Systems Engineering — Theory & Practice

Volume 29, Issue 8, August 2009

Online English edition of the Chinese language journal

Cite this article as: SETP, 2009, 29(8): 153–159

Quantitative HAZOP Analysis for Gas Turbine Compressor

based on Fuzzy Information Fusion
HU Jin-qiu∗ , ZHANG Lai-bin, LIANG Wei, WANG Zhao-hui
Faculty of Mechanical and Electronic Engineering, China University of Petroleum, Beijing 102249, China

Abstract: An improved Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) modeling and reasoning method is proposed based on the fuzzy information
fusion theory, in order to solve practical safety-related problems in industry, such as quantitative information loss and the difficulty of
system safety decision-making during the traditional computer-aid HAZOP analysis. A directed graph knowledge model of systematical
HAZOP analysis is first developed, taking advantage of different fuzzy quantitative methods corresponding to various variable nodes
with different attributes in the system. Based on the D-S evidence theory, the quantitative deviated information between relevant nodes
on the path of hazard propagation is used for the fuzzy information reasoning, which is to indicate the fusion reliability of hazard
reasons and consequences of system, respectively, and provides an important foundation in safety decision-making. The results of the
proposed method applied on the gas turbine compressor system in “Se-Ning-Lan” pipeline system present the possible hazard reasons
and consequences according to the current running states with corresponding sorted fusion reliabilities, based on which the appropriate
and effective safety maintenance plans are taken into action to avoid accidents. The comparison with traditional HAZOP analysis shows
that the proposed method is able to solve the limitation and the uncertainty of traditional HAZOP qualitative analysis and improve the
rationality of maintenance decision-making under the existence of multi hazard sources.
Key words: HAZOP analysis; fuzzy information fusion; D-S evidence theory; gas turbine compressor

1 Introduction
Hazard and Operability study (HAZOP) is an im-
portant technique used to identify potential hazard rea-
sons and estimate their consequences in large-scale me-
chanical engineering systems. Recently, HAZOP studies
have been improved successfully to overcome the time-
consuming and laborious problems of traditional artificial
HAZOP analysis, such as SDG-HAZOP method[1−2] , fuzzy
interference-based HAZOP[3] , Petri net-based HAZOP[4] ,
and a knowledge-based TOPHAZOP software tool devel-
oped by Faisal and Abbasi[5] . The above-mentioned ap-
proaches have advanced the development of safety analysis
based on HAZOP study. Nevertheless, several aspects need
to be further investigated when they are applied to complex
industrial system, such as gas turbine compressor system:
(1) In traditional computer-aid HAZOP analysis, as
variable deviations are qualitatively described by guide
words, important quantitative information (such as variable
deviation degree, probability of hazards and consequences,
etc.) is usually lost, which affects the accuracy of safety as-
sessment for complex system.
(2) The traditional HAZOP approaches usually ignore
the interaction and relationship among system variables, and
hence when there are more than one hazard sources or devi-
ations, it will result in redundant solutions, improper main-
tenance plans, and false alarms.
Received date: May 4, 2008
∗ Corresponding author: E-mail: hjqcup@hotmail.com
Foundation item: Supported by the National High Technology Research and Development Program of China (No.2008AA06Z209); CNPC Innovation
Fund(No.2006-A); Program for New Century Excellent Talents in China University(No.NCET-05-0110)
Copyright 
c 2009, Systems Engineering Society of China. Published by Elsevier BV. All rights reserved.
(3) Not all the compatible pathways derived from for-
ward and backward inference mechanism of computer-aid
HAZOP would actually happen in the real world, since a
considerable part of them have a very low occurrence prob-
ability. Especially during the safety analysis of large-scale
petrochemical or mechanical system, this approach with low
recognition capability would result in large number of out-
comes or even “combinational explosion”[6] which may lead
the safety engineer to take inappropriate safety inspections
and miss the best maintenance time.
Therefore, this article presents an improved HAZOP
approach for addressing the above challenges. A directed
graph knowledge (DGK) model is first developed to (1) iden-
tify system variables that can represent system safety condi-
tion, process, and performance; (2) determine the state space
of each variable; (3) build explicit relationships (i.e. inter-
dependencies) among above variables with different attribu-
tions. A fuzzy information fusion method integrating fuzzy
mathematics and D-S evidence theory is further proposed
to analyze the potential hazards of system (e.g. functional
faults, component failures, human mistakes, and external
destruction), providing possible hazard origins and conse-
quences with corresponding fusion reliabilities. It is utilized
to solve uncertainty problem in safety decision-making un-
der the situation of multi-hazard sources or multi deviation
variables. A field case study for the gas turbine compres-
sor system presents how to apply the proposed method to
 HU Jin-qiu, et al./Systems Engineering — Theory & Practice, 2009, 29(8): 153–159

a real industrial system for quantitative safety analysis, and

the final safety assessment results provide a reliable founda-
tion for appropriate and accurate safety maintenance or con-
tingency decision-making which is to eliminate any hazard
source leading to major accidents.
2 Systemic HAZOP analysis based on
directed graph knowledge (DGK) model
HAZOP approach is defined as the application of a for-
mal, systematic critical examination of the process and the
engineering intentions of existing facilities to assess the po-
tential for malfunctioning of individual pieces of equipment,
and the consequential effects on the facility as a whole. In
the process of HAZOP deep knowledge model development Figure 1. HAZOP DGK model
based on graph theory, executing the method relies on us-
ing guidewords combined with process parameters that aim parabola distribution are somewhat conservative; while the
to reveal deviations of the process intention or normal oper- membership function values of half-normal distribution and
ation, with the framework of relationships and interactions Cauchy distribution are less than 1, the physical meaning
among key variables. Having determined the deviations, of these formulas are also not clear enough. Therefore, ac-
their feasible causes and their possible consequences are cording to the constructive principle of fuzzy membership
explored by backward and forward reasoning respectively function and considering the transformation features of node
along compatible pathways (i.e. hazard propagation paths). variables as well as the practical experience in engineering,
Considering the various deviations corresponding to the membership function with ridge-shaped distribution is
process parameters of large-scale mechanical system, an im- selected for fuzzy quantitative processing of node states.
proved SDG-HAZOP[2] model is proposed according to the With the concept of fuzzy set, the deviation Δvi of node
industrial practice in this article, using system deviations vi is mapped into fuzzy quantitative deviation δvi . Assuming
(i.e. combinations of parameters and guide words) in HA- the normal interval of a node deviation as [vil , vis ], the value
ZOP analysis as nodes in HAZOP graph model, and hence boundary is processed by ridge-shape distribution function,
it is able to describe the “fluctuation”, “none”, “opposite” with upper and lower boundaries as [vils , vis s
],[vill l
, vis ], re-
states which are important in HAZOP analysis, as well as spectively, where vil = vi − ε, vis = vi + ε, vil = vil − ε,
s s s s l
l
“more than”, “less than” and “normal” states in traditional vis = vil + ε, and ε can be commonly set as ε = (vis − vil )/5
SDG model. with slight modification according to the need of engineer-
ing practice. The fuzzy membership function of the node
3 Quantitative HAZOP model based on
deviation is shown in Figure 1, and the formula expression
fuzzy information fusion theory
is Eq.(1).
3.1 Fuzzy quantitative deviation of observable node ⎧
⎪ −1 x ≤ vill
In DGK model, when node states are described by ⎪
⎪ l l
⎪
⎪ 1 1 π vis +vil
vill < x ≤ vis
l
guide words such as “more than”, “less than”, “normal”, ⎨ − 2 + 2 sin( visl −v l (x −
il
2 ))
“fluctuation”, the quantitative information is lost, which δvi = 0 l
vis < x ≤ vils
⎪
⎪ s s
results in a great deal of false solutions while searching ⎪
⎪ 1
+ 12 sin( vs −v
π
s (x −
vis +vil
)) s s
vil < x ≤ vis
⎪
⎩ 2 is il
2
along the hazard propagation pathway, and combinatorial 1 s
x > vis
explosion of algorithm complexity[7] . Therefore, the node (1)
states in DGK model are quantitatively determined by fuzzy
mathematics theory first, which will be subsequently used 3.2 Fuzzy membership distribution of hazard reason
for backward and forward fusion reasoning and decision- and consequence nodes
making in the next step. In HAZOP model, a given node deviation often corre-
Because of the transition phenomenon caused by the sponds to various possible hazard reasons, and also produces
transformation of node states and the unclear delineation of a number of possible consequences. In these reason and con-
the boundary between “normal” state and “abnormal” state, sequence sets, there are some certain reasons with higher
the deviation variable of a node only belongs to a discrete probabilities that indicate common hazard sources, whereas
state set to some extent. Considering the transition of an ob- others with rather lower probabilities indicating that those
servable deviation from “absolutely normal” to “absolutely hazard sources seldom occurred before. Taking node devi-
abnormal” state, the membership function is introduced to ation “Lower lubricating oil pressure” in gas turbine com-
represent the deviation degree. In engineering practice, there pressor system for example, “Oil filter is blocked” in cor-
are a few common membership functions, such as half- responding hazard reason sets will occur with higher possi-
trapezium distribution, quadratic parabola distribution, half- bility, while “bearing temperature suddenly increases” with
normal distribution, Cauchy distribution, and ridge-shaped lower possibility. If these HAZOP analysis results are output
distribution. Because half-trapezium distribution belongs to simultaneously without any information about occurrence
linear model, it is unable to represent the nonlinear charac- possibility, field safety engineer will usually be misled, ig-
teristics of variables; the calculation results of quadratic noring the most important hazards (i.e. root causes), and
 HU Jin-qiu, et al./Systems Engineering — Theory & Practice, 2009, 29(8): 153–159
finally failing to make accurate safety maintenance plan to
avoid accidents.
Relative comparison approach[8] based on dualistic
contrast compositor theory is applied to determine the fuzzy
membership of each element in reason and consequence sets.
Elements in the given universe are pairwisely compared tak-
ing into account some certain characteristics (such as occur-
rence possibility of hazard reasons or consequences accord-
ing to field engineering experience). Assuming a number
pair (fy (x), fx (y)) is a couple in [0, 1] × [0, 1], the so-called
dualistic comparative degree can be built. Matrix S is then
established based on Eq.(2), and the minimum value in each
row of S severs as the fuzzy membership value Ri of the cor-
responding element. Afterward, Ri is sorted descendingly
and is prepared for calculating fusion reliability in fusion
reasoning and decision-making process.
fy (x)
f (x/y) = (2)
max(fx (y), fy (x))
3.3 Fusion reliability of hazard propagation
Along the compatible pathway in HAZOP DGK model,
if the parent node has several deviated child nodes, i.e. multi-
hazard sources, the occurrence possibility of deviation of
parent node can be determined by the entire deviated child
nodes based on information fusion theory. According to
the composite formula[9] in D-S evidence theory, assuming
M1 , M2 , · · · , Mn as several possibility distributive functions
in Ω, their orthogonal sum M = M1 + M2 + · · · + Mn is
defined as follows:
M (Φ) = 0
 
M (A) = c−1 Mi (Ai ), when A = Φ (3)
∩Ai =A 1≤i≤n
 flow diagrams (PFDs) and Piping and Instrumentation Di-
where c = 1 −
 ∩Ai =Φ 1≤i≤n Mi (Ai ) =
∩Ai =Φ 1≤i≤n Mi (Ai )
Based on Eq.(3), assuming that parent node vi has a
child node vj on its compatible pathway, i.e. vi → vj (j ∈
J, J = j|Ψ(vi )φ(vi , vj )Ψ(vj ) = +, |J| ≥ 1), there is a the-
orem as follows[7] :
Theorem 3.1 Assuming the child nodes with basic reli-
abilities as Mj (A) = |δvj | and Mj (Θ) = 1 − |δvj |, respec-
tively, the basic reliability m(A) of parent node vi is derived
as follows:
|J|
  
m(A) = [(−1)k−1 ( |δvjl |)] (4)
k=1 |lk =k| l∈lk
where lk represents k dimensional combination
|J|
 tionship among various nodes from reason to consequence.
or m(A) = 1 − 1 − |δvjk | (5)
k=1
Known from theorem 3.1, m(A) is the fusion formula
in D-S evidence theory used for determing of parent node de-
viation, which can be derived from each child node deviation
δvj . Eqs.(4) and (5), which are mathematically equivalent,
indicate that the basic reliability of fusion node equals to the
integration of all the basic reliabilities calculated by mutual
fusion of relative nodes, in other words, whether the fusion
node is deviated or not depends on the integration of whether
each node is deviated.
If the parent node vi has fuzzy deviation δvi , then the
possibility P l(vi ) of vi being hazard propagation node or
hazard source is determined by δvi and m(A) together, that
is
P l(vi ) = |δvi |m(A) (6)
As the node deviation on hazard propagation path-
way increases, P l(vi ) increases accordingly, therefore the
changed P l(vi ) can be used to further determine the hazard
propagation pathway. When there are unobservable nodes,
the fusion values of fuzzy quantitative deviations of child
nodes can be used as the possibility of parent node being
hazard source, that is P l(vi ) = m(A), then the hazard rea-
soning will continue along the hazard propagation pathway.
When the reason or consequence node is finally searched
out, assuming the node as vi , with fuzzy membership Rvi
calculated by Eq.(2) and matrix S, the final fusion reliability
of the HAZOP fuzzy fusion reasoning is
Rl(vi ) = Rvi m(A) (7)
When there are several hazard resources, this approach
can derive the fusion reliability of each hazard reason, which
is conducive to safety maintenance decision-making accord-
ing to corresponding priorities.
4 HAZOP fuzzy fusion reasoning and
decision-making scheme for gas turbine
compressor system
1)Qualitative HAZOP study. A small multi-disciplinary
team undertakes the analysis, following the system’s process
agrams (P&IDs), breaking the design into manageable sec-
tions with definite boundaries in the process, and defining
observable and unobservable variables of system. Based on
HAZOP study procedure, the hazard reasons, consequences,
and safety measurements are determined according to differ-
ent variable deviations of system (combination of parameters
and guide words).
2) DGK model of HAZOP study development. The
DGK model of HAZOP is developed to simultaneously
integrate the structure of the system, the variables, and
causal mechanisms (or interdependencies) analysed in step
1). Meanwhile, each deviation variable is associated with
an inner node in DGK model, whereas each exogenous fac-
tor (i.e. hazard reason or consequence) is associated with
a terminal node outside the DGK model on the end of haz-
ard propagation pathway. The DGK model structure is con-
structed by creating the directed edges regarding causal rela-
Therefore, each hazard propagation pathway is created by
connecting hazard reason node to each deviation node along
directed edges, and finally reach hazard consequence node.
3) Fuzzy quantitative model of HAZOP study develop-
ment. According to the normal range of system inner vari-
able (i.e. inner node), the parameters of fuzzy membership
function with ridge-shape distribution are determined, which
is considered the fuzzy quantitative function of inner nodes
 HU Jin-qiu, et al./Systems Engineering — Theory & Practice, 2009, 29(8): 153–159
Figure 2. Main hierarchy model of gas turbine compressor system
in system DGK model representing their deviation possibil-
ity. Relative comparison approach is adopted to assign quan-
titative fuzzy membership of each exogenous node (hazard
reason or consequence node outside DGK model) represent-
ing its occurrence possibility.
4) Possible hazard consequence reasoning. Online con-
dition monitoring provides the state of observable variables
as evidence for reasoning. If there is a deviation happen-
ing on node Si according to Eq.(1), the searching procedure
is then taken from the observable deviation node Si down-
wardly, i.e. from deviation nodes to consequence nodes.
Fusion reliability of child nodes on the hazard propagation
pathway is calculated based on Eq.(4) or (5), then the hazard
occurrence possibility of downstream node is calculated by
Eq.(6), and finally the fusion reliability of each possible haz-
ard consequence is figured out according to Eq.(7). Above
possible hazard consequences are sorted with descending or-
der and output to client as the final forward fusion reasoning
results.
5) Feasible hazard source (root cause) reasoning. Back-
ward searching procedure starts from the observable devia-
tion node Si upwardly, i.e. from underlining deviation nodes
to reason nodes, and by the same way repeats the calculation
process of step 4). Finally, the fusion reliabilities of possible
hazard reasons are derived and are sorted with descending
order as output of backward fusion reasoning results.
6) Safety-related action searching. According to the
comprehensive hazard reasons and consequences output by
quantitative HAZOP analysis, corresponding safety inspec-
tion or maintenance advices are searched out.
7) Safety plan decision-making. Finally, each hazard
propagation pathway, feasible hazard season (including its
fusion reliability), possible hazard consequence (including
its fusion reliability), and corresponding safety-related ac-
tions are output, according to which field safety engineers
are able to make a decision to implement appropriate inspec-
tion or maintenance scheme to avoid major accidents.
5 Case study of gas turbine compressor system
5.1 Fuzzy quantitative analysis model of
HAZOP analysis
1) HAZOP DGK model of gas turbine compressor sys-
tem
Based on analytic hierarchy process of gas turbine com-
pressor system on “Se-Ning-Lan” gas pipeline, the hierar-
chy model of main components with four levels, i.e., system
level, subsystem level, equipment level, component level, is
shown in Figure 2, taking compressor system, start-up sys-
tem, and lubrication system as examples.
Taking centrifugal compressor subsystem in above hi-
erarchy model for example, HAZOP DGK model is devel-
oped as shown in Figure 3, where N1 − N7 represent sys-
tem deviations, which are “higher pressure difference of fil-
ter”, “lower lubricating oil pressure”, “lower level of oil
tank”, “higher bearing temperature”, “higher oil tempera-
ture”, “higher outlet water temperature”, and “less cooling
water” respectively.
 HU Jin-qiu, et al./Systems Engineering — Theory & Practice, 2009, 29(8): 153–159

Figure 3. HAZOP DGK model

2) Distribution of occurrence possibility of hazard rea-
son and consequence
Taking the reason node “higher bearing temperature”
for example, fuzzy membership value of each element
in hazard reason set is distributed according to Eq.(2)
and matrix S. Assume X as the reason set of “higher
bearing temperature”, i.e. X = {x1 , x2 , x3 }, where
x1 =“Higher lubricating oil temperature”, x2 =“Smaller
throttle diameter of oil inlet”, and x3 =“Bearing fault”.
Three dualistic comparative degrees are established as
(fx2 (x1 ), fx1 (x2 )) = (0.6, 0.5), (fx3 (x2 ), fx2 (x3 )) =
(0.6, 0.4), (fx3 (x1 ), fx1 (x3 )) = (0.8, 0.3), then the matrix
S is derived as follows:
⎛ ⎞
1 1 1
⎝ 5/6 1 1 ⎠
3/8 4/6 1
The conclusion is obtained that the fuzzy membership
of set {x1 , x2 , x3 } is {1, 0.833, 0.375}, while the occurrence
possibility of hazard consequence nodes can be distributed in
the same way.
5.2 HAZOP fuzzy fusion reasoning and
decision-making of gas turbine compressor system
During the real time on-line condition monitoring of
gas turbine compressor system, the average lubricating oil
temperature was 57◦ C, and lubricating oil pressure was
0.095MPa, all of which have deviated from normal value
interval. Traditional HAZOP analysis would indicate be-
low possible hazard reasons (10 reasons) in table 1 and even
show redundant results. Moreover each result is output with-
out any information about its occurrence possibility, which

Table 1. Result of quantitative HAZOP analysis (feasible hazard reasons with advised safety-related action)

Feasible hazard reasons Fusion reliability Safety-related action required

1. Smaller diameter of oil inlet throttle.
2. Higher outlet water temperature.
3. Fault in main oil pump.
4. Insufficient cooling water.
5. Oil pipe rupture or oil leakage at conjunctions.
6. Bearing clearance is on the small side, caus-
ing severe friction and a mass of heat.
7. Obstruction in oil filter or oil passage way,
which causes oil pressure loss.
8. Deterioration of lubricant.
9. Bearing fault.
10. Lubricating oil leakage at pipeline and valves.
0.8035 1. Checking oil throttle orifice of bearing and increasing
throttle diameter, making the flow of lubricating oil meet
the operation requirement.
0.7142 2. Increasing the cooling circulating water.
0.6829 3. Switching pump for inspection and repair.
0.6351 4. Increasing the cooling circulating water.
0.5122 5. Inspection or replacement of pipe section.
0.4763 6. Inspecting and appropriately adjusting (enlarging) the
bearing clearance to decrease the heat caused by friction.
0.4000 7. Disassembly checking and cleaning the lubricating oil
filter.
0.3969 8. Releasing the gas from lubricating oil system or changing
lubricating oil.
0.3616 9. Checking and repairing or replacing the bearing.
0.2561 10. Changing conjunction gasket at leak location, tighten-
ing connecting bolt, and making no leakage occurrence.
 HU Jin-qiu, et al./Systems Engineering — Theory & Practice, 2009, 29(8): 153–159
Table 2. Result of quantitative HAZOP analysis (possible hazard consequences)
Possible hazard consequences
1. Oil film is difficult to sustain; bearing will be burnt; seal will be damaged or impeller will be destroyed.
2. Shutdown caused by low oil pressure.
3. Carbonization of lubricating oil or decreasing lubrication performance.
make it difficult for field engineer to take proper inspec-
tion or maintenance action. So Field safety engineers have
to check each HAZOP analysis result sequentially on the as-
sessment list, which is considered as a waste of manpower
and material resources, on the other hand during this time-
consuming inspection, field engineers not only miss the best
time to maintenance and avoid major accident, but also let
system deteriorate severely.
Based on the HAZOP DGK model shown in Figure 3,
the detailed steps of fuzzy fusion reasoning and decision-
making are as follows:
1) Fuzzy quantification of observable node deviation.
The normal value interval of lubricating oil temperature at
system running state is [35, 55]◦ C, while the measured lubri-
cating oil temperature was 57◦ C. According to Eq.(1), set-
ting ε = 5, the quantitative fuzzy deviation of node N5 is
calculated to be δN5 = 0.7939. In the same way, the normal
value interval of lubricating oil pressure is [0.1, 0.15]MPa,
therefore, setting ε = 5, the quantitative fuzzy deviation of
node N2 is then calculated as δN2 = −0.8536.
2) The results of fuzzy fusion reasoning and sorting are
shown in Table 1 and Table 2, which indicate the most fea-
sible hazard reason is “Smaller diameter of oil inlet throttle”
corresponding to the largest fusion reliability of 0.8035, and
the most possible hazard consequence is ”Oil film is difficult
to sustain; bearing will be burnt; seal will be damaged or im-
peller will be destroyed” corresponding to the largest fusion
reliability of 1.318.
Afterward, field safety engineers inspected of the gas
turbine compressor system according to the sorted hazard
reasons and consequences and considered the related main-
tenance advices in the list. The manual examination results
proved that the results given by quantitative HAZOP anal-
ysis proposed in this article fitted well with the actual situ-
ation, i.e. the diameter of the oil inlet throttle was smaller
than normal value, which was a danger to system long-term
running. Meanwhile, the possible consequence list in table
2 as a pre-warning alarm is conducive for safety engineer to
make contingency plans to avoid major accidents in advance.
Safety engineers paid close attention to the condition moni-
toring data, e.g. bearing temperature, seal temperature, and
shaft displacement. Finally, after safety engineers increased
the diameter of the oil inlet throttle and added more cooling
water, the deviated observable variables came back into nor-
mal interval, which avoided potential accidents successfully.
Compared to the traditional HAZOP analysis, the proposed
method helps safety engineer to make maintenance decision
as quickly and accurately as possible, and solves the prob-
lems (e.g. limitation and uncertainty) in traditional qualita-
tive HAZOP analysis. The assessment results are more rea-
sonable when there is more than one deviation in the system.
6 Conclusions
(1) A HAZOP DGK model of gas turbine compressor
is developed in this article. By utilizing fuzzy information
Fusion reliability
1.3180
0.6829
0.5122
fusion approach, observable node deviation is fuzzily quan-
tified, i.e. node deviation degrees, and occurrence possibili-
ties of hazard reasons and consequences are also determined,
which solves the problems of false alarm due to quantitative
information loss.
(2) According to information fusion theory, the inter-
action and interdependency among deviation nodes are inte-
grated in the searching process of hazard propagation path-
way, and the final fusion reliabilities of hazard reasons and
consequences are calculated based on the proposed scheme
and then sorted in descending order, which solves the limita-
tion of hazard identification and safety assessment for com-
plex industrial system when there exist multi-hazard sources
and multi-deviation nodes. The proposed method can effec-
tively avoid the phenomena of “combinatorial explosion”.
Therefore, field safety engineer is able to know the poten-
tial hazards in system, make safety decision quickly and ac-
curately, in order to avoid major accidents, casualties, and
economic losses.
(3) In the future application of the proposed method, the
parameters of fuzzy quantitative model of HAZOP analysis
should be adjusted and modified throughout different phases
of the system life cycle, according to the running state char-
acteristics. Meanwhile, more field case studies are needed
to validate the proposed fuzzy fusion reasoning scheme and
optimize the membership function and the reasoning algo-
rithm.
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