Plato's Paradox?

Guardians and Philosopher-Kings

Author(s): Christopher M. Duncan and Peter J. Steinberger
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 4 (Dec., 1990), pp. 1317-1322
Published by: American Political Science Association
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 PLATO'SPARADOX?GUARDIANS
AND PHILOSOPHER-KINGS

F
or centuriesscholarshave engagedin interpretingthe mean-
ing of Plato's Republic. In this exchange, Peter Steinbergerand ChristopherDuncan
debatethe role of guardiansand philosopher-kingsin the ancientcity. Thiscontroversy
is ignited by Steinberger'sessay on Platonic rulersin the December1989 issue of this
Review.

n his essay well with the foundationas given; but if

on "Ruling:Guardiansand Philosopher-
Kings"PeterSteinbergerattemptsto point
out what he considersa serious paradox
in the structureof Plato'sRepublic,name-
ly, the logical inconsistency inherent in
the notion he ascribesto Plato that a ruler
must be both a philosopherand a guard-
ian. He argues-quite correctly-that the
two kinds of rulersare logically inconsis-
tent, with the former concerned with
"makingor constructing"from the "avail-
able raw materials"(p. 1207), while the
latter is concernedmore with techne, or
"crafting"solutions or means to achieve
an already structuredset of ends (see p.
1213). The incongruencybetweenthe two
types of rulersleads Steinbergerto declare
that Plato'sclaimthat the "guardiansand
philosophers are the same person" (see
Republic502d-503b)is a logical paradox
(p. 1223). In support Steinbergergoes to
greatlengthsto show that the philosopher
and the guardiancannot be the same per-
son, includingthe differencesin theiredu-
cation, character,and relationshipsto-the
necessitiesof the political world, specifi-
cally the issue of deceit. As a resultof this
paradoxhe concludesthat Plato'sview of
leadershipand rule is incoherentand the
addition of the philosopher-kingto the
kallipolissuperfluous.
The argumentmade by Steinbergeris
interestingand well formulated-given its
foundation.Muchin his analysisis agree-
able in the same way that Ptolemy's
astronomyis agreeable:it comportsquite
the foundation itself is deficient, predic-
tions basedon it can only be seen as coin-
cidence or contrivance. In other words,
while Ptolemy may have explainedrather
well a universe in which the planets
revolve aroundthe earth, he failed to ex-
plain properlythe universe, in which the
earth and the other planets revolve
aroundthe sun. While Steinbergerelabo-
rates quite well the problems with the
model he describes, it is not, in fact,
Plato's model.
While the Republic is obviously a
multifaceteddocument that can be read
on may differentlevels, certainpartsof its
structurecannot go overlooked or unac-
counted for without doing harm to its
meaning. The fundamentalprojectof the
Republicis to define justice. All the dis-
cussionsof art, music, geometry,politics,
leadership,cities, food, and so on are but
constructs to facilitate this project. On
this basis I would contend that one can
view the whole of the Republicas revolv-
ing around three questions, namely, Can
justicebe found or createdin the world of
politics?If so, what does it look like and
how is it to be achieved?If not, what does
this tell us about the world of politics (if
what we seek is justice)?Steinbergersim-
ply asks the wrong questions.Ratherthan
takingPlato at his word and askingabout
the relationship of philosophers and
guardiansto the world of justice,he asks
about their relationshipto the world of
politics. By so doing, he createsa "reality"

AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW

VOLUME 84 NO. 4 DECEMBER1990

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 AmericanPolitical Science Review Vol. 84
to which his conclusions are applicable
but fails properly to address the reality
suggestedby Plato himself.
Plato'sfirst city (Republic,Book 2) is a
natural city based on the "spontaneous
ordering of crafts" (p. 1209), which
becomesthe just city when "tasksare per-
formedproperly"by "thosewhose talent
and training is appropriate"(p. 1209).
This city "is not somethingmade, not the
produce of artifice, it simply comes into
being" (p. 1210). This being the case,
though the craftsthemselvesare rational-
ly ordered, the. orderingitself is not the
product of a craft (p. 1210); thus, "it
seemsthat thereis no rulerin this city"(p.
1210). Not only is thereno ruler,but there
is also no "ruling,law, or politicalauthor-
ity in the usual sense"(p. 1210). In other
words, in Plato's first city there are no
manifestationsof politics at all-only the
cohabitationof a specificgeographicarea
by people engagedin mutualactivitiesof
production and exchange of their own
crafted goods. Politics, with its rulers,
laws, and authority, does not exist in
Plato'sfirstcity; it is a communitybut not
a political community. Socrates insists
that this first city is the "truecity" or the
"healthy city" (p. 1210). Steinberger
makeshis criticalmistakewhen he claims
that "thiscity is in some sense a modelfor
all cities" because it offers a model of
orderand harmonyand "providesits citi-
zen with a life of peace, prosperity, and
happiness" (p. 1210). Rather, I would
argue, it is a modeLfor cities without
politics. The kallipolis-the chief model
elaboratedin the Republic-is a modelfor
quite a differenttype of city.
When Glaucon calls the city Socrates
has describedat first as a "city of pigs"
and induceshim to speak on a more lux-
urious city, the readermust be carefulto
note that doing so was not Socrates'idea.
Steinbergercorrectly notes that humans
multiplyytheir.desiresfar beyond what is
naturaland necessary"(p. 1210). But not
so Socratesor the philosopherin general.
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The concernfor luxurythatthe majority
of people share with Glauconinspires
Socratesto explorewhat is called the
"feverishcity."Only thenis it necessary
to introducepoliticsand its manifesta-
tions.Steinberger correctlynotesthat"at
thecoreof theRepublic,then,is an effort
to purge(in thought)thisfeverishcity of
its excesses,to restructure it to approxi-
matethehealthandorderliness of thefirst
city"(p. 1210);yet he is wrongto say that
this means that "the virtue of the
kallipolis,likethatof thefirstcity, lies in
how well its parts fit togetherinto an
organicwhole"(p. 1211).Thekallipolisis
not "organic" at all in the way -thefirst
city was. Rather,the kallipolisneeds
political(readhuman)interventioneven
to approximate the.firstcity. Once Soc-
rateshasleftthediscussionof thefirstcity
behind,he has left behindthe possibility
of justicein at least the strongsenseof
that whichis natural,spontaneous,and
self-ordering(read self-sufficient).In-
stead,whatwe haveoncethe shiftto the
luxuriouscity is made is an attemptto
haveourproverbial cakeandeatit too. In
otherwords,Socratesoffershis readersa
glimpseof the type of city wherejustice
mightflourish,namely,a simpleworldof
craftandexchangewhereeachpersonhas
enoughto sustainlifebutnot muchmore.
InthisworldSocratesor anyotherphilos-
ophercouldbe happyandleadthephilo-
sophiclife unencumbered by eitherpolit-
ical restrictionson what he mightthink
andsay or worldlyorpoliticaldutiessuch
as ruling.Butthisisn'tenoughforGlaucon
or mostotherpeople.Theywantall this
andluxurytoo. The taskof Socratesfor
the rest of the dialoguethenbecomesto
createa communitywhereluxuriesand
thepoliticsthatrestraintheabusesof such
thingsdo not preventthepractice. of phi-
losophyor the discoveryof justice.The
questionthatthenhauntsthe Republicis
whetherthis stateof affairsis possible
hencethe questionof ruling.
Inthefirstcitythereareno rulers.-Each
 Plato's Paradox?
person rules himself or herself because
politics and its manifestations (rulers,
laws, and authority) are nonexistent.
Only when luxury and its excesses come
to mark the city does politics in the form
of restructuringfor health and order
become necessary. The artificial city,
which lacks the spontaneous order and
harmony of the first city, is the one that
needs politics, or ruling. Ruling, or what
Steinbergercalls "managerialroles," is
"necessitatedby the fact-or persistent
threat-of disease or fever" (p. 1211).
These roles can be filled by the guardians
ruling in a "craftlikesense," who might
benefitby also being philosophersbut do
not necessarilyneed to be (p. 1212). Stein-
berger argues that the model with the
guardiansis completeeven before the in-
troduction of the philosopher-king(p.
1215), but herehis failureto keep the fun-
damentalprojectof the Republicin mind
betrayshis analysis.The politicalmodelis
in fact completewithout the philosopher-
king, for the guardiansare able through
techne to maintainorder in the city. But
Socrates and his companions set out to
find not a political model but the nature
of justice; and for this the rule of the
guardiansis not sufficient.
Steinbergeradmitsa role for the philos-
opher-kingin reformingexistingcities but
aside from this arguesthat theirintroduc-
tion into the kallipolisadds "littleto the
integrity of the model" (p. 1216). True,
the philosopher-kingadds very little to
the political model, or the kallipolis,
because the guardiansare able to main-
tain order or contain the fever by them-
selves. But the just city and the kallipolis
are not fundamental equivalents but
rather two different kinds of communi-
ties-one artificialand one natural. The
justificationfor bringingthe philosopher-
king back into the kallipolisis to reintro-
duce the original task of the dialogue,
namely, finding justice. The political
world, or the world of luxury suggested
by Glaucon,has been exploredand found
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wanting by Socrates. The guardianscan
rule over the political approximationof
the just city but they cannot make it just.
The role of the philosopher-king,as we
see in Book 7, is to destroy the kallipolis
by getting the people to "to despise the
current honors" and by killing off all
those over the age of ten who desire (as
Glaucon desires)the self-contradictionof
a community that is both luxurious and
just. Justice,the original goal, cannot be
found in the politicalworld (thoughmany
would like to believe it can.) Plato does
not "fail to revise the institutionalstruc-
ture of the kallipolis" (p. 1222). He never
authorizedits erection in the first place.
He merely demonstratedwhy Glaucon's
request was unreasonable,given the ob-
ject of their search.
The best the politicalworld can offer is
order and harmony, but order and har-
mony are not. justice. Though still unde-
fined at the- conclusion of the dialogue
justicemust clearlybe something"natural
and spontaneous," the product not of
human artificebut of human contempla-
tion and discovery. Justice is not .to be
found in the politicalcity, which becomes
necessaryonly when humandesiresin the
physical world exceed what is necessary
for their existence. The city of Glaucon,
or the kallipolis, representspeople'swish
to have all-theirdesiresmet and still have
justice. Socrateselaboratesall of the fea-
turesthat such a city will need to survive;
and if most of those ratherharshand op-
pressive solutions seem undesirable,it is
to make us see that the journeyfrom the
city of "necessity"to the city of "luxury"
isn't worth the trip. Only in the political
world do men and women need guardians
to protectthem from each other and from
themselves; the rule of the philosopher-
kings makes the apolitical city possible
again. When they rule, there are no more
"guardians"in the political sense, for the
two have become one.
CHRISTOPHER M. DUNCAN
Wayne State University
 AmericanPolitical Science Review Vol. 84
I am gratefulto ChristopherM. Dun-
can for his effort to consider and assess
my views on Plato. It is a pleasureto have
one's work taken seriously. Unfortunate-
ly, I do not see that his comments have
any force againstmy argument.
Indeed, it is not entirely clear in what
sense his criticismsare criticismsat all,
since he explicitly accepts my distinction
between guardians and philosopher-
kings, my characterizationof the features
of the city of pigs, my accountof this city
as the true or healthy city, my interpreta-
tion of Socrates'claimsconcerningluxury
and unnaturaldesire, my descriptionof
the centralaims of the Republic,my inter-
pretationof the necessity and purposeof
ruling in the kallipolis and the craftlike
quality of the guardians'rule, and my
contentionsthat Plato's "politicalmodel"
is completedprior to the introductionof
the concept of the philosopher-kingand
that philosopher-kingsare not part of the
kallipolis. He thus concedesnearly all of
the important claims that my essay
makes.
His main argument seems to be that
whereasthe first city (the city of pigs) and
the third city (the city of philosopher-
kings) are fundamentallysimilarin being
nonpolitical embodimentsof justice, the
second city (the kallipolis), characterized
by the presenceof rulers, is political and
not at all just. My error apparentlyis in
failing to see this, hencefailing to under-
stand that the kallipolis is a political
model but not a-justicemodel. This argu-
ment in no way confutes,but is fully con-
sistentwith, the centralcontentionof my
essay that there is a deep differencebe-
tween guardians and philosopher-kings.
As far as I can tell, then, Duncan is criti-
cizing only one relativelyminor corollary
of this contention-namely, that there-is
an internalcontradictionin the Republic.
One can understandwhy such a claim
would attract attention. But in fact, I
would be perfectly willing to reject this
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corollarywith equanimity,since doing so
would have no serious consequencesfor
the centralargumentof my essay.
Unfortunately, Duncan's formation
does not work even againstthe corollary
becauseit attributesviews to Plato that he
cannot possibly have held. Duncan's
argumentrests entirely on his distinction
between justice models (the city of pigs
and the city of philosopher-kings)and
politicalmodels(thekallipolis).Butthere
is, in fact, no textual,conceptual,or theo-
reticalbasis for such a distinction;hence,
the argumentderived from it cannot be
correct.
Firstof all, the notion of the politicalis
used by Duncan in a highly non-Platonic
manner, since for Plato the political
would presumablyreferto all things per-
taining to the polis. Thus, for example,
the phrase apolitical city, which Duncan
predicatesof his justicemodels, makesno
Platonic sense.
Second, one might attributethis error
simply to an imprecise use of language
and say that by apoliticalDuncanis really
referringto the absenceof an explicitruler
or group of rulers.Therecertainlyare no
rulers in the city of pigs. But Duncan
claims that this is also the case with the
city of philosopher-kings,a most implaus-
ible claim. Whereasthe city of pigs arises
and functions "naturallyand spontane-
ously" (i.e., without human artifice or
rulers),this can hardlybe trueof the third
city. Philosopher-kingsare kings. They
do not gravitate spontaneously to the
cave but are compelled to return there;
once there, they presumably propagate
laws and policies explicitlyand intention-
ally designed to ensure that empirical
cities function as harmoniouslyas possi-
ble. There is no unseen hand here. The
city of philosopher-kingsis not a spon-
taneous, unplannedorganismlike the city
of pigs; it is indeedthe productof human
artificeand rule, albeitguidedquitestrict-
ly by the dictatesof right reason.
Third, Duncan'sclaim that the kallipo-
 Plato's Paradox?
lis is in no sensea matterof justicedespite
the fact that it is well ordered and har-
moniousis equallyimplausible.He argues
thatjusticeremains"undefinedat the con-
clusion of the dialogue."I do not know
how to reconcilethis with the famouspas-
sages in Book 4 (e.g., 427b-435a) where
Plato certainly seems to provide an ex-
plicit and powerful definition of justice.
Justice is, indeed, a matter of correct
order and harmony, whether of the city
or of the soul. To the extent that such
orderand harmonyis characteristicof the
kallipolis, it must be like the city of pigs
and the city of philosopher-kingsin being
a representationof justice.The distinction
between political city and just city thus
has no textualbasis.
It may be that Duncan'smisinterpreta-
tion is rooted in a series of erroneous
readings,both of Plato and of my essay.
He begins by citing a distinctionbetween
rulingas "makingor constructing"on the
one hand and "craftingsolutions"on the
other. In fact, thereis no suchdistinction.
The distinctionI drewwas betweenruling
as techne (which includes making and
constructing,as well as crafting)and rul-
ing as philosophy.He discussesthe happy
and unencumberedlife of philosophy in
the city of pigs, whereas Plato's account
of that city in fact makes no mention of
philosophy. He accusesPlato of advocat-
ing genocide-of wantingto murdermost
individualsover the age of ten-when in
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fact Plato wants only to exile them to the
countryside. The latter may be a fate
worse than death, but it's hardlythe same
thing.
For all these reasons, I do not find that
Duncan makes a plausible case even
againstthe relativelyminorcorollarythat
his commenttacitly addresses.This some-
what surprisesme, for I had expectedhis
criticism,along with commentsfrom var-
ious other interlocutors,to be far more
telling. My purpose in writing the essay
was to providean accountof the Republic
that was both original and accurate.
Given the enormousamountof extraordi-
nary philosophical talent that has been
devoted to interpretingPlato over many
centuries, I assumed at the outset that
achievingsuch a goal would be highly un-
likely. As a purely probabilisticmatter,
any original account would almost cer-
tainly be wrong and any correctaccount
would almost certainly be unoriginal.
This is still my view. I presumethat my
essay must be either old hat or in error,
and I am thus waiting only to learn in
exactly what ways this is so. Duncan has
not been helpful in this regard, and this
leaves me slightly-though only slightly
-less confident that my argument is
somehow defective.
PETERJ. STEINBERGER
Reed College
 American Political Science Review Vol. 84

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