ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
The alien is naturally
FACTS: The Legislature passed R.A. 1180 (An Act to Regulate the Retail
Business). Its purpose was to prevent persons who are not citizens of the Phil. from
having a stranglehold upon the people’s economic life.
 a prohibition against aliens and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by Filipinos, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade
 aliens actually engaged in the retail business on May 15, 1954 are allowed to
continue their business, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with
law, until their death or voluntary retirement. In case of juridical persons, ten
years after the approval of the Act or until the expiration of term.
Citizens and juridical entities of the United States were exempted from this Act.
 provision for the forfeiture of licenses to engage in the retail business for
violation of the laws on nationalization, economic control weights and measures
and labor and other laws relating to trade, commerce and industry.
 provision against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the
retail business of additional stores or branches of retail business Lao Ichong, in
his own behalf and behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
affected by the Act, filed an action to declare it unconstitutional for the ff:
reasons:
1. It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives
them of their liberty and property without due process.
2. The subject of the Act is not expressed in the title
3. The Act violates international and treaty obligations
4. The provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail
business thru hereditary succession
ISSUE: WON the Act deprives the aliens of the equal protection of the laws.
HELD: The law is a valid exercise of police power and it does not deny the aliens
the equal protection of the laws. There are real and actual, positive and fundamental
differences between an alien and a citizen, which fully justify the legislative
classification adopted.
RATIO: The equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality among
residents. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced. The classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one
class are treated alike. The difference in status between citizens and aliens constitutes
a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise of police power.
Official statistics point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control by
alien of the retail trade. It is this domination and control that is the legislature’s target
in the enactment of the Act. The mere fact of alienage is the root cause of the
distinction between the alien and the national as a trader.
lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for the Phil. where he temporarily
stays and makes his living. The alien owes no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and
the State cannot rely on him/her in times of crisis or emergency.
While the citizen holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of
the country, the alien may become the potential enemy of the State.
The alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on
whom he makes his profit. Through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and
practices, the alien now enjoys a monopolistic control on the nation’s economy
endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.
I. The case and issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and
constitutionality of a legislative enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in
significance. The enactment poses questions of due process, police power and equal
protection of the laws. It also poses an important issue of fact, that is whether the
conditions which the disputed law purports to remedy really or actually exist.
Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive nationalistic impulse, the
law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer. Through it, and
within the field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate national
aspirations for economic independence and national security, rooted in the drive and
urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures
designed to free the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so
that the country and the nation may be free from a supposed economic dependence
and bondage. Do the facts and circumstances justify the enactment?
xxx
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the
supposed violation thereby of the Charter of the United Nations and of the
Declaration of the Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.
We find no merit in the Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations
regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the
United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains
nothing more than a mere recommendation or a common standard of achievement
for all peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United
Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can be inferred the fact that
members of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway and Denmark,
prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world
laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.
 The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in
question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese
nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But the
nationals of China are not discriminating against because nationals of all other
countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the
Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But even supposing
that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification
or amendment by a subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and
the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State
(plaston vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was
enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien
dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from
dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police
power of the State, thru which and by which it protects its own personality and
insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction
between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due
process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the
privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their
privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to
us to be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but
actually necessary — and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of
the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the
Government may not interfere; that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in
the title, and this suffers from no duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the
segment of the population affected; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed
conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on
the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or
any other conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the
law could have been made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that
the more time should have been given in the law for the liquidation of existing
businesses when the time comes for them to close. Our legal duty, however, is
merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of legislative authority and does
not transcend the limitations of due process and equal protection guaranteed in the
Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law should be addressed to the
Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.
MAXIMO CALALANG vs A. D. WILLIAMS, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 47800 December 2, 1940
Doctrine: Social Justice
Facts: The National Traffic Commission, in its resolution of July 17, 1940, resolved
to recommend to the Director of the Public Works and to the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited
from passing along the following for a period of one year from the date of the
opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic:
1) Rosario Street extending from Plaza Calderon de la Barca to Dasmariñas
Street from 7:30Am to 12:30 pm and from 1:30 pm to 530 pm; and
2) along Rizal Avenue extending from the railroad crossing at Antipolo Street to
Echague Street from 7 am to 11pm.
The Chairman of the National Traffic Commission on July 18, 1940
recommended to the Director of Public Works with the approval of the Secretary of
Public Works the adoption of the measure proposed in the resolution aforementioned
in pursuance of the provisions of the Commonwealth Act No. 548 which authorizes
said Director with the approval from the Secretary of the Public Works and
Communication to promulgate rules and regulations to regulate and control the use
of and traffic on national roads.
On August 2, 1940, the Director recommended to the Secretary the approval
of the recommendations made by the Chairman of the National Traffic Commission
with modifications. The Secretary of Public Works approved the recommendations
on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila
have enforced and caused to be enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence,
all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the
places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding
public as well.
Issues: 1) Whether the rules and regulations promulgated by the respondents
pursuant to the provisions of Commonwealth Act NO. 548 constitute an unlawful
inference with legitimate business or trade and abridged the right to personal liberty
and freedom of locomotion?
2) Whether the rules and regulations complained of infringe upon the constitutional
precept regarding the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and
economic security of all the people?
Held: 1) No. The promulgation of the Act aims to promote safe transit upon and
avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. In
enacting said law, the National Assembly was prompted by considerations of public
convenience and welfare. It was inspired by the desire to relieve congestion of
traffic, which is a menace to the public safety. Public welfare lies at the bottom of
the promulgation of the said law and the state in order to promote the general welfare
may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and
occupations. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and
burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To
this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated. Liberty is a blessing which should not be made to prevail over
authority because society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to
prevail over liberty because then the individual will fall into slavery. The paradox
lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is precisely the very means of
insuring its preserving.
2) No. Social justice is “neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor
anarchy,” but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic
forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception
may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of
all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure
economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance
of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of
the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable,
or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of
all governments on the time-honored principles of salus populi estsuprema lex.
Social justice must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence
among divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be
equally and evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and
economic life, consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state
of promoting health, comfort and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about “the
greatest good to the greatest number.”
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 648; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER; AUTHORITY OF DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS TO
PROMULGATE RULES AND REGULATIONS. — The provisions of section 1
of Commonwealth Act No. 648 do not confer legislative power upon the Director of
Public Works and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. The authority
therein conferred upon them and under which they promulgated the rules and
regulations now complained of is not to determine what public policy demands but
merely to carry out the legislative policy laid down by the National Assembly in said
Act, to wit, "to promote safe transit upon, and avoid obstructions on, roads and
streets designated as national roads by acts of the National Assembly or by executive
orders of the President of the Philippines" and to close them temporarily to any or all
classes of traffic "whenever the condition of the road or the traffic thereon makes
such action necessary or advisable in the public convenience and interest." The
delegated power, if at all, therefore, is not the determination of what the law shall be,
but merely the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances upon which the
application of said law is to be predicated. To promulgate rules and regulations on
the use of national roads and to determine when and how long a national road should
be closed to traffic, in view of the condition of the road or the traffic thereon and the
requirements of public convenience and interest, is an administrative function which
cannot be directly discharged by the National Assembly. It must depend on the
discretion of some other government official to whom is confided the duty of
determining whether the proper occasion exists for executing the law. But it cannot
be said that the exercise of such discretion is the making of the law.
2. ID.; ID.; POLICE POWER; PERSONAL LIBERTY; GOVERNMENTAL
AUTHORITY. — Commonwealth Act No. 548 was passed by the National
Assembly in the exercise of the paramount police power of the state. Said Act, by
virtue of which the rules and regulations complained of were promulgated, aims to
promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest
and convenience of the public. In enacting said law, therefore, the National
Assembly was prompted by considerations of public convenience and welfare. It was
inspired by a desire to relieve congestion of traffic, which is, to say the least, a
menace to public safety. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of
said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with
personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure
the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state (U.S. v. Gomer Jesus, 31
Phil., 218). To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the individual
are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty
should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the
individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of
liberty and authority in his mind through education and, personal discipline, so that
there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and
happiness for all. The moment greater authority is conferred upon the government,
logically so much is withdrawn from the residuum of liberty which resides in the
people. The paradox lies in the fact that the apparent curtailment of liberty is
precisely the very means of insuring its preservation.
3. ID.; ID.; SOCIAL JUSTICE. — Social justice is "neither communism, nor
despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy," but the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational
and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice
means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the
Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent
elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social
equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally,
through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally,
through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the
time-honored principle of salus populi est suprema lex. Social justice, therefore,
must be founded on the recognition of the necessity of interdependence among
divers and diverse units of a society and of the protection that should be equally and
evenly extended to all groups as a combined force in our social and economic life,
consistent with the fundamental and paramount objective of the state of promoting
the health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and of bringing about "the greatest good
to the greatest number."
Oposa vs. Factoran
Facts: This case is unique in that it is a class suit brought by 44children, through
their parents, claiming that they bring the case in the name of “their generation as
well as those generations yet unborn.” Aiming to stop deforestation, it was filed
against the Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, seeking to have him cancel all the timber license agreements (TLAs) in
the country and to cease and desist from accepting and approving more timber
license agreements. The children invoked their right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. The
petitioners claimed that the DENR Secretary's refusal to cancel the TLAs and to stop
issuing them was "contrary to the highest law of humankind-- the natural law—and
violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation." The case was
dismissed in the lower court, invoking the law on non-impairment of contracts, so it
was brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
Issue: Did the children have the legal standing to file the case?
Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court in granting the petition ruled that the children had
the legal standing to file the case based on the concept of “intergenerational
responsibility”. Their right to a healthy environment carried with it an obligation
to preserve that environment for the succeeding generations. In this, the Court
recognized legal standing to sue on behalf of future generations. Also, the Court said,
the law on non-impairment of contracts must give way to the exercise of the police
power of the state in the interest of public welfare.
Oposa vs Factoran (Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law:
Intergenerational Responsibility)
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al.,
representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their
parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or
appraising new TLAs; and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and
equitable under the premises.” They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional
right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in
its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in
allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in
trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of the government.
ISSUE: Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to
“prevent the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”
HELD: Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature”
which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters,
fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their
exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as
well as the future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve
that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.
Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL HOMEOWNERS VS SEC. OF
AGRARIAN REFORM
FACTS: These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including
serious challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the
"Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"
In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228
and 229 on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due process, equal
protection and the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation.
In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to provide for a
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to
the Congress and not to the President, the also allege that Proclamation No. 131 and
E.O No. 229 should be annulled for violation of the constitutional provisions on just
compensation, due process and equal protection. They contended that the taking
must be simultaneous with payment of just compensation which such payment is not
contemplated in Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.

In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly
issued by the President and that the said executive orders violate the constitutional
provision that no private property shall be taken without due process or just
compensation which was denied to the petitioners.
In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants and so are
unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform
has so far not issued the implementing rules of the decree. They therefore ask the
Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondents to issue the said
rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power
or Power of Eminent Domain.
RULING: Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there
are traditional distinction between the police power and the power of eminent
domain, property condemned under police power is noxious or intended for noxious
purpose, the compensation for the taking of such property is not subject to
compensation, unlike the taking of the property in Eminent Domain or the power of
expropriation which requires the payment of just compensation to the owner of the
property expropriated.
REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998
FACTS: On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting authority to all
municipalities and chartered cities to undertake and carry out at their own expense
the reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of any foreshore lands bordering
them, and to establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair proper and adequate
docking and harbor facilities as such municipalities and chartered cities may
determine in consultation with the Secretary of Finance and the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was passed by the city of Pasay for the
reclamation of foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered into an agreement
with Republic Real Estate Corporation for the said project.
Republic questioned the agreement. It contended, among others, that the agreement
between RREC and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the contract is
outside the commerce of man, it being a foreshore land.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in question is within the commerce
of man because RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term “foreshore land” than
that in the definition provided by the dictionary.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City and RREC, and the decision was
affirmed by the CA with modifications.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged area.
II. Whether or not “foreshore land” and the reclaimed area is within the
commerce of man.
HELD:
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the
respondent court that the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged areas. To
repeat, the term "foreshore lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and that is
alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide.
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake or stream); the part of a
seashore between the low-water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-tide
terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at high tide usually marked by a beach
scarp or berm. (Webster's Third New International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we
cannot broaden its meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of
Congress were to include submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That
Congress did not so provide could only signify the exclusion of submerged areas
from the term “foreshore lands.”
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay City Ordinance No. 121, as
amended by Ordinance No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have been found to
be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null
and void.
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR (Natural Resources and Environmental Law;
Constitutional Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine)
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD: No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining
the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the
natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources
in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by the IPRA to
the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely gives them,
as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to
the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their
large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the
public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title,
which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant
from the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of
their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right
to alienate the same.
LA BUGAL-B'LAAN vs DENR
Jan. 21, 2004
Facts: R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of mineral agreements for mining
operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval, assignment/transfer
and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or
technical assistance agreements.
Petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus, with a prayer for
a temporary restraining order alleging that at the time of the filing of the petition,
100 FTAA applications had already been filed, covering an area of 8.4 million
hectares, 64 of which applications are by fully foreign-owned corporations covering
a total of 5.8 million hectares, and at least one by a fully foreign-owned mining
company over offshore areas.
Issue: Are foreign-owned corporations in the large-scale exploration, development,
and utilization of petroleum, minerals and mineral oils limited to “technical” or
“financial” assistance only?
Ruling: Only technical assistance or financial assistance agreements may be entered
into, and only for large-scale activities. These are contract forms which recognize
and assert our sovereignty and ownership over natural resources since the foreign
entity is just a pure contractor and not a beneficial owner of our economic resources.
The proposal recognizes the need for capital and technology to develop our natural
resources without sacrificing our sovereignty and control over such resources by the
safeguard of a special law which requires two-thirds vote of all the members of the
Legislature.
It is true that the word “technical” encompasses a broad number of possible services.
However, the law follows the maxim “casus omisus pro omisso habendus est” which
means a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have
been omitted intentionally.
CHAVEZ V. PEA AND AMARI
Facts: In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to
reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development Corportion of
the Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under P.D.
1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These lands were
transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road
and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and PEA entered into an agreement that
all future projects under the MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to
PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the
Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the three reclaimed islands known
as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsequently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with
AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands. Along with
another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA which would later transfer
said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the
agreement, claiming that such lands were part of public domain (famously known as
the “mother of all scams”).
Petitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for mandamus, a
writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA
to AMARI and from implementing the JVA. Following these events, under President
Estrada’s admin, PEA and AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves
claim that the contract is null and void.
Issue: w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part of the
stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII
of the 1987 Constitution.
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the amended joint
venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or
transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these
lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable lands open
to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The government can
make such classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural lands of the public
domain, which are the only natural resources the government can alienate. In their
present state, the 592.15 hectares of submerged areas are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man.

3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,

ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.
PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government can classify the
reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare them no longer
needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands of the
public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the
1987Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.