers is
that Wang was arrested mainly on the information that he was the employer of
Frank and Junio who were previously arrested and charged for illegal transport
of shabu. Frank and Junio did not even categorically identify Wang to be their
source of the shabu they were caught with in flagrante delicto. Upon the duo’s
declaration that there will be a delivery of shabu on the early morning of the
following day, which is only a few hours thereafter, and that Wang may be found
in Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria Orosa Street, the arresting officers
conducted "surveillance" operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a
person which will match the description of one Lawrence Wang. These
circumstances do not sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause
based on personal knowledge as required in paragraph (b) of Section 5.
 The inevitable conclusion, as correctly made by the trial court, is that the
warrantless arrest was illegal. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the
illegal arrest is likewise unlawful.
111
 The People’s contention that Wang waived his right against unreasonable
search and seizure has no factual basis. While we agree in principle that consent
will validate an otherwise illegal search, however, based on the evidence on
record, Wang resisted his arrest and the search on his person and belongings.
Moreover, during arraignment, he continued to object to the validity of the
warrantless arrest and search.
Double Jeopardy Issue: An order granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is a
resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally, any further
prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy. It may not be appeal under Rule 45 but one can file a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on GADALEJ
FACTS:
 On 16 May 1996, at about 7pm, police operatives of the Public Assistance and
Reaction Against Crime of the DILG, namely, Captain Margallo, Police Inspector
Cielito Coronel and SPO3 Reynaldo Cristobal , arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios,
Rogelio Anoble and a certain Arellano, for unlawful possession of shabu. During
the investigation, the 3 identified Redentor “Frank” Teck and Joseph Junio as the
source and then, they planned an entrapment operation.
 At around 11pm that same date, Teck and Junio were arrested while they were
about to hand over another bag of shabu to De Dios et al. They informed the
police operatives that they were working as talent manager and gymnast
instructor of Glamour Modeling Agency owned by Lawrence Wang. Teck and
Junio did not disclose their source but admitted that
o they were working for Wang
o they knew of a scheduled delivery of shabu on May 17, 1996
o Wang could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate, Manila.
 The police operatives decided to look for Wang. Coronel testified that at about
2:10am of May 1, 1996, Wang came out of the apartment. Wang was walking
towards a BMW car when the 3 police operatives introduced themselves and
immediately frisked him upon hearing that he was Lawrence Wang. They found
an unlicensed gun, which they confiscated, inside the front right pocket.
 They asked him to open the back compartment of the BMW car and found the ff:
(a) 32 transparent plastic bags of Shabu with a total weight of 29.2941
kilograms
(b) cash in the amount of P650,000.00
(c) one electronic and one mechanical scales
(d) an unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine.
 Then and there, Wang resisted the warrantless arrest and search.
 There were 3 separate informations filed against Lawrence Wang in the RTC of
Manila:
o Violation of Dangerous Drugs Act (Criminal Case No. 96-149990)-
possession of shabu, contained in 32 transparent plastic bags,
approximately 29.3 kgs
o Illegal Possession of Firearms (Criminal Case No. 96-149991)-
possessed 1) DAEWOO Cal. 9mm, automatic pistol with one loaded
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
magazine and one AMT Cal. .380 9mm automatic backup pistol with
magazine loaded with ammunitions
o Violation of COMELEC Gun Ban (Criminal Case No. 96-149992)- was
carrying the weapon along Maria Orosa St., Ermita, Manila
 During his arraignment, accused Wang refused to enter a plea to all the
Informations and instead interposed a continuing objection to the admissibility
of the evidence obtained by the police operatives. So the court entered a not-
guilty plea for Wang. Then, a joint trial of the 3 consolidated cases followed.
 On 6 Dec 1996, the prosecution rested its case and upon motion, accused Wang
was granted 25 days from said date within which to file his intended Demurrer
to Evidence.
 On 19 December 1996, the prosecution filed a Manifestation to the effect that it
had rested its case only in so far as the charge for Violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act is concerned and not as regards the other two cases. Accordingly, trial
continued.
 On 9 Jan 1997, Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence, praying for his
acquittal and the dismissal of the 3 cases against him for lack of a valid arrest
and search warrants and the inadmissibility of the prosecution’s evidence
against him. Although the prosecution has not yet filed its opposition, Wang
filed an Amplification to his Demurrer on 20 Jan 1997.
 On 12 Feb 1997, the prosecution filed its Opposition alleging that the
warrantless search was legal as an incident to the lawful arrest
 On 13 Mar 1997, the Hon. Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., granted Wang’s Demurrer to
Evidence and acquitting him of all charges for lack of evidence.
 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 by the People.
ISSUES: [Go to ISSUE No. 2]
1) Whether the prosecution may appeal the trial court’s resolution granting Wang’s
demurrer to evidence and acquitting him of all the charges against him without violating
the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy (NOT SO RELEVANT)- may not
appeal under Rule 45 but should’ve filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on
GADALEJ.
 Although Section 2, Rule 122 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that any
party may appeal, the right of the People to appeal is expressly made subject to
the prohibition against putting the accused in double jeopardy. It also basic that
appeal in criminal cases throws the whole records of the case wide open for
review by the appellate court, that is why any appeal from a judgment of
acquittal necessarily puts the accused in double jeopardy.
 General Rule: An order granting an accused’s demurrer to evidence is a
resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounts to an acquittal. Generally,
any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate the
constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.
 1st Exception: Galman v. Sandiganbayan presents one exception. It is settled
doctrine that double jeopardy cannot be invoked against this Court's setting
aside of the trial courts' judgment of dismissal or acquittal where the
prosecution which represents the sovereign people in criminal cases is denied
112
due process.
o Galman Case: Basically, the Court was constrained to declare the sham
trial a mock trial and that the predetermined judgment of acquittal
was unlawful and void ab initio. Jurisdiction over cases should be
determined by law, and not by preselection of the Executive. (Based on
my understanding: the Presiding Justice received orders from the
President to transfer the case-obviously to get a favorable decision- to
the Sandiganbayan instead of the Court Martial who then had
exclusive jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by military
men.
o People vs. Bocar: Where the prosecution is deprived of a fair
opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is
thereby violated.
o The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic
constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the
violation of the State's right to due process raises a serious
jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at
will.
o Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a
competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been
entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated
without the express consent of the accused
 The lower court was not competent as it was ousted of its
jurisdiction when it violated the right of the prosecution to
due process. Hence, the first jeopardy was never terminated,
and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing
and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a
continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not expose the
accused to a second jeopardy.
 2nd Exception: Another exception is when the trial court commits grave abuse
of discretion in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer
to evidence. In People v. Uy, it was held that the fundamental philosophy behind
the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy is to afford the
defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard him from
government oppression through the abuse of criminal processes. By way of
exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court upon a clear showing
by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not
merely reversible errors of judgment but also grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus
rendering the assailed judgment void. Such dismissal order, being considered
void judgment, does not result in jeopardy.
o The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound
discretion of the trial court and its ruling on the matter shall not be
disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of discretion. This
constitutes an exception to the rule that the dismissal of a criminal
case made with the express consent of the accused or upon his own
motion bars a plea of double jeopardy.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
 The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,
such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or
where the trial was a sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to
correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary
proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its
authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense
justice.
 However, in this case, People of the Philippines, through the Sec. of Justice and
SolGen, filed an appeal via a petition for Review under Rule 45 and NOT a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
o The special civil action of certiorari and appeal are two different
remedies mutually exclusive; they are neither alternative nor
successive. Where appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper. In
the dismissal of a criminal case upon demurrer to evidence, appeal is
not available as such an appeal will put the accused in double
jeopardy. Certiorari, however, is allowed.
o For being the wrong remedy taken by petitioner People of the
Philippines in this case, this petition is dismissible. Even assuming
that the Court may treat an "appeal" as a special civil action of
certiorari, the instant petition will nevertheless fail on the merits.
2) Whether there was lawful arrest, search and seizure by the police operatives in this
case despite the absence of a warrant of arrest and/or a search warrant. (RELEVANT)
 There are actually 2 acts involved in this case: the warrantless arrest and the
warrantless search. There is no question that warrantless search may be
conducted as an incident to a valid warrantless arrest. The law requires that
there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be
reversed. However, if there are valid reasons to conduct lawful search and
seizure which thereafter shows that the accused is currently committing a
crime, the accused may be lawfully arrested in flagrante delicto without need
for a warrant of arrest.
 Finding that the warrantless arrest preceded the warrantless search in the case
at bar, the trial court granted private respondent's demurrer to evidence and
acquitted him of all the three charges for lack of evidence, because the unlawful
arrest resulted in the inadmissibility of the evidence gathered from an invalid
warrantless search. Ipso jure, the warrantless search incidental to the illegal
arrest is likewise unlawful.
 Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the New Rules of Court, a peace officer may arrest
a person without a warrant: (a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it,
and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while being transferred from one confinement to another.
o None of these circumstances were present when the accused was
113
arrested. The accused was merely walking from the Maria Orosa
Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW car when the
police officers arrested and frisked him and searched his car.
a. For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto
under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be valid, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. The
accused was not committing any visible offense at the time of his
arrest that would reasonably invite the attention of the police.
The arresting officers had no information and knowledge that the
accused was carrying an unlicensed handgun, nor did they see
him in possession thereof immediately prior to his arrest
 It is settled that "reliable information" alone, absent
any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the
presence and within the view of the arresting officers,
is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that
would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest.
b. Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under paragraph
(b) of Section 5. What is clearly established from the testimonies
of the arresting officers is that Wang was arrested mainly on the
information that he was the employer of Redentor Teck and
Joseph Junio who were previously arrested and charged for illegal
transport of shabu. Teck and Junio did not even categorically
identify Wang as their source. These circumstances do not
sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause based on
personal knowledge as required in paragraph (b) of Section 5.
 The police officers had no information, or knowledge
that the banned articles were inside the car, or that the
accused had placed them there. The police officers
searched the car on mere suspicion that there was
shabu therein. They arrested him because of the
information relayed to them by one of those whom
they have previously apprehended in connection with
the delivery of shabu somewhere also in Ermita,
Manila.
 Contrary to its position at the trial court, the People, however, now posits that
the warrantless search preceded the warrantless arrest and that the
warrantless arrest of the accused must necessarily have to be regarded as
having been made on the occasion of the commission of the crime in flagrante
delicto, and therefore constitutionally and statutorily permissible and lawful.
o The conflicting versions as to whether the arrest preceded the search
or vice versa, is a matter of credibility of evidence. It entails
appreciation of evidence, which may be done in an appeal of a
criminal case because the entire case is thrown open for review, but
not in the case of a petition for certiorari where the factual findings of
the trial court are binding upon the Court. Since a dismissal order
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal and
reviewable only by certiorari, the factual finding that the arrest
preceded the search is conclusive upon this Court.
o The only legal basis for this Court to possibly reverse and set aside the
dismissal order of the trial court upon demurrer to evidence would be
if the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in excess of
jurisdiction when it ruled that there was no legal basis to lawfully
effect a warrantless arrest.
 The People’s contention that Wang waived his right against unreasonable
search and seizure has no factual basis. Based on the evidence on record, Wang
resisted his arrest and the search on his person and belongings. The implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than
mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances
and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional
guarantee. Moreover, the continuing objection to the validity of the warrantless
arrest made of record during the arraignment bolsters Wang’s claim that he
resisted the warrantless arrest and search.
3. VALDEZ V. PEOPLE, G.R.170180, NOVEMBER 23, 2007 – DEVESA
Doctrine: For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that
two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer.
ER: Bautista and 2 other barangay tanods were patrolling along the National Highway in
La Union when Valdez alighted from a mini-bus. The tanods observed that Valdez was
“looking around” after getting off the bus so they approached him. Valdez was arrested
and brought to the barangay captain’s house wherein his bag was opened and marijuana
leaves were found therein.
Were the warrantless arrest and subsequent search valid? NO. (Therefore, the marijuana
leaves were inadmissible against Valdez. Invalid warrantless arrest -> invalid warrantless
search and seizure -> inadmissible in evidence)
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions on
which a person may be arrested without a warrant, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
114
Valdez was not committing an offense at the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he
appear to be then committing an offense. The tanod did not have probable cause either to
justify petitioner’s warrantless arrest.
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2)
elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.
Complete Digest:
Facts: Bautista testified that while he and 2 other tanods were patroling along
the National Highway in Aringay, La Union, they noticed petitioner Valdez, lugging a bag,
alight from a mini-bus. The tanods observed that petitioner, who appeared suspicious to
them, seemed to be looking for something. They thus approached him but the latter
purportedly attempted to run away. They chased him, put him under arrest and
thereafter brought him to the house of Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado (Mercado)
where he, as averred by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his bag. Petitioner’s
bag allegedly contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried
marijuana leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It was then that petitioner was
taken to the police station for further investigation.
On the other hand, Valdez testified that after alighting from the bus, he went to the house
of a friend to drink water and then proceeded to walk to his brother’s house. As he was
walking, Ordonñ o (tanod) approached him and asked where he was going. Petitioner
replied that he was going to his brother’s house. Ordonñ o then purportedly requested to
see the contents of his bag and appellant acceded. It was at this point that Bautista and
Aratas joined them. After inspecting all the contents of his bag, petitioner testified that he
was restrained by the tanod and taken to the house of Mercado. It was Aratas who carried
the bag until they reached their destination.
The RTC found Valdez guilty for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act. CA affirmed.
Issue: 1) W/N the warrantless arrest and search were valid (to determine the
admissibility of the confiscated marijuana)
Held: NO.
At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find any objection by
petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. Considering this and
his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence dictates that petitioner is
deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, thereby curing any defect
in his arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his
person. Petitioner’s warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his
acquittal.
However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it is
indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged
contraband was lawful. The search, conducted as it was without a warrant, is justified
only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest. Evaluating the evidence on record in its
totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that the arrest of petitioner
without a warrant is not lawful as well.
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113
Petitioner maintains, in a nutshell, that after he was approached by the tanod and asked
to show the contents of his bag, he was simply herded without explanation and taken to
the house of the barangay captain. On their way there, it was Aratas who carried his bag.
He denies ownership over the contraband allegedly found in his bag and asserts that he
saw it for the first time at thebarangay captain’s house.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only occasions
on which a person may be arrested without a warrant, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
It is obvious that based on the testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not one of
these circumstances was obtaining at the time petitioner was arrested. By their own
admission, petitioner was not committing an offense at the time he alighted from
the bus, nor did he appear to be then committing an offense. The tanod did not
have probable cause either to justify petitioner’s warrantless arrest.
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two
(2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting
to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view
of the arresting officer. Here, petitioner’s act of looking around after getting off the bus
was but natural as he was finding his way to his destination. That he purportedly
attempted to run away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be
construed as adequate to charge the tanodwith personal knowledge that petitioner had
just engaged in, was actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity.
More importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke with
the barangay tanod when they approached him.
4. ROLITO GO V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.NO.101837, FEBRUARY 11, 1992 - DEVESA
Rolito Go v. Court of Appeals
ER: Go was travelling in the wrong direction in a one way street (Wilson St.) when he
almost collided with Maguan’s vehicle. Go alighted from his car, walked over to Maguan
and shot him. He quicly boarded his car and left the scene thereafter. An eyewitness of
the incident was able to take down Go’s plate number and reported the same to the
police, who subsequently ordered a manhunt for petitioner. 6 days after the shooting, Go
went to the police station, accompanied by 2 lawyers to verify news reports that he was
being hunted by the police. The police detained him. Subsequently a criminal charge was
brought against him.
115
Was there a valid warrantless arrest? NO. There was no valid warrantless arrest.
Go's warrantless "arrest" or detention does not fall within the terms of Section 5 of Rule
113 of the Rules of Court which provides that "A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be created has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
Go's "arrest" took place 6 days after the shooting of Maguan. The "arresting"
officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a), at the time Go
had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected 6 days after the shooting
be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in fact just been committed"
within the meaning of Section 5 (b). Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any
"personal knowledge" of facts indicating that Go was the gunman who had shot Maguan.
Complete Digest:
Facts: On 2 July 1991, Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St.(ONE WAY), San
Juan, Metro Manila, heading towards P. Guevarra St. Rolito Go entered Wilson St. and
started traveling in the wrong direction. At the corner of Wilson and J. Abad Santos Sts.,
Go's and Maguan's cars nearly bumped each other. Go alighted from his car, walked over
and shot Maguan inside his car. Go then boarded his car and left the scene. A security
guard at a nearby restaurant was able to take down Go's car plate number. The police
arrived shortly thereafter at the scene of the shooting and there retrieved an empty shell
and one round of live ammunition for a 9mm caliber pistol.
The following day, the security guard of the bake shop was shown a picture of
Go and he positively identified him as the same person who had shot Maguan.
Having established that the assailant was probably Go, the police launched a
manhunt for Go. On 8 July 1991, Go presented himself before the San Juan Police Station
to verify news reports that he was being hunted by the police; he was accompanied by
two (2) lawyers. The police forthwith detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who
was at the police station at that time, positively identified Go as the gunman. That same
day, the police promptly filed a complaint for frustrated homicide against Go with the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Dennis
Villa Ignacio ("Prosecutor") informed Go, in the presence of his lawyers that he could
avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that he must first sign a waiver
 08 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. CrimPro: Venue to Rule 113 116

of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Go refused to execute any such which the police acted had been derived from statements made by alleged eyewitnesses
waiver. to the shooting -- one stated that Go was the gunman another was able to take down the
alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to be registered in Go's wife's
On 9 July 1991, while the complaint was still with the Prosecutor, and before an name. That information did not, however, constitute "personal knowledge." It is
information could be filed in court, the victim, Eldon Maguan, died of his gunshot thus clear to the Court that there was no lawful warrantless arrest of Go within the
wound(s). Accordingly, on 11 July 1991, the Prosecutor, instead of filing an information meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.
for frustrated homicide, filed an information for murder before the Regional Trial Court. It is clear too that Section 7 of Rule 112 is also not applicable. Indeed, Go was
No bail was recommended. At the bottom of the information, the Prosecutor certified that not arrested at all. When he walked into the San Juan Police Station, accompanied by two
no preliminary investigation had been conducted because the accused did not execute (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the police authorities. He did not
and sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. In the state that he was surrendering. When the police filed a complaint for frustrated homicide
afternoon of 11 July 1991, Go's counsel filed with the prosecutor an omnibus motion for with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately scheduled a preliminary
immediate release and proper preliminary investigation, alleging that the warrantless investigation to determine whether there was probable cause for charging Go in court for
arrest of Go was unlawful and that no preliminary investigation had been conducted the killing of Eldon Maguan.
before the information was filed. Instead, as noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceeded under the erroneous supposition that
Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required Go to waive the provisions of Article
Issue: W/N Go was arrested legally without warrant for the killing of Maguan, and is thus 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation.
not entitled to be released pending the conduct of a preliminary investigation. This was substantive error, for Go was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that
Held: No, there was no valid warrantless arrest. right should have been accorded him without any conditions. Moreover, since Go had not
Go's warrantless "arrest" or detention does not fall within the terms of Section 5 of Rule been arrested; with or without a warrant, he was also entitled to be released forthwith
113 of the Rules ofCourt which provides that subject only to his appearing at the preliminary investigation. "surrendering" himself, in
"A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: all probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be created has committed, is actually or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime.
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested
without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he
shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7."
Go's "arrest" took place 6 days after the shooting of Maguan. The
"arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a),
at the time Go had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected 6 days
after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected "when [the shooting had] in
fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5 (b). The reliance of both
petitioner and the Solicitor General upon Umil v. Ramos is, in the circumstances of this
case, misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos, by an eight-to-six vote, the Court sustained the legality
of the warrantless arrests of petitioners made from 1 to 14 days after the actual
commission of the offenses, upon the ground that such offenses constituted "continuing
crimes." Those offenses were subversion, membership in an outlawed organization like
the New People's Army, etc. In the instant case, the offense for which petitioner was
arrested was murder, an offense which was obviously commenced and completed at one
definite location in time and space. No one had pretended that the fatal shooting of
Maguan was a "continuing crime."
Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of
facts indicating that Go was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information upon