Lyceum of the Philippines University College of Law Political Law - Cases│ Page 1 of 10

Table of Contents
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS ................................................................................................................................ 1
SEPARATION OF POWERS ......................................................................................................................................... 1
Republic v. Sereno (May 11, 2018)* ......................................................................................................................... 1
B. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT .................................................................................................................................. 1
AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS ................................................................................................................................ 1
Lambino Vs. Comelec (October 25, 2006) ............................................................................................................... 1
LEGISLATIVE VETO ....................................................................................................................................................... 2
Macalintal v. COMELEC (July 10, 2003) .................................................................................................................. 2
C. EXECUTIVE .............................................................................................................................................................. 2
POWERS AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF ...................................................................................................................... 2
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY ........................................................................................................................................... 3
D. JUDICIARY ............................................................................................................................................................... 3
Fuentes vs. Office of the Ombudsman (October 23, 2001) ................................................................................. 3
E. BILL OF RIGHTS.......................................................................................................................................................... 4
BAIL (EXTRADITION) ..................................................................................................................................................... 4
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION ................................................................................................................... 4
Dela Cruz v People (July 23, 2014) ........................................................................................................................... 4
RIGHT TO PRIVACY ....................................................................................................................................................... 5
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS ........................................................................................................................................ 5
F. CITIZENSHIP ................................................................................................................................................................ 6
Poe-Llamanzares vs COMELEC (March 8, 2016) .......................................................................................................... 6
G. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ......................................................................................................................................... 6
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS ............................................................ 6
HOLDING OF MULTIPLE OFFICES ............................................................................................................................. 7
H. ELECTION LAW ....................................................................................................................................................... 7
Substitution........................................................................................................................................................................ 7
Tagolino v HRET (March 19, 2013) ........................................................................................................................... 7
I. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ............................................................................................................................... 8
SOURCES ......................................................................................................................................................................... 8
STATE IMMUNITY ........................................................................................................................................................... 9
 Lyceum of the Philippines University College of Law
A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
SEPARATION OF POWERS
Republic v. Sereno (May 11, 2018)*
J. Tijam
(Note: Case was decided beyond the 2018 Bar cut
off)
In August 2017, an impeachment complaint was
filed by Atty. Gadon against Chief Justice Sereno
with the Committee on Justice for corruption, high
crimes, and betrayal of public trust. In February
2018, during the pendency of impeachment
proceedings, a quo warranto proceeding was filed
by the Republic, through the OSG, before the
Supreme Court, against Sereno, on the ground of
lack of integrity stemmed from her failure to file
several SALNs.
Q: Whether or not an impeachable officer may
be ousted from office through a quo warranto
proceeding?
A: Yes. An impeachable officer may be ousted from
office through a quo warranto proceeding.
Q: Whether or not the Supreme Court’s exercise
of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is
violative of the doctrine of separation of
powers?
A: No. Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction
over a quo warranto petition is not violative of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
The Court's exercise of its jurisdiction over quo
warranto proceedings does not preclude Congress
from enforcing its own prerogative of determining
probable cause for impeachment, to craft and
transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it
preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally
committed power of impeachment.
The filing of the SALN is a Constitutional
requirement which Sereno failed to comply. It is a
Constitutional qualification for a Chief justice to be
a person of proven competence, integrity, probity,
and independence. Her failure to file her SALNs
and to submit the same to the JBC go into the very
qualification of integrity.
Political Law - Cases│ Page 1 of 10
B. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
AMENDMENTS AND REVISIONS
Lambino Vs. Comelec (October 25, 2006)
J Carpio
Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering
signatures for an initiative petition to change the
1987 constitution; they filed a petition with the
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their
initiative petition. The Lambino Group's initiative
petition changes the 1987 Constitution by modifying
Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department)
and Sections 1-4 of Article VII (Executive
Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled
"Transitory Provisions." These proposed changes
will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system
to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government.
Q. Does the Lambino Group's initiative
constitute an amendment or revision of the
Constitution?
A: REVISION. Art. 17, Sec. 1. Any amendment to,
or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed
by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of
all its Members, or
(2) A constitutional convention.
Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may
likewise be directly proposed by the people through
initiative.
The framers intended, and wrote, that only
Congress or a constitutional convention may
propose revisions to the Constitution. The framers
intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may
propose only amendments to the Constitution.
Where the intent and language of the Constitution
clearly withhold from the people the power to
propose revisions to the Constitution, the people
cannot propose revisions even as they are
empowered to propose amendments.
Revision broadly implies a change that alters a
basic principle in the constitution, like altering the
principle of separation of powers or the system of
checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the
change alters the substantial entirety of the
constitution, as when the change affects substantial
provisions of the constitution. On the other hand,
amendment broadly refers to a change that adds,
reduces, or deletes without altering the basic
 Lyceum of the Philippines University College of Law
principle involved. Revision generally affects
several provisions of the constitution, while
amendment generally affects only the specific
provision being amended.
LEGISLATIVE VETO
Macalintal v. COMELEC (July 10, 2003)
J. Austria-Martinez
Atty. Macalintal assailed the constitutionality of RA
No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
2003).
He alleged that the creation of Joint Congressional
Oversight Committee (JCOC) in Section 25 of RA
No. 9189, which exercises the power to review,
revise, amend, and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC
shall promulgate, as it violates the independence of
the COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of the
Constitution.
Q: Whether or not the power of legislative veto by
the joint congressional oversight committee is
unconstitutional?
A: Yes. The power of legislative veto by the joint
congressional oversight committee is
unconstitutional.
R.A. No. 9189 gives to the JCOC the following
functions:
(a) to review, revise, amend and approve the IRR
promulgated by the COMELEC [Secs. 25 & 19];
and
(b) subject to the approval of the JCOC [Section
17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three
countries for the May 2004 elections and in any
country determined by COMELEC.
Under Section 1 of Article IX-A of the Constitution,
it ordains that COMELEC as a constitutional
commission shall be “independent”.
The powers vested to Congress by the said law to
approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for
The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, were
beyond the scope of its constitutional authority.
Congress trampled upon the constitutional mandate
of independence of the COMELEC.
Political Law - Cases│ Page 2 of 10
Hence, as held in ABAKADA v. Purisima, a
LEGISLATIVE VETO IN THE FORM OF A
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL since it entrusts to
Congress a direct role in enforcing and
implementing its own laws.
C. EXECUTIVE
POWERS AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
Gudani VS SENGA (August 15, 2006)
J Tinga
Senator Rodolfo Biazon (Sen. Biazon) invited
several senior officers of the AFP to clarify
allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing
of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464
enjoining officials of the executive department
including the military establishment from appearing
in any legislative inquiry without her consent. AFP
Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum,
prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from
appearing before the Senate Committee without
Presidential approval. . However, the two appeared
before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive
has been given to them. As a result, the two were
relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating
the Articles of War and the time honoured principle
of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered
them to be subjected before the General Court
Martial proceedings for willfully violating an order of
a superior officer.
Q: Whether or not the President has the authority
to issue an order to the members of the AFP
preventing them from testifying before a legislative
inquiry.
A: Yes. The SC hold that President has
constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her
power as commander-in-chief, and that as a
consequence a military officer who defies such
injunction is liable under military justice. At the
same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks
the appearance before it of a military officer against
the consent of the President has adequate
remedies under law to compel such attendance.
Any military official whom Congress summons to
testify before it may be compelled to do so by the
President. If the President is not so inclined, the
President may be commanded by judicial order to
compel the attendance of the military officer. Final
 Lyceum of the Philippines University College of Law
judicial orders have the force of the law of the land
which the President has the duty to faithfully
execute.
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY
Estrada v Desierto (March 2, 2001)
J Puno
On January 20, 2001, then President Joseph
Estrada fell from power and resigned as President
while Gloria Macapagal Arroyo took oath on the
same date. Several cases previously filed against
him in the Office of the Ombudsman were set in
motion including bribery, graft and corruption,
plunder, forfeiture, perjury, serious misconduct,
violation of the Code of Conduct for government
Employees, malversation of public funds and illegal
use of public funds.
On February 5, petitioner filed a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from conducting any further
proceedings or in any other criminal complaint that
may be filed in his office, until after the term of
petitioner as President is over and only if legally
warranted.
Petitioner Estrada makes two submissions: first, the
cases filed against him before the respondent
Ombudsman should be prohibited because he has
not been convicted in the impeachment
proceedings against him; and second, he enjoys
immunity from all kinds of suit, whether criminal or
civil.
Q: When is the President immune from suite?
A: During his tenure for official and unofficial acts.
After his tenure, only in regards to his official acts.
Q: What is covered by presidential immunity?
A: Presidential immunity only covers official acts of
the President or by others pursuant to his specific
orders during his tenure. The cases filed against
petitioner Estrada are criminal in character. They
involve plunder, bribery and graft and corruption.
By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes,
especially plunder which carries the death penalty,
be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a
non-sitting president. Petitioner cannot cite any
decision of this Court licensing the President to
commit criminal acts and wrapping him with post-
Political Law - Cases│ Page 3 of 10
tenure immunity from liability. It will be anomalous
to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability
for unlawful acts and omissions. The rule is that
unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the
State and the officer who acts illegally is not acting
as such but stands in the same footing as any other
trespasser.
Q: Is impeachment mandatory before a
President can be prosecuted for the cases filed
against him?
A: No. The Senate passed Senate Resolution No.
83 Recognizing that the Impeachment Court is
Functus Officio due to his resignation. Since the
Impeachment Court is now functus officio, it is
untenable for petitioner to demand that he should
first be impeached and then convicted before he
can be prosecuted. The plea, if granted, would put
a perpetual bar against his prosecution. Such a
submission has nothing to commend itself for it will
place him in a better situation than a non-sitting
President who has not been subjected to
impeachment proceedings and yet can be the
object of a criminal prosecution. To be sure, the
debates in the Constitutional Commission make it
clear that when impeachment proceedings have
become moot due to the resignation of the
President, the proper criminal and civil cases may
already be filed against him.
D. JUDICIARY
Fuentes vs. Office of the Ombudsman
(October 23, 2001)
J. Pardo
The Director of the Office of the Ombudsman filed
with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao a criminal complaint charging Judge
Rentao A. Fuentes with violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices or Republic Act No. 3019,
Section 3 (e).
Q: Whether the Ombudsman may conduct an
investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise
of his official functions alleged to be in violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in
the absence of an administrative charge for the
same acts before the Supreme Court?
 Lyceum of the Philippines University College of Law
A: No. Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution
exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court
personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court
of Appeals to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to
oversee the judges and court personnel and take
the proper administrative action against them if they
commit any violation of the laws of the land. No
other branch of government may intrude into this
power, without running afoul of the independence
of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of
powers.
The Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides: "Section
21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority,
Exceptions.-The Office of the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including members of
the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or
controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except
over officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.”
Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or
investigate a criminal or administrative complaint
before his office against petitioner judge, pursuant
to his power to investigate public officers. The
Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme
Court, for appropriate action.
E. BILL OF RIGHTS
BAIL (EXTRADITION)
Government of Hongkong vs Olalia Jr (April 19,
2007)
J Sandoval-Gutierrez
Private Respondent Muñoz was charged for
violation of the Prevention of Bribery ordinance of
Hongkong and of 7 counts of conspiracy to defraud,
punishable by the common law of Hongkong. The
Hongkong Department of Justice requested DOJ
for the provisional arrest.
The Hongkong Administrative Region then filed
with the RTC a petition for extradition and arrest of
Munoz. Munoz then filed a petition for bail, which
was opposed. The RTC initially denied the petition
Political Law - Cases│ Page 4 of 10
holding that there is no Philippine Law granting bail
in extradition cases and that Munoz is a “flight risk”.
Hence MR was filed by Munoz which was granted.
Q: Whether or not right to bail can be availed in
extradition cases?
A: Yes today the right to bail can be availed of in
extradition cases. In a previous case however of
Gov’t of United States of America vs Hon Guillermo
Purganan, it ruled that the right to bail was not
included in the extradition cases, since it is
available only in criminal proceedings. However the
SC recognized the modern trend in International
Law today wherein the primacy is placed on the
sanctity of human rights. Hence it departed from
the ruling and ruled that the exercise of the State’s
police power to deprive a person of his liberty is not
to be limited to criminal proceedings and that the
Philippines has the obligation of ensuring the
individual his right to liberty and due process and
should not therefor deprive him of his right to bail
provided that certain standards for the grant is
satisfactorily met.
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Dela Cruz v People (July 23, 2014)
CJ. Sereno
Accused was a public officer who was arrested by
the NBI and was found positive for using “SHABU”.
When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty because
despite his request to have his urine test be done in
the PNP Crime laboratory, NBI denied his request
and took the sample themselves, furthermore, he
was denied the right to counsel. RTC found him
guilty, stating that “a suspect cannot invoke his right
to counsel when he is required to extract the urine
because extracting urine from one’s body is merely
a mechanical act which is outside the concept of
custodial investigation”.
Q: Was the drug test covered under allowable non-
testimonial compulsion?
A: No. The constitutional right of an accused
against self-incrimination proscribes the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from the accused and not the
inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be
material. Purely mechanical acts are not included
in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby
speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding
hand of counsel is not required.
 Lyceum of the Philippines University College of Law
In the instant case, the SC failed to see how urine
sample could be material to the charge of extortion.
The RTC and CA both erred when they held that
the extraction of Dela Cruz’s urine for purposes of
drug testing was “merely a mechanical act, hence,
falling outside the concept of a custodial
investigation.
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Vivares vs St Theresa’s College (Sept 29, 2014)
J Velasco
A High school Student at St. Theresa’s College
(STC), uploaded on Facebook several pictures of
her and her classmates wearing only their
undergarment which were reported to their teacher.
The latter showed said pictured to the Discipline in
Charge for appropriate action. The school then
found the students guilty and banned them from
marching in their graduation ceremonies. A petition
for the issuance of a writ of habeas data was filed
against the school alleging that the Facebook
accounts of the students have a reasonable
expectation of privacy which must be respected,
that the photos accessed belong to the girls and,
thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their
consent. The Cebu RTC denied the petition.
Q: Whether or not the right to informational
privacy of the students were violated?
A: NO. It is ruled that if an online networking site
like Facebook has privacy tools, and the user
makes use of such privacy tools, then he or she
has a reasonable expectation of privacy. Such
reasonable expectation of privacy is the right to
informational privacy which is the right of the
individuals to control information about themselves
which must be respected and protected.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that the
students concerned made use of such privacy
tools. Evidence would show that that their posts on
Facebook were published as “Public” which
everyone could see. Hence the school did not
violate the students’ right to privacy. The manner
which the school gathered the pictures cannot be
considered illegal. As it appears, it was the
classmates of the involved student who showed the
pictures to their teacher and then the latter reported
the matter to the proper school authority for
appropriate action which is to discipline their
students according to the standards set by the
school.
Political Law - Cases│ Page 5 of 10
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
In the matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus
of Datukan Malaang Salibo (April 8, 2015)
J Leonen
Butukan S. Malang, one of the accused in the
Maguindanao massacre, had a pending warrant of
arrest issued by the trial court in People vs
Ampatuan Jr. et. al. When Datukan Malang Salibo
learned that the police officers of Datu Hofer Police
Station in Maguindanao suspected him to be
Butukan S. Malang, he presented himself to clear
his name. The authorities, however, apprehended
and detained him. He questioned the legality of his
detention via Urgent Petition for Habeas Corpus
before the CA, maintaining that he is not the
accused Batukan S. Malang. The CA issued the
writ, making it returnable to the judge of RTC
Taguig. After hearing of the Return, the trial court
granted Salibo’s petition and ordered his immediate
release from detention.
On appeal by the Warden, the CA reversed the
RTC ruling. The CA held that even assuming Salibo
was not the Batukan S. Malang named in the Alias
Warrant of Arrest, orderly course of trial must
be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted
before the writ of habeas corpus may be invoked.
Salibo’s proper remedy, according to the CA,
should have been a motion to quash information
and/or warrant of arrest.
Q: W/N Salibo properly availed the remedy of a
petition for writ of habeas corpus
A: Yes. Habeas corpus is the remedy for a person
deprived of liberty due to mistaken identity. In such
cases, the person is not under any lawful process
and is continuously being illegally detained.
Certainly, it was Butukan S. Malang, not Salibo,
who was charged and accused in the Information
and Alias Warrant of Arrest issued in the case of
People vs Ampatuan. Based on the evidences
presented, Salibo sufficiently established that he
could not have been Butukan S. Malang. Therefore,
Salibo was not arrested by virtue of any warrant
charging him of an offense, nor restrained under a
lawful process or an order of a court. Second,
Salibo was not validly arrested without a warrant.
When he was in the presence of authorities, he was
neither committing nor attempting to commit an
 Lyceum of the Philippines University College of Law
offense, and the police officers had no personal
knowledge of any offense that he might have
committed. Salibo was also not an escape prisoner.
The police officers have deprived him of his liberty
without due process of law. Therefore, Salibo
correctly availed himself of a Petition for Habeas
Corpus.
F. CITIZENSHIP
Poe-Llamanzares vs COMELEC (March 8, 2016)
J. Perez
Grace Poe was a presidential candidate for the
2016 Election. A petition for disqualification was
filed against her contending that she committed
material misrepresentation in her COC when she
stated that she is a resident of the Philippines for at
least 10 years 11 months up to the day before May
9, 2016 Elections and that persons of unknown
parentage, particularly foundlings, are not natural
born Filipino citizens.
Q: Whether as a foundling, Poe-Llamanzares
can be considered a natural born citizen?
A: Yes. Foundlings are as a class considered to be
natural born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution is
silent as to foundlings, there is no express
language as to exclude them either. In other words,
there is no intent or language that would permit
discrimination against foundlings in the
Constitution.
Also as stated in the domestic laws of adoption,
it supported the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos and that Filipino children which can be
adopted include “foundlings” as well. On the
international law perspective, foundlings are
citizens as the Hague Convention on Certain
Questions Relation to the Conflict of Nationality
laws ruled that a foundling is presumed to have the
nationality of the country of birth and in the
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness that
foundling is presumed born of citizens of the
country where he is found bind the
Philippines. Hence, there is a generally accepted
principle of international law to presume foundlings
as having been born and a national of the country
in which it is found. Hence, as a foundling, Poe is
considered a natural born Filipino citizen.
Political Law - Cases│ Page 6 of 10
Q: Is Poe considered a resident of the
Philippine for at least 10 years immediately
preceding such election for purposes of
candidacy for presidency?
A: Yes. There are three requisites to acquire a new
domicile 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new
locality 2. Intention to remain and 3. Intention to
abandon the old domicile.
Poe presented voluminous evidence showing that
she and her family abandoned their US domicile
and stayed in the Philippines for good. This
evidences include her former US passport showing
her arrival on May 24, 2005 and her return to the
Philippines every time she travelled abroad, email
correspondences with freight company to arrange
for the shipment of household items as well as with
the pet Bureau; school records of her children
showing enrolment in Philippine schools starting on
June 2005 etc. Hence such leads to no to other
conclusion that Poe decided to permanently
abandon her US residence and reside in the
Philippines as early as May 24, 2005. These
evidences, coupled with her eventual application to
reacquire Philippine citizenship is clear that when
she returned in May 2005, it was for good. Poe is
thus declared qualified to be a candidate for
Presidency.
G. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS
Ang Tibay vs. CIR (February 27, 1940)
J. Laurel
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a
leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio
caused the layoff of a number of his employees.
However, the National Labor Union, Inc. (NLU)
questioned the validity of said lay off as it averred
that the said employees laid off were members of
NLU while no members of the rival labor union
National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) were laid off.
The case reached the Court of Industrial Relations
(CIR) where Toribio and NWB won. Eventually,
NLU went to the Supreme Court invoking its right
for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered
evidence. The Supreme Court agreed with NLU.
The Solicitor General, arguing for the CIR, filed a
motion for reconsideration.
 Lyceum of the Philippines University College of Law
Q: What are the cardinal rights or requisites
which must be respected in administrative
proceedings?
A:
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the
right to present one’s case and submit
evidence in support thereof.
2. Tribunal must consider the evidence
presented.
3. Decision must have something to support it.
4. Evidence must be substantial (more than a
mere “scintilla”, relevant evidence a
reasonable mind accepts to support a
conclusion)
5. Decision must be rendered on the evident
presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record or disclosed to the
parties affected.
6. Tribunal or body or any of its judges must
act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy and not simply accept the views
of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
7. The board or body should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision
in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered.
HOLDING OF MULTIPLE OFFICES
Denis Funa vs Acting Secretary of Justice
Alberto C. Agra (Feb 19, 2013)
J Bersamin
On March 1, 2010, Arroyo appointed Agra as the
Acting Secretary of Justice following the resignation
of Secretary Agnes Devanadera. On March 5,
2010, President Arroyo designated Agra as the
Acting Solicitor General in a concurrent capacity.
Denis Funa then filed a suit to challenge the
constitutionality of Agra’s concurrent appointments
or designations, claiming it to be prohibited under
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Q: Is the holding of two offices valid if the other
is only on a temporary capacity?
A: No. Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution provides a stricter prohibition on the
Political Law - Cases│ Page 7 of 10
President and the Members of his Cabinet in so far
as holding other offices or employments in the
Government or in government owned or
government controlled corporations. Being
designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice
concurrently with his position of Acting Solicitor
General, Agra was undoubtedly covered by Section
13, Article VII. Hence, Agra could not validly hold
any other office or employment during his tenure as
the Acting Solicitor General because the
Constitution has not otherwise so provided. It does
not matter whether Agra’s designation was in an
acting or temporary capacity. The prohibition
against dual or multiple offices being held by one
official must be construed as to apply to all
appointments or designations, whether permanent
or temporary appointment.
H. ELECTION LAW
Substitution
Tagolino v HRET (March 19, 2013)
J Perlas-Bernabe
Richard Gomez filed his certificate of candidacy
(CoC) with the Commission on Elections, seeking
congressional office as Representative for the
Fourth Legislative District of Leyte. Juntilla filed a
verified complaint stating that Richard failed to
meet the 1 yr residency thus, should be declared
disqualified.
Juntilla’s petition was granted, Richard manifested
that he accepting the resolution (disqualified) and
his wife will substitute the position. Lucy Torres-
Gomez then filed her CoC together with a
Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance from the
Liberal Party endorsing her as the party’s official
substitute candidate of her husband Richard
wherein the COMELEC En Banc approved such
substitution. Juntilla, opposed the candidacy of Ms.
Lucy as Richard’s substitute. Juntilla stated that
there should be no substitution because there is no
candidate to substitute for.
Q: Whether or not the substitution of Richard
Gomez as a candidate valid?
A: NO. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that, if an official candidate of a
 Lyceum of the Philippines University College of Law
registered or accredited political party dies,
withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, a person
belonging to and certified by the same political
party may file a certificate of candidacy to
replace the candidate who died, withdrew or
was disqualified. Evidently, Section 77 requires that
there be an “official candidate” before candidate
substitution proceeds. As defined under Section
79(a) of the OEC, the term “candidate” refers to any
person aspiring for or seeking an elective public
office who has filed a certificate of candidacy by
himself or through an accredited political party,
aggroupment, or coalition of parties. Clearly, the
law requires that one must have validly filed a CoC
in order to be considered a candidate.
But it must be noted that Richard's "disqualification"
was due to his failure to comply with the
residency requirement and misrepresenting his
residence which is a ground for denial due course
to and/or cancellation of CoC under Sec 78. Hence,
there was no valid substitution and Lucy Torres
Gomez was not a bona fide candidate for the
position when she ran for office, which means she
could not have been elected.
I. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
SOURCES
Pharmaceutical & Health Care Assn. of the Phil.
v. Sec. of Health Duque, et al. (October 9, 2007)
J Austria-Martinez
Before the court is a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 seeing to nullify the Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations of Executive Order No. 51,
otherwise known as “The Milk Code” issued by then
President Corazon Aquino. Petitioner posits that
the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that
are not constitutional and go beyond the law it is
supposed to implement.
One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code
states that the law seeks to give effect to Article
112 of the International Code of Marketing of
Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by
the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. The
WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and
protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition
Political Law - Cases│ Page 8 of 10
and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk
substitutes.
In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of
said instrument provides that State Parties should
take appropriate measures to diminish infant and
child mortality, and ensure that all segments of
society, specially parents and children, are
informed of the advantages of breastfeeding.
On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed
RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
Q: Whether the RIRR is constitutional and
whether it is in accord with the provisions of
the Milk Code.
A. Yes for ICBMS but not for WHA Resolutions.
The Court notes that the following international
instruments invoked by respondents, namely: (1)
The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child; (2) The International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights; and (3) the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, only provide the steps that must
be taken by State Parties to diminish infant and
child mortality and inform society of the advantages
of breastfeeding, ensure the health and well-being
of families, and ensure that women are provided
with services and nutrition in connection with
pregnancy and lactation. Said instruments do not
contain specific provisions regarding the use or
marketing of breastmilk substitutes.
The international instruments that do have specific
provisions regarding breastmilk substitutes are the
ICMBS and various WHA Resolutions.
The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties
as they have not been concurred in by at least two-
thirds of all members of the Senate as required
under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution.
However, the ICMBS which was adopted by the
WHA in 1981 had been transformed into domestic
law through local legislation, the Milk Code.
Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force
and effect of law in this jurisdiction and not the
ICMBS per se.
The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of
the ICMBS, but the Code did not adopt the
 Lyceum of the Philippines University College of Law
provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting
advertising or other forms of promotion to the
general public of products within the scope of the
ICMBS. Instead, the Milk Code expressly provides
that advertising, promotion, or other marketing
materials may be allowed if such materials are duly
authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency
Committee (IAC).
Q: How do International Laws become part of
the law of the land?
A: Under the 1987 Constitution, international law
can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either by transformation or incorporation. The
transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic
law through a constitutional mechanism such as
local legislation. The incorporation method applies
when, by mere constitutional declaration,
international law is deemed to have the force of
domestic law.
Q: What is Soft Law and can it (in this case the
WHA Resolutions) be considered as customary
law?
A: It is an expression of non-binding norms,
principles, and practices that influence state
behavior. "Soft law" does not fall into any of the
categories of international law set forth in Article 38,
Chapter III of the 1946 Statute of the International
Court of Justice.
For an international rule to be considered as
customary law, it must be established that such rule
is being followed by states because they consider it
obligatory to comply with such rules (opinio juris).
STATE IMMUNITY
Air Transportation Office (ATO) v. Sps. David
and Elisea Ramos (February 23, 2011)
J Bersamin
Sps. Ramos discovered that a portion of their land
was being used as part of the runway and running
shoulder of the Loakan Airport which is operated by
ATO. Sometime in 1995, respondents agreed to
convey the subject portion by deed of sale to ATO
in consideration of the amount of Php778,150.00.
However, ATO failed to pay despite repeated
verbal and written demands. Thus, an action for
Political Law - Cases│ Page 9 of 10
collection against ATO was filed by the
respondents before the RTC. ATO’s primary
contention was that the deed of sale was entered
into the performance of governmental functions.
RTC ruled in favor of the respondents. CA affirmed
RTC. Hence, the petition.
Q: Whether ATO could be sued without the
State’s consent.
A: The State’s immunity from suit does not extend
to the petitioner (ATO) because it is an agency of
the State engaged in an enterprise that is far from
being the State’s exclusive prerogative. The CA
thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character
of the ATO as an agency of the Government not
performing a purely governmental or sovereign
function, but was instead involved in the
management and maintenance of the Loakan
Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive
prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity.
Hence, the ATO had no claim to the State’s
immunity from suit. The SC further observes that
the doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be
successfully invoked to defeat a valid claim for
compensation arising from the taking without just
compensation and without the proper expropriation
proceedings being first resorted to of the plaintiff’s
property.
Lastly, the issue of whether or not the ATO could
be sued without the States consent has been
rendered moot by the passage of the Civil Aviation
Authority Act of 2008 (R.A. No. 9497). Section 23 of
said law enumerates the corporate powers vested
in the CAAP, including the power to sue and be
sued, to enter into contracts of every class, kind
and description, to construct, acquire, own, hold,
operate, maintain, administer and lease personal
and real properties, and to settle, under such terms
and conditions most advantageous to it, any claim
by or against it. With the CAAP having legally
succeeded the ATO pursuant to R.A. No. 9497, the
obligations that the ATO had incurred by virtue of
the deed of sale with the Ramos spouses might
now be enforced against the CAAP.