A.
Wrongful Act done be different than that which he intended possession of the bolo, which Pacas was trying to wrench away from him, and his conduct was perfectly
G.R. No. L-34665 August 28, 1931
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DONATO BINDOY, defendant-appellant.
VILLAMOR, J.:
The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First Instance of Occidental Misamis to the penalty of
twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The crime charged against the accused is
homicide, according to the following information:
That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of Calunod, municipality of Baliangao,
Province of Occidental Misamis, the accused Donato Bindoy willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously attacked and with his bolo wounded Emigdio Omamdam, inflicting upon the latter
a serious wound in the chest which caused his instant death, in violation of article 404 of the
Penal Code.
The accused appealed from the judgment of the trial court, and his counsel in this instance contends that
the court erred in finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and in convicting him of the crime of
homicide.
The record shows that in the afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop in the
barrio market of Calunod, municipality of Baliangao, Province of Occidental Misamis, started by some of
the tubadrinkers. There were Faustino Pacas (alias Agaton), and his wife called Tibay. One Donato
Bindoy, who was also there, offered some tuba to Pacas' wife; and as she refused to drink having
already done so, Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did not accept. There ensued an interchange of
words between Tibay and Bindoy, and Pacas stepped in to defend his wife, attempting to take away
from Bindoy the bolo he carried. This occasioned a disturbance which attracted the attention of Emigdio
Omamdam, who, with his family, lived near the market. Emigdio left his house to see what was
happening, while Bindoy and Pacas were struggling for the bolo. In the course of this struggle, Bindoy
succeeded in disengaging himself from Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand towards the left
behind the accused, with such violence that the point of the bolo reached Emigdio Omamdam's chest,
who was then behind Bindoy.
There is no evidence that Emigdio took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas. Neither is there any
indication that the accused was aware of Emigdio Omamdam's presence in the place, for, according to
the testimony of the witnesses, the latter passed behind the combatants when he left his house to satisfy
his curiosity. There was no disagreement or ill feeling between Bindoy and Omamdam, on the contrary,
it appears they were nephew and uncle, respectively, and were on good terms with each other. Bindoy
did not try to wound Pacas, and instead of wounding him, he hit Omamdam; he was only defending his
1
lawful.
The wound which Omamdam received in the chest, judging by the description given by the sanitary
inspector who attended him as he lay dying, tallies with the size of the point of Bindoy's bolo.
There is no doubt that the latter caused the wound which produced Emigdio Omamdam's death, but the
defendant alleges that it was caused accidentally and without malicious intent.
Pacas and the widow of the deceased, Carmen Angot, testified having seen the accused stab
Omamdam with his bolo. Such testimony is not incompatible with that of the accused, to the effect that
he wounded Omamdam by accident. The widow testified that she knew of her husband's wound being
caused by Bindoy from his statement to her before his death.
The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to show that the accused stabbed Omamdam
in the chest with his bolo on that occasion. The defendant, indeed, in his effort to free himself of Pacas,
who was endeavoring to wrench his bolo from him, hit Omamdam in the chest; but, as we have stated,
there is no evidence to show that he did so deliberately and with the intention of committing a crime. If, in
his struggle with Pacas, the defendant had attempted to wound his opponent, and instead of doing so,
had wounded Omamdam, he would have had to answer for his act, since whoever willfully commits a
felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal liability, although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended. (Art. 1 of the Penal Code.) But, as we have said, this is not the case.
The witness for the defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates the defendant to the effect that Pacas and
Bindoy were actually struggling for the possession of the bolo, and that when the latter let go, the former
had pulled so violently that it flew towards his left side, at the very moment when Emigdio Omamdam
came up, who was therefore hit in the chest, without Donato's seeing him, because Emigdio had passed
behind him. The same witness adds that he went to see Omamdam at his home later, and asked him
about his wound when he replied: "I think I shall die of this wound." And then continued: "Please look
after my wife when I die: See that she doesn't starve," adding further: "This wound was an accident.
Donato did not aim at me, nor I at him: It was a mishap." The testimony of this witness was not
contradicted by any rebuttal evidence adduced by the fiscal.
We have searched the record in vain for the motive of this kind, which, had it existed, would have greatly
facilitated the solution of this case. And we deem it well to repeat what this court said in United
States vs. Carlos (15 Phil., 47), to wit:
The attention of prosecuting officers, and especially of provincial fiscals, directed to the
importance of definitely ascertaining and proving, when possible, the motives which actuated
the commission of a crime under investigation.
In many criminal cases one of the most important aids in completing the proof of the
commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the motives
which tempted the mind of the guilty person to indulge the criminal act.
In view of the evidence before us, we are of opinion and so hold, that the appellant is entitled to acquittal
according to article 8, No. 8, Penal Code. Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the
accused Donato Bindoy is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio. So ordered.
G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencing the accused-
appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder.
The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With the approval of the
new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death and commuting all existing death sentences to life
imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to inform us whether or not he wished to pursue the
case as an appealed case. In compliance therewith, he filed a statement informing us that he wished to
continue with the case by way of an appeal.
The information (amended) in this case reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Tacloban accuses Francisco Abarca of
the crime of Murder with Double Frustrated Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of July, 1984, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
deliberate intent to kill and with evident premeditation, and with treachery, armed
with an unlicensed firearm (armalite), M-16 rifle, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and shot several times KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH
on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon said KHINGSLEY PAUL
KOH gunshot wounds which caused his instantaneous death and as a
consequence of which also caused gunshot wounds to LINA AMPARADO and
ARNOLD AMPARADO on the different parts of their bodies thereby inflicting
gunshot wounds which otherwise would have caused the death of said Lina
Amparado and Arnold Amparado, thus performing all the acts of execution which
should have produced the crimes of murders as a consequence, but nevertheless
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is by the timely
and able medical assistance rendered to Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado
which prevented their death. 1
2
xxx xxx xxx
On arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The Solicitor General states accurately the
facts as follows:
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny, had illicit
relationship. The illicit relationship apparently began while the accused was in
Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations. His wife was left behind in their
residence in Tacloban, Leyte (pp. 45-47, 65, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984).
On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence in Tacloban, Leyte. On the
morning of that date he went to the bus station to go to Dolores, Eastern Samar, to
fetch his daughter. However, he was not able to catch the first trip (in the morning).
He went back to the station in the afternoon to take the 2:00 o'clock trip but the
bus had engine trouble and could not leave (pp. 5-8, tsn, Nov. 28, 1985). The
accused, then proceeded to the residence of his father after which he went home.
He arrived at his residence at the V & G Subdivision in Tacloban City at around
6:00 o'clock in the afternoon (pp. 8-9, tsn, Id.).
Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the
act of sexual intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the accused, the wife
pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused who was then peeping
above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away (pp. 9-13, tsn, Id.).
The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to the house of a
PC soldier, C2C Arturo Talbo, arriving there at around 6:30 p.m. He got Talbo's
firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went back to his house at V & G Subdivision. He was
not able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the "mahjong session" as
it was the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He
fired at Kingsley Koh three times with his rifle (pp. 13-19, tsn, Id.). Koh was hit.
Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to the room
where Koh was playing mahjong were also hit by the shots fired by the accused
(pp. 34-49, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984). Kingsley Koh died instantaneously of
cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of multiple
gunshot wounds on the head, trunk and abdomen (pp. 28-29, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984;
see also exh. A): Arnold Amparado was hospitalized and operated on in the kidney
to remove a bullet (pp. 17-23, tsn, Oct. 17, 1984; see also exh. C). His wife, Lina
Amparado, was also treated in the hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments (p.
23, tsn, Id.). Arnold Amparado who received a salary of nearly P1,000.00 a month
was not able to work for 1-1/2 months because of his wounds. He spent
P15,000.00 for medical expenses while his wife spent Pl,000.00 for the same
purpose (pp. 24-25, tsn, Id. ). 2
On March 17, 1986, the trial court rendered the appealed judgment, the dispositive portion whereof
reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
 WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Francisco Abarca guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder as charged in
the amended information, and pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code
which does not consider the effect of mitigating or aggravating circumstances
when the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty in relation to Art. 48, he is
hereby sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs of Khingsley Paul Koh in the
sum of P30,000, complainant spouses Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of
Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
It appears from the evidence that the deceased Khingsley Paul Koh and
defendant's wife had illicit relationship while he was away in Manila; that the
accused had been deceived, betrayed, disgraced and ruined by his wife's infidelity
which disturbed his reasoning faculties and deprived him of the capacity to reflect
upon his acts. Considering all these circumstances this court believes the accused
Francisco Abarca is deserving of executive clemency, not of full pardon but of a
substantial if not a radical reduction or commutation of his death sentence.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished her Excellency, the President of the
Philippines, thru the Ministry of Justice, Manila.
SO ORDERED. 3
xxx xxx xxx
The accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by the court a quo:
I.
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS CHARGED INSTEAD OF ENTERING A
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UNDER ARTICLE 247 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE;
II.
IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS AMENDED BY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
TREACHERY. 4
The Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code defining death
inflicted under exceptional circumstances, complexed with double frustrated murder. Article 247 reads in
full:
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. —
Any legally married person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both of
them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.
3
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt
from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with
respect to their daughters under eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while
the daughters are living with their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or daughter, or
shall otherwise have consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be
entitled to the benefits of this article.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision applies in the instant case. There is
no question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of
illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst.
Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in
the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of
them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in
convicting the accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the accused-appellant
discovered his wife having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot,
the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-
appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them .
. . immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does not say that he should commit
the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the
outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the
killing should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been
influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage.
It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not define an offense. 5 In People v.
Araque, 6 we said:
xxx xxx xxx
As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in the Code, the above-
quoted article, far from defining a felony, merely provides or grants a privilege or
benefit — amounting practically to an exemption from an adequate punishment —
to a legally married person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or daughter in
the act of committing sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill any or both of
them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious
physical injury. Thus, in case of death or serious physical injuries, considering the
enormous provocation and his righteous indignation, the accused — who would
otherwise be criminally liable for the crime of homicide, parricide, murder, or
serious physical injury, as the case may be — is punished only withdestierro. This
penalty is mere banishment and, as held in a case, is intended more for the
protection of the accused than a punishment. (People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.)
And where physical injuries other than serious are inflicted, the offender is
 exempted from punishment. In effect, therefore, Article 247, or the exceptional
circumstances mentioned therein, amount to an exempting circumstance, for even
where death or serious physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly
lowered as to result to no punishment at all. A different interpretation, i.e., that it
defines and penalizes a distinct crime, would make the exceptional circumstances
which practically exempt the accused from criminal liability integral elements of the
offense, and thereby compel the prosecuting officer to plead, and, incidentally,
admit them, in the information. Such an interpretation would be illogical if not
absurd, since a mitigating and much less an exempting circumstance cannot be an
integral element of the crime charged. Only "acts or omissons . . . constituting the
offense" should be pleaded in a complaint or information, and a circumstance
which mitigates criminal liability or exempts the accused therefrom, not being an
essential element of the offense charged-but a matter of defense that must be
proved to the satisfaction of the court-need not be pleaded. (Sec. 5, Rule 106,
Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil., 368.)
That the article in question defines no crime is made more manifest when we
consider that its counterpart in the old Penal Code (Article 423) was found under
the General Provisions (Chapter VIII) of Title VIII covering crimes against persons.
There can, we think, hardly be any dispute that as part of the general provisions, it
could not have possibly provided for a distinct and separate crime.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not
define and provide for a specific crime, but grants a privilege or benefit to the
accused for the killing of another or the infliction of serious physical injuries under
the circumstances therein mentioned. ... 7
xxx xxx xxx
Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is banished, but that is intended for his
protection.8
It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional circumstances, not being a punishable
act, cannot be qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying circumstances, We cannot
accordingly appreciate treachery in this case.
The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the physical injuries suffered by Lina
Amparado and Arnold Amparado who were caught in the crossfire as the accused-appellant shot the
victim. The Solicitor General recommends a finding of double frustrated murder against the accused-
appellant, and being the more severe offense, proposes the imposition of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. This is where we disagree. The
accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one
committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule presupposes that the act
done amounts to a felony. 9
4
But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing murder when
he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not
murder. We cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by
the Amparados.
This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility. Granting
the fact that he was not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he cannot be said to
be entirely without fault. While it appears that before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words
("an waray labot kagawas,") 10that is not enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained
by the Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we hold him liable under
the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious physical injuries through simple
imprudence or negligence. (The records show that Arnold Amparado was incapacitated for one and one-
half months; 11 there is no showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to the extent of her injuries. We
presume that she was placed in confinement for only ten to fourteen days based on the medical
certificate estimating her recovery period.) 12
For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose upon the accused-
appellantarresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum period, arresto to being
the graver penalty (than destierro). 13
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to
four months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in
confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify
Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of
P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special pronouncement as to
costs. IT IS SO ORDERED.
B. Aberratio ictus-in relation to Art 6
G.R. No. 123485 August 31, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROLUSAPE SABALONES alias "Roling," ARTEMIO TIMOTEO BERONGA, TEODULO ALEGARBES
and EUFEMIO CABANERO, accused, ROLUSAPE SABALONES alias "Roling" and ARTEMIO
TIMOTEO BERONGA,accused-appellants.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Factual findings of trial courts which are affirmed by the Court of Appeals are, as a general rule, binding
and conclusive upon the Supreme Court. Alibi, on the other hand, cannot prevail over positive
identification by credible witnesses. Furthermore, alleged violations of constitutional rights during
custodial investigation are relevant only when the conviction of the accused by the trial court is based on
the evidence obtained during such investigation.
The Case
These are the principles relied upon by the Court in resolving this appeal from the Court of Appeals
(CA) 1 Decision2 dated September 28, 1995, convicting Rolusape Sabalones and Timoteo Beronga of
murder and frustrated murder. The convictions arose from a shooting incident on June 1, 1985 in
Talisay, Cebu, which resulted in the killing of two persons and the wounding of three others, who were
all riding in two vehicles which were allegedly ambushed by appellants.
After conducting a preliminary investigation, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Juanito M. Gabiana
Sr. filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 7, 3 five amended Informations
charging four "John Does," who were later identified as Rolusape Sabalones, Artemio Timoteo Beronga,
Teodulo Alegarbes and Eufemio Cabanero, with two counts of murder and three counts of frustrated
murder. The Informations are quoted hereunder.
1) Crim Case No. CBU-9257 for murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985, at 11:45 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at
Mansueto Village, Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with high-
powered firearms, with intent to kill and treachery, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot GLENN TIEMPO, who was
riding [i]n a jeep and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting upon the latter
several gunshot wounds, thereby causing his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
2) Criminal Case No. 9258 for murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 o'clock in the evening, more or less at
Mansueto Village, Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with
high-powered firearms, with intent to kill and treachery, did [then] and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot ALFREDO NARDO,
who was riding on a jeep and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting upon the
latter several gunshot wounds, thereby causing his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
3) Crim Case No. CBU-9259 for frustrated murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at
Mansueto Village, Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with
high-powered firearms, with intent to kill and treachery, did and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot REY BOLO who was riding in
5
a car and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting upon the latter the following
injuries to wit:
laceration, mouth due to gunshot wound, gunshot wound (L) shoulder penetrating
(L) chest; gunshot wound (R) hand (palm); open fracture (L) clavicle (L) scapula;
contusion (L) lung;
thereby performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
[m]urder as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason
of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, i.e. the timely medical
attendance.
IN VIOLATION of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
4) Criminal Case No. 9260 for frustrated murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at
Mansueto Village, Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with
high-powered firearms, with intent to kill and treachery, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot ROGELIO PRESORES, who
was riding in a car and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting upon the latter
the following injuries, to wit:
gunshot wound, thru and thru right chest
thereby performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of
[m]urder as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason
of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator, i.e. the timely medical
attendance.
IN VIOLATION of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
5) Criminal Case No. 9261 for frustrated murder:
That on the 1st day of June, 1985 at 11:45 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at
Mansueto Village, Barangay Bulacao, Municipality of Talisay, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with
high-powered firearms, with intent to kill and treachery, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot NELSON TIEMPO, who was
riding in a car and who gave no provocation, thereby inflicting upon the latter the
following injuries, to wit:
 Gunshot wound neck penetrating wound perforating trachea (cricoid) thereby
performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of [m]urder as
a consequence but which nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator, i.e. the timely medical attendance.
IN VIOLATION of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
Of the four indictees in the five Informations, Teodulo Alegarbes and Artemio Timoteo Beronga were the
first to be arraigned. Upon the arrest of the two, the Informations were amended by the public
prosecutor, with the conformity of the defense counsel, by substituting the names of the two accused for
the "John Does" appearing in the original Informations. When arraigned, said accused, assisted by their
respective lawyers, pleaded not guilty to the five Informations.
Alegarbes died in the course of trial; thus, the cases against him were dismissed. Accused Cabanero
remained at large. Sabalones, on the other hand, was eventually arrested. Subsequently, he jumped bail
but was recaptured in 1988 and thereafter pleaded not guilty during his arraignment.
The cases against Sabalones and Beronga were jointly tried. Thereafter, the lower court found them
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged. The RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises above-set forth, the Court finds accused ROLUSAPE
SABALONES and (ARTEMIO) TIMOTEO BERONGA, [g]uilty beyond reasonable
doubt, as principals:
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9257, for MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to suffer the
penalty of [f]ourteen (14) years, [e]ight (8) months and [o]ne (1) day, as minimum,
to [s]eventeen (17) years, [f]our (4) months and [o]ne (1) day, of [r]eclusion
[t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of deceased, Glenn Tiempo, the
sum of P50,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9258, for MURDER, defined and penalized in Art. 248 of
the Revised Penal Code, hereby sentences each said accused to suffer the
penalty of [f]ourteen (14) years, [e]ight (8) months and [o]ne (1) day, as minimum,
to [s]eventeen (17) years, [f]our (4) months and [o]ne (1) day, of [r]eclusion
[t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the heirs of deceased, Alfredo Nardo, the
sum of P50,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9259, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, defined and
penalized in Art. 248 in relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby
sentences each said accused to suffer the penalty of [e]ight (8) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight (8) months of [re]clusion
[t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the victim, Rey Bolo, the sum of
P20,000.00;
6
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9260, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, defined and
penalized in Art. 248 in relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby
sentences each said accused to suffer the penalty of [e]ight (8) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight months of[r]eclusion
[t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the victim, Rogelio Presores, the sum of
P20,000.00;
In Crim. Case No. CBU-9261, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, defined and
penalized in Art. 248 in relation to Art. 50 of the Revised Penal Code, hereby
sentences each said accused to suffer the penalty of [e]ight (8) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to [f]ourteen (14) years and [e]ight (8) months of [r]eclusion
[t]emporal, as maximum, to indemnify the victim, Nelson Tiempo, the sum of
P20,000.00; and
To pay the costs in all instances. The period of their preventive imprisonment shall
be credited to each accused in full.
SO ORDERED. 4
Appellants filed a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the CA affirmed their conviction
but sentenced them toreclusion perpetua for the murders they were found guilty of. Accordingly, the
appellate court, without entering judgment, certified the case to the Supreme Court in accordance with
Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the trial court convicting accused-appellants
Rolusa[p]e Sabalones and Artemio Timoteo Beronga for murder in Crim. Cases
Nos. CBU-9257 and CBU-9258, and [f]rustrated [m]urder in Crim. Cases Nos.
CBU-9259, CBU-9260, and CBU-9261 is hereby AFFIRMED; however, the
penalties in the [f]rustrated [m]urder and [m]urder cases are hereby MODIFIED,
such that both accused-appellants are each sentenced to imprisonment of TEN
(10) YEARS of [p]rision [m]ayor medium as minimum to SEVENTEEN (17)
YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of [r]eclusion [t]emporal medium as maximum in
each of the three [f]rustrated [m]urder cases (Crim. Cases Nos. CBU-9259, CBU-
9260 and CBU-9261); and are each sentenced to [r]eclusion [p]erpetua in each of
the two [m]urder cases (Crim. Cases Nos. CBU-9257 and CBU-9258). The
indemnity to the victim in each [f]rustrated [m]urder case shall remain. In
conformity with Rule 124, Section 13 of the Rules of Court, however, this Court
refrains from entering judgment, and hereby certifies the case and orders that the
entire record hereof be elevated to the Supreme Court for review. 5
After the Court of Appeals certified the case to this Court, we required appellants to file supplemental
briefs. Appellants failed to comply within the prescribed period and were deemed to have waived their
right to do so. 6 Thus, in resolving this case, this Court will address primarily the arguments raised by the
appellants in their Brief before the Court of Appeals, which assailed the RTC Decision.
The Facts
 Version of the Prosecution
The solicitor general 7 quoted the following factual findings of the trial court:
Edwin Santos, a resident of Mambaling, Cebu City stated that on June 1, 1985 at
6:00 o'clock in the evening, he was at the residence of Inday Presores, sister of
Rogelio Presores, located at Rizal Ave., Cebu City to attend a wedding. He stayed
until 9:00 o'clock in the evening and proceeded to the house of Maj. Tiempo at
Basak, Mambaling, Cebu City where a small gathering was also taking place. (pp.
3-6, tsn, April 7, 1987)
Arriving thereat, he saw Nelson and Glenn Tiempo as well as Rogelio Presores,
Rogelio Oliveros, Junior Villoria, Rey Bolo and Alfredo Nardo. (p. 7, ibid.)
At about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, Stephen Lim, who was also at the party,
called their group and requested them to push his car. When the engine started,
the former asked them to drive his car home. (pp. 7-11, ibid.)
Together with Nelson Tiempo, who was at the wheel, Rogelio Presores, Rogelio
Oliveros and Junior Villoria, they drove to the residence of Stephen Lim at
Mansueto Compound, Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu. (p. 12, ibid.)
Glenn Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Alfredo Nardo also went with them riding in an
owner-type jeep, driven by the latter, in order to bring back the group [as] soon as
the car of Mr. Lim was parked in his home. (p. 21, ibid.)
The two vehicles traveled in convoy with the jeep 3 to 4 meters ahead of the car.
When they arrived at the gate of the house of Stephen Lim, they were met with a
sudden burst of gunfire. He looked at the direction where the gunfire came, and
saw [the] persons [who] fired at the jeep. He identified accused, Teodulo
Alegarbes, Rolusape Sabalones and Timoteo Beronga as the persons who fired at
the vehicle. Except for Teodulo Alegarbes, who was naked from [the] waist up, the
gunmen wore clothes. (pp. 21-23; 13-16; 33, ibid.)
After firing at the jeep, the assailants shot the ear they were riding[,] hitting Nelson
Tiempo on the throat and Rogelio Presores on the breast. Despite the injury he
sustained, Nelson Tiempo was able to maneuver the car back to their residence.
(pp. 17-19, ibid.)
He immediately informed Maj. Tiempo about the incident and the lat[t]er brought
the victims to the Cebu Doctor's Hospital. (p. 20, ibid.)
Rogelio Presores corroborated in substance the testimony of Edwin Santos, being
one of those who were in the car driven by Nelson Tiempo to the residence of
Stephen Lim. (pp. 4-6, tsn, Aug. 14, 1987)
7
He further testified that when the jeep driven by Alfredo Nardo with Rey Bolo and
Glenn Tiempo as passengers arrived at the front gate of Lim's residence and while
their car was 3 meters from the rear end of the jeep, there was a volley of gunfire.
He glanced at the direction of the gunfire and saw the jeep being fired at by four
persons, who were standing behind a concrete wall, 42 inches in height, and
armed with long firearms. Thenceforth, he saw Alfredo Nardo, Glenn Tiempo and
Rey Bolo f[a]ll to the ground. (pp. 6-7, ibid.)
He recognized accused, Rolusape Sabalones, as one of those who fired at the
jeep. He also identified in Court accused, Teodulo Alegarbes, Timoteo Beronga
and another person, whom he recognized only through his facial appearance. (pp.
7-8, ibid.)
When the shots were directed [at] their car[,] they were able to bend their heads
low. When the firing stopped, he directed Nelson Tiempo to back out from the
place. As the latter was maneuvering the car, the shooting continued and he was
hit in the breast while Nelson Tiempo, in the neck, and the windshield of the
vehicle was shattered. (p. 10, ibid.)
Arriving at the house of Maj. Tiempo, they were brought to Cebu Doctor's Hospital.
He and Nelson Tiempo were operated on. He had incurred hospital expenses in
the sum of P5,412.69, (Exh. "I", "K"). (pp. 11-12, ibid.)
Ladislao Diola, Jr., [m]edico-[l]egal [o]fficer of the PC Crime Laboratory, Regional
Unit 7 stationed at Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City remembered having
performed a post-mortem examination on the dead body of Glenn Tiempo on June
2, 1985 at the Cosmopolitan Funeral Homes, Cebu City. (p. 7, tsn, Nov. 11, 1987)
He issued the necessary Death Certificate, (Exh. "D") and Necropsy Report, (Exh.
"F") and indicated therein that the victim's cause of death was "[c]ardio respiratory
arrest due to [s]hock and [h]emorrhage [s]econdary to [g]unshot wounds to the
trunk." (p. 8, ibid.)
The victim sustained gunshot wounds in the right chest and left lumbar area. (pp.
10-11, ibid.)
He explained that in gunshot wound no. 1, the wound entrance[,] which [was]
characterized by invaginated edges and contusion collar[,] was located in the right
chest and the bullet went up to the left clavicle hitting a bone which incompletely
fractured it causing the navigation of the bullet to the left and to the anterior side of
the body. He recovered a slug, (Exh. "G") below the muscles of the left clavicle. (p.
21, ibid.)
Based on the trajectory of the bullet, the assailant could have been [o]n the right
side of the victim or in front of the victim but [o]n a lower level than the latter.
In both gunshot wounds, he did not find any powder burns which would indicate
that the muzzle of the gun was beyond a distance of 12 inches from the target. (p.
15, ibid.)
At the time he conducted the autopsy, he noted that rigor mortis in its early stage
had already set in which denote[s] that death had occurred 5 to 6 hours earlier.
(pp. 34-5, ibid.)
Maj. Juan Tiempo, father of the victims, Glenn and Nelson Tiempo, testified that
when he learned about the incident in question, he immediately summoned
military soldiers and together they proceeded to the scene. (pp. 4-6, tsn, Nov. 12,
1988)
Arriving thereat, he saw the lifeless body of his son, Glenn. He immediately carried
him in his arms and rushed him to the hospital but the victim was pronounced
Dead on Arrival. (pp. 6-7, ibid.)
They buried his son, who was then barely 14 years old, at Cebu Memorial Park
and had incurred funeral expenses (Exhs. "K", "L", "O"). (pp. 7-8, ibid.)
His other son, Nelson, then 21 years old and a graduate of [m]edical [t]echology,
was admitted at the Cebu Doctor's Hospital for gunshot wound in the neck. The
latter survived but could hardly talk as a result of the injuries he sustained. He had
incurred medical and hospitalization expenses in the sum of P21,594.22, (Exh.
"H"), (pp. 8-10, ibid.)
He had also incurred expenses in connection with the hospitalization of the injured
victims, Rogelio Presores and Rey Bolo in the amount[s] of P5,412.69, (exh. "I")
and P9,431.10, (Exh. "J"), respectively. (p. 11, ibid.)
He further stated that he [was] familiar the accused, Roling Sabalones, because
the latter had a criminal record in their office in connection with the kidnapping of a
certain Zabate and Macaraya. (p. 16, ibid.)
xxx xxx xxx
Dr. Jesus P. Cerna, [m]edico-[l]egal [o]fficer of the PC/INP, Cebu Metrodiscom,
had conducted an autopsy on the dead body of Alfredo Nardo, who sustained two
(2) gunshot wounds in the lower lip and left intraclavicular region, upon the request
of the [c]hief of the Homicide Section of Cebu Metrodiscom. He issued the victim's
Necropsy Report, (Exh. "F:") and Death Certificate, (Exh. "G"). (pp. 5-8, tsn, Dec.
4, 1987; pp. 4-6, tsn, Nov. 29, 1988)
He stated that the wound of entrance in gunshot wound no. 1 was located in the
lower lip, more or less[,] on the left side making an exit in the left mandibular
region. (pp. 9-11, tsn, Dec. 4, 1987; pp. 6-8, tsn, Nov. 29, 1988)
8
In gunshot wound no. 2, the wound of entrance was in the left intraclavicular
region exiting at the back as reflected in the sketch, (Exh. "F-2"). This wound was
fatal and [could] almost cause an instantaneous death considering that the bullet
penetrated the thoracic cavity, lacerating the lungs and perforating the heart
before making an exit. (pp. 11-13, tsn, Dec. 4, 1987; pp. 13-15, tsn, Nov. 29, 1988)
He found no tattooing around the wound of entrance in both gunshot wounds. (pp.
8-9, tsn, Nov. 29, 1988)
He prepared and issued th[e] Necropsy Report, (Exh. "F") and Death Certificate,
(Exh. "G") of Alfredo Nardo who was identified to him by the latter's daughter,
Anita Nardo. (pp. 26-27, ibid.)
Rey Bolo, one of the victims, testified that when the jeep he was riding [in] together
with Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo, reached the gate of the residence of
Stephen Lim, they were suddenly fired upon. (pp. 5-8, tsn, March 6, 1989)
He was hit in the right palm and left cheek. He jumped out of the vehicle and ran
towards the car which was behind them but he was again shot at [,] [and hit] in the
left scapular region. He was still able to reach the road despite the injuries he
sustained and tried to ask help from the people who were in the vicinity but nobody
dared to help him, [they] simply disappeared from the scene, instead: (pp. 8-
9, ibid.)
He took a passenger jeepney to the city and had himself treated at the Cebu
Doctor's Hospital, and incurred medical expenses in the sum of P9,000.00. (p.
9, ibid.)
He was issued a Medical Certificate, (Exh. "N") by his attending physician.
Dr. Miguel Mancao, a [p]hysician-[s]urgeon, recalled having attended [to] the
victims, Nelson Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores at the Cebu Doctor's
Hospital on June 2, 1985. (pp. 7-8, 11, 14, tsn, May 30, 1989)
Nelson Tiempo sustained gunshot wound[s] in the neck and in the right chest but
the bullet did not penetrate the chest cavity but only the left axilla. He was not able
to recover any slugs because the same disintegrated while the other was thru and
thru. The wound could have proved fatal but the victim miraculously survived. As a
consequence of the injury he sustained, Nelson Tiempo permanently lost his voice
because his trachea was shattered. His only chance of recovery is by coaching
and speech therapy. He issued his Medical Certificate. (Exh. "O"). (pp. 8-11, ibid.)
With regard to the patient, Rey Bolo, the latter suffered multiple gunshot wounds in
the left shoulder penetrating the chest and fracturing the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th ribs in
the process, in the right hand fracturing the proximal right thumb and in the mouth
 lacerating its soft tissues, per Medical Certificate, (Exh. "N") which he issued. (pp.
11-16, ibid.)
Based on the trajectory of the bullet, the gunman could have been in front of the
victim, when gunshot would no. 1 was inflicted. (p. 30, ibid.)
With respect to the patient, Rogelio Presores, the latter suffered [a] gunshot
wound in the chest with the wound of entrance in the right anterior chest exiting at
the back which was slightly lower than the wound of entrance. He issued the
victim's Medical Certificate, (Exh. "M"). (pp. 34-35, ibid.)
Based on the location of the wound, the gunman could have been in front of the
victim but [o]n a slightly higher elevation than the latter. (pp. 35-36, ibid.) 8
Version of the Defense
Appellants interposed denial and alibi. Their version of the facts is summarized by the trial court 9 thus:
. . . Timoteo Beronga, a cristo or bet caller in the cockpit, testified that in the
afternoon of June 1, 1985, he was in the Talisay Sports Complex located at
Tabunok, Talisay, Cebu to attend a cock-derby.
At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, he was fetched by his wife and they left
taking a taxicab going to their residence in Lapulapu City. After passing by the
market place, they took a tricycle and arrived home at 8:00 o'clock in the evening.
After taking his supper with his family, he went home to sleep at 10:30 in the
evening. The following morning, after preparing breakfast, he went back to sleep
until 11:00 in the morning.
On February 24, 1987, while he was playing mahjong at the corner of R.R. Landon
and D. Jakosalem Sts., Cebu City, complainant, Maj. Juan Tiempo with some
companions, arrived and after knowing that he [was] "Timmy," [which was] his
nickname, the former immediately held him by the neck.
He ran away but the latter chased him and kicked the door of the house where he
hid. He was able to escape through the back door and took refuge in Mandaue at
the residence of Nito Seno, a driver of Gen. Emilio Narcissi. (Tsn-Abangan, pp. 4-
17, October 19, 1989)
On February 27, 1987, upon the advi[c]e of his friend, they approached Gen.
Narcissi and informed him of the incident. The latter brought him to the Provincial
Command Headquarters in Lahug, Cebu City to confront Maj. Juan Tiempo.
9
After several days, he was brought by Maj. Tiempo to the PC Headquarter[s] in
Jones Ave., Cebu City where he was provided with a lawyer to defend him but he
was instructed that he should assent to whatever his lawyer would ask of him.
He was introduced to Atty. Marcelo Guinto, his lawyer, who made him sign an
Affidavit, (Exh. "U") the contents of which, co[u]ched in the dialect, were read to
him.
He also testified that before he was detained at the CPDRC, complainant brought
him inside the shop of a certain Den Ong, where he was again mauled after he
denied having any knowledge of the whereabouts of Roling Sabalones and the
carbine.
At the instance of Col. Medija, he was physically examined at the Southern Islands
Hospital, Cebu City and was issued a [M]edical Certificate. (Tsn-Formentera, pp.
3-36, Jan. 18, 1990).
Justiniano Cuizon, [a]ccount [o]fficer of the Visayan Electric Company (VECO)
South Extension Office, who is in charge of the billing, disconnection and
reconnection of electric current, testified that based on the entries in their logbook,
(Exh. "3") made by their checker, Remigio Villaver, the electrical supply at the
Mansueto Compound, Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu, particularly the Mansueto
Homeowners covered by Account No. 465-293000-0, (Exh. "4-B") was
disconnected on January 10, 1985, (Exh. "3-A") for non-payment of electric bills
from March 1984 to January 1985 and was reconnected only on June 17, 1985
(Exh. "4", "4-A"). (Tsn-Abangan, pp. 22-27, Jan. 31, 1990).
Remigio Villaver, a checker of VECO, whose area of responsibility cover[ed] the
towns of Talisay and San Fernando, Cebu had kept the record of disconnection of
electrical supply of Mansueto Subdivision in Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu and the same
showed that on January 10, 1985, (Exh. "3-A"), a service order was issued by their
office to the Mansueto Homeowners for the permanent disconnection of their
electric lights due to non-payment of their electric bills from March 1984 until
January 1985. The actual disconnection took place on December 29, 1984.
Witness Fredo Canete made efforts to corroborate their testimony. (Tsn-
Formentera, pp. 3-5, Apr. 20, 1990).
Vicente Cabanero, a resident of Mansueto Compound in Talisay, Cebu since 1957
until the present, remembered that on June 1, 1985, between 10:00 o'clock and
11:00 o'clock in the evening, he heard a burst of gunfire about 15 to 20 armslength
[sic] from his residence.
He did not bother to verify because he was scared since the whole place was in
total darkness. (Tsn-Abangan, pp. 18-23, Feb. 22, 1990).
Marilyn Boc, another witness for the accused, stated that on the date and time of
the incident in question, while she was at the wake of Junior Sabalones, younger
brother of Roling Sabalones, who died on May 26, 1985, a sudden burst of gunfire
occurred more or less 60 meters away.
Frightened, she went inside a room to hide and saw accused, Roling Sabalones,
sound asleep.
She came to know accused, Timoteo Beronga, only during one of the hearings of
this case and during the entire period that the body of the late Junior Sabalones
[lay] in state at his residence, she never saw said accused.
She was requested to testify in this case by Thelma Beronga, wife of Timoteo
Beronga. (Tsn-Abangan, pp. 9-13, February 28, 1990).
Dr. Daniel Medina, while then the [r]esident [p]hysician of Southern Islands
Hospital, Cebu City had treated the patient, Timoteo Beronga on March 18, 1987.
Upon examination, he found out that the patient sustained linear abrasion, linear
laceration and hematoma in the different parts of the body. Except for the linear
laceration which he believed to have been inflicted two or three days prior to [the]
date of examination, all the other injuries were already healed indicating that the
same were inflicted 10 to 12 days earlier.
He issued the corresponding Medical Certificate (Exh. "2") to the patient. (Tsn-
Abangan, pp. 9-13, May 21, 1990).
Atty. Jesus Pono, counsel for accused Beronga, mounted the witness stand and
averred that he [was] a resident of Mansueto Compound, Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu.
As shown in the pictures, (Exhs. "3", "4" & "5" with submarkings) his house is
enclosed by a concrete fence about 5 feet 6 inches tall. It is situated 6 meters from
the residence of accused, Roling Sabalones, which was then being rented by
Stephen Lim. Outside the fence [are] shrubs and at the left side is a lamp post
provided with 200 watts fluorescent bulb.
On June 1, 1985 at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, he saw Roling Sabalones,
whom he personally [knew] because they used to be neighbors in Talisay, Cebu,
at the wake of his brother, Federico Sabalones, Jr. or Junior Sabalones, as
mentioned repeatedly hereabout. They even had a talk and he noticed accused to
be physically indisposed being gravely affected by the loss of his only brother, who
met a violent death in the hands of an unknown hitman on May 26,1985.
He went home after he saw accused [lie] down on a bamboo bench to rest.
10
At about 12:00 o'clock midnight, he was awakened by a rapid burst of gunfire
which emanated near his house. He did not attempt to go down or look outside.
He [was] in no position to tell whether or not the street light was lighted.
When he verified the following morning, he noticed bloodstains on the ground as
well as inside the jeep which was parked 2 to 3 meters from his fence and 50 to 70
meters from the house where Junior Sabalones [lay] in state. He observed that the
jeep was riddled with bullets and its windshield shattered. (Tsn-Abangan, pp. 3-16,
June 6, 1990).
He admitted that he used to be a counsel of accused, Roling Sabalones, in several
cases, among which involved the death of a certain Garces and Macaraya, which
cases were however, dismissed by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Cebu.
(Tsn-Tumarao, pp. 2-3, June 13, 1990).
Doroteo Ejares, a relative of accused, testified that when he attended the wake of
Junior Sabalones on June 1, 1985 at 8:00 o'clock in the evening, he saw accused
lying on a bamboo bench in the yard of the house of the deceased.
At past 10:00 o'clock in the evening, accused excused himself as he was not
feeling well and entered a room to rest while he remained by the door and slept.
At almost 12:00 o'clock midnight, he was awakened by a burst of gunfire which
took place more or less 20 meters away and saw the people scamper[ing] for
safety. He hid inside the room where accused was sleeping and peeped thru the
door. Not long after, Marilyn Boc entered and in a low voice talked about the
incident.
They decided to wake up the accused to inform him of what was happening, but
the latter merely opened his eyes and realizing that accused was too weak, they
allowed him to go back to sleep.
When he went home at past 5:00 o'clock in the morning of June 2, 1985, he saw a
jeep outside of the compound. He did not bother to investigate or inquire about the
incident as he was in a hurry to go home and prepare for the burial of Junior
Sabalones.
He was requested to testify in this case by his aunt and mother of accused
Rolusape Sabalones. (Tsn-Tumarao, pp. 10-15, June 13, 1990).
Russo Sabalones, uncle of accused, Sabalones, averred that the latter was once,
one of his undercover agents while he was then the [c]hief of the Intelligence
Service of the PC from 1966 until 1968.
As part of their intelligence tradition, an undercover agent is not allowed to carry
his real name. In the case of his nephew and accused, Rolusape Sabalones, the
latter chose the name "Paciano Laput" which name was recorded in their code of
names.
When he retired in 1968, the accused ceased to be an agent and . . . likewise
ceased to have the authority to use the name Paciano Laput. (Tsn-Abangan, p.
12, July 23, 1990).
Alfonso Allere, a distant relative of the accused, remembered having received a
call from Roling Sabalones, one morning after the burial of the latter's brother,
asking for his advise because of the threats [to] his life which he received thru
telephone from the group of Nabing Velez and the group of the military.
After he had advised accused to lie low, he had not heard of him, since then.
Godofredo Mainegro of the Public Assistance and Complaint Action Office of the
Regional Unified Command 7, received a complaint from one Inocencia Sabalones
on March 13, 1986.
He recorded the complaint in their Complaint Sheet, (Exh. "6") and let complainant
affix her signature.
After the document was subscribed and sworn to before him, (Exh. "6-C"), he
indorsed it to their [c]ommanding [o]fficer, Apolinario Castano. (Tsn-Formentera,
pp. 3-10, July 24, 1990).
Ret. Col. Apolinario Castano, recalled that while he was then with the Regional
Unified Command 7, his niece, Racquel Sabalones together with her husband
Roling Sabalones, came to him for advi[c]e because the latter was afraid of his life
brought about by the rampant killings of which his brother and the son of Maj.
Tiempo were victims.
Considering that accused's problem matter, they approached Gen. Ecarma, the
then [c]ommander of the PC/INP, Recom 7, and the latter referred them to his
[c]hief of [s]taff, Col. Roger Denia, who informed them that there was no case filed
against the accused. Nevertheless, the latter was advised to be careful and
consult a lawyer.
Inocencia Sabalones, mother of accused, Roling Sabalones, narrated that on
March 12, 1986 at past 10:00 o'clock in the evening, she was roused from sleep
by a shout of a man demanding for Roling Sabalones.
Upon hearing the name of her son, she immediately stood up and peeped through
the door of her store and saw men in fatigue uniforms carrying long firearms.
Thenceforth, these men boarded a vehicle and left.
11
On the following morning, she was again awakened by the persistent shouts and
pushing of the gate. When she verified, the man who introduced himself to her as
Maj. Tiempo, ordered her to open the gate. Once opened, the men of Maj. Tiempo
entered the house and proceeded to search for Roling Sabalones, whom Maj.
Tiempo suspected to have killed his son and shot another to near death. When
she demanded for a search warrant, she was only shown a piece of paper but was
not given the chance to read its contents.
Racquel Sabalones, wife of accused, Rolusape Sabalones, maintained that on
June 1, 1985 at 1.00 o'clock in the afternoon, she was at the wake of her brother-
in-law, Junior Sabalones, at his residence in Bulacao, Talisay, Cebu.
At 11:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, together with her 3 daughters as
well as Marlyn Sabarita, Rose Lapasaran and Gloria Mondejar, left the place in
order to sleep in an unoccupied apartment situated 30 meters away from the
house where her deceased, brother-in-law, Junior, was lying in state, as shown in
the Sketch, (Exh. "7" and submarkings) prepared by her. They brought with them a
flashlight because the whole place was in total darkness.
As they were about to enter the gate leading to her apartment she noticed a sedan
car coming towards them. She waited for the car to come nearer as she thought
that the same belong[ed] to her friend, but the vehicle instead stopped at the
corner of the road, (Exh. "7-F") and then proceeded to the end portion of
Mansueto Compound, (Exh. "7-G"). As it moved slowly towards the highway, she
rushed inside the apartment.
Few minutes later, she heard a burst of gunfire outside their gate. She immediately
gathered her children and instructed Marlyn Sabarita to use the phone situated at
the third door apartment and call the police.
After the lull of gunfire, she went to the terrace and saw people in civilian and in
fatigue uniforms with firearms, gathered around the place. One of these men even
asked her about the whereabouts of her husband, whom she left sleeping in the
house of the deceased.
At 8:30 in the morning of June 2, 1985, during the burial of Junior Sabalones, they
were informed by Pedro Cabanero that Roling Sabalones was a suspect for the
death of Nabing Velez and the son of Maj. Tiempo.
She believed that the reason why her husband was implicated in the killing of
Nabing Velez was because of the slapping incident involving her father-in-law,
Federico Sabalones, Sr. and Nabing Velez which took place prior to the death of
Junior Sabalones.
After the funeral, she began to receive mysterious calls at their residence in
Sikatuna St., Cebu City where they began staying since 1978. She also noticed
cars with tinted windows strangely parked in front of their residence.
Frightened and cowed, they decided to seek the advice of Col. Apolinario
Castano, who after relating to him their fears, advised her husband to lie low and
to consult a lawyer.
To allay their apprehension, accused, Roling Sabalones, left Cebu City for Iligan,
Manila and other cities to avoid those who were after him. When she learned
about the threat made by Maj. Tiempo on her husband, she forewarned the latter
not to return to Cebu.
Marlyn Sabarita, an illegitimate daughter of Rolusape Sabalones, stated that in the
night in question, she was at the wake of Junior Sabalones and saw her Papa
Roling, the herein accused, lying on the lawn of the house of the deceased.
She was already in the apartment with her Mama Racquel when she heard a burst
of gunfire. Upon instructions of the latter, she went out to call the police thru the
phone located [in] the third apartment occupied by a certain Jet. (Tsn-Tumarao,
pp. 3-15, Oct. 15, 1990).
Edward Gutang, [a]sst. lay-out [e]ditor and [a]sst. [s]ports [e]ditor of Sun-Star
Daily, while then a military and police reporter had covered the shooting incident
which took place on June 1, 1985 at the Mansueto Compound, Bulacao, Talisay,
Cebu.
At past 1:00 o'clock dawn, together with their newspaper photographer, Almario
Bitang, they went to the crime scene boarding the vehicle of the Cosmopolitan
Funeral Homes. Arriving thereat, they decided not to proceed inside the compound
because of fear. The place was then incomplete darkness.
Upon being informed that the victims were brought to Cebu City Medical Center,
they rushed to the place and met Maj. Tiempo hugging the dead body of his 14-
year old son. His photographer took a picture of that pathetic scene. (Exh. "8-B").
Samson Sabalones, a retired [a]mbassador and uncle of Rolusape Sabalones,
posted a bail bond for his nephew with Eastern Insurance Company, when a
warrant for his arrest was issued by the Municipal Court, on March 12, 1986
because he was bothered by the fact that the latter was being unreasonably
hunted by several groups. He even advised the accused to appear in [c]ourt to
clarify the nature of the case filed against him.
Virgincita Pajigal, a resident of Butuan City, met accused, Rolusape Sabalones,
who introduced himself to her as "Paciano Laput" nicknamed, Ondo, in a massage
clinic where she was working.
For less than a year, they lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage because according to her the accused was married but separated from
his wife, whose name was never mentioned to her. For such a short span of time
12
being together, her love for the accused developed to the extent that whatever
happen[ed] to him, she [would] always be there to defend him.
With the help of Maj. delos Santos, who advised her to always stay close [to] the
accused, she was able to board the same vessel. She saw the latter clad in green
T-shirt, (Exh. "14") and pants, handcuffed and guarded.
Reaching Cebu City, they took a taxicab and as the vehicle went around the city,
she was instructed by Maj. Tiempo to place the towel, (Exh. "15") which she found
inside her bag, on the head of the accused. They stopped at the Reclamation Area
and Maj. Tiempo pulled them out of the vehicle but she held on tightly to Ondo,
ripping his shirt. This pulling incident happened for several times but complainant
failed to let them out of the vehicle.
The accused was finally brought to the Provincial Jail while she stayed in the
residence of the accused. She returned to Butuan after a week. (Tsn-Formentera,
pp. 5-33, Jan. 22, 1991).
Accused, Rolusape Sabalones, alias "Roling", in his defense, with ancillary
incidental narrations, testified, that on June 1, 1985 at 6:00 o'clock in the evening,
he was at the wake of his only brother, Junior Sabalones, who was killed on May
26, 1985.
He had no idea as to who was responsible for the killing of his brother inasmuch
as the latter had plenty of enemies. He also did not exert effort to look into the
case and to place it under police authority since he had lost faith in the capabilities
of the police. The matter was however reported by his uncle, Ambassador
Sabalones, to the authorities.
He stayed at the wake until 10:00 o'clock in the evening because he was not
feeling well. He retired in a small room adjacent to the sala of the house of the
deceased. Not long after, he felt somebody waking him up but he merely opened
his eyes and went back to sleep as he was really exhausted.
At 6:30 the following morning, he was roused by his wife so he could prepare for
the burial. He came to know about the burst of gunfire which took place the
previous night upon the information of his wife. He did not take the news seriously
as he was busy preparing for the burial of his deceased brother, Jun.
The funeral started at past 8:00 o'clock in the morning and he noticed the
presence of Maj. Eddie Ricardo and his men, who were sent by Col. Castano
purposely to provide the burial with military security, upon the request of his wife.
He had a conversation with Maj. Ricardo who inquired about the shooting incident
which resulted in the death of the son of Maj. Tiempo and others in his company.
Also in the course of their conversation, he came to know that Nabing Velez was
killed earlier on that same night in Labangon, Cebu [C]ity.
On the same occasion, Pedro Cabanero also notified him that he was a suspect in
the killing of Nabing Velez, a radio commentator of ferocious character, who was
engaged in a protection racket with several under his control.
He remembered that a month prior to the death of Nabing Velez, his father,
Federico Sabalones, Sr. and the deceased while matching their fighting cocks at
the Talisay Sports Complex, had an altercation and the latter slapped his paralytic
father and challenged him to ask one of his sons to avenge what he had done to
him. He came to know about the incident only after a week.
He did not deny the fact that he was hurt by the actuation of the deceased for
humiliating his father but it did not occur to him to file a case or take any action
against the deceased because he was too busy with his business and with his
work as a bet caller in the cockpit.
He advised his father to stay in Bohol to avoid further trouble because he knew
that the latter would frequent the cockpit[,] being a cockfight aficionado.
Likewise, during the burial, he was informed by a PC soldier, Roger Capuyan, that
he was also a suspect in the killing of the son of Maj. Tiempo and even advised
him to leave the place.
On the following days after the burial, his wife started to notice cars suspiciously
parked in front of their house and [she] also received mysterious calls.
Together with his wife, they decided to see Col. Apolinario Castaño to seek his
advise. The latter verified from the Cebu Metrodiscom and learned that there was
no case filed against him.
In the evening of June 6, 1985, he left for Iligan and after a month, he transferred
to Ozamis and ten to Pagadian. He likewise went to Manila especially when he
learned that his uncle, Samson Sabalones, had arrived from abroad. The latter
posted a bond for his temporary liberty immediately after being informed that a
case was filed against him, before the Municipal Court of Talisay.
Despite . . . the bond put up his uncle, he did not return to Cebu City because it
came to his knowledge that Maj. Tiempo inquired from the bonding company as to
his address.
He also stayed in Marikina in the house of his friend and during his stay in the said
place, he registered as a voter and was issue a Voter's Affidavit, (Exh. "19"; Exh.
"R" for the prosecution) which bore the name "Paciano Mendoza Laput" which
[was] his baptismal name. He explained that the name[s] Mendoza and Laput
13
[were] the middle name and surname, respectively of his mother. The name
"Rolusape" was given to him by his father and the same [was] not his registered
name because during the old days, priests would not allow parents to name their
children with names not found in the Almanac; thus, Paciano [was] his chosen
name and the same appeared in his Baptismal Certificate, (Exh. "20") issued by
the Parish of the Blessed Trinity of Talibon, Bohol. In his Birth Certificate, it [was]
the name "Rolusape" which appeared based upon the data supplied by his father.
He had used the name Paciano during the time when he [was] still a secret agent
under his uncle, Gen. Russo Sabalones, when the latter was still the [c]hief of the
C-2 in 1966 until 1967 and as such, he was issued a firearm. He likewise used
said name at the time he was employed at the Governor's Office in Agusan and
when he registered in the Civil Service Commission to conceal his identity to
protect himself from those who were after him.
From Marikina he proceeded to Davao and then to Butuan City where he was
made to campaign for the candidacy of Gov. Eddie Rama. When the latter won in
the election, he was given a job at the Provincial Capitol and later became an
agent of the PC in Butuan using the name, "Paciano Laput."
During his stay in Butuan, he met Virgie Pajigal, a manicurist who became his live-
in partner.
On October 23, 1988 while he was at the Octagon Cockpit in Butuan with Sgt.
Tambok, he was arrested by Capt. Ochate and was brought to the PC
Headquarter[s] in Libertad, Butuan City and was detained. Among the papers
confiscated from him was his Identification Card No. 028-88, (Exh. "21") issued by
the PC Command bearing the name Paciano Laput.
On October 26, 1988 he was taken from the City Jail by Capt. Ochate and some
soldiers, one of whom was Maj. Tiempo whom he met for the first time.
On their way to Nasipit to board a vessel bound for Cebu City, Maj. Tiempo made
him lie flat on his belly and stepped on his back and handcuffed him. He cried in
pain because of his sprained shoulder. A certain soldier also took his watch and
ring.
Arriving in Cebu at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, he and Virgie Pajigal, who followed
him in the boat, were made to board a taxicab. Maj. Tiempo alighted in certain
place and talked to a certain guy. Thereafter, they were brought to the
Reclamation Area and were forced to go down from the vehicle but Virgie Pajigal
held him tightly. They were again pulled out of the taxi but they resisted.
From the Capitol Building, they proceeded to CPDRC and on their way thereto,
Maj. Tiempo sat beside him inside the taxi and boxed him on the right cheek below
the ear and pulled his cuffed hands apart.
 At the Provincial Jail, he was physically examined by its resident physician, Dr.
Dionisio Sadaya, and was also fingerprinted and photographed, (Exh. "21"). He
was issued a Medical Certificate, (Exh. "22").
He further stated that he [was] acquainted with his co-accused Timoteo Beronga,
known to him as "Timmy" being also a bet caller in the cockpit. (Tsn-Formentera,
pp. 5-23, Feb. 26, 1991; Tsn-Abangan, pp. 3-33, Feb. 27, 1991; Tsn-Abangan, pp.
4-18, Apr. 10, 1991).
As surrebuttal witness, accused Rolusape Sabalones denied that he bribed a
certain soldier because at the time he was arrested, his wallet as well as his
wristwatch and ring worth P2,000.00 each were confiscated and his hands tied
behind his back.
He also denied the allegation of Maj. Tiempo that he offered the latter the amount
of P1,000,000.00 to drop the case against him, the truth being that while they were
on board a vessel bound for Cebu City, Maj. Tiempo compelled him to tell [who]
the real killers of his son [were] because he knew that he (Rolusape Sabalones)
was not responsible. The former also inquired from him as to the whereabouts of
the carbine.
He also rebutted complainant's testimony that upon their arrival here in Cebu City
and while on board a taxicab, he directed the former [to] first go around the city to
locate a certain Romeo Cabañero, whom he did not know personally. 10
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Giving full credence to the evidence of the prosecution, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
Decision convicting appellants of two counts of murder and three counts of frustrated murder. Like the
trial court, it appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery and rejected appellants' defense of
alibi.
The Court of Appeals, however, ruled that the penalties imposed by the trial court were erroneous.
Hence, for each count of murder, it sentenced appellants to reclusion perpetua. For each count of
frustrated murder, it imposed the following penalty: ten years (10) of prision mayor (medium), as
minimum, to seventeen years (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal (medium), as
maximum. Sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals awarded indemnity of P20,000 to each of the
victims of frustrated murder. However, it was silent on the indemnity of P50,000 awarded by the trial
court to the heirs of each of the two deceased.
Having imposed reclusion perpetua on the appellants, the Court of Appeals, as earlier noted, refrained
from entering judgment and certified the case to the Supreme Court for review, in conformity with
Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, this appeal before this Court. 11
14
The Issues
In his Brief, 12 Appellant Sabalones raised the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
The court a quo erred in finding that accused Sabalones and his friends left the
house where his brother Sabalones Junior was lying in state and "went to their
grisly destination amidst the dark and positioned themselves in defense of his turf
against the invasion of a revengeful gang of the supporters of Nabing Velez.
II
The court a quo erred in finding that accused Sabalones and his two co-accused
were identified as among the four gunmen who fired at the victims.
III
The court a quo erred in overlooking or disregarding physical evidence that would
have contradicted the testimony of prosecution witnesses Edwin Santos and
Rogelio Presores that the gunmen were shooting at them from a standing position.
IV
The court a quo erred in holding that the instant case is "one of aberratio ictus",
which is not a defense, and that the "defense of alibi" interposed by the accused
may not be considered.
V
The court a quo erred in not finding that the evidence of the prosecution has not
overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
VI
The court a quo erred in not acquitting the accused on ground of reasonable
doubt.
In a Manifestation dated December 20, 1995, Appellant Beronga, through counsel, adopted as his own
the Brief of Sabalones. 13
The foregoing assignment of errors shall be reformulated by the Court into these three issues or topics:
(1) credibility of the witnesses and sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, (2) defense of denial and
alibi, and (3) characterization of the crimes committed and the penalty therefor.
 The Court's Ruling Q After that, what did you find?

The appeal is devoid of merit. A I saw persons firing towards us.

First Issue: Q Where were these persons situated when they were firing
Credibility of Witnesses and towards you?
Sufficiency of Evidence
A Near the foot of the electric post and close to the
Well-entrenched is the tenet that this Court will not interfere with the trial court's assessment of the cemented wall.
credibility of the witnesses, absent any indication or showing that the trial court has overlooked some
material facts or gravely abused its discretion, 14 especially where, as in this case, such assessment is Q This electric post, was that lighted at that moment?
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. "As this Court has reiterated often enough, the matter of assigning
values to declarations at the witness stand is best and most competently performed or carried out by a
trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light of the accused's A Yes, sir, it was lighted.
behavior, demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial." 15 Giving credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, the trial court concluded: Q How far were these persons firing, to the place where you
were?
Stripped of unnecessary verbiage, this Court, given the evidence, finds that there
is more realism in the conclusion based on a keener and realistic appraisal of A From here to there (The witness indicating the distance by
events, circumstances and evidentiary facts on record, that the gun slaying and pointing to a place inside the courtroom, indicating a
violent deaths of Glenn Tiempo and Alfredo Nardo, and the near fatal injuries of distance of about 6 to 7 meters, making the witness stand
Nelson Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores, resulted from the felonious and as the point of reference).
wanton acts of the herein accused for mistaking said victims for the persons [who
were] objects of their wrath. 16 Q Were you able to know how many persons fired towards
you?
We stress that "factual findings of the lower courts, the trial court and the Court of Appeals are, as a
general rule, binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court." 17 We find nothing in the instant case to A I only saw 3 to 4 persons.
justify a reversal or modification of the findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that appellants
committed two counts of murder and three counts of frustrated murder.
Q How long did these persons fire the guns at you?
Edwin Santos, a survivor of the assault, positively pointed to and identified the appellants as the authors
of the crime. His categorical and straightforward testimony is quoted hereunder: 18 A Until we went home. The persons were still firing, until we
went home.
COURT:
Q You stated that you saw these persons who were firing at
you. Do you know these persons?
Q You stated there was a gun fired. What happened next?

A I can identify [them] when I [see] them.

WITNESS:

Q Try to look around this courtroom, if these persons you

A There was a rapid fire in succession. saw who were firing at you are present in the courtroom[.]

Q When you heard this rapid firing, what did you do? A Yes, sir.

A I tried to look from where the firing came from. Q Can you point to these persons?

15
 A Yes, sir. A 3 to 4 meters.

Q Point at them. Q While the car was following the jeep at that distance of 3
to 4 meters, what happened?
COURT INTERPRETER:
A All of a sudden, we heard the burst of gunfire.
The Court directed the witness to go down from the witness
stand and [point] at them, Beronga and Alegarbes. Q From what direction was the gunfire?

FISCAL GABIANA: A Through the direction of the jeep.

I would like to make it of record that on the bench of Q After hearing the gunfire, what happened?
prisoner, only the two accused were seated.
A We looked at the jeep.
COURT:
Q What did you see?
Make it of record that only two prisoners were present.
A We saw Alfredo Nardo and Glenn Tiempo and Rey Bolo
Q Now, Mr. Santos, aside from these two accused you f[a]ll to the ground. There were only 3.
identified as among those who fired [at] you on that evening,
were there other persons that you saw on that particular Q Who was driving the jeep at that time?
occasion who fired at you?
A Alfredo Nardo.
A Yes, sir, there were[;] if I can see them, I can identify
them.
Q What happened after that?
Corroborating the foregoing, Rogelio Presores, another survivor, also pointed to Timoteo Beronga,
Teodulo Alegarbes and Roling Sabalones as the perpetrators of the crime. His testimony proceeded in A So, I looked, whence the burst of gunfire came from.
this manner: 19
Q What did you see from that gunfire?
Q When you arrived at the residence of Stephen Lim, can
you remember of any unusual incident that took place? A I saw 4 persons standing at the back of the fence.

A Yes, sir. Q What were those 4 persons doing when they were
standing at the back of the fence?
Q What was that?
A They were bringing long firearms.
A When the jeep arrived, the car was following.
Q Did you recognize these persons?
Q What happened next?
A I can clearly recognize one and the 3 persons[.] I can
A When the jeep was near the gate, the car was following. identify them, if I can see them again.

Q The car was following the jeep, at what distance?

16
 Q If you are shown these persons, can you recognize them?
Can you name these persons?
A No, sir. Only their facial appearance.
Q What about the 3 persons?
A That's why the 3 persons, I do not know them. I can
recognize only their facial appearance.
Q What about one person?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is the name of the person?
A Roling Sabalones.
Q If Roling Sabalones is inside the courtroom, can you
recognize Roling Sabalones?
A Yes, sir, he is around.
Q Can you point to Roling Sabalones?
A Yes, he is there (The witness pointing to the person who
answered the name of Roling Sabalones).
Q I would like [you] again to please look around and see, if
those persons whom you know through their faces, if they
are here around?
A The two of them (The witness pointing to the 2 persons,
who, when asked, answered that his name [was] Teofilo
Beronga and the other [was] Alegarbes).
Indeed, we have carefully waded through the voluminous records of this case and the testimonies of all
the fifty-nine witnesses, and we find that the prosecution has presented the required quantum of proof to
establish that appellants are indeed guilty as charged. Appellants' arguments, as we shall now discuss,
fail to rebut this conclusion.
Positive Identification
17
Appellants allege that the two witnesses could not have properly identified the appellants because, after
the first burst of shooting, they both crouched down, such that they could not have seen the faces of
their assailants. This contention does not persuade. Both eyewitnesses testified that the firing was not
continuous; thus, during a lull in the firing, they raised their heads and managed a peek at the
perpetrators. Edwin Santos testified as follows:
Atty. Albino, counsel for accused Beronga:
Q You mean to say that when you bent you heard the
successive shots, [and] you again raised your head. Is that
correct?
A There, were times that the shots were not in succession
and continuous and that was the time I raised my head
again. 20
Like Santos, Rogelio Presores also stooped down when the firing started, but he raised his head during
a break in the gunfire:
Atty. Albino:
Q So, what did you do when you first heard that one shot?
A So, after the first shot, we looked towards the direction we
were facing and when we heard the second shot, that was
the time we stooped down. 21
He further testified:
Atty. Acido: [Counsel for Appellant Sabalones]
Q And you said you stooped down inside the car when you
heard the first firing to the jeep. Is that what you want the
Court to understand[?]
Presores:
A Yes, sir.
Q So, you never saw who fired the successive shots to the
car as you said you stooped down inside the car?
A The bursts of gunfire stopped for a while and that was the
time I reared of [sic] my head.
 Q And that was the first time you saw them? Q Ordinary pliers and ordinary screw driver?

A Yes, sir. 22 A Yes, sir.

The records clearly show that two vehicles proceeded to the house of Stephen Lim on that fateful day. Q And does [one] need to be an expert in electronic [sic] in
The first was the jeep where Alfredo Nardo, Glenn Tiempo and Rey Bolo were riding. About three to four order to conduct the disconnection?
meters behind was the second car carrying Nelson Tiempo, Guillermo Viloria, Rogelio Oliveros and the
two prosecution witnesses — Edwin Santos and Rogelio Presores. 23 As stated earlier, said witnesses A No, sir.
attested to the fact that after the first volley of shots directed at the jeep, they both looked at the direction
where the shots were coming from, and they saw their friends in the jeep falling to the ground, as well as
the faces of the perpetrators. 24 It was only then that a rapid succession of gunshots were directed at Q In other words, Mr. Canete, any ordinary electrician can
them, upon which they started crouching to avoid being hit. cut it?

Hence, they were able to see and identify the appellants, having had a good look at them after the initial A That is if they are connected with the Visayan Electric
burst of shots. We stress that the normal reaction of a person is to direct his sights towards the source of Company.
a startling shout or occurrence. As held in People v. Dolar, 25 "the most natural reaction for victims of
criminal violence is to strive to see the looks and faces of their assailants and to observe the manner in Q What I mean is that, can the cutting be done by any
which the crime is committed. ordinary electrician?

In bolstering their claim that it was impossible for the witnesses to have identified them, appellants
further aver that the crime scene was dark, there being no light in the lampposts at the time. To prove
that the service wire to the street lamps at the Mansueto Compound was disconnected as early as
December 1984 and reconnected only on June 27, 1985, they presented the testimonies of Vicente
Cabanero, 26 Remigio Villaver, 27 Fredo Canete 28 and Edward Gutang. 29 The trial court, however, did
not lend weight to said testimonies, preferring to believe the statement of other prosecution witnesses
that the place was lighted during that time.
A Yes, sir. 30
Said witness even admitted that he could not recall if he did in fact cut the electrical connection of the
Mansueto Compound.31 The Court of Appeals further noted that "none of the above witnesses were at
the crime scene at or about the exact time that the ambush occurred. Thus, none was in a position to
state with absolute certainty that there was allegedly no light to illuminate the gunmen when they rained
bullets on the victims. 32

The Court of Appeals sustained said findings by citing the testimonies of defense witnesses. Fredo
Canete of the Visayan Electric Company (VECO), for instance, admitted that it was so easy to connect
and disconnect the lights. He testified thus:
Atty. Kintanar:
Even assuming arguendo that the lampposts were not functioning at the time, the headlights of the jeep
and the car were more than sufficient to illuminate the crime scene. 33 The Court has previously held that
the light from the stars or the moon, an oven, or a wick lamp or gasera can give ample illumination to
enable a person to identify or recognize another. 34 In the same vein, the headlights of a car or a jeep
are sufficient to enable eyewitnesses to identify appellants at the distance of 4 to 10 meters.

Q Now, as a cutter, what instruments do you usually use in Extrajudicial Statement

cutting the electrical connection of a certain place? of Beronga

Canete: Appellants insist that Beronga's extrajudicial statement was obtained through violence and intimidation.
Citing theres inter alios acta rule, they also argue that the said statement is inadmissible against
A Pliers and screw driver. Sabalones. Specifically, they challenge the trial court's reliance on the following portions of Beronga's
statement:
Q Does it need . . . very sophisticated instruments to
disconnect the lights? Q After Roling knew that Na[b]ing Velez was killed, have
you observed [if] Roling and his companions prepared
themselves for any eventuality?
A No, these are the only instruments we use.

18
 A It did not take long after we knew that Na[b]ing was killed,
somebody called up by telephone looking for Roling, and
this was answered by Roling but we did not know what they
were conversing about and then Roling went back to the
house of Junior after answering the phone. And after more
than two hours, we heard the sound of engines of vehicles
arriving, and then Meo, the man who was told by Roling to
guard, shouted saying: "They are already here[;]" after that,
Roling came out carrying a carbine accompanied by Tsupe,
and not long after we heard gunshots and because of that
we ran towards the house where the wake was. But before
the gun-shots, I heard Pedring Sabalones father of Roling
saying: "You clarify, [t]hat you watch out for mistake[n] in
identity," and after that shout, gunshots followed. [sic] Then
after the gun-shots Roling went back inside still carrying the
carbine and shouted: "GATHER THE EMPTY SHELLS AND
MEO[,] YOU BRING A FLASHLIGHT," and then I was called
by Meo to help him gather the empty shells of the carbine
and also our third companion to gather the empty shells.
These arguments have no merit. In the first place, it is well to stress that appellants were convicted
based primarily on the positive identification of the two survivors, Edwin Santos and Rogelio Presores,
and not only on the extrajudicial statement, which merely corroborates the eyewitness testimonies. Thus,
said arguments have no relevance to this case. As the Court held in People vs. Tidula: 35 "Any allegation
of violation of rights during custodial investigation is relevant and material only to cases in which an
extrajudicial admission or confession extracted from the accused becomes the basis of their conviction."
In any case, we sustain the trial court's holding, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, that the extrajudicial
statement of Beronga was executed in compliance with the constitutional requirements. 36 "Extrajudicial
confessions, especially those which are adverse to the declarant's interests are presumed voluntary, and
in the absence of conclusive evidence showing that the declarant's consent in executing the same has
been vitiated, such confession shall be upheld." 37
The exhaustive testimony of Sgt. Miasco, who undertook the investigation, shows that the appellant was
apprised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel of
his own choice. 38 Said witness also stated that Beronga was assisted by Atty. Marcelo Guinto during the
custodial investigation. 39 In fact, Atty. Guinto also took the witness stand and confirmed that Appellant
Beronga was informed of his rights, and that the investigation was proper, legal and not objectionable.
Indeed, other than appellants' bare allegations, there was no showing that Beronga's statement was
obtained by force or duress. 40
Equally unavailing is appellants' reliance on the res inter alios acta rule under Section 30, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:
The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its
existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
19
Appellants assert that the admission referred to in the above provision is considered to be against a co-
conspirator only when it is given during the existence of the conspiracy. They argue that Beronga's
statement was made afterthe termination of the conspiracy; thus, it should not be admitted and used
against Sabalones.
The well-settled rule is that the extrajudicial confession of an accused is binding only upon himself and is
nor admissible as evidence against his co-accused, it being mere hearsay evidence as far as the other
accused are concerned. 41 But this rule admits of exception. It does not apply when the confession, as in
this case, is used as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation of the co-accused in
the killing of the victims 42 or when the confession of the co-accused is corroborated by other
evidence. 43
Beronga's extrajudicial statement is, in fact, corroborated by the testimony of Prosecution Witness
Jennifer Binghoy. Pertinent portions of said testimony are reproduced hereunder:
Q While you were at the wake of Jun Sabalones and the
group were sitting with Roling Sabalones, what were they
doing?
A They were gathered in one table and they were
conversing with each other.
xxx xxx xxx
Q On that same date, time and place, at about 10:00 [i]n the
evening, can you remember if there was unusual incident
that took place?
A I heard over the radio at the Sabalones Family that a
certain Nabing Velez was shot.
Q That [a] certain Nabing Velez was shot? What else . . .
transpired?
A I observed that their reactions were so queer, — as if they
were running.
xxx xxx xxx
Q In that evening of June 1, 1985, when you went there at
the house of Jun Sabalones, have you seen an armalite?
A Yes, sir.
Q Where aid you see this armalite?
A At the table where they were conversing.
Q How many armalites or guns [did you see] that evening in
that place?
A Two (2).
xxx xxx xxx
Q This armalite that you saw, — how far was this in relation
to the groups of Sabalones?
A There (The witness indicating a distance of about 4 to 5
meters).
ATTY. KINTANAR:
Q When you looked . . . through the window and saw there
were two vehicles and there were bursts of gunfire, what
happened after that?
A I did not proceed to look . . . through the window because
I stooped down.
Q When you stooped down, what happened?
A After the burst of gunfire, I again opened the window.
Q And when again you opened the window, what
happened?
A I saw two persons going towards the jeep.
Q What transpired next after [you saw] those 2 persons?
A When they arrived there, they nodded their head[s].
Q After that, what happened?
A So, they went back to the direction where they came from,
going to the house of Sabalones.
Q While they were going to the direction of the house of
Sabalones, what transpired?
20
A I saw 5 to 6 persons coming from the highway and looking
to the jeep, and before they reached the jeep, somebody
shouted that "it's ours".
Q Who shouted?
A The voice was very familiar to me.
Q Whose voice?
A The voice of Roling Sabalones.
Q What else have you noticed during the commotion [when]
wives were advising their husbands to go home?
A They were really in chaos. 44
A careful reading of her testimony buttresses the finding of the trial court that Rolusape Sabalones and
his friends were gathered at one table, conversing in whispers with each other, that there were two rifles
on top of the table, and that they became panicky after hearing of the death of Nabing Velez on the
radio. Hence, the observation of the trial court that "they went to their grisly destination amidst the dark
and positioned themselves in defense of his turf against the invasion of a revengeful gang of supporters
of the recently slain Nabing Velez." 45
Alleged Inconsistencies
Appellants also allege that the prosecution account had inconsistencies relating to the number of shots
heard, the interval between gunshots and the victims' positions when they were killed. These, however,
are minor and inconsequential flaws which strengthen, rather than impair, the credibility of said
eyewitnesses. Such harmless errors are indicative of truth, not falsehood, and do not cast serious doubt
on the veracity and reliability of complainant's testimony. 46
Appellants further claim that the relative positions of the gunmen, as testified to by the eyewitnesses,
were incompatible with the wounds sustained by the victims. They cite the testimony of Dr. Ladislao
Diola, who conducted the autopsy on Glenn Tiempo. He declared that the victim must necessarily be on
a higher level than the assailant, in the light of the path of the bullet from the entrance wound to where
the slug was extracted. This finding, according to appellant, negates the prosecution's account that the
appellants were standing side by side behind a wall when they fired at the victims. If standing, appellants
must have been on a level higher than that of the occupants of the vehicles; if beside each other, they
could not have inflicted wounds which were supposed to have come from opposite angles.
We are not persuaded. The defense presumes that the victims were sitting still when they were fired
upon, and that they froze in the same position during and after the shooting. This has no testimonial
foundation. On the contrary, it was shown that the victims ducked and hid themselves, albeit in vain,
when the firing began. After the first volley, they crouched and tried to take cover from the hail of bullets.
It would have been unnatural for them to remain upright and still in their seat. Hence, it is not difficult to
imagine that the trajectories of the bullet wounds varied as the victims shifted their positions. We agree
with the following explanation of the Court of Appeals:
The locations of the entry wounds can readily be explained, . . . Glenn Tiempo,
after looking in the direction of the explosion, turned his body around; and since
the ambushers were between the jeep and the car, he received a bullet in his right
chest (wound no. 1) which traveled to the left. As to wound No. 2, it can be
explained by the spot where Major Tiempo found his fallen son.
Atty. Kintanar:
Q: Upon being informed by these occupants who were
ambushed and [you] were able to return the car, what did
you do?
Major Tiempo:
A: I immediately got soldiers and we immediately proceeded
to the area or to the place where my fallen son was located
and when we reached . . . the place, I saw my fallen son [in]
a kneeling position where both knees [were] touching the
ground and the toes also and the forehead was touching
towards the ground. (TSN, Feb. 12, 1988, p. 6)
In such position the second bullet necessarily traveled upwards in relation to the
body, and thus the entry wound should be lower than the exit wound. There is no
showing that both wounds were inflicted at the same time. 47
In any event, the witnesses saw that the appellants were the gunmen who were standing side by side
firing at them. They could have been in a different position and in another hiding place when they first
fired, but this is not important. They were present at the crime scene, and they were shooting their rifles
at the victims.
Aberratio Ictus
Appellants likewise accuse the trial court of engaging in "conjecture" in ruling that there was aberratio
ictus in this case. This allegation does not advance the cause of the appellants. It must be stressed that
the trial court relied on the concept of aberratio ictus to explain why the appellants staged the ambush,
not to prove that appellants did in fact commit the crimes. Even assuming that the trial court did err in
explaining the motive of the appellants, this does not detract from its findings, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals and sustained by this Court in the discussion above, that the guilt of the appellants was proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
In any event, the trial court was not engaging in conjecture in so ruling. The conclusion of the trial court
and the Court of Appeals that the appellants killed the wrong persons was based on the extrajudicial
statement of Appellant Beronga and the testimony of Jennifer Binghoy. These pieces of evidence
21
sufficiently show that appellants believed that they were suspected of having killed the recently slain
Nabing Velez, and that they expected his group to retaliate against them. Hence, upon the arrival of the
victims' vehicles which they mistook to be carrying the avenging men of Nabing Velez, appellants
opened fire. Nonetheless, the fact that they were mistaken does not diminish their culpability. The Court
has held that "mistake in the identity of the victim carries the same gravity as when the accused zeroes
in on his intended
victim." 48
Be that as it may, the observation of the solicitor general on this point is well-taken. The case is better
characterized as errorpersonae or mistake in the identity of the victims, rather than aberratio ictus which
means mistake in the blow, characterized by aiming at one but hitting the other due to imprecision in the
blow.
Second Issue:
Denial and Alibi
Appellants decry the lower courts' disregard of their defense of alibi. We disagree. As constantly
enunciated by this Court, the established doctrine requires the accused to prove not only that he was at
some other place at the time of the commission of the crime, but that it was physically impossible for him
at the time to have been present at thelocus criminis or its immediate vicinity. 49 This the appellants
miserably failed to do.
Appellant Beronga testified that, at the time of the incident, he was in his residence in Lapulapu City,
which was not shown to be so remote and inaccessible that it precluded his presence in Mansueto
Subdivision. The alibi of Sabalones is even more unworthy of belief; he sought to establish that he was a
mere 20-25 meters away from the scene of the crime. He was allegedly in the house of his brother who
was lying in state, which was so near the ambush site that some of the defense witnesses even testified
that they were terrified by the gunfire. Clearly, appellants failed to establish the requisites of alibi.
Furthermore, the defense of alibi cannot overcome the positive identification of the appellants. 50 As aptly
held by this Court in People v. Nescio: 51
Alibi is not credible when the accused-appellant is only a short distance from the
scene of the crime. The defense of alibi is further offset by the positive
identification made by the prosecution witnesses. Alibi, to reiterate a well-settled
doctrine, is accepted only upon the clearest proof that the accused-appellant was
not or could not have been at the crime scene when it was committed.
Flight
Appellants further object to the finding that Sabalones, after the incident, "made himself scarce from the
place of commission. He left for Manila, thence Mindanao on the supposition that he want[ed] to escape
from the wrath of Maj. Tiempo and his men for the death of Glenn Tiempo and the near fatal shooting of
the other son or from the supporters of Nabing Velez. . . . On his supposedly borrowed freedom, he
jumped bail and hid himself deeper into Mindanao, under a cloak of an assumed name. Why, did his
conscience bother him for comfort?" 52
Appellants rationalized that Sabalones was forced to jump bail in order to escape two groups, who were
allegedly out to get him, one of Nabing Velez and the other of Major Tiempo. Their ratiocination is futile.
It is well-established that "the flight of an accused is competent evidence to indicate his guilt, and flight,
when unexplained, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn." 53 It must be
stressed, nonetheless, that appellants were not convicted based on legal inference alone but on the
overwhelming evidence presented against them.
Third Issue:
Crime and Punishment
We agree with the appellate court that accused-appellants are guilty of murder for the deaths of Glenn
Tiempo end Alfredo Nardo. The allegation of treachery as charged in the Information was duly proven by
the prosecution. "Treachery is committed when two conditions concur, namely, that the means, methods,
and forms of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and that such means, methods and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously
adopted by the accused without danger to his person." 54 These requisites were evidently present when
the accused, swiftly and unexpectedly, fired at the victims who were inside their vehicles and were in no
position and without any means to defend themselves.
The appellate court also correctly convicted them of frustrated murder for the injuries sustained by
Nelson Tiempo, Rey Bolo and Rogelio Presores. As evidenced by the medical certificates and the
testimony of Dr. Miguel Mancao who attended to the victims, Nelson Tiempo sustained a neck wound
which completely shattered his trachea and rendered him voiceless, as well as a wound on the right
chest which penetrated his axilla but not his chest cavity.55 Rey Bolo sustained three injuries which
affected his clavicle, ribs and lungs. 56 Rogelio Presores, on the other hand, sustained an injury to his
lungs from a bullet wound which entered his right chest and exited through his back. 57
The wounds sustained by these survivors would have caused their death had it not been for the timely
medical intervention. Hence, we sustain the ruling of the Court of Appeals that appellants are guilty of
three counts of frustrated murder.
We also uphold the Court of Appeals' modification of the penalty for murder, but not its computation of
the sentence for frustrated murder.
For each of the two counts of murder, the trial court imposed the penalty of fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal (medium), as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal (maximum), as maximum. This is incorrect. Under Article
248 of the Ravised Penal Code, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal, in its maximum period, to
death. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, aside from the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, the appellate court correctly imposedreclusion perpetua for murder.
The Court of Appeals, however, erred in computing the penalty for each of the three counts of frustrated
murder. It sentenced appellants to imprisonment of ten years of prision mayor (medium) as minimum to
seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal (medium) as maximum. It modified the trial
court's computation of eight (8) years of prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to fourteen (14) years
and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal(minimum) as maximum.
22
Under Article 50 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for a frustrated felony is the "next lower in
degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony . . . ." The imposable penalty for
frustrated murder, therefore, is prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium
period. 58 Because there are no aggravating or mitigating circumstance as the Court of Appeals itself
held, 59 the penalty prescribed by law should be imposed in its medium period. With the application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty for frustrated murder should be 8 years of prision
mayor (minimum), as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal (minimum) as
maximum.
Although the Court of Appeals was silent on this point, the trial court correctly ordered the payment of
P50,000 as indemnity to the heirs of each of the two murdered victims. In light of current jurisprudence,
this amount is awarded without need of proof other than the fact of the victim's death. 60 The trial court
and the CA, however, erred in awarding indemnity of P20,000 each to Nelson Tiempo, Rogelio Presores
and Rey Bolo. There is no basis, statutory or jurisprudential, for the award of a fixed amount to victims of
frustrated murder. Hence, they are entitled only to the amounts of actual expenses duly proven during
the trial.
Thus, Nelson Tiempo, who was treated for a gunshot wound on the neck which shattered his trachea,
should be awarded indemnity of P21,594.22 for his medical expenses. This is evidenced by a statement
of account from Cebu Doctor's Hospital. 61
Rogelio Presores, who was likewise treated for gunshot wound in the same hospital, presented a
statement of account amounting to P5,412.69 for his hospitalization. 62 Hence, he is likewise entitled to
indemnity in the said amount.
Rey Bolo, on the other hand, incurred an expense of P9,431.10 for the treatment of his gunshot wounds,
as evidenced by a statement of account from the same hospital. 63 This amount should be awarded to
him as indemnity.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. However, the penalties
are hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9257, for MURDER, the accused-appellants are each hereby sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased, Glenn Tiempo, in
the sum of P50,000;
2) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9258, for MURDER, the accused-appellants are each hereby sentenced
to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased, Alfredo Nardo, in
the sum of P50,000;
3) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9259, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, the accused-appellants are each hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of 8 years of prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to 14 years and 8
months of reclusion temporal (minimum) as maximum; and to jointly and severally pay the victim, Rey
Bolo, in the sum of P9,431.10 as actual damages;
4) In Crim Case No. CBU-9260, for FRUSTRATED MURDER, the accused-appellants are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of 8 years of prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to 14 years and 8
months of reclusion temporal (minimum) as maximum; and to jointly and severally indemnify the victim,
Rogelio Presores, in the sum of P5,412.69 for actual damages;
5) In Crim. Case No. CBU-9261 for FRUSTRATED MURDER, the accused-appellants are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of 8 years of prision mayor (minimum), as minimum, to 14 years and 8
months of reclusion temporal (minimum) as maximum; and to jointly and severally indemnify the victim,
Nelson Tiempo, in the sum of P21,594.22 as actual damages.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Secretary of Interior and Local Government and the
Secretary of Justice so that Accused Eufemio Cabanero may be brought to justice.
Costs against appellants. SO ORDERED.
C. Praeter intentionem-in relation to Art 13 par 3
G.R. No. L-74324 November 17, 1988
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA, & BENJAMIN SAMSON y MAGDALENA, accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Citizens Legal Assistance Office for accused-appellants.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
For the death of Bayani Miranda, a retardate, FERNANDO PUGAY y BALCITA and BENJAMIN
SAMSON y MAGDALENA were charged with the crime of MURDER in Criminal Case No. L-175-82 of
the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cavite, under an information which reads as
follows:
That on or about May 19, 1982 at the town plaza of the Municipality of Rosario,
Province of Cavite, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping and
assisting one another, with treachery and evident premeditation, taking advantage
of their superior strength, and with the decided purpose to kill, poured gasoline, a
combustible liquid to the body of Bayani Miranda and with the use of fire did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, burn the whole body of said Bayani
Miranda which caused his subsequent death, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the aforenamed Bayani Miranda.
23
That the crime was committed with the qualifying circumstance of treachery and
the aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and superior strength, and
the means employed was to weaken the defense; that the wrong done in the
commission of the crime was deliberately augmented by causing another wrong,
that is the burning of the body of Bayani Miranda.
CONTRARY TO LAW (p. 1, Records).
Upon being arraigned, both accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After trial, the trial court
rendered a decision finding both accused guilty on the crime of murder but crediting in favor of the
accused Pugay the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the accused Fernando Pugay y Balcita and Benjamin Samson y
Magdalena are pronounced guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals by direct
participation of the crime of murder for the death of Bayani Miranda, and
appreciating the aforestated mitigating circumstance in favor of Pugay, he is
sentenced to a prison term ranging from twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and Samson to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with the accessories of the law for
both of them. The accused are solidarily held liable to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P13,940.00 plus moral damages of P10,000.00 and
exemplary damages of P5,000.00.
Let the preventive imprisonment of Pugay be deducted from the principal penalty.
Cost against both accused.
SO ORDERED (p. 248, Records).
Not satisfied with the decision, both accused interposed the present appeal and assigned the following
errors committed by the court a quo:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN UTILIZING THE STATEMENTS OF
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN ITS APPRECIATION OF FACTS DESPITE ITS
ADMISSION THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE NOT ASSISTED BY A
COUNSEL DURING THE CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SUPPRESSION BY
THE PROSECUTION OF SOME EVIDENCE IS FATAL TO ITS CASE.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN LENDING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE
TESTIMONY OF EDUARDO GABION WHO WAS ONE OF THE MANY
SUSPECTS ARRESTED BY THE POLICE (Accused-appellants' Brief, p. 48,
Rollo).
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The deceased Miranda, a 25-year old retardate, and the accused Pugay were friends. Miranda used to
run errands for Pugay and at times they slept together. On the evening of May 19, 1982, a town fiesta
fair was held in the public plaza of Rosario, Cavite. There were different kinds of ride and one was a
ferris wheel.
Sometime after midnight of the same date, Eduardo Gabion was sitting in the ferris wheel and reading a
comic book with his friend Henry. Later, the accused Pugay and Samson with several companions
arrived. These persons appeared to be drunk as they were all happy and noisy. As the group saw the
deceased walking nearby, they started making fun of him. They made the deceased dance by tickling
him with a piece of wood.
Not content with what they were doing with the deceased, the accused Pugay suddenly took a can of
gasoline from under the engine of the ferns wheel and poured its contents on the body of the former.
Gabion told Pugay not to do so while the latter was already in the process of pouring the gasoline. Then,
the accused Samson set Miranda on fire making a human torch out of him.
The ferris wheel operator later arrived and doused with water the burning body of the deceased. Some
people around also poured sand on the burning body and others wrapped the same with rags to
extinguish the flame.
The body of the deceased was still aflame when police officer Rolando Silangcruz and other police
officers of the Rosario Police Force arrived at the scene of the incident. Upon inquiring as to who were
responsible for the dastardly act, the persons around spontaneously pointed to Pugay and Samson as
the authors thereof.
The deceased was later rushed to the Grace Hospital for treatment. In the meantime, the police officers
brought Gabion, the two accused and five other persons to the Rosario municipal building for
interrogation. Police officer Reynaldo Canlas took the written statements of Gabion and the two accused,
after which Gabion was released. The two accused remained in custody.
After a careful review of the records, We find the grounds relied upon by the accused-appellants for the
reversal of the decision of the court a quo to be without merit.
It bears emphasis that barely a few hours after the incident, accused-appellants gave their written
statements to the police. The accused Pugay admitted in his statement, Exhibit F, that he poured a can
of gasoline on the deceased believing that the contents thereof was water and then the accused
Samson set the deceased on fire. The accused Samson, on the other hand, alleged in his statement that
he saw Pugay pour gasoline on Miranda but did not see the person who set him on fire. Worthy of note
is the fact that both statements did not impute any participation of eyewitness Gabion in the commission
of the offense.
While testifying on their defense, the accused-appellants repudiated their written statements alleging that
they were extracted by force. They claimed that the police maltreated them into admitting authorship of
24
the crime. They also engaged in a concerted effort to lay the blame on Gabion for the commission of the
offense.
Thus, while it is true that the written statements of the accused-appellants were mentioned and
discussed in the decision of the court a quo, the contents thereof were not utilized as the sole basis for
the findings of facts in the decision rendered. The said court categorically stated that "even without
Exhibits 'F' and 'G', there is still Gabion's straightforward, positive and convincing testimony which
remains unaffected by the uncorroborated, self-serving and unrealiable testimonies of Pugay and
Samson" (p. 247, Records).
Accused-appellants next assert that the prosecution suppressed the testimonies of other eyewitnesses
to the incident. They claim that despite the fact that there were other persons investigated by the police,
only Gabion was presented as an eyewitness during the trial of the case. They argue that the deliberate
non- presentation of these persons raises the presumption that their testimonies would be adverse to the
prosecution.
There is no dispute that there were other persons who witnessed the commission of the crime. In fact
there appears on record (pp. 16-17, Records) the written statements of one Abelardo Reyes and one
Monico Alimorong alleging the same facts and imputing the respective acts of pouring of gasoline and
setting the deceased on fire to the accused-appellants as testified to by Gabion in open court. They were
listed as prosecution witnesses in the information filed. Considering that their testimonies would be
merely corroborative, their non-presentation does not give rise to the presumption that evidence wilfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced. This presumption does not apply to the suppression of
merely corroborative evidence (U.S. vs. Dinola, 37 Phil. 797).<äre||anº•1àw> Besides, the matter as to
whom to utilize as witness is for the prosecution to decide.
Accused-appellants also attack the credibility of the eyewitness Gabion alleging that not only was the
latter requested by the mother of the deceased to testify for the prosecution in exchange for his
absolution from liability but also because his testimony that he was reading a comic book during an
unusual event is contrary to human behavior and experience.
Gabion testified that it was his uncle and not the mother of the deceased who asked him to testify and
state the truth about the incident. The mother of the deceased likewise testified that she never talked to
Gabion and that she saw the latter for the first time when the instant case was tried. Besides, the
accused Pugay admitted that Gabion was his friend and both Pugay and the other accused Samson
testified that they had no previous misunderstanding with Gabion. Clearly, Gabion had no reason to
testify falsely against them.
In support of their claim that the testimony of Gabion to the effect that he saw Pugay pour gasoline on
the deceased and then Samson set him on fire is incredible, the accused-appellants quote Gabion's
testimony on cross-examination that, after telling Pugay not to pour gasoline on the deceased, he
(Gabion) resumed reading comics; and that it was only when the victim's body was on fire that he
noticed a commotion.
However, explaining this testimony on re-direct examination, Gabion stated:
Q. Mr. Gabion, you told the Court on cross-examination that
you were reading comics when you saw Pugay poured
gasoline unto Bayani Miranda and lighted by Samson. How
could you possibly see that incident while you were reading
comics?
A. I put down the comics which I am reading and I saw what
they were doing.
Q. According to you also before Bayani was poured with
gasoline and lighted and burned later you had a talk with
Pugay, is that correct?
A. When he was pouring gasoline on Bayani Miranda I was
trying to prevent him from doing so.
Q. We want to clarify. According to you a while ago you had
a talk with Pugay and as a matter of fact, you told him not to
pour gasoline. That is what I want to know from you, if that is
true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Aside from Bayani being tickled with a stick on his ass,
do you mean to say you come to know that Pugay will pour
gasoline unto him?
A. I do not know that would be that incident.
Q. Why did you as(k) Pugay in the first place not to pour
gasoline before he did that actually?
A. Because I pity Bayani, sir.
Q. When you saw Pugay tickling Bayani with a stick on his
ass you tried according to you to ask him not to and then
later you said you asked not to pour gasoline. Did Pugay tell
you he was going to pour gasoline on Bayani?
A. I was not told, sir.
Q. Did you come to know..... how did you come to know he
was going to pour gasoline that is why you prevent him?
25
A. Because he was holding on a container of gasoline. I
thought it was water but it was gasoline.
Q. It is clear that while Pugay was tickling Bayani with a
stick on his ass, he later got hold of a can of gasoline, is that
correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And when he pick up the can of gasoline, was that the
time you told him not to pour gasoline when he merely pick
up the can of gasoline.
A. I saw him pouring the gasoline on the body of Joe.
Q. So, it is clear when you told Pugay not to pour gasoline
he was already in the process of pouring gasoline on the
body of Bayani?
A. Yes, sir (Tsn, July 30, 1983, pp. 32-33).
It is thus clear that prior to the incident in question, Gabion was reading a comic book; that Gabion
stopped reading when the group of Pugay started to make fun of the deceased; that Gabion saw Pugay
get the can of gasoline from under the engine of the ferris wheel; that it was while Pugay was in the
process of pouring the gasoline on the body of the deceased when Gabion warned him not to do so; and
that Gabion later saw Samson set the deceased on fire.
However, there is nothing in the records showing that there was previous conspiracy or unity of criminal
purpose and intention between the two accused-appellants immediately before the commission of the
crime. There was no animosity between the deceased and the accused Pugay or Samson. Their
meeting at the scene of the incident was accidental. It is also clear that the accused Pugay and his
group merely wanted to make fun of the deceased. Hence, the respective criminal responsibility of
Pugay and Samson arising from different acts directed against the deceased is individual and not
collective, and each of them is liable only for the act committed by him (U.S. vs. Magcomot, et. al. 13,
Phil. 386; U.S. vs. Abiog, et. al. 37 Phil. 1371).
The next question to be determined is the criminal responsibility of the accused Pugay. Having taken the
can from under the engine of the ferris wheel and holding it before pouring its contents on the body of
the deceased, this accused knew that the can contained gasoline. The stinging smell of this flammable
liquid could not have escaped his notice even before pouring the same. Clearly, he failed to exercise all
the diligence necessary to avoid every undesirable consequence arising from any act that may be
committed by his companions who at the time were making fun of the deceased. We agree with the
Solicitor General that the accused is only guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence defined in
Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. In U.S. vs. Maleza, et. al. 14 Phil. 468, 470, this
Court ruled as follows:
 A man must use common sense and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his
duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of
incurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee
and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable
abandon. Otherwise his own person, rights and property, all those of his fellow-
beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and injury.
The proper penalty that the accused Pugay must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from four (4)
months ofarresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
maximum. With respect to the accused Samson, the Solicitor General in his brief contends that "his
conviction of murder, is proper considering that his act in setting the deceased on fire knowing that
gasoline had just been poured on him is characterized by treachery as the victim was left completely
helpless to defend and protect himself against such an outrage" (p. 57, Rollo). We do not agree.
There is entire absence of proof in the record that the accused Samson had some reason to kill the
deceased before the incident. On the contrary, there is adequate evidence showing that his act was
merely a part of their fun-making that evening. For the circumstance of treachery to exist, the attack
must be deliberate and the culprit employed means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any defense which
the offended party might make.
There can be no doubt that the accused Samson knew very well that the liquid poured on the body of the
deceased was gasoline and a flammable substance for he would not have committed the act of setting
the latter on fire if it were otherwise. Giving him the benefit of doubt, it call be conceded that as part of
their fun-making he merely intended to set the deceased's clothes on fire. His act, however, does not
relieve him of criminal responsibility. Burning the clothes of the victim would cause at the very least
some kind of physical injuries on his person, a felony defined in the Revised Penal Code. If his act
resulted into a graver offense, as what took place in the instant case, he must be held responsible
therefor. Article 4 of the aforesaid code provides, inter alia, that criminal liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended.
As no sufficient evidence appears in the record establishing any qualifying circumstances, the accused
Samson is only guilty of the crime of homicide defined and penalized in Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. We are disposed to credit in his favor the ordinary mitigating circumstance of no
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed as there is evidence of a fact from which such
conclusion can be drawn. The eyewitness Gabion testified that the accused Pugay and Samson were
stunned when they noticed the deceased burning (Tsn, June 1, 1983, pp. 16-17).<äre||anº•1àw>
The proper penalty that the accused Samson must suffer is an indeterminate one ranging from eight (8)
years ofprision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
The lower court held the accused solidarily liable for P13,940.00, the amount spent by Miranda's parents
for his hospitalization, wake and interment. The indemnity for death is P30,000.00. Hence, the indemnity
to the heirs of the deceased Miranda is increased to P43,940.00.
26
Both accused shall be jointly and severally liable for the aforesaid amount plus the P10,000.00 as moral
damages and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages as found by the court a quo.
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed with the modifications above-indicated. Costs against the accused-
appellants.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-42117 March 29, 1935
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GREGORIO REYES, defendant-appellant.
Jose G. Pardo for appellant.
Acting Solicitor-General Melencio for appellee.
HULL, J.:
Appellant was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur of the crime of homicide
committed on the person of Fausta Tavera on the evening of April 30, 1934.
Previous to the crime, the deceased for a couple of weeks had been living with appellant, but her
parents had persuaded her to come home and were demanding that appellant pay a dowry of P30
before the date of the celebration of the marriage could be fixed.
That evening there had been a barrio procession, and after the procession, they were gathered in one of
the houses, where an impromptu dance took place. The deceased and appellant were talking in the yard
of the house where the dance was taking place, and she informed him that she could not return to him
and that she was going with her parents of Catanduanes. Appellant dragged the deceased towards the
street and stabbed her in the chest with a fanknife. Deceased ran to the house of the barrio lieutenant, a
short distance away, falling deed at the foot of the staircase, although the wound was only a slight one, it
not having penetrated the thoracic cavity, having hit a bone.
Immediately Andres Tapil, Tomas and Rufino, relatives of the deceased, attempted to seize the
appellant, but with the aid of his knife, he escaped and ran from the scene of the affray.
Appellant as witness in his own behalf claimed that he was attacked by the three relatives of the
deceased, and if deceased was wounded by him, it was in the midst of that affray and purely accidental
on his part.
Not only is this testimony directly contrary to the witnesses for the prosecution but is greatly weakened
by appellant's own statement given to the chief of police the day after the crime. The story as told by
appellant was not believed by the trial court, and on the whole does not ring with sincerity and truth.
Appellant contends that he cannot be convicted of homicide as the wound actually inflicted was a
superficial wound of no intrinsic magnitude. As above stated, deceased ran screaming to the nearby
house where she dropped dead. The sanitary inspector who examined the body the next day, found no
other wound and certified that deceased had died from shock as a result of the wound and so testified at
the trial.
The death having occurred in an outlying barrio, there was no proper autopsy. So far as is known,
deceased was in normal health, but appellant contends that it is incumbent upon the State to prove that
the deceased did not die of poisoning or some other cause.
In this jurisdiction it is well settled that such is not the law. A person is responsible for the consequences
of his criminal act and even if the deceased had been shown to be suffering from a diseased heart
(which was not shown), appellant's assault being the proximate cause of the death, he would be
responsible, (U.S. vs. Luciano, 2 Phil., 96; U.S. vs. Lugo and Lugo, 8 Phil., 80; U.S. vs. Brobst, 14 Phil.,
310; U.S. vs. Rodriguez, 23 Phil., 22.)
The trial court appreciated the mitigating circumstances that the offender had no intention to commit so
grave a wrong as that committed and that sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended
party immediately preceded the act.
We have repeatedly held that when a person stabs another with a lethal weapon such as a fanknife
upon a part of the body, for example, the head, chest, or stomach, death could reasonably be
anticipated, and the accused must be presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his
wrongful act. The means employed contradict the claim that appellant had lack of intention to commit the
crime of homicide.
The trial court considered provocation as a mitigating circumstance based on the testimony of appellant
that he had been attacked, overlooking the fact that the law requires that the provocation come from the
offended party. Certainly the deceased did not attack appellant, and her refusal to renew her illicit
relationship with him can hardly be construed as legal provocation.
On a careful review of the evidence we are convinced that appellant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
of the crime of homicide without either aggravating or mitigating circumstances and therefore sentence
him under Act No. 4103 to from eight years of prision mayor to fourteen years, eight months, and one
day of reclusion temporaland to indemnify the heirs of the offended party in the sum of P1,000. As thus
modified the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellant. So ordered.
D. Error in personae-in relation to Art 48 and 49
G.R. No. L-47722 July 27, 1943
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO Z. OANIS and ALBERTO GALANTA, defendants-appellants.
27
Antonio Z. Oanis in his own behalf.
Maximo L. Valenzuela for appellant Galanta.
Acting Solicitor-General Ibañez and Assistant Attorney Torres for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Charged with the crime of murder of one Serapio Tecson, the accused Antonio Z. Oanis and Alberto
Galanta, chief of police of Cabanatuan and corporal of the Philippine Constabulary, respectively, were,
after due trial, found guilty by the lower court of homicide through reckless imprudence and were
sentenced each to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and six months to two years and two
months of prison correccional and to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the deceased in the
amount of P1,000. Defendants appealed separately from this judgment.
In the afternoon of December 24, 1938. Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector
at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information
received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or
alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first sergeant and asked that he be given four men.
Defendant corporal Alberto Galanta, and privates Nicomedes Oralo, Venancio Serna and D. Fernandez,
upon order of their sergeant, reported at the office of the Provincial Inspector where they were shown a
copy of the above-quoted telegram and a newspaper clipping containing a picture of Balagtas. They
were instructed to arrest Balagtas and, if overpowered, to follow the instruction contained in the
telegram. The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the
Provincial Inspector. When the chief of police was asked whether he knew one Irene, a bailarina, he
answered that he knew one of loose morals of the same name. Upon request of the Provincial Inspector,
the chief of police tried to locate some of his men to guide the constabulary soldiers in ascertaining
Balagtas' whereabouts, and failing to see anyone of them he volunteered to go with the party. The
Provincial Inspector divided the party into two groups with defendants Oanis and Galanta, and private
Fernandez taking the route to Rizal street leading to the house where Irene was supposedly living. When
this group arrived at Irene's house, Oanis approached one Brigida Mallare, who was then stripping
banana stalks, and asked her where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place and upon further
inquiry also said that Irene was sleeping with her paramour. Brigida trembling, immediately returned to
her own room which was very near that occupied by Irene and her paramour. Defendants Oanis and
Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back towards the door
where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber revolvers.
Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where
the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it
turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a
peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour. The Provincial Inspector,
informed of the killing, repaired to the scene and when he asked as to who killed the deceased. Galanta,
referring to himself and to Oanis, answered: "We two, sir." The corpse was thereafter brought to the
provincial hospital and upon autopsy by Dr. Ricardo de Castro, multiple gunshot wounds inflicted by a
.32 and a .45 caliber revolvers were found on Tecson's body which caused his death.
These are the facts as found by the trial court and fully supported by the evidence, particularly by the
testimony of Irene Requinea. Appellants gave, however, a different version of the tragedy. According to
Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida
where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of
Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room. Oanis went to the room thus
indicated and upon opening the curtain covering the door, he said: "If you are Balagtas, stand up."
Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, and Irene woke up and as the former was about to sit up in bed. Oanis
fired at him. Wounded, Tecson leaned towards the door, and Oanis receded and shouted: "That is
Balagtas." Galanta then fired at Tecson.
On the other hand, Oanis testified that after he had opened the curtain covering the door and after
having said, "if you are Balagtas stand up." Galanta at once fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas,
while the latter was still lying on bed, and continued firing until he had exhausted his bullets: that it was
only thereafter that he, Oanis, entered the door and upon seeing the supposed Balagtas, who was then
apparently watching and picking up something from the floor, he fired at him.
The trial court refused to believe the appellants. Their testimonies are certainly incredible not only
because they are vitiated by a natural urge to exculpate themselves of the crime, but also because they
are materially contradictory. Oasis averred that be fired at Tecson when the latter was apparently
watching somebody in an attitudes of picking up something from the floor; on the other hand, Galanta
testified that Oasis shot Tecson while the latter was about to sit up in bed immediately after he was
awakened by a noise. Galanta testified that he fired at Tecson, the supposed Balagtas, when the latter
was rushing at him. But Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying on bed. It
is apparent from these contradictions that when each of the appellants tries to exculpate himself of the
crime charged, he is at once belied by the other; but their mutual incriminating averments dovetail with
and corroborate substantially, the testimony of Irene Requinea. It should be recalled that, according to
Requinea, Tecson was still sleeping in bed when he was shot to death by appellants. And this, to a
certain extent, is confirmed by both appellants themselves in their mutual recriminations. According, to
Galanta, Oanis shot Tecson when the latter was still in bed about to sit up just after he was awakened by
a noise. And Oanis assured that when Galanta shot Tecson, the latter was still lying in bed. Thus
corroborated, and considering that the trial court had the opportunity to observe her demeanor on the
stand, we believe and so hold that no error was committed in accepting her testimony and in rejecting
the exculpatory pretensions of the two appellants. Furthermore, a careful examination of Irene's
testimony will show not only that her version of the tragedy is not concocted but that it contains all indicia
of veracity. In her cross-examination, even misleading questions had been put which were unsuccessful,
the witness having stuck to the truth in every detail of the occurrence. Under these circumstances, we do
not feel ourselves justified in disturbing the findings of fact made by the trial court.
The true fact, therefore, of the case is that, while Tecson was sleeping in his room with his back towards
the door, Oanis and Galanta, on sight, fired at him simultaneously or successively, believing him to be
Anselmo Balagtas but without having made previously any reasonable inquiry as to his identity. And the
question is whether or not they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to
Tecson. It is contended that, as appellants acted in innocent mistake of fact in the honest performance of
their official duties, both of them believing that Tecson was Balagtas, they incur no criminal liability.
Sustaining this theory in part, the lower court held and so declared them guilty of the crime of homicide
through reckless imprudence. We are of the opinion, however, that, under the circumstances of the
case, the crime committed by appellants is murder through specially mitigated by circumstances to be
mentioned below.
In support of the theory of non-liability by reasons of honest mistake of fact, appellants rely on the case
of U.S. v. Ah Chong, 15 Phil., 488. The maxim is ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the
mistake is committed without fault or carelessness. In the Ah Chong case, defendant therein after having
gone to bed was awakened by someone trying to open the door. He called out twice, "who is there," but
28
received no answer. Fearing that the intruder was a robber, he leaped from his bed and called out
again., "If you enter the room I will kill you." But at that precise moment, he was struck by a chair which
had been placed against the door and believing that he was then being attacked, he seized a kitchen
knife and struck and fatally wounded the intruder who turned out to be his room-mate. A common
illustration of innocent mistake of fact is the case of a man who was marked as a footpad at night and in
a lonely road held up a friend in a spirit of mischief, and with leveled, pistol demanded his money or life.
He was killed by his friend under the mistaken belief that the attack was real, that the pistol leveled at his
head was loaded and that his life and property were in imminent danger at the hands of the aggressor.
In these instances, there is an innocent mistake of fact committed without any fault or carelessness
because the accused, having no time or opportunity to make a further inquiry, and being pressed by
circumstances to act immediately, had no alternative but to take the facts as they then appeared to him,
and such facts justified his act of killing. In the instant case, appellants, unlike the accused in the
instances cited, found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The
person in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his
identity without hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to
that end had been made, as the victim was unarmed, according to Irene Requinea. This, indeed, is the
only legitimate course of action for appellants to follow even if the victim was really Balagtas, as they
were instructed not to kill Balagtas at sight but to arrest him, and to get him dead or alive only if
resistance or aggression is offered by him.
Although an officer in making a lawful arrest is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to
secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance, prevent his escape, recapture him if he
escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm (People vs. Delima, 46 Phil, 738), yet he is never justified
in using unnecessary force or in treating him with wanton violence, or in resorting to dangerous means
when the arrest could be effected otherwise (6 C.J.S., par. 13, p. 612). The doctrine is restated in the
new Rules of Court thus: "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and
the person arrested shall not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention."
(Rule 109, sec. 2, par. 2). And a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses
unnecessary force or violence in making an arrest (5 C.J., p. 753; U.S.vs. Mendoza, 2 Phil., 109). It may
be true that Anselmo Balagtas was a notorious criminal, a life-termer, a fugitive from justice and a
menace to the peace of the community, but these facts alone constitute no justification for killing him
when in effecting his arrest, he offers no resistance or in fact no resistance can be offered, as when he is
asleep. This, in effect, is the principle laid down, although upon different facts, in U.S. vs. Donoso (3
Phil., 234, 242).
It is, however, suggested that a notorious criminal "must be taken by storm" without regard to his right to
life which he has by such notoriety already forfeited. We may approve of this standard of official conduct
where the criminal offers resistance or does something which places his captors in danger of imminent
attack. Otherwise we cannot see how, as in the present case, the mere fact of notoriety can make the
life of a criminal a mere trifle in the hands of the officers of the law. Notoriety rightly supplies a basis for
redoubled official alertness and vigilance; it never can justify precipitate action at the cost of human life.
Where, as here, the precipitate action of the appellants has cost an innocent life and there exist no
circumstances whatsoever to warrant action of such character in the mind of a reasonably prudent man,
condemnation — not condonation — should be the rule; otherwise we should offer a premium to crime in
the shelter of official actuation.
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not
accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply
the incident of another act performed without malice. (People vs. Sara, 55 Phil., 939). In the words of
Viada, "para que se celifique un hecho de imprudencia es preciso que no haya mediado en el malicia ni
intencion alguna de dañar; existiendo esa intencion, debera calificarse el hecho del delito que ha
producido, por mas que no haya sido la intencion del agente el causar un mal de tanta gravedad como
el que se produjo." (Tomo 7, Viada Codigo Penal Comentado, 5.a ed. pag. 7). And, as once held by this
Court, a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is essentially inconsistent with the idea of reckless
imprudence (People vs. Nanquil, 43 Phil., 232; People vs. Bindor, 56 Phil., 16), and where such unlawful
act is wilfully done, a mistake in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless
imprudence (People vs. Gona, 54 Phil., 605) to support a plea of mitigated liability.
As the deceased was killed while asleep, the crime committed is murder with the qualifying circumstance
ofalevosia. There is, however, a mitigating circumstance of weight consisting in the incomplete justifying
circumstance defined in article 11, No. 5, of the Revised Penal Code. According to such legal provision,
a person incurs no criminal liability when he acts in the fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a
right or office. There are two requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one:
(a) that the offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that
the injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or
the lawful exercise of such right or office. In the instance case, only the first requisite is present —
appellants have acted in the performance of a duty. The second requisite is wanting for the crime by
them committed is not the necessary consequence of a due performance of their duty. Their duty was to
arrest Balagtas or to get him dead or alive if resistance is offered by him and they are overpowered. But
through impatience or over-anxiety or in their desire to take no chances, they have exceeded in the
fulfillment of such duty by killing the person whom they believed to be Balagtas without any resistance
from him and without making any previous inquiry as to his identity. According to article 69 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law shall, in such
case, be imposed.
For all the foregoing, the judgment is modified and appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with
the mitigating circumstance above mentioned, and accordingly sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
from five (5) years of prision correctional to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, with the accessories
of the law, and to pay the heirs of the deceased Serapio Tecson jointly and severally an indemnity of
P2,000, with costs.
G.R. No. L-32066 March 15, 1903
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellee,
vs.
GONA (Mansaca), defendant and appellant.
Jose Ma. Capili for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
OSTRAND, J.:
The defendant was charged before the Court of First Instance of the Province of Davao with the crime of
homicide, the information reading as follows:
29
That on or about October 26, 1928, in the municipal district of Pantukan, Province of Davao,
Philippine Islands, as within the jurisdiction of the court, the said accused voluntarily, illegally,
and criminally and with a bolo which he then carried, assaulted the Mansaca Mapudul,
causing him a mortal wound on the left side of the neck and that as a consequence of said
wound, the said Mapudul died.
Upon trial the court below found the defendant guilty as charged in the information and taking into
consideration the extenuating circumstance of non-habitual intoxication, sentenced him to suffer twelve
years and one ofreclusion temporal with the accessory penalties prosecuted by law to indemnity the
heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to the costs. From this sentenced the defendant
appealed.
It appears from the evidence that on the evening of October 26, 1928, a number of Mansacas celebrated
a reunion in the house of the Mansaca Gabriel. There seems to have been liberal supply of alcoholic
drinks and some of the men present became intoxicated, with the result that a quarrel took the place
between the MansacaDunca and the defendant. Dunca and his son Aguipo eventually left the house and
were followed by Mapudul and one Award. The defendant left the house about the same time with
intention of assaulting Dunca, but in the darkness of the evening and in the intoxicated condition of the
defendant, the mistook Mapudul for Dunca and inflicated on him a mortal wound with a bolo.
There can no doubt that the defendant killed Mapudul and that he is guilty of the crime charged, but his
attorney argues that in view of the fact that said defendant had no intention to kill the deceased and
committed the crime by mistake, he should have been found guilty of homicide through negligence under
paragraph 1 of article 568 of the Penal Code and not of the graver crime of intentional homicide.
This contention is contrary to earlier decisions of this court. In these case of United
State vs. Mendieta(34 Phil., 242), the court said:
Even admitting that the defendant intended to injure Hilario Lauigan instead of Pedro Acierto,
even that, in view of the mortal wound which inflicted upon the latter, in no way could be
considered as a relief from his criminal act. That he made a mistake in killing one man
instead of another, when it is proved that he acted maliciously and willfully, cannot relieve him
from criminal responsibility. Neither do we believe that the fact that he made a mistake in
killing the wrong man should be considered as a mitigating circumstances.
The appealed sentence is affirmed with the costs against the defendant. So ordered.
E. Proximate Cause
G.R. No. L-37507 June 7, 1977
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- appellee,
vs.
WILLIAM PAGE, defendant- appellant.

AQUINO, J.:
William Page appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal dated July 21, 1973,
convicting him of robbery with homicide, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay
the heirs of Veronica Villaverde-Balacapo an indemnity of P12,000 plus P20,000 as moral damages
(Criminal Case No. 5396). The judgment of conviction was based on the following facts:
According to Page's confession (Exh. C), at around four o'clock in the afternoon of February 13, 1972
Crisanto Camposano, alias Boy Sangkay, a resident of Bagong Ilog, Baclaran, Parañaque , Rizal, went
to the house of William Page y Ubina located at 143 Pildira Street, near the Manila International Airport,
Pasay City, They were friends since boyhood. Page was an eighteen-year old third year high school
student at the Arellano' University in Pasay City (Exh. H).
From Page's house, the two went to Camposano's house, where they met the latter's father who was
drinking with a companion. Camposano's father gave Page some liquor to drink. Page and Camposano
stayed at the latter's house up to ten o'clock in the evening (Exh. C).
At past ten o'clock, Page and Camposano went to the rotonda or intersection of Taft Avenue and F. B.
Harrison Boulevard, where they boarded a Manila-bound jeepney. Page was armed with
a balisong knife. Camposano had a revolver.
According to Page's confession, he seated himself beside a male passenger who was near the driver on
the front seat. Camposano took a seat at the back of the jeepney where two female passengers were
seated. (The male passenger turned out to be Randolf Scot, a thirty-year old employee of the Hyatt
Regency Hotel who was on his way to work. The female passengers were the sisters, Veronica
Villaverde-Balacapo and Cesarean Villaverde).
With the jeepney was in front of the San Antonio Savings Bank on Harrison Boulevard, Page and
Camposano told the driver to turn left on Russel Avenue, going to M. Roxas Boulevard, and then to turn
left going to Parañaque . There, they held up the driver and the three passengers. They got the money
and pieces of jewelry of the passengers and the driver. From the rear view mirror of the jeepney, Page
saw Camposano dumping the two female passengers on Roxas Boulevard in front of Casa Marcos.
Then, the two directed the driver to proceed to the airport. They left the jeepney at Pildira Street (where
Page resided). Camposano gave Page a watch and a woman's ring as his share of the loot.
Page admitted that he had been charged with theft but the case was dismissed in the municipal court.
He knew certain hoodlums named Remy, Manoling, Cuerson and Edgar whose specialty was holding up
taxicabs (Exh. C).
Scot gave a slightly different version of the holdup. He testified that when the jeepney reached that
portion of Harrison Boulevard in front of the San Antonio Savings Bank, Page pressed a knife at the
neck of Scot and shouted: "This is a holdup. Don't move." Page got Scot's diary book containing a one
peso bill. Page ordered the driver, Eduardo Dilla, to shut off the lights of the jeepney, to turn left on
30
Russel Avenue, and to proceed to Roxas Boulevard. Page and Camposano covered their faces with
pieces of cloth.
Camposano told the women passengers to bring out their money and not to shout "or else there will be
shots". They replied that they had already given everything to Camposano.
When the jeepney was in front of Casa Marcos and El Presidente Hotel, one of the women jumped out
of the jeepney. (The husband of one of the women was a waiter at Casa Marcos). The other woman
shouted. Camposano kicked her, thus causing her to fall out of the jeepney. Camposano noticed that a
car was following the jeepney. Believing that it was a police car, he ordered Villa (Dilla) to drive at full
speed.
According to Scot, at an isolated place called Baltao Street near the airport, Page and Camposano told
the driver to stop. Page robbed Scot of his other one peso bill and divested the driver of his earnings
after boxing him for making some resistance. Then, the two malefactors fled to a dark alley. Scot and the
driver reported the holdup to the police of Parañaque . It was already eleven o'clock.
Lieutenant Casiano Eugenio the precinct commander, showed them a photograph of Camposano. Dilla
and Scot Identified him as one of the two hoodlums. Eugenio and the two robbery victims repaired to the
residence of Camposano at Bagong Ilog Baclaran. They saw Camposano, whom Dilla fingered, but
Camposano fired shots at them and was able to elude pursuit due to the darkness of the night. He was
killed by the Pasay City policemen while he was committing another crime.
The next day policemen went to Page's residence near the airport to apprehend him. He was not there.
His father, in the presence of his aunt, promised to surrender him.
Page was arrested in the morning of February 24, 1972 at the Jose Abad Santos High School of the
Arellano University in Pasay City. In the afternoon of that day, his statement was taken down by
Patrolman C. Prepena and sworn to before the municipal judge (Exh. C).
The woman, who jumped from the jeepney (according to Scot's story), was Veronica Balacapo. She was
brought to the Philippine General Hospital by a good Samaritan, Manolo Daval, Santos. She was already
dead when she reached the hospital.
The other woman, Cesarea Villaverde (the sister of Veronica), who was pushed by Camposano out of
the jeepney, was brought to the Ospital ng Maynila. The record is not clear as to whether she survived.
The postmortem examination of the body of Veronica Balacapo, a forty-two year old married woman,
revealed that she suffered (1) abrasions on the left eyebrow, left shoulder, left elbow and sacral region;
(2) bilateral severe hematoma on the occipital region of the scalp; (3) fractures on the base of the cranial
fossa and the fourth and fifth ribs along the midclavicular line, and (4) hemorrhage in the posterior
cranial fossa. Death was caused by the severe and traumatic meningeal hemorrhage (Exh. A and F).
On February 15, 1972 or before Page was arrested, the chief of police filed a complaint for robbery with
murder in the municipal court of Parañaque against Camposano and John Doe (Criminal Case No.
30039). The complaint was based on the investigation of Dilla and Scot. Page did not present any
evidence at the preliminary investigation. The case was remanded to the Court of First Instance where
the fiscal filed an information for robbery with homicide against Page and Camposano.
After trial, the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction already mentioned.
In this appeal, appellant Page contends that the trial court erred (1) in relying on his repudiated
confession, (2) in convicting him although he was not Identified by Randolf Scot, the prosecution's
eyewitness, and (3) in convicting him on the basis of weak circumstantial evidence.
1. Patrolman Prepena who took Page's confession, testified on its voluntariness. Lieutenant Eugenia the
precinct commander, and Patrolmen Manolito Miranda and Jose Elquiero, the arresting officer, denied
that Page was maltreated while he was in the custody of the police.
Page admitted that when he was brought before the municipal judge for the administration of the oath on
his confession, he could have complained to the latter about the alleged maltreatment. He did not
complain.
His aunt, Prudencia Alupit, and his own lawyer visited him in jail. He allegedly confided to them that he
was maltreated. He requested them to take action against the policemen. They did not complain to the
proper authorities about the alleged maltreatment.
The learned trial court made a searching and conscientious analysis of appellant's evidence on the
alleged duress employed by the police in extracting his confession. It concluded that the confession was
voluntary.
We find no error in that conclusion. Page's confession, having been taken before the new Constitution
took effect, is admissible although the requisites in section 20 of article IV were not observed (Magtoto
vs. Manguera, L-37201-2, March 3, 1975, 63 SCRA 4).
Certain details found in the confession are strong indicia of its authenticity. Page specified therein that
his residence was at 143 Pildira Street, an address which jibes with the address in his school record
(Exh. I); that his maternal surname is Ubina; that he met Camposano at four o'clock in the afternoon of
February 13, 1972; that they went to Camposano's residence, where he (Page) was given liquor by
Camposano's father; that he directed the driver to follow a certain route; that Camposano was from
Sorsogon; that Page was acquainted with some hoodlums, and that he (Page) was charged with theft.
These details would not have been embodied in the confession had not Page freely disclosed them to
the police.
2. It is true that Scot during the trial did not point to Page as the person who sat beside him on the front
seat of the jeepney and who pressed an open knife at his neck. Testifying nine months after the
occurrence, Scot could not remember the face of Page. He recalled only that Page's hair was thick.
Patrolman Ruben Crue Santiago, one of those who investigated Page, testified that the latter was
sporting long hair and looked like a hippie at the time of the investigation (2 tsn November 21, 1972).
The photographs of Page taken in July, 1971, or about seven months before the holdup, when Page was
booked for theft, show that he had long hair (Exh. G).
31
Scot's failure to identify Page during the trial is of no moment because the crucial fact is that Page in his
own confession admitted his participation in the holdup. Page stated in his confession:
Iyong jeep na pampasahero na aming sinakyan sa may Rotonda ng Baclaran
patungong Maynila, biaheng Harrison, ay may sakay na dalawang babae sa
hulihan at isang lalaki sa unahan sa tabi ng driver at ako ay naupo sa harapan
katabi ko iyong lalaki at si Boy Sangkay (Camposano) ay sa gawing hulihan.
Pagdating namin sa may tapat ng San Antonio Bank ay hinoldup namin iyong jeep
pati ng mga pasahero at pinaliko namin sa Russel Avenue patungong M. Roxas
Blvd. Pagdating namin sa M. Roxas Blvd., ay pinakaliwa namin patungong
Parañaque at noong kami'y nasa M. Roxas Blvd. na, ay kinuha namin ang mga
pera at alahas noong mga pasahero at tsuper ng jeep at matapos noon any nakita
ko na lang sa salamin na inihulog ni Boy Sangkay iyong dalawang babae sa may
tapat ng Casa Marcos sa M. Roxas Blvd.
At pagkatapos ay nagpahatid kami patungong MIA at bumaba kami sa Pildira sa
Pasay City. (No. 13, Exh. C).
Scot's testimony and the necropsy report (Exh. A) prove the corpus delicti or the fact that robbery with
homicide was committed. Page's extrajudicial confession was corroborated by the evidence on
the corpus delicti (Sec. 3, Rule 133, Rules of Court).
3. Appellant's third contention that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt, because the
prosecution's evidence is mainly circumstantial, is not meritorious.
Once it is conceded that his confession is voluntary then there cannot be any doubt as to his guilt. We
have already shown that his confession was not vitiated by compulsion or constraint.
The alibi, which Page interposed during the trial and which his counsel did not bother to discuss in his
brief, appears to be a complete fabrication. Page testified that at the time of the commission of the
holdup, he was residing with his aunt at 26 Simbo Street, Fort Bonifacio, Makati, Rizal and that he was
sick.
That testimony was squarely belied by Page's school record (Exh. 1) which shows that, when the holdup
was perpetrated, he was residing with his father at 143 Pildira Street, Pasay City near the airport (or at
101 Interior Rivera Village near the airport, Exh. H) and that on February 11, 1972, or two days before
the holdup was committed, he was not sick because on that date he was not absent from school.
In any event, even if he was a Makati resident at the time of the holdup, that would not have precluded
his participation in the commission of that offense at Baclaran, Parañaque , which is not very far from
Fort Bonifacio.
To establish an alibi, the accused must show that he was in another place for such a period of time that
it was impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its
commission (People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1973, 54 SCRA 350, 354). Page's alibi does
not satisfy that requirement.
The more important point to consider is whether the trial court correctly ruled that Page, as a fellow
conspirator of Camposano, could be held liable for robbery with homicide or for robbery only. In his
letters to this Court, Page, not being a lawyer and not knowing the rules on conspiracy, insisted that he
had nothing to do with the death of Veronica Villaverde Balacapo.
Of course, it was Camposano alone who directly brought about Veronica's death. Whether Veronica
jumped from the jeepney, as testified by Scot, or whether Camposano kicked and pushed her and her
sister, Cesarean out of the jeepney, as stated by Page in his confession, Camposano's culpability for
that flagitious deed cannot be disputed.
If Veronica jumped out of the jeepney, it must have been because she was in mortal dread that
Camposano would shoot her. As fear gripped Veronica, she, in desperation, thought of scampering out
of the moving jeepney. Her head struck the pavement. It was broken. A hemorrhage ensued. She died
before medical assistance could be extended to her.
The rule is that if a man creates in another person's mind an immediate sense of danger, which causes
such person to try to escape, and, in so doing, the latter injures himself, the man who creates such a
state of mind is responsible for the resulting injuries (People vs. Toling, L-27097, January 17, 1975, 62
SCRA 17,33).
We find that the trial court's conclusion as to conspiracy is borne out by the evidence. Page and
Camposano were boyhood friends. About six hours before the crime was committed, they were already
together. They were in the Baclaran rotonda at around ten o'clock in the evening or shortly before the
holdup was committed. They boarded the jeepney in that place. Inside the jeepney, they coordinated
their actions. They directed the jeepney driver to go near the airport or in the vicinity of Page's residence,
a place which was well-known to the two malefactors. They left the jeepney together and fled in the
same direction.
There is not a scintilla of doubt that a conspiracy to commit robbery existed between Page and
Camposano. The fact that the two armed themselves with deadly weapons, a knife and a revolver,
signified that they were determined to kill their victims in order to consummate their nefarious objective.
The conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of Page and Camposano. Those acts reveal that they had
agreed to commit robbery inside a passenger jeepney (Art. 8, Revised Penal Code). This Court may
take judicial notice that that kind of robbery has been frequently committed since the liberation when the
jeepney came into existence as a public conveyance.
Page and Camposano implemented their agreement when they waited for a passenger jeepney at the
Baclaran rotonda and boarded it at the same time. If they had no evil intention, they could have sat
together at the back. But, they did not do so. Obviously, as previously planned by them, Page took the
front seat so that he could control the driver and at the same time extort money from him and the other
passenger in the front seat. Camposano took a seat at the back of the jeepney so that he could rob the
two female passengers.
32
The behavior of Page and Camposano inside the jeepney disclosed a synchronization of their actions,
evincing a prior concert and plan to commit robbery with violence against and intimidation of persons.
Page should answer for all the consequences of the conspiracy, including the homicide which was
intertwined with the robbery committed by his conspirator. The homicide was committed on the occasion
or by reason of the robbery.
The rule is that where the conspirarcy to commit robbery was conclusively shown by the concurrent and
coordinate acts of the accused, and homicide was committed as consequence, or on the occasion, of
the robbery, all of the accused are guilty of robo con homicidio whether or not they actually participated
in the killing (People vs. Lingad, 98 Phil. 5; People vs. Puno, L-31594, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 659,
663).
Generally, when robo con homicidio has been proven. all those who had taken part int the robbery are
guilty of the special complex crime unless it appears that they endoevored to prevent the homicide (U.S.
vs. Macalalad, 9 Phil. 1). tha same rule is followed is Spanish jurisprudence.
Son resonsables de este delito (robo con homicidio) en concepto de autor no solo
todos los que cooperen a la muerte, siquiera sea con supresencia, sino tabien
todos los que intevienen en la ejecucion del robo aun cuando no temon parte en
el homicidio: (2 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal, 1975 Edition, p. 976).
Cuestion II. Comedio un robo con violencia e intimidacion e las personas por dos
sujetos, uno de los cuales dispara un trbuco, dejando muerto en el acto a un
tercero que acude en auxilo de llos rabalos, el que no disparo sera solo
responsable del robo, o al igual que su consorte, incurrira en la pena del robo con
homicido, previsto en el numero 10 del art. 516 que comentamos?
El Tribunal Supremo ha declarado que siendo ambos procesados autores del
robo, lo sonigualmente del homicido que ocurrio en el ultimo delito esta de tal
manera enlazado con el de robo, que a no prestarselo el tercero hubiese sido
muerto como lo fue; y que por ambos procesados, son autores uno y otro, segun
el art. 13 del Codigo penal, y por lo lmismo responsables los dos de todas las
consequencias de su accion." (Sentencia de 30 de Abril de 1872; 3 Viada, Codigo
Penal 347).
El propio Tribunal Supremo ha resulto; 'que si resulta probado la delincuencia del
procesado en el hecho generador, que es el robo, con ocasion del que se cometio
un homijcidio, basta esto, en conformidad a lo dispuesto en, el num. 1.º del art.
516, para conderearle tambien responsable de homicidio; resolucion cuya justicia
evidencia aun mas al parrafo segundo del art. 518, en el que se declara que los
malchechores presentes a la ejecucion de un robo en despoblado y en cuadrilla
soautores de cualquera de los atentados que esta cometa. si on constare que
procuraron impedirios. (Sentencia de 23 de Febrero de 1872; 3 Viada, Codigo
Penal, Cuarta Edicion, p. 347).
It may be added that the presence of Page in the front seat, armed with a balisong, must have
emboldened Camposano to threaten Veronica Balacapo and to cause her death with impunity.
The lower court failed to order the accused to pay the sum of P95 as the value of the things taken by
Camposano from the deceased victim.
The case of Page, a former high school student, now twenty four years old, the child of estranged
parents (he lived with his father), who, at the age of eighteen years, was implicated in robbery with
homicide, undoubtedly by reason of poverty, should ordinarily excite some sympathy and might evoke
compassionate justice.
Pressed by his lawyer to examine his conscience and to state truthfully whether he was implicated in the
holdup, Page cried and said: "Before the eyes of God, I really do not have anything to do with it. That is
why I am very sad, sir. I am being charged for a crime which I have not done. I have been in jail. I have
nothing to do with it" (19 tsn December 19, 1972).
Of course, he did not kill the victim. But, under the rules of conspiracy, he is deemed to be a co-principal
in the robbery with homicide.
He testified that he was single, However, Rosita Lareza, claiming to be his wife, and Teresita Cordero,
posing as his girl friend, filed written requests for the early disposition of his case (pp. 125 and 140,
Rollo).
We have already mentioned that he was charged with theft in the municipal court but the case was
dismissed. At the time the instant case was filed in 1972, he was charged also in the municipal court with
simple robbery and two cases of robbery with murder (Criminal Cases Nos. 30000, 30001 and 30038)
(p. 12, Expediente of Criminal Case No. 5396). He was also charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 5395 and
9765 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. (See I. S. No. 73-5054 for robbery filed in the fiscal's office at
Pasig, Rizal, pp. 63, 70 and 78 of Rollo). What happened to those cases is not shown in the record.
His behavior in prison has not been exemplary. On October 7, 1975 Page and five other prisoners
comandered the truck, which was delivering foodstuffs at the prison compound, held as hostages the
driver and the kitchen supervisor, and tried to escape. Page and four others were recaptured (p. 119,
Rollo).
Page in his letter to the Chief Justice dated April 14, 1977 manifested that, inasmuch as he could not
endure the discomforts of prolonged confinement, he was amenable to be electrocuted (he was only
sentenced to reclusion perpetua by the trial court).
This is a case where considerations of leniency are out of place. The full force of retributive justice
should be brought to bear upon the accused. Many persons have been victimized in extortions or
holdups committed in buses, taxicabs and jeepneys. The court should cooperate with the agents of the
law in making these public conveyances a safe means of travel.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's judgment is affirmed with slight modification that appellant should
further pay-the heirs of the victim the sum of P95 representing the value of the watch, earrings and
necklace taken from her. Costs against the defendant-appellant. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-16486 March 22, 1921
33
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appelle,
vs.
CALIXTO VALDEZ Y QUIRI, defendant-appellant.
Angel Roco for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Feria for appellee.
STREET, J.:
The rather singular circumstances attending the commission of the offense of homicide which is under
discussion in the present appeal are these:
At about noon, on November 29, 1919, while the interisland steamer Vigan was anchored in the Pasig
River a short distance from the lighthouse and not far from where the river debouches into the Manila
Bay, a small boat was sent out to raise the anchor. The crew of this boat consisted of the accused,
Calixto Valdez y Quiri, and six others among whom was the deceased, Venancio Gargantel. The
accused was in charge of the men and stood at the stern of the boat, acting as helmsman, while
Venancio Gargantel was at the bow.
The work raising the anchor seems to have proceeded too slowly to satisfy the accused, and he
accordingly began to abuse the men with offensive epithets. Upon this Venancio Gargantel
remonstrated, saying that it would be better, and they would work better, if he would not insult them. The
accused took this remonstrance as a display of insubordination; and rising in rage he moved towards
Venancio, with a big knife in hand, threatening to stab him. At the instant when the accused had attained
to within a few feet of Venancio, the latter, evidently believing himself in great and immediate peril, threw
himself into the water and disappeared beneath its surface to be seen no more.
The boat in which this incident took place was at the time possibly 30 or 40 yards from shore and was
distant, say, 10 paces from the Vigan. Two scows were moored to the shore, but between these and the
boat intervened a space which may be estimated at 18 or 20 yards. At it was full midday, and there was
nothing to obstruct the view of persons upon the scene, the failure of Venancio Gargantel to rise to the
surface conclusively shows that, owing to his possible inability to swim or the strength of the current, he
was borne down into the water and was drowned.
Two witnesses who were on the boat state that, immediately after Venancio leaped into the water, the
accused told the remaining members of the crew to keep quiet or he would kill them. For this reason
they made no movement looking to rescue; but inasmuch as there witnesses are sure that Venancio did
not again come to the surface, efforts at rescue would have been fruitless. The fact that the accused at
his juncture threatened the crew with violence is, therefore, of no moment except tho show the
temporary excitement under which he was laboring.
On the next day one of the friends of Venancio Gargantel posted himself near the lighthouse to watch for
the body, in the hope that it might come to the surface and could thus be recovered. Though his friendly
vigil lasted three days nothing came of it.
It may be added that Venancio has not returned to his lodging in Manila, where he lived as a bachelor in
the house of an acquaintance; and his personal belongings have been delivered to a representative of
his mother who lives in the Province of Iloilo. His friends and relatives, it is needless to say, take it for
granted that he is dead.
The circumstances narrated above are such in our opinion as to exclude all reasonable possibility that
Venancio Gargantel may have survived; and we think that the trial judge did not err in holding that he is
dead and that he came to his death by drowning under the circumstances stated. The proof is direct that
he never rose to the surface after jumping into the river, so far as the observers could see; and this
circumstance, coupled with the known fact that human life must inevitably be extinguished by
asphyxiation under water, is conclusive of his death. The possibility that he might have swum ashore,
after rising in a spot hidden from the view of his companions, we consider too remote to be entertained
for a moment.
As to the criminal responsibility of the accused for the death thus occasioned the likewise can be no
doubt; for it is obvious that the deceased, in throwing himself in the river, acted solely in obedience to the
instinct of self-preservation and was in no sense legally responsible for his own death. As to him it was
but the exercise of a choice between two evils, and any reasonable person under the same
circumstances might have done the same. As was once said by a British court, "If a man creates in
another man's mind an immediate sense of dander which causes such person to try to escape, and in so
doing he injuries himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries
which result." (Reg. vs. Halliday, 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.], 701.
In this connection a pertinent decision from the Supreme Court of Spain, of July 13, 1882, is cited in the
brief of The Attorney-General, as follows: It appeared that upon a certain occasion an individual, after
having inflicted sundry injuries upon another with a cutting weapon, pointed a shotgun at the injured
person and to escape the discharge the latter had to jump into a river where he perished by drowning.
The medical authorities charged with conducting the autopsy found that only one of the wounds caused
by a cut could have resulted in the death of the injured person, supposing that he had received no
succour, and that by throwing himself in the river he in fact died of asphyxia from submersion. Having
been convicted as the author of the homicide, the accused alleged upon appeal that he was only guilty
of the offense of inflicting serious physical injuries, or at most of frustrated homicide. The Supreme
Court, disallowing the appeal, enunciated the following doctrine: "That even though the death of the
injured person should not be considered as the exclusive and necessary effect of the very grave wound
which almost completely severed his axillary artery, occasioning a hemorrhage impossible to stanch
under the circumstances in which that person was placed, nevertheless as the persistence of the
aggression of the accused compelled his adversary, in order to escape the attack, to leap into the river,
an act which the accused forcibly compelled the injured person to do after having inflicted, among
others, a mortal wound upon him and as the aggressor by said attack manifested a determined
resolution to cause the death of the deceased, by depriving him of all possible help and putting him in
the very serious situation narrated in the decision appealed from, the trial court, in qualifying the act
prosecuted as consummated homicide, did not commit any error of law, as the death of the injured
person was due to the act of the accused." (II Hidalgo, Codigo Penal, p. 183.)
The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible author of the death of Venancio Gargantel,
and he was properly convicted of the offense of homicide. The trial judge appreciated as an attenuating
circumstance the fact that the offender had no intention to commit so great a wrong as that committed.
(Par. 3, art. 9 Penal Code.) In accordance with this finding the judge sentenced the accused to undergo
34
imprisonment for twelve years and one day, reclusion temporal, to suffer the corresponding accessories,
to indemnify the family of the deceased in the sum of P500, and to pay the costs. Said sentenced is in
accordance with law; and it being understood that the accessories appropriate to the case are those
specified in article 59 of the Penal Code, the same is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
G.R. No. 155791. March 16, 2005
MELBA QUINTO, Petitioners,
vs.
DANTE ANDRES and RANDYVER PACHECO, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
At around 7:30 a.m. on November 13, 1995, eleven-year-old Edison Garcia, a Grade 4 elementary
school pupil, and his playmate, Wilson Quinto, who was also about eleven years old, were at Barangay
San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac. They saw respondents Dante Andres and Randyver Pacheco by the mouth
of a drainage culvert. Andres and Pacheco invited Wilson to go fishing with them inside the drainage
culvert.1 Wilson assented. When Garcia saw that it was dark inside, he opted to remain seated in a
grassy area about two meters from the entrance of the drainage system.2
Respondent Pacheco had a flashlight. He, along with respondent Andres and Wilson, entered the
drainage system which was covered by concrete culvert about a meter high and a meter wide, with
water about a foot deep.3 After a while, respondent Pacheco, who was holding a fish, came out of the
drainage system and left4without saying a word. Respondent Andres also came out, went back inside,
and emerged again, this time, carrying Wilson who was already dead. Respondent Andres laid the boy’s
lifeless body down in the grassy area.5Shocked at the sudden turn of events, Garcia fled from the
scene.6 For his part, respondent Andres went to the house of petitioner Melba Quinto, Wilson’s mother,
and informed her that her son had died. Melba Quinto rushed to the drainage culvert while respondent
Andres followed her.7
The cadaver of Wilson was buried without any autopsy thereon having been conducted. The police
authorities of Tarlac, Tarlac, did not file any criminal complaint against the respondents for Wilson’s
death.
Two weeks thereafter, or on November 28, 1995, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) investigators
took the sworn statements of respondent Pacheco, Garcia and petitioner Quinto.8 Respondent Pacheco
alleged that he had never been to the drainage system catching fish with respondent Andres and Wilson.
He also declared that he saw Wilson already dead when he passed by the drainage system while riding
on his carabao.
On February 29, 1996, the cadaver of Wilson was exhumed. Dr. Dominic Aguda of the NBI performed an
autopsy thereon at the cemetery and submitted his autopsy report containing the
following postmortem findings:
 POSTMORTEM FINDINGS
Body in previously embalmed, early stage of decomposition, attired with white long sleeves and dark
pants and placed inside a wooden coffin in a niche-apartment style.
Hematoma, 14.0 x 7.0 cms., scalp, occipital region.
Abrasion, 4.0 x 3.0 cms., right face, 5.0 x 3.0 cms., left forearm.
Laryngo – tracheal lumina – congested and edematous containing muddy particles with bloody path.
Lungs – hyperinflated, heavy and readily pits on pressure; section contains bloody froth.
Brain – autolyzed and liquefied.
Stomach – partly autolyzed.
CAUSE OF DEATH: Asphyxia by drowning; traumatic head injuries, contributory.9
The NBI filed a criminal complaint for homicide against respondents Andres and Pacheco in the Office of
the Provincial Prosecutor, which found probable cause for homicide by dolo against the two.
An Information was later filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac, Tarlac, charging the
respondents with homicide. The accusatory portion reads:
That at around 8 o’clock in the morning of November 13, 1995, in the Municipality of Tarlac, Province of
Tarlac, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Dante Andres
and Randyver Pacheco y Suliven @ Randy, conspiring, confederating, and helping one another, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault, and maul Wilson Quinto inside a
culvert where the three were fishing, causing Wilson Quinto to drown and die.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
After presenting Garcia, the prosecution presented Dr. Dominic Aguda, who testified on direct
examination that the hematoma at the back of the victim’s head and the abrasion on the latter’s left
forearm could have been caused by a strong force coming from a blunt instrument or object. The injuries
in the larynx and trachea also indicated that the victim died of drowning, as some muddy particles were
also found on the lumina of the larynx and trachea ("Nakahigop ng putik"). Dr. Aguda stated that such
injury could be caused when a person is put under water by pressure or by force.11 On cross-
examination, Dr. Aguda declared that the hematoma on the scalp was caused by a strong pressure or a
strong force applied to the scalp coming from a blunt instrument. He also stated that the victim could
have fallen, and that the occipital portion of his head could have hit a blunt object.
35
Dr. Aguda also declared that the 14x7-centimeter hematoma at the back of Wilson’s head could have
rendered the latter unconscious, and, if he was thrown in a body of water, the boy could have died by
drowning.
In answer to clarificatory questions made by the court, the doctor declared that the 4x3-centimeter
abrasion on the right side of Wilson’s face could have also been caused by rubbing against a concrete
wall or pavement, or by contact with a rough surface. He also stated that the trachea region was full of
mud, but that there was no sign of strangulation.12
After the prosecution had presented its witnesses and the respondents had admitted the pictures
showing the drainage system including the inside portions thereof,13 the prosecution rested its case.
The respondents filed a demurer to evidence which the trial court granted on the ground of insufficiency
of evidence, per its Order dated January 28, 1998. It also held that it could not hold the respondents
liable for damages because of the absence of preponderant evidence to prove their liability for Wilson’s
death.
The petitioner appealed the order to the Court of Appeals (CA) insofar as the civil aspect of the case was
concerned. In her brief, she averred that –
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE AND IN RULING THAT NO
PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD ACCUSED-APPELLEES CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE
DEATH OF THE VICTIM WILSON QUINTO.14
The CA rendered judgment affirming the assailed order of the RTC on December 21, 2001. It ruled as
follows:
The acquittal in this case is not merely based on reasonable doubt but rather on a finding that the
accused-appellees did not commit the criminal acts complained of. Thus, pursuant to the above rule and
settled jurisprudence, any civil action ex delicto cannot prosper. Acquittal in a criminal action bars the
civil action arising therefrom where the judgment of acquittal holds that the accused did not commit the
criminal acts imputed to them. (Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., 91 Phil. 672)15
The petitioner filed the instant petition for review and raised the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE EXTINCTION OF RESPONDENTS’ CRIMINAL LIABILITY, LIKEWISE,
CARRIES WITH IT THE EXTINCTION OF THEIR CIVIL LIABILITY.
II
WHETHER OR NOT PREPONDERANT EVIDENCE EXISTS TO HOLD RESPONDENTS CIVILLY
LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF WILSON QUINTO.16
The petitioner avers that the trial court indulged in mere possibilities, surmises and speculations when it
held that Wilson died because (a) he could have fallen, his head hitting the stones in the drainage
system since the culvert was slippery; or (b) he might have been bitten by a snake which he thought was
the prick of a fish fin, causing his head to hit hard on the top of the culvert; or (c) he could have lost
consciousness due to some ailment, such as epilepsy. The petitioner also alleges that the trial court
erred in ruling that the prosecution failed to prove any ill motive on the part of the respondents to kill the
victim, and in considering that respondent Andres even informed her of Wilson’s death.
The petitioner posits that the trial court ignored the testimony of the Medico-Legal Expert, Dr. Aguda; the
nature, location and number of the injuries sustained by the victim which caused his death; as well as
the locus criminis. The petitioner insists that the behavior of the respondents after the commission of the
crime betrayed their guilt, considering that respondent Pacheco left the scene, leaving respondent
Andres to bring out Wilson’s cadaver, while respondent Andres returned inside the drainage system only
when he saw Garcia seated in the grassy area waiting for his friend Wilson to come out.
The petitioner contends that there is preponderant evidence on record to show that either or both the
respondents caused the death of her son and, as such, are jointly and severally liable therefor.
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that since the prosecution failed to adduce any
evidence to prove that they committed the crime of homicide and caused the death of Wilson, they are
not criminally and civilly liable for the latter’s death.
The petition has no merit.
Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.17 The civil liability of such person
established in Articles 100, 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code includes restitution, reparation of the
damage caused, and indemnification for consequential damages.18 When a criminal action is instituted,
the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. 19 With the implied institution
of the civil action in the criminal action, the two actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with
the criminal action predominating the civil.20
The prime purpose of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from
committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, to reform and rehabilitate him or, in
general, to maintain social order.21 The sole purpose of the civil action is the restitution, reparation or
indemnification of the private offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by reason of the
delictual or felonious act of the accused.22While the prosecution must prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged, it is required to prove the cause of action of the private
complainant against the accused for damages and/or restitution.
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil action. However, the
civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the
civil action that the act or omission from where the civil liability may arise does not exist. 23
Moreover, a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences
resulting therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.24 "Natural"
36
refers to an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events, while "logical" means that there is
a rational connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The felony
committed must be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that cause which in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural
and continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate
predecessor.25
There must be a relation of "cause and effect," the cause being the felonious act of the offender, the
effect being the resultant injuries and/or death of the victim. The "cause and effect" relationship is not
altered or changed because of the pre-existing conditions, such as the pathological condition of the
victim (las condiciones patologica del lesionado); the predisposition of the offended party (la
predisposicion del ofendido); the physical condition of the offended party (la constitucion fisica del
herido); or the concomitant or concurrent conditions, such as the negligence or fault of the doctors (la
falta de medicos para sister al herido); or the conditions supervening the felonious act such as tetanus,
pulmonary infection or gangrene.26
The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when:
(a) there is an active force that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting injury, and the
active force is a distinct act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or
(b) the resulting injury is due to the intentional act of the victim.27
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner as to put life in jeopardy and death
follows as a consequence of their felonious act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to
prove that other causes cooperated in producing the factual result. The offender is criminally liable for
the death of the victim if his delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the
victim.28 A different doctrine would tend to give immunity to crime and to take away from human life a
salutary and essential safeguard.29 This Court has emphasized that:
… Amid the conflicting theories of medical men, and the uncertainties attendant upon the treatment of
bodily ailments and injuries, it would be easy in many cases of homicide to raise a doubt as to the
immediate cause of death, and thereby to open a wide door by which persons guilty of the highest crime
might escape conviction and punishment. …30
In People v. Quianzon,31 the Supreme Court held:
… The Supreme Court of Spain, in a Decision of April 3, 1879, said in a case similar to the present, the
following: Inasmuch as a man is responsible for the consequences of his act – and in this case, the
physical condition and temperament of the offended party nowise lessen the evil, the seriousness
whereof is to be judged, not by the violence of the means employed, but by the result actually produced;
and as the wound which the appellant inflicted upon the deceased was the cause which determined his
death, without his being able to counteract its effects, it is evident that the act in question should be
qualified as homicide, etc.32
In the present case, the respondents were charged with homicide by dolo. In People v. Delim,33 the COURT:
Court delineated the burden of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused for homicide or murder:
The Court would ask questions.
In the case at bar, the prosecution was burdened to prove the corpus delicti which consists of two things:
first, the criminal act and second, defendant’s agency in the commission of the act. Wharton says Q So it is possible that the injury, that is – the hematoma, caused on the back of the head might be due
that corpus delictiincludes two things: first, the objective; second, the subjective element of crimes. In to the victim’s falling on his back and his head hitting a pavement?
homicide (by dolo) and in murder cases, the prosecution is burdened to prove: (a) the death of the party
alleged to be dead; (b) that the death was produced by the criminal act of some other than the deceased
and was not the result of accident, natural cause or suicide; and (c) that defendant committed the A Well, the 14x7-centimeter hematoma is quite extensive, so if the fall is strong enough and would fall
criminal act or was in some way criminally responsible for the act which produced the death. To prove from a high place and hit a concrete pavement, then it is possible.
the felony of homicide or murder, there must be incontrovertible evidence, direct or circumstantial, that
the victim was deliberately killed (with malice); in other words, that there was intent to kill. Such evidence Q Is it possible that if the victim slipped on a concrete pavement and the head hit the pavement, the
may consist inter alia in the use of weapons by the malefactors, the nature, location and number of injury might be caused by that slipping?
wounds sustained by the victim and the words uttered by the malefactors before, at the time or
immediately after the killing of the victim. If the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, A It is also possible.
intent to kill is conclusively presumed.34

Q So when the victim was submerged under water while unconscious, it is possible that he might have
Insofar as the civil aspect of the case is concerned, the prosecution or the private complainant is taken in some mud or what?
burdened to adduce preponderance of evidence or superior weight of evidence. Although the evidence
adduced by the plaintiff is stronger than that presented by the defendant, he is not entitled to a judgment
if his evidence is not sufficient to sustain his cause of action. The plaintiff must rely on the strength of his A Yes, Sir.
own evidence and not upon the weakness of that of the defendants’.35
Q So it is your finding that the victim was submerged while still breathing?
Section 1, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Evidence provides how preponderance of evidence is
determined: A Yes, Your Honor, considering that the finding on the lung also would indicate that the victim was still
alive when he was placed under water.37
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. – In civil cases, the party having the burden of
proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance The doctor also admitted that the abrasion on the right side of the victim’s face could have been caused
or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and by rubbing against a concrete wall or pavement:
circumstance of the case, the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and
opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify,
Q The abrasion 4x3 centimeters on the right [side of the] face, would it be caused by the face rubbing
the probability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far
against a concrete wall or pavement?
as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of
witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.36
A Yes, Sir. Abrasion is usually caused by a contact of a skin to a rough surface.
In the present case, we rule that, as held by the trial court and the CA, the prosecution failed to adduce
preponderant evidence to prove the facts on which the civil liability of the respondents rest, i.e., that the Q Rough surface?
petitioner has a cause of action against the respondents for damages.
A Yes, Your Honor.
It bears stressing that the prosecution relied solely on the collective testimonies of Garcia, who was not
an eyewitness, and Dr. Aguda. Q When you say that the trachea region was full of mud, were there no signs that the victim was
strangled?
We agree with the petitioner that, as evidenced by the Necropsy Report of Dr. Dominic Aguda, the
deceased sustained a 14x7-centimeter hematoma on the scalp. But as to how the deceased sustained A There was no sign of strangulation, Your Honor.38
the injury, Dr. Aguda was equivocal. He presented two possibilities: (a) that the deceased could have
been hit by a blunt object or instrument applied with full force; or (b) the deceased could have slipped,
fell hard and his head hit a hard object: The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Dr. Aguda that the deceased might have slipped,
causing the latter to fall hard and hit his head on the pavement, thus:
37
Q -Could it be possible, Doctor, that this injury might have been caused when the victim fell down and A Not much but he used to go to our house and play with my son after going from her mother who is
that portion of the body or occipital portion hit a blunt object and might have been inflicted as a result of gambling, Sir.
falling down?
Q But you are acquainted with him, you know his face?
A - If the fall … if the victim fell and he hit a hard object, well, it is also possible.39
A Yes, Sir.
The trial court took into account the following facts:
Q Will you please look around this courtroom and see if he is around?
Again, it could be seen from the pictures presented by the prosecution that there were stones inside the
culvert. (See Exhibit "D" to "D-3"). The stones could have caused the victim to slip and hit his head on A (Witness is pointing to Dante Andres, who is inside the courtroom.)43
the pavement. Since there was water on the culvert, the portion soaked with water must be very slippery,
aside from the fact that the culvert is round. If the victim hit his head and lost consciousness, he will
naturally take in some amount of water and drown.40 When the petitioner’s son died inside the drainage culvert, it was respondent Andres who brought out
the deceased. He then informed the petitioner of her son’s death. Even after informing the petitioner of
the death of her son, respondent Andres followed the petitioner on her way to the grassy area where the
The CA affirmed on appeal the findings of the trial court, as well as its conclusion based on the said deceased was:
findings.
Q Did not Dante Andres follow you?
We agree with the trial and appellate courts. The general rule is that the findings of facts of the trial
court, its assessment of probative weight of the evidence of the parties, and its conclusion anchored on
such findings, affirmed no less by the CA, are given conclusive effect by this Court, unless the trial court A He went with me, Sir.
ignored, misapplied or misconstrued cogent facts and circumstances which, if considered, would change
the outcome of the case. The petitioner failed to show any justification to warrant a reversal of the Q So when you went to the place where your son was lying, Dante Andres was with you?
findings or conclusions of the trial and appellate courts.
A No, Sir. When I was informed by Dante Andres that my son was there at the culvert, I ran immediately.
That the deceased fell or slipped cannot be totally foreclosed because even Garcia testified that the He [was] just left behind and he just followed, Sir.
drainage culvert was dark, and that he himself was so afraid that he refused to join respondents Andres
and Pacheco inside.41 Respondent Andres had no flashlight; only respondent Pacheco had one. Q So when you reached the place where your son was lying down, Dante Andres also came or arrived?

Moreover, Dr. Aguda failed to testify and explain what might have caused the abrasion on the left A It was only when we boarded the jeep that he arrived, Sir.44
forearm of the deceased. He, likewise, failed to testify whether the abrasions on the face and left forearm
of the victim were madeante mortem or post mortem.
In sum, the petitioner failed to adduce preponderance of evidence to prove a cause of action for
damages based on the deliberate acts alleged in the Information.
The petitioner even failed to adduce preponderance of evidence that either or both the respondents hit
the deceased with a blunt object or instrument, and, consequently, any blunt object or instrument that
might have been used by any or both of the respondents in hitting the deceased. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. No costs. SO
ORDERED.
It is of judicial notice that nowadays persons have killed or committed serious crimes for no reason at
all.42However, the absence of any ill-motive to kill the deceased is relevant and admissible in evidence to F. Impossible Crime
prove that no violence was perpetrated on the person of the deceased. In this case, the petitioner failed
to adduce proof of any ill-motive on the part of either respondent to kill the deceased before or after the
latter was invited to join them in fishing. Indeed, the petitioner testified that respondent Andres used to
go to their house and play with her son before the latter’s death: G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992

Q Do you know this Dante Andres personally? SULPICIO INTOD, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
38

CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Petitioner, Sulpicio Intod, filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 affirming in
toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Oroquieta City, finding him guilty of the crime
of attempted murder.
From the records, we gathered the following facts.
In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig
went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to
go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian,
Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted
Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should
accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and
Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis
Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's
bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out,
however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law
and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire.
Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that before
the five men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina
Palangpangan and we will come back if (sic) you were not injured". 2
After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted Intod of attempted murder. The court (RTC), as affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner seeks from this
Court a modification of the judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible crime, citing Article 4(2)
of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be
incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or
property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on
account of the employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
39
On the other hand, Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible.
Instead, the facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder.
Respondent alleged that there was intent. Further, in its Comment to the Petition, respondent pointed
out that:
. . . The crime of murder was not consummated, not because of the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment (Art. 4(2), Revised Penal Code), but due to a
cause or accident other than petitioner's and his accused's own spontaneous
desistance (Art. 3., Ibid.) Palangpangan did not sleep at her house at that time.
Had it not been for this fact, the crime is possible, not impossible. 3
Article 4, paragraph 2 is an innovation 4 of the Revised Penal Code. This seeks to remedy the void in the
Old Penal Code where:
. . . it was necessary that the execution of the act has been commenced, that the
person conceiving the idea should have set about doing the deed, employing
appropriate means in order that his intent might become a reality, and finally, that
the result or end contemplated shall have been physically possible. So long as
these conditions were not present, the law and the courts did not hold him
criminally liable. 5
This legal doctrine left social interests entirely unprotected. 6 The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the
Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability, 7 and now penalizes an act which were it
not aimed at something quite impossible or carried out with means which prove inadequate, would
constitute a felony against person or against property. 8 The rationale of Article 4(2) is to punish such
criminal tendencies. 9
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against person or
property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment: or (2)
the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual. 10
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. 11 There must be either impossibility
of accomplishing the intended act 12 in order to qualify the act an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a
crime. 13 Thus:
Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where (1) the motive,
desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is
intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended
physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting from the intended act does not
amount to a crime. 14
The impossibility of killing a person already dead 15 falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. 16 One example is the man who
puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the
pocket empty. 17
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his victim would
be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the petitioner failed to
accomplish his end.
One American case had facts almost exactly the same as this one. In People vs. Lee Kong, 18 the
accused, with intent to kill, aimed and fired at the spot where he thought the police officer would be. It
turned out, however, that the latter was in a different place. The accused failed to hit him and to achieve
his intent. The Court convicted the accused of an attempt to kill. It held that:
The fact that the officer was not at the spot where the attacking party imagined
where he was, and where the bullet pierced the roof, renders it no less an attempt
to kill. It is well settled principle of criminal law in this country that where the
criminal result of an attempt is not accomplished simply because of an obstruction
in the way of the thing to be operated upon, and these facts are unknown to the
aggressor at the time, the criminal attempt is committed.
In the case of Strokes vs. State, 19 where the accused failed to accomplish his intent to kill the victim
because the latter did not pass by the place where he was lying-in wait, the court held him liable for
attempted murder. The court explained that:
It was no fault of Strokes that the crime was not committed. . . . It only became
impossible by reason of the extraneous circumstance that Lane did not go that
way; and further, that he was arrested and prevented from committing the murder.
This rule of the law has application only where it is inherently impossible to commit
the crime. It has no application to a case where it becomes impossible for the
crime to be committed, either by outside interference or because of miscalculation
as to a supposed opportunity to commit the crime which fails to materialize; in
short it has no application to the case when the impossibility grows out of
extraneous acts not within the control of the party.
In the case of Clark vs. State, 20 the court held defendant liable for attempted robbery even if there was
nothing to rob. In disposing of the case, the court quoted Mr. Justice Bishop, to wit:
It being an accepted truth that defendant deserves punishment by reason of his
criminal intent, no one can seriously doubt that the protection of the public requires
the punishment to be administered, equally whether in the unseen depths of the
pocket, etc., what was supposed to exist was really present or not. The community
suffers from the mere alarm of crime. Again: Where the thing intended (attempted)
as a crime and what is done is a sort to create alarm, in other words, excite
apprehension that the evil; intention will be carried out, the incipient act which the
law of attempt takes cognizance of is in reason committed.
40
In State vs. Mitchell, 21 defendant, with intent to kill, fired at the window of victim's room thinking that the
latter was inside. However, at that moment, the victim was in another part of the house. The court
convicted the accused of attempted murder.
The aforecited cases are the same cases which have been relied upon by Respondent to make this
Court sustain the judgment of attempted murder against Petitioner. However, we cannot rely upon these
decisions to resolve the issue at hand. There is a difference between the Philippine and the American
laws regarding the concept and appreciation of impossible crimes.
In the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, in Article 4(2), expressly provided for impossible crimes and
made the punishable. Whereas, in the United States, the Code of Crimes and Criminal Procedure is
silent regarding this matter. What it provided for were attempts of the crimes enumerated in the said
Code. Furthermore, in said jurisdiction, the impossibility of committing the offense is merely a defense to
an attempt charge. In this regard, commentators and the cases generally divide the impossibility defense
into two categories: legal versus factual impossibility. 22 In U.S. vs. Wilson 23 the Court held that:
. . . factual impossibility of the commission of the crime is not a defense. If the
crime could have been committed had the circumstances been as the defendant
believed them to be, it is no defense that in reality the crime was impossible of
commission.
Legal impossibility, on the other hand, is a defense which can be invoked to avoid criminal liability for an
attempt. In U.S. vs. Berrigan, 24 the accused was indicated for attempting to smuggle letters into and out
of prison. The law governing the matter made the act criminal if done without knowledge and consent of
the warden. In this case, the offender intended to send a letter without the latter's knowledge and
consent and the act was performed. However, unknown to him, the transmittal was achieved with the
warden's knowledge and consent. The lower court held the accused liable for attempt but the appellate
court reversed. It held unacceptable the contention of the state that "elimination of impossibility as a
defense to a charge of criminal attempt, as suggested by the Model Penal Code and the proposed
federal legislation, is consistent with the overwhelming modern view". In disposing of this contention, the
Court held that the federal statutes did not contain such provision, and thus, following the principle of
legality, no person could be criminally liable for an act which was not made criminal by law. Further, it
said:
Congress has not yet enacted a law that provides that intent plus act plus conduct
constitutes the offense of attempt irrespective of legal impossibility until such time
as such legislative changes in the law take place, this court will not fashion a new
non-statutory law of criminal attempt.
To restate, in the United States, where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or
accomplishment, the offender cannot escape criminal liability. He can be convicted of an attempt to
commit the substantive crime where the elements of attempt are satisfied. It appears, therefore, that the
act is penalized, not as an impossible crime, but as an attempt to commit a crime. On the other hand,
where the offense is legally impossible of accomplishment, the actor cannot be held liable for any crime
— neither for an attempt not for an impossible crime. The only reason for this is that in American law,
there is no such thing as an impossible crime. Instead, it only recognizes impossibility as a defense to a
crime charge — that is, attempt.
This is not true in the Philippines. In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility
of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore,
the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no
distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos
distinguere debemos.
The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended
crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such
is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of
Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision
in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against
persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all
circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident
independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED. the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of
respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. We
hereby hold Petitioner guilty of an impossible crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2,
and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Having in mind the social danger and degree of
criminality shown by Petitioner, this Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 129291 July 3, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ENRICO A. VALLEDOR, accused-appellant.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City,
Branch 47, in Criminal Case Nos. 9359, 9401, and 9489, convicting accused-appellant of the crimes of
murder, attempted murder and frustrated murder, respectively.
The informations filed against accused-appellant read:
In Criminal Case No. 9359, for murder:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991, in the afternoon, at Barangay Tagumpay,
Puerto Princesa City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with treachery and evident premeditation, with intent to kill and while armed with a
knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab therewith
one Elsa Villon Rodriguez thereby inflicting upon the latter stabbed (sic) wound on the chest,
which was the immediate cause of her death.
41
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
In Criminal Case No.9401, for attempted murder:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991, in the afternoon, at Bgy. Tagumpay, Puerto
Princesa City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premiditation (sic) and while armed with
a knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab
therewith one Ricardo Maglalang thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries on the
different parts of his body, thus commencing the commission of the crime of murder directly
by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution which would produce the felony
by reason of some causes or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance that is, by
the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said Ricardo Maglalang which prevented
his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
In Criminal Case No.9489, for frustrated murder:
That on or about the 6th day of March, 1991 at Bgy. Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court the above-named accused, with
intent to kill with treachery and evidence (sic) premeditation and while armed with a butcher
knife, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab therewith
on (sic) Roger Cabiguen, hitting him on his right forearm, thus performing all the acts of
execution which produce the crime of murder as a consequence but which nevertheless did
not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is, by the timely and able
medical attendance rendered to him which saved his life.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
After his arrest, accused-appellant was intermittently confined at the National Center for Mental Health.
Thus, he was arraigned only on February 19, 1993 wherein he pleaded not guilty.5 Thereafter, the cases
were archived until November 15, 1994, when accused-appellant was declared mentally fit to withstand
trial.6 This time, accused-appellant admitted commission of the crimes charged but invoked the
exempting circumstance of insanity. The lower court thus conducted reverse and joint trial, at which the
following facts were established:
On March 6, 1991, at around 1:45 in the afternoon, Roger Cabiguen was in his house at Burgos Street,
Barangay Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City. He was working on a lettering job inside his bedroom
together with his first cousin, then 25-year old Elsa Rodriguez, and his friends, Simplicio Yayen and
Antonio Magbanua. Roger was working at his table and seated on his bed while Elsa was across the
table. Antonio was on the left side, while Simplicio was seated near the door, on the right side of Roger.7
All of a sudden, accused-appellant entered the room; uttered Roger's nickname ("Jer") and immediately
attacked him with a knife, but Roger was able to parry the thrust and was stabbed instead on the right
forearm. Accused-appellant then stabbed Elsa Rodriguez on the chest and said, "Ako akabales den,
Elsa." (I had my revenge, Elsa). Thereafter, accused-appellant fled, leaving the stunned Simplicio and
Antonio unharmed.8
Roger and Elsa were immediately brought to the hospital. On their way out, Antonio noticed a
commotion and saw that Ricardo Maglalang, a neighbor of the victim, was wounded. Antonio learned
from the by-standers that Ricardo was likewise stabbed by accused-appellant.9
Upon reaching the hospital, Elsa was declared dead on arrival. Roger on the other hand was treated for
the 5-centimeter wound sustained by him on his right forearm.10
Prosecution witness Roger Cabiguen testified that sometime in 1980, accused-appellant suspected him
of killing his pet dog. In 1989, accused-appellant courted Elsa but she jilted him. On one occasion, Elsa
spat on and slapped accused-appellant.11
Accused-appellant's defense of insanity was anchored on the following facts:
Accused-appellant, then 30 years of age, was a resident of Barangay Tagumpay, Puerto Princesa City,
and employed as provincial jail guard at the Palawan Provincial Jail. Sometime in January 1990, Pacita
Valledor, his mother noticed that accused-appellant was behaving abnormally. For days he was restless
and unable to sleep. He likewise complained that their neighbors were spreading rumors that he was a
rapist and a thief. This prompted Pacita to bring his son to Dr. Deriomedes de Guzman, a medical
practitioner. Pacita disclosed to Dr. de Guzman that insanity runs in their family. After examining
accused-appellant, Dr. de Guzman diagnosed him as suffering from "psychosis with
schizophrenia."12 He prescribed a depressant known as Thoracin, which kept accused-appellant sane
for a period two months.13
On March 4, 1991, Pacita noticed that accused-appellant was again acting strangely. She left to buy
Thoracin but when she returned he was nowhere to be found.14
On March 6, 1991, at around 6:00 in the morning, accused-appellant was seen swimming across the
river of Barangay Caruray, San Vicente, Palawan. Barangay Captain Rufino Nuñez and Barangay
Councilman Antonio Sibunga took accused-appellant out of the water and took him on board a pump
boat. Inside the boat, accused-appellant kept on crying and uttering words to the effect that his family will
be killed. Suspecting that accused-appellant was mentally ill, Barangay Captain Nuñez, asked
Councilman Sibunga to accompany accused-appellant to Puerto Princesa City. Sibunga acceded and
thereafter took a jeepney with accused-appellant at Barangay Bahile. At about 1:00 in the afternoon,
they reached Junction I at the intersection of the National Highway and Rizal Avenue, Puerto Princesa
City. Suddenly, accused-appellant jumped off the jeepney. Sibunga tried but failed to chase accused-
appellant, who immediately boarded a tricycle. Later that day, he learned that accused-appellant killed
and harmed somebody.15
Meanwhile, at around 2:00 in the afternoon of March 6, 1991, Pacita Valledor was awakened by her
daughter who told her that accused-appellant has returned. She rushed out of the house and saw him
standing in the middle of the road, dusty and dirty. She asked him where he came from but his answer
was "Pinatay niya kayong lahat." Pacita dragged him inside the house and later learned that he killed
and wounded their neighbors. Thirty minutes later, accused-appellant was arrested and detained at the
city jail.16
42
On March 11, 1991, Dr. Manuel Bilog, City Health Officer I of Puerto Princesa City interviewed accused-
appellant and thereafter made the following conclusions and recommendation, to wit:
PHYSICAL EXAMINATION:
Cooperative; talkative but incoherent
Disoriented as to time, place and person
DISPOSITION AND RECOMMENDATION:
Respectfully recommending that subject patient be committed to the National
Mental Hospital, Metro Manila for proper medical care and evaluation soonest.17
The defense offered in evidence the April 27, 1992 medical findings on accused-appellant by Dr. Guia
Melendres of the National Center for Mental Health, pertinent portion of which reads:
REMARKS AND RECCOMENDATION:
In view of the foregoing history, observations, physical mental and psychological
examinations the patient Enrico Valledor y Andusay is found suffering from Psychosis or
Insanity classified under Schizophrenia. This is a thought disorder characterized by
deterioration from previous level of functioning, auditory hallucination, ideas of reference,
delusion of control, suspiciousness, poor judgment and absence of insight.
Likewise, he is found to be suffering from Psychoactive Substance Use Disorder, Alcohol,
abuse. This is characterized by a maladaptive pattern of psychoactive substance use
indicated by continued use despite knowledge of having a persistent or recurrent social,
occupational, psychological or physical problems.18
Dr. Oscar Magtang, a psychiatrist assigned at the Medical Service of the PNP, Puerto Princesa City was
likewise presented by the defense to interpret the aforecited findings of Dr. Melendres.19
On February 28, 1997, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment of conviction. The dispositive
portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused ENRICO A. VALLEDOR is hereby found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of MURDER in Criminal Case No. 9359; of
FRUSTRATED MURDER in Criminal Case No. 9489; and of ATTEMPTED MURDER in
Criminal Case No. 9401 as charged herein. Accordingly he is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case No. 9359;reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case
No. 9489; and imprisonment of from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY to TEN (10)
YEARS in Criminal Case No. 9401. It is understood that the accused shall serve these
penalties successively or one after the other.
 The accused is also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased victim Elsa Villon
Rodriguez the sum of P50,000.00 and to indemnify the victim Roger Cabiguen, the sum of
P14,000.00 as actual damages, and the sum P15,000.00 for loss of income.
Considering that the accused is found to be suffering from a serious mental disorder at
present as certified to by the National Center for Mental Health, Mandaluyong City, Metro
Manila, the service of his sentence is hereby ordered SUSPENDED pursuant to Article 12
and 79 of the Revised Penal Code. He (Enrico Valledor) is ordered shipped to and confined
at the National Center for Mental Health, Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila, for his treatment,
until such time that he becomes fit for the service of his sentence at the national penitentiary,
Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. As to his civil liability, the same is subject to execution after this
judgment shall have become final executory.
IT IS ORDERED.20
Accused-appellant interposed this appeal and raised the lone assignment of error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE FACT THAT
WHEN HE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED THE OFFENSE CHARGED HE WAS MENTALLY ILL,
OUT OF HIS MIND OR INSANE AT THE (sic) TIME.21
The appeal has no merit.
In considering a plea of insanity as a defense, the starting premise is that the law presumes all persons
to be of sound mind. Otherwise stated, the law presumes all acts to be voluntary, and it is improper to
presume that acts were done unconsciously.22
In People v. Estrada,23 it was held that:
In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The
accused must be "so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent." He must be
deprived of reason and act without the least discernment because there is a complete
absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will.
Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. And the evidence on this point
must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its
execution.
Insanity is evinced by a deranged and perverted condition of the mental faculties which is manifested in
language and conduct. An insane person has no full and clear understanding of the nature and
consequences of his acts. Hence, insanity may be shown by the surrounding circumstances fairly
throwing light on the subject, such as evidence of the alleged deranged person's general conduct and
appearance, his acts and conduct consistent with his previous character and habits, his irrational acts
and beliefs, as well as his improvident bargains. The vagaries of the mind can only be known by outward
43
acts, by means of which we read thoughts, motives and emotions of a person, and through which we
determine whether the acts conform to the practice of people of sound mind.24
In the case at bar, accused-appellant failed to discharge the burden of overcoming the presumption of
sanity at the time of the commission of the crime. The following circumstances clearly and unmistakably
show that accused-appellant was not legally insane when he perpetrated the acts for which he was
charged: 1) Simplicio Yayen was positioned nearest to accused-appellant but the latter chose to stab
Roger and Elsa; 2) Accused-appellant called out the nickname of Roger before stabbing him; 3)
Simplicio Yayen and Antonio Magbanua who were likewise inside the room were left unharmed; 4)
Accused-appellant, a spurned suitor of Elsa, uttered the words, "Ako akabales den, Elsa." (I had my
revenge, Elsa) after stabbing her; and 5) Accused-appellant hurriedly left the room after stabbing the
victims.
Evidently, the foregoing acts could hardly be said to be performed by one who was in a state of a
complete absence of the power to discern. Judging from his acts, accused-appellant was clearly aware
and in control of what he was doing as he in fact purposely chose to stab only the two victims. Two other
people were also inside the room, one of them was nearest to the door where accused-appellant
emerged, but the latter went for the victims. His obvious motive of revenge against the victims was
accentuated by calling out their names and uttering the words, "I had my revenge" after stabbing them.
Finally, his act of immediately fleeing from the scene after the incident indicates that he was aware of the
wrong he has done and the consequence thereof.
Accused-appellant's acts prior to the stabbing incident to wit: crying; swimming in the river with his
clothes on; and jumping off the jeepney; were not sufficient to prove that he was indeed insane at the
time of the commission of the crime. As consistently held by this Court, "A man may act crazy but it does
not necessarily and conclusively prove that he is legally so."25 Then, too, the medical findings showing
that accused-appellant was suffering from a mental disorder after the commission of the crime, has no
bearing on his liability. What is decisive is his mental condition at the time of the perpetration of the
offense. Failing to discharge the burden of proving that he was legally insane when he stabbed the
victims, he should be held liable for his felonious acts.
In Criminal Case No. 9489, accused-appellant should be held liable only for attempted murder and not
frustrated murder. The wound sustained by Roger Cabiguen on his right forearm was not fatal. The
settled rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is
only attempted murder, since the accused did not perform all the acts of execution that would have
brought about death.26
Pursuant to Article 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed upon the principal of an
attempted crime shall be lower by two degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony. Before
its amendment by R.A. No. 7659, Article 248 provided that the penalty for murder was reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. Under Article 61(3), the penalty two degrees lower would
be prision correccional maximum to prision mayormedium. As there is no modifying circumstance, the
medium period of the penalty, which is prision mayorminimum, should be imposed. Under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant is entitled to a minimum penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correcional in its medium period, the penalty next lower than the penalty for
attempted murder.27
For the murder of Elsa Rodriguez, in Criminal Case No. 9359, the trial court correctly imposed upon
accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua, considering that no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance was proven by the prosecution.
Accused-appellant's civil liability must be modified. Not being substantiated by evidence, the award of
P14,000.00 as actual damages, and P15,000.00 for loss of income, to Roger Cabiguen in Criminal Case
No. 9489, should be deleted. However, in lieu thereof, temperate damages under Article 2224 of the
Civil Code may be recovered, as it has been shown that Roger Cabiguen suffered some pecuniary loss
but the amount thereof cannot be proved with certainty. For this reason, an award of P10,000.00 by way
of temperate damages should suffice.28
In addition to the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity which was properly awarded by the trial court
in Criminal Case No. 9359, the heirs of Elsa Rodriguez are entitled to another P50,000.00 as moral
damages which needs no proof since the conviction of accused-appellant for the crime of murder is
sufficient justification for said award.29The heirs of the deceased are likewise entitled to the amount of
P29,250.00 representing actual damages30based on the agreement of the parties.31
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and
Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47, is MODIFIED as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 9359, accused-appellant Enrico A. Valledor is hereby found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua; and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Elsa Rodriguez the
following amounts: P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P29,250.00 as actual damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. 9489, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
only of the crime of attempted murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months ofprision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum; and to indemnify Roger Cabiguen in the amount of P10,000.00 by way
of temperate damages;
3. In Criminal Case No. 9401, accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of attempted murder and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years
and two (2) months ofprision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 162540 July 13, 2009
GEMMA T. JACINTO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
44
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto seeking the reversal
of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23761 dated December 16, 2003,
affirming petitioner's conviction of the crime of Qualified Theft, and its Resolution2 dated March 5, 2004
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner, along with two other women, namely, Anita Busog de Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline
Capitle, was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 131, with the crime
of Qualified Theft, allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about and sometime in the month of July 1997, in Kalookan City, Metro Manila, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping
one another, being then all employees of MEGA FOAM INTERNATIONAL INC., herein represented by
JOSEPH DYHENGCO Y CO, and as such had free access inside the aforesaid establishment, with
grave abuse of trust and confidence reposed upon them with intent to gain and without the knowledge
and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and
deposited in their own account, Banco De Oro Check No. 0132649 dated July 14, 1997 in the sum
of P10,000.00, representing payment made by customer Baby Aquino to the Mega Foam Int'l. Inc. to the
damage and prejudice of the latter in the aforesaid stated amount of P10,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The prosecution's evidence, which both the RTC and the CA found to be more credible, reveals the
events that transpired to be as follows.
In the month of June 1997, Isabelita Aquino Milabo, also known as Baby Aquino, handed petitioner
Banco De Oro (BDO) Check Number 0132649 postdated July 14, 1997 in the amount of P10,000.00.
The check was payment for Baby Aquino's purchases from Mega Foam Int'l., Inc., and petitioner was
then the collector of Mega Foam. Somehow, the check was deposited in the Land Bank account of
Generoso Capitle, the husband of Jacqueline Capitle; the latter is the sister of petitioner and the former
pricing, merchandising and inventory clerk of Mega Foam.
Meanwhile, Rowena Ricablanca, another employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call sometime in
the middle of July from one of their customers, Jennifer Sanalila. The customer wanted to know if she
could issue checks payable to the account of Mega Foam, instead of issuing the checks payable
to CASH. Said customer had apparently been instructed by Jacqueline Capitle to make check payments
to Mega Foam payable to CASH. Around that time, Ricablanca also received a phone call from an
employee of Land Bank, Valenzuela Branch, who was looking for Generoso Capitle. The reason for the
call was to inform Capitle that the subject BDO check deposited in his account had been dishonored.
Ricablanca then phoned accused Anita Valencia, a former employee/collector of Mega Foam, asking the
latter to inform Jacqueline Capitle about the phone call from Land Bank regarding the bounced check.
Ricablanca explained that she had to call and relay the message through Valencia, because the Capitles
did not have a phone; but they could be reached through Valencia, a neighbor and former co-employee
of Jacqueline Capitle at Mega Foam.
Valencia then told Ricablanca that the check came from Baby Aquino, and instructed Ricablanca to ask
Baby Aquino to replace the check with cash. Valencia also told Ricablanca of a plan to take the cash
and divide it equally into four: for herself, Ricablanca, petitioner Jacinto and Jacqueline Capitle.
Ricablanca, upon the advise of Mega Foam's accountant, reported the matter to the owner of Mega
Foam, Joseph Dyhengco.
Thereafter, Joseph Dyhengco talked to Baby Aquino and was able to confirm that the latter indeed
handed petitioner a BDO check for P10,000.00 sometime in June 1997 as payment for her purchases
from Mega Foam.4Baby Aquino further testified that, sometime in July 1997, petitioner also called her on
the phone to tell her that the BDO check bounced.5 Verification from company records showed that
petitioner never remitted the subject check to Mega Foam. However, Baby Aquino said that she had
already paid Mega Foam P10,000.00 cash in August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.6
Generoso Capitle, presented as a hostile witness, admitted depositing the subject BDO check in his
bank account, but explained that the check came into his possession when some unknown woman
arrived at his house around the first week of July 1997 to have the check rediscounted. He parted with
his cash in exchange for the check without even bothering to inquire into the identity of the woman or her
address. When he was informed by the bank that the check bounced, he merely disregarded it as he
didn’t know where to find the woman who rediscounted the check.
Meanwhile, Dyhengco filed a Complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out
an entrapment operation with its agents. Ten pieces of P1,000.00 bills provided by Dyhengco were
marked and dusted with fluorescent powder by the NBI. Thereafter, the bills were given to Ricablanca,
who was tasked to pretend that she was going along with Valencia's plan.
On August 15, 2007, Ricablanca and petitioner met at the latter's house. Petitioner, who was then
holding the bounced BDO check, handed over said check to Ricablanca. They originally intended to
proceed to Baby Aquino's place to have the check replaced with cash, but the plan did not push through.
However, they agreed to meet again on August 21, 2007.
On the agreed date, Ricablanca again went to petitioner’s house, where she met petitioner and
Jacqueline Capitle. Petitioner, her husband, and Ricablanca went to the house of Anita Valencia;
Jacqueline Capitle decided not to go with the group because she decided to go shopping. It was only
petitioner, her husband, Ricablanca and Valencia who then boarded petitioner's jeep and went on to
Baby Aquino's factory. Only Ricablanca alighted from the jeep and entered the premises of Baby Aquino,
pretending that she was getting cash from Baby Aquino. However, the cash she actually brought out
from the premises was the P10,000.00 marked money previously given to her by Dyhengco. Ricablanca
divided the money and upon returning to the jeep, gave P5,000.00 each to Valencia and petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested by NBI agents, who had been watching the whole
time.
Petitioner and Valencia were brought to the NBI office where the Forensic Chemist found fluorescent
powder on the palmar and dorsal aspects of both of their hands. This showed that petitioner and
Valencia handled the marked money. The NBI filed a criminal case for qualified theft against the two and
one Jane Doe who was later identified as Jacqueline Capitle, the wife of Generoso Capitle.
45
The defense, on the other hand, denied having taken the subject check and presented the following
scenario.
Petitioner admitted that she was a collector for Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30, 1997, but
claimed that she had stopped collecting payments from Baby Aquino for quite some time before her
resignation from the company. She further testified that, on the day of the arrest, Ricablanca came to her
mother’s house, where she was staying at that time, and asked that she accompany her (Ricablanca) to
Baby Aquino's house. Since petitioner was going for a pre-natal check-up at the Chinese General
Hospital, Ricablanca decided to hitch a ride with the former and her husband in their jeep going to Baby
Aquino's place in Caloocan City. She allegedly had no idea why Ricablanca asked them to wait in their
jeep, which they parked outside the house of Baby Aquino, and was very surprised when Ricablanca
placed the money on her lap and the NBI agents arrested them.
Anita Valencia also admitted that she was the cashier of Mega Foam until she resigned on June 30,
1997. It was never part of her job to collect payments from customers. According to her, on the morning
of August 21, 1997, Ricablanca called her up on the phone, asking if she (Valencia) could accompany
her (Ricablanca) to the house of Baby Aquino. Valencia claims that she agreed to do so, despite her
admission during cross-examination that she did not know where Baby Aquino resided, as she had
never been to said house. They then met at the house of petitioner's mother, rode the jeep of petitioner
and her husband, and proceeded to Baby Aquino's place. When they arrived at said place, Ricablanca
alighted, but requested them to wait for her in the jeep. After ten minutes, Ricablanca came out and, to
her surprise, Ricablanca gave her money and so she even asked, "What is this?" Then, the NBI agents
arrested them.
The trial of the three accused went its usual course and, on October 4, 1999, the RTC rendered its
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court finds accused Gemma Tubale De Jacinto y Latosa,
Anita Busog De Valencia y Rivera and Jacqueline Capitle GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime ofQUALIFIED THEFT and each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of FIVE (5)
YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS AND ELEVEN (11) DAYS, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8)
MONTHS AND TWENTY (20) DAYS, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
The three appealed to the CA and, on December 16, 2003, a Decision was promulgated, the dispositive
portion of which reads, thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED, in that:
(a) the sentence against accused Gemma Jacinto stands;
(b) the sentence against accused Anita Valencia is reduced to 4 months arresto
mayor medium.
(c) The accused Jacqueline Capitle is acquitted.
SO ORDERED.
A Partial Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing CA Decision was filed only for petitioner Gemma
Tubale Jacinto, but the same was denied per Resolution dated March 5, 2004.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner alone, assailing the Decision and
Resolution of the CA. The issues raised in the petition are as follows:
1. Whether or not petitioner can be convicted of a crime not charged in the information;
2. Whether or not a worthless check can be the object of theft; and
3. Whether or not the prosecution has proved petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.8
The petition deserves considerable thought.
The prosecution tried to establish the following pieces of evidence to constitute the elements of the crime
of qualified theft defined under Article 308, in relation to Article 310, both of the Revised Penal Code: (1)
the taking of personal property - as shown by the fact that petitioner, as collector for Mega Foam, did not
remit the customer's check payment to her employer and, instead, appropriated it for herself; (2) said
property belonged to another − the check belonged to Baby Aquino, as it was her payment for
purchases she made; (3) the taking was done with intent to gain – this is presumed from the act of
unlawful taking and further shown by the fact that the check was deposited to the bank account of
petitioner's brother-in-law; (4) it was done without the owner’s consent – petitioner hid the fact that she
had received the check payment from her employer's customer by not remitting the check to the
company; (5) it was accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things – the check was voluntarily handed to petitioner by the customer, as she was known to
be a collector for the company; and (6) it was done with grave abuse of confidence – petitioner is
admittedly entrusted with the collection of payments from customers.
However, as may be gleaned from the aforementioned Articles of the Revised Penal Code, the
personal property subject of the theft must have some value, as the intention of the accused is
to gain from the thing stolen.This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the
penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the thing stolen.
In this case, petitioner unlawfully took the postdated check belonging to Mega Foam, but the same was
apparently without value, as it was subsequently dishonored. Thus, the question arises on whether the
crime of qualified theft was actually produced.
The Court must resolve the issue in the negative.
Intod v. Court of Appeals9 is highly instructive and applicable to the present case. In Intod, the accused,
intending to kill a person, peppered the latter’s bedroom with bullets, but since the intended victim was
not home at the time, no harm came to him. The trial court and the CA held Intod guilty of attempted
murder. But upon review by this Court, he was adjudged guilty only of an impossible crime as defined
and penalized in paragraph 2, Article 4, in relation to Article 59, both of the Revised Penal Code,
46
because of the factual impossibility of producing the crime. Pertinent portions of said provisions read as
follows:
Article 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. - Criminal responsibility shall be incurred:
xxxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not
for theinherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate to
ineffectual means. (emphasis supplied)
Article 59. Penalty to be imposed in case of failure to commit the crime because the means employed or
the aims sought are impossible. - When the person intending to commit an offense has already
performed the acts for the execution of the same but nevertheless the crime was not produced by
reason of the fact that the act intended was by its nature one of impossible accomplishment or because
the means employed by such person are essentially inadequate to produce the result desired by him,
the court, having in mind the social danger and the degree of criminality shown by the offender, shall
impose upon him the penalty of arresto mayor or a fine ranging from 200 to 500 pesos.
Thus, the requisites of an impossible crime are: (1) that the act performed would be an offense against
persons or property; (2) that the act was done with evil intent; and (3) that its accomplishment was
inherently impossible, or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. The aspect of the
inherent impossibility of accomplishing the intended crime under Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code
was further explained by the Court in Intod10 in this wise:
Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against persons or
property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or (2)
the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.
That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the
offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal
impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as
an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime.
xxxx
The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
On the other hand, factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or
beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. x x x 11
In Intod, the Court went on to give an example of an offense that involved factual impossibility, i.e., a
man puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet, but gets
nothing since the pocket is empty.
Herein petitioner's case is closely akin to the above example of factual impossibility given in Intod. In this
case, petitioner performed all the acts to consummate the crime of qualified theft, which is a crime
against property. Petitioner's evil intent cannot be denied, as the mere act of unlawfully taking the check
meant for Mega Foam showed her intent to gain or be unjustly enriched. Were it not for the fact that the
check bounced, she would have received the face value thereof, which was not rightfully hers.
Therefore, it was only due to the extraneous circumstance of the check being unfunded, a fact unknown
to petitioner at the time, that prevented the crime from being produced. The thing unlawfully taken by
petitioner turned out to be absolutely worthless, because the check was eventually dishonored, and
Mega Foam had received the cash to replace the value of said dishonored check.1avvphi1
The fact that petitioner was later entrapped receiving the P5,000.00 marked money, which she thought
was the cash replacement for the dishonored check, is of no moment. The Court held in Valenzuela v.
People12 that under the definition of theft in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, "there is only one
operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the taking of personal property of another."
Elucidating further, the Court held, thus:
Baby Aquino to give cash as replacement for the check was hatched only after the check had been
dishonored by the drawee bank. Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner's act of
receiving the cash replacement should not be considered as a continuation of the theft. At most, the fact
that petitioner was caught receiving the marked money was merely corroborating evidence to strengthen
proof of her intent to gain.
Moreover, the fact that petitioner further planned to have the dishonored check replaced with cash by its
issuer is a different and separate fraudulent scheme. Unfortunately, since said scheme was not included
or covered by the allegations in the Information, the Court cannot pronounce judgment on the accused;
otherwise, it would violate the due process clause of the Constitution. If at all, that fraudulent scheme
could have been another possible source of criminal liability.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
December 16, 2003, and its Resolution dated March 5, 2004, are MODIFIED. Petitioner Gemma T.
Jacinto is found GUILTY of an IMPOSSIBLE CRIME as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph
2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code, respectively. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6)
months of arrresto mayor, and to pay the costs. SO ORDERED.

x x x Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there is one apparent answer
provided in the language of the law — that theft is already "produced" upon the "tak[ing of] personal
property of another without the latter’s consent."

xxxx

x x x when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that
theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to
gain. Viewed from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once
having committed all the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property
stolen since the deprivation from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. x x x

xxxx

x x x we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the
moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the
same. x x x

x x x Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which produces
the felony in its consummated stage. x x x 13

From the above discussion, there can be no question that as of the time that petitioner took
possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the acts to consummate
the crime of theft, had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case. The circumstance of
petitioner receiving the P5,000.00 cash as supposed replacement for the dishonored check was no
longer necessary for the consummation of the crime of qualified theft. Obviously, the plan to convince

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