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Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force
philippineS

Published by:

Ateneo de Manila University (ADMU)

Department of Political Science
Working Group on Security Sector Reform (WGSSR)
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Tel No: +632 426.6001
Email: workinggroupssr@gmail.com

in partnership with

Armed Forces of the Philippines

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with funding support from:

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Tel. No.: +632 757.8100
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Philippine Copyright ©2014

ISBN 978-971-550-691-5

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any

form or by any means, except brief quotations for review, without
permission in writing from the Authors.

Editor
Jennifer Santiago Oreta, Ph.D.

Copy Editors
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Disclaimer
Admin Support
Ramona Liza M. Paulino This publication is produced by (or is a product of) Working
Group on Security Sector Reform, Department of Political
Layout & Design Science, Ateneo de Manila University with support from the
Tyrone John A. Reyes Australian Aid. The indings, interpretations, and conclusions
Email: tihosio_14@yahoo.com expressed in this volume do not necessarily relect the views
Bernadette N. Patañag of the Australian Government.
Email: badzpatanag21@gmail.com
ABOUT THE BOOK

T
The authors have attempted to break apart the ten-point agenda towards a Modern
Defense Force to problematize and translate the big words into smaller, bite-sized,
chewable pieces. The essays attempt to elaborate on the intricacies of the concept
‘modern defense force,’ and engage the reader to think through the issues.

The authors have extensive knowledge as regards the issues they have dealt with in
their essays – some of them are military oficers in active duty, others are researchers
who were involved in actual policy research while in the Department of National Defense
(DND) and/or Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), while others are academics
involved in security research. The writers are part of the technical working group
(TWG) created for this research publication while some were invited contributors.

The papers, prior to publication, were all subjected to thorough discussion by the TWG.
While the essay-writer has full responsibility to his/her work, each paper was vetted,
challenged, and debated upon by the entire TWG. The series of TWG discussions
happened during the period January to December 2012.

No conidential information is revealed in any of the papers.

ABOUT THE BOOK iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
about the book iii

foreword vii
chapters:

1 Dreaming of a Modern Defense Force 1

2 Policy Environment for a Modern Defense Force 11

3 Mapping Out the Legal Terrain of the Philippine Security Sector 25

4 AFP Modernization 39

5 AFP Force Structure 49

6 AFP Doctrine and Training 57

7 AFP Clear Operational Plans 65

8 Philippine Intelligence Community: A Case for Transparency 75

9 Civilian Engagement of the Military 87

10 Gender Inclusiveness in the Military 99

11 Ethnic Representation in the Armed Forces of the Philippines 109

12 Self-Reliant Defense and People-Centered Security 115

13 AFP Regional Security and Defense Cooperation 131

14 The Evolving Role of the AFP: Skewing Towards Non-Traditional Roles 141

15 Regional Cooperation on Civil-Military Coordination in Disaster Response 155

– Crisis or Opportunity?

JOINT TECHNICAL WORKING GROUP 175

about the authors 177

TABLE OF CONTENTS v
FOREWORD
T
This publication comes at an auspicious time in the history of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP). In 2011, the AFP formally began its institutional reform with the adoption of the Internal Peace
and Security Plan (IPSP) “Bayanihan”. The IPSP puts on paper the positive strides that AFP units
operating on the ground have accomplished. For many years, our soldiers and oficers have carefully
and painstakingly tried to rebuild their relations with communities and stakeholders, with lessons the
IPSP Bayanihan has harvested and put into a formal document that now guides the doctrines and
rules of engagements in the military. Alongside such efforts, the Major Services of the AFP embarked
on crafting their respective transformation roadmaps, which allowed the units to collectively realize the
future of the armed forces that they wish to become.

True to the spirit of multi-sectoral engagement, civilian-led advisory boards were created to help guide
the transformation roadmaps in achieving their agenda, with distinguished members of the business,
academe, and public service as members. Likewise, the AFP has also formalized its commitment to the
Bantay Bayanihan, a network of civil society organizations (running now to almost 180 CSO-members
nationwide), to allow the group to be the oversight in the implementation of the IPSP Bayanihan. Since
November 2011, the AFP and Bantay Bayanihan network has institutionalized the quarterly dialogue
with AFP Uniied Commands, Divisions, and Brigades that allowed for candid and serious discussions
between AFP oficers and civilian groups regarding combat and non-combat operations of the AFP.

The IPSP Bayanihan and the Transformation Roadmaps, together, serve as the platform of the AFP
reform agenda. Most signiicant in these undertakings is the fact that the drive to transform is coming from
within the organization. The AFP is transforming to be a better armed forces that is more responsive in
the fulillment of its constitutional mandate as protector of the people and the State. It is recognizing the
changing landscape of the Philippines as a democratic country, and the need for the military institution
to adapt to this changing environment. It recognizes the increasing demand to address and manage
territorial concerns due to competing claims to resources.

I am happy that military oficers and civilian researchers have worked very closely in the true spirit of
Bayanihan to put together the essays in this publication. Indeed, the discussion in this publication will
greatly help the AFP in further realizing the needed transformation that the military requires to become
a credible and modern defense force, worthy of Filipino pride.

Maraming Salamat at Mabuhay ang Sandatahang Lakas ng Pilipinas!

GENERAL EMMANUEL T BAUTISTA AFP

Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines

FOREWORD vii
Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

8
Philippine Intelligence
Community: A Case for
Transparency
by Francis Domingo
Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

PHILIPPINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY:

A CASE FOR TRANSPARENCY
The continuously evolving global security landscape has prompted states across the world
to establish intelligence agencies to effectively protect national sovereignty and security
from prevailing and emerging security challenges and threats. Anchored on Western ideas,
a general notion of intelligence is that it is “stolen information” acquired through espionage
or clandestine activities. This information normally pertains to matters critical to aspects of
national security and threats from actual or potential adversaries. Thus, secrecy of intelligence
information, processes, and organization is absolutely necessary to prevent any damage to
the prestige and national security of a state.

Despite the need to ensure secrecy across all aspects of intelligence, the article argues that the
prevailing tradition or practice of security restrictions should not impede public understanding
or awareness of basic intelligence information in the Philippines. The article provides an
in-depth examination of the Philippine Intelligence Community (IC) by focusing on the following
critical junctures of analysis: 1) identiication of the notions of the intelligence; 2) implications
of secrecy of intelligence activities; 3) structure and organization of the Philippine IC; and,
4) mechanisms for intelligence oversight.

Furthermore, the article offers some recommendations in developing and ensuring intelligence
transparency in the Philippines. These include 1) maintaining public transparency through
the dissemination of basic information on intelligence agencies (i.e. use of media platforms
and linkages with academic and civilian research entities), and 2) developing intelligence
oversight mechanisms, either through executive or congressional oversight mechanisms,
which will ensure that intelligence agencies operate in accordance with democratic principles
and controls.

76 8 PHILIPPINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A CASE FOR TRANSPARENCY

Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

D
Democratic states, both new and established,
are confronted with fundamental and inevitable
dilemma in combining intelligence agencies that
are effective and under democratic civilian control.
This is due to the tension between the necessity
of intelligence agencies to work in secret and
the requirement of democratic government for
accountability, obliging intelligence transparency.1
The ultimate challenge for policymakers and
scholars is to understand this dilemma and to
manage it in a consistent and productive manner.2
In the case of the Philippines, basic information
regarding the mandate, functions, and objectives
of intelligence agencies are not available to the
public due to the ‘culture of secrecy’ embedded
in members of the intelligence community. And
without the beneit of a freedom of information
law which provides access to ‘all information
pertaining to oficial acts, transactions or
decisions, as well as government research data
used as basis for policy development…’3, it would
be impossible for ordinary Filipinos who help fund
intelligence agencies to develop awareness and
gain basic knowledge about the activities of the
Philippine Intelligence Community.
Considering that transparency and openness
are instituted norms in intelligence communities
in democratic states,4 the general mindset
towards intelligence and intelligence agencies in
the Philippine is still dominated by secrecy and
resistance to transparency. This is manifested
by the fact that government agencies that
engage in intelligence work do not have oficial
communication mediums like websites and do not
consistently publish information briefs and annual
reports where basic details can be imparted to
the public. It is also signiicant that scholars, local
and foreign, have not produced any research that
focuses primarily on the intelligence community.
While some commentators and journalists have
written about issues that challenge intelligence
agencies, their works did not consider the
emerging academic literature on intelligence
studies and the substantial information available
from other states.5
With this background, this article argues that while
numerous aspects of intelligence should remain
secret, security restrictions should not impede the
public from understanding the purpose, objectives
and basic functions of intelligence agencies.
The article examines the Philippine Intelligence
Community (IC) in the context of the following
questions: What are the notions of intelligence
in the Philippines? Why is secrecy necessary in
intelligence activities? What is the structure and

1 Refers to the oversight function for diferent sectors including legislative and judicial branches of government, media, academia and non-

government organizations to ensure the Philippine Intelligence Community is undertaking its mission legally, efectively, and eiciently.
2 homas Bruneau, “Introduction: Challenges to Efectiveness in Intelligence due to the Need for Transparency and Accountability in Democracy,”

Strategic Insights Volume VI, Issue 3 (2007).

3 Freedom of Information Act of 2009, S.B. No. 3308, 14th Congress, Second Session (2009).
4 Adam N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmit, Silent War Understanding the World of Intelligence 3rd Edition (Washington D.C.: Brassey’s, 2002),

102-103.
5 Kimberly Tan, “Drilon wants intelligence coordinating agency reorganized” GMA News Online, October 10, 2010, accessed, May 13, 2012,

htp://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/203297/news/nation/drilon-wants-intelligence-coordinating-agency-reorganized; Cathy Yamusan,

“Open records of Marcos’ spy agency, Enrile urges,” Inquirer News Online, December 12, 2011, accessed, May 13, 2012, htp://newsinfo.inquirer.
net/109377/open-records-of-marcos%E2%80%99-spy-agency-enrile-urges; Maila Ager, “Drilon, Enrile question intelligence agency’s 811
‘unjustiied’ positions,” Inquirer News Online, November 13, 2010, accessed, May 13, 2012, htp://globalnation.

8 PHILIPPINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A CASE FOR TRANSPARENCY 77

Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

organization of the IC? What are the different
mechanisms for intelligence oversight? The last
section presents recommendations for developing
intelligence transparency in the Philippines.
Understanding intelligence
The concept of “intelligence” in the Philippines
is predominantly inluenced by Western notions
of intelligence. In fact, the whole concept of
“coordinating intelligence” and establishing a
government agency that would coordinate
national intelligence efforts and provide
assessments can be attributed to American
inluence.6 Therefore, currently Philippine civilian
and military intelligence strategies and policies
are mostly based on the practices of the United
States Intelligence Community.7
There are three dominant notions of intelligence
which are generally accepted by intelligence
scholars and practitioners. These notions classify
intelligence into focus on three general catego-
ries: information, process, and organization.8
One notion is that intelligence is information.
In their seminal work Silent Warfare,
intelligence scholars Abram Shulsky and Gary
Schmitt deine intelligence as “information
relevant to a government’s formulation and
implementation of policy to further its national
security interests and to deal with threats from
actual or potentials adversaries.”9 In most cases,
this “relevant information” is collected from
different sources (secret and open) and
pertains to matters regarding an adversary’s
military capabilities and intentions, diplomatic
affairs, and intelligence activities.10 The
information is then processed and analyzed
to generate what is referred to as an “intelligence
product.”
Another notion is that intelligence is also
considered a systematic process. Mark
Lowenthal, a former American intelligence
oficial offers another perspective on intelligence.
He asserts that intelligence is a “process by which
speciic types of information important to national
security are requested, collected, analyzed,
and provided to policy makers.”11 This notion of
intelligence is broader and considers the entire
intelligence cycle, from planning and direction to
dissemination, as “intelligence.”
Lastly, intelligence is deined as an organization.
Prominent intelligence scholar and former
British intelligence oficer Michael Herman
asserts that while there are several perspectives
on intelligence, the key element in these

6 Executive Order No. 235 of 1949, “Creation of the National Intelligence and Security Authority.”
7 See for example: Executive Order No. 246 (1987). “Providing for the Creation of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, and for

other Purposes.”Malacanang, Manila, med Forces of the Philippines, AFPM 2-2 Tactical Intelligence (Quezon City, General Headquarters,
Camp Aguinaldo, 1978), Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFPM 2-5 he Armed Forces Ataché (Quezon City, General Headquarters, Camp
Aguinaldo, 1981), and Armed Forces of the Philippines, AFPM 2-02 Joint Intelligence Collection Manual (Quezon City, General Headquarters,
Camp Aguinaldo, 2008)
8 Shulsky and Schmit, Silent War.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Mark Lowenthal, Intelligence rom Secrets to Policy 4th Edition (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2009).

78 8 PHILIPPINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A CASE FOR TRANSPARENCY

Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force
perspectives is the organizational aspect. He
explains that “intelligence in government is based
on the particular set of organizations with that
name: the ‘intelligence services’ or (sometimes)
the ‘intelligence communities.’ 12 Consequently,
aside from information or a systematic process,
intelligence also refers to government
organizations. These organizations or intelligence
services have been a twenty-irst century growth
industry and are now permanent institutional
structures in governments around the world.13
The deinitions presented above are certainly
useful in increasing our understanding of
intelligence but they are not considered as
“oficial” or “accepted” deinitions. In fact, for
the past years, a number of practitioners,
academics, and specialists (intelligence
scholars) have attempted to develop viable
deinitions of intelligence.14 While these studies
have contributed to the emerging academic
literature of intelligence, a viable deinition of
intelligence is still lacking until this time.
Secrecy and intelligence
Since a general notion of intelligence is that
it is stolen information that pertains to critical
aspects of state’s national security and threats from
actual or potentials adversary, secrecy is
absolutely necessary to prevent any damage
to the prestige and national security of a state.
12 Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge: University Press, 1996)
13 Ibid.
14 Michael Warner, “Wanted: A Deinition for Intelligence,” Studies in Intelligence Vol. 46 Issue 2 (2002).
15 homas Patrick Carroll, “he Case Against Intelligence Openness,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence 14 (2001):
559-574.
16 Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy
(Washington D.C.: Government Printing Oice, 1997): 6.
8 PHILIPPINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A CASE FOR TRANSPARENCY
philippines
Therefore, information from open sources -
newspapers, television broadcast, or academic
publications may be valuable, but it is not
necessarily intelligence.
In terms of methodology, there are different ways
of stealing information. Information can be stolen
through technical means such as enciphered
cables from foreign embassies can be intercepted
and decoded or satellites can surreptitiously
photograph a terrorist training camp hidden in
a desert. Information can also be the work of a
human agent, perhaps by slipping classiied
documents into a briefcase when leaving work
at the end of the day, the classic secret agent
of the spy movies. However the information is
stolen, its theft involves two extremely sensitive
components that intelligence agencies have to
protect at all cost: the source of information and
the method used to steal the information.15
The maintenance of secrecy has proven
essential to the successful development,
implementation, and completion of plans and
missions of the government.16 Secrecy is
implemented through levels of classiication,
relecting the sensitivity of the intelligence or
intelligence means. More speciically, the
conidential classiication level prevents the
disclosure of information that is expected to cause
‘damage’ to a state’s national security, the secret
classiication level prevents the disclosure of
information that is expected to cause ’serious
79
Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force
damage’ to a state’s national security, while
the top secret classiication level prevents the
disclosure of information that is expected to cause
exceptionally grave damage’ to a state’s
national security. These classiications are
driven by concerns that disclosure of sources
and methods will allow other actors to
implement measures to prevent collection,
effectively negating the collection system.17
Therefore, intelligence and secrecy are directly
correlated. Since intelligence is information
acquired through espionage or clandestine
activities, secrecy is required to protect the
sources of information and the methods utilized
to steal the information. Having established the
connection between intelligence and secrecy,
the next section examines the structure and
organization of the Philippine Intelligence
Community.
The Intelligence Community
The structure of the IC is generally patterned
after the US Intelligence Community prior to 2004.
Much like the United States, the President of the
Philippines is the highest authority on matters
involving national security. The National
Security Advisor (NSA) is the chief advisor of the
President on national security matters and
belongs to the oficial cabinet of the President.
The National Security Council (NSC) is the
President’s principal forum for deliberating on
17 Lowenthal, Intelligence From Secrets to Policy
18 he White House, National Security Council, last modiied 2010, htp://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop/nsc.
19 Shiela Coronel and Yvonne T. Chua (eds.), he PCIJ Guide to Government (Quezon City: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism,
2003).
20 Department of Budget and Management, National Expenditures Program 2009 Executive Oices, National Intelligence Coordinating Agency.
Quezon City: Department of Budget and Management, 2009.
80
philippines
national security and foreign policy matters with
his senior national security advisors and cabinet
oficials.18 The President chairs the NSC, which
is composed of members of key government
departments including foreign affairs, national
defense, military, interior and local government,
justice, labor and employment, science and
technology.19
To translate policy into action, the NSC relies on
the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency
(NICA) which is the main intelligence agency of
the Philippine government. The agency which
was originally established as the National
Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA) by
President Elpidio Quirino in 1949 was tasked
to “organize and coordinate the intelligence
collection activities of various government
instrumentalities concerned.” However since
1987, NICA’s mandate has shifted to a
broader scope of “directing, coordinating, and
integrating all government activities involving
national intelligence.” 20 In addition, the agency
plays a central role in preparing intelligence
assessments for consideration of key
decision-makers in the Philippine government.
Under NICA, there are two functional bodies, the
National Intelligence Committee (NIC) and the
Regional Intelligence Committee (RIC). The NIC
is the principal arm of the National Intelligence
Board for providing direction and control of
intelligence operations and activities of the
intelligence community. The NIC is also a
8 PHILIPPINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A CASE FOR TRANSPARENCY
Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

high-level forum where the IC can conduct
intelligence exchanges to generate inputs for
NICA’s national intelligence estimate (NIE).21
RICs have the same mandate and structure as
the NIC, however the scope of these units is
narrower or more “localized”. RICs have direct
operational function thus permitting them to
act on intelligence reports requiring immediate
action.22
The National Intelligence Board (NIB) is the
highest forum for intelligence exchange among
senior oficials from selected government
departments and units.23 The NIB provides the
NICA Director-General with an independent
source of advice on the effectiveness of the
IC in meeting the country’s intelligence
requirements and the coordination and integration
of local and global intelligence operations. Due to
the nature of its mandate the NIB has access to all
information needed to perform its functions
and includes senior oficials of all government
department and units of the Philippines
government.24
The Special Monitoring Committee (SMC)
was established in 2002 for counterintelligence
operations, particularly to monitor domestic
threats such as destabilization plots against
the administration, and terrorism against the
general public. Two groups were created within
the SMC, SMC-Alpha and SMC-Bravo. Alpha
closely monitors domestic threats speciically
destabilization plots against the administration
while Bravo serves as “the body principally
tasked to undertake threat assessment work”
including intelligence monitoring of terrorist
plans and activities.” 25
Recommendations for intelligence
transparency
The emergence of transnational security
threats originating from state and non-state
actors has proven that intelligence is an
essential tool for states in the twenty irst century.
While developing an internal security service is a
standard procedure for states to secure
their citizens, few states still take the view
that they can dispense with a foreign
intelligence service. Two basic patterns exist for
organizing security and intelligence. The irst
involves the establishment of a single agency
integrating domestic and foreign intelligence
(Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the
Netherlands, Spain and Turkey). The second
necessitates the creation of separate
agencies for domestic security and external
intelligence, with either distinct or coinciding
territorial capabilities (France, Germany, Hungary,
Poland, the UK and the USA). Even with
the variations in the organizational structure or

21 National Intelligence Board Directive No. 1 Series 2003 cited in Ariel Perlado, “Assessing the Efectiveness of the Intelligence Coordination

System of the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (unpublished master’s thesis, National Defense College of the Philippines, 2011).
22 Ibid.
23 AFP-J2, AFP-ISAFP, PNP-IG, PNP-ITG, NBI, Presidential Security Group, Justice, Foreign Afairs, Local Government, Budget and

Management, Finance, Energy, Transportation and Communication, Labour and Employment, Transportation, Environment and Natural
Resources, Social Welfare, Public Works, Trade and Industry, Heath, Agriculture.
24 Executive Order No. 158 ______ (1968).
25 National Intelligence Board No. 2 Series 2002 cited in Perlado, Assessing the Efectiveness.

8 PHILIPPINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A CASE FOR TRANSPARENCY 81

Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force philippines

governmental set up, security and intelligence
pose a common set of challenges for
accountability across different states.26
The central issue in advocating for intelligence
transparency through oversight is the
challenge of how to provide democratic control of
intelligence and intelligence agencies which
are essential to the survival and prosperity
of the state, but which must operate secretly.
Consequently, this study submits the
following recommendations which are based
on the practices of democratic governments.
Maintain public transparency
There are two basic strategies that intelligence
agencies employ to maintain public
transparency. One strategy is for intelligence
agencies through their public affairs ofice,
publish basic information, whether printed or
online, about their work. A second strategy is for
the intelligence agencies to collaborate
with academics and researchers to allow
them to understand and assess different
aspects of intelligence agencies.
Publishing basic information about intelligence
agencies such as US National Intelligence: A
Consumer’s Guide to Intelligence released in
2009 and the UK National Intelligence Machinery
published in 2010 provides American and British
citizens with a general understanding of how the
intelligence agencies will protect them against
various threats to national security.27 On the other
hand, setting up oficial websites that feature
basic information about intelligence agencies
indicates a high level of transparency and respect
for democratic processes. Indonesia’s Badan
Intelijen Negara (State Intelligence Agency),
Mexico’s El Centro de Investigación y Seguridad
Nacional (Center for Research and National
Security) and India’s Central Intelligence
Bureau are examples of developing countries
that have been successful in disseminating
information to the public through the Internet.28
Collaborating with academics and researchers
is another basic strategy which intelligence
agencies implement to maintain transparency.
Since intelligence is a process, intelligence
agencies work with academics and researchers to
ensure that their administrators, analysts, and
oficers develop new and progressive
perspectives regarding the different aspects
of intelligence, particularly clandestine
collection, counter intelligence, analysis and
covert action or in Philippine parlance ‘special
operations’. While the literature on intelligence
is well developed, it is strictly dominated by
Western academics and practioners. Important
examples of scholarly works on intelligence
include: Michael Herman, Intelligence Power
in Peace and War and Allen Dulles, The Craft
of Intelligence which discusses clandestine
collection from an historical perspective;
Jennifer Sims, Buton Gerber, Vaults
and Mirrors and Masks Rediscovering

26 Hans Born and Ian Leigh, “Democratic Accountability of Intelligence Services” Geneva Centre for the Democratic control of Armed forces

Policy Paper 19 (2007), 6-7.

27 Oice of the Director for National Intelligence, National Intelligence: A Consumer’s Guide (Washington D.C.: U.S. Director for National

Intelligence, 2009) and UK Cabinet Oice, National Intelligence Machinery (London: he Stationary Oice, 2010)
28 Center for Research and National Security, What is the CISEN?, last modiied 2010, htp://www.cisen.gob.mx/ cisen.htm; BadanIntelijen

Negara, Proile,last modiied 2012, htp://www.bin.go.id/#; Ministry of Home Afairs, Organisational Setup, last modiied May 16, 2011.

82 8 PHILIPPINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A CASE FOR TRANSPARENCY

Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force
US Counterintelligence and William John-
son, Thwarting Enemies at Home and
Aboard discusses prospective reforms in
US counterintelligence; Stephen Marrin,
Improving Intelligence Analysis: Bridging the
Gap Between Scholarship and Practice
and Thomas Fingar, Reducing Uncertainly,
Intelligence Analysis and National Security
provide key ideas on how to improve
intelligence analysis; and, inally Gregory
Treverton, Covert Action The Limits of
Intervention in the Postwar World and
William Daugherty, Exec tive Secrets: Covert
Action and the Presidency offer recommendation
to address controversial issues regarding
covert actions in the United States.
Aside from the two basic strategies, it is
necessary for the Philippine Congress to pass
legislation requiring intelligence agencies to
disclose basic information which should at
the least, include “descriptions of its central
and ield organization” and “statements of the
general course and method by which its functions
are channeled and determined.” 29 As mentioned
previously, the Filipino people have yet to
beneit from a law that mandates easy and
eficient access to public information. While
the latest version (2012) of the freedom of
information bill, An Act to Strengthen the Right of
Citizens to Information held by the Government
requires all government agencies to “regularly
publish, print and disseminate” updated key
information regarding mandate, structure,
29 he Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 as amended by Public Law No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524.
30 Proposed Freedom of Information Act of 2012, accessed on 16 July 2012, htp://www.gov.ph/foi/.
31 Born and Leigh, Democratic Accountability of Intelligence Services.
32 Senate Bill 765, he Intelligence Oversight Act of 2010, accessed on 17 July 2012,
htp://www.senate.gov.ph/lis/bill_res.aspx?congress=15&q=SBN-765
8 PHILIPPINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A CASE FOR TRANSPARENCY
philippines
powers, functions, duties, decision making
processes and other information that does not
damage the national security of the State, it is
still uncertain whether this bill will be approved
by both legislative and executive branches of
the government.30
Develop intelligence oversight mechanisms
The central issue in ensuring intelligence
transparency is the challenge of how to provide
democratic control or oversight on intelligence
functions and institutions which are essential
to the survival and development of a state, but
which must operate in justiiable secrecy.
In contrast to other areas of governmental
activity, it is accepted that oficial
communications and operations of intelligence
agencies can only be transparent to a limited
extent. Prevailing mechanisms for oversight
applied by a majority of governmental activities
need to be modiied to match the requirements
of intelligence agencies. Therefore, the need for
rigorous oversight is much greater than in the
case of activities such as education or welfare.31
Intelligence oversight is still an emerging
concept in the Philippines.32 The mission of
investigating “illegal, unjust, improper or
ineficient” actions by public oficials resides
with the Ofice of the Ombudsman, the Senate
Committee on Accountability of Public Oficers
and Investigations (Blue Ribbon) and the House
83
Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force
Committee on Good Government and Public
Accountability.33 While these may be considered
successful in uncovering vital information
regarding national security matters, these
investigative institutions are not necessarily
suitable to implement effective intelligence
oversight because they lack the focus and security
protocols present in specialized department
or committees of more advance democratic
states like Argentina, the United Kingdom
and the United States.34 The succeeding
section discusses the two dominant types of
intelligence oversight mechanisms which could
be appropriate for the Philippine government.
Executive oversight
The deinitive authority and legitimacy of
intelligence agencies rest on legislative
approval of their powers, activities and budget.
However, for practical reasons and because of the
sensitive nature and urgency of the tasks of
involving intelligence, effective external control
of these agencies must rest with the executive
branch of government.35
There is no inherent conlict between executive
control and congressional oversight. In fact, the
congress depends on the executive for effective
oversight because congress can only reliably
call members of the executive branch to account
for the actions of intelligence agencies only if
these oficials have actual powers of control and
have suficient information about the operations
33
34 Hans Born, Loch K. Johnson, and Ian Leigh (eds.), Who’s Watching the Spies? Establishing Intelligence Service Accountability (Dulles,
Virginia: Potomac Publishers, 2005).
35 Born and Leigh, Democratic Accountability of Intelligence Services.
36 Ibid, pp. 10-11.
84
philippines
they authorized. In states where this system is
absent, the only democratic alternative is for a
congress to take over. However, this alternative
is questionable because, while legislative bodies
can effectively investigate the use of powers and
expenditure after the fact, they are not capable
of directing and managing real time intelligence
activities unlike the executive branch of
government.36
Congressional Oversight
The international norm is for Congress to
create a specialized body which is mandated to
provide oversight of the intelligence services.
Without a specialized committee, it is dificult if not
impossible for the Congress to exercise
systematic and focused oversight of the
intelligence services. The extent of the
mandate of the Congressional intelligence
oversight committee is critical for its success.
One option is for the mandate to be
comprehensive, reviewing both policy and
operations (Germany and United States). A
Congressional oversight body that focuses on
operations may have greater credibility and
may be given greater powers, such as powers
of subpoena. However, it will encounter
unavoidable restrictions on how it undertakes
investigations and on what can be reported
to the Congressional Committee or the
public. It will operate in effect within a ‘ring of
secrecy’ and that will create a barrier between
the specialized body and the remainder of the
8 PHILIPPINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A CASE FOR TRANSPARENCY
Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force
Congressional Committee. As long as the
committee establishes a reputation for
independence and thoroughness, this barrier
should not affect its legitimacy. With this
arrangement, the Congressional Committee
and the public will have to trust that there exists
proper oversight of operational matters even
without readily available supporting evidence.37
The alternative approach is to limit the mandate of
the Congressional oversight committee to certain
aspects particularly policy and inance (United
Kingdom) or human rights and the rule of law
(Norway). These aspects are generally examined
in the public arena with fewer restrictions on
disclosure, although the publication of exact
budgetary details may be damaging to national
security. The dificulty of this approach, however,
is that it undermines one of the key tasks of
Congressional scrutiny: ensuring that
government policy is carried out effectively and
within the boundaries of the law. Without access to
operational details, an oversight body can have
or give no assurance about the eficiency or the
legality of the intelligence agencies.38
Conclusion
The concept of “intelligence” in the Philippines
is dominated by Western ideas which deine
intelligence as not only information but also
a process and an organization. Since a
dominant notion of intelligence is that it is stolen
information, secrecy is absolutely necessary
to prevent damage to the prestige and national
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
8 PHILIPPINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A CASE FOR TRANSPARENCY
philippines
security of a state. More speciically, secrecy
is absolutely vital in protecting the sources of
intelligence and the methods utilized to obtain
intelligence.
In terms of structure, the Philippine
Intelligence Community is generally patterned
after the US Intelligence Community prior to 2004.
Much like the United States, the President of the
Philippines is the highest authority on matters
involving national security while the National
Security Adviser is the most inluential senior
staff member when national security matters are
involved. The NSC which is also patterned after
the American National Security Council, is the
President’s principal forum for deliberating on
national security and foreign policy matters with
his senior national security advisors and cabinet
oficials. To implement policies developed within
the NSC, the President relies on the NICA, which
is the main intelligence agency of the Philippine
government. Under the NSC, there is also the
National Intelligence Board where the highest
forum for intelligence exchange among senior
oficials from selected government departments
and units take place.
With the emergence of transnational security
threats originating from state and non-state
actors, there is no question that intelligence
agencies are necessary for states to survive in
the twenty irst century. While there are different
patterns and procedures for organizing
intelligence agencies, achieving intelligence
transparency will always remain a main challenge
for democratic states.
85
Security Sector Reform: Modern Defense Force
Increasing public transparency and developing
intelligence oversight mechanisms are
recommendations to develop intelligence
transparency in the Philippines. As discussed
previously, intelligence agencies can increase
public transparency by developing an oficial
website, publishing documents regarding the
Philippine Intelligence Community and
collaborating with academics and researchers.
Intelligence oversight is still an emerging
concept in the Philippines. Executive
oversight and congressional oversight are
two dominant mechanisms to ensuring that
intelligence agencies are a countable for their
actions. Although deinitive authority and
legitimacy of intelligence agencies rest on
legislative approval, executive oversight is a
SOURCE: 4TH SPECIAL FORCES BATTALION, AFP
86 8 PHILIPPINE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY: A CASE FOR TRANSPARENCY
philippines
practical oversight mechanism because with
the sensitive nature and urgency of the tasks of
involving intelligence, effective external control
of these agencies must rest with the executive
branch of government.
On the other hand, Congressional oversight
is the dominant mechanism adopted by
different democratic states because these
committees are generally effective in investigating
the use of powers and expenditures of intelligence
agencies. However, the problem with these
committees is that they are not capable of
directing and managing real time intelligence
activities that the executive branch of
government can implement.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
J
Jennifer Santiago Oreta, Ph.D.
JENNIFER SANTIAGO ORETA holds a PhD in Political Science. Her research interests include
security sector reform and development, peace and security, arms and gun-violence, gender and
social movements. Dr. Oreta is Asst. Professor on Political Science at the Ateneo de Manila University.
She has been appointed as Assistant Secretary to the Ofice of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace
Process (OPAPP) last February 2013. She is in-charge of the DDR (disarmament, demobilization,
and reintegration) program, as well as the Knowledge Management and Resource Center of the
institution. She is also the focal person in mainstreaming the cross-cutting issues of gender, children,
indigenous communities, human rights, and security sector reform, and ensuring there is consistency
in policy as regards these issues.

K
Kathline Anne Sigua Tolosa
KATHLINE ANNE S TOLOSA is Co-Convenor of the Working Group on Security Sector Reform. As
the head of the National Secretariat, she convenes the Bantay Bayanihan, a network of civil society
organizations performing oversight on the Philippine military, creating dialogue spaces, and building
a constituency for peace and security issues. She has co-authored Pagpati’ut: Mediating Violence
in Sulu, published by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, and Revisiting the Policy Environment
on Peace and Security, published by the Australian Aid-The Asia Foundation partnership in the
Philippines. She has served in various capacities at the Department of National Defense, Armed
Forces of the Philippines, Department of Transportation and Communications, and the Ofice for
Transportation Security.

N
Atty. Noel del Prado
NOEL ROMERO DEL PRADO graduated from the Ateneo de Manila University with a degree in AB
Philosophy in 1992, and the Ateneo de Manila University College of Law in 1997. He teaches Filipino
Literature at the Ateneo de Manila University. He is a Board Member of the Inter-Country Adoption
Board (ICAB) and the Movie and Television Review and Classiication Board (MTRCB). He worked as
the Legal Service Director of the Philippine Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
and as a Legal Consultant in the Senate, the House of Representatives, the Department of Education
(DepEd), UNICEF and USAID. He served as the Chief of Staff in the Senatorial Campaign of Hon.
Grace Poe. He is also a volunteer lawyer for Bantay Bata 163, the Council for the Welfare of Children
(CWC), and the National Council on Disability Affairs.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS 177

 M Melanie Rodulfo-Veril
MELANIE ROSE RODULFO-VERIL is a graduate student from the University of the Philippines
majoring in Asian Studies. Her area of research is in comparative Southeast Asian politics and is
particularly interested on issues on Philippine security relations, disaster management, and disaster
diplomacy. As a professional, she has been involved in several foreign-funded peace and development
programs, including those implemented in conlict and post conlict affected areas in the Philippines.
She currently works for the Pantawid Pamilyang Pilipino Program of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development as a Planning Oficer.

R
Captain Roy Vincent T. Trinidad (GSC) PN
CAPT ROY VINCENT TRINIDAD PN (GSC) is currently the Chief of the Territorial Defense Division
of the Ofice of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, J3. Prior to his serving as the Chief TDD, he
is the Assistant Division Chief of the Manpower and Organization Division, and at the same time the
Chief of the Administrative Division of OJ3. He has been working with OJ3 for three (3) years.

A
Colonel Amador T. Tabuga Jr. (GSC) PA
COL AMADOR T TABUGA, JR. graduated from the Philippine Military Academy in 1986. He is the
Chief of Uniied Command Staff of Western Mindanao Command, Armed Forces of the Philippines
which covers the whole of ARMM region, Zamboanga Peninsula and the two Lanao provinces. Prior
to this, he was the Assistant Chief of the AFP Doctrine Development Center and was the Team Leader
of the Poject Management Team (PMT) in the revision of the AFP Basic Doctrine and Joint Doctrine
manuals which were approved for publication by the CSAFP.

178 ABOUT THE AUTHORS

 I
Colonel Isidro L. Purisima (GSC) PA
COLONEL ISIDRO LA MADRID PURISIMA is currently the Chief of Staff of 3rd Infantry (Spearhead)
Division, Philippine Army based in Panay Island, Western Visayas. His recent assignments include
Chief, Research and Doctrine Division and Executive Oficer of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations, J3, AFP. He is a member of PMA ‘Sandiwa” Class of 1985. He inished his Diploma in
Strategic and Defence Studies in University of Malaya in Malaysia and is a graduate of Master of Arts
in Strategic Security Studies at the National Defense University, USA.

I
Iren C. Gumpal
IREN CACHOPERO GUMPAL is a Research Analyst of the Ofice of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations, J3, GHQ, Armed Forces of the Philippines. She took her Master of Professional Studies
in Development Communication at the University of the Philippines Open University, and her BS in
Development Communication at the University of the Philippines Los Baños. She is currently under
the Research and Doctrine Division of OJ3.

F Francis Domingo
FRANCIS DOMINGO is an Assistant Professor at the International Studies Department of De La
Salle University and concurrently a postgraduate research student at the Department of Politics and
International Relations of University of Reading. Before joining academia, he was a military analyst
with the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Associate Managing Director of RVD Business
Intelligence Consultancy, a pioneering competitive/business intelligence consultancy irm based in
Makati City for several years. He completed a BA in Political Science from De La Salle University in
2004 and an MA in Intelligence and Security Studies from Brunel University in 2009.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS 179

 MMaribel Daño-Luna
MARIBEL DAÑO-LUNA is a researcher for peace and security from the Working Group on Security
Sector Reform. She serves as the coordinator of Bantay Bayanihan, a nationwide network of CSOs
that acts as oversight for the implementation of the AFP’s IPSP Bayanihan on the operational and
policy level. Her irst-hand experience in promoting civilian and democratic control of the armed
forces stems from her background both from the civil society and the military. She began her career
as a researcher for Task Force Mapalad, an NGO helping farmers in Mindanao and Negros. After
her transitory residence in Mindanao, she proceeded to work as a researcher/analyst for the Armed
Forces of the Philippines where she took on research positions in the Philippine Navy and the Ofice
of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (OJ3). She studied BA Communication Research in the
University of the Philippines Diliman.

C
Carla Isabel M. Ravanes
CARLA ISABEL M. RAVANES is a graduate of Bachelor of Science in Psychology from the University
of the Philippines Diliman. She has previously worked for the Ofice of the Deputy Chief of Staff for
Operations, OJ3 of the Armed Forces of the Philippines under the said ofice’s Research and Doctrine
Division. Currently, she is a part of the Policy Unit of the Ofice of the Presidential Adviser on the
Peace Process (OPAPP) which aims to mainstream the different cross-cutting concerns on gender,
children, human rights and international humanitarian law, indigenous peoples, and security sector
reform in the various Philippine peace tables.

J
Joseph Raymond Franco
JOSEPH FRANCO is an Associate Research Fellow at the Centre of Excellence for National Security
(CENS), S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University,
Singapore. He holds a BA in Political Science from the University of the Philippines-Diliman and
an MSc in International Relations from RSIS (ASEAN Graduate Scholarship). Joseph is currently
working on issues surrounding radicalization in the Southern Philippines. His other research interests
include internal conlict, counter-insurgency, special operations forces and peacekeeping.

180 ABOUT THE AUTHORS

 M
Mereniza C. Gomez
MERENIZA DELA CRUZ GOMEZ is a member of the Ateneo de Manila University Working Group
of Security Sector Reform (WGSSR). She was a faculty of the Makati Medical Center College of
Nursing teaching Philippine History, Government and Constitution. She is also a part-time faculty
of De La Salle University Department of International Studies. She worked for the Armed Forces of
the Philippines as a Defense Analyst for International Affairs from 2008-2011 under the Ofice of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, J5. She is a graduate of BA Organizational Communication from UP
Manila and earned her graduate degree, Master in International Studies, at UP Diliman.

S
Saya Kiba, Ph.D.
Saya Kiba is a political scientist. She studied at the Graduate School of International Cooperation
Studies, Kobe University (Ph.D. in Political Science 2010) and the Third World Studies Center,
University of the Philippines (2003-2004, 2010). Her major ields of interest are civil-military relations,
international cooperation studies, and social movements especially in urban poor communities.
She has worked in the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines and the House of Representatives of
Japan. She is currently an adviser in the Embassy of Japan in Thailand. In 2013, she is awarded The
Nippon Foundation’s Asian Public Intellectuals (API) Collaborative Grant for her joint research project,
“Comparative Analysis on Military-NGO Cooperation Policies in Asia.”

R
Rosalie Arcala Hall, Ph.D.
ROSALIE ARCALA HALL is a Professor of Political Science and University Scientist I at University
of the Philippines Visayas Miagao, Iloilo. She earned her graduate degrees (Ph.D. in Public and
International Affairs; MA Political Science) from Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts
under a Fulbright Fellowship. She published articles on civil-military relations in the Philippine Political
Science Journal, Asian Security, Korean Journal of Defense Analysis and Scientia Militaria. She
has completed various research projects on civil-military engagements during counterinsurgency,
humanitarian, disaster response and anti-terror operations; gender issues inside the armed forces
and police; and rebel integration into the armed forces with grants from The Nippon Foundation,
Toyota Foundation, East Asian Development Network, Fulbright Advanced Research, and the Austrian
government North-South Exchange Program.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS 181

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