Quimiguing vs Icao
Facts:
Carmen Quimiguing, suing through her
parents, Antonio and Jacoba Cabilin, sought
an appeal from the orders of Zamboanga CFI,
which dismissed her complaint for support
and damages and request for amendment of
complaint.
Quimiguing averred that the then already
married Felix Icao succeeded in having
sexual relations with her through force and
intimidation. As a result, she became
pregnant despite efforts and drugs supplied
by Icao and had to stop studying. She then
claimed for monthly support, damages and
attorney’s fees.
The defendant-appellee, however, moved to
dismiss in light of Quimiguing’s failure to
allege the fact that a child had been born in
her complaint. The lower court dismissed
the case and subsequently denied further
amendment to the complaint, ruling that no
amendment was allowed for failure of the
original complaint to state a cause of action.
Issue: W/N the plaintiff-appellants can ask
for support and damages from defendant
despite failure to allege fact of birth in
complaint
Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled that plaintiff-
appellant had right to support of the child
she was carrying and an independent cause
of action for damages.
This is because the Civil Code (Art. 40)
recognizes the provisional personality of the
unborn child, which includes its right to
support from its progenitors, even it is only
“en ventre de sa mere.” Article 742 of the
same Code holds that, just as a conceived
child, it may receive donations through
persons that legally represent it. Readings of
Articles 40, 854 of the Civil Code and Article
29 of the Spanish Code also further
strengthen the case for reversal of order.
Additionally, “for a married man to force a
woman not his wife to yield to his lust xxx
constitutes a clear violation of the rights of
his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for damage caused” per
Article 21 of the Civil Code, a provision
supported by Article 2219, which provides
moral damages for victims of seduction,
abduction, rape or other lascivious acts.
Judgment reversed, set aside and remanded
for proceedings conformable to the decision;
with costs against Icao.
Geluz vs CA
FACTS:
Nita Villanueva, the wife of Oscar lazo,
respondent, came to know Antonio Geluz,
the petitioner and physician, through her
aunt Paula Yambot. Nita became pregnant
some time in 1950 before she and Oscar
were legally married. As advised by her aunt
and to conceal it from her parents, she
decided to have it aborted by Geluz. She had
her pregnancy aborted again on October
1953 since she found it inconvenient as she
was employed at COMELEC. After two years,
on February 21, 1955, she again became
pregnant and was accompanied by her sister
Purificacion and the latter’s daughter Lucida
at Geluz’ clinic at Carriedo and P. Gomez
Street. Oscar at this time was in the province
of Cagayan campaigning for his election to
the provincial board. He doesn’t have any
idea nor given his consent on the abortion.
ISSUE: Whether husband of a woman, who
voluntarily procured her abortion, could
recover damages from the physician who
caused the same.
HELD:
The Supreme Court believed that the
minimum award fixed at P3,000 for the
death of a person does not cover cases of an
unborn fetus that is not endowed with
personality which trial court and Court of
Appeals predicated.
Both trial court and CA wasn’t able to find
any basis for an award of moral damages
evidently because Oscar’s indifference to the
previous abortions of Nita clearly indicates
he was unconcerned with the frustration of
his parental affections. Instead of filing an
administrative or criminal case against
Geluz, he turned his wife’s indiscretion to
personal profit and filed a civil action for
damages of which not only he but, including
his wife would be the beneficiaries. It shows
that he’s after obtaining a large money
payment since he sued Geluz for P50,000
damages and P3,000 attorney’s fees that
serves as indemnity claim, which under the
circumstances was clearly exaggerated.
Limjuco vs. The Estate of Pedro Fragante
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time
of his death, applied for a certificate of public
convenience to install and maintain an ice
plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate
is financially capable of maintaining the
proposed service. The Public Service
Commission issued a certificate of public
convenience to Intestate Estate of the
deceased, authorizing said Intestate Estate
through its special or Judicial Administrator,
appointed by the proper court of competent
jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said
plant. Petitioner claims that the granting of
certificate applied to the estate is a
contravention of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante
may be extended an artificial judicial
personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an
artificial judicial personality because under
the Civil Code, “estate of a dead person
could be considered as artificial juridical
person for the purpose of the settlement
and distribution of his properties”. It should
be noted that the exercise of juridical
administration includes those rights and
fulfillment of obligation of Fragante which
survived after his death. One of those
surviving rights involved the pending
application for public convenience before
the Public Service Commission.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that “for the
purposes of the prosecution of said case No.
4572 of the Public Service Commission to its
final conclusion, both the personality and
citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be
deemed extended, within the meaning and
intent of the Public Service Act, as amended,
in harmony with the constitution: it is so
adjudged and decreed”.
Moy Ya Lim vs CID
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung, an alien visiting the
Philippines, whose authorized stay in the
Philippines was to expire, claims herself to
be lawfully naturalized upon her marriage to
a Filipino citizen. Solicitor General opposes
the ground that the marriage of the alien to
a Filipino citizen does not automatically
confer on the latter Philippine citizenship.
Plaintiff-appellant does not possess all the
qualifications required for applicant for
naturalization (CA 473), even she has proven
that she possesses none of the
disqualifications in said law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung became ipso
facto a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to
a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
Yes. An alien woman, upon her marriage to a
Filipino citizen, becomes lawfully naturalized
ipso facto, provided that she does not
possess all of the disqualifications
enumerated in CA 473. (Sections 15 and 4)
Republic vs Batiugas
This Petition for Review assails the Decision
of the CA, which affirmed the Decision of the
RTC that granted the Petition for
Naturalization of respondent Azucena
Saavedra Batuigas (Azucena).
On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a
Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of
Zamboanga del Sur. She stated that she
intends in good faith to become a citizen of
the Philippines and to renounce absolutely
and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any
foreign prince, potentate, state or
sovereignty, and particularly to China; and
that she will reside continuously in the
Philippines from the time of the filing of her
Petition up to the time of her naturalization.
After all the jurisdictional requirements had
been complied with, the Office of the
Solicitor General filed its Motion to Dismiss
on the ground that Azucena failed to allege
that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or
in some known lucrative trade. The OSG
maintained that Azucena is not allowed
under the Retail Trade to engage directly or
indirectly in the retail trade. The OSG
likewise disputed Azucena’s claim that she
owns real property because aliens are
precluded from owning lands in the country.
Finding the grounds relied upon by the OSG
to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied
said Motion.
Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on
September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents,
Azucena has never departed the Philippines
since birth. Azucena can speak English,
Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her
primary, secondary, and tertiary education
were taken in Philippine schools. After
earning a degree in education, she then
practiced her teaching profession in several
different schools in Mindanao.
In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married
Santiago Batuigas (Santiago), a natural-born
Filipino citizen. They have five children, all of
whom studied in Philippine public and
private schools and are all professionals.
After her stint as a teacher, Azucena and her
husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in
the retail business of and later on in
milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra. As
proof of their income, Azucena submitted
their joint annual tax returns and balance
sheets from 2000- 2002 and from 2004-
2005. During their marital union, the
Batuigas spouses bought parcels of land in
Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has validly
complied the citizenship requirement as
required by law to become a naturalized
citizen of the Philippines.
RULING:
Yes.
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire
Philippine citizenship through either judicial
naturalization under CA 473 or
administrative naturalization under Republic
Act No. 9139 (the “Administrative
Naturalization Law of 2000”). A third option,
called derivative naturalization, which is
available to alien women married to Filipino
husbands is found under Section 15 of CA
473, which provides that:
“Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
married to a citizen of the Philippines and
who might herself be lawfully naturalized
shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines.”
Under this provision, foreign women who
are married to Philippine citizens may be
deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it
is neither necessary for them to prove that
they possess other qualifications for
naturalization at the time of their marriage
nor do they have to submit themselves to
judicial naturalization.
Records, however, show that in February
1980, Azucena applied before the then
Commission on Immigration and
Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of her
Alien Certificate of Registration by reason of
her marriage to a Filipino citizen. The CID
granted her application. However, the
Ministry of Justice set aside the ruling of the
CID as it found no sufficient evidence that
Azucena’s husband is a Filipino citizen, as
only their marriage certificate was presented
to establish his citizenship. As the records
before this Court show, Santiago’s Filipino
citizenship has been adequately proven.
Under judicial proceeding, Santiago
submitted his birth certificate indicating
therein that he and his parents are Filipinos.
He also submitted voter’s registration, land
titles, and business registrations/licenses, all
of which are public records.
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the
main objective of extending the citizenship
privilege to an alien wife is to maintain a
unity of allegiance among family members,
thus:
It is, therefore, not congruent with our
cherished traditions of family unity and
identity that a husband should be a citizen
and the wife an alien, and that the national
treatment of one should be different from
that of the other.
Azucena has clearly proven, under strict
judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the
grant of that privilege, and this Court will not
stand in the way of making her a part of a
truly Filipino family.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court, that
granted the Petition for Naturalization, is
hereby AFFIRMED. Subject to compliance
with the period and the requirements under
Republic Act No. 530 which supplements the
Revised Naturalization Law, let a Certificate
of Naturalization be issued to AZUCENA
SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS after taking an oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Thereafter, her Alien Certificate of
Registration should be cancelled.
Frivaldo vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of
the province of Sorsogon and assumed office
in due time. The League of Municipalities
filed with the COMELEC a petition for the
annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that he
was not a Filipino citizen, having been
naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but
pleaded the special and affirmative defenses
that he was naturalized as American citizen
only to protect himself against President
Marcos during the Martial Law era.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election
Code provides that a qualified voter must be,
among other qualifications, a citizen of the
Philippines, this being an indispensable
requirement for suffrage under Article V,
Section 1, of the Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine
citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He
claims that by actively participating in the
local elections, he automatically forfeited
American citizenship under the laws of the
United States of America. The Court stated
that that the alleged forfeiture was between
him and the US. If he really wanted to drop
his American citizenship, he could do so in
accordance with CA No. 63 as amended by
CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by direct act of Congress,
by naturalization, or by repatriation.
Romualdez – Marcos vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about
1938, established her domicile in Tacloban,
Leyte where she studied and graduated high
school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938
to 1949. She then pursued her college
degree, education, in St. Paul’s College now
Divine Word University also in
Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte
Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went to
manila during 1952 to work with her cousin,
the late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his
office in the House of Representatives. In
1954, she married late President Ferdinand
Marcos when he was still a Congressman of
Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a
voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as
Senator in 1959, they lived together in San
Juan, Rizal where she registered as a
voter. In 1965, when Marcos won
presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace
and registered as a voter in San Miguel
Manila. She served as member of the
Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro
Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for
the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo
Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative
of the First District of Leyte and also a
candidate for the same position, filed a
“Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not
meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. The petitioner, in an honest
misrepresentation, wrote seven months
under residency, which she sought to rectify
by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that
"she has always maintained Tacloban City as
her domicile or residence. She arrived at the
seven months residency due to the fact that
she became a resident of the Municipality of
Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the
1year residency requirement to be eligible in
running as representative of the First District
of Leyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with
domicile for election purposes. The court
are in favor of a conclusion supporting
petitoner’s claim of legal residence or
domicile in the First District of Leyte despite
her own declaration of 7 months residency
in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her
parents. Tacloban became Imelda’s
domicile of origin by operation of law when
her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there
is actual removal or change of domicile, a
bona fide intention of abandoning the
former residence and establishing a new
one, and acts which correspond with the
purpose. In the absence and concurrence of
all these, domicile of origin should be
deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the
husband’s domicile because the term
“residence” in Civil Law does not mean the
same thing in Political Law. When Imelda
married late President Marcos in 1954, she
kept her domicile of origin and merely
gained a new home and not domicilium
necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new
domicile after her marriage and acquired
right to choose a new one only after the
death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon
returning to the country clearly indicated
that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of
origin, as her domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner even obtained her residence
certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while
living in her brother’s house, an act, which
supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested. She even kept close ties by
establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other
important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that
petitioner possesses the necessary
residence qualifications to run for a seat in
the House of Representatives in the First
District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11,
and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to
order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to
proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Tenchavez vs Escañ o
5 Phil 355
Torts and Damages – When Liability for
Quasi Delict Arises – Unfounded Suit
In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escañ o
secretly married each other and of course
without the knowledge of Escañ o’s parents
who were of prominent social status. The
marriage was celebrated by a military
chaplain. When Escañ o’s parents learned of
this, they insisted a church wedding to be
held but Escañ o withdrew from having a
recelebration because she heard that
Tenchavez was having an affair with another
woman. Eventually, their relationship went
sour; 2 years later, Escaño went to the US
where she acquired a decree of absolute
divorce and she subsequently became an
American citizen and also married an
American.
In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal
separation and further alleged that Escañ o’s
parents dissuaded their daughter to go
abroad and causing her to be estranged from
him hence he’s asking for damages in the
amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court
did not grant the legal separation being
sought for and at the same time awarded a
P45,000.00 worth of counter- claim by the
Escañ os.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be
awarded to either party in the case at bar
HELD: Yes.
On the part of Tenchavez:
His marriage with Escañ o was a secret one
and the failure of said marriage did not result
to public humiliation; that they never lived
together and he even consented to annulling
the marriage earlier (because Escañ o filed
for annulment before she left for the US but
the same was dismissed due to her non-
appearance in court); that he failed to prove
that Escañ o’s parents dissuaded their
daughter to leave Tenchavez and as such his
P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded.
HOWEVER, by reason of the fact that Escañ o
left without the knowledge of Tenchavez and
being able to acquire a divorce decree; and
Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC
awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral
damages and attorney’s fees to be paid by
Escañ o and not her parents.
On the part of Escañ o’s parents:
It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages
suit by Tenchavez against the Escañ os is
unfounded and the same must have
wounded their feelings and caused them
anxiety, the same could in no way have
seriously injured their reputation, or
otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having
become a common occurrence in present
society. What is important, and has been
correctly established in the decision of the
court below, is that they were not guilty of
any improper conduct in the whole
deplorable affair. The SC reduced the
damages awarded from P45,000.00 to
P5,000.00 only.
TITLE: St. Louis Realty Corp. vs. CA CITATION:
133 SCRA 179
FACTS:
Dr. Conrado Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and
member of the faculty of UE Ramon
Magsaysay Medical Center, seek to recover
damage for a wrongful advertisement in the
Sunday Times where St Louis Realty Corp.
misrepresented his house with Mr. Arcadio.
St. Louis published an ad on December 15,
1968 with the heading “where the heart is”.
This was republished on January 5, 1969. In
the advertisement, the house featured was
Dr Aramil’s house and not Mr. Arcadio with
whom the company asked permission and
the intended house to be published. After Dr
Aramil noticed the mistake, he wrote a letter
to St. Louis demanding an explanation 1
week after such receipt. No rectification or
apology was published despite that it was
received by Ernesto Magtoto, the officer in
charge of the advertisement. This prompted
Dr. Aramil’s counsel to demand actual, moral
and exemplary damages. On March 18,
1969, St Louis published an ad now with Mr.
Arcadio’s real house but nothing on the
apology or explanation of the error. Dr
Aramil filed a complaint for damages on
March 29.
During the April 15 ad, the notice of
rectification was published. ISSUE: Whether
St. Louis is liable to pay damages to Dr.
Aramil. HELD:
St Louis was grossly negligent in mixing up
residences in a widely circulated publication.
Furthermore, it never made any written
apology and explanation of the mix-up. It
just contented itself with a cavalier
"rectification ". The trial court awarded
Aramil P8,000 as actual damages, P20,000 as
moral damages and P2,000 as attorney's
fees. When St. Louis Realty appealed to the
Court of Appeals, CA affirmed the judgement
for the reason that “St. Louis Realty
committed an actionable quasi- delict under
articles 21 and 26 of the Civil Code because
the questioned advertisements pictured a
beautiful house which did not belong to
Arcadio but to Doctor Aramil who, naturally,
was annoyed by that contretemps”.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Appellate
Court is affirmed. Costs against the
petitioner.
Gregorio vs CA
FACTS:
Respondents Emma J. Datuin (Datuin) and
Sansio Philippines, Inc. (Sansio)filed an
affidavit of complaint for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 (Bouncing Checks Law)against
petitioner Zenaida R. Gregorio (Gregorio), a
proprietor of Alvi Marketing. Datuinand
Sansio claimed that Gregorio delivered
insufficiently funded bank checks as
paymentfor appliances Alvi Marketing
bought from Sansio. Gregorio was then
indicted for threecounts of violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MTC), Branch 3,Manila. The MTC issued a
warrant of arrest and she was subsequently
arrested by armedoperatives while visiting
her family house in Quezon City.On
December 5, 1997, Gregorio filed before the
MTC a Motion for Deferment of Arraignment
and Reinvestigation. She alleged that she
could not have issued the bouncedchecks as
she did not have a checking account with the
bank on which the checks weredrawn. This
was certified by the manager of the said
bank. Gregorio also alleged that
thesignature on the bounced checks were
radically and patently different from her
ownsignature. The MTC granted the motion,
and a reinvestigation was
conducted.Subsequently, the MTC ordered
the B.P. Blg. 22 cases dismissed.On August
18, 2000, Gregorio filed a complaint for
damages against Sansio andDatuin before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12,
Ligao, Albay. Part of hercomplaint was that
as a result of her wrongful arrest and
arraignment, she sufferedhelplessness,
hunger and humiliation and being
distraught. Datuin and Sansio meanwhile
filed a Motion to Dismiss on grounds that
Gregorio’s complaint arose from grounds of
compensation arising from malicious
prosecution. On October 10, 2000, the RTC
deniedthis Motion to Dismiss. Sansio and
Datuin then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration butwas again denied in
January 5, 2001. They went to the Court of
Appeals alleging graveabuse of discretion on
the part of the presiding judge of the RTC in
denying their motions to dismiss and for
reconsideration. On January 31, 2007, the CA
rendered a Decision
granting the petition and ordering
Gregorio’s damage suit to be dismissed.
ISSUE: Are Sansio and Datuin liable for
damages to Gregorio?
HELD: Yes. Among other reasons, the
Supreme Court decided
that Gregorio’s rights “
topersonal dignity, personal security,
privacy, and peace of mind were infringed by
Sansioand Datuin when they failed to
exercise the requisite diligence in
determining the identityof the person they
should rightfully accuse of tendering
insufficiently funded checks. . .. Because she
was not able to refute the charges against
her, petitioner was falselyindicted for three
(3) counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Gregorio was conveniently ather city
residence while visiting her family. She
suffered embarrassment
and humiliationover her sudden arrest and
detention and she had to spend time, effort,
and money to clearher tarnished name and
reputation, considering that she had held
several honorablepositions in different
organizations and offices in the public
service, particularly herbeing a
Kagawad
in Oas, Albay at the time of her arrest.”
Capili vs People
In September 1999, James Capili married
Karla Medina. But then, just three months
later in December 1999, he married another
woman named Shirley Tismo.
In 2004, Karla Medina filed an action for
declaration of nullity of the second marriage
between Capili and Tismo. In June 2004,
Tismo filed a bigamy case against Capili.
Before a decision can be had in the bigamy
case, the action filed by Karla Medina was
granted and Capili’s marriage with Tismo
was declared void by reason of the subsisting
marriage between Medina and Capili.
Thereafter, Capili filed a motion to dismiss in
the bigamy case. He alleged that since the
second marriage was already declared void
ab initio that marriage never took place and
that therefore, there is no bigamy to speak
of.
The trial court agreed with Capili and it
dismissed the bigamy case. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal and
remanded the case to the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a declaration of
nullity of the second marriage avoids a
prosecution for bigamy.
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally
married;
2. That the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage
has all the essential requisites for validity.
When Capili married Tismo, all the above
elements are present. The crime of bigamy
was already consummated. It is already
immaterial if the second (or first marriage,
see Mercado vs Tan) was subsequently
declared void. The outcome of the civil case
filed by Karla Medina had no bearing to the
determination of Capili’s guilt or innocence
in the bigamy case because all that is
required for the charge of bigamy to prosper
is that the first marriage be subsisting at the
time the second marriage is contracted. He
who contracts a second marriage before the
judicial declaration of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.
The Supreme Court also notes that even if a
party has reason to believe that his first
marriage is void, he cannot simply contract a
second marriage without having such first
marriage be judicially declared as void. The
parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only
when the nullity of the marriage is so
declared can it be held as void, and so long
as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists
TITLE: Nikko Hotel Manila vs. Reyes
CITATION: GR No. 154259, February 28, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila and Ruby Lim
assailed the decision of the Court of Appeals
in reversing the decision of RTC of Quezon
City. CA held petitioner liable for damages to
Roberto Reyes aka “Amang Bisaya”, an
entertainment artist.
There are two versions of the story:
Mr. Reyes: On the eve of October 13, 1994,
Mr. Reyes while having coffee at the lobby of
Nikko Hotel was approached by Dr. Violet
Filart, a friend several years back. According
to Mr. Reyes, Dr. Filart invited him to join a
birthday party at the penthouse for the
hotel’s former General Manager, Mr.
Tsuruoka. Plaintiff agreed as Dr. Filart agreed
to vouch for him
and carried a basket of fruits, the latter’s gift.
He He lined up at the buffet table as soon as
it was ready but to his great shock, shame
and embarrassment, Ruby Lim, Hotel’s
Executive Secretary, asked him to leave in a
loud voice enough to be heard by the people
around them. He was asked to leave the
party and a Makati policeman accompanied
him to step-out the hotel. All these time, Dr
Filart ignored him adding to his shame and
humiliation.
Ms. Ruby Lim: She admitted asking Mr.
Reyes to leave the party but not in the
manner claimed by the plaintiff. Ms. Lim
approached several people including Dr.
Filart’s sister, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, if Dr. Filart
did invite him as the captain waiter told Ms.
Lim that Mr. Reyes was with Dr. Filart’s
group. She wasn’t able to ask it personally
with Dr. Filart since the latter was talking
over the phone and doesn’t want to
interrupt her. She asked Mr. Reyes to leave
because the celebrant specifically ordered
that the party should be intimate consisting
only of those who part of the list. She even
asked politely with the plaintiff to finish his
food then leave the party.
During the plaintiff’s cross-examination, he
was asked how close was Ms. Lim when she
approached him at the buffet table. Mr.
Reyes answered “very close because we
nearly kissed each other”. Considering the
close proximity, it was Ms. Lim’s intention to
relay the request only be heard by him. It
was Mr. Reyes who made a scene causing
everybody to know what happened.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners acted
abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the
party.
HELD:
Supreme Court held that petitioners did not
act abusively in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the
party. Plaintiff failed to establish any proof of
ill-motive on the part of Ms. Lim who did all
the necessary precautions to ensure that Mr.
Reyes will not be humiliated in requesting
him to leave the party. Considering almost
20 years of experience in the hotel industry,
Ms. Lim is experienced enough to know how
to handle such matters. Hence, petitioners
will not be held liable for damages brought
under Article 19 and 20 of the Civil Code.
Wassmer vs Velez
12 scra 648
Breach of Promise to Marry
Franciso Velez and Beatriz Wassmer,
following their mutual promise of love,
decided to get married and set September 4,
1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954
Velez left a note to her that they have to
postpone their wedding because his mother
opposed it. And on the next day he sent her
the following telegram “Nothing changed
rest assured returning very soon apologize
mama papa love Paking”. Thereafter Velez
did not appear nor was he heard from again,
sued by Beatrice for damages, Velez filed no
answer and was declared in default. The
record reveals that on August 23, 1954,
plaintiff and defendant applied for a license
to contract marriage, which was
subsequently issued. Invitations were
printed and distributed to relatives, friends
and acquaintances. The bride-to-be’s
trousseau, party dresses and other apparel
for the important occasion were purchased.
Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower
girl were prepared, but two days before the
wedding he never returned and was never
heard from again.
ISSUE: Whether or not in the case at bar, is a
case of mere breach of promise to marry.
HELD: Surely this is not a case of mere breach
of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach
of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go
through all the above-described preparation
and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is
quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for
which defendant must be held answerable in
damages in accordance with Article 21
aforesaid. The lower court’s judgment is
hereby affirmed.
Gashem Shookat Baksh vs Court of Appeals
219 scra 115
Article 21 of the Civil Code
This is an appeal by certiorari. On October
27, 1987, without the assistance of counsel,
private respondent filed with the aforesaid
trial court a complaint for damages against
petitioner for the alleged violation of their
agreement to get married. She alleges in said
complaint that she is 20 years old, single,
Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral
character and reputation duly respected in
her country; other petitioner, on the other
hand, is an Iranian citizen residing at Lozano
Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an
exchange student, before August 20, 1987
the latter courted and proposed to marry
her, she accepted his love on the condition
that they get married; they therefore agreed
to get married. The petitioner forced her to
live with him in the Lozano apartments. She
was a virgin at that time; after a week before
the filing of complaint, petitioner’s attitude
towards her started to change. He
maltreated and threatened to kill her; as a
result of the complaint. Petitioner
repudiated the marriage agreement and
asked her not to live with him anymore and
that the petitioner is already married to
someone in Bacolod City. Private respondent
then prayed for judgment ordering
petitioner to pay her damages. On the other
hand, petitioner claimed that he never
proposed marriage to or agreed to be
married with the private respondent and
denied all allegations against him. After trial
on the merits, the lower court ordered
petitioner to pay the private respondent
damages.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 21 of the Civil
Code applies to the case at bar.
HELD: The existing rule is that a breach of
promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. Notwithstanding, Article 21, which is
designed to expand the concepts of torts and
quasi-delicts in this jurisdiction by granting
adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible
for human foresight to specifically
enumerate and punish in the statute books.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines
quasi-delicts thus:
“Whoever by act or omission causes damage
to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such
fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.”
In the light of the above laudable purpose of
Article 21, the court held that where a man’s
promise to marry in fact the proximate cause
of the acceptance of his love by a woman
and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of
the giving of herself unto him in sexual
congress, proof that he had, in reality, no
intention of marrying her and that the
promise was only subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to
accept him and obtain her consent to sexual
act could justify the award of damages
pursuant to Article 21 not because of such
breach of promise of marriage but because
of the fraud and deceit behind it, and the
willful injury to her honor and reputation
which followed thereafter. It is essential
however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs, or public policy.
Pe vs Pe
FACTS:
Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and
sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time of her
disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was
24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a
married man and works as agent of the La
Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. Defendant
was an adopted son of a Chinaman named
Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's
father. Because of such fact and the
similarity in their family name, defendant
became close to the plaintiffs who regarded
him as a member of their family. Sometime
in 1952, defendant frequented the house of
Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to
teach him how to pray the rosary. The two
eventually fell in love with each other and
conducted clandestine trysts and exchanged
love notes The rumors about their love
affairs reached Lolita's parents sometime, in
1955, and since then defendant was
forbidden from going to their house and
from further seeing Lolita. The plaintiffs even
filed deportation proceedings against
defendant. The affair between defendant
and Lolita continued nonetheless.On April
14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from their
house but her brothers and sisters found a
note written by the defendant.
ISSUE:
Whether the defendant is liable according to
Article 21 of the Civil Code
HELD:
Because of the frequency of his visits to the
Lolita’s family who was allowed free access
because he was a collateral relative and was
considered as a member of her family, the
two eventually fell in love with each other
and conducted clandestine love affairs. Even
when the defendant is prohibited to see
Lolita, the defendant continued his love
affairs with her until she disappeared from
the parental home. The wrong he has caused
her and her family is indeed immeasurable
considering the fact that he is a married
man. Verily, he has committed an injury as
contemplated in Article 21 of the New Civil
Code.Defendant is sentenced to pay the
plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages
and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and
expenses of litigations
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE vs CA
August 25, 1989
Facts: Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent
and administrative assistant to the
engineering operations manager, discovered
fictitious purchases and other fraudulent
transactions, which caused Globe Mackay
Cable and Radio Corp loss of several
thousands of pesos. He reported it to his
immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and
to the Executive Vice President and General
Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the
report, Hendry told Tobias that he was
number one suspect and ordered him one
week forced leave. When Tobias returned to
work after said leave, Hendry called him a
“crook” and a “swindler”, ordered him to
take a lie detector test, and to submit
specimen of his handwriting, signature and
initials for police investigation. Moreover,
petitioners hired a private investigator.
Private investigation was still incomplete;
the lie detector tests yielded negative
results; reports from Manila police
investigators and from the Metro Manila
Police Chief Document Examiner are in favor
of Tobias. Petitioners filed with the Fiscal’s
Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal
cases against private respondent Tobias, but
were dismissed.
Tobias received a notice of termination of his
employment from petitioners in January
1973, effective December 1972. He sought
employment with the Republic Telephone
Company (RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a
letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was
dismissed by Globe Mackay due to
dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil case for
damages anchored on alleged unlawful,
malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of
petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T.
Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private
respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him
eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as
actual damages, two hundred thousand
pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages,
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as
exemplary damages, thirty thousand pesos
(P30,000.00) as attorney’s fees, and costs;
hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether petitioners are liable for
damages to private respondent.
Held: Yes. The Court, after examining the
record and considering certain significant
circumstances, finds that all petitioners have
indeed abused the right that they invoke,
causing damage to private respondent and
for which the latter must now be
indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just
confess or else the company would file a
hundred more cases against him until he
landed in jail; his (Hendry) scornful remarks
about Filipinos (“You Filipinos cannot be
trusted.”) as well as against Tobias (“crook”,
and “swindler”); the writing of a letter to
RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed
by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and the
filing of six criminal cases by petitioners
against private respondent. All these reveal
that petitioners are motivated by malicious
and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and
cause damage to private respondent. The
imputation of guilt without basis and the
pattern of harassment during the
investigations of Tobias transgress the
standards of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 of the Civil Code.
The Court has already ruled that the right of
the employer to dismiss an employee should
not be confused with the manner in which
the right is exercised and the effects flowing
therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively,
then the employer is liable for damages to
the employee. Under the circumstances of
the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed
to exercise in a legitimate manner their right
to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right
to recover damages under Article 19 in
relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
Uypitching v. Quiamco
FACTS:
Quiamco was approached by Davalan,
Gabutero and Generoso to settle the civil
aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by
Quiamco against them.
They surrendered to him a red Honda
motorcycle and a photocopy of its certificate
of registration. Respondent asked for the
original certificate of registration but the
three accused never came to see him again.
Meanwhile, the motorcycle was parked in an
open space inside respondent‘s business
establishment, where it was visible and
accessible to the public.
It turned out that the motorcycle had been
sold on installment basis to Gabutero by
Uypitching Sons, Inc. And to secure its
payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to
the corporation.
When Gabutero could no longer pay the
installments, Davalan assumed the
obligation and continued the payments.
Davalan stopped paying the remaining
installments.
Nine years later, Uypitching, accompanied
by policemen, went to recover the
motorcycle.
The leader of the police team talked to the
clerk in charge and asked for respondent.
While P/Lt. Vendiola and the clerk were
talking, petitioner Uypitching paced back
and forth inside the establishment uttering
"Quiamco is a thief of a motorcycle."
Unable to find respondent, Uypitching took
the motorcycle.
Uypitching filed a criminal complaint for
qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law against respondent but was
dismissed.
Quiamco filed an action for damages against
petitioners in the RTC
The trial court rendered a decision finding
that Uypitching was motivated with malice
and ill will when he called respondent a thief,
took the motorcycle in an abusive manner
and filed a baseless complaint for qualified
theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing
Law
Uypitching appealed the RTC decision but
the CA affirmed the trial court‘s decision.
ISSUE: WON the filing of a complaint for
qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law warranted the award of moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney‘s
fees and costs in favor of respondent.
HELD: YES. The basic principle of human
relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil
Code. Article 19, also known as the "principle
of abuse of right," prescribes that a person
should not use his right unjustly or contrary
to honesty and good faith, otherwise he
opens himself to liability. There is an abuse
of right when it is exercised solely to
prejudice or injure another.
In this case, the manner by which the
motorcycle was taken at petitioners‘
instance was not only attended by bad faith
but also contrary to the procedure laid down
by law. Considered in conjunction with the
defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise
of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle
was utterly prejudicial and injurious to
respondent.
Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh
fashion to the prejudice of respondent.
University of East vs Jader
FACTS:
Romeo Jader graduated at UE College of law
from 1984-88. During his last year,
1stsemester, he failed to take the regular
final examination in Practical Court 1where
he was given an incomplete grade
remarks. He filed an application for removal
of the incomplete grade given by Prof. Carlos
Ortega on February 1, 1988 which was
approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after
the payment of required fees. He took the
exam on March 28 and on May 30, the
professor gave him a grade of 5.
bar examinations as what CA held because
it’s also respondent’s duty to verify for
himself whether he has completed all
necessary requirements to be eligible for the
bar examinations. As a senior law student,
he should have been responsible in ensuring
that all his affairs specifically those in
relation with his academic achievement are
in order. Before taking the bar
examinations, it doesn’t only entail a mental
preparation on the subjects but there are
other prerequisites such as documentation
and submission of requirements which
prospective examinee must meet.

The commencement exercise of UE College WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the

of law was held April 16, 1988, 3PM. In the
invitation, his name appeared. In
preparation for the bar exam, he took a
leave of absence from work from April 20-
Sept 30, 1988. He had his pre-bar class
review in FEU. Upon learning of such
deficiency, he dropped his review classes
and was not able to take the bar exam.
Jader sued UE for damages resulting to
moral shock, mental anguish, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, sleepless nights due to UE’s
negligence.
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Petitioner is ORDERED to
PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five
Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos
(P35,470.00), with legal interest of 6% per
annum computed from the date of filing of
the complaint until fully paid; the amount of
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as
attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The
award of moral damages is DELETED.

ISSUE: Whether UE should be held liable for

misleading a student into believing JADER
satisfied all the requirements for graduation
when such is not the case. Can he claim
moral damages?

HELD:

SC held that petitioner was guilty of

negligence and this liable to respondent for
the latter’s actual damages. Educational
institutions are duty-bound to inform the
students of their academic status and not
wait for the latter to inquire from the
former. However, respondent should not
have been awarded moral damages though
JADER suffered shock, trauma, and pain
when he was informed that he could not
graduate and will not be allowed to take the