DEFINITION AND CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY

1 Leung Yee vs. Chattel mortgage executed on rice cleaning machinery. deed of sale was executed on the land upon
Strong Machinery which the building stood to the machinery company and executed another mortgage to the plaintiff
upon the building, separate from the land on which it stood.
Who is the owner
of the property? The SC noted that the Chattel Mortgage law expressly contemplates provisions for chattel mortgage
which only deal with personal properties. The fact that the parties dealt the building as if its personal
property does not change the nature of the thing. It is still a real property. Its inscription in the
Chattel mortgage registry does not modify its inscription in the registry of real property.
2 Davao Sawmill vs Machineries installed on a leased. Davao Light was able to attach said machineries for the satisfaction
Castillo of judgment. It was levied as a personalty by the sheriff. Davao Sawmill has on a number of
occasions treated the machinery as personal property.
Whether or not
machineries are The characterization of the property as chattels by the appellant is indicative of intention and
personal property? impresses upon the property the character determined by the parties.

The machinery only becomes immobilized if placed in a plant by the owner of the property or plant.
Immobilization cannot be made by a tenant, a usufructuary, or any person having only a temporary
right.
3 Mindanao Bus City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro assessed at P4400 as realty tax on petitioners equipment. Petitioner
Company vs City appealed the assessment saying it is not realty. Petitioner is engaged in transportation business. The
Assessor and machines are sitting on cement and wooden platforms.
Treasurer
Movable equipment to be immobilized must first be essential and principal elements of industry and
Whether work without which such industry or works should be unable to function or carry out its business. In
equipments are real this case the equipment in questions are merely incidental and not essential and principal elements of
property petitioners business of transporting passengers and cargoes. Aside from essentiality, the industry or
work must be carried on in a building or on a piece of land. In this case, the equipment are destined
only to repair and service the transportation business, not carried on in a building or permanently on
a piece of land.
4 Sergs Products vs PCI leasing filed writ of replevin (writ issued to recover an item of personal property wrongfully
PCI Leasing taken). Serg filed a motion for special protective order praying for a directive for the sheriff to defer
the enforcement of the writ contending that the machines were not proper subjects of the writ
Whether the because they are in fact real property defined in Art 415 of the Civil Code. PCI opposed the motion
machinery are on the ground that on the lease agreement, the machines were considered as personal property.
considered real or
personal property The machines are considered personal property. The court held that the contracting parties may
validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreeing to such stipulation, they
are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise.
5 Board of Meralco constructed 40 steel towers within Quezon City, which carry electric transmission wires
Assessment attached to insulators from its hydro – electric plant located in the province of Laguna to the City of
Appeals vs Manila. The City assessor of Quezon City declares Meralco’s steel towers for real property tax
MERALCO
Meralco’s tower are not considered real properties that can be subject to real property tax. The steel
Whether or not tower do not come within the objects mentioned in the Art 415 pf yje Civil code on the enumerations
MERALCO’s steel of real property.
tower are
considered real
properties so they
can be subject to
real property tax
6 Manila Electric MERALCO received from the City Assessor of Lucena a copy of Tax Declaration No. 019-6500
Company vs City covering the electric facilities 9transformer and electric post, transmission line, insulator and electric
Assessor meter classified as capital investment of the company. Meralco appealed before LBAA of Lucena City
claiming that MERALCO was exempted from payment of real property tax on said facilities
Whether or not the substation which ruled in favor of Meralco basing on the ruling in Board of Assessment Appeals v
 poles, wires, Manila Electric Company which held that the steel towers fell within the term “poles” expressly
insulators, exempted from taxes under the franchise of MERALCO and steel towers were personal properties
transformers, and under the provisions of the Civil code hence, not subject to real property tax. Six years later Meralco
electric meters of received an assessment of real property tax delinquency beginning 1990 in total amount of 17M
MERALCO were
real properties Court finds the transformers, electric posts, transmission lines, insulators and electric meters of
MERALCO are no longer exempted from real property tax and may qualify as “machinery” subject
to real property tax under the Local Govt Code. The tax law did not provide for a definition of real
property but Art 415 of the Civil Code does…

Principle: Under section 199 of the Local Govt Code, machinery, to be deemed real property subject
to real property tax, need no longer be annexed to the land or building as these ‘may or may not be
attached permanently or temporarily to the real property , “ in fact, such machinery may even be
‘mobile”.
7 Provincial Assessor
of Agusan Vs.
Filipinas Palm Oil
8 Fels Energy vs NPC entered into a lease contract with Polar Energy, Inc. over diesel engine power barges moored at
The Province of Batangas. The contract, denominated as an Energy conversion agreement was for a period of five
Batangas and the years wherein NPC shall be responsible for the payment of all taxes, import duties, fees, charges and
Provincial other levies imposed by the National Govt and all estate taxes and assessment, rates and other
Assessor charges in respect to the Power Barges… Subsequently, Polar Energy assigned its rights under the
Agreement to FELS. Thereafter FELS received an assessment of real property tax on the power
Whether power barges…LBAA ruled that the power plant facilities while they may be classified as movable or
barges, which are personal property, are nevertheless considered real property for taxation purposes. CBAA decided
floating and that the power barges are exempt from real property tax, thus the appeal.
movable, are
personal properties No. Art. 415 of the New Civil Code provides that “docks and structures which, though floating, are
and therefore not intended by their nature and object to remain at a fixed place on a river, lake, or coast are considered
subject to real immovable property by destination being in the nature of machinery and other implements intended
property tax by the owner for an industry or work which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land
which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or work.

FELS cannot escape liability from the payment of realty taxes invoking its exemption in Section 234
of RA 7160.. the law states that the machinery be actually, directly and exclusively used by the GOCC
9 Presbitero vs They are personal property, for they are by law considered “real rights over immovable property” just
Fernandez like servitude and easements

Are “sugar quotas”

real or personal
property

10 Laurel vs Abrogar PLDT filed a complaint for theft under Article 308 of the RPC against Baynet Co., Ltd for stealing its
business. PLDT alleged that Baynet offered phone cards to people in Japan to call their friends and
Whether or not relatives in the Philippines using PLDTs facilities and equipment.
PLDT’s business of
providing No. PLDTs business of providing telecommunication services is not a personal property under Art
telecommunication 308 of the RPC.
services is not a
personal property The general rule is that only movable properties, which have physical material existence and
under Art 308 of susceptible of occupation by another are proper subjects of theft.
the Revised Penal
Code PLDTs business is intangible and cannot be taken by another and not the proper subjects of theft
because they are without form or substance.
11 Sibal vs Valdez The Deputy Sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution issued by CFI of
Pampanga, attached and sold to the defendant (Valdez) the sugar cane planted by plaintiff (Sibal) and
Whether the sugar his tenants on seven parcels of land. Included also in those attached were real properties wherein
cane is personal amount of the 11 parcels of land, house and camarin which was first acquired by Macondray and Co.,
property (The and then later on bought by Valdez in an auction. That one year from the date of the attachment and
relevance of the issue is the sale the plaintiff offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to the defendant Valdez the
with regards to the amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter, the interest thereon and any assessment or
sugarcane of the taxes which he may have paid thereon after the purchase , and the interest corresponding thereti and
petitioner which came tha Valdez refused to accept the money and to return the sugarcane to the plaintiff. Defendant later
from the land that now appealed claiming that he was the owner of many of the alleged land thus owns the crops of it. The
belongs to the court awarded the defendant..
defendant)
It is contended that sugar cane comes under the classification of real property as “ungathered
products” in paragraph 2 of Art 334 of the Civil Code. In some cases “standing crops” may be
considered and dealt with as personal property. For the purpose of attachment and execution and for
the purpose of the Chattel Mortgage Law, ungathered products” have the nature of personal
property. SC lowered the award for damages to the defendant to 8900.80 by acknowledging the fact
that some of the sugarcanes were owned by the petitioner and by reducing the calculated yield or
profit that the defendant would have made if petitioner did not judicially prevent him from planting
and harvesting his lands.
12 Strochecker vs The half – interest in the business (Antigua Botica Ramirez) was mortgaged with Fidelity & Surety
Ramirez Co. on 10 March 1919, and registered in due time in the registry of property, while another mortgage
was made with Ildefonso Ramirez on 22 September 1919 and registered also in the registry. Raised in
Whether or not half the lower court, the trial court declared the mortgage of Fidelity and Surety Co entitled to preference
– interest over a over that of Ildefonso Ramirez and another mortgage by Concepcion Ayala . Ayala did not appeal
business is a but Ramirez did.
movable property
Interest in business may be subject of mortgage. With regard to the nature of the property mortgaged
which is one-half interest in the business, such interest is a personal property capable of
appropriation and not included in the enumeration of real properties in articles 335 of the Civil Code
and may be subject of mortgage

13 Republic vs Rev Cortez Sr. claimed that since 1962, he has been in peaceful possession of about 50 hectares if
Cortez land located in the Western portion of Palaui island which with the help of Aetas and other people
under his care, cleared and developed for agricultural purposes in order to support his charitable
Whether Rev humanitarian and missionary works. With the issuance of Proclamation No. 201 reserving for military
Cortez is entitled to purposes a parcel of the public domain situated in Palaui Island. Pursuant thereto, 2000 hectares if
a final wit of the southern half portion of the Palaui island were withdrawn from dale or settlement and reserved
mandatory for the use of the Philippine Navy, subject however to private rights if there be any. Two decasdes
injunction later Pres Ramos issued proclamation no 447 declaring palaui island and surrounding waters as
marine reserve. Cortez filed for a petition for injunction against Navy Commanding Officer.. RTC
issued an Order granting the application however the pertained to five hectares only

No. Rev Cortez relies heavily on his asserted right of possession, he, nevertheless, failed to show that
the subject area over the which he has claim is not part of the public domain and therefore can be the
proper object of possession.

An Alienable public land cannot be appropriated and thus may not be proper object of possession.
Hence, injunction cannot be issued in order to protect one’s alleged right of possession.

14 Navy Officers On 1965, a certain portion of land was declared for AFP Officers Village for disposal. A month later,
Village a part of the land was declared fir the VFP as a site for rehabilitation, etc… On Nov 15, 1991 the
Association vs. property was subject of a deed of sale bet RP and the petitioner NOVAI. RP wants the title cancelled
BCDA on the ground that, among others, the land covered by NOVAI ‘s title is part of a militart reservation.

Whether or Not the No. It is settled that the land falls under those which are reserved for public use in CA 141.In a
 land is already A & limited sense, parcels of land classified as reservation for public or quasi –public uses under Section 9
D and hence can be 9d) of CA No. 141 are still non alienable and non-disposable, even though they are, by the general
registered classification under Section 6, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. By specific
declaration under Section 88, in relation with Section 8 and Section 83, these lands classified as
reservations are non-alienable and non – disposable

From the perspective of the general Civil Code provisions on Property, lands which are intended for
public use or public service such as reservation for public or quasi –public uses are property of the
public dominion and remain to be so as long as they remain reserved.
15 Dream Village Dream Village claim to represent more than 2000 families who have been occupying a 78,466 square
Neighborhood meter lot in Western Bicutan Taguig since 1985 “in the concept of owners continuously, exclusively
Association vs and notoriously.”
BCDA
Now, charging the BCDA of wrongfully asserting title to dream village and unlawfully subjecting its
Does Fort members to summary demolition , the latter filed a complaint with COSLAP to seek assistance in the
Bonifacio remain verification survey of the subject 78466sqm property , which they claimed is within Lot 1 of… The
property of the claim that they have been occupying the area for thirty years and have built their houses of study
public domain of materials thereon and introduced paved roads, drainage and recreational and religious facilities .
the state of Dream village, thus asserts that the lot is not among those transferred to the BCDA under RA 7887,
although declared and therefore patent applications by the occupants should be processed by the land management
alienable and bureau
disposable?
No. For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or
disposable, it remains of public dominion if when it is “intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth. Thus under Art 422 of the civil code, the public domain
lands become patrimonial property only if there is a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable, together with an express government manifestation that the property is already
patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth

16 Santos vs Moreno Ayala y Cia earlier dug canals deep into the hacienda for accessibility through the nipa palm which
facilitated the gathering of tuba and guarding and patrolling of the hacienda by security guards .
Do the streams Sometime in 1925 Ayala y Cia sold a portion of Hacienda Esteban to Roman Santos who also
involved in this case transformed the swamp land into a fishpond. In doing so he closed and built dikes across Saoang
belong to the public Makuling, Quinorang, Pepangebunan, Bilacos, Nigui and Nasi… The closing of the man-made canals
domain or to the drew complaints from the residents of the surrounding communities claiming that it caused flood.
owner of Hacienda Mayor Yambao of Macabebe went to the hacienda and opened the closure dikes at Sapang…
san Esteban
according to law A private person may take possession of watercourse if he constructed the same within his
and the evidence property. The streams involved in this case were originally man-made canals constructed by
submitted to the the former owners and that said streams were not held open for public use..
Department of
Public Works and With the exception of Sapang Cansusu, being a natural stream and a continuation of the Cansusu
Communications River, admittedly a public stream, belong sto the public domain. Its closure therefore was illegal

17 Republic vs Vda The records show that the land subject of the application was a riceland with an area of 12,342 square
de Joson meters known as Lot 2633, Cad-297, Paombong, Bulacan, and covered by plan Ap-03-001603;8 that
the riceland had been originally owned and possessed by one Mamerto Dionisio since 1907; 9 that on
WHETHER OR May 13, 1926, Dionisio, by way of a deed of sale,10 had sold the land to Romualda Jacinto; that upon
NOT THE LAND the death of Romualda Jacinto, her sister Maria Jacinto (mother of the respondent) had inherited the
land; that upon the death of Maria Jacinto in 1963, the respondent had herself inherited the land,
SUBJECT OF THE owning and possessing it openly, publicly, uninterruptedly, adversely against the whole world, and in
APPLICATION the concept of owner since then; that the land had been declared in her name for taxation purposes;
FOR and that the taxes due thereon had been paid, as shown in Official Receipt No. H-7100234.11
REGISTRATION IS
SUSCEPTIBLE OF In their opposition filed by Fiscal Reyes,12 the Director of Lands and the Director of Forest
 PRIVATE Development averred that whatever legal and possessory rights the respondent had acquired by
ACQUISITION reason of any Spanish government grants had been lost, abandoned or forfeited for failure to occupy
and possess the land for at least 30 years immediately preceding the filing of the application; 13 and
that the land applied for, being actually a portion of the Labangan Channel operated by the
Pampanga River Control System, could not be subject of appropriation or land registration. 14

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) also filed in behalf of the Government an opposition to
the application,15 insisting that the land was within the unclassified region of Paombong, Bulacan, as
indicated in BF Map LC No. 637 dated March 1, 1927; that areas within the unclassified region were
denominated as forest lands and thus fell under the exclusive jurisdiction, control and authority of the
Bureau of Forest Development (BFD);16 and that the CFI did not acquire jurisdiction over the
application considering that: (1) the land was beyond the commerce of man; (2) the payment of taxes
vested no title or ownership in the declarant or taxpayer.17

Held: The respondent unquestionably complied with the second requisite by virtue of her having
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land since June
12, 1945, or earlier. She testified on how the land had been passed on to her from her predecessors-
in-interest; and tendered documentary evidence like: (1) the Deed of Sale evidencing the transfer of
the property from Mamerto Dionisio to Romualda Jacinto in 1926; 28 (2) Tax Declaration No. 4547
showing that she had declared the property for taxation purposes in 1976; 29 and (3) Official Receipt
No. H-7100234 indicating that she had been paying taxes on the land since 1977. 30 The CFI found
her possession of the land and that of her predecessors-in-interest to have been open, public,
continuous, and adverse in the concept of an owner since 1926 until the present time, or for more
than 30 years, entitling her to the registration under the provisions of Act No. 496, in relation to
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 6236 and other existing laws. 31 On its
part, the CA ruled that the documentary and testimonial evidence stood unrebutted and
uncontroverted by the Republic.32

Nonetheless, what is left wanting is the fact that the respondent did not discharge her burden to
prove the classification of the land as demanded by the first requisite. She did not present evidence of
the land, albeit public, having been declared alienable and disposable by the State.

Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a
CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records

Yet, even assuming that the DENR-CENRO certification alone would have sufficed, the
respondent’s application would still be denied considering that the reclassification of the land as
alienable or disposable came only after the filing of the application in court in 1976. The certification
itself indicated that the land was reclassified as alienable or disposable only on October 15, 1980.
18 Maneclang vs IAC A creek is a recess of arm extending from a river and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. It is
a property belonging to the public domain. It is not susceptible to private appropriation and
A creek is a acquisitive prescription. As a public water it cannot be registered under the torrens system in the
property of public name of any individual. Neither the mere construction of irrigation dikes by the National Irrigation
domain and not Administration which prevents the water from flowing in and out of a fishpond , nor its conversion
susceptible to into a fishpond, alter or change the nature of the creek as a property of the public domain. Hence, a
acquisitive compromise agreement adjudicating the ownership of such property in favor of an individual is null
acquisition and void. It has no legal effect. It is contrary to law and public policy.

19 Usero Vs CA Petitioners and the private respondent are registered owners of neighboring parcels of land wherein
between the lots is a low –level strip of land with stagnant body of water. Whenever there is a storm
Whether or not the or heavy rain, the water therein would flood thereby causing damage to the houses of the Polinars
disputed strip of prompting them to build a concrete wall on the bank of the strip of land about 3 meters from their
land is part of the house causing the Useros who claims ownership of the strip to demand their construction. Polinars
creek hence part of offered to pay for the land but the parties failed to settle.
public domain
 Yes. Art 420 of the New Civil Code provides for properties which are part of public domain. A creek
is included in the phrase “and others of similar character”. A creek, which refers to a recess or arm of
a river is a property belonging to the public domain, therefore not susceptible of private ownership.
Being public water, it cannot be registered under the Torrens system under the name of any
individual.
20 Office of the City Respondents claim to be absolute owners of a 406 sqm parcel of land in Paranaque City covered by
Mayor of Tax in the name of respondent Mario D. Ebio. Said land was an accretion of Cut-Creek.
Paranaque vs. Construction of an access road along Cut-cut Creek was initiated by the Sangguniang Barangay which
Ebio will run from Urma drive to the main road of Vitalez cmpd traversing the lot occupied by the
respondents. On March 28, 2005, the City administrator sent a letter to the respondents ordering
Whether or not the them to vacate said property. Respondents went to the RTC and applied for a writ of preliminary
State may build on injunction against the petitioners.
the land in question
(alluvial property) No. It is an uncontested fact that the subject land was formed from the alluvial deposits that have
gradually settled along the banks of Cut –cut creek. This being the case, the law governs ownership
over the accredited portions in Article 84 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, which remains in
effect, in relation to Article 457 if the Civil Code.

Art. 457 To the owners of lands adjoin the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually
receive from the effects if the current of the waters.

It is therefore explicit from the foregoing that alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek do not
form part of the public domain as the alluvial property automatically belongs to the owner of the
estate to which it may have been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner if
the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens system; otherwise, the alluvial
property may be subject to acquisition through prescription by third person.

Hence, while it is true that a creek is a property of public dominion the land which is formed by the
gradual and imperceptible accumulation of sediments along its banks does not form part of the public
domain by clear provision of the law
21 Chavez vs Public The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake
Estates Authority reclamation projects nationswide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar
as a reclaimed foreshore land is concerned.
Whether or not the
transfer of PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation, of the ownership
reclaimed lands is of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290,156 hectares of submerged
valid areas of Manila Bay to Amari.

Held: To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to Amari as
pivate lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.

The transfer of to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom
Islands, is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The transfer is
void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits the
alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public domain.

22 RP vs CA Nov 25, Held: The court ruled that it is erroneous and unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the respondent
1998 court that the term “foreshore land” includes the submerged areas. To repeat , the term “foreshore
lands’ refer to:
Whether or Not the
term “foreshore The strip of land that lies between the high and low watermarks and that is alternately wet and dry
land” includes the according to the flow of tide.
submerged area
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its
meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If the intention of Congress were to include
 submerged areas, it should have provided expressly. That Congress did not so provide could only
signify the exclusion of submerged areas from the term “foreshore land.”

The agreement under attack have been found to be outside the intendment and scope of RA 1899,
and therefore ultra vires and null and void.

23 City of Lapu – Facts: The City contends that due to the enactment of LGC, specifically withdrawing all tax
Lapu vs PEZA exemptions, it maintains that PEZA is liable for real property tax.

Whether or not Held: Yes. Under Section 234 (a) of the Local Govt Code, real properties owned by the Republic of
PEZA should be the Philippines are exempt from real property taxes. Properties owned by the Republic of the
exempted from real Philippines are exempt from real property taxes. Properties owned by the state are either property of
property taxation the public domain or patrimonial property per art 420.

In this case, the properties sought to be taxed are located in publicly owned economic zones. Thjese
economic zones are property of public dominion – sites which were reserved by President Marcos
under Proclamation No. 1811m series of 1979 (Mactan)
24 MIAA vs CA Facts: The term “ports” under art 420 (1) of the Civil Code includes seaports and airports
Held: The MIAA Airport Lands and Buildings constitute a “port,” constructed by the State
The term “ports”
under art 420 (1) of
the Civil Code
includes seaports
and airports

25 Laurel Vs Garcia Facts: Petitioners seek to stop the Philippine Government to sell the Roppongi Property, ehich is
located in Japan. It is one of the properties given by the Japanese Government as reparation for
WON the subject damage done by the latter to the former during the war. Petitioners argue that under Japanese Law,
property cannot be and not Philippine Law, shall apply to the case because the property is located in Japan. They posit
alienated the the principle of lex situs applies

Held:
Under the Philippine law, there can be no doubt that it is public dominion unless it is convincingly
shown that the property has become patrimonial. This, the respondent have failed to do. As property
of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commence of man. It cannot be alienated.

There is no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists.
26 RP vs RTC On September 9, 2002, RP, represented by the DENR, through the Office of the Solicitor General
Branch 18 Roxas (OSG), filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals seeking to
City annul the Decision dated September 14, 1984 on the ground that the RTC had no jurisdiction
to adjudicate title over the subject parcel of land which forms part of the public forest. 9 In the
petition, the OSG cited Section 1410 of Presidential Decree No. 152911 which allows the court to
adjudicate only alienable and disposable lands of the public domain in favor of those who have
successfully acquired title to said lands by acquisitive prescription. The OSG argued that the trial
court exceeded its jurisdiction when it adjudicated the subject land which is forest land and,
accordingly, its decision is null and void.12

In their Answer to the Petition for Annulment of Judgment,13 the Recios argued that the RTC of
Roxas City, Branch 18 has jurisdiction over the case. They contended that petitioner hastily and
negligently filed the petition without first examining the records of LRC No. N-785 and despite its
knowledge of their duly approved Plan LRC-SWO-14402 for Lot No. 900 of the Pilar Cadastre. They
pointed out that said approved plan clearly showed that Lot No. 900 was not within LC Project No.
20-A, but LC Project No. 20 which was duly certified as alienable and disposable on September 28,
1960 as per BFD Map LC-2401. They also argued that the Decision dated September 14, 1984, has
been declared final and executory, and OCT No. 0-2107 has been issued on April 17, 1985, in their
 names. Hence, LRC No. N-785 is already a closed case and res judicata has set in.14

Held:

Petitioner failed to sufficiently prove its allegation that Lot 900 forms part of the forest lands of the
public domain. The evidence offered by the petitioner that Lot 900 falls within forest lands consists
only of the testimonies of its two witnesses, the written report of Lorna Jomento (Exhibit A), and the
ordinary photocopy of the sketch plan of Lot 900 (Exhibit E) and the verification (Exhibit E-1)
appearing on it.

The mere photocopy of the sketch plan of Lot 900 (Exhibit E) as well as the verification (Exhibit E-
1) appearing thereon is without probative value and inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the best
evidence rule. In Philippine Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held:

"The Best Evidence Rule provides that the court shall not receive any evidence that is merely
substitutionary in its nature, such as photocopies, as long as the original evidence can be had. Absent
a clear showing that the original writing has been lost, destroyed or cannot be produced in court, the
photocopy must be disregarded, being unworthy of any probative value and being an inadmissible
evidence."

The testimonies of petitioner’s two witnesses and the written report of Lorna Jomento, a Special
Investigator, stating that based on the records Lot 900 falls within the forest lands reserved for
fishpond created under Project 20-A dated January 17, 1986 under Forestry Administrative Order
No. 4-1777 per Land Classification Map No. 3132 do not overcome the Certification (Exhibit 1-D
for private respondents) dated November 8, 1976 of the then Bureau of Forest Development,
Department of Natural Resources (now DENR, the representative of herein petitioner) certifying
that Lot 900 falls within the alienable and disposable land Block LC Project No. 20 of Pilar, Capiz
certified as such on September 28, 1960 per BFD Map LC-2401. If, indeed, Lot 900 falls within the
forest lands reserved for fishpond purposes created under Project 20-A dated January 17, 1986 under
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1777 per Land Classification Map No. 3132, petitioner should
have presented such land classification map indicating that Lot 900 lies therein and not in Block LC
No. 20 of Pilar Cadastre per BFD Map LC-4201 as stated in the Certification dated November 8,
1976 of the then Bureau of Forest Development, Department of Natural Resources.
27 Alcantara vs
COSLAP Facts: Sometime in 1993, petitioner Nicasio Alcantara was granted Forest Land Grazing Lease
Agreement No. 542 (FLGLA No. 542) by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Unappropriated (DENR). Under said FLGLA, Alcantara was allowed to lease Nine Hundred Twenty-Three (923)
agricultural lands hectares of public forest land at Sitio Lanton, Barrio Apopong, General Santos City for grazing
forming part of purposes for a period of twenty-five (25) years to expire on 31 December 2018.
public domain As early as 1990, however, private respondent Rolando Paglangan together with Esmael Sabel and
Lasid Acop filed a letter-complaint with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems
(COSLAP) seeking the cancellation of FLGLA No. 542 and the reversion of the entire 923 hectares
to the Blaan and Maguindanaoan tribes. The case was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 98-052.
Petitioner filed his Answer questioning the jurisdiction of the COSLAP over the case, since the
dispute involved a claim for recovery of ancestral land. Petitioner claimed that the case should have
been filed with the DENR since it is the latter which has jurisdiction to administer and dispose of
public lands, including grazing lands.
Held: The Court of Appeals also stated that based on the records, the land area being claimed by
private respondents belongs to the Blaan indigenous cultural community since they have been in
possession of, and have been occupying and cultivating the same since time immemorial, a fact has
not been disputed by petitioner.i It was likewise declared by the appellate court that FLGLA No. 542
granted to petitioner violated Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 410ii which states that all
unappropriated agricultural lands forming part of the public domain are declared part of the
ancestral lands of the indigenous cultural groups occupying the same, and these lands are
 further declared alienable and disposable, to be distributed exclusively among the members
of the indigenous cultural group concerned.

28 Heirs of Paragas Facts: Petitioners based their petition on the claim that their alleged ascendants were the original
vs RD of Tarlac pioneers/settlers/occupants of the land in question since 1843 as its indigenous inhabitants. In 1910,
City however, officials of the Municipal Government of Paniqui, headed by Maximo Parazo, ordered the
occupants of the land to vacate their property so that the municipality could build thereon a school, a
public market, and a cemetery. According to petitioners, their ascendants were not given a chance or
opportunity to appear or answer and present their side at the cadastral proceedings involving the
subject properties, from which resulted the issuance of the OCTs in the name of the Municipality of
Paniqui.

Held: In the case at bar, a school, a public market, and a cemetery were built upon the
subject property. Unlike a public square as that in Nicolas or a playground as that in the
Province of Zamboanga del Norte, schools, public markets and cemeteries are not for the
free and indiscriminate use of everyone. The determination of the persons allowed to study in
such schools, or put up stalls in the public market, or bury their dead in public cemeteries are
regulated by the government. As such, the subject property is, under the Civil Code
classification, patrimonial property, and the Municipality may have the same registered in its
name.

29 The Province of Facts: After Zamboanga Province was divided into two (Zamboanga del Norte and Zambonga del
Zamboanga Del Sur), RA 3039 was passed providing that- “All buildings, properties, and assets belonging to the
Norte v City of former province of Zamboanga and located within the City of Zamboanga are hereby
Zamboanga transferred free of charge in favor of the City of Zamboanga”

a.) Are the Suit was brought alleging that this grant without just compensation was unconstitutional because it
properties deprived the province of property without due process. Included in the properties were the
mentioned, capital site and capitol building, certain school sites, hospital and leprosarium sites, and high
properties for school playgrounds.
public us eor
patrimonial? b.) Held: a) If we follow the Civil Code classification only the high school playgrounds are for public use
should the city pay (in the sense that generally, the are available to the general public), and all the rest are Patrimonial
for the said (since they are not devoted to public use, Under art 424 of the Civil Code, they are patrimonial )
properties
(Note: for public use if anybody can use; for the public service if only authorized persons can use. )

b.) If the civil code classification is used, since almost all of the properties involved are patrimonial,
the law would be unconstitutional since the province would be deprived of its own property without
just compensation.

If the law on Municipal Corporations would be followed, the properties would be of public
dominion, and therefore NO COMPENSATION would be required.
30 Macasiano vs Article 424 lays down the basic principle that properties of public domain devoted to public
Diokno use and made available to the public in general are outside the commerce of man and cannot
be disposed or leased by the local government unit to private persons. Aside from the
Whether an requirement of due process, the closure of the road should be for the sole purpose of withdrawing
ordinance issued by the road or other public property from public use when circumstances show that such property is no
the municipality of longer intended or necessary for public use or public service. When it is already withdrawn from
Paranaque public use, the property becomes patrimonial of the local government unit concerned. It is only then
authorizing the that respondent municipality can use or convey them for any purpose for which other real property
lease and use of belonging to the local unit concerned might lawfully used or conveyed.
public streets or
thoroughfares as Those roads and streets which are available to the public in general and ordinarily used for vehicular
sites for flea narket traffic are still considered public property devoted or to dispose of or lease out to private persons.
 is valid? Hence the ordinance is null and void.

31 Villanueva vs Facts: In 1961, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 218 authorizing 24
Castaneda members of Fernando United Merchants and Trades Association to construct permanent stalls and
sell in the subject property within the vicinity of the public market. The Resolution was protested and
Whether or not the Civil Case No. 2040 was filed,. While the case was pending, the municipal council adopted Resolution
vendors had the declaring the area as a parking place and as public plaza of the municipality . CFI held that the subject
right to occupy and land was public in nature and was beyond the commerce of man. Decision was not enforced, the
make use of the petitioners were not evicted. They were assigned specific areas and were made to pay daily fees for
property (public the municipal govt.
plaza)
Held: A public plaza is beyond the commence of man and so cannot be the subject of lease or any
other contractual undertaking.
32 Heirs of Mario Facts: 1.) On Feb 20, 1998, Malabanan filed an application for original registration of title covering a
Malabanan vs parcel of land in Silang Cavite which he purchased from Eduardo Velazco and that he and his
Republic predecessors in interest had been in open, notorious , exclusive and continuous possession of the said
land for more than 30 years. 2.) Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land was originally owned by his
Whether or not the great –grandfather which passed sown to his 4 sons. By 1996 one of the sons became administrator
registration of the of the properties which the son of the latter succeeded his parents. One of the properties therein was
property should be the one sold by the velazco. They presented evidence on the classification of land to be alienable and
allowed. disposable by the DENR on March 1982, RTC ruled in their favor byut reversed by CA

Held: No. given the length discussions of questions of law, there is need to dissect them, The case
settles down the correct interpretation of Sec 14 (1) and (2) of PD 1529 along with CA 141.

Applying to the case at bar:

1. Sec 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax declarations presented was 1948. No other substantive
evidence was presented
2. Sec 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982,
there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the
development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code, The
classification of the subject property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not
change its status as property of the public dominion under article 420 (2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is
insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.

33 Sanchez Vs Facts: On a municipal patrimonial lot, plaintiff constructed in 1952 temporary stores and buildings,
Municipality of with the knowledge and implied consent of the municipality. In 1959, however, the municipal council
Asingan passed a resolution calling the ejectment of the plaintiff. The plaintiff refused to be ejected and in the
alternative, asked the court that in case he is ejected, he must be reimbursed for the rents already
Ejectment on paid.
rented Patrimonial Issue: Should they be reimbursed
lot - should they be Held: There should be no reimbursement. Firstly, the case of Rojas cannot apply for there, the lot
reimbursed was public, here is patrimonial. Secondly, assuming that the lot is public, and that therefore the lease
is void, still there will be no reimbursement because the plaintiff had received some benefit from the
land.

34 Municipality of Facts: A parcel of land forming part of the public plaza was leased to the defendant in which their
Cavite vs Rojas house has been constructed and had been occupying the same.

WON the lease Held: The defendant has no right to continue to occupy the land for it is an integral part of the plaza
agreement for a which is for public use and is reserved for the common benefit. Property for public use in provinces
portion of public and in towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains and public
plaza between the waters, the promenades and public works of general service supported by said towns or provinces.
parties was valid? The Civil Code Art 1271, prescribes that everything which is not outside the commerce of man
maybe the subject of a contract, plazas and streets are outside of this commerce.
35 Ledesma vs TCT was issued in favor of Lopez, including the inclusion of lots 537 and 703 in error. Lopez sold to
Municipality of Kalaw and wife 228 including lots 537 and 703 evidently by mistake. Both parties were ignorant of
Iloilo the of the inclusions of the 2 lots in the TCT.

WON the inclusion Held: An examination of the records shows that as early as April 1915 said lots had been turned over
of lots 537 and 703 by Lopez to the City of Iloilo under a contract of sale for street purposes. The said lots had been
in the TCT of C included as a part of the streets in the City of Iloilo. The same were therefore illegally included, in
Ledesma made him accordance with the provisions of sec 39 act No. 496 in the certificate of title issued to Lopez.
the owner of such
properties The simple possession of a certificate of title, under the Torrens system, does not necessarily make
the possessor a true owner of all the property described therein. The inclusion of public highways in a
certificate of title does not thereby necessarily give to the holder of such certificate said public
highways. The appellant, therefore, even though a part of said streets (lots 537 and 703) had been
included in the original certificate title and In the subsequent transfer title did not become the owner
of said lots and is not therefore entitled to recover ther value from the City of Iloilo nor the damages
prayed for,.
36 United Church Held: David Jacobson was an American citizen who had been a resident of the Philippines for more
Boards for World than thirty years and up to the time of his death in 1970. 1 He left a will in which he "devised and
Ministries vs bequeathed" to the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital 60% of his shares of stocks in the Tagdangua
Sebastian Plantation Co., inc. which was incorporated under Philippine law in 1948. 2 This corporation was the
registered owner of a tract of land in Pantuhan Davao del Norte, with a total area of about 445
hectares acquired by virtue of a sales patent issued to it in 11953 . 3

In Special Proceeding No. 1695 of the Court of First Instance of Davao del Norte, Judge Alejandro
E. Sebastian disallowed the above-described legacy on the ground that it was in effect an
alienation of private agricultural land in favor of a transferee which was not qualified under
the Constitution of 1935. 4 The finding was that the Brokenshire Memorial Hospital was owned by
the United Church Board for World Ministries (UCBWM) ,the herein petitioner, which was a non-
stock corporation organized in the United States by virtue of a charter granted by the state legislature
of Massachussets . 5

The basis of this ruling was Article XII, Sections I and 5 of the 1935 Constitution, which barred
foreigners, including Americans, from acquiring agricultural lands in this country except only by
hereditary succession.

Held: Parenthetically, it should be observed, in fairness to Judge Sebastian, that he was unaware of
these circumstances when he declared the legacy invalid to enforce the nationalistic provisions of
Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution. For his vigilance in the protection of the national patrimony,
he should be, as he is hereby, commenced.

Even on the assumption that the UCBWN was really the owner of the Hospital at the time of the
effectivity of the will and that the devise was for that reason unenforceable, the defect in the will
should be deemed rectified by the subsequent transfer of the property to the Brokenshire Memorial
Hospital, Inc. Our consistent ruling on this matter is that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien
who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a ctitizen, the flaw in the original transaction is
considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid

37 JG Holdings vs Held:
CA In arguing that PHILSECO, as a shipyard, was a public utility, JG Summit relied on Sec 13 , CA No.
146. On the other hand, Kawasaki /PHI argued that PD No. 666 explicitly stated that a “shipyard”
Whether or not was not a “public utility” . But the SC stated that sec 1 of PD 666 was expressly repealed by Sec 20
PHILSECO is a BP Blg 391 and when BP Blg 391 was subsequently repealed by EO 226, the latter law did not revive
public utility sec 1 of PD 666. Therefore, the law that states a shipyard is a public utility still stands.

A shipyard such as PHILSECO bring a public utility as provided by law is therefore required to
comply with the 60-40% capitalization under the Constitution. Likewisem the JVA between NIDC
and Kawasaki manifests an intention of the parties to abide by this constitutional mandate.