FACTS: Justina Santos executed on a contract of lease in favor of Wong, Facts: Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut
covering the portion then already leased to him and another portion Muller were married in Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The
fronting Florentino Torres street. The lease was for 50 years, although the couple resided in Germany at a house owned by respondent’s parents but
lessee was given the right to withdraw at any time from the agreement. decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this
On December 21 she executed another contract giving Wong the option to time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents
buy the leased premises for P120,000, payable within ten years at a which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land
monthly installment of P1,000. The option, written in Tagalog, imposed on in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a
him the obligation to pay for the food of the dogs and the salaries of the house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered
maids in her household, the charge not to exceed P1,800 a month. The in the name of petitioner, Elena Buenaventura Muller.
option was conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a petition
for which was then pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking,
It appears, however, that this application for naturalization was withdrawn and maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.
when it was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. On October
28, 1958 she filed a petition to adopt him and his children on the
erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them Philippine citizenship. On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of
The error was discovered and the proceedings were abandoned. properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The court
In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959, she bade her legatees to granted said petition. It also decreed the separation of properties between
respect the contracts she had entered into with Wong, but in a codicil of a them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within
later date (November 4, 1959) she appears to have a change of heart. the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the
Claiming that the various contracts were made by her because of marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was
machinations and inducements practiced by him, she now directed her acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that
executor to secure the annulment of the contracts. respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased
in violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether the contracts involving Wong were valid
The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed
HELD: No, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but the decision of the RTC. It held that respondent merely prayed for
considered collectively, they reveal an insidious pattern to subvert by reimbursement for the purchase of the Antipolo property, and not
indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits. To be sure, a lease to acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It ordered the respondent to
an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition
right to buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine of the land and the amount of P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the
citizenship. house situated in Antipolo, Rizal.
But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.
piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise
dispose of his property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that
the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner Issue: Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to
divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land but also of reimbursement.
the right to dispose of it— rights the sum total of which make up
ownership. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien Ruling: No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.
landholding in the Philippines, is indeed in grave peril.
Ting Ho vs Teng Gui
Ramirez v. Vda. de Ramirez
Facts: Felix Ting Ho, Jr., Merla Ting Ho Braden, Juana Ting Ho and Lydia
FACTS: Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain with only Ting Ho Belenzo against their brother, respondent Vicente Teng Gui. The
his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the controversy revolves around a parcel of land, and the improvements which
Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch X. The administratrix of the should form part of the estate of their deceased father, Felix Ting Ho, and
estate submitted a project of partition giving one part of the estate to the should be partitioned equally among each of the siblings. Petitioners
widow “en pleno dominio” in satisfaction of her legitime while the other part alleged that their father Felix Ting Ho died intestate on June 26, 1970, and
of the “free portion” to his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez. left upon his death an estate. According to petitioners, the said lot and
Furthermore, one third of the free portion is charged with the widow’s properties were titled and tax declared under trust in the name of
usufruct and the remaining two thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of respondent Vicente Teng Gui for the benefit of the deceased Felix Ting Ho
Wanda Wrobleski. who, being a Chinese citizen, was then disqualified to own public lands in
the Philippines; and that upon the death of Felix Ting Ho, the respondent
Jorge and Roberto Ramirez opposed the project of partition, as well as the took possession of the same for his own exclusive use and benefit to their
substitutions provided by the testator as to the usufructs of the widow and exclusion and prejudice.
of Wanda. Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of partition in
its order dated May 1967. Jorge and Roberto appealed before the Issue: Whether or not the sale was void
Supreme Court.
Ruling: No, the sale was not void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code has
provided that if the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may be
ISSUE: Whether or not the usufruct over real property in favor of Wanda shown to have been in reality a donation, or some other act or contract.
violates the Constitutional prohibition against ownership of lands by alien. The sale in this case, was however valid because the sale was in fact a
donation. The law requires positive proof of the simulation of the price of
RULING: The Court upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the sale. But since the finding was based on a mere assumption, the price
the ground that the Constitution covers not only succession by operation of has not been proven to be a simulation.
law, but also testamentary succession. Any alien would be able to
circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in
exchange for a devise of a piece of land. In the present case, the usufruct
in favor of Wanda, although a real right, does not vest title to the land in the
usufructuary. It is the vesting of title in favor of aliens which is proscribed by
the Constitution.
the JVA, should the NIDC opt to sell its shares of stock to a third party,
Kawasaki could only exercise its right of first refusal to the extent that its
Register of Deeds vs Ung Siu Si Temple total shares of stock would not exceed 40% of the entire shares of stock.
The NIDC, on the other hand, may purchase even beyond 60% of the total
Facts: Jesus Dy, a Filipino citizen donated a parcel of land in favour of Ung shares. As a government corporation and necessarily a 100% Filipino-
Sui Si Temple, a religious organization whose trustees are all of Chinese owned corporation, there is nothing to prevent its purchase of stocks even
nationality.- The donation was accepted by the trustees however, the register beyond 60% of the capitalization as the Constitution clearly limits only
of deeds refused to record the said deed of donation.- The trial court ruled foreign capitalization.
that in view of the provisions of sections 1 and 5 of Article XIII of the
Constitution limiting the acquisition of land in the Philippines to its citizens, or Kawasaki was bound by its contractual obligation under the JVA that limits
to corporations or associations at least 60% of the capital stock of which is its right of first refusal to 40% of the total capitalization of PHILSECO.
owned by such citizens adopted after Act. No. 271, the deed of donation Thus, Kawasaki cannot purchase beyond 40% of the capitalization of the
should not be admitted for registration.- On appeal, Ung Sui Si Temple joint venture on account of both constitutional and contractual
claimed that the acquisition of the land, for religious purposes, is authorized proscriptions.
and permitted by Act 271 and that the refusal violates the freedom of
religious clause of the Constitution. Strategic Alliance vs. Radstock
Issue: Whether or not a deed of donation of a parcel of land executed in Facts: Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP)
favour of a religious organization whose founder, trustees and administrator was incorporated in 1966. It was granted a franchise to construct, operate
are Chinese citizens be registered or not. and maintain toll facilities in the North and South Luzon Tollways and
Metro Manila Expressway.
Ruling: No. The provisions of Act 271 are deemed repealed by the absolute
terms of section 5, Title XIII of the Constitution. The Constitution makes no CDCP Mining Corporation (CDCP Mining), an affiliate of CDCP, obtained
exception in favour of religious associations. The purpose of the sixty per loans from Marubeni Corporation of Japan (Marubeni). A CDCP official
centum requirement is obviously to ensure that corporations or associations issued letters of guarantee for the loans although there was no CDCP
allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural resources shall be Board Resolution authorizing the issuance of such letters of guarantee.
controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of the Constitution demands that in the CDCP Mining secured the Marubeni loans when CDCP and CDCP Mining
absence of capital stock, the controlling membership should be composed of were still privately owned and managed.
Filipino citizens.
In 1983, CDCP’s name was changed to Philippine National Construction
JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA Corporation (PNCC) in order to reflect that the Government already owned
90.3% of PNCC and only 9.70% is under private ownership. Meanwhile,
FACTS: The National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a the Marubeni loans to CDCP Mining remained unpaid.
government corporation, entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA)
with Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. for the construction, operation and On 20 October 2000 and 22 November 2000, the PNCC Board of
management of the Subic National Shipyard, Inc., later became the Directors (PNCC Board) passed Board Resolutions admitting PNCC’s
Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corporation (PHILSECO). Under the liability to Marubeni. Previously, for two decades the PNCC Board
JVA, NIDC and Kawasaki would maintain a shareholding proportion of consistently refused to admit any liability for the Marubeni loans.
60%-40% and that the parties have the right of first refusal in case of a
sale. In January 2001, Marubeni assigned its entire credit to Radstock
Securities Limited (Radstock), a foreign corporation. Radstock
Through a series of transfers, NIDC’s rights, title and interest in immediately sent a notice and demand letter to PNCC.
PHILSECO eventually went to the National Government. In the interest of
national economy, it was decided that PHILSECO should be privatized by PNCC and Radstock entered into a Compromise Agreement. Under this
selling 87.67% of its total outstanding capital stock to private entities. After agreement, PNCC shall pay Radstock the reduced amount of
negotiations, it was agreed that Kawasaki’s right of first refusal under the P6,185,000,000.00 in full settlement of PNCC’s guarantee of CDCP
JVA be “exchanged” for the right to top by five percent the highest bid for Mining’s debt allegedly totaling P17,040,843,968.00 (judgment debt as of
said shares. Kawasaki that Philyards Holdings, Inc. (PHI), in which it was 31 July 2006). To satisfy its reduced obligation, PNCC undertakes to (1)
a stockholder, would exercise this right in its stead. "assign to a third party assignee to be designated by Radstock all its rights
and interests" to the listed real properties of PNCC; (2) issue to Radstock
During bidding, Kawasaki/PHI Consortium is the losing bidder. Even so, or its assignee common shares of the capital stock of PNCC issued at par
because of the right to top by 5% percent the highest bid, it was able to value which shall comprise 20% of the outstanding capital stock of PNCC;
top JG Summit’s bid. JG Summit protested, contending that PHILSECO, and (3) assign to Radstock or its assignee 50% of PNCC’s 6% share, for
as a shipyard is a public utility and, hence, must observe the 60%-40% the next 27 years, in the gross toll revenues of the Manila North Tollways
Filipino-foreign capitalization. By buying 87.67% of PHILSECO’s capital Corporation.
stock at bidding, Kawasaki/PHI in effect now owns more than 40% of the
stock. Strategic Alliance Development Corporation (STRADEC) moved for
reconsideration. STRADEC alleged that it has a claim against PNCC as a
ISSUE: * Whether or not PHILSECO is a public utility. bidder of the National Government’s shares, receivables, securities and
* Whether or not Kawasaki/PHI can purchase beyond 40% of interests in PNCC.
PHILSECO’s stocks
Issue: Whether or not the Compromise Agreement between PNCC and
HELD: In arguing that PHILSECO, as a shipyard, was a public utility, JG Radstock is valid in relation to the Constitution, existing laws, and public
Summit relied on sec. 13, CA No. 146. On the other hand, Kawasaki/PHI policy
argued that PD No. 666 explicitly stated that a “shipyard” was not a “public
utility.” But the SC stated that sec. 1 of PD No. 666 was expressly Held: The Compromise Agreement is contrary to the Constitution, existing
repealed by sec. 20, BP Blg. 391 and when BP Blg. 391 was subsequently laws and public policy.
repealed by EO 226, the latter law did not revive sec. 1 of PD No. 666.
Therefore, the law that states that a shipyard is a public utility still stands. PNCC’s toll fees are public funds. PNCC cannot use public funds like toll
fees that indisputably form part of the General Fund, to pay a private debt
A shipyard such as PHILSECO being a public utility as provided by law is of CDCP Mining to Radstock. Such payment cannot qualify as expenditure
therefore required to comply with the 60%-40% capitalization under the for a public purpose. The toll fees are merely held in trust by PNCC for the
Constitution. Likewise, the JVA between NIDC and Kawasaki manifests an National Government, which is the owner of the toll fees. Considering that
intention of the parties to abide by this constitutional mandate. Thus, under there is no appropriation law passed by Congress for the compromise
amount, the Compromise Agreement is void for being contrary to law, Martinez vs CA
specifically Section 29(1), Article VI of the Constitution. And since the
payment pertains to CDCP Mining’s private debt to Radstock, the FACTS: Private respondents Godofredo De la Paz and his sister Manuela
Compromise Agreement is also void for being contrary to the fundamental De la Paz entered into an oral contract with petitioner Rev. Fr. Dante
public policy that government funds or property shall be spent or used Martinez, then Assistant parish priest of Cabanatuan City, for the sale of
solely for public purposes. Lot No. 1337-A-3 at the Villa Fe Subdivision in Cabanatuan City for the
sum of P15,000.00. At the time of the sale, the lot was still registered in
Radstock is not qualified to own land in the Philippines. Consequently, the name of Claudia De la Paz, mother of private respondents, although
Radstock is also disqualified to own the rights to ownership of lands in the the latter had already sold it to private respondent Manuela de la Paz by
Philippines. Radstock cannot own the rights to ownership of any land in virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale dated. He was assured by them that the
the Philippines because Radstock cannot lawfully own the land itself. lot belonged to Manuela De la Paz. It was agreed that petitioner would
Otherwise, there will be a blatant circumvention of the Constitution, which give a downpayment of P3,000.00 to private respondents De la Paz and
prohibits a foreign private corporation from owning land in the Philippines. that the balance would be payable by installment. After giving the
In addition, Radstock cannot transfer the rights to ownership of land in the P3,000.00 downpayment, petitioner started the construction of a house on
Philippines if it cannot own the land itself. It is basic that an assignor or the lot and began paying the real estate taxes on said property.
seller cannot assign or sell something he does not own at the time the
ownership, or the rights to the ownership, are to be transferred to the In the meantime, in a Deed of. Absolute Sale with Right to Repurchase,
assignee or buyer. The third party assignee under the Compromise private respondents De la Paz sold three lots with right to repurchase the
Agreement who will be designated by Radstock can only acquire rights same within one year to private respondents spouses Reynaldo and
duplicating those which its assignor is entitled by law to exercise. Thus, Susan Veneracion for the sum of P150,000.00. One of the lots sold was
the assignee can acquire ownership of the land only if its assignor owns the lot previously sold to petitioner. Petitioner discovered that the lot he
the land. Clearly, the assignment by PNCC of the real properties to a was occupying with his family had been sold to the spouses Veneracion
nominee to be designated by Radstock is a circumvention of the after receiving a letter from private respondent Reynaldo Veneracion
Constitutional prohibition against a private foreign corporation owning claiming ownership of the land and demanding that they vacate the
lands in the Philippines. The said circumvention renders the Compromise property and remove their improvements thereon. Petitioner, in turn,
Agreement void. demanded through counsel the execution of the deed of sale from private
respondents De la Paz and informed Reynaldo Veneracion that he was
Secretary of DENR vs Yap the owner of the property as he had previously purchased the same from
private respondents De la Paz.
FACTS: This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in ISSUE: Can the second purchaser in a case of double sales of immovable
Kalibo Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by property (under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code) claim the presence of
respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al, and ordered the survey of good faith despite the fact that he had previously seen the construction of
Boracay for titling purposes. a house on the same lot?
On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801
declaring Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming HELD: NO. A purchaser who is aware of facts which should put a
that Proc. No. 1801 precluded them from filing an application for a judicial reasonable man upon his guard cannot turn a blind eye and later claim
confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes, that he acted in good faith. The fact that there are persons, other than the
respondents-claimants filed a petition for declaratory relief with the RTC in vendors, in actual possession of the disputed lot should have put the
Kalibo, Aklan. purchaser on inquiry as to the nature of the builder’s right over the
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed property. Mere reliance on the assurance of a third person regarding the
the petition countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the assertion that the lot had not been previously sold to another purchaser
public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public does not meet the standard of good faith required under Article 1544.
forest,” which was not available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of
PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code.
HELD: No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration
is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of
the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order,
an administrative action, investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigators, and a legislative act or statute.
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In
keeping with the presumption of state ownership, the Court has time and
again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government,
such as an official proclamation, declassifying inalienable public land into
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong
to the State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership
of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.
Facts: 1. On February 20, 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for 1. Sec. 14 (1) is unsatisfied as the earliest tax declarations
original registration of title covering a parcel of land in Silang, Cavite which presented was 1948. No other substantive evidence was
he purchased from Eduardo Velazco and that he and his predecessors in presented.
interest had been in open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession 2. Sec. 14 (2) is also unsatisfied as the subject property was
of the said land for more than 30 years. declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no
2.Velazco, the vendor, alleges that this land was originally owned by his competent evidence that is no longer intended for public use
great-grandfather which passed down to his four sons. By 1966, one of the service or for the development of the national evidence,
sons became the administrator of the properties which the son of the latter conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
succeeded his parents. One of the properties therein was the one sold by classification of the subject property as alienable and
the Velazco. disposable land of the public domain does not change its status
3.They also presented an evidence on the classification of land to be as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the
alienable and disposable by the DENR on March 15, 1982. Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by
4.The RTC ruled in favor with them, but the CA reversed citing the case of prescription.
Republic v Hebierto.
The Court holds that the correct interpretation for Section 14 (1) is Naguit,
not Herbierto, the latter being only an orbiter dicta to a case where the
MTC did not acquire jurisdiction to settle the original registration. Thus:
The Court rules that the interpretation for Sec 14 (2) requires a mix of
interpretation of Art. 1113, Art. 1137, and Art. 420-422 of the New Civil
Code.
1. It is well settled, per Art. 1113, that only objects within the
commerce of men and the patrimonial property of the State can
be subject to acquisitive or extraordinary acquisitive
prescription.
2. It is also clear that in Arts. 420-422, the property of public
dominion when no longer in use, is converted into patrimonial
property, if and only if, as held in Ignacio vs. Director of Lands
or Laurel vs. Garcia, there is a positive act of the executive or
legislative declaring lands to be such.
3. Hence, combining both rulings, it is clear that only when there
is a positive act, regardless if the land was classified as
alienable and disposable, that the land sought to be registered,
can be acquired through prescription.
Philippine Constitution - ARTICLE 12
NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY
SEC. 2.
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of
natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the
State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into
co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with
Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum
of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a
period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than
twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be
provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power,
beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation's marine wealth in its archipelagic
waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic zone, and reserve its use
and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in
accordance with this provision, within thirty days from its execution.
SEC. 3.
Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain
may be further classified by law according to the uses which they may be
devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to
agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such
alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the
Philippines may lease not more than five hundred hectares, or acquire not
more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase, homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and
development, and subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the
Congress shall determine, by law, the size of lands of the public domain
which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and the conditions
therefore.
SEC. 7.
SEC. 8.
Section47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby
granted time, not to extend beyond December 31, 1987 within which to
take advantage of the benefit of this chapter: Provided, That this extension
shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed 144 hectares.
Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated by the
President in accordance with section forty-five of this Act shall apply also
to the lands comprised in the provisions of this chapter, but this section
shall not be construed as prohibiting any of said persons from acting under
this chapter at any time prior to the period fixed by the President.
(a) Those who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the prior
United States have applied for the purchase, composition or other form of
grant of lands of the public domain under the laws and royal decrees then
in force and have instituted and prosecuted the proceedings in connection
therewith, but have with or without default upon their part, or for any other
cause, not received title therefor, if such applicants or grantees and their
heirs have occupied and cultivated said lands continuously since the filing
of their applications.