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Assess Primitive
Problem

Detailed Process Plant-wide

Synthesis - Development of Controllability
Algorithmic Base-case Assessment
Methods

Detailed Design,
Equipment sizing, Cap.
Cost Estimation,
Profitability Analysis,
Optimization

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 Analysis of HS&E impact of technology is so important

that it is carried out at every stage of a project, using the
project technical information as it becomes available

Procurement,
Research Conceptual Preliminary Detailed
Construction,
Concept Design Design Design
Operation
Available Information
Chemistry + PFD + P&ID + Mech designs + Plot plans
MSDS info Equipment list Process control Instrument specs Isometrics
Vessel designs Metallurgy As built specs
Reactor models Detailed H&WB
Offsites
HS&E Analysis
•Process FMEA •HAZOP •Quantitative •As built
•MSDS Review •HAZAN •Emergency Risk Analysis HAZOP
•Major Hazard Review •PP Analysis Procedures •Fault Tree •Operator
•Effluent Summary Analysis training

 Occurs when mass, moles or energy accumulate in a

contained volume (or space with restricted outflow)
 Rate of accumulation determines the pressure rise
 Process controls may not be able to respond quickly
enough
 If pressure is not relieved by pressure safety valve
then outcomes could include
 Vessel rupture
 Explosion
 Other loss of containment
 See following lecture for design for overpressure

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A fire requires a flammable mixture and an

ignition source
 Fires in chemical plants can quickly lead to
damage to control systems and equipment,
causing overpressure, loss of containment
and explosions
 Fire protection guidelines are given in
several standards (see Ch9)
 NFPA 30, API RP 2001, API Publ 2218
 Legal requirements for fire protection are set
by OSHA (29 CFR 1910 L)

 Can you think of possible sources of ignition on a

chemical plant?
 Sparking of electrical equipment
 Motors, actuators, lighting, electric heaters, …
 Process flames
 Furnaces, flare stacks, incinerators
 These should always be sited well away from plant, usually upwind
 Static electricity
 See API RP 2003 and NFPA 77
 Lightning
 Vehicles (engines, electrical systems and exhausts)
 Portable electrical devices
 Welding and cutting equipment
 Miscellaneous sources (matches, lighters, etc. are usually
banned)

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 The use of electrical equipment in chemical plants is

regulated by law (OSHA standard 29 CFR 1910.307) and
by industry design codes
 National Electrical Code NFPA 70
 NFPA standards 496, 497, API RP 500, 505
 NFPA70 defines classified areas in which flammable
materials may be present at high enough
concentrations to be ignitable
 Specific precautions must be taken depending on the classification
 Equipment must be designed and installed in accordance with code

 Codes should be consulted

before selecting equipment
for use in classified areas
 Codes also govern electrical
maintenance work (NFPA
70B). Companies usually have
strict “Lock-out, tag-out”
procedures to prevent
electric shock accidents

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 An explosion is the sudden, catastrophic release

of energy causing a pressure wave (blast wave)
 Explosions can be caused by ignition of a
flammable mixture
 Liquid
 Vapor
 Solid (e.g., finely dispersed dust)
 Explosions can also be caused by release of
thermal energy
 Boiler rupture
 BLEVE (boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion)

 Deflagration
 Combustion zone propagates at (subsonic) flame speed, usually < 30 m/s
 Pressure wave generated usually < 10 bar
 Principal heating mechanism is combustion
 Detonation
 Combustion zone propagates at supersonic velocity, 2000 – 3000 m/s
 Pressure wave up to 20 bar
 Principal heating mechanism is shock compression
 Usually requires confinement or a high-intensity source
 Deflagration can turn into detonation when propagating along a pipe
 Expansion factor
 Measure of the increase in volume resulting from combustion
 E = (molar density of reagents)/(molar density of products)
 Maximum value of E is for adiabatic combustion
 Flame speed
 The rate of propogation of a flame front through a flammable mixture, with
respect to a fixed observer

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Dugdale, D. An introduction to Fire Dynamics, Wiley, New York, 1985

 Designto prevent explosions from happening

 Prevent formation of explosive mixtures
whenever possible
 Operate outside flammability envelope
 Consider confined explosion as a pressure
relief scenario and ensure that PRV is sized
to allow adequate relief load to prevent
detonation
 Use flame suppressors to prevent
deflagration from propagating into
detonation

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 The primary means of protecting the public from

toxic chemicals is containment by the plant itself
 Loss of containment can occur due to:
 Pressure relief
 Operator error (e.g. leaving a sample point open)
 Poor maintenance procedures
 Failure to drain and purge properly
 Failure to put everything back together properly
 Leaks from degraded equipment
 Corrosion
 Damaged seals, gaskets
 These are mostly operational issues, but design may
need to provide for secondary containment if the
potential impact of a release is high

 Chemical plants can be very noisy, especially

compressors, turbines, motors and solids handling
 Chronic effects include permanent damage to
hearing
 Sound is measured in decibels, defined by:

 RMS sound pressure Pa  

Sound level  20 log10   dB
 2 10 5
(Note: log scale)
 Ear protection should be required in areas where
noise > 80 dB
 Permanent damage can be caused by noise > 85 dB

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From
Daniel R. Lewin
Department of Chemical Engineering
Technion
Technion,, Haifa, Israel

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This lecture, and next week’s lecture:

 Provide motivation for performing a HAZOP/HAZAN

study on a process
 This lecture provides instruction on how to carry out
a HAZOP analysis
o HAZOP is a technique for identifying hazards
without waiting for an accident to occur.
 We will learn about the tools and methods used in a
HAZAN analysis
o HAZAN is a technique for estimating the
probability and consequences of a hazard.

1. What can go wrong ?

2. What will be the consequences?
3. How often will it occur ?
4. How can it be prevented ?
5. Is the cost of prevention justified ?
6. Is it worth the cost ?
7. Prevention ?

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1. Identify what can go wrong.

The first and most important stage in any

hazard study is to identify the most
important things that can go wrong and
produce accidents or operating problems.

A HAZOP is a systematic procedure to analyze the hazards

associated with each process pipeline, applying the
following guide words:
NONE, MORE OF, LESS OF, REVERSE, OTHER THAN, PART OF,
MORE THAN.

2. How big will the consequences be?

We need to know the consequences to

employees, members of the public, plant
and profits, now and in the long term.

3. How often will it occur?

We need to know how often the hazard is

likely to occur (HAZAN). Imply probability or
likelihood.

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4. Prevention.
How can we prevent the accident occurring, or
make it less probable or protect people from
the consequences?

5. What should we do?

We should compare the risk (that is, the

probability times the consequence) with generally
accepted codes and standards or with the other
risks around us..

6. Is it worth the cost?

We should also compare the cost of prevention
with the cost of the accident to see if the
remedy is ‘reasonably practical’ or we should
look for a cheaper solution.

7. Prevention ?
Perhaps our method of prevention has
disadvantages, and better methods can be
suggested. We should answer this question
before a table is made and a glass ordered.

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Select Line

Select Deviation, eg more flow

Move on to next NO
Is more flow possible?
Deviation
Yes

Is it hazardous or does it prevent NO Consider other

efficient operation? causes of more flow

Yes

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Yes

NO
What change in plan Will the operator know that there
will tell him? is more flow?

Yes

What change in plan or methods

Consider other
will prevent the deviation or make
changes or agree to
it less likely or protect against the
accept hazard
consequences?

NO
Is the cost of change justified?

Yes

Consider other
Yes causes of more flow

Agree changes
Agree who is responsible for
actions

Follow up to see action has

been taken

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FI
37ᵒC
J1: Transfer pumps
36 psig
(one working, one spare)

Hydrocarbons from
intermediate storage Drain and N2 purge

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A HAZOP team for a new process consists of the following members:

PROJECT or DESIGN ENGINEER – Often a MechE. Responsible for

keeping costs within target. He/she will want to minimize changes, but
at the same time wants to find out now rather than later if there are
any unknown hazards or operating problems.
PROCESS ENGINEER – Usually a ChemE. The person who drew
developed the flowsheet.
COMMISSIONING MANAGER – Usually a ChemE. He/she will have to
start-up and operate the plant, and will be in favor of any changes that
will make life easier.
INSTRUMENT DESIGN ENGINEER – A modern plant contains
sophisticated control and trip systems, and HAZOPs often result in even
more instrumentation.
RESEARCH CHEMIST – If new chemistry is involved.
INDEPENDENT CHAIRMAN – An expert in the HAZOP technique, but not
the plant. If he/she is not a representative of the plant safety
department, one needs to be present.

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COMMISSIONING MANAGER
INSTRUMENT DESIGN ENGINEER
DESIGN ENGINEER

On completing this week’s materials, you should be able to

carry out a HAZOP analysis:

•Applying the guide words systematically to identify the

most important hazards affecting each line in the
process.
•Categorizing each hazard according to its severity,
likelihood and cost.
•Realizing that a HAZOP analysis is an ongoing process
that needs to be documented and followed up.

HAZOP analysis is not the only tool used. HAZAN analysis is

another technique for assessing unsafe operational conditions
and it is based on estimating the probability and consequences
of hazards.

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