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STATE IMMUNITY into by the Philippine Government and the United Nations for
1. VILLASOR v. REPUBLIC
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Hon. Guillermo P.
Villasor, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
Branch I, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, the Sheriff of the City
of Manila, the Clerk of Court of First Instance of Cebu, P.J.
Kiener Co., Ltd., GavinoUnchuan, and International
Construction Corporation, respondents.
November 28, 1973
Fernando, J:
Facts: The decision that was rendered in favor of respondents
P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd, GavinoUnchuan and International
Construction Corporation was declared final and executory by
Respondent Hon. Guillermo P. Villasor. Pursuant to the said
declaration, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was
issued. And for the strength of this writ, the provincial sheriff
served notices of garnishment with several banks, especially
on the 'monies due the Armed Forces of the Philippines in the
form of deposits; the Philippines Veterans Bank received the
same notice of garnishment.
The funds of the AFP on deposit with the banks are public
funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of
pensions of retirees, pay and allowances of military and
civillian personnel and for maintenance and operations of AFP.
Petitioner filed a petition against Villasor for acting in excess
jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the
issuance of a Writ of Execution against the properties of AFP,
hence the notices and garnishments are null and void.
Issue:Whether or not the Writ of Execution issued by
respondent Judge Villasor is valid.
Held: No.What was done by respondent Judge is not in
conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It is a
fundamental postulate of constitutionalism flowing from the
juristic concept of sovereignty that the state and its government
is immune from suit unless it gives its consent. A sovereign is
exempt from suit not because of any formal conception or
obsolete theory but on the logical and practical ground that
there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes
the law on which the right depends.
2. LASCO v. UNRENRE
Eldepio Lasco et al v United Nations Revolving Fund For
Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE)
G.R. Nos. 109095-109107 February 23, 1995
Facts: Petitioners were dismissed from their employment with
private respondent, the United Nations Revolving Fund for
Natural Resources Exploration (UNRFNRE), which is a special
fund and subsidiary organ of the United Nations. The
UNRFNRE is involved in a joint project of the Philippine
Government and the United Nations for exploration work in
Dinagat Island. Petitioners are the complainants for illegal
dismissal and damages. Private respondent alleged that
respondent Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over its
personality since it enjoyed diplomatic immunity.
Issue:WON specialized agencies enjoy diplomatic immunity
Held:Petition is dismissed. This is not to say that petitioner
have no recourse. Section 31 of the Convention on the
Privileges and Immunities of the Specialized Agencies of the
United Nations states that ³each specialized agency shall
make a provision for appropriate modes of settlement of (a)
disputes arising out of contracts or other disputes of private
character to which the specialized agency is a party.´ Private
respondent is not engaged in a commercial venture in the
Philippines. Its presence is by virtue of a joint project entered
mineral exploration in Dinagat Island
3. SEAFDEC v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 97468-70, September 2
1993, 241 SCRA 580
FACTS: Two labor cases were filed by the herein private
respondents against the petitioner, Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development Center (SEAFDEC), before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch,
Iloilo City. In these cases, the private respondents claim having
been wrongfully terminated from their employment by the
petitioner.
The petitioner, who claims to be an international inter-
government organization composed of various Southeast
Asian countries, filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenged the
jurisdiction of the public respondent in taking cognizance of the
above cases.
The private respondents, as well as respondent labor arbiter,
allege that the petitioner is not immune from suit and assuming
that if, indeed, it is an international organization, it has,
however, impliedly, if not expressly, waived its immunity by
belatedly raising the issue of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit.
HELD:The Court ruled for the petitioner. It is beyond question
that petitioner SEAFDEC is an international agency enjoying
diplomatic immunity. It has already been held in Southeast
Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department
vs. National Labor Relations Commission (G.R. No. 86773,
206 SCRA 283/1992). Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries
Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-
AQD) is an international agency beyond the jurisdiction of
public respondent NLRC.
Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including
its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and
freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is
located. One of the basic immunities of an international
organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is
immune from the legal writs and processes issued by the
tribunals of the country where it is found. The obvious reason
for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the
authority of the local courts would afford a convenient medium
thru which the host government may interfere in their
operations or even influence or control its policies and
decisions of the organization; besides, such objection to local
jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge
its responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states.
4. CALLADO v. IRRI G.R. No. 106483 May 22, 1995/
ROMERO, J.:
Facts: Ernesto Callado, petitioner, was employed as a driver
at the IRRI. One day while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official
trip to the NAIA and back to the IRRI, petitioner figured in an
accident.
Petitioner was informed of the findings of a preliminary
investigation conducted by the IRRI's Human Resource
Development Department Manager. In view of the findings, he
was charged with:
(1) Driving an institute vehicle while on official duty under the
influence of liquor;
(2) Serious misconduct consisting of failure to report to
supervisors the failure of the vehicle to start because of a
problem with the car battery, and
(3) Gross and habitual neglect of duties.

Petitioner submitted his answer and defenses to the charges
against him. However, IRRI issued a Notice of Termination to
petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter
for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with
moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
IRRI wrote the Labor Arbiter to inform him that the Institute
enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1620, 5 and that it invokes such
diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international
organization in the instant case filed by petitioner, not having
waived the same.
While admitting IRRI's defense of immunity, the Labor Arbiter,
nonetheless, cited an Order issued by the Institute to the effect
that "in all cases of termination, respondent IRRI waives its
immunity," and, accordingly, considered the defense of
immunity no longer a legal obstacle in resolving the case.
The NLRC found merit in private respondent's appeal and,
finding that IRRI did not waive its immunity, ordered the
aforesaid decision of the Labor Arbiter set aside and the
complaint dismissed.
In this petition petitioner contends that the immunity of the IRRI
as an international organization granted by Article 3 of
Presidential Decree No. 1620 may not be invoked in the case
at bench inasmuch as it waived the same by virtue of its
Memorandum on "Guidelines on the handling of dismissed
employees in relation to P.D. 1620."
Issue: Did the (IRRI) waive its immunity from suit in this
dispute which arose from an employer-employee relationship?
Held: No.P.D. No. 1620, Article 3 provides:
Art. 3. Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy
immunity from any penal, civil and administrative proceedings,
except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by
the Director-General of the Institute or his authorized
representatives.
The SC upholds the constitutionality of the aforequoted law.
There is in this case "a categorical recognition by the Executive
Branch of the Government that IRRI enjoys immunities
accorded to international organizations, which determination
has been held to be a political question conclusive upon the
Courts in order not to embarrass a political department of
Government.
It is a recognized principle of international law and under our
system of separation of powers that diplomatic immunity is
essentially a political question and courts should refuse to look
beyond a determination by the executive branch of the
government, and where the plea of diplomatic immunity is
recognized and affirmed by the executive branch of the
government as in the case at bar, it is then the duty of the
courts to accept the claim of immunity upon appropriate
suggestion by the principal law officer of the government or
other officer acting under his direction.
The raison d'etre for these immunities is the assurance of
unimpeded performance of their functions by the agencies
concerned.
The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an
express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which
it may relinquish or abandon this immunity.
In cases involving dismissed employees, the Institute may
waive its immunity, signifying that such waiver is discretionary
on its part.
5. Begosa vs. PVA
Gaudencio A. Begosa, plantiff-appellee,
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vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration;and
Members of the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans
Administration, defendants/ appellants
Nature: Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila
April 30, 1970, Fernando, J
Facts: Plaintiff sought the aid of the judiciary to obtain the
benefits to which he believed he was entitled under the
Veterans’ Bill of Rights.
He filed his claim for disability pension on March 4, 1955 but
was erroneously disapproved on June 21, 1955 due to his
dishonorable discharge from the army.
The Board of Administrators of PVA finally approved his claim
on September 2, 1964, entitling him with a pension of P30 a
month, to take effect on October 5 of that year.
Believing that his pension should have taken effect back in
1955 when his claim was disapproved, and that he is entitled
to a higher pension of P50 (RA No. 1362 amending Section 9
of RA No. 65) as a permanently incapacitated person, which
was increased toP100 a month when RP 1362 was amended
by RA No. 1920 on June 22, 1957, Begosa filed a case against
PVA in the Court of First Instance.
CFI ruled in favor plaintiff.
Defendants claim that the plaintiff has not exhausted all
administrative remedies before resorting to court action and
that the plaintiff’s claim is in reality a suit against the
Government which cannot be entertained by this Court for lack
of jurisdiction because the Government has not given its
consent.
Issue: WON the SC can entertain the suit against PVA.
Held: Yes.
Ratio: Where a litigation may have adverse consequences on
the public treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or
loss of property, the public official proceeded against not being
liable in his personal capacity, then the doctrine of non-
suitability may appropriately be invoked.
However, it has no application where the suit against such a
functionary had to be instituted because of his failure to comply
with the duty imposed by statue appropriating public funds for
the benefit of plaintiff.
Also, where there is a stipulation of facts, the question before
the lower court being solely one of law and on the face of the
decision, the actuation of appellants being patently illegal, the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies certainly
does not come into play
6. DEL MAR V. PHILIPPINE VETERANS ADM (PVA)
Facts: Del Mar averred that he served during WW II as chief
Judge advocate of the Cebu Area Command(a duly recognized
guerrilla org.) w/ the rank of major; that he subsequently
obtained an honorable discharge from the service on 10/20/46
on a cert. of permanent total physical disability; that upon
proper claim presented and after hearing and adjudication, the
Phil. Veterans BD granted him a monthly life pension of P50
effective 1/28/47;that in 3/50,the aid Bd, discounted payment of
monthly life pension on the ground that his receipt of similar
pension from the Us gov’t, thru the US Veterans Admin. by
reason of military service rendered in the US in the Far East
during the war, precluded him from receiving any further
monthly life pension from the Phil. Govt; that he wrote the said
BB. Twice, demanding the continued payment of his monthly
pension but his demands went unheeded. And petition for
mandamus was filed w/ CFI Cebu w/c rendered judgement
upholding Del mar’s claim.

The PVA argues that the court a quo was w/o jurisdiction to try
civil cases bec.it involves a money claim against PVA- a mere
agency of the Gov’t performing governmental functions w/ no
juridical personality of its own-and,in reality, partakes of an
action against the Phil. Gov’t which is immune from suit w/o its
consent.
HELD: As a general proposition, the rule on the immunity of
the Government from suit w/o its consent holds true in all
actions resulting in “adverse consequences on the public
treasury, whether in the disbursements of funds or loss pf prop.
Needless to say, in such actions, which ,in effect, constitute
suit against the Gov’t, the court has no option but to dismiss
them. Nonetheless, the rule admits of an exception. It finds no
application where a claimant. As clearly discernible from the
circumstances, the case at bar falls under the exception.
7. VETERANS MANPOWER AND PROTECTIVE SERVICE,
INC. VS CA
(G.R. NO. 91359, SEPTEMBER 25, 1992)
FACTS: A suit was filed against the PC Chief for failure to act
on the request by petitioner seeking to set aside the findings of
PADPAO expelling it from PADPAO and considering its
application for renewal of its license even without a certificate
of membership from PADPAO. A Motion to Dismiss was filed
invoking that it is a suit against the State which had not given
its consent.
ISSUES: Whether or not the action taken by the petitioners is a
suit against the State.
Whether or not the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are liable in their
private capacities.
Whether or not the Memorandum of Agreement constitute as
an implied consent of the State to be sued
HELD: Yes, it is a suit against the State, the PC Chief and PC-
SUSIA being instrumentalities of the State exercising the
governmental function of regulating the organization and
operation of private detective watchmen or security guard
agencies. Even if its action prospers, the payment of its
monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did
not consent to appropriate the necessary funds for the
purpose.
No, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are
being called to account in this case, were performed by them
as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence
or bad faith, no recovery may be held against them in their
private capacities.
No, the Memorandum of Agreement did not constitute an
implied consent by the State to be sued because it was
intended to professionalize the industry and to standardized
the salaries of the security guards. It is merely incidental to the
purpose of RA No. 5487 which is to regulate the organization
and operation of private security agencies.
The State is deemed to have given tacitly its consent to be
sued when it enters into a contract. However, it does not apply
where the contact relates to the exercise of its sovereign
functions.
8. PNB v. CIR (81 SCRA 314)
Facts: Petitioner’s motion to quash a notice of garnishment
was denied for lack of merit. What was sought to be garnished
was the money of the People's Homesite and Housing
Corporation deposited at petitioner's branch in Quezon City, to
satisfy a decision of respondent Court which had become final
and executory. A writ of execution in favor of private
respondent Gabriel V. Manansala had previously been issued.
He was the counsel of the prevailing party, the United
Homesite Employees and Laborers Association. The validity of
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the order assailed is challenged on two grounds: (1) that the
appointment of respondent Gilbert P. Lorenzo as authorized
deputy sheriff to serve the writ of execution was contrary to law
and (2) that the funds subject of the garnishment "may be
public in character."The order of August 26, 1970 of
respondent Court denying the motion to quash, subject of this
certiorari proceeding, reads as follows:"The Philippine National
Bank moves to quash the notice of garnishment served upon
its branch in Quezon City by the authorize ddeputy sheriff of
this Court. It contends that the service of the notice by the
authorized deputy sheriff of the court contravenes Section11 of
Commonwealth Act No. 105, as amended which reads:" 'All
writs and processes issued by the Court shall be served and
executed free of charge by provincial or city sheriffs, or by any
person authorized by this Court, in the same manner as writs
and processes of Courts of First Instance.' Following the law,
the Bank argues that it is the Sheriff of Quezon City, and not
the Clerk of this Court who is its Ex-Officio Sheriff, that has the
authority to serve the notice of garnishment, and that the actual
service by the latter officer of said notice is therefore not in
order. The Court finds no merit in this argument. Republic Act
No. 4201 has, since June 19, 1965, already repealed
Commonwealth Act No. 103, and under this law, it is now the
Clerk of this Court that is at the same time the Ex-Officio
Sheriff. As such Ex-Officio Sheriff, the Clerk of this Court has
therefore the authority to issue writs of execution and notices
of garnishment in an area encompassing the whole of the
country, including Quezon City, since his area of authority is
coterminous with that of the Court itself, which is national in
nature. ... At this stage, the Court notes from the record that
the appeal to the Supreme Court by individual employees of
PHHC which questions the award of attorney's fees to Atty.
Gabriel V. Manansala, has already been dismissed and that
the same became final and executory on August 9, 1970.
There is no longer any reason, therefore, for withholding action
in this case. [Wherefore], the motion to quash filed by the
Philippine National Bank is denied for lack of merit. The said
Bank is therefore ordered to comply within five days from
receipt with the 'notice of Garnishment' dated May 6, 1970."
There was a motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner, but
in a resolution dated September 22, 1970, it was denied.
Hence, this certiorari petition.
Issue: WON the funds mentioned may be garnished
Ruling: No. National Shipyard and Steel Corporation v. court
of Industrial Relations is squarely in point. As was explicitly
stated in the opinion of the then Justice, later Chief Justice,
Concepcion: "The allegation to the effect that the funds of the
NASSCO are public funds of the government, and that, as
such, the same may not be garnished, attached or levied upon,
is untenable for, as a government owned and controlled
corporation. the NASSCO has a personality of its own, distinct
and separate from that of the Government. It has pursuant to
Section 2 of Executive Order No. 356, dated October 23, 1950
..., pursuant to which the NASSCO has been established — 'all
the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law ...'
Accordingly, it may sue and be sued and may be subjected to
court processes just like any other corporation (Section 13, Act
No. 1459), as amended."In a 1941 decision,
Manila Hotel Employees Association v. Manila Hotel Company
this Court, through Justice Ozaeta, held: "On theother hand, it
is well settled that when the government enters into
commercial business, it abandons its sovereign capacity and is
to betreated like any other corporation. (Bank of the United
States v. Planters' Bank,Wheat, 904, 6 L.ed. 244). By engaging
in a particular business thru the instrumentality of a
corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its
sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to
the rules of law governing private corporations."Both the
Palacio and the Commissioner of Public Highways decisions,
insofar as they reiterate the doctrine that one of the coronaries
of the fundamental concept of non-suability is that
governmental funds are immune from garnishment. It is an
entirely different matter if, according to Justice
Sanchez in Ramos v. Court of Industrial Relations , the office
or entity is "possessed of a separate and distinct corporate

existence." Then it can sue and be sued. Thereafter, its funds
may be levied upon or garnished.
9. SSS v CA 120 SCRA 707
MELENCIO-HERRERA; February 21. 1983
FACTS: In March 1963, spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro
Cancio Cruz applied for and were granted a real estate loan by
the SSS with their residential lot located at Lozada Street, Sto.
Rosario, Pateros, Rizal covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 2000 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal its collateral.
Pursuant to this real estate loan said spouses executed on
March 26, 1963 the corresponding real estate mortgage
originally in the amount of P39,500.00 which was later
increased to P48,000.00 covering said property.
- On July 9, 1968, defendant SSS filed an application with the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage executed by the plaintiffs on the ground, among
others that the conditions of the mortgage have been broken
since October 1967 with the default on the part of the
mortgagor to pay in full the installments then due and payable
on the principal debt and the interest thereon, and all of the
monthly installments due and payable thereafter up to the
present date. Notice of the Sheriff's Sale of the mortgaged
property was initially published in the Sunday Chronicle in its
issue of July 14, 1968 announcing the sale at public auction of
the said mortgaged property. Despite plaintiff’s letter to
defendant demanding the latter to withdraw foreclosure and
discontinue the publication of the notice of sale of their
property claiming that plaintiffs were up-to date in the payment
of their monthly amortizations, defendant SSS still went on to
publish second and third publications of foreclosure.
- On July 24, 1968, the plaintiff Cruz spouses instituted before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for damages and
attorney's fees against the SSS and the Provincial Sheriff of
Rizal alleging, among other things, that they had fully and
religiously paid their monthly amortizations and had not
defaulted in any payment. Trial Court rendered judgment
against defendant SSS. Court of Appeals affirmed Trial Court’s
decision. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES
(1) WON the Cruz spouses had, in fact, violated their real
estate mortgage contract with the SSS as would have
warranted the publications of the notices of as would have
foreclosure
(2) WON the SSS is immune from suit
(3) WON SSS can be held liable for damages.
HELD
(1) Ratio On questions of appreciation of evidence, factual
findings of the lower court are not subject to review by this
Court.
Reasoning The reasoning used precedence to arrive at this
ratio. Applying the rule, it can be said therefore, that the
findings of the Court of Appeals that the mortgage-debtors
have not in fact violated their contract because SSS accepted
their installment payments although given late will not be
disturbed on appeal.
(2) Ratio An entity performing governmental functions, by
virtue of the explicit provision of an enabling law, is deemed to
have waived immunity from suit, although it does not thereby
concede its liability.
Reasoning Again, the leg of reasoning is ratio by precedence,
citing Rayo v. Court of First Instance of Bulacan, (110 SCRA
457), which involved the National Power Corporation as an
entity performing governmental functions. In that case it said,
“It is sufficient to say that the government has organized a
private corporation, put money in it and has allowed it to site
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and be sued in any court under its charter.” The enabling law is
R.A. No. 6395. Applying this rule in the present case, the SSS’
own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be
sued in Court, the enabling law being R.A. 1161 and P.D. 24.
Hence, there’s a statutory consent by the SSS to waive right of
immunity from suit.
(3) Ratio No moral and/or temperate damages is to be
adjudged against a party which commenced foreclosure
proceedings in view of the irregular payments of the debtor of
his installments.
Decision (1) The ruling of the lower courts remain. While it is
true that the payments of the monthly installments were
previously not regular, it is a fact that as of June 30, 1968 the
appellee, David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio-Cruz were up-to-
date and current in the payment of their monthly installments.
Having accepted the prior late payments of the monthly
installments, the appellant could no longer suddenly and
without prior notice to the mortgagors apply for the extra-
judicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
(2) SSS is deemed to have waived its immunity from suit.
(3) SSS cannot be held liable for damages.
Voting 10 justices concur, 1 dissent, 3 took no part.
10. RAYO VS. CFI OF BULACAN
Facts: During the height of typhoon Kading , the National
Power Corporation’s plant superintendent Chavez opened
simultaneously all the three floodgates of the Angat Dam.
As a direct and immediate result, several towns in Bulacan
were flooded (particularly Norzagaray). About a hundred of its
residents died and properties worth million of pesos were
destroyed.
The petitioners, who are among the unfortunate victims of the
man-caused flood, filed several complaints for damages
against NPC and the plant superintendent.
NPC claimed, as its defense, that in the operation of the Angat
Dam, it is performing a purely governmental function. Thus, it
cannot be sued without the express consent of the State.
The petitioners opposed the claim of NPC and claimed that it is
performing not governmental but merely proprietary functions
and that based on the organic charter (charter -a legal
document that provides for the creation of a corporate entity )
of NPC, it can be sued and be sued in any court.
Issue: Whether or not the power of NPC to sue and be sued
under its organic charter includes the power to be sued for tort.
Held :The government has organized a private corporation, put
money in it and has allowed it to sue and be sued in any court
under its charter. NPC, as a government owned and controlled
corporation, has a personality of its own, distinct and separate
from that of the Government. In any court, NPC can sue and
be sued for tort. The petition of the petitioners was granted.
Government-owned and controlled corporations have a
personality of their own, separate and distinct from the
government. Therefore, although they are considered to be
public in character, they are not exempt from garnishment
(legal proceedings).
11. MALONG VS. PNR, G.R. NO. L-49930
Facts: The Petitioners, Malong spouses alleged in their
complaint that on October 30, 1977 their son, Jaime Aquino, a
paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train
while it was between Tarlac City and Capas. The said train
was overloaded with passengers and baggage in view of the

proximity of All Saints Day. The Malong spouses prayed that
the PNR be ordered to pay them damages totalling P136,370.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that it had no
jurisdiction because the PNR, being a government
instrumentality, the action was a suit against the State.
The petitioners appealed to SC pursuant to RA No. 5440.
Issue: W/N the PNR is immune from suit?
Ruling: NO. Although the PNR is a government instrumentality
under Republic Act No. 4156, as amended by Republic Act No.
6366 and Presidential Decree No. 741, it was held that the
State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized
the PNR which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila
Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from
suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of articles 1732
to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers.
However, as held in precedents, the correct rule is that "not all
government entities, whether corporate or non-corporate, are
immune from suits. Immunity from suit is determined by the
character of the” objectives “for which the entity was
organized.”
The Manila Hotel case also relied on the following rulings: “By
engaging in a particular business through the instrumentality of
a corporation, the government divests itself pro hac vice of its
sovereign character, so as to render the corporation subject to
the rules of law governing private corporations.”
Held: The order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The
case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings,
costs against the Philippine National Railways.
It would be unjust if the heirs of the victim of an alleged
negligence of the PNR employees could not sue the PNR for
damages. Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject
to the obligations of persons engaged in that private enterprise.
It is not performing any governmental function.
Notes
Abad Santos, J., concurring:
The claim that Philippine National Railways is immune from
suit because it is an instrumentality of the government is so
outlandish that it deserves slight consideration.
He mentioned the Central Bank of the Philippines as an
example of government instrumentality that is not immune from
suit for it also performs proprietary functions.
He also contended the use of the immunity from suit on the
part of the government corporations to deny justice that is due
to the people they are to serve.
12. JESUS DISNI v. SANDIGANBAYAN
Hermino T. Disini vs. the HonorableSandiganbayan
Decision: The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original
jurisdiction over the criminal action of Hermino T. Disini
notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering his
criminal prosecution is intimately related to the recovery of ill-
gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their immediate family,
subordinates and close associates.
Facts: Disini, is the husband of PacienciaEscolin-Disini, the
first cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and at the
same time the family physician of the Marcoses, had close
personal relations and intimacy with and free access to
President Marcos, a public official.
Mr. Disini was charged by the Sandiganbayan on June 30,
2004 with corruption of public officials and violation of Section
4a of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
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Criminal Case No. 28001 – from the period of 1974 to
February 1986 conspired with then President Marcos to give
gifts and presents to President Marcos in forms of 2.5 billion
shares of stock in Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation
and 4 billion shares of stock in the Energy Corporation with
both shares having a book value of P 100.00/share.
Criminal Case No. 28002 - from the period of 1974 to February
1986, conspired with then President Marcos to request and
receive from Burns and Roe, a foreign consultant, the total
amount of One Million U.S. Dollars ($1,000,000.00),more or
less, and also from Westinghouse Electric
Corporation(WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount of
Seventeen Million U.S. Dollars($17,000,000.00), more or less,
all for and in consideration of Disini to secure and obtain, which
Disini did secure and obtain, the contract for the said Burns
and Roe and Westinghouse to do the engineering and
architectural design, and construct, of the Philippine Nuclear
Power Plant Project at Morong, Bataan.
Mr. Disini via petition for critoriari alleging the Sandiganbayan
committed grace abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
a. Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
b. Grave abuse of discretion by denial of petitioner’s
constitutional and statutory right of prescription erring in the
following:
i. Determining applicable prescriptive period;
ii. Commencement of prescriptive period; and
iii. Determination of point of prescriptive period.
c. Sandiganbayan showed prejudgement of the case by
upholding the glaringly absent elements of the offenses
charged
d. Sandiganbayan refused to quash the information
despite utter failure to comply to prescribed form denying the
petitioner’s constitutional and statutory right to be informed the
nature and cause of accusations against him.
Issue: The jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan over the criminal
action of HerminoDisina and the grave abuse of the
Sandiganbayan to Mr. Disini’s statutory and constitutional
rights of prescription and rights to be informed the cause and
nature of accusations against him.
Ruling:
1. The petition for certiorari has no merit
2. On the issue of jurisdiction, Section 2 of E.O. No.1
has tasked the PCGG to assist the recovery of ill-gotten wealth
of President Marcos. It is underscored that it was the PCGG
that had initially filed the criminal complaints in the
Sandiganbayan, with the Office of the Ombudsman taking over
the investigation of Disini only after the Court issued in
Cojuangco, Jr. the directive to the PCGG to refer the criminal
cases to the Office of the Ombudsman on the ground that the
PCGG would not be an impartial office following its finding of a
prima facie case being established against Disini
3. Similarly, The Sandiganbayan also holds jurisdiction
of Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection
with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986
under Section c of RA 8249.
4. On the issue of offenses charged has not yet
prescribed:
a. Applicability of prescription period: Although period of
prescription for corruption of public officials charged against
Disini is 15 years, it would not be held that the prescriptive
period began to run from 1974 since during the Marcos regime,
no person would have dared to assail the legality of the
transaction.

b. Prescriptive period for the crime commenced from the
date of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an
exhaustive investigation. When the complaint was filed in
1997, only five years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription
has not yet set in.
c. Criminal complaints were filed and their records
transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of the Ombudsman on
April 8, 1991for the conduct the preliminary investigation and
as such there was no interruption of proscriptive period.
5. Information was insufficient in form and substance:
a. Information on Criminal Case 28001 and 28002 is
sufficiently complied to the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110
of the Rules of the Court since it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date
of the commission of the offense; and the place where the
offense was committed.
b. Allegations are also sufficiently upheld as the
elements of the offenses under Section 4(a) of RA 3019 are
present.
13. DA v. NLRC
Department of Agriculture vs. the National Labor Relations
Commission
Decision: Petition to nullify the Resolution, 1 dated 27
November 1991, of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), Fifth Division, Cagayan de Oro City, which will deny
the petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus that prays
to enjoin permanently the NLRC's Regional Arbitration Branch
X and Cagayan de Oro City Sheriff from enforcing the decision
2 of 31 May 1991 of the Executive Labor Arbiter and from
attaching and executing on petitioner's property.
Facts: The NLRC rendered a decision on May 31, 1990 finding
the DA jointly and severally liable with Sultan Security Agency
for the payment of money claims, aggregating P266,483.91, of
the complainant security guards. The petitioner and Sultan
Security Agency did not appeal the decision of the Labor
Arbiter. Thus, the decision became final and executory.
On 18 July 1991, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution. 5
commanding the City Sheriff to enforce and execute the
judgment against the property of the two respondents.
Forthwith, or on 19 July 1991, the City Sheriff levied on
execution the motor vehicles of the petitioner, i.e. one (1) unit
Toyota Hi-Ace, one (1) unit Toyota Mini Cruiser, and one (1)
unit Toyota Crown. 6 These units were put under the custody
of Zacharias Roa, the property custodian of the petitioner,
pending their sale at public auction or the final settlement of
the case, whichever would come first.
Petitioner charged that the NLRC with grave abuse of
discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution as the
NLRC assumes jurisdiction over a money claim which should
fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit
and the NLRC disregards the cardinal rule of the non-suability
of the State.
Issue: The non-suability of the State and execution of the
NLRC to acquire the government property.
Ruling:
1. Petition was granted.
2. The basic postulate in the Constitution states that
"The State may not be sued without its consent. (Article XVI,
Section 3 of the Constitution). This rule though does not say
that the State cannot be sued in any circumstances.
3. When the state gives its consent to be sued, it does
thereby necessarily consent to unrestrained execution against
6
it. In other words, when the State waives its immunity, all it
does, in effect, is to give the other party an opportunity to
prove, if it can, that the State has a liability.
4. The universal rule that where the State gives its
consent to be sued by private parties either by general or
special law, it may limit the claimant's action "only up to the
completion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution"
5. That the power of the Courts ends when the judgment
is rendered, since government funds and properties may not
be seized under writs or execution or garnishment to satisfy
such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public
policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
correspondent appropriation as required by law. The functions
and public services rendered by the State cannot be allowed to
be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from
their legitimate and specific objects, as appropriated by law.
14. VMPSI v. CA
Facts:Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc.
(VMPSI) alleges that the provisions under Section 4 and 17 of
Republic Act No. 5487 or the Private Security Agency Law
violate the 1987 Constitution against monopolies, unfair
competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and tend to
favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective
and Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is
monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one
security agency.
Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of
paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of the Modifying Regulations on
the Issuance of License to Operate and Private Security
Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the Operation of
PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt. Gen. Fidel V. Ramos,
through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that “all private
security agencies/company security forces must register as
members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the
Region where their main offices are located...”. As such
membership requirement in PADPAO is compulsory in nature,
it allegedly violates legal and constitutional provisions against
monopolies, unfair competition and combinations in restraint of
trade.
A Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and
the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly contract rate
per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day at
P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro
Manila.
Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO
accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition by undercutting its
contract rate for security services rendered to the Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said
customer lower than the standard minimum rates provided in
the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986.
PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence,
the PADPAO Committee on Discipline recommended the
expulsion of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its
license to operate a security agency. The PC-SUSIA affirmed
the findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of
VMPSI’s license. As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a
clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI.
VMPSI made a request letter to the PC Chief to set aside or
disregard the findings of PADPAO and consider VMPSI’s
application for renewal of its license, even without a certificate
of membership from PADPAO.
Issue:Whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief
and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent.
Held:Yes. A public official may sometimes be held liable in his
personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond
the scope of his authority or jurisdiction, however, since the
acts for which the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA are being called to
account in this case, were performed as part of their official

duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no
recovery may be had against them in their private capacities.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of
Appeals that the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12,
1986 does not constitute an implied consent by the State to be
sued. The consent of the State to be sued must emanate from
statutory authority, hence, a legislative act, not from a mere
memorandum. Without such consent, the trial court did not
acquired jurisdiction over the public respondents. Petition for
review is denied and the judgment appealed from is affirmed in
toto.
15. LARKINS v. NLRC
T/Sgt.Larkins vs NLRC (1995) G.R. 92432
Facts:On August 12, 1988, private respondents filed a
complaint with the Regional Arbitration Branch No. III of the
NLRC, San Fernando, Pampanga, against petitioner Larkins, a
member of the United States Air Force (USAF) assigned to
oversee the dormitories of the Third Aircraft Generation
Squadron (3 AGS) at Clark Air Base, Pampanga., Lt. Col.
Frankhauser, and Cunanan (the new contractor ) for illegal
dismissal and underpayment of wages. Petitioner and Lt. Col.
Frankhauser failed to answer the complaint and to appear at
the hearings.
They, likewise, failed to submit their position paper, which the
Labor Arbiter deemed a waiver on their part to do so. On the
basis of private respondents' position paper and supporting
documents, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision granting all
the claims of private respondents. He found both Lt. Col.
Frankhauser and petitioner "guilty of illegal dismissal" and
ordered them to reinstate private respondents with full back
wages, or if that is no longer possible, to pay private
respondents' separation pay. Petitioner appealed to the NLRC
claiming that the Labor Arbiter never acquired jurisdiction over
her person because no summons or copies of the complaints,
both original and amended, were ever served on her. In her
"Supplemental Memorandum to Memorandum of Appeal,"
petitioner argued that the attempts to serve her with notices of
hearing were not in accordance with the provisions of the RP-
US Military Bases Agreement of 1947.
Issue:Whether or not the questioned resolutions are null and
void.
Held:No jurisdiction was ever acquired by the Labor Arbiter
over the case and the person of petitioner and the judgment
rendered is null and void. Summonses and other processes
issued by Philippine courts and administrative agencies for
United States Armed Forces personnel within any U.S. base in
the Philippines could be served therein only with the
permission of the Base Commander. If he withholds giving his
permission, he should instead designate another person to
serve the process, and obtain the server's affidavit for filing
with the appropriate court. Respondent Labor Arbiter did not
follow said procedure. He instead, addressed the summons to
Lt. Col. Frankhauser and not the Base Commander.
Respondents do not dispute petitioner's claim that no
summons was ever issued and served on her. They contend,
however, that they sent notices of the hearings to her Notices
of hearing are not summonses. The provisions and prevailing
jurisprudence in Civil Procedure may be applied by analogy to
NLRC proceedings (Revised Rules of the NLRC, Rule I, Sec.
3). It is basic that the Labor Arbiter cannot acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the respondent without the latter being
served with summons. In the absence of service of summons
or a valid waiver thereof, the hearings and judgment rendered
by the Labor Arbiter are null and void. Petitioner, in the case at
bench, appealed to the NLRC and participated in the oral
argument before the said body. This, however, does not
constitute a waiver of the lack of summons and a voluntary
submission of her person to the jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter. She may have raised in her pleadings grounds other
than lack of jurisdiction, but these grounds were discussed in
relation to and as a result of the issue of the lack of jurisdiction.
In effect, petitioner set forth only one issue and that is the
absence of jurisdiction over her
7
person. If an appearance before the NLRC is precisely to
question the jurisdiction of the said agency over the person of
the defendant, then this appearance is not equivalent to
service of summons. Be that as it may, on the assumption that
petitioner validly waived service of summons on her, still the
case could not prosper. There is no allegation from the
pleadings filed that Lt. Col. Frankhauser and petitioner were
being sued in their personal capacities for tortious acts.
However, private respondents named 3 AGS as one of the
respondents in their complaint. Private respondents were
dismissed from their employment by Lt. Col. Frankhauser
acting for and in behalf of the U.S. Government. The employer
of private respondents was neither Lt. Col. Frankhauser nor
petitioner. The employer of private respondents, as found by
NLRC, was the U.S. Government which, by right of sovereign
power, operated and maintained the dormitories at Clark Air
Base for members of the USAF. Indeed, assuming that
jurisdiction was acquired over the United States Government
and the monetary claims of private respondents proved, such
awards will have to be satisfied not by Lt. Col. Frankhauser
and petitioner in their personal capacities, but by the United
States government.
16. SHAUF V COURT OF APPEALS 191 SCRA 713
REGALADO; November 27, 1990
FACTS: Petitioner Loida Q. Shauf, a Filipino by origin and
married to an American who is a member of the United States
Air Force, applied for the vacant position of Guidance
Counselor, GS 1710-9, in the Base Education Office at Clark
Air Base, for which she is eminently qualified. She had
functioned as a Guidance Counselor at the Clark Air Base at
the GS 1710-9 level for approximately four years at the time
she applied for the same position in 1976. her application was
forwarded to Anthony Persi, who had some reservations
regarding Shauf’s work experience. Persi then requested the
Civilian Personnel Office to initiate immediate inquiry to the
Central Oversea Rotation and Recruiting Office (CORRO).
Persi was then informed by CORRO that an Edward B.
Isakson was selected for the position. Isakson was placed on
the rolls at Clark Air Base on January 1977.
By reason of her non-selection to the position, Loida
Shauf filed an equal employment opportunity complain against
respondents for alleged discrimination against the former by
reason of her nationality and sex. Trial court held in favor of
Shauf, while Court of Appeals reversed decision.
ISSUES
WoN the officers of the US Armed Forces performing official
functions in accordance with the powers vested in them under
the Philippine American Military Bases Agreement are immune
from suit (even w/o consent of the State).
WoN the respondents are guilty of discrimination against
petitioner Shauf.
WoN Shauf should be awarded compensatory damages.
HELD: As expressed in Art. XVI, Section 3 of the 1987 Consti,
the state may not be sued without its consent. This is a
generally accepted principle of International law under Art II,
Section 2. The case at hand may be construed as a suit
against the US, since the damages to Shauf will be taken from
funds of the US. However, it is also applicable to complaints
filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed
by them in the discharge of their duties. Unauthorized acts of
government officials are not acts of the State, and an action
against the officials by one whose rights have been invaded by
such offenses, is not a suit against the State covered by the
rule of immunity. The respondents are being sued in their

private and personal capacity. The rationale for this ruling is
that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an
instrument for perpetrating an injustice. A public official may be
liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he
may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith,
or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction.
Doctrine Yes. Regalado is concurred with by Melencio-Herrera,
Paras, Padilla, and Sarmiento.
The US officers are NOT IMMUNE from suit even without the
consent of the State.
Yes the petitioners are guilty of discrimination against Shauf.
Despite Shauf’s qualifications, Persi did not even consider the
former’s application. Since the petitioner was able to prove the
discrimination in the non-consideration of her application, the
burden shifted to the respondents. The respondents however
answered with mere denials of the charges.
Shauf need not be awarded compensatory damages. There
was no proof that she really was to earn $39,662 if she was
employed at the time. Damages which are merely possible are
speculative. There must be an actual proof of loss.
17. REPUBLIC VS. SANDOVAL
220 SCRA 124 (1993)
FACTS: By reason of the Mendiola massacre, wherein 12
rallyists died in their quest for “genuine agrarian reform”,
President Aquino issued Administrative Order No.11 which
created the Citizen’s Mendiola Commission for the purpose of
conducting an investigation for the disorders, death and
casualties that took place.
The most significant recommendation of the Commission
was for the deceased and other victims of Mendiola incident to
be compensated by the government.
Due to the recommendation, petitioners filed a formal letter of
demand for compensation from the government to which the
latter did not take heed. The group then instituted an action for
damages against the Republic of the Philippines together
with military officers and personnel involved in Mendiola
incident.
Respondent Judge Sandoval dismissed the complaint as
against the Republic of the Philippines on the basis that there
was no waver by the state. Hence, the petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether the State by virtue of the administrative order
waived its immunity from suit?
HELD: NO. Firstly, recommendation made by the commission
does not in any way mean that liability automatically attaches
to the state. In effect, the same shall only serve as a cause of
action on the event that any party decides to litigate his or her
claim. The commission is merely a preliminary venue.
Secondly, whatever acts or utterances that then President
Aquino may have said or done, the same are not tantamount to
the state having waived its immunity from suit.
The principle of state immunity from suit does not apply in this
case, as when the relief demanded by the suit requires no
affirmative official action on the part of the state nor the
affirmative discharge of any obligation which belongs to the
state in its political capacity, even though the officers or agents
who are made defendants claim to hold or act only by virtue of
a title of the state and as its agents and servants.
8
18. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE (DOA), petitioner,
vs. THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et
al., respondents.
Facts: DOA and Sultan Security Agency (SSA) entered into a
contract for security services. Several guards filed a complaint
against DOA and SSA for under payment of wages, non-
payment of 13th month pay and etc.
The Labor Arbiter of Cagayan de Oro found DOA and SSA
liable for the payment of money claim of the guards. The Labor
Arbiter issued a “Writ of Execution” commanding the City
Sheriff to execute the judgment against the DOA and SSA.
Hence, the City Sheriff seized three motorcycles of the DOA.
In a petition of certiorari, DOA filed a “petition for injunction,
prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary
injunction” to the NLRC Cagayan De Oro for reasons that the
“writ” was null and void and the seizure of motorcycles
jeopardizes governmental functions. NLRC --- dismissed the
petition.
DOA charges NLRC for grave abuse of discretion for refusing
to nullify the “writ of execution”. DOA further asserts that NLRC
has disregarded the rule on the non-suability of the State.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State
applies in the case
Held: Under the Constitution, the rule which says “the State
cannot be sued without its consent” is not really absolute. The
State’s consent may be given expressly through a general or
special law, or impliedly when the State commences litigation
or enters a contract. In this jurisdiction, the general law waiving
the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083,
where the Philippine government "consents and submits to be
sued upon any money claim involving liability arising from
contract, express or implied”. The claims of the guards for
underpayment of wages and similar other items, arising from
the Contract for Security Services, clearly constitute money
claims. However, pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 327, as
amended by PD No. 1445, the money claim should first be
brought to the Commission on Audit.
19. MERRITT vs. GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
(G.R. NO. L-11154, MARCH 21, 1916)
TRENT, J.
FACTS: Merritt, while riding his motorcycle was hit by an
ambulance owned by the Philippine General Hospital. A
driver employed by the hospital drove it. In order for Merritt to
sue the Philippine government, Act No. 2457 was enacted by
the Philippine Legislature authorizing Merritt to bring suit
against the Government of the Philippine Islands and
authorizing the Attorney-General of said Islands to appear in
said suit. A suit was then filed before the CFI of Manila, which
fixed the responsibility for the collision solely on the ambulance
driver and determined the amount of damages to be awarded
to Merritt. Both parties appealed from the decision, plaintiff
Merritt as to the amount of damages and defendant in
rendering the amount against the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant, Government of the
Philippines, waived its immunity from suit as well as conceded
its liability to the plaintiff when it enacted Act No. 2457
HELD: NO. By consenting to be sued, a state simply waives
its immunity from suit. It does not thereby concede its liability
to the plaintiff, or create any cause of action in his favor, or
extend its liability to any cause not previously recognized. It
merely gives a remedy to enforce a pre-existing liability and
submit itself to the jurisdiction of the court, subject to its right to
interpose any lawful defense.

The Government of the Philippines Islands is only liable, for the
acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act as
special agents. A special agent is one who receives a definite
and fixed order or commission, foreign to the exercise of the
duties of his office if he is a special official. The special agent
acts in representation of the state and being bound to act as an
agent thereof, he executes the trust confided to him. This
concept does not apply to any executive agent who is an
employee of the acting administration and who on his own
responsibility performs the functions which are inherent in and
naturally pertain to his office and which are regulated by law
and the regulations. The responsibility of the state is limited to
that which it contracts through a special agent, duly
empowered by a definite order or commission to perform
some act or charged with some definite purpose which gives
rise to the claim, and not where the claim is based on acts or
omissions imputable to a public official charged with some
administrative or technical office who can be held to the proper
responsibility in the manner laid down by the law of civil
responsibility. The chauffeur of the ambulance of the General
Hospital was not such an agent.
19 Merritt v. Gov. of the Phil Islands
(1916)
Plaintiff Merritt on a motorcycle collided with an ambulance
which did not warn of its impending approach. As the
negligence which caused the collision is a tort committed by an
agent or employee of the Government, the inquiry at once
arises whether the Government is legally liable for the
damages resulting therefrom. The government, by no less than
an Act, authorized Merritt to bring suit in the CFI Manila in
order to fix the responsibility for the collision between his
motorcycle and the ambulance of the General Hospital.
Did the government simply waive its immunity from suit or did it
also concede its liability to the plaintiff?
Paragraph 5 of article 1903 of the Civil Code reads: “The state
is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but
not when the damage should have been caused by the official
to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in which
case the provisions of the preceding article shall be
applicable." It is, therefore, evident that the State (the
Government of the Philippine Islands) is only liable, according
to the above quoted decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain,
for the acts of its agents, officers and employees when they act
as special agents within the meaning of paragraph 5 of article
1903, supra, and that the chauffeur of the ambulance of the
General Hospital was not such an agent.
20. Republic v. Purisima
(1977)
Yellow Bell Freight Lines brought a suit against the Rice and
Corn Administration for an alleged breach of contract. Rice and
Corn moved to dismiss the suit by using the doctrine of state
immunity. Respondent judge dismissed the motion to dismiss.
The SC held that the courts do not have jurisdiction to pass
upon the merits of the claims against any office or entity acting
as part of the machinery of the national government.
Express waiver of immunity cannot be made by a mere
counsel of the government but must be effected through a
duly-enacted statute. Neither does such answer come under
the implied forms of consent as earlier discussed.
9
United States v. Ruiz
(1985)
Respondent was able to win a bid for a project for the repair of
the wharves/shoreline of the Subic Bay Area. Petitioner asked
for a quotation but later on denied the respondent the project
stating that the respondent was not qualified. The latter files
suit for awarding the project to him and for damages as well.
The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only
when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of
the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can thus be
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when
it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the
contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In
this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base
which is devoted to the defense of both the United States and
the Philippines, indisputably a function of the government of
the highest order; they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes.
21. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA VS. RUIZ
136 SCRA 487 (1985)
FACTS: Petitioner invited the submission of bids for repair of
its wharves and shoreline in the Subic Bay Area. Eligion and
Co. responded to the invitation and submitted bids. Said
company was requested by telegram to confirm its price
proposals and for the name of its bonding company, and from
which it complied.
Later, the United States, through its agents, informed said
company that it was not qualified to receive an award at the
project for the poorly completed projects it awarded to third
parties. The company sued petitioner for specific performance
and if no longer possible, for damages. It also asked for a writ
of preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants from
entering into contracts with others.
The United States entered a special appearance for the
purpose only of questioning the jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter of the complaint and the persons of the
defendants, the subject matter of the complaint being acts and
omissions of the individual defendants as agents of the
defendant United States of America, a foreign sovereign which
has not given its consent to this suit or any other suit for the
cause of action asserted in the complaint.
US filed a motion to dismiss and opposed the writ. The trial
court denied the motion and issued a writ.
ISSUE: Whether the US may be sued?
HELD: No. The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a
State from being sued in the courts of another State without its
consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of
the principles of independence and equality of States.
However, the rules of International Law are not petrified; they
are constantly developing and evolving. And because the
activities of states have multiplied, it has been necessary to
distinguish them — between sovereign and governmental
acts (jure imperii) and private, commercial and proprietary acts
(jure gestionis). The result is that State immunity now extends
only to acts jure imperii. The restrictive application of State
immunity is now the rule in the United States, the United
Kingdom and other states in western Europe. (See Coquia and

Defensor-Santiago, Public International Law, pp. 207-209
[1984].)
The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only
when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of
the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic
affairs. Stated differently, a state may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can be thus
deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when
the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.
In this case, the projects are an integral part of the naval base
which is devoted to the defense of both the US and the
Philippines, undisputed a function of the government of the
highest order, they are not utilized for nor dedicated to
commercial or business purposes. The correct test for the
application of State immunity is not the conclusion of a
contract by a State but the legal nature of the act is shown in
Syquia vs. Lopez, 84 Phil. 312 (1949). In that case the
plaintiffs leased three apartment buildings to the United States
of America for the use of its military officials. The plaintiffs sued
to recover possession of the premises on the ground that the
term of the leases had expired, They also asked for increased
rentals until the apartments shall have been vacated.
22. MALONG VS. PNR, G.R. NO. L-49930
Facts: The Petitioners, Malong spouses alleged in their
complaint that on October 30, 1977 their son, Jaime Aquino, a
paying passenger, was killed when he fell from a PNR train
while it was between Tarlac City and Capas. The said train
was overloaded with passengers and baggage in view of the
proximity of All Saints Day. The Malong spouses prayed that
the PNR be ordered to pay them damages totalling P136,370.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, ruling that it had no
jurisdiction because the PNR, being a government
instrumentality, the action was a suit against the State.
The petitioners appealed to SC pursuant to RA No. 5440.
Issue: W/N the PNR is immune from suit? NO.
• Although the PNR is a government instrumentality
under Republic Act No. 4156, as amended by Republic Act No.
6366 and Presidential Decree No. 741, it was held that the
State divested itself of its sovereign capacity when it organized
the PNR which is no different from its predecessor, the Manila
Railroad Company. The PNR did not become immune from
suit. It did not remove itself from the operation of articles 1732
to 1766 of the Civil Code on common carriers.
• However, as held in precedents, the correct rule is
that "not all government entities, whether corporate or non-
corporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suit is
determined by the character of the” objectives “for which the
entity was organized.”
• The Manila Hotel case also relied on the following
rulings: “By engaging in a particular business through the
instrumentality of a corporation, the government divests itself
pro hac vice of its sovereign character, so as to render the
corporation subject to the rules of law governing private
corporations.”
Held: The order of dismissal is reversed and set aside. The
case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings,
costs against the Philippine National Railways.
It would be unjust if the heirs of the victim of an alleged
negligence of the PNR employees could not sue the PNR for
damages. Like any private common carrier, the PNR is subject
to the obligations of persons engaged in that private enterprise.
It is not performing any governmental function.
Notes
Abad Santos, J., concurring:
10
• The claim that Philippine National Railways is immune
from suit because it is an instrumentality of the government is
so outlandish that it deserves slight consideration.
• He mentioned the Central Bank of the Philippines as
an example of government instrumentality that is not immune
from suit for it also performs proprietary functions.
• He also contended the use of the immunity from suit
on the part of the government corporations to deny justice that
is due to the people they are to serve.
22. DOH v Phil Pharmawealth GR No. 182358
Department of Health, Secretary Alfredo Romualdez, USec.
Margarita Galon, petitioner; Philippine Pharmawealth, Inc,
respondent; February 20, 2013 Second Division Del Castillo, J.
FACTS: On December 22, 1998, Administrative Order (AO)
No. 27 series of 1995 was issued by then Department of
Health Secretary Alfredo G. Romualdez. AO 27 sets the
guidelines and procedure for accreditation of government
suppliers of pharmaceutical products for sale or distribution to
the public, such accreditation to be valid for three years but
subject to annual review.
On January 25, 2000, Secretary Romualdez issued AO 10
series of 2006 which amended AO 27. Under Sec 7 of AO 10,
accreditation period for government suppliers of
pharmaceutical products was reduced to 2 years. Also,
accreditation of Pharmaceutical companies may be recalled,
suspended or revoked after due deliberation and proper notice
by the DOH Accreditation Committee, through its Chairman.
Sec 7 of AO 10 was later amended AO 66 series of 2008
which stated that the 2 year accreditation may be recalled,
suspended or revoked only after due deliberation, hearing and
notice by the DOH Accreditation Committee, through its
Chairman.
On August 28, 2000, the DOH issued Memorandum No. 171-
C9 which provided for a list and category of sanctions to be
imposed on accredited government suppliers. In line with
Memorandum No. 171-C, the DOH, through former
Undersecretary Ma. Margarita M. Galon, issued Memorandum
No. 209 series of 2000 inviting representatives of 24 accredited
drug companies, including herein respondent Phil
Pharmawealth, Inc. (PPI) to a meeting on October 27, 2000.
During the meeting, Undersecretary Galon handed them
copies of a document entitled “Report on ViolativeProducts”
issued by the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), which
detailed violations or adverse findings relative to these
accredited drug companies’ products. PPI’s products were
included as BFAD found that PPI’s products sold to the public
were unfit for human consumption.
The companies were directed to submit their respective
explanations on the findings within 10 days. PPI did not submit
its reply on time. Instead, it submitted a letter stating that it is
referring the matter to its lawyers for preparation of a reply but
with no indicated date of compliance, which DOH Usec Galon
found untenable, thus she informed PPI thru letter that its
accreditation had been suspended for two years in accordance
with AO 10 and Memorandum No. 171-C. PPI thru letter,
demanded that Usec Galon cease and desist from enforcing
the suspension under pain of legal redress.
PPI then filed a complaint to declare certain DOH issuances
(Memorandum No. 171-C, AO 10, Series 2000, Usec Galon’s
suspension order; and AO 14, Series 2001) null and void for
being in violation of Section 26, Republic Act 3720, with prayer
for injunction and damages against Usec Galon and later DOH
Secretary Dayrit. It claimed that its accreditation was
suspended without due notice and hearing. It prayed that it be
awarded moral damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.
The respondent DOH officials filed a motion to dismiss,
alleging that it gave PPI the opportunity to explain but it did not

do so in a timely manner. The suspension was necessary to
stop the distribution and sale of substandard products. In a
Manifestation and Motion, the DOH officials further moved to
dismiss the case as it was a suit against the State; the
complaint was improperly verified; and the corporate officer
lacked the authority to file the suit. The Regional Trial Court
dismissed the case, holding that the suit is against the State,
thus the principle of immunity form suit is applicable.
On appeal to the CA, however, the latter reversed and set
aside the RTC decision. According to the CA, it was
premature for the RTC to have dismissed the case, as the
cause of actions were sufficiently alleged in the complaint.
Further, by filing a complaint, the DOH officials hypothetically
admitted the allegations in the complaint-that they were being
sued in their official and private capacities. Thus the DOH
officials, herein petitioners, elevated the case to the Supreme
Court, arguing that PPI’s prayer for damages should be
considered a suit against the State for it would require the
needed appropriation to satisfy PPI’s claim for damages should
it win. In issuing the assailed DOH issuances, they acted within
the scope of their authority, hence should not be made to
account individually. Petition was granted.
ISSUE: Whether or not DOH, in this circumstance, is under the
mantle of state immunity.
HELD: As a general rule, a state may not be sued. However, if
it consents, either expressly or impliedly, then it may be the
subject of a suit. There is express consent when a law, either
special or general, so provides. On the other hand, there is
implied consent when the state “enters into a contract or it itself
commences litigation.” However, it must be clarified that when
a state enters into a contract, it does not automatically mean
that it has waived its nonsuability. The State “will be deemed to
have impliedly waived its non-suability [only] if it has entered
into a contract in its proprietary or private capacity. [However,]
when the contract involves its sovereign or governmental
capacity, x x x no such waiver may be implied.” “Statutory
provisions waiving state immunity are construed in strictissimi
juris.
For, waiver of immunity is in derogation of sovereignty.”
24 JUSMAG PHILIPPINES V. NLRC
PUNO; December 15, 1994
FACTS: Florencio Sacramento was one of the 74 security
assistance support personnel (SASP) working at JUSMAG
Phils.; he had been with JUSMAG for more than 20yrs (1969-
1992); was dismissed on April 27, 1992
He filed a complaint with the Dept. of Labor and Employment
(March 31, 1992) on the ground that he was illegally
suspended and dismissed; asked for reinstatement
JUSMAG filed a Motion to Dismiss invoking its immunity from
suit as an agency of US; also alleged lack of employer-
employee rel’p and it has no juridical personality to sue and be
sued
Labor Arbiter Daniel Cueto dismissed complaint for want of
jurisdiction
NLRC reversed—JUSMAG had lost its right not to be sued
based on: 1) estoppel- JUSMAG failed to refute the employer-
employee rel’p under the control test and 2) it has waived its
right to immunity from suit when it hired Sacramento’s
services.
NLRC relied on Harry Lyons vs. USA (“US Govt waived its
immunity from suit by entering into a contract of stevedoring
services, and thus, it submitted itself to the jurisdiction of local
courts”)
JUSMAG now contends that the NLRC committed grave abuse
of discretion in reversing the labor arbiter’s decision, in saying
that JUSMAG waived its immunity from suit, in finding an
11
employer-employee relp between JUSMAG and Sacramento,
and in considering JUSMAG estopped from denying that
respondent is its employee for failure to present proof.
ISSUE: Is the Joint United States Military Assistance Group to
the RP (JUSMAG-PHIL) immune from suit?
HELD: Ratio As it stands now, the application of the doctrine of
immunity from suit has been restricted to sovereign or
governmental activities. The mantle of state immunity cannot
be extended to commercial, private and proprietary acts.
Reasoning
- When JUSMAG took the services of Sacramento, it was
performing a governmental function on behalf of the US
pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement. The suit is, in
effect, one against the US and, considering that the US has not
waived or consented to the suit, the complaint cannot prosper.
- Immunity of State from suit is one of the universally
recognized principles of international law that the Phils.
Recognizes and adopts as part of the law of the land. This is
anchored on the principle of sovereign equality of states (an
equal has no power over an equal).
Discussion
- Historical Background of JUSMAG
- was created pursuant to the Military Assistance Agreement
dated March 21, 1947 between the Philippines and the US;
primary task was to advise and assist the Philippines on air
force, army and naval matters
- in 1991, US manifested its preparedness to provide funds to
cover the salaries of SASP and security guards, the rent of
bldgs, and housing, and cost of utilities
- Memorandum of Agreement between AFP and JUSMAG-
Phils
- Salaries- for security guards and SASP
- SASP are employees of the AFP; under the total operational
control of the Chief JUSMAG-Phils; AFP to assume the
severance/retirement pay liability for all appointed SASP
- It is apparent that when JUSMAG took the services of private
respondent, it was performing a governmental function on
behalf of the US. Hence, the suit is, in effect, one against the
US Government.
- In this jurisdiction, Immunity of State is a universally accepted
principle. Immunity is understood as the exemption of the state
and its organs from the judicial jurisdiction of another state.
- A state cannot be sued in the courts of another state, without
its consent or waiver. An exception to the doctrine, however,
was recognized in Santos, et al vs. Santos, et al: “the state
itself may be sued, even without its consent, because by
entering into a contract, the sovereign state has descended the
level of the citizen and its consent to be sued is implied from
the very act of entering into such contract.”
- it was in this light that the state immunity issue in Harry Lyons
vs. USA was decided
- Exception evolved: existence of contract does not, per se,
mean that sovereign states may, at all times, be sued in local
courts.
US vs. Ruiz: “...does not apply where the contract relates to
the exercise of its sovereign functions”
US vs. Hon. Rodrigo, et al: “petitioners cannot invoke the
doctrine of state immunity...the reason is that by entering into
the employment contract with Genove in the discharge of its
proprietary functions, it impliedly divested itself of its sovereign
immunity from suit.”

- SASP are employees of the AFP as consistently contended
by JUSMAG, thus it is not estopped from denying employer-
employee relationship
Dispositive Petition for certiori is granted, resolution of NLRC
is reversed and set aside.
25. SANTIAGO v. CA
Facts:On 20 Jan 1971, Santiago gratuitously donated a parcel
of land to the Bureau of Plant Industry. The terms of the
donation are; that the Bureau should construct a building on
the said lot and that the building should be finished by
December 7, 1974, that the Bureau should install lighting
facilities on the said lot. However, come 1976 there were still
no improvements on the lot. This prompted Santiago to file a
case pleading for the revocation of such contract of donation.
The trial court dismissed the petition claiming that it is a suit
against the government and should not prosper without the
consent of the government.
Issue:Whether or not the state has not waived its immunity
from suit.
Held: The government has waived its immunity and such
waiver is implied by virtue of the terms provided in the deed of
donation. The government is a beneficiary of the terms of the
donation. But the government through the Bureau has
breached the terms of the deed by not complying with such,
therefore, the donor Santiago has the right to have his day in
court and be heard. Further, to not allow the donor to be heard
would be unethical and contrary to equity which the
government so advances. Case should prosper.
26. FROILAN V. ORIENTAL PAN SHIPPING, SEPTEMBER
30, 1950
Facts: Fernando A. Froilan purchased the vessel FS-197 from
the Shipping Commission for P200,000, paying P50,000 down
and agreeing to pay the balance in installments. However, the
installments were not paid and the Shipping Commission took
possession of the vessel and considered the sale cancelled.
The Shipping Commission then chartered the vessel to Pan
Oriental Shipping Co.
Froilan then filed a complaint against Pan Oriental Shipping
Co. Pan Oriental Shipping Co. filed its answer denying the right
of Froilan to the vessel. Following this, the Republic of the
Philippines, as intervenor, filed a complaint in intervention
alleging that Froilan had failed to pay to the Shipping
Commission the balance. Froilan then tendered to the Board of
Liquidators (which was liquidating the affairs of the Shipping
Administration) a check in payment of his obligation for the
vessel. The lower court held that the check constituted a
payment and a discharge of Froilan's obligation to the
government.
However, Pan Oriental Shipping Co. had also filed an answer
to the government's complaint in intervention saying that the
government was obligated to deliver the vessel to it by
contract. In response, the government filed a motion to dismiss
the counterclaim of Pan Oriental Shipping Co. against it on the
grounds that the action of delivering the vessel to Pan Oriental
Shipping Co. was no longer feasible and was barred by prior
judgment, and also that the court has no jurisdiction over the
intervenor government of the Republic of the Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not the Government's motion to dismiss Pan
Oriental's counterclaims are allowable.
Held: The counterclaim was not barred by prior judgment, as
the counterclaim was filed before the decision had been made
with regards to Froilan's payment. The State was also not
immune from suit, since by filing its complaint in intervention,
the Government waived its right of nonsuability. Appellee
12
27. RCBC v. DE CASTRO
Facts: The Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City issued
an order regarding civil case Badoc Planters, Inc v. Philippine
Virginia Tobacco Administration, et al. for the recovery of
unpaid tobacco deliveries to BADOC. The Branch clerk of court
then issued a Writ of Execution to Special Sheriff Faustion
Rigor, who issued a Notice of Garnishment to the General
Manager/Cashier of RCBC requesting a reply within 5 days to
any property that PVTA that was currently in control of RCBC.
On the same day, BADOC filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
a Writ of Execution, which was also granted by the respondent
judge. In compliance, RCBC delivered to Sheriff Rigor a
certified check with the amount.
PVTA then filed a Motion for Reconsideration to restore the
account of PTVA in RCBC to the condition it was in before the
issuance of the Writ of Execution and the Orders. It was
granted, and then RCBC filed a Motion for Reconsideration as
well. This, however, was denied, so RCBC filed a Notice of
Appeal to the Court of Appeals from the said orders.
Issues:
1) Whether or not PVTA funds are public funds not
subject to garnishment;
2) Whether or not the respondent Judge correctly
ordered the petitioner to reimburse the amount paid to the
special sheriff
Ruling: The court found that RCBC should not be held liable
since it was following the court order which instructed that a
check be delivered to Sheriff Rigor. They could also not be
held responsible that the check was later encashed, which was
also directed by a court order. In response to the issues at
hand, the court found that PVTA funds are not exempt from
garnishment because PVTA was created by RA 2265 as an
ordinary corporation subject to the provisions of Corporation
Law. Hence, it possesses the power to “sue and be sued” and
"to acquire and hold such assets and incur such liabilities
resulting directly from operations authorized by the provisions
of this Act or as essential to the proper conduct of such
operations." [Section 3, Republic Act No. 2265.].
RCBC cannot therefore be compelled to make restitution
solidarily with the plaintiff BADOC. Plaintiff BADOC alone was
responsible for the issuance of the Writ of Execution and Order
of Payment and so, the plaintiff alone should bear the
consequences of a subsequent annulment of such court
orders; hence, only the plaintiff can be ordered to restore the
account of the PVTA.
28. SAN MIGUEL, BULACAN VS. FERNANDEZ 130 SCRA
56 (1984)
FACTS: In Civil Case No. 604-B, the then CFI of Bulacan
rendered judgment holding herein petitioner municipality liable
to respondents Imperio, et al. When the judgment became
final, respondent judge issued a writ of execution to satisfy the
same. Petitioner municipality filed a motion to quash the writ
on the ground that the municipality’s property or funds are
public exempt from execution. The motion was denied. The
respondent judge issued another order requiring both the
municipal and provincial treasurer to comply with the money
judgment. When the treasurers failed to do so, respondent
judge issued an order for their arrest and that they will be
released upon compliance, hence the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether the funds of the municipality in the
hands of the Provincial and Municipal Treasurers of Bulacan
and San Miguel, respectively are public funds which are
exempt from execution?
HELD: YES. Municipal funds in possession of municipal and
provincial treasurers are public funds exempt from execution.
The reason for those was explained in the case of Municipality
of Paoay vs. Manaois ‘that are held in trust for the people
intended and used for the accomplices of the purposes for

which municipal corporations are created and that to subject
said properties and public funds to execution would
materially impede, even defeat and in some instance destroy
said purpose.” Thus it is clear that all the funds of petitioner
municipality in the possession of the Municipal Treasurer of
San Miguel as well as those in the possession of the Provincial
Treasurer of Bulacan are also public funds and as such they
are exempt from execution.
Besides PD 447, known as the Decree on Local Fiscal
Administration, provides in section 3 (a) that “no money shall
be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of a lawful
appropriation or other specific statutory authority.” Otherwise
stated, there must be a corresponding appropriation in the form
of an ordinance duly passed by the Sangguniang Bayan before
any money of the municipality may be paid out. In the case at
bar, it has not been shown that the Sangguniang Bayan has
passed any ordinance to this effect.
29. MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI VS CA 190 SCRA 206
Facts: An expropriation proceeding was filed by the
Municipality of Makati, herein petitioner, against the private
property of Arceli Jo. In compliance to PD 42, the petitioner
opened an account under its name at PNB depositing an
amount of P417,510.00. The court fixed the appraised value of
the expropriated property at P5,291,666.00 and an advanced
payment was made in the amount of P338,160 leaving a
balance of P4,953,506. After the decision becomes final and
executory, the private respondent moved for the issuance of a
writ of execution. A notice of garnishment was thereafter
issued by the court to the PNB account. A manifestation was
filed by the petitioner informing the court that the private
respondent was no longer the true owner of the expropriated
property. The court consolidated the ownership of the property
to PSB as a mortgagee/purchaser. The private respondent and
PSB agreed to divide the compensation due from the
expropriation proceeding. The judge ordered PNB to
immediately release to them the sum of P4,953.506
corresponding to the balance of the appraised value of the
expropriated property. The PNB bank manager refused as he
is waiting for the approval of their head office. The Municipality
of Makati contends that its fund with DBP could neither be be
garnished or levied upon execution for to do so would result to
the disbursement of public funds without the proper
appropriation required under the law. The lower court denied
the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner ruling that the
account with DBP of the petitioner was an account specifically
opened for the expropriation proceeding. Petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
lower court’s decision. A petition for review with a prayer for
preliminary injunction was filed to the S.C. A temporary
restraining order was issued by the S.C.
Issue: Whether or not the PNB funds may be levied in the
expropriation proceeding?
Held: The petitioner belatedly informed the court that there are
two existing accounts with PNB. Account A was the one
intended for the expropriation proceeding and account B is
primarily intended for financing governmental functions and
activities. Because account A has a fund that is insufficient to
meet the remaining amount of its balance for the expropriation
proceeding, it is unlawful to get the remaining balance from
Account B without an ordinance appropriating said funds for
expropriation purpose. Thus the court ruled that account A
maybe levied but not account B. The respondents are without
recourse however should the petitioner refuse to pay its
remaining obligation. Where a municipality refuses without
justifiable reason to effect payment of a final money judgment
rendered against it, the claimant may avail the remedy of
mandamus in order to compel the enactment and approval of
the necessary appropriation ordinance and the corresponding
disbursement of municipal funds for such purpose.
13
30. MERITT VS. GOVT OF THE PHIL. ISLANDS.
Facts: Meritt, riding in a motorcycle collided with an
ambulance of the General Hospital. He was severely injured
damaging his efficiency as contractor. The inquiry arises
whether the Government is liable for the damages due to the
negligence committed by an agent or employee of the
government which is the chauffer.
Issue: Whether or not the Government is liable in this case.
Held: No.According to Art. 1903, Paragraph 5 of Civil Code, in
a damage case, the responsibility of the State is limited to that
which it contracts through a special agent. The evidence
showed that the chauffer, who acted negligently, of the
ambulance was not such of an agent. The court held that the
judgment rests solely with the Legislature and not with the
Court.
31. National Irrigation Administration (nia) v Court of
Appeals
Facts: Petitioner NIA awarded HYDRO a contract for
construction of the main civil works of the Magat River Multi-
purpose Project. The contract provided Respondent HYDRO
would be paid partly in Philippine pesos and partly in US
dollars. Respondent HYDRO substantially completed in 1982
and final acceptance by Petitioner NIA was made in 1984.
Thereafter, HYDRO still had an account receivable from NIA
representing dollar differential rate after the prescribed
provided in the contract. HYDRO filed Request for Adjudication
in Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC).
Petitioner NIA filed its Answer wherein it questioned the
jurisdiction of the CIAC alleging lack of cause of action, laches
and estoppel in view of Respondent HYDRO’s alleged failure
to avail of its right to submit the dispute to arbitration within the
prescribed period as provided in the contract.
Later, Petitioner NIA filed a Motion to Dismiss alleging lack of
jurisdiction over the disputes.
Petitioner NIA filed with the CA an Original Action of Certiorari
and Prohibition with prayer for Restraining Order and/or
Injunction which dismissed the same.
Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with
urgent prayer for Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.
Issue: Whether or not the CIAC has jurisdiction over the case.
Held: Yes. The CIAC has jurisdiction over the controversy,
contrary to the claim of NIA. The instant Petition is dismissed
for lack of merit.
LEGISLATIVE
GUDANI VS. SENGA
GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 [Article VI Sec. 22:
Congress' Power of Inquiry; Legislative Investigation]
FACTS: The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan
to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and the surfacing of
the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining
officials of the executive department including the military
establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without
her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a
Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from
appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential
approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in
spite the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a
result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly
violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of
the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be
subjected before the General Court Martial proceedings for

willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President has the authority to issue
an order to the members of the AFP preventing them from
testifying before a legislative inquiry.
RULING: Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional
authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-in-
chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies
such injunction is liable under military justice. At the same time,
any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance before
it of a military officer against the consent of the President has
adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any
military official whom Congress summons to testify before it
may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is
not so inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial
order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final
judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the
President has the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue
a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive officials
summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing.
In doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations
on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be
formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of
the President to prevent military officers from testifying before
Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief
Executive’s power as commander-in-chief to control the
actions and speech of members of the armed forces. The
President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not
hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow
members of the military to appear before Congress is still
subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as
one of the legislature’s functions is the conduct of inquiries in
aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to
interfere with the President’s power as commander-in-chief, it
is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with
Congress’s right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse
did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified
anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is
aware that with its pronouncement today that the President has
the right to require prior consent from members of the armed
forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.
The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as
commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the
military officers before Congress. Even if the President has
earlier disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before
the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless
obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.
ROMULO NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEE ON
ACCOUNTABILITY of Public Officers G.R No. 180643
In April April 2007, DOTC entered into a contract with Zhong
Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network
(NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290.00
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be
financed by the People’s Republic of China. The Senate
passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. On the
other hand, Joe De Venecia issued a statement that several
high executive officials and power brokers were using their
influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the
Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he
was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that
Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in
exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further
narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about
the NBN Project, Neri refused to answer, invoking “executive
privilege“. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN
14
Project, (b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve. He later
refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to
the SBRC averring that the communications between GMA
and Neri is privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down
in Senate vs Ermita be applied. The SBRC cited Neri for
contempt.
ISSUE: Whether or not the three questions sought by the
SBRC to be answered falls under executive privilege.
HELD: The oversight function of Congress may be facilitated
by compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in
pursuit of legislation.
The communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
covered by the presidential communications privilege.
1st, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-
delegable power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into
an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of
the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been
recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
2nd, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of
the President. Under the “operational proximity” test, petitioner
can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyo’s cabinet. And
3rd, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that
would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
REGHIS M. ROMERO II v. SENATOR JINGGOY E.
ESTRADA, GR No. 174105, 2009-04-02
Facts: petitioner Reghis Romero II, as owner of R-II Builders,
Inc., received from the Committee an invitation,[1] signed by
the Legislative Committee Secretary,... the Committee on
Labor, Employment and Human Resources Development
chaired by Sen. Jinggoy Ejercito Estrada will conduct a public
hearing at 1:00 p.m. on the 23rd day of August 2006 at
The inquiry/investigation is specifically intended to aid the
Senate in the review and possible amendments to the pertinent
provisions of R.A. 8042, "the Migrant Workers Act"... and to
craft a much needed legislation relative to the stated subject
matter... petitioner Romero II requested to be excused from
appearing and testifying before the Committee at its scheduled
hearings of the subject matter and purpose of Philippine
Senate (PS) Resolution Nos. 537 and 543... his request, being
unmeritorious, was denied
Senator Jinggoy Estrada, as Chairperson of the Committee,
caused the service of a subpoena ad testificandum[4] on
petitioner Romero II... directing him to appear and testify
before the Committee at its hearing on September 4, 2006
relative to the aforesaid Senate resolutions.
On August 30, 2006, petitioners filed the instant petition,
docketed as G.R. No. 174105, seeking to bar the Committee
from continuing with its inquiry and to enjoin it from compelling
petitioners to appear before it pursuant to the invitations thus
issued.
observing that the Senate's motives in calling for an
investigation in aid of... legislation were a political question. T
Respondents averred that the subject matter of the
investigation focused on the alleged dissipation of OWWA
funds and the purpose of the probe was to aid the Senate
determine the propriety of amending Republic Act No. 8042 or
The Migrant Workers Act of 1995 and enacting... laws to
protect OWWA funds in the future.
Issues:
since the investigation has been intended to ascertain
petitioners' criminal liability for plunder, it is... not in aid of
legislation

Whether or not the subject matter of the Committee's inquiry is
sub judice
Ruling: The same directors and officers contend that the
Senate is barred from inquiring into the same issues being
litigated before the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan.
Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any
prosecution or administrative action should not stop or abate
any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose... inquiries in aid
of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the
legislative body to gather information and, thus, legislate wisely
and effectively;[17] and to determine whether there is a need...
to improve existing laws or enact new or remedial
legislation,[18] albeit the inquiry need not result in any potential
legislation.
On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude congressional
hearings in aid of legislation.
[T]he mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint
before a court or quasi-judicial body should not automatically
bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would
be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress
through the... convenient ploy of instituting a criminal or an
administrative complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign
legislative authority, of which the power of legislative inquiry is
an essential component, cannot be made subordinate to a
criminal or administrative investigation.
all pending matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and
even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a particular
Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of
that Congress and it is merely optional... on the Senate of the
succeeding Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not
in the same status, but as if presented for the first time... when
the Committee issued invitations and subpoenas to petitioners
to appear before it in connection with its investigation of the
aforementioned... investments, it did so pursuant to its
authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This is clearly
provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the Constitution, which was
quoted at the outset. And the Court has no authority to prohibit
a Senate committee from requiring persons to... appear and
testify before it in connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation
in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The... unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to
subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its
Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within
the realm of proper investigation.[22] (Emphasis... supplied.)...
there is no more investigation to be continued by virtue of said
resolutions; there is no more investigation the constitutionality
of which is subject to a challenge.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED
ARTURO TOLENTINO VS SECRETARY OF FINANCE
235 SCRA 630 (1994) – 249 SCRA 635 (1995) – Political Law
– Origination of Revenue Bills – EVAT – Amendment by
Substitution
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA
7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax
(EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not
exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as
required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even
though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the
3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3
readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to
the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate
passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino
averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197
by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB
1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate
version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. (It’s
ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul
Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)
15
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the
challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with
the power of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the
Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that
the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there
were several instances before where Senate passed its own
version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue
and other such bills are concerned. This practice of
amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The
proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There
is no showing that it would make a significant difference if
Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
HEHERSON ALVAREZ VS TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR.
252 SCRA 695 – Political Law – Municipal Corporation – LGU
Requirement – Income – Inclusion of IRAs
In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the
Municipality of Santiago into an Independent Component City
to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the House
of Representatives.
In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and
content with that of HB 8817 was introduced in the Senate.
In January 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In
February 1994, the Senate conducted a public hearing on SB
1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee on Local
Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB
8817 as it was totally the same with SB 1243. Eventually, HB
8817 became a law (RA 7720).
Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et al are assailing the
constitutionality of the said law on the ground that the bill
creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that
City of Santiago was not able to comply with the income of at
least P20M per annum in order for it to be a city. That in the
computation of the reported average income of
P20,974,581.97, the IRA was included which should not be.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally
from the HOR.
2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the
computation of an LGU’s income.
HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate
bill as the record shows. Further, the Senate held in abeyance
any hearing on the said SB while the HB was on its 1st,
2nd and 3rd reading in the HOR. The Senate only conducted
its 1st hearing on the said SB one month after the HB was
transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation of the said HB as
well).
2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an
LGU’s average annual income as was done in the case at bar.
The IRAs are items of income because they form part of the
gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The
IRAs regularly and automatically accrue to the local treasury
without need of any further action on the part of the local
government unit. They thus constitute income which the local
government can invariably rely upon as the source of much
needed funds.
To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is
there a basis, too, to classify the same as a special fund or
transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all
its own as used in the Local Government Code that
unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or transfers
referred to when the Code speaks of “funding support from the
national government, its instrumentalities and government-
owned-or-controlled corporations.
Garcia vs Mata

G.R. No. L-33713 July 30, 1975
Facts: The donation of the property to the government to
make the property public does not cure the constitutional
defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said
property was still a private property cannot be ignored. “In
accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be
exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation
can be expanded only for public purposes and not for the
advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the land on
which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed
belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation
sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.
Issue: Whether RA 1600 is valid. Does it contain rider in an
appropriation bill?
Held: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident.
Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any
appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the
operation of government while Section 11 refers to a
fundamental governmental policy of calling to active duty and
the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP.
Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN
AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in violation of the
constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general
appropriation act. It was indeed a new and completely
unrelated provision attached to the GAA.
It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to
be considered must be expressed in the title of the act. When
an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in
the subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions
are void, inoperative and without effect.
SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the
AFP to reinstate him.
DEMETRIO DEMETRIA VS MANUEL ALBA
148 SCRA 208 – Political Law – Transfer of Funds – Power
of the President to Realign Funds
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the
Batasan Pambansa sought to prohibit Manuel Alba, then
Minister of the Budget, from disbursing funds pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of
1977. Demetria assailed the constitutionality of paragraph 1,
Section 44 of the said PD. This Section provides that:
“The President shall have the authority
to transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and
agencies of the Executive Department,
which are included in the General
Appropriations Act, to any program,
project or activity of any department, bureau,
or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment.”
Demetria averred that this is unconstitutional for it violates the
1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Paragraph 1, Section 44, of PD 1177 is
constitutional.
HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be
passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however, the
President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional
commissions may by law be authorized to augment any item in
the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
However, paragraph 1 of Section 44 of PD 1177 unduly
overextends the privilege granted under the Constitution. It
empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from
16
one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
Department to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General
Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment, without
regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are
actually savings in the item from which the same are to be
taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It
does not only completely disregard the standards set in the
fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of
legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.
Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in
question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one
department from one item to another in the GAA may be
allowed by law in the interest of expediency and efficiency.
There is no transfer from one department to another here.
PHILCONSA VS ENRIQUEZ
G.R. No. 113105 August 19 1994 [Article VI Section 25 -
Appropriations]
FACTS: Petitioners assailed the validity of RA 7663 or General
Appropriations Act of 1994.
GAA contains a special provision that allows any members of
the Congress the REalignment of Allocation for Operational
Expenses, provided that the total of said allocation is not
exceeded.
Philconsa claims that only the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives are the ones
authorized under the Constitution to realign savings, not the
individual members of Congress themselves.
President signed the law, but Vetoes certain provisions of the
law and imposed certain provisional conditions: that the AFP
Chief of Staff is authorized to use savings to augment the
pension funds under the Retirement and Separation Benefits of
the AFP.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 7663 is violative of Article VI,
Section 25 (5) of 1987 Constitution.
RULING: Yes. Only the Senate President and the Speaker of
the House are allowed to approve the realignment.
Furthermore, two conditions must be met: 1) the funds to be
realigned are actually savings, and 2) the transfer is for the
purpose of augmenting the items of expenditures to which said
transfer to be made.
As to the certain condition given to the AFP Chief of Staff, it is
violative of of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the
Constitution. The list of those who may be authorized to
transfer funds is exclusive. the AFP Chief of Staff may not be
given authority.
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC. VS
PEDRO GIMENEZ
15 SCRA 479 – Political Law – Salaries of the Members of
Congress – Other Emolument
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails
the validity of Republic Act No. 3836 insofar as the same
allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and
sick leave to Senators and Representatives. PHILCONSA now
seeks to enjoin Pedor Gimenez, the Auditor General, from
disbursing funds therefor.
According to PHILCONSA, the provision on retirement gratuity
is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase
of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of
office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the
Constitution. The same provision constitutes “selfish class
legislation” because it allows members and officers of
Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives
them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four
years of service, which is not refundable in case of
reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while all other

officers and employees of the government can retire only after
at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity
which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of
service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The
provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the
highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are
concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further
increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General, arguing for Congress, averred that the
grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No.
3836 to the officers does not constitute “forbidden
compensation” within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of
the Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not
constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable
vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely
“in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each
retiring member” and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to
increase their salary.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional.
HELD: No, the said law is unconstitutional. Section 14, Article
VI, of the Constitution, provides:
The senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law,
receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two
hundred pesos each, including per diems and other
emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling
expenses to and from their respective district in the case of
Members of the House of Representatives and to and from
their places of residence in the case of Senators, when
attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the
full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise
provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker
of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.
When the Constitutional Convention first determined the
compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed
by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special
proviso which reads as follows:
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after
the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National
Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase.
In other words, under the original constitutional provision
regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the
salaries of its members, no increase would take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of the members of the
Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such
increase.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14,
Article VI, includes in the term compensation “other
emoluments”.
“Emolument” is “the profit arising from office or employment;
that which is received as compensation for services or which is
annexed to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and
perquisites.”
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species
of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for
services of one possessing any office.
RA 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to
take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June
22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available
thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full term of all
the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter
to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.
RA 3836 is hereby declared unconstitutional by the SC.
VALENTIN TIO VS VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD
17
151 SCRA 208 – Political Law – The Embrace of Only One
Subject by a Bill
Delegation of Power – Delegation to Administrative Bodies
In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled “An Act
Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board” was enacted which
gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the
videogram industry. The said law sought to minimize the
economic effects of piracy. There was a need to regulate the
sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie
industry. The proliferation of videograms has significantly
lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie industry,
and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be
taxed. Section 10 of the PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross
receipts payable to the LGUs.
In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it
is unconstitutional on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross
receipts, is a rider and is not germane to the subject matter of
the law.
2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the
VRB, an administrative body, because the law allowed the
VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government
agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said PD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tio’s arguments are
correct.
HELD: No.
1. The Constitutional requirement that “every bill shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof” is
sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough
to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to
achieve. In the case at bar, the questioned provision is allied
and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the
regulation of the video industry through the VRB as expressed
in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign
to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is
simply one of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered
throughout the PD.
2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the
VRB. VRB is not being tasked to legislate. What was conferred
to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in
the execution, enforcement, and implementation of the
law. Besides, in the very language of the decree, the authority
of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a “fixed and
limited period” with the deputized agencies concerned being
“subject to the direction and control of the [VRB].”
Philippine Judges Association vs Pete Prado
227 SCRA 703 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of
Rights – Equal Protection – Franking Privilege of the Judiciary
Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine
Postal Corporation (PPC) to withdraw franking privileges from
certain government agencies. Franking privilege is a privilege
granted to certain agencies to make use of the Philippine
postal service free of charge.
In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the
bulk of the expenditure of the postal service comes from the
judiciary’s use of the postal service (issuance of court
processes). Hence, the postal service recommended that the
franking privilege be withdrawn from the judiciary. AS a result,
the PPC issued a circular withdrawing the said franking
privilege.
The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular
and questioned the validity of Section 35 of RA 7354. PJA
claimed that the said provision is violative of the equal
protection clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege
from the judiciary is valid.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of
the equal protection clause. The judiciary needs the franking

privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that
need is the high expense allotted to the judiciary’s franking
needs. The Postmaster cannot be sustained in contending that
the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in
order to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster
would intend to cut expenditure by removing the franking
privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the
franking privilege all at once from all the other departments. If
the problem is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege,
the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the
government, including those who do not need it. The problem
is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from
others, especially where there is no substantial distinction
between those favored, which may or may not need it at all,
and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not
solved by violating the Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal
application of the laws on all persons or things without
distinction (it is true that the postmaster withdraw the franking
privileges from other agencies of the government but still, the
judiciary is different because its operation largely relies on the
mailing of court processes). This might in fact sometimes result
in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting
mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit
the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What
the clause requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from all others in these same
particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the
franking privilege has been withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the
courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it
recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the
members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no
reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater
need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.
Arturo Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance
235 SCRA 630 (1994) – 249 SCRA 635 (1995) – Political Law
– Origination of Revenue Bills – EVAT – Amendment by
Substitution
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA
7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax
(EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not
exclusively originate from the House of Representatives as
required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even
though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the
3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3
readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to
the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate
passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino
averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197
by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB
1630 in that way “the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate
version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB”. (It’s
ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul
Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the
challenge, holding that such consolidation was consistent with
the power of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What the
Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that
the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that there
were several instances before where Senate passed its own
version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue
and other such bills are concerned. This practice of
amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The
proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There
is no showing that it would make a significant difference if
Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
18
Tan vs. Del Rosario
237 SCRA 324
Facts:Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA 7496 or
the simplified income taxation scheme (SNIT) under Arts (26)
and (28) and III (1). The SNIT contained changes in the tax
schedules and different treatment in the professionals which
petitioners assail as unconstitutional for being isolative of the
equal protection clause in the constitution.
Issue: Is the contention meritorious?
Ruling: No. uniformity of taxation, like the hindered concept of
equal protection, merely require that all subjects or objects of
taxation similarly situated are to be treated alike both privileges
and liabilities. Uniformity, does not offend classification as long
as it rest on substantial distinctions, it is germane to the
purpose of the law. It is not limited to existing only and must
apply equally to all members of the same class.
The legislative intent is to increasingly shift the income tax
system towards the scheduled approach in taxation of
individual taxpayers and maintain the present global treatment
on taxable corporations. This classification is neither arbitrary
nor inappropriate.
NEPTALI GONZALES VS MACARAIG
Political Law – Veto Power – Inappropriate Provision in an
Appropriation Bill
Gonzales, together w/ 22 other senators, assailed the
constitutionality of Cory’s veto of Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill (Sec 55 FY ’89, and subsequently of its
counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill (Sec 16
FY ’90). Gonzalez averred the following: (1) the President’s
line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to
item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she exceeded
her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section
16 (FY ’90) which are provision; (2) when the President objects
to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the
item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto
power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions
or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers; and (4) the power of
augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987
Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore,
Congress is also vested with the prerogative to impose
restrictions on the exercise of that power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto
power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the
President the power to veto `provisions’ of an Appropriations
Bill.
HELD: SC ruled that Congress cannot include in a general
appropriations bill matters that should be more properly
enacted in separate legislation, and if it does that, the
inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as
“item,” which can be vetoed by the President in the exercise of
his item-veto power. The SC went one step further and rules
that even assuming arguendo that “provisions” are beyond the
executive power to veto, and Section 55 (FY ’89) and Section
16 (FY ’90) were not “provisions” in the budgetary sense of the
term, they are “inappropriate provisions” that should be treated
as “items” for the purpose of the President’s veto power.
Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan v Tan
(1988)
FACTS: EO 372 was issued by the President of the Philippines
which amended the Revenue Code, adopting the value-added
tax (VAT) effective January 1, 1988. Four petitions assailed the
validity of the VAT Law from being beyond the President to
enact; for being oppressive, discriminatory, regressive and
violative of the due process and equal protection clauses,
among others, of the Constitution. The Integrated Customs
Brokers Association particularly contend that it unduly
discriminate against customs brokers (Section 103r) as the

amended provision of the Tax Code provides that “service
performed in the exercise of profession or calling (except
custom brokers) subject to occupational tax under the Local
Tax Code and professional services performed by registered
general professional partnerships are exempt from VAT.
ISSUE: Whether the E-VAT law is void for being discriminatory
against customs brokers
RULING: No. The phrase “except custom brokers” is not
meant to discriminate against custom brokers but to avert a
potential conflict between Sections 102 and 103 of the Tax
Code, as amended. The distinction of the customs brokers
from the other professionals who are subject to occupation tax
under the Local Tax Code is based on material differences, in
that the activities of customs partake more of a business,
rather than a profession and were thus subjected to the
percentage tax under Section 174 of the Tax Code prior to its
amendment by EO 273. EO 273 abolished the percentage tax
and replaced it with the VAT. If the Association did not protest
the classification of customs brokers then, there is no reason
why it should protest now.
PROVINCE OF ABRA VS HAROLD HERNANDO
107 SCRA 104 – Political Law – Exemption From Taxes – The
Church
The Province of Abra sought to tax the properties of the
Roman Catholic Bishop, Inc. of Bangued. Judge Harold
Hernando dismissed the petition of Abra without hearing its
side. Hernando ruled that there “is no question that the real
properties sought to be taxed by the Province of Abra are
properties of the respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of
Bangued, Inc.” Likewise, there is no dispute that the properties
including their produce are actually, directly and exclusively
used by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. for
religious or charitable purposes.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties of the church (in this
case) is exempt from taxes.
HELD: No, they are not tax exempt. It is true that the
Constitution provides that “charitable institutions, mosques,
and non-profit cemeteries” are required that for the exemption
of “lands, buildings, and improvements,” they should not only
be “exclusively” but also “actually” and “directly” used for
religious or charitable purposes. The exemption from taxation
is not favored and is never presumed, so that if granted it must
be strictly construed against the taxpayer. However, in this
case, there is no showing that the said properties are actually
and directly used for religious or charitable uses.
ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC. represented by PEDRO V.
BORGONIA,petitioner, vs. HON. JUAN P. AQUINO, Judge,
Court of First Instance, Abra;ARMIN M. CARIAGA, Provincial
Treasurer, Abra; GASPAR V. BOSQUE, Municipal Treasurer,
Bangued, Abra; HEIRS OF PATERNO MILLARE, respondents.
FACTS: On June 8, 1972 the properties of the Abra Valley
Junior College, Inc. was sold at public auction for the
satisfaction of the unpaid real property taxes thereon and the
same was sold to Paterno Millare who offered the highest bid
of P6,000.00 and a Certificate of Sale in his favor was issued
by the defendant Municipal Treasurer.
(a) that the school is recognized by the government and is
offering Primary, High School and College Courses, and has a
school population of more than one thousand students all in all;
(b) that it is located right in the heart of the town of Bangued, a
few meters from the plaza and about 120 meters from the
Court of First Instance building; (c) that the elementary pupils
are housed in a two-storey building across the street; (d) that
the high school and college students are housed in the main
building; (e) that the Director with his family is in the second
floor of the main building; and (f) that the annual gross income
of the school reaches more than one hundred thousand
pesos.
19
The only issue left for the Court to determine and as agreed by
the parties, is whether or not the lot and building in question
are used exclusively for educational purposes.
ISSUE: Whether or not the properties are exclusively for
education purposes?
HELD: Petitioner contends that the primary use of the lot and
building for educational purposes, and not the incidental use
thereof, determines and exemption from property taxes under
Section 22 (3), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution. Hence, the
seizure and sale of subject college lot and building, which are
contrary thereto as well as to the provision of Commonwealth
Act No. 470, otherwise known as the Assessment Law, are
without legal basis and therefore void.
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that the
college lot and building in question which were subjected to
seizure and sale to answer for the unpaid tax are used: (1) for
the educational purposes of the college; (2) as the permanent
residence of the President and Director thereof, Mr. Pedro V.
Borgonia, and his family including the in-laws and
grandchildren; and (3) for commercial purposes because the
ground floor of the college building is being used and rented by
a commercial establishment, the Northern Marketing
Corporation
The phrase “exclusively used for educational purposes” was
further clarified by this Court, thus““Moreover, the exemption in
favor of property used exclusively for charitable or educational
purposes is ‘not limited to property actually indispensable’
therefor, but extends to facilities which are incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of said purposes,
such as in the case of hospitals, ‘a school for training nurses, a
nurses’ home, property use to provide housing facilities for
interns, resident doctors, superintendents, and other members
of the hospital staff, and recreational facilities for student
nurses, interns, and residents’ (84 CJS 6621), such as ‘athletic
fields’ including ‘a firm used for the inmates of the institution.’ ”
The exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main
purpose the lease of the first floor to the Northern Marketing
Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
considered incidental to the purposes of education; Case at
bar.—It must be stressed however, that while this Court allows
a more liberal and non-restrictive interpretation of the phrase
“exclusively used for educational purposes” as provided for in
Article VI, Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been made that
exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main
purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or
lot for commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law,
nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the second floor of
the main building in the case at bar for residential purposes of
the Director and his family, may find justification under the
concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to the main
or primary pur-pose—educational, the lease of the first floor
thereof to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any
stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the
purposes of education.
Trial Court correct in imposing the tax not because the second
floor is being used by the Director and his family for residential
purposes but because the first floor is being used for
commercial purposes.—Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial
court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the school building
as well as the lot where it is built, should be taxed, not because
the second floor of the same is being used by the Director and
his family for residential purposes, but because the first floor
thereof is being used for commercial purposes. However, since
only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair
that half of the assessed tax be returned to the school involved.
WENCESLAO PASCUAL VS SECRETARY OF PUBLIC
WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS

110 Phil. 331 – Political Law – Appropriation For Private Use
Not Allowed
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law
appropriated P85,000.00 “for the construction, reconstruction,
repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road
terminals”. Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal,
assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the
appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for
the terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio
Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose
Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that passed
and approved the same RA. Pascual claimed that Zulueta
misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those
terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at
the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld.
Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications be restrained from releasing funds for such
purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an
afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.
HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation
for a private purpose. The subsequent donation of the property
to the government to make the property public does not cure
the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed
when the said property was still a private property cannot be
ignored. “In accordance with the rule that the taxing power
must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by
taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for
the advantage of private individuals.” Inasmuch as the land on
which the projected feeder roads were to be constructed
belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation
sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.
AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ [64 PHIL 201; G.R. NO. 45459; 13 MAR
1937]
Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition
against respondent Director of Posts from issuing and selling
postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International
Eucharistic Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a
violation of the Constitutional provision stating that no public
funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church,
system of religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle
of the separation of church and state, for the purpose of
avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or
vice versa, as a weapon to further their ends and aims.
Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance to
Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to
respondent for the production and issuance of postage stamps
as would be advantageous to the government.
Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to
religion.
Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious
freedom and not mere religious toleration. It is however not an
inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial
of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of
faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his
Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds
the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and
highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No. 4052 “advantageous
to the government” does not authorize violation of the
Constitution. The issuance of the stamps was not inspired by
any feeling to favor a particular church or religious
denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman
Catholic Church. The postage stamps, instead of showing a
Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of the
Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words “Seat
XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress.” The focus of the
stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila,
being the seat of that congress. This was to “to advertise the
Philippines and attract more tourists,” the officials merely took
advantage of an event considered of international importance.
Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked
with the Roman Catholic Church, any benefit and propaganda
incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the
Government.
20
Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague
G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991
FACTS: The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in
automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt service)
and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise
known as the General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5
Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to
P27,017,813,000.00.
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized
by PD No. 18, entitled “ Amending Certain Provisions of
Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty,
as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), “by PD No. 1177,
entitled “Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,”
and by PD No.1967, entitled “An Act Strengthening the
Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the
Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent
and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose.”
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the
automatic appropriation for debt service, it being higher than
the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5),
Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to “assign the
highest budgetary priority to education.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt
service is unconstitutional; it being higher than the budget for
education.
HELD: No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV
of the Constitution Congress is mandated to “assign the
highest budgetary priority to education,” it does not thereby
follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to
deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the
national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or
objectives.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its
good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can
reasonably service our enormous debt…It is not only a matter
of honor and to protect the credit standing of the country. More
especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if
in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt
service bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court
finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby
assailed as unconstitutional.
OSMEÑA vs. ORBOS
220 SCRA 703
GR No. 99886, March 31, 1993
" To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation of the power to tax,
there must be a standard which implies that the legislature
determines matter of principle and lays down fundamental
policy."
FACTS: Senator John Osmeña assails the constitutionality of
paragraph 1c of PD 1956, as amended by EO 137,
empowering the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) to approve
the increase of fuel prices or impose additional amounts on
petroleum products which proceeds shall accrue to the Oil
Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) established for the
reimbursement to ailing oil companies in the event of sudden
price increases. The petitioner avers that the collection on oil
products establishments is an undue and invalid delegation of
legislative power to tax. Further, the petitioner points out that
since a 'special fund' consists of monies collected through the
taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State,
although the use thereof is limited to the special
purpose/objective for which it was created. It thus appears that
the challenge posed by the petitioner is premised primarily on
the view that the powers granted to the ERB under P.D. 1956,
as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power of the
State.

ISSUE: Is there an undue delegation of the legislative power of
taxation?
HELD: None. It seems clear that while the funds collected may
be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in the exercise of the
police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF as a
special fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O.
137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is
placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the
fund nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of
the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply
with the constitutional description of a "special fund." With
regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the
Court finds that the provision conferring the authority upon the
ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products
provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be
exercised. In addition to the general policy of the law to protect
the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic
pump rates, P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to
impose additional amounts to augment the resources of the
Fund.
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMIC V CA
Facts: Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P. 129,
EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the Supreme
Court which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for appeal of
cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the Board of
Investments (BOI).
BOI granted petitioner First Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.'s
application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by
changing the scope of its registered product from "glazed floor
tiles" to "ceramic tiles." Oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-
Hispano Ceramics, Inc. did not move to reconsider the same
nor appeal therefrom. Soon rebuffed in its bid for
reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a petition for review with CA.
CA temporarily restrained the BOI from implementing its
decision. The TRO lapsed by its own terms twenty (20) days
after its issuance, without respondent court issuing any
preliminary injunction.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining
order contending that CA does not have jurisdiction over the
BOI case, since the same is exclusively vested with the
Supreme Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus
Investments Code of 1987.
Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980
or B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, "Prescribing the Rules
Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final Order
or Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals and Quasi-Judicial
Agencies" cannot be the basis of Mariwasa's appeal to
respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down
therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides
that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed
directly with the Supreme Court.
While Mariwasa maintains that whatever inconsistency there
may have been between B.P. 129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226
on the question of venue for appeal, has already been resolved
by Circular 1-91 of the Supreme Court, which was promulgated
on February 27, 1991 or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was
enacted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
over the case
YES. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article
82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing
the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned.
Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by statute was
previously allowed to be filed directly with the Supreme Court,
should now be brought to the Court of Appeals.
21
Diaz v. CA
G.R. No. L-109698 December 5, 1
Bellossillo, J.
Facts: On 23 January 1991, Davao Light and Power Company,
Inc. (DLPC) filed with the Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an
application for the approval of the sound value appraisal of its
property in service.
The Asian Appraisal Company valued the property and
equipment of DLPC as of 12 March 1990 at One Billion One
Hundred Forty One Million Seven Hundred Seventy Four
Thousand Pesos (P1,141,774,000.00).
On 6 December 1992, ERB approved the application of DLPC
after deducting Fourteen Million Eight Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P14,800,000.00) worth of property and equipment
which were not used by DLPC in its operation.
On 6 July 1992, petitioners filed a petition for review on
certiorari before the Supreme Court assailing the decision of
ERB on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
In our resolution of 8 September 1992, the Supreme Court
referred the case for proper disposition to the Court of Appeals
which subsequently dismissed the petition on the ground that
(1) the filing of the petition for review with the Supreme Court
was a wrong mode of appeal, and (2) the petition did not
comply with the provisions of Supreme Court Circular 1-88 in
that (a) it did not state the date when the petitioners received
notice of the ERB decision, (b) it did not state the date when
the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, and (c) it
inconsistently alleged different dates when petitioners
supposedly received the denial of their motion by ERB.
On 18 December 1992, petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration contending that our resolution of 8 September
1992 was a directive for the Court of Appeals to disregard the
above circular.
In its resolution of 24 March 1993, the Court of Appeals denied
the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Issue: whether or not E.O. No. 172 is violative of Section 30,
Article VI of the Constitution
Held: Yes. Since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was enacted without
the advice and concurrence of the Supreme Court, this
provision never became effective, with the result that it cannot
be deemed to have amended the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980. Consequently, the authority of the Court of Appeals to
decide cases from the Board of Energy, now ERB, remains.
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996
FACTS: On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227 (The
Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992), which
created the Subic Economic Zone. RA 7227 likewise created
SBMA to implement the declared national policy of converting
the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.
On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the
Subic military reservation to the Philippines government.
Immediately,petitioner commenced the implementation of its
task, particularly the preservation of the sea-ports, airport,
buildings, houses and other installations left by the American
navy.
On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan
passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993,
expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by
said Sec. 12 of RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic
Zone and submitted such to the Office of the President.
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993.

The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify
PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to join the Subic
Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided
conditions are met.
The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition by
promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993,
requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend certain
provisions of RA 7227.
Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative
under the LGC of 1991.
On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local
initiative on the ground that the subject thereof was merely a
resolution and not an ordinance.
On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No.
532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ including
therein the portion of the former naval base within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.
On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution
No. 2845and 2848, adopting a "Calendar of Activities for local
referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to
govern the conduct of the referendum.
On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari
contesting the validity of Resolution No. 2848 alleging that
public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative
that proposes an amendment of a national law.
Issue:
1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in
promulgating Resolution No. 2848 which governs the conduct
of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10
2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within
the powersof the people of Morong to enact; i.e., whether such
initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."
Ruling:
1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.
FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an
INITIATIVE but respondent Comelec made preparations for a
REFERENDUM only.
In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the
footnote below,the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27
times, but "initiative" is not mentioned at all. The Comelec
labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes
was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents
were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers,
"Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves
bore the description"referendum". To repeat, not once was the
word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No. 2848. And
yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.
As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills
and laws,and to enact or reject them at the polls independent
of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is
the right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or
measure which has been passed by a legislative body and
which in most cases would without action on the part of
electors become a law.
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises
administration and supervision of the process itself, akin to its
powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making
powers belong to the people, hence the respondent
Commission cannot control or change the substance or the
content of legislation.
2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal
resolution is still in the proposal stage and not yet an approved
law.
22
The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not
yet an approved law. Should the people reject it, then there
would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when
the people have voted for it and it has become an approved
ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be
enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely
a proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere
conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may
decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or
cases.
In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority
to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the
commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not
have the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative
since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed
upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that
matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no
reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the
pleadings. The Comelec simply included verbatim the proposal
in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no
decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court
which this Court could take cognizance of and acquire
jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Marcos vs Manglapus
G.R. No. 88211 September 15 1989
FACTS: Former President Marcos, after his and his family
spent three year exile in Hawaii, USA, sought to return to the
Philippines. The call is about to request of Marcos family to
order the respondents to issue travel order to them and to
enjoin the petition of the President's decision to bar their return
to the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted
by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses
from returning to the Philippines.
RULING: Yes. According to Section 1, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution: "The executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines." The phrase, however, does not
define what is meant by executive power although the same
article tackles on exercises of certain powers by the President
such as appointing power during recess of the
Congress (S.16), control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices (Section 17), power to grant reprieves,
commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures,
after conviction by final judgment (Section 19), treaty making
power(Section 21), borrowing power (Section 20), budgetary
power (Section 22), informing power (Section 23).
The Constitution may have grant powers to the President, it
cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers
enumerated in the Constitution. Whatever power inherent in
the government that is neither legislative nor judicial has to be
executive.
Soliven v Makasiar
G.R. No. 82585 Nov 14, 1988
Facts: Soliven broadcasted the statement that President
Aquino hid under her bed during a coup d' etat. The President
sued for libel. Soliven claimed that he can't be sued because
the President was immune from suit.
Issue: WON Beltran's rights were violated when the RTC
issued a warrant of arrest without personally examining the
complainant and the witnesses to determine probable cause.
Held: No. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable
cause to issue a warrant of arrest, the judge isn't required to
examine the complainant and the witnesses.
He shall only personally evaluate the report and
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and issue a warrant of arrest on
the basis thereof.

Also, if he finds no probable cause, he may disregard
the fiscal's report and required the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as
to the existence of probable cause.
Otherwise, judges would be burdened with
preliminary investigation instead of hearing cases.
Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Eduardo
Ermita
April 2,2009
FACTS: There was a report that handwritten copies of two
sets of 2006 Nursing Board examination were circulated
duringthe examination period among examinees reviewing at
the R.A. Gapuz Review Center and Inress Review Center.The
examinees were provided with a list of 500 questions and
answers in two of the examinations’ five subjects, particularly
Tests III (Psychiatric Nursing) and V (MedicalSurgical Nursing).
The PRC later admitted the leakageand traced it to two Board
of Nursing members. Exam results came out but Court of
Appeals restrained the PRCfrom proceeding with the
oathtaking of the successful examinees.- President GMA
ordered for a re-examination and issued EO 566 which
authorized the CHED to supervise theestablishment and
operation of all review centers and similar entities in the
Philippines. CHED Chairman Punoapproved CHED
Memorandum Order No. 49 series of 2006 (Implementing
Rules and Regulations). Review Center Association of the
Philippines (petitioner), an organization of independent review
centers, asked theCHED to "amend, if not withdraw" the IRR
arguing, among other things, that giving permits to operate a
reviewcenter to Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) or
consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will
effectivelyabolish independent review centers. CHED
Chairman Puno however believed that suspending the
implementation of the IRR would be inconsistent with the
mandate of EO 566.- A dialogue between the petitioner and
CHED took place.
ISSUES:
1. Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the
Executive of legislative power as it expands theCHED’s
jurisdiction [Yes, it expands CHED’s jurisdiction, hence
unconsititutional]; and
2. Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executive’s
rule-making power. [Yes, it is invalid.]
RULING: TheCHED’s coverage under RA 7722 is limited to
public and private institutions of higher education and degree-
granting programs in all public and private post-secondary
educational institutions.
EO 566 directed theCHED to formulate a framework
for the regulation of review centers and similar entities.The
definition of a review center under EO 566 shows that it refers
to one which offers "a program or course of study that is
intended to refresh and enhance the knowledge or
competencies and skills of reviewees obtained in theformal
school setting in preparation for the licensure examinations"
given by the PRC. It does not offer a degree granting a
program that would put it under the jurisdiction of CHED. A
review course is only intended to refresh and enhance the
knowledge and competencies. Therefore EO566 is
unconstitutional.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO
versus GRP PEACE PANEL
G.R. NO. 183591
October 14, 2008
FACTS: The case was filed by Hon. Marino Ridao and Kisin
Buxani, both residents of Cotabato City, is a petition in
intervention for the prohibition of the signing of Memorandum
of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) between the
respondent Government of the Republic of the Philippines
Peace Panel (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF). The petition of the Province of Cotabato also seeks the
23
following which is to declare the MOA-AD as null and void, or
in the alternative, and to exclude all the mthirty-seven (37)
barangays of Cotabato City from the coverage of the
Bangsamoro-Juridical Entity (BJE) territory.
On September 2, 1996 the GRP and MNLF entered
into and signed a total and final peace agreement
implementing the 1976 Tripoli Agreement between the GRP
and the MNLF. However, the MILF also wanted a separate
peace. As a result, Pres. Arroyo issued a different guideline for
the GRP to promulgate a peace talk with the MILF.
On August 5, 2008 the various peace talks between
the GRP and MILF lead to the drafting of the subject of the
MOA-AD which is intended to be signed in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia. News report began to appear on the contents of the
MOA-AD and the scheduled date of its signing. A day before
the scheduled signing, the government issued a Temporrary
Restraining Order commanding and directing the respondents
and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the
MOA-AD.
ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP Peace Panel, committed a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it negotiated and initialed the MOA-AD.
HELD: Section 1, Article VII of the Philippine Constitution
provides: "The executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines.”
This case calls for the exercise of the President's
powers as protector of the peace. The power of the President
to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to
leading the State against external and internal threats to its
existence. The President is also tasked with extraordinary
powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with
attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and
order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no
foreign foe appears on the horizon. Undoubtedly, then, the
President has power to negotiate peace with the MILF, and to
determine in what form and manner the peace process should
be conducted.
Since the President already issued an order that the
GRP Peace Panel has been disbanded and that the said MOA-
AD will not be signed in its present form, or any other form,
before the Honorable Court render its decision. Wherefore, the
court could no longer provide reliefs for the said controversies
are no longer there. The petition was denied the said MOA-AD
and the Peace Panel is non-existent.
LOUIS “BAROK” C.BIRAOGO
versus THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
G.R NO. 192935
x-----------------------------------X
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN et. al.
versus EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA
G.R. NO. 193036
December 7, 2010
FACTS: The two cases presented a domino effect for both of it
assails the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order No.
1, (Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010). Prior to
May 2010 elections, Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III used
a slogan “kung walang corrupt, waalang mahirap” as a
representation of his stand against corruption. On July 30,
2010 he signed EO No. 1 establishing the Philippine truth
Commission of 2010 which is tasked to investigate reported
cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the
previous administration.
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil
action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis Biraogo in
his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo assails
Executive Order No. 1 as being violative of the legislative
power of Congress under Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the
legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds
therefore.
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C.
Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and
Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent
members of the House of Representatives.

To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the
powers of an investigative body. It is not, however, a quasi-
judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle,
or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it
can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena
powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much
less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or
administrative penalties or sanctions. A month after the
issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the
Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Order No.1 is
constitutional.
HELD: Article VII Sec 1 states that, the executive power shall
be vested in the President of the Philippines. However, it is not
among his power to create a public office such as the
Philippine Truth Commission and appropriate funds thereof. In
addition, the said EO no.1 also violates the equal protection
clause as its power to investigate is only limited to the graft and
corrupt practices of the previous administration of President
Arroyo. Wherefore, the petition are granted and EO no.1 is
hereby declared unconstitutional.
DENIS A.B. FUNA versus
ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
ALBERTO C. AGRA
G.R. NO. 191644
February 19, 2013
FACTS: On March 1, 2010, President Gloria M. Macapagal-
Arroyo appointed Agra as the Acting Secretary of Justice
following the resignation of Secretary Agnes VST Devanadera
in order to compete for a congressional seat in Quezon
Province; that on March 5, 2010, President Arroyo designated
Agra as the Acting Solicitor General inn a concurrent capacity.
On April 7, 2010 the petitioner Denis Funa, challenge the
constitutionality of Aggra’s concurrent appointments or
designations, claiming it to be prohibited under Section 13,
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. That, Acting Secretaries
being members of the Cabinet are not exempt from the
Constitutional ban.
On the other hand, the respondent argues that the
appointments being hereby challenged were in acting or
temporary capacities and that in order for the appointment to
be covered by the constitutional prohibition, it must be regular
and permanent, instead of a mere designation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of Agra as Acting
Secretary of Justice, concurrently with his position as Acting
Solicitor General, violate the constitutional prohibition against
dual or multiple offices for the members of the Cabinet and
their deputies and assistants.
HELD: Section 13 of Article VII states that, “The President,
Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies
or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their
tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly,
practice any other profession, participate in any business, or
be financially interested in any contract with, or in any
franchise, or special privilege granted by the Government or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the
conduct of their office.”
Being designated as the Acting Secretary of Justice
concurrently with his position as Acting Solicitor General, Agra
was undoubtedly covered by Section 13 of Article VII. Hence,
Agra could not validly hold any other office or employment
during his tenure as the Acting Solicitor General, because the
Constitution has not otherwise so provided.
Wherefore, the designation of Agra as Acting
Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position of Acting
Solicitor General was unconstitutional and void for being in
24
violation of the constitution prohibition under Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution. The petition is meritorious.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 194
SCRA 317
G.R. No. 83815, February 22, 1991
FACTS: The two petitions in this case sought to declare
unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 issued by President
Corazon C. Aquino. The assailed law provides that:
Sec. 1. Even if allowed by law or by the ordinary
functions of his position, a member of the Cabinet,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive
officials of the Executive Department may, in addition to
his primary position, hold not more than two positions in
the government and government corporations and
receive the corresponding compensation therefor;
Provided, that this limitation shall not apply to ad hoc
bodies or committees, or to boards, councils or bodies of
which the President is the Chairman.
The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being
challenged by petitioners on the principal submission that it
adds exceptions to Section 13, Article VII other than those
provided in the Constitution.
Public respondents maintain that the phrase "unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution" in Section 13, Article VII
makes reference to Section 7, par. (2), Article IX-B insofar as
the appointive officials mentioned therein are concerned.
ISSUE: WON the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the
1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies
or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions
made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par.
(2), Article IX-B.
RULING: No. While all other appointive officials in the civil
service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the
government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or
by the primary functions of their positions, members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when
expressly authorized by the Constitution itself.
Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general
rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and
employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the
exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President,
Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Executive Order No. 284 is unconstitutional as it actually
allows a member of the cabinet, undersecretary or assistant
secretary or other appointive officials of the Executive
Department to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Section 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless
otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
DENNIS FUNA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010
FACTS: On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of
then MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista
was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the
Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC
Undersecretary.
Petitioner in his capacity as a taxpayer and a concerned
citizen filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus under Rule 65 with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction, to declare as unconstitutional the designation of
Maria Elena H. Bautista. He argues that Bautista’s concurrent
positions as DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in
violation of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation of Bautista as OIC of
MARINA, concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary
for Maritime Transport to which she had been appointed,
violated Sec. 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
RULING: The language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory
so that it must be understood as intended to be a positive and

unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding multiple
government offices or employment. Verily, wherever the
language used in the constitution is prohibitory, it is to be
understood as intended to be a positive and unequivocal
negation. The phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only
to those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to
wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the
Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2), Article VII; or acting as
President in those instances provided under Section 7, pars.
(2) and (3), Article VII; and, the Secretary of Justice being ex-
officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of
Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed
Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the stricter
prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and consequently she
cannot invoke the exception provided in Section 7, paragraph
2, Article IX-B where holding another office is allowed by law or
the primary functions of the position. Neither was she
designated OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is
the exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
designation of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-
Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry
Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her position as DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section 13, Article
VII of the 1987 Constitution and therefore, NULL and VOID.
AYTONA V. CASTILLO, 4 SCRA 1
G.R. No. L-19313, January 19, 1962
FACTS: Dominador Aytona was one of the 350 persons
appointed by outgoing president Carlos Garcia during Dec. 29,
1961, which is the last day of his term. Aytona was appointed
as the ad interim governor of the Central Bank.
When the next president, Diosdado Macapagal took his
office, he issued Order No. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and
cancelling all ad interim appointment made by President
Garcia after December 13, 1961. He then appointed Andres
Castillo as the new governor of the Central Bank to replace
Aytona.
In revoking the appointments, President Macapagal is
said to have acted for these and other reasons: (1) the
outgoing President should have refrained from filling vacancies
to give the new President opportunity to consider names in the
light of his new policies, which were approved by the electorate
in the last elections; (2) these scandalously hurried
appointments in mass do not fall within the intent and spirit of
the constitutional provision authorizing the issuance of ad
interim appointments; (3) the appointments were irregular,
immoral and unjust, because they were issued only upon the
condition that the appointee would immediately qualify
obviously to prevent a recall or revocation by the incoming
President, with the result that those deserving of promotion or
appointment who preferred to be named by the new President
declined and were by-passed; and (4) the abnormal conditions
surrounding the appointment and qualifications evinced a
desire on the part of the outgoing President merely subvert the
policies of the incoming administration.
Aytona filed a quo warranto proceeding claiming that he
is qualified to remain as the Central Bank governor and that he
was validly appointed by the former president.
ISSUE: Whether or not Aytona should remain in his position.
RULING: No. Even though he is qualified for the position, his
appointment can be revoked by the President. Garcia’s
appointments are hurried maneuvers to subvert the upcoming
administration and are set to obstruct the policies of the next
president. Of course, the Court is aware of many precedents to
the effect that once an appointment has been issued, it cannot
be reconsidered, especially where the appointee has qualified.
But none of them refer to mass ad interim appointments (three-
hundred and fifty), issued in the last hours of an outgoing Chief
Executive, in a setting similar to that outlined herein. On the
other hand, the authorities admit of exceptional circumstances
justifying revocation and if any circumstances justify
revocation, those described herein should fit the exception. As
a general rule, once a person is qualified his appointment
25
should not be revoked but in here it may be since his
appointment was grounded on bad faith, immorality and
impropriety. There are instances wherein not only strict legality,
but also fairness, justice and righteousness should be taken
into account.
IN RE: APPOINTMENTS DATED MARCH 30, 1998 OF HON.
MATEO A. VELENZUELA AND HON. PLACIDO B.
VILLARTA AS JUDGES OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF BRANCH 62, BAGO CITY AND OF BRANCH24,
CABANATUAN CITY RESPECTIVELY.
A.M. No. 98-5-01-SC. November 9, 1998
FACTS: The controversy roots from two seemingly
contradicting provisions.
Under Section 15 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, a
president may not appoint two months prior to the next
presidential election and up to the end of his term. While under
Section 4(1) and 9 of Article VIII, the President shall appoint
judges within 90 days within the occurrence of vacancy. An
inevitable controversy will erupt when a judge needs to be
nominated 90 days before another judge will retire, and the 90
day period is within the two month ban of appointments, prior
to the next presidential election. And such occurrence
happened with the case at bar.
The then President, Fidel V. Ramos appointed Hon.
Placido B. Vallarta and Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela as RTC
judges on March 30, 1998, two months before the next
presidential election. A constitutional provision under Section
15, Article VII was deemed violated.
The issue was related to a meeting in the Judicial Bar
and Council regarding the appointment of eight Court of
Appeals judges within the two month ban of appointments prior
the presidential election. During the
meeting, Senior associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, Cons
ultant of the Council, who had been member of the Committee
of the Executive Department and of the Committee on the
Judicial Department of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
expressed that on the basis of the Commission’s records, the
election ban had no application to appointments to the Court of
Appeals.
-On May 4, 1998, the Chief Justice received a letter
from the President requesting the list of nominees.
-On May 5, 1998, the Secretary of Justice asked for
the guidance of the Chief Justice. He also waited for the
meeting of the JBC for the nomination and the letter the Chief
Justice was drafting for the President.
-On May 6, 1998, the Chief Justice replied to the
President stating that no session has been scheduled. And that
the matter needed to further study to avoid constitutional
violation with regards to ban on appointments.
-On May 7, 1998, the President replied to the Chief
Justice contending that the ban on appointments under Sec.
15, Art. VII only applies to the Executive Dept.
-On May 8, 1998, a regular meeting of the JBC
together with the Chief Justice made a resolution that the issue
be suspended and be referred to the Supreme Court En Banc
for appropriate action.
-On May 12, 1998, the Chief Justice received from
Malacañang the appointments of two RTC judges mentioned
above.
The Court Resolved to file the case as an
administrative matter and cause it to be appropriately
docketed. The Court further Resolved to that no actions be
taken on the appointments of the above mentioned judges.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President can appoint
judges two months before the next presidential election and up
to the end of his term?
HELD: The appointments of the Valenzuela and
Vallarta were considered void. Both judges were served orders
to cease and desist from discharging the office of the Judge of
the Courts to which they were respectively appointed to.
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO VS. JUDICIAL AND BAR
COUNCIL AND PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL
ARROYO

G.R. NO. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The controversy arises from the constitutional
provision under Section 15, Art. VII, which prohibits the
President from making appointments two months before the
next presidential elections up to the end of his term. But under
Sec 4 (1) Art. VIII requires the appointment of Supreme Court
Justices 90 days before the occurrence of its vacancy. The
then Chief Justice Reynato Puno was set for compulsory
retirement seven days after the 2010 presidential election. In
view of this, on January 18 of the same year, the Judicial and
Bar Council in its En Banc meeting, agreed to start the process
of filling up the position of Chief Justice.
The Judicial Bar and Council then started the process
of nomination. In conformity to its existing practice, the JBC
“automatically considered” for the position of Chief Justice the
five most senior of the Associate Justices of the Court, namely:
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice Renato
C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales;
Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate
Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura. The OSG also agrees
with the decision of the JBC that the incumbent President may
appoint the next Chief Justice even within two months before
the next presidential election and up to the end of his term.
Contending that the vacancy of justices within the Supreme
Court must be filled 90days before its occurrence. Stating that
had the framers had intended the prohibition to extend up to
the Supreme Court, they could have easily expressed it under
the Judiciary or Executive department in the Constitution. The
framers already have set enough restrictions or limitations on
the President’s power to appoint Supreme Court Justices to
ensure the doctrine of separation of powers. For such purpose
was the JBC created in the first place.
The process of the nomination of the JBC was also
questioned by some intervenors. Stating that the process was
initiated prematurely, and it should have commenced after May
17, 2010 or the day of the compulsory retirement by Chief
Justice Puno.
ISSUE: Does the ban on appointments stated in Sec. 15 of Art.
VII also applies to the Supreme Court?
HELD: The Prohibition under Sec. 15, Art VII does not include
appointments within the Supreme Court. The reason behind
the provision should be construed liberally and within the
context. Knowing that the intent of the framers for the
prohibition is primarily aimed to ensure that the Executive
department is free from influence from the previous
administration. The Judicial Department has enough safety to
ensure that it is free from influence from the other two
branches of government. Had the constitutional commission
meant that the prohibition includes the appointment of the
Supreme Court justices, they would have expressed it in the
constitution.
SARMIENTO III VS. MISON
No. L-79974. December 17, 1987
FACTS: The herein petitioners for this petition for
prohibition are taxpayers, lawyers, members of the the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and professors of
Constitutional Law, seek to enjoin the respondent Salvador
Mison from performing the functions of the Office of
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs and the respondent
Guillermo Carague, as Secretary of the Department of Budget,
from effecting disbursements in payment of Mison's salaries
and emoluments, on the ground that Mison's appointment as
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs is unconstitutional by
reason of its not having been confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain
the constitutionality of respondent Mison's appointment without
the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.
Due to public interest, and the need for stability in the
public service, the Court decided to give the case due course.
Setting aside procedural questions as to whether the
prohibition is the proper remedy to test the right of the
respondent to hold the position as the Office of Commissioner
of the Bureau of Customs. The Court also allowed the
Commission on appointments to intervene and file a petition in
intervention.
26
This case has relevant significance because, it
involves a conflict between the Executive and Legislative
department. Within the grey areas of the blending of powers.
And it so happens to be filed within the primacy of the life of
the 1987 constitution. The Court is tasked to shed light upon
matter by employing the relatively clear provisions in the
Constitution.
The core of controversy was tackled mainly on the
provision on Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Which
provides for the positions within the executive department
which the President is tasked to nominate but will only be
appointed with the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments.
ISSUES: Whether or not the appointment is valid.
HELD: In the 1987 Constitution, the framers narrowed down
the appointments that need the confirmation from COA into
four groups. Namely: 1) the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or
naval captain, and other officers whose appointments are
vested in him in this Constitution; 2) all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
for by law; 3) those whom the President may be authorized by
law to appoint; and 4) officers lower in rank whose
appointments the Congress may by law vest in the President to
appoint. The position of Mison does not belong to any of the
above mentioned groups. The “heads of bureaus” was not
included in the enumeration for a reason. Therefore it is
deemed excluded. Which mean Mison does not need the
confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Therefore it
is deemed that the President acted within her constitutional
authority when she appointed respondent as the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
The petition and petition in intervention were
dismissed without costs.
MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, petitioner,
vs.
SENATOR JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON
APPOINTMENTS COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, JUDICIAL
AND BAR COUNCIL AND HUMAN RIGHTS AND HESIQUIO
R. MALLILLIN, respondents
G.R. No. 86439 April 13, 1989
FACTS: The President of the Philippines designated herein
petitioner Mary Concepcion Bautista as "Acting Chairman,
Commission on Human Rights. Immediately, after taking her
oath of office as Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights, petitioner Bautista discharged the functions and duties
of the Office of Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights
which, as previously stated, she had originally held merely in
an acting capacity beginning 27 August 1987.
On 9 January 1989, petitioner Bautista received a
letter from the Secretary of the Commission on Appointments
requesting her to submit to the Commission certain information
and documents as required by its rules in connection with the
confirmation of her appointment as Chairman of the
Commission on Human Rights. Bautista wrote to the Chairman
of the Commission on Appointments stating that the
Commission on Appointments has no jurisdiction to review her
appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights.
The Constitution, in Article VII Section 16 which expressly
vested on the President the appointing power, has expressly
mentioned the government officials whose appointments are
subject to the confirmation of the Commission on
Appointments of Congress. The Commissioners of the
Commission on Human Rights are not included among those.
ISSUE: Whether the appointment of the petitioner is
considered as ad interim; Commission on Appointments has
jurisdiction to review petitioner’s appointment as Chairman of
the Commission on Human Rights
HELD: Ad interim appointments, by their very nature under the
1987 Constitution, extend only to appointments where the
review of the Commission on Appointments is needed. That is
why ad interim appointments are to remain valid until

disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of Congress; but appointments that are for
the President solely to make, that is, without the participation of
the Commission on Appointments, cannot be ad
interim appointments. As provided for by the Executive Order
No. 163 the Chairman and Members of the Commission on
Human Rights shall be appointed by the President. Their
tenure in office shall be at the pleasure of the President. To
hold, as the Court holds, that petitioner Bautista is the lawful
incumbent of the office of Chairman of the Commission on
Human Rights by virtue of her appointment, as such, by the
President on 17 December 1988, and her acceptance thereof,
is not to say that she cannot be removed from office before the
expiration of her seven (7) year term. She certainly can be
removed but her removal must be for cause and with her right
to due process properly safeguarded.
Petitioner Bautista is declared to be, as she is, the duly
appointed Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights and
the lawful incumbent thereof, entitled to all the benefits,
privileges and emoluments of said office. Her appointment
does not need conformity from the Commission on
Appointment hence; it has no jurisdiction to review petitioner’s
appointment as Chairman of the Commission on Human
Rights
Flores v Drilon
223 SCRA 568
FACTS: The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A.
7227, 1 otherwise known as the "Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor
Richard J. Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman
and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA), is challenged in this original petition with
prayer for prohibition, preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order "to prevent useless and unnecessary
expenditures of public funds by way of salaries and other
operational expenses attached to the office.
(d) Chairman administrator — The President shall appoint a
professional manager as administrator of the Subic Authority
with a compensation to be determined by the Board subject to
the approval of the Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex
oficio chairman of the Board and who shall serve as the chief
executive officer of the Subic Authority: Provided, however,
That for the first year of its operations from the effectivity of this
Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as
the chairman and chief executive officer of the Subic Authority
Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the constitutional
provision of Sec 7, first par., Art. 9 paragraph 2;Sec. 16, Art. 7,
of the Constitution, which provides that "The President shall . .
. . appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint", since it was
Congress through the questioned proviso and not the
President who appointed the Mayor to the subject posts; and,
Sec. 261, par.
ISSUE: Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates
the constitutional prescription against appointment or
designation of elective officials to other government posts.
RULING: The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a
public officer to hold multiple functions since they are accorded
with a public office that is a full time job to let them function
without the distraction of other governmental duties.
The Congress gives the President the appointing
authority which it cannot limit by providing the condition that in
the first year of the operation the Mayor of Olongapo City shall
assume the Chairmanship. The court points out that the
appointing authority the congress gives to the President is no
power at all as it curtails the right of the President to exercise
discretion of whom to appoint by limiting his choice.
Luego vs CSC
143 SCRA 327
FACTS: Petitioner was appointed Admin Officer II, Office of the
City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Solon. The appointment was
27
described as “permanent” but the CSC approved it as
“temporary,” subject to the final action taken in the protest filed
by the private respondent and another employee.
Subsequently, the CSC found the private respondent
better qualified than the petitioner for the contested position
and, accordingly directed that the latter be appointed to said
position in place of the petitioner whose appointment is
revoked. Hence, the private respondent was so appointed to
the position by Mayor Duterte, the new mayor.
The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent
appointment, questions the order and the validity of the
respondent’s appointment.
ISSUE: WON the CSC is authorized to disapprove a
permanent appointment on the ground that another person is
better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this
finding, order his replacement.
HELD: No. The appointment of the petitioner was not
temporary but permanent and was therefore protected by
Constitution. The appointing authority indicated that it was
permanent, as he had the right to do so, and it was not for the
respondent CSC to reverse him and call it temporary.
The CSC is not empowered to determine the kind or
nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer,
its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the
appointment in the light of the requirements of the CSC Law.
When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but
to attest to the appointment in accordance with the CSC Laws.
CSC is without authority to revoke an appointment
because of its belief that another person was better qualified,
which is an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the
city mayor.
POBRE V. MENDIETA
224 SCRA 738
FACTS: These consolidated petitions under Rules 45 and 65
of the Rules of Court were filed by Hermogenes Pobre to set
aside the decision dated August 5, 1992 and writ of prohibitory
injunction dated August 19, 1992 issued by Judge (now Court
of Appeals Justice) Corona Ibay-Somera, in Civil Case No. 92-
60272 entitled, "Mariano A. Mendieta, petitioner vs.
Hermogenes P. Pobre, respondent," annulling the appointment
extended by President Corazon C. Aquino to the petitioner,
Hermogenes Pobre, as Commissioner/Chairman of the
Professional Regulation Commission (hereafter PRC for
brevity) and enjoining him from discharging the duties and
functions of that office.
The controversy began on January 2, 1992, when the term of
office of Honorable Julio B. Francia as PRC
Commissioner/Chairman expired. At that time, Mariano A.
Mendieta was the senior Associate Commissioner and
Hermogenes P. Pobre was the second Associate
Commissioner of the PRC.
On January 6, 1992, Executive Secretary Franklin M. Drilon
sought the opinion of Acting Secretary of Justice Silvestre H.
Bello, III on whether the President's power to appoint the
Commissioner of the Professional Regulation Commission is
restricted by Section 2 of P.D. No. 223, as amended, which
provides:
Sec. 2. Composition. — The Commission shall be headed by
one fulltime Commissioner and two fulltime Associate
Commissioners, all to be appointed by the President for a term
of nine (9) years without reappointment to start from the time
they assume the office, except the first two Associate
Commissioners who shall be appointed, one for six (6) years
and the other for three (3) years, and thereafter, any vacancy
in the Commission shall be filled for the unexpired term
only with the most senior of the Associate Commissioner
succeeding the Commissioner at the expiration of his term,
resignation or removal. No person shall be appointed chairman
or member of the Commission unless he is at lease forty (40)
years of age, familiar with the principles and methods of

professional regulation and/or licensing and has at lease five
(5) years of executive or managerial experience.
ISSUE: Whether or not said provision of the P.D No. 223
violates the constitutional prescription against appointment of
elective officials to government posts.
RULING: The petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The
questioned decision dated August 5, 1992 and the writ of
prohibitory injunction dated August 19, 1992 issued by
respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 92-60272 are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The appointment of petitioner
Hermogenes P. Pobre as Commissioner/Chairman of the
Professional Regulation Commission is declared lawful and in
order. No costs.
ARTURO DE CASTRO VS JBC AND GLORIA MACAPAGAL
ARROYO,
G.R. NO. 191002, MARCH 7, 2010
FACTS: These cases trace their genesis to the controversy
that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory retirement of
Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or seven days after the
presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to Section
9, Article VIII, that “vacancy shall be filled within ninety days
from the occurrence thereof” from a “list of at least three
nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council for every
vacancy. Also considering that Section 15, Article VII
(Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the
President or Acting President from making appointments within
two months immediately before the next presidential elections
and up to the end of his term, except temporary appointments
to executive positions when continued vacancies therein will
prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may
appoint the next Chief Justice, because the prohibition under
Section 15, Article VII of the Constitution does not apply to
appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues that any
vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days
from its occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the
Constitution. The framers also incorporated in Article VIII
ample restrictions or limitations on the President’s power to
appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure its
independence from “political vicissitudes” and its “insulation
from political pressures,” such as stringent qualifications for the
positions, the establishment of the JBC, the specified period
within which the President shall appoint a Supreme Court
Justice.
ISSUE: Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint
the successor of Chief Justice Puno upon his retirement.
HELD: Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply
to appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to
other appointments to the Judiciary.
Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written
the prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being
equally applicable to the appointment of Members of the
Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1),
Article VIII. That such specification was not done only reveals
that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next
presidential elections and up to the end of the President’s or
Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the
Supreme Court.
DRILON vs. LIM
G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994
FACTS: Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government
Code, the Secretary of Justice had, on appeal to him of four oil
companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794,
otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void
for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the
enactment of tax ordinances and for containing certain
provisions contrary to law and public policy. In a petition for
28
certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the RTC declared Section
187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional
because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power
of control over local governments in violation of the policy of
local autonomy mandated in the Constitution and of the
specific provision therein conferring on the President of the
Philippines only the power of supervision over local
governments. In this case, Judge Rodolfo C. Palattao declared
Section 187 unconstitutional insofar as it empowered the
Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances. He cited the
familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first
being "the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside
what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his
duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the
latter," while the second is "the power of a superior officer to
see to it that lower officers perform their functions in
accordance with law.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government
Code is constitutional. Whether or not the Secretary of Justice
can exercise control over the Local Government.
HELD: Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to
review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance
and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these
grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax
ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own
judgment for the judgment of the local government that
enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila
Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version of
what the Code should be. What he found only was that it was
illegal. All he did in reviewing the said measure was determine
if the petitioners were performing their functions in accordance
with law, that is, with the prescribed procedure for the
enactment of tax ordinances and the grant of powers to the city
government under the Local Government Code. As the court
sees it, that was an act not of control but of mere supervision.
Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code only on
two grounds, to wit, the inclusion therein of certain ultra vires
provisions and non-compliance with the prescribed procedure
in its enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not the
wisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure.
As regards the issue of non-compliance with the
prescribed procedure in the enactment of the Manila Revenue
Code, the Court has carefully examined every one of the
exhibits and agree with the trial court that the procedural
requirements have indeed been observed. Notices of the
public hearings were sent to interested parties. The minutes of
the hearings are found in the exhibits and such show that the
proposed ordinances were published.
JOSE D. VILLENA vs. THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
G.R. NO L-46570, April 21, 1939
FACTS:This is an original action of prohibition with prayer for
preliminary injunction against the Secretary of the Interior to
restrain him and his agents from proceeding with the
investigation of the herein petitioner, Jose D. Villena, mayor of
Makati, Rizal, which was scheduled to take place on March 28,
1939, until this case is finally determined by this court. The
respondent was required to answer, but the petition for
preliminary injunction was denied.
Villena was the then mayor of Makati. After
investigation, the Secretary of Interior recommended the
suspension of Villena with the Office of the president who
approved the same. The Secretary then suspended Villena.
Villena averred claiming that the Secretary has no jurisdiction
over the matter. The power or jurisdiction is lodged in the local
government [the governor] pursuant to sec 2188 of the
Administrative Code. Further, even if the respondent Secretary
of the Interior has power of supervision over local
governments, that power, according to the constitution, must
be exercised in accordance with the provisions of law and the
provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective
municipal officials are those contained in sec 2188 of the
Administrative Code as amended. In other words, the
Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over
local governments, if he has that power under existing law, in
accordance with sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, as
amended, as the latter provisions govern the procedure to be

followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials
while sec 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the genera law
which must yield to the special law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend a
Local Government Unit official under investigation
HELD: There is no clear and express grant of power to the
secretary to suspend a mayor of a municipality who is under
investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the
provincial governor by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code.
The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly
granted by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code to the
provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily
exclusive and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from
exercising a similar power. For instance, counsel for the
petitioner admitted in the oral argument that the President of
the Philippines may himself suspend the petitioner from office
in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as
amended, Administrative Code) to be exercised conformably to
law. Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed by
law, remove a municipal official; it would be a legal incongruity
if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And
the incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of the
power both to suspend and to remove a provincial official (sec.
2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without
the power to suspend a municipal official. The power to
suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. Preventive
suspension may be issued to give way for an impartial
investigation.
LACSON-MAGALLANES CO., INC.,
v.
JOSE PAÑO
G.R. No. L-27811 November 17, 1967
FACTS: Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual
occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land situated in
Tamlangon, Municipality of Bansalan, Province of Davao in
1932. In 1953, he ceded his rights and interests to a portion of
the said public land to the plaintiff. In 1954, the portion
Magallanes ceded to the plaintiff was officially released from
the forest zone as pasture land and was declared as
agricultural land.
In 1955, Paño and the nineteen others, applied for the
purchase of ninety (90) hectares of the area. In turn, the
plaintiff filed its own sales application covering the entire
released area. In 1956, the Director of Lands, following an
investigation of the conflict, rendered a decision giving due
course to the application of plaintiff corporation and it was
affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
in 1957.
The case was then elevated to the President of the
Philippines and in 1958, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo,by the
authority of the President, decided the controversy and
declared that "it would be for the public interest that appellants,
who are mostly landless farmers who depend on the land for
their existence, be allocated that portion on which they have
made improvements".
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Secretary, acting by
authority of the President, may reverse the decision made by
the Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
RULING: YES. Article VII of the Constitution, begins with the
principle that the executive power shall be vested in a
President of the Philippines. Moreover, the President has the
duty to execute the law and have the control of all executive
departments. Hence, based on the Constitution, the President
may delegate his powers to his Executive Secretary. The said
act of the Executive Secretary is presumptively the act of the
President and the said decision is given full credit unless
disapproved by the Presiden
24. CITY OF ILIGAN
v.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS
G.R. No. L-30852 February 26, 1988
29
FACTS: In 1952, the President issued Proclamation No. 335
withdrawing certain parcels of public land in Iligan City from
sale or settlement and reserving such for the use of National
Power Corporation (NPC). NPC then constructed a fertilizer
plant known as Maria Cristina Fertilizer Plant under the same
proclamation. In 1960, NPC sold the fertilizer plant to Marcelo
Tire and Rubber Corporation with all the machineries,
equipment, buildings, quarters, structures, etc. including the
right of occupancy and use of the land. Moreover, the NPC
covenanted to collaborate with the Department of Agriculture
and Natural Resources (DANR) in facilitating the outright sale
and/or right to lease for at least 25 years, renewable for
another 25 year, the lands where the plant is located.
Proclamation No. 20 and Proclamation 198 were issued. The
first, excluding from the operation of Proclamation No. 335,
certain areas occupied by the Plant and the Employees
Housing Compound declaring the same open to disposition
under the provisions of Public Land Act. The second, changing
the technical description of said excluded areas (six lots). In
1964, the Marcelo Steel Corporation and/or the Maria Cristina
Fertilizer Plant filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application in the
Bureau of Lands. Marcelo Tire and Maria Cristina Plant are
sister corporations and the purchaser was Marcelo Tire
(another sister corporation) while the Marcelo Steel operated
and managed the plant.
In the notice of sale of public lands issued in Manila,
the Director of lands advised the public that the Bureau of
Lands of Iligan City will sell the lands of Marcelo Steel in an
auction. The President then issued Proclamation 469 excluding
from the reservation made in favor to NPC certain lands in
Iligan (Lot 1, 1-a, 3, and 4) and donating the said lands in favor
of Iligan City. The Mayor of Iligan City then wrote to the
Director of Lands informing him that the City is the owner of the
said lands and foreshores in auction. No action was taken on
the said request hence the City filed a complaint for injunction
in the Court of First Instance (CFI) against the Director of
Lands and was temporarily issued. While the case was
pending, President Marcos issued Proclamation 94, excluding
from the donation in Proclamation 469 certain lands (Lot 1-a,
2-a, and 3) and declaring the same for open disposition. CFI
then dismissed the complaint of the City and dissolved the
injunction, hence this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the President of the Philippines has the
authority to grant a portion of public domain to the City of
Iligan.
RULING: YES. Under Section 60 of Public Land Act provides
that portions of land can be disposed of by grant, donation or
transfer made to a province, municipality, branch, or
subdivision of government for purposes conducive to public
interest. Even though the Secretary of Agriculture and National
Resources through Director of Lands, the President has the
capacity to control or direct the acts of the Director/Secretary.
Under Article VII, Sec. 17, the President shall control all
executive departments, bureaus, and offices. Therefore, the
President has the same authority to dispose of the portions of
public domain. From this, the questioned Proclamation 469 is
valid and binding and the Proclamation 94 is null and void. The
decision of CFI is Reversed.
GASCON
v.
ARROYO
G.R. No. 78389 October 16, 1989
FACTS: The Lopez family is the owner of two (2) television
stations, namely: Channels 2 and 4 which they have operated
through the ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation.
On September 21, 1972, when martial law was
declared, TV Channel 4 was closed by the military and its
facilities were taken over by the Kanlaon Broadcasting System
(KBS) which operated it as a commercial TV station. Then, the
said TV station and its facilities were taken over by the
National Media Production Center (NMPC), which operated it
as the Maharlika Broadcasting System TV 4 (MBS-4) in 1978.
After EDSA revolution (February 1986), the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)

sequestered the aforementioned TV Stations, thus the Office of
Media Affairs took over the operation of TV Channel 4.
On April 17, 1986, the Lopez family requested
President Aquino to order the return to them TV Stations 2 and
4. On October 18, 1986, PCGG approved the return of TV
Station Channel 2 to the family.
Lopez family then requested for the return of TV
Station Channel 4 and upon the request, respondent Executive
Secretary, by authority of the President, entered into with the
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, represented by its
President, Eugenio Lopez, Jr., an "Agreement to Arbitrate".
Arbitration Committee was then created.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Secretary had the power
and authority to enter into the “Agreement to Arbitrate” with
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation.
RULING: YES. The President exercised both legislative and
executive powers of the government wherein the administrative
functions of the President is performed by and through the
executive departments. The Executive Secretary entered into
the “Agreement to Arbitrate” acted in behalf of the President of
the Philippines. Hence, the agreement is valid and binding.
KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA
MAGTITINDA NG BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG
MUNTINLUPA, INC. (KBMBPM)
vs
IGNACIO R. BUNYE et al
GR NO. 85439
FACTS: On September 2, 1985, The Municipal government of
Muntinlupa thru its Mayor Santiago Carlos Jr., entered into
contract with the KBMBPM for the latter’s management and
operation of the new public market for 25 years and renewable
of the same years unless sooner terminated and/or rescinded
by mutual agreement of the parties KBMBPM is a service
cooperative organized by and composed of vendors occupying
the New Muntinlupa Public Market.
Bunye claiming that the 50 year term agreement is
contrary to BP Blg. 337 Section 143 and therefore to be
cancelled/ rescind. The Municipal Council then issued
Resolution No. 45 abrogating the contract. Bunye with Capital
Command of the Philippine Constabulary, proceeded to the
public market and announced to the general public of the
taking over and where they then thru force, violence, and
intimidation forcibly broke the petitioners building purportedly to
serve the Order of respondent Secretary of the taking over and
assuming the management of the KBMBPM.
KBMBPM then filed in the RTC for breach of contract on
the ground of illegal take- over, that the respondent Secretary
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Order
that said order is violative to the by-laws of the KBMBPM and
should be declared null and void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Order of Respondent Secretary of
Agriculture is valid.
Whether or not there is failure of exhausting
administrative remedies.
RULING: The Order issued by the Department is in the
exercise of its regulatory and supervisory powers. As to failure
to exhaust administrative remedies, the requirement does not
apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts, as an alter ego of the President unless disapproved by
him except when the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary
or oppressive. Respondent Secretary arrogated unto himself
the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized
to vote to remove the petitioning directors and officers. He
cannot take refuge under P.D No. 175 Section 8 which grants
him authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives; this
does not give him the right.
Administrative supervision is limited to the authority of the
department or its equivalent. Neither suspension nor
cancellation includes the take- over and ouster of incumbent
directors and officers, otherwise the law itself would have
expressly so stated.
30
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs
HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA
GR NO. 141284
FACTS: In view of alarming increase of violent crimes in Metro
Manila President Estrada in verbal directive, ordered PNP and
the Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols for the purpose of
crime prevention and suppression. In compliance therewith,
PNP Chief formulated Letter of Instruction which detailed the
manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force
Tulungan would be conducted. The President confirmed the
deployment in his Memorandum desired to improve the peace
and order through more effective crime prevention including
increased patrol and that the service of the Marines in the anti-
crime campaign are merly temporary.
The IBP filed instant petition to annul LOI and to declare
the deployment of the Ph Marines, null and void and
unconstitutional arguing that it is violative of the Constitution
that: a) no emergency situation would justify such deployment,
b) that it constitute an insidious incursion by the military in a
civilian function of government, c) that in militarizing the law
enforcement the administration is unwittingly making the
military more powerful
ISSUE: Whether or not the calling of the armed forces to assist
the PNP in joint visibility violates the constitutional provisions
on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian
character of PNP
RULING: When the President calls the armed forces to
prevent lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily
exercises a discretionary power solely vested in him. The
Court cannot be called upon to overrule the Presidents wisdom
or substitutes its own. The Constitution bestow on the
President full discretionary power to call out the armed forces
and to determine the necessity for the exercise of such power.
Art VII Sec 18 of the Constitution, which embodies the powers
of the President as Commander-in-Chief.
In the exercise of the power to call on- the- spot decisions
may be imperatively necessary in emergency situations to
avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of
property. It must be done swiftly and decisively. The
deployment of the Marines does not violate the civilian
supremacy clause nor does it infringe the civilian character of
the police force. It onstitute permissible use of military assets
for civilian law enforcement.
Wherefore, petition is hereby dismissed.
OLEGUER ET AL.
vs
MILITARY COMMISSION
G.R. NO. L-54558
FACTS: Herein petitioners were arrested by military authorities
charged for subversion. Respondent Chief of Staff created the
respondent Military Commission to try criminal case filed
against the petitioners.
Petitioners then filed an instant prohibition and habeas
corpus sought to enjoin respondent from proceeding with the
trial, that military commissions have no jurisdiction to try
civilians for offenses alleged to have been committed during
the period of martial law, that proceeding under such
commission is violative of constitutional right of due process of
law.
Supervening event occurred when Marcos issued
Proclamation No. 2045 officially lifting martial law in Ph. Same
Proclamation revoked General Order No. 8 (creating military
tribunals) and directed that military tribunals created pursuant
thereto are hereby dissolved
ISSUE: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to
try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning
RULING: The Court ordered the transfer of the criminal
proceedings to the civil courts after noting that with martial law
having been lifted, all cases pending before military tribunals
should, as a general rule, be transferred to the civilian courts.

That the crime alleged to have been committed did not have
any political complexion.
Military Commissions or Tribunals have no jurisdiction to
try civilians for alleged offenses when the civil courts are open
and functioning. Due process of law demands that in all
criminal prosecutions accused shall be entitled, due process
clause of the Constitution. Military Commissions or Tribunals
are however not courts in Ph judicial system.
Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive
Department of the Government and are simply
instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the
legislature for the President as Commander-in-Chief to aid him
in properly commanding the army and navy and enforcing
discipline therein, and utilize under his order or those of his
authorized military representation. The power and duty of
interpreting the laws as when an individual should be
considered to have violated the law is primarily a function of
the judiciary.
Wherefore, Military Commission No. 34 is hereby
declared unconstitutional.
SANLAKAS VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 159085. February 3, 2004
Facts: In the middle of the night of 27 July 2003, the 300
enlisted men and officers of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines marched up armed with heavy weapons and
explosives to the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City
to demand the resignation of the President, Secretary of
Defence and Chief of the PNP. The said incident brought up
the issuance of Proclamation 427 dated 27 July 2003 that
declared the state of rebellion and General Order No 4 of the
same date, the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the
Philippine National Police were directed to suppress and quell
the rebellion pursuant to Section 18 Article VII of the
Constitution. Negotiations took place and the officers went
back to their barracks in the evening of the same day. Both the
Proclamation and General Orders were lifted, and
Proclamation No.435, declaring the termination of the State of
rebellion was issued stating that the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Police have effectively
suppressed and quelled the rebellion. Petitioners contend that
Section 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the
declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that
there is no factual basis for such proclamation. They
contended that the Presidential issuances cannot be construed
as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not
delegated any such power to the President. Solicitor General
argues that the petitions have been rendered moot and
academic by the lifting of the declaration.
Issue: Whether or not Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No.4 are constitutional?
Held: Yes. The court rendered that both Proclamation No. 427
and General Order No.4 are constitutional. Article VII Section
18 does not expressly prohibit declaring state of rebellion. The
President, as it was stated in the Constitution, is the
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and it is not disputed that the President has full discretionary
powers to call out the armed forces and to determine the
necessity for the exercise of such power. The argument that
the declaration of a state of rebellion amounts to a declaration
of martial law and, therefore, is a circumvention of the report
requirement, is a leap of logic. There is no indication that
military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military
authorities have taken over the functions of civil government.
There is no allegation of curtailment of civil or political rights.
There is no indication that the President has exercised judicial
and legislative powers. In short, there is no illustration that the
President has attempted to exercise or has exercised martial
law powers. The mere announcement of a state of rebellion
cannot obliterate or violate constitutionally protected rights.
Indeed, if a state of martial law does not suspend the operation
of the Constitution or automatically suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, then it is with more reason that a simple
declaration of a state of rebellion could not bring about these
conditions. The petitions dismissed. The State of Rebellion has
ceased to exist and rendered the case moot and academic.
31
Gudani et. al. vs Lt. Gen. Senga et. al.
GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006
Facts: Petitioner Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan was invited
by the Senate to clarify the allegations of 2004 election fraud
and the “Hello Garci” tapes appearance. In regards to this
matter, President Gloria macapagal Arroyo issued Executive
Order 464 prohibiting anybody from the executive department
as well as from the military establishment from appearing in
any legislative inquiry without her consent. A memorandum
was issued by then AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga prohibiting
petitioner Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan from appearing
before the Senate Committee without the President’s approval
or consent. However, the two appeared before the Senate
inspite of the order released not to appear on any Senate
inquiry.
The petitioner and the other one who testified in the
Senate inquiry were relieved of their respective positions for
allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured
principle of the military which is the “Chain of Command”. Gen.
Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court
Martial proceedings for wilfully violating the order of a senior
officer.
Issue: Whether or not the President has the authority to issue
an order to the members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP) preventing them from testifying before a
legislative inquiry.
Held: Yes. The Supreme Court agreed that the President has
the authority to do so. By virtue of her power as the
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP vested by the Constitution,
any military officer shall be subjected to liabilities under the
military law if ever the defy or committed acts against the order
of the Commander-in-Chief. Although this privilege does not
leave the Congress with no remedies as to compel the military
officers to appear before the Senate inquiry even without the
consent of the President. If the President refuse to do so, the
President may be compelled by the judicial order to compel the
attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the
force of the law of the land which the President which the
President has the duty to faithfully execute.
The refusal of the President to allow members of the
military to appear before the Congress is still subject to judicial
relief. The Constitution stated and recognized the function of
the Legislative Department to conduct Senate inquiry in aid of
legislation. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition,
since the petitioners testified anyway despite the president’s
refusal to give her consent for them to appear and testify
before the Senate inquiry.
David et. al. vs Arroyo et. al.
G.R. No. 171396 May 3, 200
Facts: On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the
20th Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President
Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency, on the same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5
implementing PP 1017 due to the escape of some Magdalo
members and the discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to
assassinate the president. Pursuant to the effect of the
proclamation, the President cancelled all permits regarding the
rallies and organizational meetings. However, the alleged head
of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) Randolf David organized a rally
which lead to his arrest.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that
the state of national emergency ceased to exist. David and
some Congressman in the side of opposition contended that
the issuance of Presidential Proclamation 1017 is
unconstitutional due to lack of factual basis and such power
cannot be validly proclaimed because such power is reposed
in Congress. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth
because it encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights.
The Solicitor General argued that the issue has become moot
and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of
the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017
is within the president’s calling out power, take care power and
take over power.

Issue: Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O No. 5 is
constitutional.
Held: The petitions are partly granted by the Supreme Court.
PP 1017 and its implementing G.O. No. 5 are partly
constitutional and partly unconstitutional. PP1017 issued by
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was considered
constitutional as to the call of the President to suppress the
lawless violence but it was unconstitutional as to the provisions
of the PP1017 that commands the AFP to enforces law not
related to the suppression of the lawless violence as well as
the decrees promulgated the President. Article VII Section 17
of the Constitution does not prohibit the President to issue
PP1017, declaring state of emergency but it prohibits the
President to take-over any privately-owned corporations and
businesses affected with public interest without the aid of
legislation.
G.O. No.5 is constitutional since it provides a
standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP
1017, is necessary and appropriate actions and measures
to suppress and prevent acts of lawless
violence. Considering that acts of terrorism have not yet been
defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion
of G.O. No. 5 is declared unconstitutional.
JAMAR M. KULAYAN ET. AL. VS GOV. ABDUSAKUR M.
TAN, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 187298 July 3, 2012
FACTS: Three members from the International Committee of
the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of the
Provincial Capitol in Sulu. Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and
Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting a water
sanitation project for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were
seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be
members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). A Local Crisis
Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee
was then formed to investigate the kidnapping incident. The
Committee convened under the leadership of Governor Tan of
the Province of Sulu.
Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of
2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu,
which cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said
declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant to the
Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. 7160), which
bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out
emergency measures during man-made and natural disasters
and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law
enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless
violence. In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and
the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set up checkpoints and
chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including
arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety.
Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that
Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra vires, and thus null and
void, for violating Sec. 1 and 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
which grants the President sole authority to exercise
emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief
executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the
armed forces.
ISSUE: Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out
powers of a President.
HELD: It has already been established that there is one
repository of executive powers, and that is the President of the
Republic, which means that when Sec. 1, Art. VII of the
Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the
President and no one else. Thus, it is only the President, as
Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as
provided under Sec. 23, Art. VI, of the Constitution, as well as
what became known as the calling-out powers under Sect. 7,
Art. VII thereof. While the President is still a civilian, Art. II,
Sec. 3 of the Constitution mandates that civilian authority is, at
all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian
president the nation’s supreme military leader. The net effect of
Art. II, Sec. 3, when read with Art. VII, Sec. 18, is that recent
jurisprudence, a civilian President is the ceremonial, legal and
administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does
32
not require that the President must be possessed of military
training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the
power to direct military operations and to determine military
strategy. He may, delegate the actual command of the armed
forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his.
Governor Tan does not have the power to call upon
the armed forces at his own bidding. Governor Tan exceeded
his authority when he declared a state of emergency and
called upon the AFP, the police, and his own Civilian
Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under
the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by
another official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra
vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of and Section
465 of the Local Government Code.
WILFREDO TORRES VS HON. NEPTALI A.
GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF PARDONS AND
PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF PRISONS
G.R. No. 76872 July 23, 1987
FACTS: In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa. In
1979, he was pardoned by the president with the condition that
he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was
charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, then Chairman
of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned for the
cancellation of Torres’ pardon. Hence, the president cancelled
the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme
Court averring that the Executive Department erred in
convicting him for violating the conditions of his pardon
because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and
executory as they were still on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not conviction of a crime by final
judgment of a court is necessary before Torres can be validly
rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his
conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the balance of his
original sentence.
HELD: The SC affirmed the following:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the
terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are purely
executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of
a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such
breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to
judicial scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of
trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon
under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where the
President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a
subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor
by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique
judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned
convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his
trial and conviction for the offense for which he was
conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
In proceeding against a convict who has been
conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached
the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has
two options: (i) to proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of
the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him
under Article 159 of the RPC which imposes the penalty of
prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who
“having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of such pardon.”
Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the
petitioner under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative
Code. That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive
prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
SALVACION MONSANTO VS FULGENCIO
FACTORAN, JR. 170 SCRA 190
G.R. No. 78239 February 9, 1989

FACTS: In a decision by the Sandiganbayan convicted
Monsanto was accused of the crime of estafa thru falsification
of public documents. She was given an absolute pardon by
President Marcos which she accepted and requested that she
be restored to her former post as assistant city treasurer since
the same was still vacant and asked for the back wages for the
entire period of her suspension. Finance Ministry ruled that
petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the
necessity of a new appointment.
The Office of the President said that that acquittal, not
absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground
for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to
payment of his salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him
during the period of his suspension pendente lite. In such a
situation, the former public official must secure a
reappointment before he can reassume his former position,
and the pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence.
Petitioner argued that general rules on pardon cannot
apply to her case because of the fact that she was extended
executive clemency while her conviction was still pending
appeal in this Court. There having been no final judgment of
conviction, her employment therefore as assistant city
treasurer could not be said to have been terminated or
forfeited. The court viewed that, it is not material when the
pardon was bestowed, whether before or after conviction, for
the result would still be the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted
an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of a new
appointment.
HELD: No. Automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken
notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense
of estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and
plenary, cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing
appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor
moral risk, or who is unsuitable by reason of the pardoned
conviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public
office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised
Penal Code for estafa thru falsification of public documents.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her
disqualification from holding public employment but it cannot
go beyond that. To regain her former post as assistant city
treasurer, she must re-apply and undergo the usual procedure
required for a new appointment.
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for
the offense and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon
is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the
guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as
if he had never committed the offense. If granted before
conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities,
consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted after
conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities and
restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a
new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity. But unless
expressly grounded on the person’s innocence, it cannot bring
back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
PEOPLE VS SALLE JR
250 SCRA 581
FACTS: Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as co-principals of the
compound crime of murder and destructive arson and were
each sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On
24 March 1993, the accused filed an appeal. However, on 28
December 1993, they were released from the National Bilibid
Prison as they were granted a conditional pardon. On 6
January 1994, appeallant Francisco Salle, Jr filed an Urgent
Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Appellant Ricky Mengote, on the
other hand, left for the province without informing his counsel
and was not able to file his motion to withdraw his appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appeallants conditional pardon is
valid?
33
RULING: For a pardon to be valid, a final conviction is
necessary. Pardon has no effect until his appeal is
withdrawn and the person allows his conviction to be final. As
was mandated in the original provision of Section 14, Article IX
of the 1973 Constitution, or “conviction by final judgment,” as
presently prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. In such a case, no pardon may be extended
before a judgment of conviction becomes final.
Francisco Salle Jr' appeal is valid as he has accepted
his conviction as final when he withdrew his appeal.
Ricky Mengote, however, as he did not file for motion
to withdrew his appeal and hence has not accepted his
conviction as final is not eligible for pardon.
“WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky
Mengote y Cuntado is hereby given thirty (30) days from notice
hereof within which to secure from the latter the withdrawal of
his appeal and to submit it to this Court. The conditional pardon
granted the said appellant shall be deemed to take effect only
upon the grant of such withdrawal. In case of non-compliance
with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of Corrections
must exert every possible effort to take back into his custody
the said appellant, for which purpose he may seek the
assistance of the Philippine National Police or the National
Bureau of Investigation.”
GARCIA VS COA
226 SCRA 356
FACTS: Petitioner was a supervising lineman in the Region IV
Station of the Bureau of Telecommunications in Lucena City. A
criminal case of qualified theft was filed against him, however,
the president grated him an executive clemency. The
petitioner was later reinstated to the service on 12 March 1984
but the records do not show whether petitioner’s was to the
same position of Supervising Lineman. Petitioner thereafter
filed with respondent COA a claim for payment of back salaries
effective 1 April 1975, the date of his dismissal from the
service.
ISSUE: Whether Petitioner Garcia is entitled to the payment of
back wages after having been reinstated pursuant to the grant
of executive clemency.
HELD: Our Constitution reposes in the President the power
and the exclusive prerogative to extend executive clemency
under the following circumstances:
Except in cases of impeachment or as otherwise
provided in this Constitution, the President may grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and
forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with
the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.
In this case, petitioner was found administratively
liable for dishonesty and consequently dismissed from the
service. However, he was later acquitted by the trial court of
the charge of qualified theft based on the very same acts for
which he was dismissed. The acquittal of petitioner by the trial
court was founded not on lack of proof but on the fact that
petitioner did not commit the offense alleged of him. Aside from
finding him innocent of the charge, the trial court commended
petitioner for his concern and dedication as a public servant.
Hence, petitioner's innocence is the primary reason behind the
grant of executive clemency to him.
The executive clemency itself exculpating petitioner
from the administrative charge and thereby directing his
reinstatement, which is rendered automatic by the grant of the
pardon. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be
reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office
ipso facto upon the issuance of the clemency. Petitioner's
automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him
to back wages.
LLAMAS VS ORBOS
202 SCRA 844
FACTS: Mariano Ocampo III was the Governor of Tarlac
Province and he was suspended for 90 days when he was
found guilty of administrative charges against him. Rodolfo

Llamas was the Vice-governor and assumed the Office of the
Governor when Ocampo was suspended.
However, in less than 30 days, Ocampo returned with
an Administrative Order showing that he was pardoned and
hence he can assume office without completing the 90-day
suspension.
ISSUE: Has the President the power to grant an executive
clemency in administrative cases?
HELD: Petitioner's main argument is that the President may
grant executive clemency only in criminal cases, based on
Article VII, Section 19 of the Constitution which reads:
Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as
otherwise pro vided in this Constitution, the President may
grant reprieves, commu tations, and pardons, and remit fines
and forfeitures,after conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the members of the Congress.
The Constitution does not distinguish between which
cases executive clemency may be exercised by the President,
with the sole exclusion of impeachment cases. However, the
President can grant executive clemency in administrative
cases, it refers only to all administrative cases in the Executive
branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the
government.
EDUARDO E. KAPUNAN V. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. Nos. 14821317, March 13, 2009
Facts: Olalia and Alayay were both found dead with their
bodies riddled with bullets on 13 November 1986. The double
murders stirred considerable public anger, given Olalias high
profile as Chairman of the KMU at the time of his death.
On 12 January 1998, private respondents Feliciana C.
Olalia and Perolina G. Alayay
filed a letter complaint before the Department of Justice (DOJ)
charging petitioner Eduardo E. Kapunan, Jr. (Kapunan, Jr.),
petitioner Oscar E. Legaspi (Legaspi), and other officers and
men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP) for the complex crime of
kidnapping with murder of Alayay and Olalia. The affidavits of
TSgt. Medardo Barreto (Barreto) and Eduardo E. Bueno were
annexed to the complaint, which was docketed as I.S. No.
98025.
On 26 February 1998, Kapunan, Jr., filed a motion to
dismiss the charges against him before the Panel. On the
same day, Legaspi likewise filed a motion to dismiss alleging
that his criminal liability had been totally extinguished by the
amnesty granted to him under Proclamation No. 347, entitled
Granting Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other
Persons Who Have or May Have Committed Crimes Against
Public Order, Other Crimes Committed in Furtherance of
Political Ends, and Violations of the Article of War, and
Creating a National Amnesty Commission." The DOJ
Prosecutor refused to rule on the motions to dismiss and
instead treated them as their counter affidavits.
In a Resolution dated 18 March 1998, the Panel
recommended the filing of two informations each for a separate
count of murder against Kapunan, Jr., Legaspi, Ricardo Dicon,
Cirilio Almario, Filomeno Crizaldo Maligaya, Edger Sumido,
Jose Bacera, Jr., Dennis Jabatan, Freddie Sumagaysay,
Fernando Casanova, Gene Paris, Gilberto Galicia, and
Desiderio Perez. The Panel determined that Olalia and Alayay
were seized on the night of 12 November 1986 along Julia
Vargas Avenue in Pasig. Thereafter, the two were brought to a
safehouse in Cubao, then to a secluded area in Antipolo where
they were shot dead. The alleged perpetrators belonged to a
team of members of the AFP.
Issue: Whether or not the amnesty granted to Kapunan and
Legaspi under Proclamation No. 347 is valid; stated
differently,are Kapunan and Legaspi covered by Proclamation
No. 347 or No. 348?
Held: On their face, the murders of Olalia and Alayay do not
indicate they are components of rebellion. It is not self
explanatory how the murders of two private citizens could have
been oriented to the aims of rebellion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. The assailed
Joint Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 29 December
34
1999, as well as its Resolution dated 22 May 2001 are hereby
AFFIRMED. With costs against petitioners.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS V. EASTERN SEA
TRADING
G.R. No. L14279 ,October 31, 1961
FACTS:Respondent Eastern Sea Trading was the consignee
of several shipments of onion and garlic which arrived at the
Port of Manila from August 25 to September 7, 1954. Some
shipments came from Japan and others from Hong Kong. In as
much as none of the shipments had the certificate required by
Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 for the release thereof,
the goods thus imported were seized and subjected to
forfeiture proceedings for alleged violations of section 1363(f)
of the Revised Administrative Code, in relation to the
aforementioned circulars of the Central Bank. In due course,
the Collector of Customs of Manila rendered a decision on
September 4, 1956, declaring said goods forfeited to the
Government and — the goods having been, in the meantime,
released to the consignees on surety bonds, filed by the same,
as principal, and the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., as
surety, in compliance with orders of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, in Civil Cases Nos. 23942 and 23852 thereof —
directing that the amounts of said bonds be paid, by said
principal and surety, jointly and severally, to the Bureau of
Customs, within thirty (30) days from notice.
ISSUE:Whether or not the EO is subject to the concurrence of
at least 2/3 of the Senate.
HELD: No, executive Agreements are not like treaties which
are subject to the concurrence of at least 2/3 of the members
of the Senate. Agreements concluded by the President which
fall short of treaties are commonly referred to as executive
agreements and are no less common in our scheme of
government than are the more formal instruments — treaties
and conventions. They sometimes take the form of exchanges
of notes and at other times that of more formal documents
denominated ‘agreements’ or ‘protocols’. The point where
ordinary correspondence between this and other governments
ends and agreements — whether denominated executive
agreements or exchanges of notes or otherwise — begin, may
sometimes be difficult of ready ascertainment. It would be
useless to undertake to discuss here the large variety of
executive agreements as such, concluded from time to time.
Hundreds of executive agreements, other than those entered
into under the trade- agreements act, have been negotiated
with foreign governments. It would seem to be sufficient,in
order to show that the trade agreements under the act of 1934
are not anomalous in character, that they are not treaties,and
that they have abundant precedent in our history, to refer to
certain classes of agreements heretofore entered into by the
Executive without the approval of the Senate. They cover such
subjects as the inspection of vessels, navigation dues, income
tax on shipping profits, the admission of civil aircraft, customs
matters, and commercial relations generally,international
claims, postal matters, the registration of trade-marks and
copyrights, etc. Some of them were concluded not by specific
congressional authorization but in conformity with policies
declared in acts of Congress with respect to the general
subject matter, such as tariff acts; while still others, particularly
those with respect to the settlement of claims against foreign
governments, were concluded independently of any legislation.
LOURDES RUBRICO ET. AL V. GLORIA MACAPAGAL
ARROYO ET. AL
G.R. No. 183871, February 18,2010
FACTS: In this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court in relation to Section 19 of the Rule on the Writ of
Amparo (Amparo Rule), Lourdes D. Rubrico, Jean Rubrico
Apruebo, and Mary Joy Rubrico Carbonel assail and seek to
set aside the Decisionof the Court of Appeals (CA) dated July
31, 2008 in CAG.R. SP No. 00003, a petition commenced
under the Amparo Rule.The petition for the writ of amparo
dated October 25, 2007 was originally filed before this Court.
Rubrico, in her petition, said she was abducted on April 3,
2007 by armed men belonging to the 301st Air Intelligence and
Security Squadron, based at the Philippine Air Force Field

Station at Fernando Air Base in Lipa City, Batangas. During
her detention, the petitioner added, her daughters Mary Joy
Rubrico Carbonel and Jean Rubrico Apruebo were harassed
by Senior Insp. Arsenio Gomez and that there were also armed
men following them. The petitioners prayed that a writ of
amparo be issued, ordering the individual respondents to
desist from performing any threatening act against the security
of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)
to immediately file an information for kidnapping qualified with
the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party.
It also prayed for damages and for respondents to produce
documents submitted to any of them on the case of Lourdes.
The respondents then filed a joint return on the writ specifically
denying the material inculpatory averments against them.
ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT the CA committed reversible
error in dismissing their Petition and dropping President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo as party respondent.
HELD: The presidential immunity from suit remains preserved
under our system of government, albeit not expressly reserved
in the present constitution. Addressing a concern of his co-
members in the 1986 Constitutional Commission on the
absence of an express provision on the matter, Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, S.J. observed that it was already understood in
jurisprudence that the President may not be sued during his or
her tenure.
Settled is the doctrine that the President, during his
tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any
civil or criminal case, and there is no need to provide for it in
the Constitution or law. It will degrade the dignity of the high
office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged
into court litigations while serving as such.In their petition for a
writ of amparo, petitioners asked, as their main prayer, that the
Court order the impleaded respondents to immediately desist
from doing any acts that would threaten or seem to threaten
the security of the Petitioners and to desist from approaching
Petitioners, x x x their residences and offices where they are
working under pain of contempt of [this] Court. Petitioners,
however, failed to adduce the threshold substantive evidence
to establish the predicate facts to support their cause of action,
i.e., the adverted harassments and threats to their life, liberty,
or security, against responding respondents, as responsible for
the disappearance and harassments complained of.
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v. Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC), et al.
GR. No. 171101 (November 22, 2011)
Facts: Hacienda Luisita de Tarlac is a 6,443-hectare mixed
agricultural-industrial- residential expanse straddling several
municipalities of Tarlac.
On May 9, 1989, 93% of the then farmworker-
beneficiaries (FWBs) signified in a referendum their
acceptance of the proposed HLI’s Stock Distribution Option
Plan. On May 11, 1989, the Stock Distribution Option
Agreement (SDOA), styled as a Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), was entered into by Tadeco, HLI, and the 5,848
qualified FWBs. On December 22, 2005, the PARC issued the
assailed Resolution No. 2005-32-01 revoking the SDO Plan for
Hacienda Luisita Inc.
On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court en banc voted
unanimously (11-0) to dismiss/deny the petition filed by HLI
and affirm with modifications the resolutions of the PARC
revoking HLI’s Stock Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing the
subject lands in Hacienda Luisita under compulsory coverage
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of
the government.
Issues:
1. Whether or not PARC can revoke HLI’s SDP.
2. Whether or not Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is unconstitutional.
3. Whether or not the operative fact doctrine is applicable to
the case.
Ruling:
1. Yes, following the doctrine of necessary implication, it may
be stated that the conferment of express power to approve a
35
plan for stock distribution of the agricultural land of corporate
owners necessarily includes the power to recall or revoke the
approval of the plan.
2. No, the court ruled that it is not compelled to address the
constitutionality of the law because the petitioners failed to
raise the issue at the earliest opportunity and the issue of
constitutionality is not the very lis mota of the case. The court
reiterated that it would only exercise its power of judicial review
when the following essential requisites are met: (a)that there is
an actual case or controversy; (b)that the constitutional
question is raised at the earliest possible opportunity by a
proper party or one with locus standi or legal standing; (c)that
the issue of constitutionality be the very lis mota of the case.
3. Yes, what was actually revoked in the Resolution No. 2005-
32-01 was PARC’s approval of the SDP embodied in the
Resolution No. 89-12-2. This means that what was revoked is
an executive act. The operative fact doctrine is embodied in De
Agbayani v. Court of Appeals wherein it is stated that a
legislative or an executive act, prior to being declared
unconstitutional by the courts, is valid and must be complied
with. Consequently, the operative fact doctrine is not limited to
invalid or unconstitutional laws but also applies to decisions
made by the President or the administrative agencies that have
the force and effect of laws.
4.
Malaga v. Penachos Jr.
GR. No. 86695 (September 3, 1992)
Facts: The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (ISCOF) through its
Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee (PBAC)
published an invitation to bid for the construction of the Micro
Laboratory Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the
last day for the submission of pre-qualification requirements
was December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received
and opened on December 12, 1988, at 3 in the afternoon.
Petitioners Malaga and Najarro, respectively doing
business under the name of the B.E. Construction and Best
Built Construction, submitted their pre-qualification documents
at two o’clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner
Occeña submitted his own PRE-C1 on December 5, 1988.
They were not allowed to participate in the bidding because
their documents were considered late, having been submitted
after the cut-off time of ten o’clock in the morning of December
2, 1988.
On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with
the Iloilo RTC against the officers of PBAC for their refusal
without just cause to accept them resulting to their non-
inclusion in the list of bidders.On the same date, a restraining
order prohibiting PBAC from conducting the bidding and award
the project was issued. The defendants filed a motion to lift the
restraining order on the ground that the court is prohibited from
issuing such order, preliminary injunction and preliminary
mandatory injunction in government infrastructure project
under Sec. 1 of P.D. 1818. They also contended that the
preliminary injunction had become moot and academic as it
was served after the bidding had been awarded and closed.
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the
restraining order and denied the petition for preliminary
injunction. It declared that the building sought to be
constructed at the ISCOF is covered under P.D. 1818.
Issue: Whether or not ISCOF is subject to Presidential Decree
1818.
Ruling: Yes, ISCOF is a chartered institution and is covered
by P.D. 1818. However, there are irregularities surrounding the
transaction that justified the injunction issued as regards to the
bidding and the award of the project. First, PBAC set deadlines
for the filing of the PRE-C1 and the opening of bids and then
changed these deadlines without prior notice to prospective
participants. Second, PBAC was required to issue to pre-
qualified applicants the plans, specifications and proposal book
forms for the project to be bid thirty days before the date of
bidding if the estimate project cost was between P1M and
P5M. PBAC only issued these forms on Dec. 2, 1988 or 10
days before the bidding.
The irregularities committed by PBAC also defeated the
purpose of rules implementing P.D. 1594 which is to secure

competitive bidding and to prevent favoritism, collusion and
fraud in the award of these contracts to the detriment of the
public.
P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial
scrutiny irregularities committed by administrative agencies
such as the anomalies above described. Hence, the
challenged restraining order was not improperly issued by the
respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction should
not have been denied. It has been held in a long line of cases
that a contract granted without the competitive bidding required
by law is void, and the party to whom it is awarded cannot
benefit from it.
PACU v. Secretary of Education
GR. No. L-5279 (October 31, 1955)
Facts: Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities
(PACU) requests that Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No.
3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180 be declared
unconstitutional due to (a) it deprive owners of schools and
colleges as well as teachers and parents of liberty and property
without due process of law; (b) it deprive parents of their
natural rights and duty to rear their children for civic efficiency;
and (c) its provisions conferring on the Secretary of Education
unlimited power and discretion to prescribe rules and
standards constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative
power.
Section 1 of Act 2706, as amended provides that: “It
shall be the duty of the Secretary of Public Instruction to
maintain a general standard of efficiency in all private schools
and colleges of the Philippines so that the same shall furnish
adequate instruction to the public, in accordance with the class
and grade of instruction given in them, and for this purpose
said Secretary or his duly authorized representative shall have
authority to advise, inspect, and regulate said schools and
colleges in order to determine the efficiency of instruction given
in the same”.
The Solicitor General submitted a mimeographed
memorandum contending that, (a) the matter constitutes no
justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of
deciding the constitutional questions; (b) petitioners are in
estoppel to challenge the validity of the said acts; and (c) the
Acts are constitutionally valid.
Issue: Whether or not the case filed is a justiciable controversy.
Ruling: No, the issue does not constitute a justiciable
controversy. As a general rule, the constitutionality of a statute
will be passed on only if, and to the extent that, it is directly and
necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and is
essential to the protection of the rights of the parties
concerned. None of the petitioners has the cause to present
this issue, because all of them have permits to operate and
are actually operating by virtue of their permits. And they do
not assert that the respondent Secretary of Education has
threatened to revoke their permits. They have suffered no
wrong under the terms of law and, naturally need no relief in
the form they now seek to obtain.
It could be true that the Secretary has issued rules
and regulations "whimsical and capricious" and that such
discretionary power has produced arrogant inspectors who
bully heads and teachers of private schools. Nevertheless,
their remedy is to challenge those regulations specifically,
and/or to ring those inspectors to book, in proper administrative
or judicial proceedings not to invalidate the law. For it needs no
argument, to show that abuse by the officials entrusted with the
execution of a statute does not per se demonstrate the
unconstitutionality of such statute.
To support their position that the law and the
Secretary of Education have transcended the governmental
power of supervision and regulation, the petitioners appended
a list of circulars and memoranda issued by the said
Department, however, they failed to indicate which document
was constitutionally objectionable for being capricious. Unless
a constitutional point is specifically raised, insisted upon and
adequately argued, the court will not consider.
JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al.,petitioners vs. COMELEC,
respondents
GR NO. 118577 March 7, 1995
36
JOHN OSMENA,petitioner vs. COMELEC, JEJOMAR
BINAY et al.,respondents
GR NO. 118627 March 7, 1995
FACTS: These are two petitions assailing for constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is
entitled, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati into a
Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati." G.R.
No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory
relief. it was filed by petitioners Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S.
Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo
Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza,
Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of the petitioners, only
Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents
of Ibayo Ususan, Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers,
they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of R.A.
No. 7854.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is an actual case or
controversy to challenge the constitutionality of one of the
questioned sections of R.A. No. 7854.
2. Constitutionality of R.A. NO. 7854 Sections 2, 51
and 52.
HELD:
1. We cannot entertain this challenge to the
constitutionality of section 51.The requirements before a
litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated: there must be an actual case or controversy, the
question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party,
the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity, and the decision on the constitutional
question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself. Considering that these contingencies may or may not
happen, petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which
has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy. Petitioners
who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the
proper parties to raise this abstract issue. Worse, they hoist
this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which
this Court has no jurisdiction.
2. Section 2, The Municipality of Makati shall be
converted into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City
of Makati.Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the
proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them
subject to the ultimate resolution by the courts. Considering
these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that
section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the
submission of the Solicitor General in this regard.
Section 51, We cannot entertain this challenge to
the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a
litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well
delineated.
Section 52, we ruled that reapportionment of
legislative districts may be made through a special law, such
as in the charter of a new city. The Constitution 9 clearly
provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than
two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by
law. As thus worded, the Constitution did not preclude
Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law,
other than a general reapportionment of the law. This is its
exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854
and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district.
POLICE GENERAL LEVY MACASIANO (Ret.) Vs.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, et. al.
G.R. No. 107921 July 1, 1993
FACTS: Petitioner seeks to have this Court declare as
unconstitutional Sections 28 and 44 of Republic Act No. 7279,
otherwise known as the Urban Development and Housing Act
of 1992. He predicates his locust standi on his being a
consultant of the Department of Public Works and Highways
(DPWH) pursuant to a Contract of Consultancy on Operation
for Removal of Obstructions and Encroachments on Properties
of Public Domain (executed immediately after his retirement on
2 January 1992 from the Philippine National Police) and his

being a taxpayer. As to the first, he alleges that said Sections
28 and 44 "contain the seeds of a ripening controversy that
serve as drawback" to his "tasks and duties regarding
demolition of illegal structures"; because of the said sections,
he "is unable to continue the demolition of illegal structures
which he assiduously and faithfully carried out in the past." As
a taxpayer, he alleges that "he has a direct interest in seeing to
it that public funds are properly and lawfully disbursed."
ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner has legal standing
RULING: It is a rule firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence that
the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be
determined by the courts unless that, question is properly
raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to
a determination of the case, i.e., the issue of constitutionality
must be very lis mota presented. To reiterate, the essential
requisites for a successful judicial inquiry into the
constitutionality of a law are: (a) the existence of an actual
case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination, (b) the constitutional
question must be raised by a proper property, (c) the
constitutional question must be raised at the opportunity, and
(d) the resolution of the constitutional question must be
necessary to the decision of the case. A proper party is one
who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate
injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of.
It is easily discernible in the instant case that the first
two (2) fundamental requisites are absent. There is no actual
controversy. Moreover, petitioner does not claim that, in either
or both of the capacities in which he is filing the petition, he has
been actually prevented from performing his duties as a
consultant and exercising his rights as a property owner
because of the assertion by other parties of any benefit under
the challenged sections of the said Act. Judicial review cannot
be exercised in vacuo. Judicial power is the "right to determine
actual controversies arising between adverse litigants."
Wherefore, for lack of merit, the instant petition is
DISMISSED with costs against the petitioner.
DEAN JOSE JOYA ET. AL., petitioners
vs.
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT
(PCGG), CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., in his official
capacity, and/or the Executive Secretary, and CHAIRMAN
MATEO A.T. CAPARAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 96541 August 24, 1993
FACTS: Petitioners claim that as Filipino citizens, taxpayers
and artists deeply concerned with the preservation and
protection of the country's artistic wealth, they have the legal
personality to restrain respondents Executive Secretary and
PCGG from acting contrary to their public duty to conserve the
artistic creations as mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
particularly Art. XIV, Secs. 14 to 18, on Arts and Culture, and
R.A. 4846 governing the preservation and disposition of
national and important cultural properties. Petitioners also
anchor their case on the premise that the paintings and
silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and
by the people in general to view and enjoy as great works of
art. They allege that with the unauthorized act of PCGG in
selling the art pieces, petitioners have been deprived of their
right to public property without due process of law in violation
of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether petitioners have legal standing to file the
instant petition
HELD: Petitioners' arguments are devoid of merit. The rule is
settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity
of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the
court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry, namely: that the question must be raised by the
proper party; that there must be an actual case or controversy;
that the question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and, that the decision on the constitutional or legal
question must be necessary to the determination of the case
itself. But the most important are the first two (2) requisites.
37
On the first requisite, we have held that one having no
right or interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the
court as party-plaintiff in an action. "Legal standing" means a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of
the governmental act that is being challenged. The term
"interest" is material interest, an interest in issue and to be
affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in
the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. The
confiscation of these properties by the Aquino administration
however should not be understood to mean that the ownership
of these paintings has automatically passed on the government
without complying with constitutional and statutory
requirements of due process and just compensation. If these
properties were already acquired by the government, any
constitutional or statutory defect in their acquisition and their
subsequent disposition must be raised only by the proper
parties whose authority to recover emanates from their
proprietary rights which are protected by statutes and the
Constitution. Having failed to show that they are the legal
owners of the artworks or that the valued pieces have become
publicly owned, petitioners do not possess any clear legal right
whatsoever to question their alleged unauthorized disposition.
For lack of merit, the petition for prohibition and mandamus
is DISMISSED.
TATAD VS. GARCIA JR.
243 SCRA 436
FACTS: In 1989, DOTC planned to construct a light railway
transit line along EDSA. Among the five applicants of
contractors who seek to finance and implement the project,
only the EDSA LRT Consortium met the prequalification
requirements set forth by the Prequalification Bids and Awards
Committee. DOTC and respondent EDSA LRT Corporation,
Ltd., in substitution of the EDSA LRT Consortium, entered into
an agreement under the terms of the Build-Operate-Transfer
scheme provided for by RA 6957, as amended by RA 7718.
Under the agreement, EDSA LRT Consortium, private
respondent, shall undertake and finance the entire project
required for a complete operational light rail transit system.
Upon full or partial completion and viability thereof, it shall
deliver the use and possession of the completed portion to
DOTC which shall operate the same. DOTC shall pay private
respondent rentals on a monthly basis. As agreed upon,
private respondent's capital shall be recovered from the rentals
to be paid by the DOTC which, in turn, shall come from the
earnings of the EDSA LRT. After 25 years and DOTC shall
have completed payment of the rentals, ownership of the
project shall be transferred to the latter for a consideration of
only USD 1.00.
However, Senators Francisco Tatad, John Osmeña,
and Rodolfo Biazon, in their capacity as Senators and
taxpayers, opposed the implementation of said agreement
contending that such agreement grants EDSA LRT Consortium
ownership of EDSA LRT III, a public utility, which violates the
Constitution, the latter being a foreign corporation as it was
organized under Hongkong laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd., a foreign
corporation, own EDSA LRT III, a public utility.
HELD: No. Private respondent EDSA LRT Corporation, Ltd. is
admittedly a foreign corporation but what it actually owns are
the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches, rail stations,
terminals, the power plant, but not the EDSA LRT III, a public
utility. While a franchise is needed to operate these facilities to
serve the public, they do not by themselves constitute a public
utility. What constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but
their use to serve the public. The Constitution, in no uncertain
terms, requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility.
However, it does not require a franchise before one can own
the facilities needed to operate a public utility so long as it does
not operate them to serve the public. The right to operate a
public utility may exist independently and separately from the
ownership of the facilities thereof. One can own said facilities
without operating them as a public utility, or conversely, one
may operate a public utility without owning the facilities used to
serve the public. The devotion of property to serve the public

may be done by the owner or by the person in control thereof
who may not necessarily be the owner thereof.
While private respondent is the owner of the facilities
necessary to operate the EDSA LRT III, it admits that it is not
enfranchised to operate a public utility. In view of this
incapacity, private respondent and DOTC agreed that on
completion date, private respondent will immediately deliver
possession of the LRT system by way of lease for 25 years,
during which period DOTC shall operate the same as a
common carrier and private respondent shall provide technical
maintenance and repair services to DOTC.
Private respondent will not run the light rail vehicles
and collect fees from the riding public. It will have no dealings
with the public and the public will have no right to demand any
services from it.
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN
G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993
FACTS: The plaintiffs are all minors duly represented and
joined by their parents. The complaint was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit alleging that they are entitled to the full
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure
that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They contended that
they represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn and that the continued deforestation have caused a
distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. They seek for the
court to order the respondent to cancel all existing Timber
License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new TLAs.
The RTC Judge, however, sustained the motion to
dismiss filed by defendant on the ground that the complaint
had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question. Further, the court ruled that the granting of the relief
prayed for would violate the non-impairment clause provided
for in the Constitution.
Hence, the petitioners filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
2. Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
3. Whether or not the petition violates the non-
impairment of contract clause as provided for in the
Constitution
HELD:
(1) Yes. This petition bears upon Filipinos’ fundamental right to
a balanced and healthful ecology as provided for in the
Constitution. DENR is the primary government agency
responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration,
utilization, development and conservation of the country's
natural resources. Hence, it has the duty to protect and
advance the said right. A denial or violation of that right by the
other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or
protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners claim that there was grave abuse of discretion in
the granting of TLAs. After careful examination of the
petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough
to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights.
Hence, plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) No. Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the
Constitution allows the Supreme Court to rule upon even on
the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature
and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of
jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they
claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their
right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the case at
bar is a justiciable controversy.
(3) No. The Court held that a timber license is an instrument by
which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is
38
not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it
is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this
case. Hence, the non-impairment of contract clause cannot be
invoked.
KILOSBAYAN VS. MORATO
246 SCRA 540
FACTS: In the case of Kilosbayan vs. Guingona, the contract
between Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and
the privately owned Philippine Gaming Management
Corporation (PGMC) for the operation of a nationwide on-line
lottery system was held invalid. The contract violated the
provision in the PCSO Charter which prohibits PCSO from
holding and conducting lotteries through a collaboration,
association, or joint venture. On January 25, 1995, the same
parties entered again into an eight-year Equipment Lease
Agreement (ELA) for online lottery equipment and accessories.
The agreement provides that the rental is 4.3% of gross
amount of ticket sales by PCSO at which in no case be less
than an annual rental computed at P35,000 per terminal in
commercial operation. PCSO is to employ its own personnel
and responsible for the facilities and upon expiration of term, it
can purchase the equipment at P25M.
Kilosbayan again filed a petition to declare amended
ELA invalid because it is the same as the old contract of lease.
It is still violative of PCSO’s charter, the law regarding public
bidding, and of Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution.
Standing can no longer be questioned because it has become
the law of the case. PCSO and PGMC filed separate
comments contending that ELA is different from the Contract of
Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if
ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of
PCSO. PCSO does not have funds and hence, cannot
purchase its own online lottery equipment. Petitioners do not
have a legal standing because they were not parties to the
contract
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioners have a legal standing
to sue.
(2) Whether or not the Equipment Lease Agreement is
valid.
HELD:
(1) No. Petitioners do not have a legal standing to sue. Stare
decisis does not apply. The previous ruling in Kilosbayan vs.
Guingona sustaining the standing of the petitioners is a
departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest
because no constitutional issues were actually involved. It is
noteworthy that petitioners do not question the validity of the
law allowing lotteries. It is the contract entered into by the
PCSO and the PGMC which they are assailing. This case,
therefore, does not raise issues of constitutionality but only of
contract law, which petitioners, not being privies to the
agreement, cannot raise.
The "law of the case" doctrine is also inapplicable,
because this case is not a continuation of the first one. The
questions raised in this case are legal questions and the claims
involved are substantially different from those involved in the
prior case between the parties. As already stated, the ELA is
substantially different from the Contract of Lease declared void
in the first case.
(2) Yes. The ELA is valid because it is different from the prior
lease agreement. The operation of the system is clearly in the
hands of PCSO. It was as held in Kilosbayan vs. Guingona that
PCSO does not have the power to enter into any contract
which would involve it in any form of “collaboration,
association, or joint venture” for the holding of sweepstakes
activities. This only mentions that PCSO is prohibited from
investing in any activities that would compete in their own
activities. Also, with regard to public bidding, E.O. 301 applies
only to contracts for the purchase of supplies, materials and
equipment and not on contracts of lease.
ATTY. OLIVER O. LOZANO and ATTY. EVANGELINE J.
LOZANO-ENDRIANO, vs. SPEAKER PROSPERO C.

NOGRALES, Representative, Majority, House of
Representatives,
G.R. No. 187883
Facts: The petition filed by the petitioners in their capacities as
concerned citizens and taxpayers, prayed for the nullification of
House Resolution No. 1109 entitled A Resolution Calling upon
the Members of Congress to Convene for the Purpose of
Considering Proposals to Amend or Revise the Constitution,
Upon a Three-fourths Vote of All the Members of Congress. In
essence, the petition seeks to trigger a justiciable controversy
that would warrant a definitive interpretation by this Court of
Section 1, Article XVII, which provides for the procedure for
amending or revising the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the court can exercise the power of
judicial review in this case.
Ruling: The court cannot exercise the power of judicial review.
It is well settled that it is the duty of the judiciary to
say what the law is. The determination of the nature, scope
and extent of the powers of government is the exclusive
province of the judiciary, such that any mediation on the part of
the latter for the allocation of constitutional boundaries would
amount, not to its supremacy, but to its mere fulfillment of its
solemn and sacred obligation under the Constitution.
The case-or-controversy requirement bans this court
from deciding abstract, hypothetical or contingent questions,
lest the court give opinions in the nature of advice concerning
legislative or executive action. An aspect of the case-or-
controversy requirement is the requisite of ripeness
In the present case, the fitness of petitioners’ case for
the exercise of judicial review is grossly lacking. In the first
place, petitioners have not sufficiently proven any adverse
injury or hardship from the act complained of. In the second
place, House Resolution No. 1109 only resolved that the
House of Representatives shall convene at a future time for the
purpose of proposing amendments or revisions to the
Constitution. No actual convention has yet transpired and no
rules of procedure have yet been adopted. More importantly,
no proposal has yet been made, and hence, no usurpation of
power or gross abuse of discretion has yet taken place. In
short, House Resolution No. 1109 involves a quintessential
example of an uncertain contingent future event that may not
occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. The
House has not yet performed a positive act that would warrant
an intervention from this Court.
Yet another requisite rooted in the very nature of
judicial power is locus standi or standing to sue. Thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when he can
demonstrate that (1) he has personally suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by the
remedy being sought. In the case at bar, petitioners have not
shown the elemental injury in fact that would endow them with
the standing to sue. Locus standi requires a personal stake in
the outcome of a controversy for significant reasons. The lack
of petitioners personal stake in this case is no more evident
than in Lozanos three-page petition that is devoid of any legal
or jurisprudential basis.
In the final scheme, judicial review is effective largely
because it is not available simply at the behest of a partisan
faction, but is exercised only to remedy a particular, concrete
injury. When warranted by the presence of indispensible
minimums for judicial review, this Court shall not shun the duty
to resolve the constitutional challenge that may confront it.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed.
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 177499
Facts: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law
33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However,
Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities
into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into
law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which amended Section
450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual
39
income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city
from P20 million to P100 million.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of
Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution
No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income
requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood
bills were not approved in the 11 th Congress. However, the
12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint
Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, the House of
Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint
Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval.
However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint
Resolution.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the
Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal
protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale
conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of
existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more
cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside
for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issues:
1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal
protection clause.
Ruling: We grant the petitions as the Cityhood Laws violate
the constitution.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article
X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in
RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive
application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the
cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall
prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law, including the
Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X
of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just
distribution of the national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the
Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for
converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and
unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to
exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009
remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of
the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on
unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in
interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws
were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the
exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the
equal protection clause.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and
declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws herein
petition.
VENANCIO INONOG vs. JUDGE FRANCISCO B. IBAY
July 28, 2009
Facts: The administrative case stemmed from the
Sinumpaang Salaysay of Venancio P. Inonog, filed with the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on April 26, 2005,
charging Judge Francisco B. Ibay of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 135, Makati City with gross abuse of
authority. The complaint involved an incident in the Makati City
Hall basement parking lot for which respondent judge cited
complainant in contempt of court because complainant parked
his superiors vehicle at the parking space reserved for
respondent judge. Respondent judge initiated the proceeding
for indirect contempt by issuing an order directing the
complainant to show cause why he should not be punished for
contempt. That same day, respondent judge issued another
order, finding complainant guilty of contempt.

The complainant was informed that the respondent
judge blamed the usurpation of the said parking space for the
delay in the promulgation of the decision in Criminal Case Nos.
02-1320, 02-3046, 02-3168-69, and 03-392-393 scheduled at
8:00 a.m. of March 18, 2005 because the latter had a hard time
looking for another parking space. Complainant was also
informed that if he failed to appear at the hearing, a warrant for
his arrest will be issued.
With this, respondent judge ordered a fine
of P2,000.00 against herein complainant, with a stern warning
that a repetition of the same offense will be dealt with more
severely. In compliance, complainant paid the additional
amount of P1,000.00 as fine.
Aggrieved by the said orders of respondent judge,
complainant filed the instant administrative complaint.
Issue: Whether or not respondent judge is guilty of gross
abuse of authority.
Ruling: The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all
courts so as to preserve order in judicial proceedings as well
as to uphold the administration of justice. The courts must
exercise the power of contempt for purposes that are
impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not
for the judges but for the functions they exercise. Besides
possessing the requisite learning in the law, a magistrate must
exhibit that hallmark of judicial temperament of utmost sobriety
and self-restraint which are indispensable qualities of every
judge.
Thus, the Court agrees with the findings of the OCA
(which ordered that the instant case be REDOCKETED as a
regular administrative matter and Judge Francisco B. Ibay,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Makati City, be penalized to
pay a FINE in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos with a
STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act
in the future shall be dealt with more severely) but deems it
proper to impose a penalty different from the OCAs
recommendation.
As for the appropriate penalty to be imposed, we note
that this is not the first time respondent judge was charged with
grave abuse of authority in connection with his misuse of his
contempt power.
Considering that this is not the first time that
respondent judge committed the same offense and
in Nuez, which had similar factual antecedents as the case at
bar, the Court already saw fit to impose upon him a fine in the
amount of P40,000.00, it is proper to impose on him the same
penalty in this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent
Judge Francisco B. Ibay is found guilty of grave abuse of
authority. He is ordered to pay a FINE of Forty Thousand
Pesos (P40,000.00) to be deducted from his retirement
benefits.
LOUIS “BAROK” C.BIRAOGO
versus THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
G.R NO. 192935
x-----------------------------------X
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN et. al.
versus EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA
G.R. NO. 193036
December 7, 2010
FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing
Philippine Truth Commission
of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.
The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad
hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the
primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their
co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an
"independent collegial body," it is essentially an entity within
the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control.
Doubtless, it constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is
one.
PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it
is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate,
40
resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between
contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations.
It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite
people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is
a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if
probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of information in
our courts of law.
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive order
No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions.
ISSUE: WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the
Ombudsman and the DOJ.
HELD: PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or
erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative
function of the commission will complement those of the two
offices. The function of determining probable cause for the
filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to
be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to
investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and
guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to
the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
The Ombudsman’s power to investigate under R.A.
No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly
authorized government agencies. The same holds true with
respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter
1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no
means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body likewise
tasked to investigate the commission of crimes.
ATTY. ROMULO B. MACALINTAL versus
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 191618
November 23, 2010
FACTS: Atty. Romulo Macalintal questions the constitutionality
of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and
unauthorized progeny of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution.
Par 7, Sec 4, Art VII of the 1987 Constitution
provides: “The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may
promulgate its rules for the purpose.”
Sec 12, Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: The
Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established
by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-
judicial or administrative functions.
Petitioner argues that PET is unconstitutional on the
ground that Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution does not provide
for the creation of the PET, and it violates Sec 12, Art VIII of
the Constitution.
The Solicitor General maintains that the constitution
of the PET is on firm footing on the basis of the grant of
authority to the Supreme Court to be the sole judge of all
election contests for the President or Vice-President under par
7, Sec 4, Art VII of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether the designation of members of the Supreme
Court as members of the presidential electoral tribunal is
unconstitutional for being a violation of Section 12, Article VIII
of the 1987 Constitution.
HELD: The traditional grant of judicial power is found in
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides that
the power “shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.” The set up
embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterize the
resolution of electoral contests as essentially an exercise of
judicial power. When the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a
presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it performs
what is essentially a judicial power.
Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the
same Constitution is plenary. And under the doctrine of
necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by
the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution to
decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests
includes the means necessary to carry it into effect.

PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the
Court were designated. It is intended by the framers of the
Constitution to be an institution independent, but not separate,
from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
The COMELEC, HRET and SET are not, strictly and
literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law,
they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests
which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power,
because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in
Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17,
Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the
Constitution.
The decision of the Court still stands on its
constitutionality.
CESAR BENGZON, et al. versus
HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON
G.R. No. 103524
April 15, 1992
FACTS: The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals who are currently receiving
monthly pensions under Republic Act No. 910 as amended by
Republic Act No. 1797. They filed the instant petition on their
own behalf and in representation of all other retired Justices of
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals similarly situated.
President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 644 on
January 25, 1975 repealing Section 3-A of Republic Act No.
1797 and Republic Act No. 3595 (amending Republic Act No.
1568 and Presidential Decree No. 578) which authorized the
adjustment of the pension of the retired Justices of the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Chairman and members of
the Constitutional Commissions and the officers and enlisted
members of the Armed Forces to the prevailing rates of
salaries.
RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990.
However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill
No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give
preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.
However, they pointed out that RA 1797 was never
repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because of the absence of its
publication, thus there was no law. Hence, the repealing law
never existed due to non-publication and in effect, RA 1797
was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their
pensions.
President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which
provided for the pensions of the retired justices in the judiciary
in the General Appropriation Bill. She explained that that
portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when she vetoed
H.B. 16297.
ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President of certain
provisions in the GAA of FY 1992 relating to the payment of
the adjusted pensions of retired Justices is constitutional or
valid.
HELD: The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the
accrued pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic
Act 1797. The veto of these specific provisions in the GAA is
tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary of its funds should be
utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. It is a
constitutional mandate that the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in
the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations
law.
The president has no power to set aside and override
the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president
have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her
predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws. The
veto is unconstitutional since the power of the president to
disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not
grant the authority to veto part of an item and to approve the
remaining portion of said item.
The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its
entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item
in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not
veto the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She
merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of
the justices but did not veto the other items covering
obligations to the other departments of the government.
41
Therefore, the petition is granted and the questioned
veto is illegal and the provisions of 1992 GAA are declared
valid and subsisting.
DRILON VS. LIM
G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994
FACTS: The Secretary of Justice, on appeal to him of four oil
companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance No. 7794,
known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-
compliance with the procedure in the enactment of tax
ordinances and for containing certain provisions contrary to law
and public policy. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) revoked the
Secretary’s resolution and sustained the ordinance. It declared
Section 187 of the Local Government Code (LGC) as
unconstitutional because it vests on the Secretary the power of
control over LGUs in violation of the policy of local autonomy
mandated in the Constitution. The Secretary argues that the
annulled Section 187 is constitutional and that the procedural
requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as specified
in the LGC had indeed not been observed. The petition was
originally dismissed by the Court due to failure to submit
certified true copy of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to
consider the constitutionality of Section 187 of the LGC.
HELD: Yes. B.P. 129 vests in the Regional Trial Court’s
jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Moreover, Article
VIII, Section 5(2)(a), of the Constitution vests in the Supreme
Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of
lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity
of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance,
or regulation is in question. In the exercise of this jurisdiction,
lower courts are advised to act with the utmost circumspection,
bearing in mind the consequences of a declaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less than on
the doctrine of separation of powers. It is also emphasized that
every court, including this Court, is charged with the duty of a
purposeful hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional,
on the theory that the measure was first carefully studied by
the executive and the legislative departments and determined
by them to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it
was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The presumption
of constitutionality can be overcome only by the clearest
showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution.
LARRANAGA VS. CA
G.R. No. 130644, October 27, 1997
FACTS: On September 15, 1997, some members of the
Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation Group
(PNPCIG) went to the Center for Culinary Arts in Quezon City
to arrest petitioner, albeit without warrant. Petitioner resisted
the arrest and immediately phoned his sister and brother-in-
law. Petitioner’s sister sought the aid of Atty. Raymundo A.
Armovit. Atty. Armovit, over the phone, dissuaded the Police
Officers from carrying out the warrantless arrest before CIG
Legal Officer Ruben Zacarias. After consulting with his
superiors, Legal Officer Zacarias ordered to stop the arrest and
allowed petitioner to go home. Atty. Armovit made an
undertaking in writing that he and petitioner would appear
before the Cebu City Prosecutor on September 17, 1997 for
preliminary investigation. Petitioner Larranaga was charged
with two counts of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
before the RTC of Cebu City. He was arrested and detained
without the filing of the necessary information and warrant of
arrest. The petitioner alleged that he must be released and
must be subject to a preliminary investigation. However,
pending the resolution of the Court for the petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory
and mandatory injunction filed by the petitioner, RTC judge
issued a warrant of arrest directed to petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the arrest of Petitioner Larranaga
without a warrant was legal.

HELD: No. Petitioner in this case was, in the first place, not
arrested either by a peace officer or a private person. To be
sure, even if petitioner were arrested by the PNP CIG
personnel, such arrest would still be illegal because of the
absence of a warrant. It does not appear in the case at bar
that petitioner has just committed, is actually committing or is
attempting to commit an offense when the Police Officers tried
to arrest him on September 15, 1997. In fact, the petitioner
was attending classes at the Center for Culinary Arts at that
time.
FIRST LEPANTO CERAMICS, INC. VS. CA
G.R. No. 117680, February 9, 1996
FACTS: Petitioner assailed the conflicting provisions of B.P.
129, EO 226 (Art. 82) and a circular, 1-91 issued by the
Supreme Court which deals with the jurisdiction of courts for
appeal of cases decided by quasi-judicial agencies such as the
Board of Investment (BOI). BOI granted petitioner First
Lepanto Ceramics, Inc.’s application to amend its BOI
certificate of registration by changing the scope of its
registered product from “glazed floor tiles” to “ceramic tiles.”
Oppositor Mariwasa filed a motion for reconsideration of the
said BOI decision while oppositor Fil-Hispano Ceramics, Inc.
did not move to reconsider the same nor appeal therefrom.
Soon rebuffed in its bid for reconsideration, Mariwasa filed a
petition for review with CA. CA temporarily restrained the BOI
from implementing its decision. The TRO lapsed by its own
terms of twenty (20) days after its issuance, without
respondent court issuing any preliminary injunction. Petitioner
filed a motion to dismiss and to lift the restraining order
contending that CA does not have jurisdiction over the BOI
case, since the same is exclusively vested with the Supreme
Court pursuant to Article 82 of the Omnibus Investments Code
of 1987. Petitioner argued that the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980 of B.P. 129 and Circular 1-91, “Prescribing the
Rules Governing Appeals to the Court of Appeals from a Final
Order of Decision of the Court of Appeals and Quasi-Judicial
Agencies”, cannot be the basis of Mariwasa’s appeal to
respondent court because the procedure for appeal laid down
therein runs contrary to Article 82 of E.O. 226, which provides
that appeals from decisions or orders of the BOI shall be filed
directly with the Supreme Court. Mariwasa maintains that
whatever inconsistency there may have been between B.P.
129 and Article 82 of E.O. 226 on the question of venue for
appeal, has already been resolved by Circular 1-91 of the
Supreme Court, which was promulgated on February 27, 1991
or four (4) years after E.O. 226 was enacted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction
over the case.
HELD: Yes. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or suspended
Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of
enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are
concerned. Appeals from decisions of the BOI, which by
statute was previously allowed to be filed directly with the
Supreme Court, should now be brought to the Court of
Appeals.
G.R. No. 107852 October 20, 1993
GREGORIO M. ARUELO, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BULACAN, BRANCH 17,
MALOLOS BULACAN, and DANILO F.
GATCHALIAN, respondents.
FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under
rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, to set aside the Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated November 24, 1992 in CA-G.R.
SP No, 28621, which ruled that the answer and counter-protest
of respondent Danilo F. Gatchalian was filed timely and
ordered the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Malolos, Bulacan
to continue with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 343-M-92,
the protest case filed by petitioner Gregorio N. Aruelo, Jr.
Aruelo and Gatchalian were rival candidates in the
May 11, 1992 elections for the office of the Vice-Mayor of the
Municipality of Balagtas, Province of Bulacan. Gatchalian won
over Aruelo by a margin of four votes, such that on May 13,
42
1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed him as
the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Balagtas, Bulacan. Aruelo
claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure gives the respondent therein only five days from
receipt of summons within which to file his answer to the
petition (Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and that this five-day period
had lapsed when Gatchalian filed his answer. According to
him, the filing of motions to dismiss and motions for bill of
particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said
pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or
give Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his answer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
when it allowed respondent Gatchalian to file his pleading
beyond the five-day period prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13,
Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that they find no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioner filed the election protest with the Regional Trial
Court, whose proceedings are governed by the Revised Rules
of Court.
Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the regular
courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1, Part I of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to
dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings
brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I
provides:
Sec. 2. Applicability — These rules, except Part VI,
shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought before the
Commission. Part VI shall apply to election contests and quo
warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limited
jurisdiction.
It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to
dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election
protests or quowarranto cases pending before the regular
courts.
Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot
adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the
regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning
pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the
Supreme Court (Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).
G.R. No. 102549 August 10, 1992
EDWIN B. JAVELLANA, petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
AND LUIS T. SANTOS, SECRETARY, respondents.
FACTS: Attorney Erwin B. Javellana was an elected City
Councilor of Bago City, Negros Occidental. On October 5,
1989, City Engineer Ernesto C. Divinagracia filed
Administrative Case No. C-10-90 against Javellana for: (1)
violation of Department of Local Government (DLG)
Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 dated June 10, 1980 in
relation to DLG Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 and of
Section 7, paragraph b, No. 2 of Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise known as the "Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards for Public Officials and Employees," and (2) for
oppression, misconduct and abuse of authority.
Divinagracia’s complaint alleged that Javellana, an
incumbent member of the City Council or
SanggunianPanglungsod of Bago City, and a lawyer by
profession, has continuously engaged in the practice of law
without securing authority for that purpose from the Regional
Director, Department of Local Government, as required by
DLG Memorandum Circular No. 80-38 in relation to DLG
Memorandum Circular No. 74-58 of the same department.
Meanwhile, on September 10, 1990, Javellana requested the
DLG for a permit to continue his practice of law for the reasons
stated in his letter-request. On September 21, 1991, Secretary
Luis T. Santos issued Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 setting
forth guidelines for the practice of professions by local elective
officials. In an order dated May 2, 1991, Javellana’s motion to
dismiss was denied by the public respondents. His motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied on June 20, 1991. Five

months later or on October 10, 1991, the Local Government
Code of 1991 (RA 7160) was signed into law, Section 90 of
which provides:
Sec. 90. Practice of Profession. — (a) All governors, city and
municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their
profession or engaging in any occupation other than the
exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
XXX XXX XXX
ISSUE: Whether or not DILG Memorandum Circulars Nos. 80-
38 and 90-81 are unconstitutional because it prohibits public
officials to practice their profession while they are in position
RULING: The Supreme Court ruled that DILG Memorandum
Circulars Nos. 80-38 and 90-81 is not unconstitutional.
Petitioner’s contention that Section 90 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 and DLG Memorandum Circular
No. 90-81 violate Article VIII, Section 5 of the Constitution is
completely off tangent. Neither the statute nor the circular
trenches upon the Supreme Court’s power and authority to
prescribe rules on the practice of law. The Local Government
Code and DLG Memorandum Circular No. 90-81 simply
prescribe rules of conduct for public officials to avoid conflicts
of interest between the discharge of their public duties and the
private practice of their profession, in those instances where
the law allows it.
RE: PETITION FOR RECOGNITION OF THE EXEMPTION
OF THE GSIS FROM PAYMENT OF LEGAL FEES.
A.M. No. 08-2-01-0
February 11, 2010
FACTS: The GSIS seeks exemption from the payment of legal
fees imposed on GOCCs under Sec 22, Rule 141 (Legal Fees)
of the ROC. The said provision states:
SEC. 22. Government exempt. – The Republic of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities are exempt from
paying the legal fees provided in this Rule. Local government
corporations and government-owned or controlled corporations
with or without independent charter are not exempt from
paying such fees. xx
The GSIS anchors its petition on Sec 39 of its charter, RA
8291 (The GSIS Act of 1997):
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien. – It is
hereby declared to be the policy of the State that the actuarial
solvency of the funds of the GSIS shall be preserved and
maintained at all times and that contribution rates necessary to
sustain the benefits under this Act shall be kept as low as
possible in order not to burden the members of the GSIS and
their employers. Taxes imposed on the GSIS tend to impair the
actuarial solvency of its funds and increase the contribution
rate necessary to sustain the benefits of this Act. Accordingly,
notwithstanding any laws to the contrary, the GSIS, its assets,
revenues including accruals thereto, and benefits paid, shall be
exempt from all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of
all kinds. These exemptions shall continue unless expressly
and specifically revoked and any assessment against the GSIS
as of the approval of this Act are hereby considered paid.
Consequently, all laws, ordinances, regulations, issuances,
opinions or jurisprudence contrary to or in derogation of this
provision are hereby deemed repealed, superseded and
rendered ineffective and without legal force and effect. xx
Required to comment on the GSIS’ petition, the OSG
maintains that the petition should be denied. On this Court’s
order, the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) submitted a
report and recommendation on the petition of the GSIS and the
comment of the OSG thereon. According to the OCAT, the
claim of the GSIS for exemption from the payment of legal fees
has no legal basis.
ISSUE: May the legislature exempt the GSIS from legal fees
imposed by the Court on GOCCs and local government units?
RULING: Congress could not have carved out an exemption
for the GSIS from the payment of legal fees without
transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard
of the Court’s independence — fiscal autonomy. Rule 141 (on
Legal Fees) of the ROC was promulgated by this Court in the
43
exercise of its rule-making powers under Sec 5(5), Art VIII of
the Constitution: Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the
following powers: (5) Promulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the
practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged. xx
Clearly, therefore, the payment of legal fees under
Rule 141 of the ROC is an integral part of the rules
promulgated by this Court pursuant to its rule-making power
under Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution. In particular,
it is part of the rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in courts. Indeed, payment of legal (or docket) fees
is a jurisdictional requirement.
Since the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the
rules promulgated by this Court concerning pleading, practice
and procedure, it cannot be validly annulled, changed or
modified by Congress. As one of the safeguards of this Court’s
institutional independence, the power to promulgate rules of
pleading, practice and procedure is now the Court’s exclusive
domain. That power is no longer shared by this Court with
Congress, much less with the Executive.
BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA
vs
HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 102781
April 22, 1993.
FACTS: Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge
of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of Antique, seeks the
review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman:
(1) the Order dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte
motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by petitioner; and (2)
the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed
before the Office of the Ombudsman, respondents alleged that
petitioner had falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated
February 6, 1989, by certifying “that all civil and criminal cases
which have been submitted for decision or determination for a
period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or
before January 31, 1998,” when in truth and in fact, petitioner
knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and
ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision.
Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner similarly
falsified his certificates of service for the months of February,
April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months
beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of
seventeen (17) months. On the other hand, petitioner contends
that he had been granted by the Supreme Court an extension
of ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain
a criminal complaint for the alleged falsification of a judge’s
certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and assuming
that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the
Supreme Court
HELD: In the absence of any administrative action taken
against him by the Supreme Court with regard to his
certificates of service, the investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman encroaches into the Court’s power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in
violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively
vests in the Supreme Court administrative supervision over all
courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court that can
oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance with all
laws, and took the proper administrative action against them if
they commit any violation thereof. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul
of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of
petitioner’s certificates of service to the Supreme Court for
determination of whether said certificates reflected the true

status of his pending case load, as the Supreme Court has the
necessary records to make such a determination.
ANTONIO V. RAQUIZA
vs
DISTRICT JUDGE MARIANO CASTAÑEDA, JR.
A.M. No. 1312-CFI
January 31, 1978
FACTS: Petitioner files a petition to order the transfer of
Special Proceedings No. 6824 of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga (Testate Estate of the late Don Alfonso Castellvi)
from the sala of respondent judge, Hon. Mariano Castañeda to
another branch and administrative complaint against the same
judge namely:
I. Violation of the Anti Graft Law (Corrupt practices of
public officers under Section 3, Republic Act 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti- Graft Law);
II. Decision knowing it to be unjust and illegal (violation
of Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code);
III. Extortion by means of oppression; and
IV. Bribery
After respondent judge had filed his comment on said
petition and administrative complaint, the Court resolved on
August 3, 1976 to refer the administrative complaint to Justice
Jose G. Bautista of the Court of Appeals for investigation,
report and recommendation. After the conduct of the
investigation, Justice Bautista recommends the dismissal of
the charges against the judge for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a basis on the
recommendation of the investigator to dismiss the respondent
judge.
HELD: The court reviewed the records, testimonies of the
witnesses, and other evidences submitted by the parties and
find the recommendation of the investigator as fully supported
with enough evidence to merit the dismissal of the complainant
against the respondent judge.
The rules even in an administrative case demands
that if the respondent Judge should be disciplined for grave
misconduct or any graver offense, the evidence presented
against him should be competent and derived from direct
knowledge. The judiciary, to which respondent belongs, no
less demands that before its member could be faulted, it
should be only after due investigation and based on competent
proofs, no less. This is all the more so when as in this case the
charges are penal in nature.
The ground for removal of a judicial officer should be
established beyond reasonable doubt and especially if it
involves misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption,
incompetency, etc.
DAVID G. NITAFAN, ET. AL.
vs
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, ET. AL
G.R. No. 78780
July 23, 1987
FACTS:The Chief Justice has previously issued a directive to
the Fiscal Management and Budget Office to continue the
deduction of the withholding taxes from the salaries of the
Justices of the Supreme Court and other members of the
judiciary. This was affirmed by the Supreme Court en banc on
December 4, 1987.
Nitafan and some others, duly qualified and appointed
judges of the RTC, NCR, all with stations in Manila, seek to
prohibit and/or perpetually enjoin the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue and the Financial Officer of the Supreme Court, from
making any deduction of withholding taxes from their salaries
They submit that “any tax withheld from their
emoluments or compensation as judicial officers constitutes a
decrease or diminution of their salaries, contrary to the
provision of Section 10, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
mandating that during their continuance in office, their salary
shall not be decreased.
ISSUE: Whether or not the members of the judiciary are
exempt from payment of income taxes.
44
HELD: No. The clear intent of the framers of the Constitution,
based on their deliberations, was NOT to exempt justices and
judges from general taxation. Members of the judiciary, just like
members of the other branches of the government, are subject
to income taxation. What is provided for by the constitution is
that salaries of judges may not be decreased during their
continuance in office. They have a fix salary which may not be
subject to the whims and caprices of congress. But the salaries
of the judges shall be subject to the general income tax as well
as other members of the judiciary.
The 1973 Constitution has provided that “no salary or any
form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including
constitutional officers, shall be exempt from payment of income
tax (Section 6, Article XV)” which was not present in the 1987
Constitution. The deliberations of the 1986 Constitution
Commission relevant to Section 10, Article VIII (The salary of
the Chief Justice and of the Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, and of judges of lower courts shall be fixed by law.
During their continuance in office, their salary shall not be
decreased), negate the contention that the intent of the framers
is to revert to the original concept of “non-diminution” of
salaries of judicial officers.
DE LA LLANA VS ALBA
G.R. NO. L-57883 MARCH 12, 1982
Facts: A petition was filed challenging the validity of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled "An act reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes."
The assailed legislation mandates that Justices and
judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal
circuit courts, except the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and
the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior
courts established by such Act, would be considered separated
from the judiciary. It is the termination of their incumbency that
for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged
that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution
has been ignored and disregarded. He averred that only the
Supreme Court can remove judges not the Congress.
Issue: Whether or not reorganization under Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129 violates the security of tenure?
Held: The reorganization under B.P. Blg. 129 is valid and does
not violate security of tenure. It is a well-settled rule that
abolition of an office is not tantamount to illegal removal of its
incumbent but in order to be valid, it must be done in good
faith.
Removal must be distinguished from termination by virtue
of the abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-
existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant.
In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position.
It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the
question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished,
the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction
exists between removal and the abolition of the office.
Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a
member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed
legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted
principles of constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be
consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest
consideration. No question of law is involved. If such were the
case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the
action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it
could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the
matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into
who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created by the
reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to
whom it properly belongs. Moreover, such a construction would
be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of
alternatives between one which would save and another which
would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.
PEOPLE VS JUDGE GACOTT
G.R. NO. 116049 JULY 13, 1995

Facts: Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott has failed to check citations
of the prosecutions, the order of respondent RTC Judge
dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the Supreme
Court. Respondent judge's utter inexcusable neglect to check
the citations of the prosecution is the mistaken belief that the
duty to inform the court on the applicable law to a particular
case devolves solely upon the prosecution or whoever may be
the advocate before the court.
The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing
the case is quite obvious in the light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2
and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. The intent to abolish the
Anti-Dummy Board could not have been expressed more
clearly than in the aforequoted LOI.
The respondent judge was also sanctioned with a
reprimand and a fine of PHP 10k for gross ignorance of law.
The judgment was made by the Second Division of the
Supreme Court. Stress is apparently laid by respondent judge
on the inclusion of the adverbial phrase "en banc" in referring
to this Court in the quoted provision of the 1987 Constitution
and, from this, he argues that it is only the full Court, not a
division thereof, that can administratively punish him.
Issue: Whether or not the a Division of the Supreme Court has
the competence to administratively discipline respondent
judge?
Held: The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the
Constitution clearly shows that there are actually two situations
envisaged therein. The first clause which states that “the SC
en banc shall have the power to discipline judges of lower
courts,” is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power
to, and the determination of the procedure in the
exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not therein
intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be
heard and decided by the whole Court since it would result in
an absurdity.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon
and participate in all administrative matters or cases regardless
of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a
congested docket and undue delay in the adjudication of cases
in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since even
cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action
by the Court en banc. This would subvert the constitutional
injunction for the Court to adopt a systematic plan to expedite
the decision or resolution of cases or matters pending in the
Supreme Court or the lower courts, 9 and the very purpose of
authorizing the Court to sit en banc or in divisions of three, five,
or seven members. 10
Yet, although as thus demonstrated, only cases involving
dismissal of judges of lower courts are specifically required to
be decided by the Court en banc, in cognizance of the need for
a thorough and judicious evaluation of serious charges against
members of the judiciary, it is only when the penalty imposed
does not exceed suspension of more than one year or a fine of
P10,000.00, or both, that the administrative matter may be
decided in division.
IN RE: RODOLFO MANZANO
A.M. No. 88-7-1861-RTC October 5, 1988
Facts: On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive
Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19 sent a letter
requesting a resolution from the Supreme Court favorable to
his appointment as a member of Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee on Justice.
He petitioned that his membership in the Committee will
not in any way amount to an abandonment to his present
position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, RTC, 1st Judicial
region and as a member of judiciary.
Issue: Whether or not his membership in the Committee will
not violate the Constitution.
Held: It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on
Justice perform administrative functions. Administrative
functions are those which involve the regulation and control
over the conduct and affairs of individuals for; their own welfare
and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry
out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon
the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence.
45
Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending
Executive Order No. 856, it is provided that:
Section 6. Supervision.—The Provincial/City Committees
on Justice shall be under the supervision of the Secretary of
justice Quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to
the Office of the Secretary of Justice.
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme
Court and other courts established by law shag not be
designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or
administrative functions (Section 12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the
Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which
discharges a administrative functions, will be in violation of the
Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his request.
While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative
theory not to be enforced with pedantic rigor, the practical
demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application,
it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to
assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in character.
That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain
departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed
in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by
Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a
subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however
eminent.
ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo
U. Manzano is DENIED.
NICOS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION VS. COURT OF
APPEALS
Case number 31 (November 7, 2016)
FACTS: The order is assailed by the petitioners on the
principal ground that it violates the aforementioned
constitutional requirement of Article 8 Section 14 of the
Constitution. The petitioners claim that it is not a reasoned
decision and does not clearly anddistinctly explain how it
was reached by the trial court. Petitioners complain
that there was no analysis of their testimonial evidence or of
their 21 exhibits, the trial court merely confining itself to the
pronouncement that the sheriff's sale was valid and that it
had no jurisdiction over the derivative suit. There was therefore
no adequate factual or legal basis for the decision that could
justify its review and affirmance by the Court of Appeals. On
January 24, 1980, NICOS Industrial Corporation obtained a
loan of P2, 000,000.00 from private respondent United
Coconut Planters Bank and to secure payment thereof
executed a real estate mortgage on two parcels of land located
at Marilao, Bulacan. The mortgage was foreclosed for the
supposed non-payment of the loan, and the sheriff's sale was
held on July 11, 1983, without re-publication of the required
notices after the original date for the auction was
changed without the knowledge or consent of the mortgagor.
CA decision: We hold that the order appealed from as framed
by the court a quo while leaving much to be desired,
substantially complies with the rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the trial court is
unconstitutional.
HELD: The challenged decision of the Court of Appeals is
SET ASIDE for lack of basis. This case is REMANDED to
the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 10, for
revision, within 30 days from notice, of the Order of June
6, 1986, conformably to the requirements of Article VIII,
Section 14, of the Constitution, subject to the appeal thereof, if
desired, in accordance with law. (a) The questioned order is
an over-simplification of the issues, and violates both the letter
and spirit of Article 8, Section 14 of the Constitution. (b) It is a
requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation
be informed of how it was decided, with an explanation of
the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the
court. The court cannot simply say that judgment is rendered in
favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any
justification whatsoever for its action. The losing party is
entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher
court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should
be reversed. A decision that does not clearly and distinctly
state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the
parties in the dark as to how it was reached and is

especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to
pinpoint the possible errors of the court for review by a
higher tribunal. (c) Brevity is doubtless an admirable trait, but it
should not and cannot be substituted for substance. As the
ruling on this second ground was unquestionably a judgment
on the merits, the failure to state the factual and legal basis
thereof was fatal to the order. (d) Kilometric decisions without
much substance must be avoided, to be sure, but the
other extreme, where substance is also lost in the wish to
be brief, is no lessunacceptable either. The ideal decision
is that which, with welcome economy of words, arrives at
the factual findings reaches the legal conclusions renders its
ruling and having done so ends.
KOMATSU INDUSTRIES (PHILS.), INC. VS. COURT OF
APPEALS
Case number 32 (November 7, 2016)
FACTS: National Investment and Development Corporation
granted KIPI a direct loan of Eight Million Pesos
(P8,000,000.00) and a Two Million ((P2,000,000.00) guarantee
to secure PNB. (Exh. M of petitioner and Exh. 22 of respondent
PNB and intervenor SLDC, T.S.N. October 14, 1992 pp. 19-
28). As security thereof, a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage dated
April 24, 1975 was executed by Petitioner KIPI in favor of
NIDC, covering, among others, a parcel of land with all its
improvements embraced in and covered by TCT NO. 469737.
KIPI then executed an Amendment of Mortage Deed of
Release and Cancellation of Mortgage. By virtue of this
release, NIDC returned the owner’s copy of the TCT to KIPI
and registered the Deed of Release with the Registry of Deed.
However, PNB requested the return of the TCT due to
unsettled accounts based on the subsequent amendment of
the mortgage. The return was made but after a year, PNB filed
for extrajudicial foreclosure of the property. KIPI contests the
foreclosure saying that the release by NIDC had the effect of
releasing the real estate mortgage. Petitioner KIPI filed a
petition for review on certiorari of the adverse decision of
respondent, Court of Appeals. However, it was denied by this
Court for failure to sufficiently show that respondent court had
committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment.
Hence, in its second motion for reconsideration, petitioner tried
a different approach by assailing the minute resolutions are in
violation of the constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not issuance of Minute Resolutions is valid
under Article 8, Section 14 of the Constitution.
HELD: “Resolutions” are not “decisions” within the above
constitutional requirements; they merely hold that the petition
for review should not be entertained. And the petition to review
the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a matter of right but
of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully
explain the Court’s denial since, for one thing, the facts and the
law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeals’ decision.
The constitutional mandate is applicable only in cases
“submitted for decision,” i.e., given due course and after the
filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not
where the petition is refused due course, with the resolution
therefor stating the legal basis thereof. Thus, when the
Supreme Court, after deliberating on a petition and subsequent
pleadings, decides to deny due course to the petition and
states that the questions raised are factual or there is no
reversible error in the resolution.
PRUDENTIAL BANK VS. CASTRO
Case number 33 (November 7, 2016)
FACTS: The case at bar relates to the disbarment of Atty.
Benjamin M. Grecia. Prudential Bank instituted an
administrative case and ask the court for the initiation of
proceedings for his disbarment or suspension in connection
with his actuations in a civil case ("Macro Textile Millsdel
Rosario, Notary Public for Quezon City, Defendants"), where
he represented the plaintiff.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Court’s decision violates the
Constitution since it lacks certification by the Chief
Justice that the conclusions of the Court were
46
reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to a member for the writing of the opinion of the Court.
2. Whether or not a constitutional provision has been
disregarded in the Court's Minute Resolution dated
January 12, 1988.
HELD: The certification requirement refers to decisions in
judicial, not administrative cases. From the very beginning,
resolutions/decisions of the Court in administrative cases have
not been accompanied by any formal certification. Such a
certification would be a superfluity in administrative cases. But
even if such certification were required, it is beyond doubt that
the conclusions of the Court in its decision were arrived at after
consultation and deliberation. The signatures of the members
who actually took part in the deliberations and voted attest to
that. No constitutional provision has been disregarded either in
the Court's Minute Resolution, dated January 12,1988, denying
the motion for reconsideration "for lack of merit, the issues
raised therein having been previously duly considered and
passed upon." It bears repeating that this is an administrative
case so that the Constitutional mandate that "no ... motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be ... denied
without stating the legal basis therefore" is inapplicable. And
even if it were, said Resolution stated the legal basis for the
denial and, therefore, adhered faithfully to the Constitutional
requirement. "Lack of merit," which was one of the grounds for
denial, is a legal basis
OIL AND NATURAL GAS COMMISSION VS. COURT OF
APPEALS
G.R. No. 114323. July 23, 1998
FACTS: This proceeding involves the enforcement of a foreign
judgment rendered by the Civil Judge of Dehra Dun, India in
favor of the petitioner, OIL AND NATURAL GAS
COMMISSION and against the private respondent, PACIFIC
CEMENT COMPANY, INCORPORATED. The petitioner is a
foreign corporation owned and controlled by the Government
of India while the private respondent is a private corporation
duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines.
The present conflict between the petitioner and the private
respondent has its roots in a contract entered into by and
between both parties whereby the private respondent
undertook to supply the petitioner FOUR THOUSAND THREE
HUNDRED (4,300) metric tons of oil well cement. In
consideration therefore, the petitioner bound itself to pay the
private respondent the amount of FOUR HUNDRED
SEVENTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED U.S.
DOLLARS ($477,300.00) by opening an irrevocable, divisible,
and confirmed letter of credit in favor of the latter. The private
respondent moved to dismiss the complaint of the petitioner on
the following grounds: (1) plaintiffs lack of legal capacity to sue;
(2) lack of cause of action; and (3) plaintiffs claim or demand
has been waived, abandoned, or otherwise extinguished. The
RTC characterized the erroneous submission of the dispute to
the arbitrator as a "mistake of law or fact amounting to want of
jurisdiction". Consequently, the proceedings had before the
arbitrator were null and void and the foreign court had
therefore, adopted no legal award which could be the source of
an enforceable right.
ISSUE: Whether or not Memorandum Decisions are violative
of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
HELD: No. The constitutional mandate that no decision shall
be rendered by any court without expressing therein dearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based does not
preclude the validity of “memorandum decisions” which adopt
by reference the findings of fact and conclusions of law
contained in the decisions of inferior tribunals. Even in this
jurisdiction, incorporation by reference is allowed if only to
avoid the cumbersome reproduction of the decision of the
lower courts, or portions thereof, in the decision of the higher
court. This is particularly true when the decision sought to be
incorporated is a lengthy and thorough discussion of the facts
and conclusions arrived at. Furthermore, the recognition to be
accorded a foreign judgment is not necessarily affected by the
fact that the procedure in the courts of the country in which
such judgment was rendered differs from that of the courts of

the country in which the judgment is relied on. This Court has
held that matters of remedy and procedure are governed by
the lexfori or the internal law of the forum. Thus, if under the
procedural rules of the Civil Court of Dehra Dun, India, a valid
judgment may be rendered by adopting the arbitrator's
findings, then the same must be accorded respect. In the same
vein, if the procedure in the foreign court mandates that an
Order of the Court becomes final and executory upon failure to
pay the necessary docket fees, then the courts in this
jurisdiction cannot invalidate the order of the foreign court
simply because our rules provide otherwise. The foreign
judgment being valid, there is nothing else left to be done than
to order its enforcement, despite the fact that the petitioner
merely prays for the remand of the case to the RTC for further
proceedings. As this Court has ruled on the validity and
enforceability of the said foreign judgment in this jurisdiction,
further proceedings in the RTC for the reception of evidence to
prove otherwise are no longer necessary.
ATTY ALICE ODCHIGUE-BONDOC VS. TAN TIONG BIO
AKA HENRY TAN
G.R. No. 186652, October 6, 2010
FACTS: Tan Tiong Bio (respondent) had fully paid the
installment payments of a 683-square-meter lot in the Manila
Southwoods Residential Estates, a project of Fil-Estate Golf &
Development, Inc. (Fil-Estate) in Carmona, Cavite, but Fil-
Estate failed to deliver to him the title covering the lot, despite
repeated demands. Fil-Estate also failed to heed the demand
for the refund of the purchase price. Respondent, later learning
that the lot "sold" to him was inexistent, filed a complaint for
Estafa against Fil-Estate officials including its Corporate
Secretary Atty. Alice Odchigue-Bondoc (petitioner) and other
employees. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration having
been denied by Resolution of January 23, 2006, he filed a
petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which, by
Decision of September 5, 2008, set aside the DOJ Secretary’s
Resolution, holding that it committed grave abuse of discretion
in issuing its Resolution dismissing respondent’s petition for
review without therein expressing clearly and distinctly the
facts on which the dismissal was based, in violation of Section
14, Article VIII of the Constitution. The appellate court went on
to hold that the matter of disposing the petition outright is
clearly delineated, not under Section 12 but, under Section 7 of
the NPS Rule on Appeal which categorically directs the
Secretary to dismiss outright an appeal or a petition for review
filed after arraignment; and that under Section 7, the Secretary
may dismiss the petition outright if he finds the same to be
patently without merit, or manifestly intended for delay, or
when the issues raised are too unsubstantial to require
consideration. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration having
been denied by the appellate court, she filed the present
petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner asserts that the
requirement in Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution
applies only to decisions of "courts of justice"; that, citing Solid
Homes, Inc. v. Laserna, the constitutional provision does not
extend to decisions or rulings of executive departments such
as the DOJ; and that Section 12(c) of the NPS Rule on Appeal
allows the DOJ to dismiss a petition for review motuproprio,
and the use of the word "outright" in the DOJ Resolution simply
means "altogether," "entirely" or "openly." In his Comment,
respondent counters that the constitutional requirement is not
limited to courts, citing Presidential Ad hoc Fact-Finding
Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, as it extends to quasi-
judicial and administrative bodies, as well as to preliminary
investigations conducted by these tribunals.
ISSUE: Whether or not DOJ Secretary’s Resolution violates
provision of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution?
HELD: No. Under the ruling of Balangauan v. Court of
Appeals, in fact, it iterates that even the action of the Secretary
of Justice in reviewing a prosecutor’s order or resolution via
appeal or petition for review cannot be considered a quasi-
judicial proceeding since the "DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body.
While the [prosecutor] makes that determination, he cannot be
said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately,
that pass judgment on the accused, not the [prosecutor].
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution does not thus extend
to resolutions issued by the DOJ Secretary. Respondent
47
posits, however, that Balangauan finds no application in the
present case for, as the Supreme Court stated, the DOJ
"rectified the shortness of its first resolution by issuing a
lengthier one when it resolved [the therein] respondent[’s] . . .
motion for reconsideration."Respondent’s position fails.
Whether the DOJ in Balangauan issued an extended resolution
in resolving the therein respondent’s motion for reconsideration
is immaterial. The extended resolution did not detract from
settling that the DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body. Respondent’s
citation of Presidential Ad hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans is misplaced as the Ombudsman dismissed the
therein subject complaint prior to any preliminary investigation.
VALDEZ vs COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 85082 February 25, 1991
FACTS: This is a case of double sale of real property where
both vendees registered the sales with Register of Deeds and
each produced their respective owner’s duplicate copy of the
certificate of title to the property. A certain spouse owned a
parcel of land. They executed a special power of attorney of
the said lot in favor of their son Atty. Ante. The said lot has an
occupant to which Atty. Ante offered the lot for sale. But the
former declined due to lack of capacity to but the said lot.
Atty. Ante had the lot subdivided. And Sold the portion
labeled Lot A in favor of the Valdez spouse. A few years later,
he also sold Lot B to the spouses, the herein petitioners. The
spouses demanded the Transfer Certificate of Title of both Lots
A and B from the seller, Atty. Ante. The latter promised to
deliver the said title which the petitioners believed in good faith.
In the meanwhile, the spouses started fencing the
lots. The occupants were told by the spouses that they are
fencing the lot as they purchased it from Atty Ante. As Ante
failed to deliver the title, the spouses filed for adverse claim.
Only to find out the Atty. Ante had the lots used as collateral for
his loan.
Atty. Ante had the TCT’s he promised to the original
buyers canceled and had a new TCT issued in favor of new
buyers in good faith. When the spouses approached Atty. Ante
to inquire as to why he sold the lots to different buyers. Atty.
Ante simply replied that they can file a case against him. Thus
an original case was filed by the couple against Atty. Ante.
The original decision, simply penalized Atty. Ante for
damages as form of claims. But the couple were not satisfied.
For they believed that they have the right to ownership of the
lots.
ISSUE: Who are the rightful owners of the lots?
HELD: The original decision was declared Null and Void. And
the lots were awarded for ownership to the petitioners. “After
considering the evidence on record, this Court finds that
plaintiffs have failed to prove their case as against defendants
who were the occupants but proved their case against
defaulted defendants Antes. The Court finds that there is no
sufficient proof of knowledge or bad faith on the part of the
occupants, and on the basis of existing jurisprudence, a third
person who in good faith purchases and registers a property
cannot be deprived of his title as against plaintiff who had
previously purchased same property but failed to register the
same.
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS
GREGORIO M. ARUELO, JR. VS. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDG, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF BULACAN, BRANCH 17, MALOLOS BULACAN, AND
DANILO F. GATCHALIAN
G.R.No.107852, October 20,1993
Facts: Aruelo and Gatchalian were rival candidates in the May
11,1992 elections for the office of the Vice-Mayor of the
municipality of Balagtas, Province of Bulacan. Gatchalian won
over Aruelo by a margin of four votes, such that on May13,
1992, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed him as
the duly elected Vice-mayor of Balagtas, Bulacan. On
May22,1992, Aruelo filed with the Commission on
Election(COMELEC) a petition seeking to annul Gatchalian’s
proclamation on the ground of “fraudulent alteration and

tampering” of votes in tally sheets and the election returns then
after 11 days, Aruelo filed a petition with the Regional Trial
Court protesting the same election. On June 10, 1992,
Gatchalian was served an Amended Summons from the trial
court, giving him five days within which to answer the petition.
Instead of submitting his answer, Gatchalian filed on June
15,1992 a Motion to Dismiss claiming that the petition was filed
out of time, there was a pending case in COMELEC and
Aruelo failed to pay the prescribed filing fees and cash deposit
on the petition. On July 10,1992, denying Gatchalian’s Motion
to Dismiss and ordering him to file his answer to the petition
within five days from notice, otherwise,” a general denial shall
be deemed to have been entered”.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess jurisdiction when it
allowed respondent Gatchalian to file his pleading beyond five-
day period prescribed in Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure?
Ruling: No. Aruelo filed election protest with the Regional Trial
Court, whose proceeding are governed by the Revised Rules
of Court. Under Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure is not applicable to proceedings before the
regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1,
Part 1 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filling of
motions to dismiss and bill of particulars, shall apply only to
proceedings brought before the COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1,
Part I provides the Applicability – These rules, Except Part VI,
shall apply to all actions and proceedings brought before the
Commission. Part VI apply to election contests and quo
warranto cases cognizable by courts of general or limited
jurisdiction. It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure is it provided that motions to
dismiss and bill of particulars are not allowed in election
protests or quo warranto cases pending before the regular
courts. Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC cannot adopt
a rule prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular
courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning pleadings,
practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme
Court (Art. VIII, Sec 5 [5]). Gatchalian received a copy of the
order of the Regional Trial Court denying his motion for a bill of
particulars on August on August 6,1922. Under Section 1 (b),
The Rule of 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at
least five days to file his answer after the receipt of the order
denying his motion for a bill of particulars. Gatchalian,
therefore, had until August 11, 1992 within which to file his
answer. The Answer with Counter-Protest and Counterclaim
filed by him on August 11,1992 was filed timely.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
MAMERTO T. SEVILLA, JR. vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and RENATO R. SO
G.R. No. 203833 March 19, 2013
FACTS: Sevilla and So were candidates for the position of
Punong Barangay of Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa City during
the October 25, 2010 Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan
Elections. On November 4, 2010, So filed an election protest
with the MeTC on the ground that Sevilla committed electoral
fraud, anomalies and irregularities in all the protested
precincts. The COMELEC Second Division held that certiorari
can be granted despite the availability of appeals when the
questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority, as in the case before it. The COMELEC en banc, by
a vote of 3-3, 8 affirmed the COMELEC Second Division's
ruling. Sevilla argues that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion when it entertained So's petition despite its loss of
jurisdiction to entertain the petition after the court a quo's
dismissal order became final and executory due to So's wrong
choice of remedy. Instead of filing an appeal within five (5)
days from receipt of the Order and paying the required appeal
fee, So filed a motion for reconsideration a prohibited pleading
that did not stop the running of the prescriptive period to file an
appeal. Sevilla also emphasizes that So's petition for certiorari
should not have been given due course since it is not a
substitute for an appeal and may only be allowed if there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. In his Comment, the respondent
contends that the petition was filed prematurely. He
48
emphasizes that the October 6, 2012 Resolution of the
COMELEC en banc was not a majority decision considering
that three Commissioners voted for the denial of the motion for
reconsideration and the three others voted to grant the same.
So notes that the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution was
deliberated upon only by six (6) Commissioners because the
7th Commissioner had not yet been appointed by the President
at that time. Considering that the October 6, 2012 Resolution
was not a majority decision by the COMELEC en banc, So
prays for the dismissal of the petition so that it can be
remanded to the COMELEC for a rehearing by a full and
complete Commission.
ISSUE: Whether or not the majority decision in the COMELEC
en banc resolution lacks legal effect?
RULING: The COMELEC Rules of Procedure specifically
states that if the opinion of the COMELEC en banc is equally
divided, the case shall be reheard. Such rules must be in
accordance with Article IX-A Section 6, “Each Commission en
banc may promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and
practice before it or before any of its offices. Such rules
however shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights.” In the present case, while the October 6, 2012
Resolution of the COMELEC en banc appears to have affirmed
the COMELEC Second Division's Resolution and, in effect,
denied Sevilla's motion for reconsideration, the equally divided
voting between three Commissioners concurring and three
Commissioners dissenting is not the majority vote that the
Constitution and the COMELEC Rules of Procedure require for
a valid pronouncement of the assailed October 6, 2012
Resolution of the COMELEC en banc. The October 6, 2012
COMELEC en banc's Resolution lacks legal effect as it is not a
majority decision required by the Constitution and by the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Thus, for all intents and
purposes, the assailed October 6, 2012 Resolution of the
COMELEC en banc had no legal effect whatsoever except to
convey that the COMELEC failed to reach a decision and that
further action is required. The COMELEC en banc's Resolution
must be reheard pursuant to the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Therefore, the Court resolves to dismiss the
petition for having been prematurely filed with this Court, and
remand the case to the COMELEC for its appropriate action.
The COMELEC en banc is ordered to proceed with the
rehearing with utmost dispatch.
JUNIE EVANGELISTA CUA VS. COMMISSION ON
ELECTION AND RICHARD S. PUZON
G.R. No. 80519-21/156 SCRA 582 DECEMBER 17, 1987
FACTS: The First Division of COMELEC rendered a 2-1
decision favoring the petitioner Cua but nevertheless
suspended his proclamation as winner in the lone
congressional district of Quirino due to the lack of unanimous
vote required by the procedural rules in COMELEC Resolution
No. 1669 dated May 02, 1984. Pursuant to said rules, private
respondent Puzon filed a motion for reconsideration/appeal of
the said decision with the COMELEC in banc, where three
members voted to sustain the First Division, with two
dissenting and one abstaining (one having died earlier). On the
strength of 3-2 vote, Cua moved for his proclamation by the
board of canvassers who granted his motion. Cua took his oath
but the next day Puzon filed with the COMELEC an urgent
motion to suspend Cua’s proclamation or to annul or suspend
its effect if already made. COMELEC then set the motion for
hearing and three days later it issued a restraining telegram
enjoining Cua from assuming the office as member of the
House of Representative. The petitioner then came to SC to
enjoin the COMELEC from acting on the said motion and
enforcing its restraining order.
Section 5 of the said Resolution states that, “A case
being heard by it shall be decided with the unanimous
concurrence of all three Commissioners and its decision shall
be considered a decision of the Commission. If this required
number is not obtained, as when there is a dissenting opinion,
the case may be appealed to the Commission En Banc, in
which case the vote of the majority thereof shall be the
decision of the Commission.”
Petitioner contends that the 2-1 decision of the First
Division was a valid decision despite the Resolution stated

above because of Article IX-A, Section 7 of the Constitution.
He argues that this applies to the voting of the COMELEC both
in division and En Banc.
Respondent on the other hand, insists that no
decision was reached by the First Division because the
required unanimous vote was not obtained. It was also argued
that no valid decision was reached by the COMELEC En Banc
because only three votes were cast in favour of the petitioner
and these did not constitute the majority of the body.
ISSUE: Whether the 2-1 decision of the First Division was
valid.
RULING: Yes. The Court held that the 2-1 decision rendered
by the First Division was a valid decision under Article IX-A,
Section 7 of the Constitution, providing that “each Commission
shall decide by a majority votes of all its members any case or
matter brought before it”. Furthermore, the three members
who voted to affirm the First Division constituted a majority of
the five members who deliberated and voted thereon En Banc
and their decision is also valid under the aforecited
constitutional provision because the voting applies both in
division and en banc.
Hence, the proclamation of Cua on the basis of the
two aforecited decision was a valid act that entitles him now to
assume his seat in the House of Representative.
Raymundo Acena vs. Civil Service Commission and
Josefina Estolas G.R. No.
90780, February 6, 1991
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari to annul the resolution of
the Civil Service Commission which set aside the order of the
Merit Systems Protection Board declaring the herein petitioner
as the legitimate Administrative Officer of Rizal Technological
Colleges.
Petitioner Raymundo T. Acena was appointed on as an
Administrative Officer of Rizal Technological Colleges. His
appointment was approved as permanent by the Civil Service
Commission. Dr. Lydia Profeta extended to petitioner Acena a
promotional appointment as Associate Professor on temporary
status pending his compliance to obtain a Master’s Degree
while assuming the position of Acting Admin Officer at the
same time. The Board of Trustees designated Ricardo
Salvador as Acting Admin Officer and pursuant to the same.
The new College President Dr. Estolas revoked the
designation of the petitioner as acting Admin Officer. Petitioner
sent a letter to the CSC stating his desire to keep his
appointment as Admin Officer instead of Associate Professor.
Thus the latter’s appointment was withdrawn. He also filed a
complaint for injunction of damages to Dr. Estolas assailing the
validity of his dismissal from his position as violation of security
of tenure. He filed another complaint for illegal termination
against Dr. Estolas before the Merit Systems Protection Board
(MSPB). The CSC opined that Acena is still the Admin Officer
since his appointment as Asso. Prof. was withdrawn. Dr.
Estolas filed petition for review to the Office of the President.
The Presidential Staff Director referred the complaint back to
the CSC. In the dispositive portion of its resolution, the CSC
finds the action of Dr. Estolas valid and set aside the previous
opinion made by the CSC and the order of the MSPB. The
petitioner files a petition for certiorari against the CSC decision
on jurisdictional issue.
Issue: Whether or not the public respondent Civil Service
Commission acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion when it set aside the order dated
March 23, 1988 of the Merit Systems Protection Board?
Ruling: It is a settled rule, that a respondent tribunal, board or
officer exercising judicial functions acts without jurisdiction if he
does not have the authority conferred by law to hear and
decide the case. There is excess of jurisdiction where the
respondent has the legal power to decide the case but
oversteps his authority. And there is grave abuse of discretion
where the respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary
or despotic manner in the exercise of his judgment amounting
to lack of jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, it is an admitted fact by no less than the
public respondent Civil Service Commission that private
49
respondent Estolas' petition for review filed on June 16, 1988,
with the Office of the President was filed out of time and with
the wrong forum . Ostensibly, public respondent Civil Service
Commission has the jurisdiction to review the decision of the
MSPB. However, said authority to review can only be
exercised if the party adversely affected by the decision of the
MSPB has filed an appeal with the Commission within the
reglementary period. This being so, the public respondent
exceeded its jurisdiction when it entertained the petition that
was erroneously filed with the Office of the President. Having
exceeded its jurisdiction public respondent committed a
reversible error when it set aside the order dated March 23,
1988 of the MSPB which had long become final and executory.
Vital-Goon v. Court of Appeals 212 SCRA 235
G.R. No. 129132 July 8, 1998
FACTS: Executive Order No. 119 issued on January 30, 1987
by President Corazon Aquino ordered reorganization of the
various offices of the Ministry of Health. At the time of the
reorganization, Dr. Alejandro S. de la Fuente was the Chief of
the Clinics of the National Children's Hospital. Prior thereto, he
occupied the post of Medical Specialist II, a position to which
he was promoted in 1977 after serving as Medical Specialist I
of the same hospital for six (6) years since 1971.
On February 4, 1988 Dr. de la Fuente received notice
from the Department of Health that he would be re-appointed
"Medical Specialist II." Considering this is to be a demotion by
no less than two ranks from his post as Chief of Clinics, Dr. de
la Fuente filed a protest with the DOH Reorganization Board.
When his protest was ignored, he brought his case to the Civil
Service Commission. In the meantime "the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the position of Chief of Clinics
were turned over to and were allowed to be exercised by Dr.
Jose D. Merencilla.
Dr. de la Fuente’s case was decided and declared
that the demotion/transfer of appellant de la Fuente, Jr. from
Chief of Clinics to Medical Specialists II as null and void, the
resolution became final. De la Fuente there upon sent two (2)
letters to Dr. Vital-Gozon, the Medical Center Chief of National
Children’s Hospital, demanding the implementation of the
Commission’s decision but she did not answer Dr. de la
Fuente’s letters or to take steps to comply or otherwise advise
compliance, with the final and executory Resolution of the Civil
Service Commission. She instituted in the Court of Appeals an
action of “ mandamus and damages with preliminary
injunction” to compel Vital-Gozon, and the Administrative
Officer, Budget Officer and Cashier of the NCH to comply with
the final and executory resolution but Vital-Gozon did not
respond to the order of the court. Thus CA declared, that the
said resolution declared dela Fuente as the lawful and de jure
Chief of Respondents, particularly Dr. Isabelita Vital-Gozon,
had no discretion or choice on the matter; the resolution had to
be complied with. A writ of execution was issued thereafter. On
her motion for reconsideration, Vital-Gozon argued that the
Appellate Court had no jurisdiction over the question of
damages in a mandamus action and referred this to the Office
of Solicitor General. Court of Appeals denied the motion and
ruled that the Solicitor General has no authority to appear as
counsel for respondent Gozon.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction,
in a special civil action of mandamus against a public officer, to
take cognizance of the matter of damages sought to be
recovered from the defendant officer.
RULING: The Solicitor General's Office evidently searched
said Section 9 for an explicit and specific statement regarding
"actions for moral and exemplary damages," and finding none,
concluded that the Court of Appeals had not been granted
competence to assume cognizance of claims for such
damages. The conclusion is incorrect. Section 19, governing
the exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in
civil cases, contains no reference whatever to claims "for moral
and exemplary damages," and indeed does not use the word
"damages" at all; yet it is indisputable that said courts have
power to try and decide claims for moral, exemplary and other
classes of damages accompanying any of the types or kinds of
cases falling within their specified jurisdiction. The Solicitor

General's theory that the rule in question is a mere procedural
one allowing joinder of an action of mandamus and another for
damages, is untenable, for it implies that a claim for damages
arising from the omission or failure to do an act subject of a
mandamus suit may be litigated separately from the latter, the
matter of damages not being inextricably linked to the cause of
action for mandamus, which is certainly not the case. It being
quite evident that Dr. Vital-Gozon is not here charged with a
crime, or civilly prosecuted for damages arising from a crime,
there is no legal obstacle to her being represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
resolution was affirmed.
FILIPINAS ENGINEERING AND MACHINE SHOP vs. HON.
JAIME N. FERRER
G.R. No. L-31455 February 28, 1985
FACTS: In preparation for the national elections of November
11, 1969, then respondent Commissioners of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) issued an INVITATION TO BID
CALL No. 127 on September 16, 1969 calling for the
submission of sealed proposals for the manufacture and
delivery of 1 1,000 units of voting booths.
COMELEC awarded the contract to Acme for the
manufacture and supply of voting booths. However, the losing
bidder, petitioner in the instant case, Filipinas Engineering and
Machine Shop filed an Injunction suit against COMELEC and
Acme. The lower court denied the writ prayed for.
Thereafter, ACME filed a motion to Dismiss on the
grounds that the lower court has no jurisdiction over the case
which the court granted. Filipinas' motion for reconsideration
was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this appeal for certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of a suit involving an order of the COMELEC
dealing with an award of contract arising from its invitation to
bid; and
RULING: Finding the petition to be without merit, the same is
dismissed.
The Commission on Elections shall have exclusive
charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws
relative to the conduct of elections and shall exercise all other
functions which may be conferred upon it by law. It shall
decide, save those involving the right to vote, all administrative
questions affecting elections, including the determination of the
number of location of Polling places, and the appointment of
election inspectors and of other election officials. ... The
decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission shall be
subject to review by the Supreme Court. (Section 2, Article X,
1935 Philippine Constitution, which was then in force)
The COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in
favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial
functions but merely as an incident of its inherent
administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and
hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final
order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being
non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the
COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal
by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question
arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil
action before the trial courts.
What is contemplated by the term "final orders, rulings
and decisions" of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by
the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered in
actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken
cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
ANICETO G. MATEO, MAXIMO SAN DIEGO, QUIRINO
MATEO, DANIEL FRANCISCO AND LEONILA KUIZON VS.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTURO A.
MARAVE, AND EDGAR STA. MARIA
G.R. No. 113219/247SCRA 284 AUGUST 14, 1995
FACTS: Upon complaint of some Morong Water District
(MOWAD) employees, petitioners, all Board Members of
MOWAD, conducted an investigation on private respondent
Edgar Sta. Maria, then General Manager. Private respondent
50
was placed under preventive suspension and Maximo San
Diego was designated in his place as Acting General Manager
but was later dismissed.
Private respondent then filed a Special Civil Action for
Quo Warranto and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction
before the RTC of Rizal challenging his dismissal by
petitioners. The petition embodied three causes of action. The
first one says that he is the General Manager of MOWAD since
August 1984 with concomitant security of tenure in office and
could not be removed either temporarily or permanently,
except for cause and only after compliance with the elementary
rules of due process.
However, members of the Board of Directors of the
MOWAD have arbitrarily, whimsically and unilaterally stopped
and prohibited him from exercising his rights and performing
his duties as General Manager of the MOWAD and in his place
designated Maximo San Diego as Acting GM.
Then, while he was out of office on official travel,
petitioners have conspired and helped one another in removing
himfrom the office of the Gen. Mgr. of the MOWAD by forcibly
destroying its door and locked it with replaced door knob that
Sta. Maria can no longer gain access and entry to his office.
Second cause of action was Aniceto Mateo presented
the respondent an Order terminating his services as Gen. Mgr.
Respondent then claimed that he has a clear right to the Office
of the Gen. Mgr. which is being usurped or unlawfully held by
Maximo San Diego.
Third cause of action of the respondent is his petition
for relief of continuous acts of petitioners of stopping him from
exercising his rights and performing his duties as GM of
MOWAD.
Petitioners, in turn moved to dismiss the case on two grounds:
(1) the court has no jurisdiction over disciplinary actions of
gov’t employees which is vested exclusively in the Civil Service
Commission; and (2) quo warranto was not the proper
remedy.RTC denied the motion.
ISSUE: Whether Regional Trial Court of Rizal or the Civil
Service Commission has jurisdiction over a case involving
dismissal of an employee of Morong Water District, a quasi-
public corporation.
RULING: MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created
pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198, known as the
provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended. Employees
of government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission.
The hiring and firing of employees of GOCC are
governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules
and Regulations.
REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 1-95 May 16,
1995 (REVISED CIRCULAR NO. 1-91)
TO: COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF TAX APPEALS,
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, THEGOVERNMENT
CORPORATE COUNSEL, ALL MEMBERS OF THE
GOVERNMENT PROSECUTIONSERVICE, AND ALL
MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.
SUBJECT: Rules Governing appeals to the Court of Appeals
from Judgment or Final Orders of the Court of Tax Appeals
and Quasihelical Agencies.
1. SCOPE. — These rules shall apply to appeals from
judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from
awards,judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized
by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions.Among these agencies are the Civil Service
Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals,
Securities and ExchangeCommission, Land Registration
Authority, Social Security Commission, Office of the President,
Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau ofPatents, Trademarks and
Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration,
Energy Regulatory Board, NationalTelecommunications
Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic
Act 6657, Government Service Insurance System,Employees
Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board,
Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic

EnergyCommission, Board of Investments, and Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission.
2. CASES NOT COVERED. — These rules shall not apply to
judgments or final orders issued under the Labor Code of the
Philippines.
3. WHERE TO APPEAL. — An appeal under these rules may
be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the
mannerherein provided, whether the appeal involves questions
of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.
4. PERIOD OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall be taken within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order
orresolution or from the date of its last publication, if publication
is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of
petitioner's motionfor new trial or reconsideration filed in
accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a
quo. Only one (1) motion forreconsideration shall be allowed.
Upon proper motion and the payment of the full a mount of the
docket fee before the expiration ofthe reglementary period, the
Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15)
days only within which to file the petitionfor review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling
reason and in no case to exceed another period of fifteen (15)
days.
5. HOW APPEAL TAKEN. — Appeal shall be taken by filing a
verified petition for review in seven (7) legible copies with the
Court ofAppeals, with proof of service of a copy thereof on the
adverse party and on the court or agency a quo. The original
copy of thepetition intended for the Court of Appeals shall be
indicated as such by the petitioner. Upon filing the petition for
review, the petitioner shall pay to the Clerk of Court of the
Court of Appeals the docketing and other lawfulfees and
deposit the sum of P500.00 for costs. Exemption from payment
of docketing and other lawful fees and the deposit for costsmay
be granted by the Court of Appeals upon verified motion
setting forth the grounds relied upon. If the Court of Appeals
denies themotion, the petitioner shall pay the docketing and
other lawful fees and deposit for costs within fifteen (15) days
from notice of the denial.
6. CONTENTS OF THE PETITION. — The petition for review
shall (a) state the full names of the parties to the case, without
impleadingthe courts or agencies either as petitioners or
respondents; (b) contain a concise statement of the facts and
issues involved and thegrounds relied upon for the review; (c)
be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or
certified true copy of the award,judgment, final order or
resolution appealed from, together with certified true copies of
such material portions of the record as arereferred to therein
and other supporting papers; and (d) state all the specific
material dates showing that it was filed within thereglementary
period provided herein; and (e) contain a sworn certification
against forum shopping as required in Revised Circular No.
28-91.
7. EFFECT OF FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH
REQUIREMENTS. — The failure of the petitioner to comply
with the foregoingrequirements regarding the payment of the
docket and other lawful fees, the deposit for costs, proof of
service of the petition, and thecontents of and the documents
which should accompany the petition shall be sufficient
grounds for the dismissal thereof.
8. ACTION ON THE PETITION. — The Court of Appeals may
require the respondent to file a comment on the petition, not a
motion todismiss, within ten (10) days from notice. The Court,
however, may dismiss the petition if it finds the same to be
patently without merit, prosecuted manifestly for delay, or that
the questions raised therein are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.
9. CONTENTS OF COMMENT. — The comment shall be filed
within ten (10) days from notice in seven (7) legible copies
andaccompanied by clearly legible certified true copies of such
material portions of the record referred to therein together with
othersupporting papers. It shall point out insufficiencies or
inaccuracies in petitioner's statement of facts and issues, and
51
state the reasonswhy the petition should be denied or
dismissed. A copy thereof shall be served on the petitioner,
and proof of such service shall be filed with the Court of
Appeals.
10. DUE COURSE. — If upon the filing of the comment or such
other pleadings or documents as may be required or allowed
by theCourt of Appeals or upon the expiration of period for the
filing thereof, and on the bases of the petition or the record the
Court ofAppeals finds prima facie that the court or agencies
concerned has committed errors of fact or law that would
warrant reversal ormodification of the award, judgment, final
order or resolution sought to be reviewed, it may give due
course to the petition; otherwise, itshall dismiss the same. The
findings of fact of the court or agency concerned, when
supported by substantial evidence, shall be binding on the
Court of Appeals.
11. TRANSMITTAL OF RECORD. — Within fifteen (15) days
from notice that the petition has been given due course, the
Court ofAppeals may re-quire the court or agency concerned to
transmit the original or a legible certified true copy of the entire
record of theproceeding under review. The record to be
transmitted may be abridged by agreement of all parties to the
proceeding. The Court of Appeals may require or permit
subsequent correction of or addition to the record.
12. EFFECT OF APPEAL. — The appeal shall not stay the
award, judgment, final order or resolution sought to be
reviewed unless the Court of Appeals shall direct otherwise
upon such terms as it may deem just.
13. SUBMISSION FOR DECISION. — If the petition is given
due course, the Court of Appeals may set the case for oral
argument orrequire the parties to submit memoranda within a
period of fifteen (15) days from notice. The case shall be
deemed submitted fordecision upon the filing of the last
pleading or memorandum required by these rules or by the
Court itself.
14. TRANSITORY PROVISIONS. — All petitions for certiorari
against the Civil Service Commission and The Central Board
ofAssessment Appeals filed and pending in the Supreme Court
prior to the effectivity of this Revised Administrative Circular
shall betreated as petitions for review hereunder and shall be
transferred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate disposition.
Petitions forcertiorari against the aforesaid agencies which
may be filed after the effectivity hereof and up to June 30, 1995
shall likewise beconsidered as petitions for review and shall be
referred to the Court of Appeals for the same purpose.
In both instances, for purposes of the period of appeal
contemplated in Section 4 hereof, the date of receipt by the
Court of Appeals ofthe petitions thus transferred or referred to
it shall be considered as the date of the filing thereof as
petitions for review, and the Courtof Appeals may require the
filing of amended or supplemental pleadings and the
submission of such further documents or records asit may
deem necessary in view of and consequent to the change in
the mode of appellate review.
15. REPEALING CLAUSE. — Rules 43 and 44 of the Rules of
Court are hereby repealed and superseded by this Circular.
16. EFFECTIVITY. — This Circular shall be published in two
(2) newspapers of general circulation and shall take effect on
June 1, 1995. May 16, 1995.
(Sgd.) ANDRES R. NARVASA Chief Justice
COMMISSION ON ELECTION
RENATO CAYETANO vs CHRISTIAN MONSOD, et. al.
G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991
201 SCRA 210
FACTS: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by
President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the
Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not

possess the required qualification of having been engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed
the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On
June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a
citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the consequent
appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on
Elections be declared null and void.
ISSUE: Whether the appointment of Chairman Monsod of
Comelec violates Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution?
HELD: The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article
IX-C, that there shall be a Commission on Elections composed
of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-
born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a
college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding elections.
However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine
Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade
of 86.55%. He has been dues paying member of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-1973. He has
also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for
more than ten years. Hence, the Commission on the basis of
evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possesses the
necessary qualifications as required by law.
SIXTO S. BRILLANTES, JR., Petitioner, vs. HAYDEE B.
YORAC, in her capacity as ACTING CHAIRPERSON of the
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
[G.R. No. 93867 : December 18, 1990.]
192 SCRA 358
Facts: In December 1989, due to coup d' etat attempt
President of the Philippines created a fact finding-commission
which would be chaired by Hilario Davide. Consequently, he
has to leave his chairmanship in the Commission on Elections.
Haydee Yorac, an associate commissioner in the COMELEC,
was appointed by then President Corazon Aquino as an Acting
Commissioner of CCOMELEC. Sixto Brillantes, Jr., petitioner
herein questioned such appointment urging Commission on
Elections as an independent constitutional body and the
specific provision of Article IX-C, Section 1(2) of the
Constitution that "(I)n no case shall any Member (of the
Commission on Elections) be appointed or designated in a
temporary or acting capacity."
The petitioner further contends that the choice of the
Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections is an internal
matter that should be resolved by the members themselves
and that the intrusion of the President of the Philippines
violates their independence. He cites the practice in this Court,
where the senior Associate Justice serves as Acting Chief
Justice in the absence of the Chief Justice. No designation
from the President of the Philippines is necessary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the designation made by the President
violates the constitutional independence of the COMELEC.
HELD: Yes, Yorac’s designation as acting chairman is
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court ruled although essentially
executive in nature, they are not under the control of the
President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective
functions. Each of these Commissions conducts its own
proceedings under the applicable laws and its own rules and in
the exercise of its own discretion. The designation made by the
president has dubious justification as it was merely grounded
on the quote “administrative expediency” to present the
functions of the COMELEC. In the choice of the Acting
Chairman, the members of the Commission on Elections would
most likely have been guided by the seniority rule as they
52
themselves would have appreciated it. In any event, that
choice and the basis thereof were for them and not the
President to make. To emphasize the importance of the
COMELEC’s constitutionally guaranteed independence, the
Court said that the choice of a temporary Chairman is an
internal matter which comes under their discretion of the
Commission a body and that such discretion cannot be
exercised for the Commission by anybody else.
But even though the president’s appointment of Yorac
as acting president is void, the members of COMELEC can
choose to reinstate Yorac as their acting Chairman. What is
that the members should elect their acting chairman pursuant
to the principles that constitutional commissions are
guaranteed by the Constitution as an independent bodies.
CONRADO LINDO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
[G.R. No. 127311. June 19, 1997]
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for
temporary restraining order Petitioner Conrado Lindo is the
newly appointed Mayor of the Municipality of Ternate, Cavite
and his main rival Rosario Velasco the incumbent mayor filed
petition protest against him with the RTC of Naic, Cavite,
contesting the results of the election in all 19 precincts. After
the review of the ballots of the assisting judge Emerito M.
Agcaoili, he declared Rosario Velasco as the duly elected
mayor of Ternate, Cavite. Petitioner Lindo, filed a notice of
appeal with the trial court and appealed the trial court’s
decision with the COMELEC. A second judge took over the
case and after examining the ballots, he issued the writ of
execution directing the PNP Director of Cavite to implement
the writ and install Rosario Velasco as mayor of Tarnate,
Cavite. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with the COMELEC, with prayer for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction to prevent the implementation of the
Order and writ of execution. COMELEC issued a Resolution,
which denied the petition for certiorari and lifted the preliminary
injunction. It ruled that the trial court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in granting the motion for execution
pending appeal since on the basis alone of the physical count
of ballots, private respondent would still be ahead of petitioner
by 90 votes. It also held that the examination of original ballots
shall be made at the appeal proper to dispose of all the issues
relative to the merits of the case.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC committed a grave
abuse of discretion when it sustained the execution of the trial
court's decision despite the COMELEC's finding that the
decision was based only on the xerox copy of the contested
ballots and that fake and spurious ballots may have been
introduced in the ballot boxes to increase the votes of private
respondent
Ruling: No, Comelec did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion. COMELEC's statement that fake and spurious
ballots may have been introduced to increase the votes of
protestant was taken out of context. Thus, it cannot be made
as basis for denying the execution pending appeal. To be
precise, the COMELEC merely said that there is a possibility
that fake and spurious ballots were placed in the ballot box to
increase private respondent's votes, but the COMELEC
correctly ruled that an examination of the ballots to resolve the
petition for certiorari is not proper at said time for the only issue
it resolved was whether there was a grave abuse of discretion
in granting the execution pending appeal.
Antonio Gallardo, Antonio Arevalo, Cresencio Echaves,
Emmanuel Aranas, Palermo Sia, Ronnie Rambuyon, Primo
Navarro, and Noel Navarro, Petitioners,
vs.
Hon. Sinforoso V. Tabamo, JR., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 28 of the Regional Trial Court
of Mambajao, Camiguin, and Pedro P. Romualdo,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 104848 January 29, 1993
Facts: Cong. Pedro P. Romualdo and Gov. Antonio R.
Gallardo were both candidates in the May 11, 1992 elections
for the positions of congressmen and governor, respectively, of

Camiguin. They belonged to opposing political factions and
were in a bitter electoral battle.
On April 10, 1992 or about a month before the elections, Cong.
Romualdo filed a petition docketed as Special Civil Action No.
465 before the RTC of Camiguin (Br. 28) presided over by
respondent Judge Tabamo against Gov. Gallardo, the
Provincial Treasurer, the Provincial Auditor, the Provincial
Engineer, and the Provincial Budget Officer as respondents. In
this petition Cong. Romualdo sought to prohibit and restrain
the respondents from undertaking and/or pursuing
certain public works projects and from disbursing,
releasing, and/or spending public funds for said projects,
allegedly because, among other reasons, said projects were
undertaken in violation of the 45-day ban on public works
imposed by the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881). On the
same day, Judge Tabamo issued a temporary restraining order
and required the petitioner to answer the petition within 10
days from receipt. The petitioner received the copy of the
restraining order, (being a lawyer) saw that it is not within the
jurisdiction of the RTC. Hence this instant case, questioning
the issuance of the temporary restraining order and the
jurisdiction of the court over Special Civil Action No. 465.
Issue: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over cases involving
violations of the Omnibus Election Code?
Ruling: No. The COMELEC is vested by the Constitution (Art
IX-C, Sec 2(2)) with the exclusive [original jurisdiction] charge
of the enforcement of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections, the assumption of jurisdiction by the trial court over a
case involving the enforcement of the Election Code.
Relampagos vs. Cumba, 243 SCRA 690
G.R. No. 118861
April 27, 1995
Facts: In the synchronized elections of May 11, 1992, the
petitioner and private respondent were candidates for the
position of Mayor in the municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del
Norte. The latter was proclaimed the winning candidate.
Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election
protest with the RTC of Agusan del Norte. On June 29, 1994,
the trial court, per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found the
petitioner to have won with a margin of six votes over the
private respondent and rendered judgement in favor of the
petitioner. The private respondent appealed the decision to the
COMELEC which was later on given a due course by the trial
court. The petitioner then filed with the trial court a motion for
execution pending appeal. The trial court granted the
petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal despite the
opposition of the private respondent. The corresponding writ of
execution was forthwith issued. Thereafter, the private
respondent filed a motion for a reconsideration which was later
on denied. The private respondent then filed with the
respondent COMELEC a petition for certiorari to annul the
aforesaid order of the trial court granting the motion for
execution pending appeal and the writ of execution. The
COMELEC granted the petition on February 9, 1995, ordering
the petitioner Rosita Cumba is ordered restored to her position
as Municipality Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte,
upholding its exclusive authority to decide petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus where the COMELEC
maintains that there is a special law granting it such jurisdiction
Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in full force as it
was not expressly repealed by the Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. Blg. 881).
Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction
Held: Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 remains in full force and
effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph (2),
Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the
authority to issue the extraordinary writs of certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction. Moreover, the court points out that the petitioner
made an appeal after which the court already divested its
53
jurisdiction over the case to the comelec therefore it could no
longer validly act upon its motion
NORBI H. EDDING, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
PABLO BERNARDO
G.R. No. 112060 July 17, 1995
Facts: During the May 1992 elections, Edding and Bernardo
were among the candidates for the office of the municipal
mayor of Sibuco Zamboanga del Norte. After the canvassing of
the election returns, Bernardo was declared winner over
Edding by 212 votes. Unconvinced and alleging massive
election fraud, Edding filed an election protest on June 9, 1992
with the Regional Trial Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del
Norte.Upon termination of the protest proceedings and
recounting of the ballots, the RTC rendered judgment on July
2, 1993 proclaiming Edding as the winner of the election for the
mayoralty seat of Sibuco, Zamboanga del Norte, and declaring
as null and void the election of respondent Bernardo. On July
8, 1993, Bernardo filed a Notice of Appeal while Edding moved
for the immediate execution of the July 2, 1993 decision.
Bernardo opposed Edding's motion, claiming that the RTC has
no jurisdiction to order execution pending appeal, and invoked
Section 17 of Ruler 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
which allows execution only if the judgment has become final.
On July 12, 1993, the RTC Approved Bernardo's Notice of
Appeal. On the next day, however, July 13, 1993, the RTC
granted Edding's Motion for Immediate Execution, and ordered
the records of the case to be forwarded to the COMELEC.
Thereafter, Edding replaced Bernardo, and assumed office on
the July 15, 1993. On July 16, 1993, Bernardo filed with the
COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari with Application for
Preliminary Injunction and for Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order seeking to enjoin the Order of the RTC
granting execution pending appeal. The COMELEC gave due
course to the petition, and issued a temporary restraining order
on July 19, 1993.Finally, the COMELEC issued the assailed
Order on September 23, 1993, which Edding received on
October 12, 1993.
Issue: Whether or not the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) has jurisdiction to issue Writs of Certiorari against
the interlocutory order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
election cases.
Ruling: Yes. under paragraph (2), Section 1, Article IX-C of
the Constitution, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus but
only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
In the instant case, the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it enjoined the order of the RTC,
dated July 13, 1993, granting petitioner's motion for immediate
execution. Bernardo 's petition for certiorari with application for
a writ of preliminary injunction before the COMELEC is
anchored on the former's claim that the trial court acted without
or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in
granting execution despite the filling of a notice of appeal by
private respondent within the reglementary period. It appears
however that on July 8, 1993, the same day when private
respondent filed his notice of appeal with the RTC, petitioner in
turn filed his motion for immediate execution. Both actions
were therefore seasonably filed within the five-day
reglementary period for filling an appeal since the decision of
the RTC was promulgated in open court on July 8, 1993. The
settled rule is that the mere filing of a notice of appeal does not
divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over a case and resolve
pending incidents. Where the motion for execution pending,
appeal was filed within the reglementary period for perfecting
an appeal, as in the case at bench, the filing of a notice of
appeal by the opposing party is of no moment and does not
divest the trial court of its jurisdiction to resolve the motion for
immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal because
the court must hear and resolve it for it would become part of
the records to be elevated on appeal.
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES vs. THE COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN
G.R. No. 207264, October 22, 2013

FACTS: On May 14, 2013, in its Resolution, the COMELEC
En Banc has already denied for lack of merit the petitioner's
motion to reconsider the decision of the COMELEC First
Division that cancelled petitioner's certificate of candidacy and
had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner's lack of
Filipino citizenship and residency. On May 18, 2013, there was
already a standing and unquestioned cancellation of
petitioner's certificate of candidacy which cancellation is a
definite bar to her proclamation. On that same day, that bar
has not been removed, there was not even any attempt to
remove it. The COMELEC Rules indicate the manner by which
the impediment to proclamation may be removed. Rule 18,
Section 13 (b) provides: "(b) In Special Actions and Special
Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission En Banc
shall become final and executory after five (5) days from its
promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court." Within
that five (5 days, petitioner had the opportunity to go to the
Supreme Court for a restraining order that will remove the
immediate effect of the En Banc cancellation of her certificate
of candidacy. Within the five (5) days the Supreme Court may
remove the barrier to, and thus allow, the proclamation of
petitioner. However, the petitioner did not move to have it
happen. Her certificate of candidacy has been ordered
cancelled. She could not be proclaimed because there was a
final finding against her by the COMELEC. She needed a
restraining order from the Supreme Court to avoid the final
finding. What petitioner, without any legal remedy obtained or
was available, did was to "take the law into her hands" and
secure a proclamation in complete disregard of the COMELEC
En Banc decision that was final on 14 May 2013 and final and
executory five days thereafter. Petitioner, assails that the
House of the Representatives Electoral Tribunal has exclusive
jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of the House of
Representatives and not the COMELEC. For this reason, this
Motion for Reconsideration of the En Banc Resolution of 25
June 2013 that found no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution
of the COMELEC En Banc that affirmed the 27 March 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division.
ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction over the
petitioner who is proclaimed as winner and who has already
taken her oath of office for the position of member of the
House of Representative of Marinduque.
HELD: Yes, COMELEC retains jurisdiction because the
jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is
considered a Member of the House of Representatives. The
House of the Representatives Electoral Tribunal is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives
is a written constitutional provision. It is, however unavailable
to petitioner because she is NOT a Member of the House at
present. The COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as
the rightful winner in the election for such membership. The
action for cancellation of petitioner's certificate of candidacy,
the decision in which is the indispensable determinant of the
right of petitioner to proclamation, was correctly lodged in the
COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated was finally
decided by the COMELEC. The decision sealed the
proceedings in the COMELEC regarding petitioner's ineligibility
as a candidate for Representative of Marinduque. The decision
erected the bar to petitioner's proclamation. The bar remained
when no restraining order was obtained by petitioner from the
Supreme Court within five days from 14 May 2013.
Furthermore, petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave
abuse of discretion, which must be patent and gross, is alleged
and proved to exist. The Court finds that petitioner failed to
adequately and substantially show that grave abuse of
discretion exists. Hence, the Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by the Supreme Court.
JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO VS. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
ET. AL.
G.R. No. 199082 JULY 23, 2013
FACTS: On August 15, 2011, COMELEC and the DOJ issued
a Joint Order creating and constituting a Joint Committee and
Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections
electoral fraud and manipulation cases.
54
In its Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team
concluded that manipulation on the results in the May 14, 2007
senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South
Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated. It
recommended that petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, GMA, and
Mike Arroyo be subjected to preliminary investigation for
electoral sabotage and manipulating the election results.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate
Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ
of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint
Panel.
On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the
assailed Decision which states:
1. Petitions and supplemental petitions are DISMISSED
and the Fact-Finding Teams Initial Report dated October 20,
2011 are declared VALID. However, the Rules of Procedure
on the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged
Election Fraud in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections is
declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.
2. The Joint Panel and the proceedings having been
conducted in accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, the conduct of the preliminary investigation is
hereby declared VALID.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel
undermines the decisional independence of the COMELEC.
2. Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary
investigation only when deputized by the COMELEC but not
exercise concurrent jurisdiction
RULING:
1. The creation of the Joint Committee of COMELEC
and the DOJ does not undermine the independence of the
COMELEC as a constitutional body because it is still the
COMELEC that ultimately determines probable cause in
accordance with the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
2. The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to
the concept of “concurrent jurisdiction” authorized by the
amendatory law. The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means
equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter. There
is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between
two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation
where one files a complaint against a respondent initially with
one office (such as the COMELEC) for preliminary
investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office
and the re-filing of the same complaint with another office
(such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction
by the second office over cases filed will not be allowed.
Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that first
takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of the others.Hence, DOJ can exercise concurent
jurisdiction with COMELEC and not only to conduct
preliminary investigation when deputized by said office.
Salic Dumarpa vs. Commission on Elections, G. R. No.
192249, April 02, 2013
Facts: Dumarpa was a congressional candidate for the 1st
District of Lanao del Sur at the 10 May 2010 elections. The
COMELEC declared a total failure of elections in seven (7)
municipalities, including the three (3) Municipalities of Masiu,
Lumba Bayabao and Kapai, which are situated in the 1st
Congressional District of Province of Lanao del Sur.
The conduct of special elections in the seven
municipalities was originally scheduled for 29 May 2010 but
was reset to 3 June 2010 because: aside from the 7
municipalities, there are precincts in 8 other municipalities
where there were failure of elections; the results of elections in
the said municipalities will affect the elections not only in the
provincial but also in the municipal level; there are missing
ballots in some precincts; some of the BEIs are not willing to
serve or are disqualified due to relationship; the Precinct Count
Optical Scan (PCOS) assigned in the said municipalities were
already pulled out by Smartmatic; there is a need for the newly

constituted BEIs to undergo training and certification as
required under R.A. 9369 and last, there is a need to review
the manning of Comelec personnel in the municipal level and
assess their capabilities to discharge their duties and functions
not only as an Election Officer but also as Chairman of the
Board of Canvassers.
Dumarpa filed a Motion for Reconsideration concerning only
Sections 4 and 12 thereof as it may apply to the Municipality of
Masiu, Lanao del Sur. The COMELEC did not act on
Dumarpa’s motion. A day before the scheduled special
elections, on 2 June 2010, Dumarpa filed the instant petition
alleging that “both provisions on Re-clustering of Precincts
(Section 12) and constitution of SBEIs [Special Board of
Election Inspectors] (Section 4).
Issues:
1. Whether or not section 12 of COMELEC resolution
no. 8965 is illegal or void?
2. Whether or not section 4 of COMELEC resolution no.
8965 is illegal or void?
3. Whether or not the commission on elections, acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, in incorporating, providing, or issuing section 12
and section 4 in said resolution no. 8965
Ruling: Petition Denied. The special elections held on 3 June
2010 mooted the issues posed by Dumarpa. The opponent of
Dumarpa was proclaimed winner in the 1st Congressional
District of Lanao del Sur. The event mooted the present
petition as the issues raised herein are resolvable in the
election protest.
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8965, in the
exercise of its plenary powers in the conduct of elections
enshrined in the Constitution. COMELEC’s broad power to
“enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall,” carries with it all necessary and incidental powers for it
to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections.
The purity of the elections is one of the most
fundamental requisites of popular government. The
Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate, must do
everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of
the votes cast in the elections. In the performance of its duties,
the Commission must be given considerable latitude in
adopting means and methods that will insure the
accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created
- to promote free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice of
means taken by the Commission on Elections, unless they are
clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should
not be inferred with.
Marc Douglas Cagas vs. Comelec
G.R. No. 209185, October 25, 2013
FACTS: This Resolution resolves the Petition for Prohibition
filed by petitioner in his capacity as taxpayer, to prohibit the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting a
plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao Occidental
simultaneously with the 28 October 2013 Barangay Elections
within the whole province of Davao del Sur, except in Davao
City.
On 9 October 2013, petitioner filed the
present petition for prohibition citing three (3) causes of action
to wit:
1. COMELEC is without authority or legal basis to
AMEND or MODIFY Section 46 of Republic Act No. 10360 by
mere MINUTE RESOLUTION because it is only CONGRESS
who can validly amend, repel or modify existing laws, thus
COMELEC act in suspending the holding of a plebiscite is
unconstitutional;
2. COMELEC is without authority or legal basis to
hold a plebiscite this coming October 28, 2013 for the creation
of the Province of Davao Occidental because Section 46 of
Republic Act No. 10360 has already lapsed; and
3. Petitioner has no other adequate remedy to prevent
the COMELEC from holding the Plebiscite on October 28,
55
2013 for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental
except through the issuance of Temporary Restraining Order
and Preliminary Injunction because COMELEC had already
commenced the preparation for holding of the Plebiscite for the
creation of the Province of Davao Occidental synchronizing it
with that of the Barangay and SK elections this coming
October 28, 2013.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC act without or in excess
of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it resolved to hold the
plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao
simultaneous with the Barangay Elections?
RULING: The COMELEC’s power to administer elections
includes the power to conduct a plebiscite beyond the
schedule prescribed by law. The conduct of a plebiscite is
necessary for the creation of a province in reference to
Sections 10 and 11 of Article X of the Constitution provide that:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay
may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
political units directly affected.
Sec. 11. The Congress may, by law, create special
metropolitan political subdivisions, subject to a plebiscite as set
forth in Section 10 hereof. The component cities and
municipalities shall retain their basic autonomy and shall be
entitled to their own local executive and legislative assemblies.
The jurisdiction of the metropolitan authority that will thereby
be created shall be limited to basic services requiring
coordination.
The Constitution does not specify a date as to when
plebiscites should be held. The Constitution recognizes that
the power to fix the date of elections is legislative in nature,
which is shown by the exceptions in previously mentioned
Constitutional provisions, as well as in the election of local
government officials. To demand now that the COMELEC
desist from holding the plebiscite would be an utter waste of
time, effort and resources, not to mention its detriment to public
interest given that public funds are involved. In election law,
the right of suffrage should prevail over mere scheduling
mishaps in holding elections or plebiscites. Indeed, Cagas
insistence that only Congress can cure the alleged legal
infirmity in the date of holding the plebiscite for the creation of
the Province of Davao Occidental fails in light of the absence
of abuse of discretion of the COMELEC. Finally, this Court
finds it unacceptable to utilize more of our taxpayers time and
money by preventing the COMELEC from holding the
plebiscite as now scheduled.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition for lack of
merit.
COMELEC vs. SILVA
G.R. No. 129417 February 10, 1998
FACTS: COMELEC charged private respondents Erasto
Tanciongco and Norma Castillo with violations of Sec. 27 of
R.A. No. 6646, together with Zenon Uy, in twelve separate
informations filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bataan.
Tanciongco, who is provincial prosecutor of Bataan, was vice
chairman, while Castillo, who is division superintendent of
schools, was secretary of the Provincial Board of Canvassers
of Bataan. Uy, who is assistant regional director of elections,
was chairman of the board. In each information, the three were
accused of having tampered, in conspiracy with one another,
with the certificates of canvass by increasing the votes
received by then senatorial candidate Juan Ponce Enrile in
certain municipalities of Bataan in the May 8, 1995 elections.
The Private Respondents moved for the Dismissal of
the Cases filed against them. The Chief State Prosecutor, who
had been designated by the Commission on Elections to
prosecute the cases, filed a comment joining in private
respondents' request. Eventually, the cases were dismissed.
The COMELEC sought to appeal the dismissal of the cases to
the Court of Appeals. When the Chief State Prosecutor was
required to comment, he stated that he cannot give his
conformity to the Notice of Appeal filed by the Comelec as it
would not be consistent with his position that he would abide

by whatever finding the court may come up with on the
existence of probable cause as against the Private
Respondents. Thus, the judges denied due course to the
appeal. The sole basis for the denial was the fact that the
prosecutor, whom the COMELEC had deputized to prosecute
the cases, had earlier taken a contrary stand against the
COMELEC.
ISSUE: Who has the authority to decide whether or not to
appeal from the orders of dismissal — the COMELEC or its
designated prosecutor?
RULING: Whether the orders of dismissal should be appealed
is for the COMELEC to decide, not for Chief State Prosecutor
whom it has merely deputized to represent in it court. The 1987
Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate
but also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This
means that the COMELEC is empowered to conduct
preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses
for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause
and for filing information in court. This power is exclusive with
COMELEC.
Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to
prosecute the cases act as its deputies. They derive their
authority from it and not from their offices. Consequently, it was
beyond the power of Chief State Prosecutor to oppose the
appeal of the COMELEC. For that matter, it was beyond his
power, as COMELEC-designated prosecutor, to leave to the
trial courts the determination of whether there was probable
cause for the filing of the cases and, if it found none, whether
the cases should be dismissed.
Atty. Rosauro I. Torres vs. Commission on Elections and
Vicente Rafael A. De Peralta 270 SCRA 583, G.R.
No. 121031, March 26, 1997
Facts: This case involves the power of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to annul the proclamation of a winning
candidate for Municipal Councilor in view of an error in the
computation of totals in the Statement of Votes which was
made the basis of the proclamation, and to direct the Municipal
Board of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the rightful
winner.
On May 9, 1995 the Municipal Board of Canvassers
of Tanza, Cavite issued a Certificated of Canvass of Votes
and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates of the Municipal
Offices (Councilors) where petitioner Rosauro Torres was
proclaimed as fifth winning candidate for councilor. Two days
after, the same Municipal Board of Canvassers requested the
COMELEC for correction of the number of votes garnered by
the petitioner. The votes intended for Mr. Dimaala in the
subtotal was erroneously added to Mr. Torres. Mr. Torres
should have been number ten (10) in the winning column and
that Mr. Peralta should have landed in the 7th position.
Petitioner filed his answer alleging that the subject matter of
the letter-petition, which was the correction of votes garnered
by him, properly falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant
to Sec. 251of the Omnibus Election Code. After due course,
respondent COMELEC issued the assailed en banc resolution
granting the letter-request for the correction of the number of
votes garnered by petitioner
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC acted without or in excess of
its jurisdiction in granting the request of the Municipal Board of
Canvassers to correct the votes garnered by petitioner and in
ordering the proclamation of private respondent?
Ruling: No. The position of COMELEC is well-taken. Sec. 7,
Rule 27, of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides the
Correction of Errors in Tabulation or Tallying of Results by the
Board of Canvassers. (a) where it is clearly shown before
proclamation that manifest errors were committed in the
tabulation or tallying of election returns, or certificates of
canvass, during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the
election returns of one precinct or two or more copies of a
certificate of canvass were tabulated more than once, (2) two
copies of the election returns or certificate of canvass were
tabulated separately, (3) there was a mistake in the adding or
copying of the figures into the certificate of canvass or into the
statement of votes by precinct, or (4) so-called election returns
56
from non-existent precincts were included in the canvass, the
board may motu proprio or upon verified petition by any
candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political
parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the errors
committed.
The Statement of Votes is merely a tabulation per
precinct of the votes obtained by the candidates as reflected in
the election returns. What is involved in the instant case is
simple arithmetic. In making the correction in the computation
the Municipal Board of Canvassers acted in an administrative
capacity under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.
Pursuant to its constitutional function to decide questions
affecting elections, the COMELEC En Banc has authority to
resolve any question pertaining to the proceedings of the
Municipal Board of Canvassers.
RODULFO SARMIENTO vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 105628, August 6, 1992
Facts: The case at bar seeks to set aside the decisions of the
Commission on Elections on 9 special cases which were heard
and decided by the Comelec En Banc. Petitioners impugn the
decision of the Comelec as issued with grave abuse of
discretion because it heard and decided the cases En Banc
without first referring them to any of its Divisions.
1. G.R. No. 105628 – SPC No. 92-266
2. G.R. No. 105725 – SPC No. 92-323
3. G.R. No. 105727 – SPC No. 92-288
4. G.R. No. 105730 – SPC No. 92-315
5. G.R. No. 105771 – SPC No. 92-271
6. G.R. No. 105778 – SPC No. 92-039
7. G.R. No. 105797 – SPC No. 92-153
8. G.R. No. 105919 – SPC No. 92-293
9. G.R. No. 105977 – SPC No. 92-087
Issue: Whether or not the rulings of the Comelec En Banc,
instead of first referring it to its Divisions, where issued with
grave abuse of discretion.
Ruling: Yes. In its decision, the Supreme Court cited Section
3, subdivision C, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which
states that “the Comelec may sit En Banc or in 2 divisions, and
shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite
disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation
controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of
decisions shall be decided by the commission en banc.” From
the above quoted provision, the Supreme Court interpreted it
that all election cases including pre-proclamation cases must
first be heard and decided by the Comelec in its divisions, and
any motions for reconsiderations will then be heard by the
commission en banc. Since the commission heard and decided
the 9 cases en banc without referring it to its divisions, the
commission acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Consequently, the Supreme Court decided that the
resolutions are null and void and must be set aside.
Aquiles U. Reyes vs Regional Trial Court of Mindoro,
Branch XXXIX, Commision on Elecetions, Adolfo G. Comia
and the Sangguniang Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro
244 SCRA 41, G.R. No. 108886, May 5, 1995
Facts: The petitioner and the private respondent were
candidates for the position of the member of Sangguniang
Bayan of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro. Comia moved for the
exclusion of certain election returns, on the ground of serious
irregularity in counting in favor of petitioner Aquiles Reyes
votes cast for "Reyes" only, considering that there was another
candidate (Epitacio Reyes) bearing the same surname.
However, without resolving his petition, the Municipal Board of
Canvassers (MBC) proclaimed on the same day petitioner as
the eighth winning candidate with 7,205 votes. After two days,
petitioner took his oath of office. Comia filed an election protest
before the trial court alleging 1) that in the Statement of Votes
by City/Municipality or Precinct, the total number of votes
garnered by him is only 858 votes, when in fact and in truth,
after reviewing and correcting the computation of the actual
votes garnered the total votes to be counted in his favor is 915
votes 2) that the MBC and the Election Registrar of Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro, after having been informed of the said

discrepancies, manifested in the presence of Municipal Trial
Court Judge Leynes that it was an honest mistake committed
in the computation and the addition of the total number of votes
3) that after correcting the total number of votes garnered by
the him, it appears now that the total votes cast in his favor in
all precincts is 7,233 votes which is more than 28 votes over
the total of 7,205 votes garnered by Reyes, who was
proclaimed as Elected Sangguniang Bayan Member. Reyes
filed a motion to dismiss private respondent's petition on the
ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary period of ten
days from proclamation. The trial court denied his motion. MBC
filed its answer in which it admitted that it had made a mistake
in crediting private respondent with only 858 votes when he
was entitled to 915 votes in the Statement of Votes.
Consequently, the trial court rendered its decision annulling the
proclamation of Reyes and declared Comia as the eighth
winning candidate. Reyes filed a notice of appeal to the
COMELEC. In addition, he filed a petition for mandamus and
prohibition in the Court of Appeals, to compel the Sangguniang
Bayan to recognize him as the duly proclaimed member of that
body and prohibit it from further recognizing private
respondent.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC’s First Division
committed grave abuse of discretion
RULING: No, the COMELEC’s First Division and the trial court
did not commit grave abuse of discretion. The Solicitor
General, in behalf of the COMELEC, contends that the filing of
the petition, without petitioner first filing a motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc, violates Art. IX,
A, §7 of the Constitution because under this provision only
decisions of the COMELEC en banc may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari.
Since a basic condition for bringing such action is that
the petitioner first file a motion for reconsideration, it follows
that petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the First Division of the COMELEC is fatal to his
action.Conformably to these provisions of the Constitution all
election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, must
be decided by the COMELEC in division. Should a party be
dissatisfied with the decision, he may file a motion for
reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. It is, therefore,
the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc that, in
accordance with Art. IX, A, §7, "may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari."
As provided for by Rule 22 §9 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, the appeal may be dismissed upon motion
of either party or at the instance of the Commission upon
failure to pay the appeal fee. Petitioner is, however, estopped
to raise this question now. He did not only appeal from the
decision of the trial court to the COMELEC, but he also filed a
petition for mandamus and prohibition in the Court of Appeals.
He should not be allowed to file the present petition just
because he lost in those cases. Hence, petition is dismissed
for lack of merit
National Press Club vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 102653 March 5, 1992
Facts: This is a petition for 3 consolidated petitions which
consists of the representatives of the mass media which are
prevented from selling or donating space and time for political
advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for
office (one for national and the other for provincial office) in the
coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers and voters who
claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of
credentials of the candidates is being curtailed.
It is principally argued by petitioners that Section 11
(b) of Republic Act No. 6646 invades and violates the
constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression.
Petitioners maintain that the prohibition imposed by Section 11
(b) amounts to censorship, because it selects and singles out
for suppression and repression with criminal sanctions, only
publications of a particular content, namely, media-based
election or political propaganda during the election period of
1992. Further, petitioners contend that Section 11 (b) abridges
the freedom of speech of candidates, and that the suppression
of media-based campaign or political propaganda except those
appearing in the Comelec space of the newspapers and on
57
Comelec time of radio and television broadcasts, would bring
about a substantial reduction in the quantity or volume of
information concerning candidates and issues in the election
thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information
and opinion.
Issue: Whether or not Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646
is unconstitutional?
Ruling: No. The objective which animates Section 11 (b) is the
equalizing, as far as practicable, the situations of rich and poor
candidates by preventing the former from enjoying the undue
advantage offered by huge campaign "war chests." Section 11
(b) prohibits the sale or donation of print space and air time "for
campaign or other political purposes" except to the
Commission on Elections. Further, the Comelec is statutorily
commanded to allocate "Comelec space" and "Comelec time"
on a free of charge, equal and impartial basis among all
candidates within the area served by the newspaper or radio
and television station involved. That objective is of special
importance and urgency in a country which, like ours, is
characterized by extreme disparity in income distribution
between the economic elite and the rest of society, and by the
prevalence of poverty, with the bulk of our population falling
below that "poverty line. It is believed that, when so viewed, the
limiting impact of Section 11 (b) upon the right to free speech
of the candidates themselves may be seen to be not unduly
repressive or unreasonable. For, once again, there is nothing
in Section 11 (b) to prevent media reporting of and
commentary on pronouncements, activities, written statements
of the candidates themselves.
Telecommunications Broadcast Attorneys of the
Philippines, Inc. and GMA Network Inc.
vs. Commission on Elections
289 SCRA 337 | April 21, 1998
Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast
Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization
of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It
was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case
as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to
suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject
law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the
requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge.
Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in
the Philippines affected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P.
No. 881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P.
No. 881 with the contention that while Section 90 of the same
law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers
and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time
shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it singles
out radio and television stations to provide free air time.
Petitioner further claims that it suffered losses running to
several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in
connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995
senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more
should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim
that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television
stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require
these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust
taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it
lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each
day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lost
P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it
provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.
Issues:
Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and
television broadcast companies the equal protection of the
laws.
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of
property without due process of law and without just
compensation.
Ruling: Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All
broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations, is

licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast
that there are frequencies to assign. Radio and television
broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not
own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit
broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the
temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the
privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by
the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the
privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio
and television stations, the state spends considerable public
funds in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio
and television stations to provide free air time as against
newspapers and magazines which require payment of just
compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise
without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires
spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of
print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free
air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry
gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own
the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement
that they provide air time to the COMELEC.
BLO UMPAR ADIONG vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 103956 | March 31, 1992
Facts: On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos.
6646 and 7166 and other election laws which provides that
decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas, prohibiting posting in "mobile"
places, public or private.
The petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong is a senatorial
candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections. Adiong is questioning
the Resolution. In addition, Adiong believes that with the ban
on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being
a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and
irreparable injury with this prohibition as he assails insofar as it
prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in mobile places
like cars and other moving vehicles, wherein it is his last
medium to inform the electorate that he is a senatorial
candidate, due to the ban on radio, TV and print political
advertisements.
Issue: Whether or not the promulgated resolution prohibiting
the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or
private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized
posting areas that it fixes is constitutional.
Ruling: NO. The prohibitory resolution on “mobile “places
whether public or private except in the authorized areas
designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which
cannot be justified by the Constitution thus, unconstitutional.
There is no public interest substantial enough to warrant the
prohibition.
The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's
fundamental right of free speech. The preferred freedom of
expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what
may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make
more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. The so-
called balancing of interests (individual freedom on one hand
and substantial public interests on the other) is made even
more difficult in election campaign cases because the
Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on
Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly
elections. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that
no person shall be deprived of his property without due
process of law.
Sanidad vs. COMELEC
181 SCRA 529
October 12, 1976
FACTS: An organic law called RA 6646 was passed. In order
for it to take effect, Comelec promulgated a Comelec
Resolution No. 2197 which gave them the power to conduct
the plebiscite on said organic act. Pablito Sanidad, as a
58
newspaper columnist, assailed the constitutionality of Section
19 of said resolution which bans columnists, commentators or
announcers to use their columns or television time to campaign
for or against the plebiscite issues. He alleged that the said
provision is void and unconstitutional because it violates the
constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of
the press. Respondent Comelec maintains that the questioned
provision does not violate the freedom of expression and of the
press enshrined in the Constitution. Rather, it is a valid
implementation of the power of the Comelec to supervise and
regulate media during election or plebiscite periods as
enunciated in Article IX-C, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Comelec’s actions of banning
media practitioners for expressing their views and opinions
during the campaign period are valid exercise of Comelec’s
power to “supervise and regulate media during election or
plebiscite periods” pursuant to Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution.
RULING: No. It is very clear from Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was the
power “to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of
franchises, permits, or other grants issued for transportation or
other public utilities, media of communication or information
XXX for public information campaigns and forums among the
candidates are ensured.” The evil sought to be prevented by
this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor
or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of
advertising space or radio or television time. This is also the
reason why “a columnist, commentator, announcer or
personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is
required to take a leave of absence from his work during the
campaign period. (2ndpar. Section 11(b) R.A. 6646). It cannot
be gainsaid that a columnist or commentator who is also a
candidate would be more exposed to the voters to the
prejudice of other candidates unless required taking a leave of
absence. However, neither Article IX-C of the Constitution nor
section 11(b), 2nd par. of RA 6646 can be construed to mean
that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise
and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of
their right to expression during plebiscite periods. Media
practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during
plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the
candidates. In fact, there are no candidates involved in a
plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No.
2167 has no statutory basis and is a restriction of freedom of
expression. The petition was granted.
SOCIAL WEATHER STATIONS, INCORPORATED VS.
COMELEC
G.R. No. 147571. May 5, 2001
Facts: Petitioner SWS [an institution conducting surveys in
various fields] with Kamahalan Publishing Corporation
[publishes the Manila Standard which is a newspaper of
general circulation and features items of information including
election surveys] states that it wishes to conduct an election
survey throughout the period of the elections and release to
the media the results of such survey as well as publish them
directly. Petitioners argue that the restriction on the publication
of election survey results constitutes a prior restraint on the
exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present
danger to justify such restraint.
Issue: Are the COMELEC Resolutions prohibiting the holding
of pre-polls and exit polls and the dissemination of their results
through mass media, valid and constitutional?
Ruling: No. The Court held that Section (5)4 is invalid because
(1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom of expression,
(2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of
expression even though such suppression is only for a limited
period, and (3) the governmental interest sought to be
promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of
freedom of expression.
It has been held that "[mere] legislative preferences or
beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well
support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be

insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights
so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions.”
Mitmug vs COMELEC
230 SCRA 54 G.R. No. 106270-73 February 10, 1994
Facts: Petitioner SULTAN MOHAMAD L. MITMUG and private
respondent DATU GAMBAI DAGALANGIT were among the
candidates for the mayoralty position of Lumba-Bayabao. Voter
turnout for the election was very low. Only 2,330 out of 9,830
registered voters therein cast their votes. Dagalangit won.
Other candidates filed separate petition for the declaration of
failure of election in some or all precincts in Lumba-Bayabao.
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC should declare a failure
of election on the ground of massive disenfranchisement of
voters due to alleged terrorism and unlawful clustering of
precincts.
Ruling: No. before COMELEC can act on a verified petition
seeking to declare a failure of election, two (2) conditions must
concur: first, no voting has taken place in the precinct or
precincts on the date fixed by law or, even if there was voting,
the election nevertheless results in failure to elect;and, second
, the votes not cast would affect the result of the election.
In the case before us, it is indubitable that the votes
not cast will definitely affect the outcome of the election. But,
the first requisite is missing, i.e., that no actual voting took
place, or even if there is, the results thereon will be tantamount
to a failure to elect. Since actual voting and election by the
registered voters in the questioned precincts have taken place,
the results thereof cannot be disregarded and excluded.
COMELEC therefore did not commit any abuse of discretion,
much less grave, in denying the petitions outright. There was
no basis for the petitions since the facts alleged therein did not
constitute sufficient grounds to warrant the relief sought. For,
the language of the law expressly requires the concurrence of
these conditions to justify the calling of a special election.
There can be failure of election in a political unit only
if the will of the majority has been defiled and cannot be
ascertained. But, if it can be determined, it must be accorded
respect. After all, there is no provision in our election laws
which requires that a majority of registered voters must cast
their votes. All the law requires is that a winning candidate
must be elected by a plurality of valid votes, regardless of the
actual number of ballots cast. Thus,even if less than 25% of
the electorate in the questioned precincts cast their votes, the
same must still be respected.There is prima facie showing that
private respondent was elected through a plurality of valid
votes of a valid constituency.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Guillermo B. Guevara, petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable Perdo M. Gimenez, as the Auditor General
of the Philippines and Ismael Mathay, as the Auditor of the
Central Bank, respondents.
6 SCRA 813, G.R. No. L-17115 November 30, 1962
Facts: In 1954, the District Engineer of Sorsogon prepared a
program of work and detailed estimate for there construction of
the Sorsogon Central School building. Specifications consisting
of five pages were likewise prepared. The Cost of painting was
left out in the detailed estimate and specifications. The papers
were submitted to the Division Engineer in Lucena, Quezon,
who returned them duly approved with an authorized
appropriation of P40, 000.00"provided that painting shall be
included". Whereupon, the specification for painting was
accordingly made and appended to the specifications as page
six.
In August 1954 the District Engineer advertised an
invitation to bid for “furnishing of all materials, labor and plant,
for reconstruction” project. Fernando Guevarra's bid of P37,
500 was declared lowest and the contract was awarded to him.
Eighty five days after completion of the project, Guevarra file
with the Director of Public Works a written claim for the
payment of P4, 620.00 representing cost of painting not
covered by the contract.
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After hearing, Secretary of Public Works and
Communications denied the claim and two motion for
reconsideration were also denied. On appeal, the Auditor
General also denied the claim. Guevarra appealed to the
Supreme Court pursuant to CA 327.
Issue: Whether the contract for the reconstruction of the
school building included the painting.
Held: Yes. Testimonies of the employees' should be given
more weight than those of the contractors. These government
employees testified as to what transpired in the performance of
their duties. The presumption is that official duty has been
regularly performed. [Note: The main issue of the case has
nothing to do with COA. However, note that, claims and
disbursements of public funds should have be coursed to COA]
Orocio v COA
213 SCRA 109 G.R. No. 75959 August 31, 1992
FACTS: An accident occurred at the Malaya Power Plant of
the National Power Corporation (NPC) on May 25, 1982 where
two individuals suffered injury – Ernesto Pumaloy, an NPC
employee, and Domingo Abodizo, a casual employee O.P.
Landrito’s General Services (OPLGS), the janitorial contractor
of the NPC. The two injured personnel were brought to the
hospital. NPC initially advanced the amount for hospitalization
expenses for the treatment of Abodizo, and set up this as an
account receivable from OPLGS deducted on a staggered
basis from the latter's billing against the NPC until the same
was fully satisfied. Subsequently, OPLGS requested a refund
of the total amount deducted from their billings representing
payment of the advances made by the NPC. The amount of
hospitalization expenses was refunded to the contractor
OPLGS. The Unit Auditor of the Commission on Audit
disallowed the refund of the hospitalization expenses of
Abodizo contending that under the contract, there is no
employee-employer relation between the NPC and the OPLGS
employees. Hence,NPC is not answerable for such expenses.
General Counsel asked for is consideration of the said
disallowance denied. The COA Regional Director, herein
respondent, confirmed the disallowance. NPC General
Counsel submitted a second request for reconsideration and
justifies that his legal opinion is based on Sec 15-A of RA 6395
(NPC Charter) which provides that “... all legal matters shall be
handled by the General Counsel of the Corporation...”
ISSUE: Whether the disbursement on the basis of the legal
opinion of the legal counsel of the NPC is within the scope of
the auditing power of the COA?
HELD: The Constitution grants the COA the power, authority
and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to
the expenditures or uses of funds and property pertaining to
the Government or any of itssubdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations. The matter of allowing in audit a disbursement
account is not a ministerial function, but one which
necessitates the exercise of discretion. Besides, the OPLGS,
Abodizo's employer, admitted that the incident was purely
accidental and that there is no showing whatsoever in the
incident report of any negligence on the part of NPC or its
employees.
Wherefore, the instant petition is GRANTED. In so far as it
holds petitioner personally liable for the disallowed
disbursement and the Debit Memo, dated July 22, 1986, of the
Manager of the Accounting Department of the National Power
Corporation, are herby set aside for being null and void.
So ordered.
OSMEÑA vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 110045 November 29, 1994,
Facts: The controversy arises in the stabbing of Reynaldo de
la Cerna, the son of the de la Cerna Spouses. He was rushed
to Cebu City Medical Center, but unfortunately died due to
severe loss of blood. They filed a complaint for damages in
Cebu City RTC against the city of Cebu, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, and five physicians, claiming that their son died
because of the ineptitude, gross negligence, irresponsibility,

stupidity and incompetence of the medical staff. The City of
Cebu was impleaded as defendant on the theory that as
employer of the doctors, it was vicariously responsible for the
latter’s negligence.
An amicable settlement was entered into between the
parties whereby the City of Cebu agreed to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P30,000.00 as financial assistance. Such agreement
was also ratified by the Sangguniang Panlungsod on July 31,
1989 and thereafter authorized the City Budget Officer to
include in the Supplemental Budget for the year 1989 the
amount of P30,000.00. The agreement was approved by the
Regional Trial Court on August 1, 1989, finding it to be in
conformity with law, morals and public policy and enjoining the
parties to comply strictly with the terms and conditions thereof.
About eleven (11) months later, the Commission on
Audit (COA) disallowed the financial assistance declaring that
it is not within the powers of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to
provide monetary assistance that would promote the economic
condition and private interests of certain individuals only.
Respondent further stressed that not being a party to the
compromise agreement, it was not bound by it. The Motion for
Reconsideration of the City was denied by COA, hence, in
behalf of the City of Cebu, Mayor Tomas R. Osmeña petitioned
to the Court ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the COA
and its Members in so disallowing the city's appropriation of
P30,000.00 made conformably with the compromise
agreement in the civil suit against the City, embodied in due
course in the Trial Court's judgment.
Issue: Whether or not COA committed grave abuse of
discretion in disallowing the city’s appropriation of P30,000.00
made conformably with the compromise agreement in the civil
suit against the City of Cebu.
Held: COA’s disallowance of the appropriation is tainted by
grave abuse of discretion and should be rectified. The
participation by the City in negotiations for an amicable
settlement of a pending litigation and its eventual execution of
a compromise relative thereto, are indubitably within its
authority and capacity as a public corporation; and a
compromise of a civil suit in which it is involved as a party, is a
perfectly legitimate transaction, not only recognized but even
encouraged by law.
It is noteworthy that the compromise agreement was
submitted to its legislative council, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, which approved it conformably with its
established rules and procedure and was embodied in the
judgment of the Court which pronounced it to be in conformity
with law, morals and public policy and enjoined the parties to
comply strictly with the terms and conditions thereof. This
judicial compromise is conclusive and binding on all the
parties, including the City of Cebu. Cebu City has the power to
sue and be sued, it has the authority to settle or compromise
suits, as well as the obligation to pay just and valid claims
against it. Thus, there was no reason to object to it, much less
disallow any disbursement therein stipulated.
The writ of certiorari prayed for is issued and the COA
decisions dated 15 June 1990 (No. 1364) and 30 March 1993
(No. 2773) are nullified and set aside. COA is also ordered to
approve and allow in audit the appropriation of P30,000.00.
Edmundo C. Sambeli vs Province of Isabela, Provincial
Treasurer and COA
210 SCRA 80, G.R. No. 92279, June 18, 1992
Facts: On October 2, 1987, the Province of Isabela went into
an agreement with ECS Enterprises for the purchase of 300
units of wheelbarrows, 837 pieces of shovels, and 1 set of
radio communication equipment for a sum totaling to
Php761,077.20. On November 11, 1987, a partial delivery of
150 units of wheelbarrows and 419 pieces of shovels was
made. The remaining items were delivered on December 1,
1987. ECS Enterprise received a total of Php380,538.20 which
is equivalent to 50% of the total amount due. But in February
20, 1988, the Provincial auditor advised the Provincial
treasurer that the quotation made was overpriced by
Php619,042.20 which resulted to an overpayment made by the
Province of Isabela of the amount of Php195,893.10. The basis
for the price comparison made by the Price Evaluation
Division, COA Technical Office, Quezon City was that of the
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prevailing prices in Manila. It was discovered that if the items
were purchased at Manila, the Province of Isabela would not
have overpayed by Php195,893.10 despite paying for freight
cost. Thus the Provincial Auditor recommended to the
Provincial Treasurer that future claims of ECS Enterprises be
withheld and applied to the refund for overpayment. In a letter
dated April 1, 1988, the president of ECS enterprise made no
comment on the matter of overpricing but offered a 10%
reduction on the unpaid price. The provincial auditor forwarded
the matter to the COA Regional Director, who affirmed the
recommendation made by the provincial auditor. ECS
Enterprises appealed to the Commission on Audit (COA) but to
no avail. COA denied the appeal and affirmed the position of
the Provincial Auditor and the COA Regional Director. Hence,
petitioner filed a petition assailing that the ruling of COA is not
valid.
Issue: Whether or not the ruling of COA denying the appeal
made by petitioner and affirming the position of the Provincial
Auditor and of the COA Regional Director was
unconstitutional?
Ruling: NO, the ruling of COA was constitutional. Petitioner
contends that the contract of sale was not yet perfected
although the items were already delivered to the Province of
Isabela. Nonpayment on the part of the Province of Isabela
would constitute an impairment of a contract. The court rejects
this contention. It ruled that in the exercise of the regulatory
power vested upon it by the Constitution, it is the duty of COA
to protect government funds are not subjected to irregular,
unnecessary, excessive, or extravagant expenditures.
Furthermore, the commission is also charged with the duty to
examine, audit, and settle all accounts pertaining to the
expenditures or uses of funds owned by or pertaining to the
Government or any of its subsidiaries. In line with this, the
Commission is also empowered to review contracts entered
into by the Government of any of its subsidiaries. In this light,
the ruled that the Commission on Audit had the power to
disallow government funds from being paid to respondent. The
court finds the findings, recommendation, and position made
by the Provincial Auditor and the Regional Director of COA to
be within its jurisdiction and is constitutional. Wherefore, the
honorable court dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Bustamante v. COA
G.R. No. 134903
March 26, 2001
FACTS: Petitioner Unicraft Industries International Corporation
is a domestic corporation with principal office at Apao,
Mandaue City. Private respondents were employees of
petitioner corporation for at least over a year, performing work
necessary and desirable to the business operation of petitioner
corporation. When it expanded its business operations,
petitioner corporation opened a branch in Lapulapu City and
transferred private respondents from the Mandaue office to the
Lapulapu City branch. It appears that petitioner corporation
failed to comply with some legal requirements for its business
operations in Lapulapu City. Thus, on July 3, 1995, the city
government of Lapulapu ordered the closure of petitioner's
business due to lack of business and building permit.
Consequently, petitioner corporation effected the mass
dismissal of private respondents eight (8) days after their
transfer to the Lapulapu City branch. Hence, the thirty-two
private respondents herein filed with the National Labor
Relations Commission, Regional Arbitration Branch No. VII,
Cebu City, their individual and separate complaints
(consolidated as NLRC Case No. RAB-VII 07-0705-95) for
illegal dismissal, underpayment/non-payment of wages,
overtime pay, holiday pay, 13th month pay, and service
incentive leave. Named respondents were petitioner
corporation, Robert Dino, Michael Lloyd Dino, and Cristina
Dino, as "owners/president/managers" of the corporation.
Private respondents, complainants in the labor case,
contended that petitioners dismissed them because of their
union activities. Petitioners, on the other hand, countered that
private respondents were not illegally dismissed and argued
that the closure of the branch office was effected by virtue of a
lawful order of the city government of Lapulapu. Moreover,
petitioners alleged that they offered to pay separation pay to

the private respondents who, in fact, have already executed
quitclaims in favor of petitioner corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the honorable court of appeals violated
the petitioner’s constitutional right to due process when it
affirmed the voluntary arbitrator’s award for separation pay
notwithstanding that the former, as can readily be gleaned from
the questioned resolutions, did not have in its possession the
records of the case submitted to it for review
RULING: The right of due process is fundamental in our legal
system and we adhere to this principle not for reasons of
convenience or merely to comply with technical formalities but
because of a strong conviction that every man must have his
day in court. In its most basic sense, the right to due process is
simply that every man is accorded a reasonable opportunity to
be heard. Its very concept contemplates freedom from
arbitrariness, as what is required is fairness or justice. It abhors
all attempts to make an accusation synonymous with liability.
The right to be heard is among the so-called "cardinal primary
rights" which should be observed and respected in
administrative adjudications in order to comply with the
imperatives of due process
The Court of Appeals, thus, committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered the
immediate execution of the Voluntary Arbitrator's award of
separation pay and attorney's fees, notwithstanding that the
same was null and void for violation of petitioner's right to due
process of law. Grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction, or in other words where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of
passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
EDITHA B. SALIGUMBA vs COMMISSION ON AUDIT and
LEONARDO ESTELLA
G.R. No. L – 61676, October 18, 1982
117 SCRA 669
FACTS: This is a petition for review of the decision rendered
by the COA regarding the Administrative case filed by the
petitioner against Leonardo Estella, Auditing Examiner III of the
Auditor’s Office of Misamis Occidental. The charge was that
the respondent raped Editha Saligumba on several occasions.
The COA dropped the administrative complaint due to
insufficient evidence. Saligumba petitioned the court to review
such action taken by the COA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may take cognizance of the
case.
HELD: The court dismissed the petition as it held that the
power of the Supreme Court to review COA decisions refers to
money matter and not to administrative cases involving
discipline of its personnel and even assuming that it does have
jurisdiction to review decisions on administrative matters as
mentioned above, the court cannot do so on factual issues
since its power to review is limited to legal issues only.
RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, EDELWINA DG. PARUNGAO, and
REBECCA A. BARBO, Petitioners,
vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION Chico-Nazario, and (CSC)
and LWUA EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION FOR PROGRESS,
(LEAP) Represented by Its Chairman, LEONARDO C.
CRUZ, Respondent.
G.R. No. 156559 September 30, 2005
Facts: Petitioners are officials of the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA) and designated members of the Interim
Board of Directors of the San Fernando Water District (SFWD).
On December 4, 1995 and February 12 1996, the LWUA
Board of Trustees issued Board Resolution No. 313, Series of
1995 and Board Resolution No. 39, Series of 1996
respectively. These Board Resolutions authorized the Board of
Directors of SFWD to receive reimbursable allowances in the
form of Representation and Transportation Allowance (RATA),
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Travel Allowance, and Extraordinary & Miscellaneous Expense
(EME); Christmas Bonus; Uniform Allowance; Rice Allowance;
Medical and Dental Benefits; and Productivity Incentive Bonus.
Pursuant to the said Board Resolutions, petitioners received
EME, Rice Allowance, Christmas Bonus, and Productivity
Bonus from SFWD during the calendar years starting 1994
until 1996.
On June 30, 1997, a Special Audit Team of COA
Regional Office No. III at San Fernando, Pampanga audited
the financial accounts of SFWD for the period covering
January 1, 1994 to July 15, 1996. The COA Special Audit
Team disallowed the payment of the above-mentioned benefits
and allowances received by petitioners after the same were
found to be excessive and contrary to Sections 228, 162 and
163 of the Government Accounting and Auditing Manual
(GAAM) and to Civil Service Commission (CSC) Resolution
No. 954073 in relation to Section 13 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 198 (Provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973) as
amended. Petitioners were directed to refund the benefits and
allowances subject to the disallowance.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the respondent has the jurisdiction to motu
proprio declare LWUA Board Resolution No. 313, S. 1995, as
amended by Resolution No. 39, S. 1996, to be totally in conflict
with Sec. 13 of PD No. 198 as amended.
2. Whether or not the Sec 13, PD 198, as amended,
prohibiting petitioners' entitlement to RATA, EME, Bonuses
and Other Benefits and Allowances.
Ruling: The Court has already settled this issue in a myriad
of cases. Particularly, in Rodolfo S. de Jesus [Catbalogan
Water District] v. COA, the Court upheld the authority and
jurisdiction of the COA to rule on the legality of the
disbursement of government funds by a water district and
declared that such power does not conflict with the jurisdiction
of the courts, the DBM, and the LWUA. Citing Section 2,
Subdivision D, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution the Court
declared that it is the mandate of the COA to audit all
government agencies, including government-owned and
controlled corporations with original charters. Indeed, the
Constitution specifically vests in the COA the authority to
determine whether government entities comply with laws and
regulations in disbursing government funds, and to disallow
illegal or irregular disbursements of government funds. This
independent constitutional body is tasked to be vigilant and
conscientious in safeguarding the proper use of the
government's, and ultimately the people's, property.
The second issue, a water district is a government-
owned and controlled corporation with a special charter since it
is created pursuant to a special law, Presidential Decree (PD)
198. It is undeniable that PD 198 expressly prohibit to the grant
of RATA, EME, and bonuses to members of the board of
Water Districts. Section 13 of PD 198 is clear enough that it
needs no interpretation. It expressly prohibits the grant of
compensation other than the payment of per diem, thus
preempting the exercise of any discretion by water districts in
paying other allowances and bonuses.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. INC., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT and PETRON CORPORATION,
respondents.
G.R. No. 91890 June 9, 1995
Facts: PAL is a domestic corporation, engaged in the air
transport business. Majority of stocks are GSIS owned Usually,
PAL would use a system of bidding to get fuel60% of fuel
purchases awarded to the lowest bidder40% to second lowest
bidder Petron, Caltex, Shell were usual bidders COA told PAL
to stop the bidding and only get from Petron Based on
Department Order (DO) 19 requiring GOCC to only get from
Petron PAL sought reconsideration, saying DO 19 should not
include PAL because: Bidding ensured the best fuel price
Petron alone might not be sufficient for PAL’s fuel needs COA
denied. Told PAL to just negotiate with Petron. Hence,
petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not DO 19 should cover PAL.

Held: SC ruled that DO 19 really included PAL (GSIS owns
stocks) HOWEVER, COA committed GADALEJ in not
exempting PAL. The reasons that PAL gave were really
persuasive. They had more weight than the policy enunciated
in DO 19. It was COA’s duty to exempt PAL because not
exempting PAL would lead to unnecessary spending – the very
evil sought to be prevented by the creation of COA
Department Order 19 required all GOCCs to get their fuel from
Petron. In the case of PAL v. COA, COA ordered PAL to follow
DO 19The very evil sought to be avoided in the creation of the
COA the irregular, excessive or unconscionable expenditures
of the government. Thus, it has the power and the duty to
exempt certain branches from any regulation if, obedience to it
would lead to those kinds of excessive expenditures.
REPRESENTATIVE AMADO S. BAGATSING, petitioner,
vs.
COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
OIL COMPANY and THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, respondents.
G.R. No. 112399 July 14, 1995
Facts: PETRON was originally registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) in 1966 under the corporate
name "Esso Philippines, Inc." ESSO became a wholly-owned
company of the government under the corporate name
PETRON and as a subsidiary of PNOC. PETRON owns the
largest, most modern complex refinery in the Philippines. It is
listed as the No. 1 corporation in terms of assets and income in
the Philippines in 1993. President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated Proclamation No. 50 in the exercise of her
legislative power under the Freedom Constitution. Implicit in
the Proclamation is the need to raise revenue for the
Government and the ideal of leaving business to the private
sector by creating the committee on privatization. The
Government can then concentrate on the delivery of basic
services and the performance of vital public functions. The
Presidential Cabinet of President Ramos approved the
privatization of PETRON as part of the Energy Sector Action
Plan.
PNOC Board of Directors passed a resolution
authorizing the company to negotiate and conclude a contract
with the consortium of Salomon Brothers of Hongkong Limited
and PCI Capital Corporation for financial advisory services to
be rendered to PETRON. The Petron Privatization Working
Committee (PWC) was thus formed. It finalized a privatization
strategy with 40% of the shares to be sold to a strategic
partner and 20% to the general public. The President approved
the 40% — 40% — 20% privatization strategy of PETRON.
The invitation to bid was published in several newspapers of
general circulation, both local and foreign. The PNOC Board of
Directors then passed Resolution No. 866, S. 1993, declaring
ARAMCO the winning bidder. PNOC and ARAMCO signed the
Stock Purchase Agreement, the two companies signed the
Shareholders' Agreement. The petition for prohibition in G.R.
No. 112399 sought:
(1) to nullify the bidding conducted for the sale of a block of
shares constituting 40% of the capital stock (40% block) of
Petron Corporation (PETRON) and the award made to Aramco
Overseas Company, B.V. (ARAMCO) as the highest bidder
and ;(2) to stop the sale of said block of shares to ARAMCO.
The petition for prohibition and certiorari in G.R. No. 115994
sought to annul the sale of the same block of Petron shares
subject of the petition in G.R. No. 112399. ARAMCO entered a
limited appearance to question the jurisdiction over its person,
alleging that it is a foreign company organized under the laws
of the Netherlands, that it is not doing nor licensed to do
business in the Philippines, and that it does not maintain an
office or a business address in and has not appointed a
resident agent for the Philippines (Rollo, p. 240). Petitioners
however, countered that they filed the action in their capacity
as members of Congress.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners have a locus standi.
Ruling: Petition is dismissed.In Philippine Constitution
Association v. Hon. Salvador Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105,
August 19, 1994, we held that the members of Congress have
62
the legal standing to question the validity of acts of the
Executive which injures them in their person or the institution of
Congress to which they belong. In the absence of a claim that
the contract in question violated the rights of petitioners or
impermissibly intruded into the domain of the Legislature,
petitioners have no legal standing to institute the instant action
in their capacity as members of Congress. However,
petitioners can bring the action in their capacity as taxpayers
under the doctrine laid down in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona,
232 SCRA 110 (1994). As long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on
locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it
and uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to
institute the present action.
In the case at bench, there were three offerors:
SAUDI ARAMCO, PETRONAS and WESTMONT. While two
offerors were disqualified, PETRONAS for submitting a bid
below the floor price and WESTMONT for technical reasons,
not all the offerors were disqualified. To constitute a failed
bidding under the COA Circular, all the offerors must be
disqualified.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISION
TUPAS vs National Housing Corporation and Atty. Virgilio
Sy, as Officer-in-Charge of the Bureau of Labor Relations
173 SCRA 33, G.R. No. L-49677, May 4, 1989
Facts: On July 13, 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the
conduct of a certification election with Regional Office No. IV of
the Department of Labor in order to determine the exclusive
bargaining representative of the workers in NHC. It was
claimed that its members comprised the majority of the
employees of the corporation. The petition was dismissed by
med-arbiter Eusebio M. Jimenez in an order, dated November
7, 1977, holding that NHC "being a government-owned and/or
controlled corporation its employees/workers are prohibited to
form, join or assist any labor organization for purposes of
collective bargaining pursuant to Section 1, Rule II, Book V of
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code."
From this order of dismissal, TUPAS appealed to the
Bureau of Labor Relations where, acting thereon in BLR Case
No. A-984-77 (RO4-MED-1090-77), Director Carmelo C. Noriel
reversed the order of dismissal and ordered the holding of a
certification election. This order was, however, set aside by
Officer-in-Charge Virgilio S.J. Sy in his resolution of November
21, 1978 6 upon a motion for reconsideration of respondent
NHC.
In the instant petition for certiorari, TUPAS seeks the
reversal of the said resolution and prays that a certification
election be held among the rank and file employees of NHC.
Issue: Whether or not the employees of NHC have the right to
form union?
Ruling: With respect to other civil servants, that is, employees
of all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of
the government including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters and who are, therefore,
covered by the civil service laws, the guidelines for the
exercise of their right to organize is provided for under
Executive Order No. 180. Chapter IV thereof, consisting of
Sections 9 to 12, regulates the determination of the "sole and
exclusive employees representative"; Under Section 12,
"where there are two or more duly registered employees'
organizations in the appropriate organization unit, the Bureau
of Labor Relations shall, upon petition order the conduct of
certification election and shall certify the winner as the
exclusive representative of the rank-and-file employees in said
organizational unit."
Parenthetically, note should be taken of the specific
qualification in the Constitution that the State "shall guarantee
the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective
bargaining, and peaceful concerted activities, including the
right to strike in accordance with law" and that they shall also
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting
their rights and benefits as may be provided by law."
ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the assailed
resolution of the Bureau of Labor Relations, dated November
21, 1978, is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the conduct of a
certification election among the affected employees of

respondent National Housing Corporation in accordance with
the rules therefor is hereby GRANTED
Salazar vs. Mathay
G.R. No. L-44061 September 20, 1976
Facts: Petitioner Melania Salazar was appointed as
confidential agent by the Auditor General, GSIS. The said
appointment was noted by the Civil Service Commission.
After 6 years, petitioner received a notice from the
Auditor General that her services as confidential agent in the
Office of the Auditor, GSIS have been terminated as of the
close of the office hours.
Thereafter, the Auditor General, upon favourable
recommendation of Mr. Pedro Encabo, Auditor of the GSIS
issued an appointment to the examiner as Junior Examiner
receiving lower compensation. Said appointment was
approved by the Civil Service Commission.
Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus to compel the
Auditor General toreinstate her former position as confidential
agent in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS.
Issue: Whether or not the service of petitioner as “confidential
agent” in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS was validly terminated
on the alleged ground of loss of confidence and if not, whether
or not she could still be reinstated to said position after
accepting the position of Junior Examiner in the same office.
Ruling: The Court ruled that there are two instances when a
position may be considered primarily confidential: (1) When the
President upon recommendation of the Commissioner of Civil
Service (now Civil Service Commission) has declared the
position to be primarily confidential; or (2) In the absence of
such declaration when by the nature of the functions of the
office, there exists "close intimacy between the appointee and
appointing power which insures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state."
Her position being primarily confidential, petitioner
cannot complain that the termination of her services as
confidential agent in the Office of the Auditor, GSIS is in
violation of her security of tenure.
Accordingly, it can be said that petitioner was not
removed from her office as confidential agent in the office of
the Auditor, GSIS, but that her term in said position has
already expired when the appointing power terminated her
services.
R. Marino Corpus vs Miguel Cuaderno, Sr.
13 SCRA 591 | March 30, 1962
Facts: The Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central
Bank, Marino Corpus, was administratively charged with
dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and violation of the
internal regulations of the office. He was suspended by the
Monetary Board despite the recommendation of the
investigating committee that he be reinstated and there was no
basis for actions against Corpus. The Board considered him
resigned as of the date of his suspension. Corpus moved for
reconsideration but was denied. He filed the petition to CFI of
Manila which favored him and declared the Resolution of the
Board as null and void. He was awarded PhP 5,000.00 as
attorney’s fees. Both Petitioner and respondent appealed the
judgment. Petitioner was appealing the amount awarded to him
contending that it was lower than what he has spent for
attorney’s fees. While the respondent claimed that an officer
holding highly technical position may be removed at any time
for lack of confidence by the appointing power who was
Governor Miguel Cuaderno, Sr..
Issue: Whether or not the lack of trust and confidence by the
appointing power a ground for removing an employee or a
public officer?
Ruling: The Constitution distinguishes the primarily
confidential from the highly technical employees, and to the
latter the loss of confidence as a ground for removal is not
applicable. No public officer or employee in the Civil Service
shall be removed or suspended except for a cause provided by
law. Pertaining to the petitioner’s claim for damages, the
63
agreement between a client and his lawyer as to attorney’s
fees cannot bind the other party who was a stranger to the fee
contract. While the Civil Code allows a party to recover
reasonable counsel fees by way of damages, such fees must
lie primarily in the discretion of the trial court.
Decision appealed affirmed by the Supreme Court.
FELIMON LUEGO vs. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION and
FELICULA TUOZO
G.R. NO. L-69137 | August 5, 1986
Facts: The petitioner was appointed Administrative Officer 11,
Office of the City Mayor, Cebu City, by Mayor Florentino Solon
on February 18, 1983.
• The appointment was described as permanent" but
the Civil Service Commission approved it as "temporary,"
subject to the final action taken in the protest filed by the
private respondent and another employee, and provided "there
(was) no pending administrative case against the appointee,
no pending protest against the appointment nor any decision
by competent authority that will adversely affect the approval of
the appointment."
• On March 22, 1984, after protracted hearings the
legality of which does not have to be decided here, the Civil
Service Commission found the private respondent better
qualified than the petitioner for the contested position and,
accordingly, directed "that Felicula Tuozo be appointed to the
position of Administrative Officer 11 in the Administrative
Division, Cebu City, in place of Felimon Luego whose
appointment as Administrative Officer II is hereby revoked."
• The private respondent was so appointed on June 28,
1984, by the new mayor, Mayor Ronald Duterte.
• The petitioner, invoking his earlier permanent
appointment, is now before us to question that order and the
private respondent's title.
Issue: The issue is starkly simple: Is the Civil Service
Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent
appointment on the ground that another person is better
qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding,
order his replacement by the latter?
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The
appointment of the petitioner was not temporary but permanent
and was therefore protected by Constitution. The appointing
authority indicated that it was permanent, as he had the right to
do so, and it was not for the respondent Civil Service
Commission to reverse him and call it temporary.
The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to
determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by
the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or
reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of
the Civil Service Law.
As one of the Justices, Ramon C. Fernandez declared in an
earlier case:
The Commissioner of Civil Service is not empowered
to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by
the appointing officer. When the appointee is qualified, as in
this case, the Commissioner of Civil Service has no choice but
to attest to the appointment.
The Commission had no authority to revoke the said
appointment simply because it believed that the private
respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted
an encroachment on the discretion vested solely in the city
mayor.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR) vs. Carlos P. Rilloraza
359 SCRA 525
June 25, 2001
FACTS: PAGCOR filed administrative charges against the
respondent for dishonesty, grave misconduct and/or conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service and loss of
confidence as their casino operations manager. Finding the
defendant’s explanation unsatisfactory, PAGCOR Board
handed a resolution dismissing the respondent and several
others from their positions in PAGCOR. On appeal to the Civil
Service Commission, the respondent was found guilty only of
Simple Neglect of Duty and was penalized only for one month

and one day suspension. The appellate court reaffirmed the
decision of Commission but ordered the petitioner to reinstate
the respondent with payment of full back wages plus benefits.
The petitioner, however, elevated the case before the Court
and argues that pursuant to Section 16 of Presidential Decree
No. 1869 the respondent is a primarily confidential employee.
Hence, he holds office at the pleasure of the appointing power
and may be removed upon the cessation of confidence in him
by the latter.
ISSUES: (1) Whether or not a casino operations manager is
classified as “highly confidential” employee. (2) If the answer to
the previous question is in the affirmative, whether or not there
has been a sufficient cause of action to dismiss the defendant.
RULING: No. PAGCOR employees like casino operations
manager are not highly confidential employees by operation of
law under Section 16 of P. D. 1869. First, the classification of a
particular position as primarily confidential, policy- determining
or highly technical amounts to no more than an executive or
legislative declaration that is not conclusive upon the courts,
the true test being the nature of the position. Undoubtedly, it
can be gleaned that the duties of a casino operations manager
call for a great measure of both ability and dependability, but
his position lacks confidence, trust or close intimacy reposed in
him by his superior so as to qualify his position as primarily
confidential. Second, whether primarily confidential, policy-
determining or highly technical, the exemption provided in the
Charter (that is, the charter for the operations of the PAGCOR)
pertains to exemption from competitive examinations to
determine merit and fitness to enter the Civil Service. Such
employees are still protected by the mantle of security of
tenure. Last, and more to the point, Section 16 of P.D. 1869,
insofar as it declares all positions within PAGCOR as primarily
confidential, is not absolutely binding on courts. Executive
pronouncements such presidential decrees can be no more
than initial determinations that are not conclusive in case of
conflict. It must be so, or else it would then lie within the
discretion of the Chief Executive to deny any offer the
protection of Section 2(3), Article IX-B of the Constitution which
states that “no officer or employee of the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause provided by law.” In
other words, Section 16 of P.D. 1869 cannot be given stringent
application without compromising the constitutionally protected
right of an employee to security of tenure. Regardless of
whether a position is primarily confidential, policy-determining
or highly technical, the Supreme Court, being the final arbiter,
shall decide the matter not by title but by the nature of the task
entrusted by the appointing power to it. The Supreme Court
held that since a casino operations manager is not among
those highly confidential appointees or employees it classified
to be, the respondent is not bound to be dismissed by
PAGCOR Board because the latter has no sufficient cause of
action to do so: the former being protected of his right to
security of tenure.
SSS EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V. SSS
G.R. No. 85279 July 28, 1989
Facts: On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging
that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEA
staged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the
SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from
reporting for work and SSS members from transacting
business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to the
Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the
strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to
work; and that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the
strike.
The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be
ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners
herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the strike be
declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the
SSS failed to act on the union's demands, which included:
implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union
64
dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay
and holiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual
employees with six (6) months or more of service into regular
and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same
salaries, allowances and benefits given to other regular
employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's
allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain
amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly
committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices.
Issue: Whether or not employees of the Social Security
System (SSS) have the right to strike.
Ruling: The 1987 Constitution, Art. XIII (Social Justice and
Human Rights), Sec. 31, provides that the State "shall
guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law".
Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes
helpful in understanding the meaning of these provisions. A
reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission
that drafted the 1987 Constitution would show that in
recognizing the right of government employees to organize, the
commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of
unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.
Considering that under the 1987 Constitution, Art. IX
(B), Sec. 2, "the civil service embraces all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters", also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180
where the employees in the civil service are denominated as
"government employees"] and that the SSS is one such
government-controlled corporation with an original charter,
having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are
part of the civil service and are covered by the Civil Service
Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the
case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was
illegal.
Reynaldo d. Lopez vs Civil Service Commission and
Romeo v. Luz, Jr.
194 SCRA 269 G.r. No. 92140 February 19, 1991
Facts: Petitioner Lopez, along with private respondent Romeo
V. Luz, Jr. and Roberto Abellana, was appointed as Assistant
Harbor Master at Manila International Container Terminal,
Manila South Harbor and Manila North Harbor, respectively. A
law was passed wherein the DOTC was reorganized, and the
number of Assistant Harbor Master in the Philippine Ports
Authority (PPA) was reduced from (3) three to (2) two. After a
careful evaluation of a placement committee of the PPA,Luz
was rated third.Luz protested/appealed the appointment of
Lopez, but the PPA General Manager said Luz was not
qualified for the two slots. Luz then appealed to the CSC. The
CSC ordered for a re-assessment which the PPA complied.
Still, the CSC found that the re-assessment was not in order. It
ruled that the immediate supervisor of respondent Luz was in
the best position to assess the competence of the respondent
and not a psychiatric-consultant who was merely a contractual
employee and susceptible to partiality. It directed the
appointment of Luz as the Harbor Master instead of the
petitioner Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the CSC erred in nullifying Lopez’
appointment and instead substituting its decision for that of the
PPA.
Ruling: The role of the Civil Service Commission in
establishing a career service and in promoting the morale,
efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, and courtesy among civil
servants is not disputed by petitioner Lopez. On the other
hand, the discretionary power of appointment delegated to the
heads of departments or agencies of the government is not
controverted by the respondents. In the appointment,
placement and promotion of civil service employees according
to merit and fitness, it is the appointing power, especially
where it is assisted by a screening committee composed of
persons who are in the best position to screen the
qualifications of the nominees, who should decide on the
integrity, performance and capabilities of the future

appointees.The law limits the Commission's authority only to
whether or not the appointees possess the legal qualifications
and the appropriate civil service eligibility, nothing else. To go
beyond this would be to set at naught the discretionary power
of the appointing authority and to give to the Commission a
task which the law (Sec. 6, Rep. Act No. 6656) does not
confer. This does not mean that the Commission's act of
approving or disapproving becomes ministerial.The Court has
defined the parameters within which the power of approval of
appointments shall be exercised by the respondent
Commission. In the case of Luego v.Civil Service Commission,
143SCRA 327 [1986], the Court ruled that all the Commission
is actually authorized to do is to check if the appointee
possesses the qualifications and appropriate eligibility: "If he
does, his appointment is approved; if not it is disapproved." We
further ruled that the Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment simply because it believed that the private
respondent was better qualified for that would have constituted
an encroachment of the discretion vested solely in the
appointing authority.The Commission cannot exceed its power
by substituting its will for that of the appointing authority.
Petition is GRANTED.
University of the Philippines and Alfredo de Torres,
petitioners,
vs.
Civil Service Commission, respondent.
G.R. No. 132860 April 3, 2001
Facts: "Dr. Alfredo B. De Torres is an Associate Professor of
the University of the Philippines in Los Baños (UPLB) who
went on a vacation leave of absence without pay from
September 1, 1986 to August 30, 1989. During this period, he
served as the Philippine Government'' official representative to
the Centre on Integrated Rural Development for Asia and [the]
Pacific (CIRDAP).
"When the term of his leave of absence was about to expire,
CIRDAP requested the UPLB for an extension of said leave of
absence for another year, but was denied by Dr. Eulogio
Castillo, the then Director of the Agricultural Credit
Corporation, Inc. (ACCI) of UPLB. In the same letter, Dr.
Castillo advised Dr. De Torres to report for duty at UPLB not
later than September 15, 1989. Dr. De Torres did not report to
work.
"On January 3, 1994 or after almost five years of absence
without leave, Dr. De Torres wrote the incumbent Chancellor
Ruben L. Villareal that he was reporting back to duty at ACCI-
UPLB effective January 3, 1994. Thus, he was advised to re-
apply with UPLB.
"On June 30, 1994, Dr. De Torres wrote Chancellor Villareal
seeking reconsideration [of] the two aforementioned decisions.
On July 4, 1994, Chancellor Villareal reversed his earlier stand
and notified De Torres that since records at UPLB did not show
that he had been officially dropped from the rolls he may report
for duty effective January 3, 1994.
"On June 9, 1995, Dr. De Torres and the University of the
Philippines at Los Baños (UPLB) filed separate requests for
reconsideration of aforesaid CSC Resolution No. 95-3045
dated May 5, 1995. In its CSC Resolution No. 96-1041 x x x,
the commission denied the motion for reconsideration, further
stating that CSC Resolution No. 95-3045 [stood] and that since
separation from the service was non-disciplinary in nature, the
appointing authority may appoint Dr. De Torres to any vacant
position pursuant to existing civil service law and rules."6
The CSC rationalized its ruling in this manner:
"It could be gleaned from the foregoing circumstances that De
Torres was already on AWOL beginning September 1, 1989
since his request for extension of leave of absence for one
year was denied by then Chancellor De Guzman. It is a fact
that De Torres' absence from work was not duly authorized by
UPLB. Despite the advice of Chancellor De Guzman to him
that he should report for duty on or before September 5, 1989,
De Torres failed to do so. Thus, his failure to assume duty as
ordered caused his automatic separation from the service."
65
Issue: Whether or not the issuance by the COMMISSION of
Resolution Nos. 95-3045 and 961041, is hereby GRANTED.
Ruling: The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals and the
Respondent Civil Service Commission's Resolution Nos. 95-
3045 and 96-1041 are SET ASIDE. No costs.
There is no question that the UPLB Chancellor had
advised petitioner on the Civil Service Rules regarding leaves.
The former warned the latter of the possibility of being
considered on AWOL (absence without leave) and of being
dropped from the service, if he failed to return and report for
duty upon the expiration of his authorized leave.
However, Petitioner De Torres was never actually
dropped from the service by UP. He remained in the UPLB's
roll of academic personnel, even after he had been warned of
the possibility of being dropped from the service if he failed to
return to work within a stated period. Indeed, as Vice
Chancellor for Academic Affairs Emiliana N. Bernardo
explained to the CSC in her October 12, 1994 letter:12 "UPLB
records show that no notice or order of dropping Dr. de Torres
from the rolls was ever issued by the UPLB Chancellor. On the
contrary, UPLB records show that his salary was increased
several times during his absence – on January 1, 1988, March
16, 1988, and July 1, 1989. His appointment was also
reclassified with promotion in rank from Training Specialist II to
Assistant Professor IV effective March 16, 1988. This
promotion was approved by the UP Board of Regents during
its 1015th meeting held on August 25, 1988."
Verily, these acts are clearly inconsistent with
separation or dropping from the service. Private petitioner was
not only retained in the roll of personnel; his salary was even
increased three times. Moreover, he was promoted in rank with
the explicit approval of the Board of Regents, the highest
governing body of UP.13 Since the commencement of the
Complaint before the CSC, the University has consistently
stood by his side. When respondent ruled against him in its
assailed Resolution No. 95-3045, the University promptly filed
a Motion for Reconsideration favoring his cause. Then, UP
joined Dr. De Torres in his appeal before the Court of Appeals,
as well as in the Petition now before us. All these
circumstances indubitably demonstrate that the University has
chosen not to exercise its prerogative of dismissing petitioner
from its employ.
Needless to say, UP definitely recognizes and values
petitioner's academic expertise. As the vice chancellor for
academic affairs explained, "[d]ropping him from the rolls will
utterly be a waste of government funds and will not serve the
best interest of the country which is suffering from 'brain-
drain'."22 Even UP President Emil Q. Javier advised
Complainants Baskiñas and Medina to "give Dr. de Torres the
opportunity to honor his service obligation to the University,"23
referring to petitioner's required return service in view of a
fellowship abroad earlier granted him by the institution.
Consequently, there is no need for the issuance of a
new appointment in favor of Dr. De Torres. His service in UP is
deemed uninterrupted during his tenure at CIRDAP.
Navarro v. Civil Service Commission
226 SCRA 522 G.R. Nos. 107370-71 September 16, 1993
Facts: Cable drums were stolen from Ford Stockyard in
Mariveles Bataan on June 21, 1989 who were owned by
Takaoka Engineering Construction Co. Ltd worth P21,250.00.
The suspect for the stolen cable drums is the Petitioner Mario
Navarro .The Senior Deputy Administrator of Export
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) approved an Order
terminating the services of Navarro and finding him guilty as
charged.
Navarro appealed to the Merit Systems Protection
Board (MSPB). The MSPB rendered its decision setting aside
the Order issued by the Senior Deputy Administrator of EPZA.
The decision of the MSPB also reinstated Navarro with
payment and back wages and other benefits due him from the
time of his dismissal. The MSPB denied the motion for
reconsideration of the EPZA. The Regional Trial Court of
Bataan dismisses the criminal case filed against Navarro and
his co-accused for qualified theft. EPZA sought to reverse the
decision of the MSPB before the CSC and on July 16, 1992,
the CSC rendered its decision setting aside the MSPB’s
decision dated December 11, 1991 and the CSC found

Navarro guilty of grave misconduct and reimposed the penalty
of dismissal. The CSC also denied in its Resolution dated
September 11, 1992 the motion for reconsideration of Navarro.
In the recourse, Navarro claims that the CSC acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
jurisdiction in deciding the case without considering other
pertinent evidence but the EPZA filed for the dismissal of the
petition. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
manifestation to support the plea of the Petitioner in the
argument that there can be no appeal in the MSPB’s decision
exonerating Navarro.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Civil Service Commission and the
Export Processing Zone Authority acted without jurisdiction.
HELD: The MSPB rendered a favorable decision for Navarro
and this fact alone should have prevented EPZA from
appealing to the Commission on the bases of prevailing
jurisprudence. Under P.D. 807 or The Philippine Civil Service
Law, the CSC has no appellate jurisdiction over MSPB’s
decisions exonerating officers and employees from
administrative charges and P.D. 807 does not contemplate a
review of decisions exonerating officers or employees.
The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative cases involving suspension for more than thirty
days or removal or dismissal from office. P.D. 807 provides
that appeals shall be made by the party adversely affected by
the decision. The party adversely affected by the decision
refers to the government employee whom the administrative
case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action. EPZA, for
appealing MSPB’s decision and exonerating Navarro from
administrative charge and CSC, for taking recognizance of,
and deciding the appeal shows that both EPZA and CSC acted
without jurisdiction.
Civil Service Commission vs Dacoycoy
G.R. No. 135805 April 29, 1999
Facts: On November 29, 1995, a complaint for habitual
drunkenness, misconduct and nepotism was filed by the Vice-
President of the Citizens Crime Watch, Allen Chapter of
Northern Samar, George P. Suan, at the Civil Service
Commission-Quezon City against Pedro O. Dacoycoy, the
Vocational School Administrator of Balicuatro College of Arts
and Trades, Allen, Northern Samar. After a fact-finding
investigation of the CSC RO8- Tacloban City on January 28,
1997, the Civil Service Commission promulgated its resolution
finding no substantial evidence to support the charge of
habitual drunkenness and misconduct. However, the Civil
Service Commission found respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy
guilty of nepotism on two counts as a result of the appointment
of his two sons, Rito and Ped Dacoycoy, as driver and utility
worker, respectively, and their assignment under his immediate
supervision and control as the Vocational School
Administrator, and imposed on him the penalty of dismissal
from the service. Dacoycoy invoked the power of the Court of
Appeals via special civil action for certiorari with preliminary
injunction. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the
Civil Service Commission ruling that respondent did not
appoint or recommend his two sons Rito and Ped, and, hence,
was not guilty of nepotism.
Issue: Whether or not Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism
Ruling: Yes, Dacoycoy is guilty of nepotism. Sec 59 (1) of EO
212 defines nepotism as all appointments to the national,
provincial, city and municipal governments or in any branch or
instrumentality thereof, including government owned or
controlled corporations, made in favor of a relative of the
appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the
bureau or office, or of the persons exercising immediate
supervision over him. Further, the word "relative" and members
of the family referred to are those related within the third
degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.
CSC found the respondent guilty of nepotism as a
result of the appointment of his 2 sons Rito, a driver and Ped, a
utility worker, as they are under his immediate supervision and
control as the school administrator. It is true that he did not
appoint or recommend his two sons to the positions of driver
and utility worker in the Balicuatro College of Arts and Trades.
66
In fact, it was Mr. Jaime Daclag, Head of the Vocational
Department of the BCAT, who recommended the appointment
of Rito. Mr. Daclag was a subordinate of respondent Pedro O.
Dacoycoy, who was the school administrator. It was
respondent Dacoycoy who certified that funds are available for
the proposed appointment of Rito Dacoycoy and even rated
his performance as "very satisfactory". He authorized Mr.
Daclag to recommend the appointment of first level employees
under his immediate supervision. Then Mr. Daclag
recommended the appointment of respondent's two sons and
placed them under respondent's immediate supervision serving
as driver and utility worker of the school. Both positions are
career positions.
The Court grants the petition and reversed the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 44711 it
also revives and affirms the resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission dated January 28, 1998 and September 30, 1998,
dismissing respondent Pedro O. Dacoycoy from service.s
Jose V. De Los Santos Et. Al. vs Hon. Nicasio Yatco Et. Al.
106 Phil 745, G. R. No. L-13932, December 24, 1959
Facts: The parties submitted to the Court of First Instance of
Quezon City a compromise agreement on December 9, 1957,
referring to a sale by installment of a parcel of land by plaintiff
to private respondent (Francisco Mendoñez). Honorable Judge
Nicasio Yatco rendered a decision stating: judgement is hereby
rendered in accordance with the terms and conditiond set forth
therein, for the parties to comply therewith. However, private
respondent had failed to pay monthly installments since
January 1958. Hence, plaintiffs filed a motion for execution on
March 1958. Private respondent moved for postponement in
order to give parties enough time to settle matters amicably
which the court granted. It was not clear what happened during
the hearing on March 22, 1958. However, the court issued a
writ of execution on March 25, 1958 and defendant filed an
urgent motion to quash the writ of execution on April 17, 1958.
According to private respondent, he went into a verbal
agreement with Pacita V. De Los Santos right after the
execution of the compromise agreement. They agreed that
plaintiffs would consider the compromise agreement
unenforceable if private respondent pays his indebtedness in
full and at one time through a GSIS loan that plaintiff is willing
to facilitate. After defendant has secured the loan and paid
plaintiff, plaintiff is still asking payment from defendant for
attorney’s fees and interest all amounting to 14,563.00.
Defendant says he is willing to settle at 13, 563.00 because he
has already paid Php1,000.00 in advance. However, plaintiffs
refused to accept the offer made by defendant and insisted
that the Php1,000.00 be forfeited in plaintiff’s favor. During the
pre-trial conference held on June 2, 1958, plaintiff’s counsel
failed to appear. Thus, Judge Yatco quashed the writ of
execution he earlier issued by his order on June 4, 1958
because he found no justification for the issuance of said
order. Hence, plaintiffs filed a petition for certiorari to revoke
the order which quashed the earlier issued writ of execution
alleging that Honorable Judge Yatco acted with grave abuse of
discretion.
Issues: Whether or not Honorable Judge Nicasio Yatco
committed grave abuse of discretion when he ordered that the
writ of execution he earlier issued be quashed?
Ruling: NO, Honorable Judge Yatco did not commit grave
abuse of discretion when he ordered that the writ of execution
he earlier issued be quashed. The court cited Dimayuga vs.
Raymundo 176 Phil 143, wherein the court said that: there is
no question in this country that a judge may quash a writ of
execution issued by him, particularly where it was
improvidently issued. Because there was no opposition to the
statements proven by defendant that there was a verbal
agreement that amended the compromise agreement, the
court cannot validly execute the ordered compromise
agreement without proper hearing. Furthermore, plaintiffs has
already received more than Php12,000.00 from defendant from
the latter’s previous payments made before the parties went
into a compromise agreement. In consideration also that
plaintiffs is still using a portion on the land in question, court
finds that no irreparable damage was done to plaintiffs. Thus,
the court denied the petition of plaintiffs.

CSC, Anicia De Lima v. Larry M. Alfonso
G.R. No. 179452
June 11, 2009
FACTS: Respondent Larry Alfonso was charged with Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the
Service and preventively suspending him from his position as
Director of the Human Resources Management Department of
the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP).
Respondent argued that the CSC had no jurisdiction to hear
and decide the administrative case filed against him. According
to him, it is the PUP Board of Regents that has the exclusive
authority to appoint and remove PUP employees pursuant to
the provisions of R.A. No. 8292 in relation to R.A. No. 4670
Without ruling on the motion, Assistant Commissioner Atty.
Anicia Marasigan-de Lima, head of CSC-NCR, issued an
Order dated December 11, 2006 directing the Office of the
President of PUP to implement the preventive suspension
order against respondent.
Dissatisfied, respondent sought relief before the CA via a
petition for certiorari and prohibition.
On May 21, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision in favor of
Alfonso
ISSUE: Whether or not the CSC has jurisdiction to hear and
decide the complaint filed against Alfonso.
RULING: As the central personnel agency of the government,
the CSC has jurisdiction to supervise the performance of and
discipline, if need be, all government employees, including
those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters such as PUP. Accordingly,
all PUP officers and employees, whether they be classified as
teachers or professors pursuant to certain provisions of law,
are deemed, first and foremost, civil servants accountable to
the people and answerable to the CSC in cases of complaints
lodged by a citizen against them as public servants.
Admittedly, the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary
cases decided by government departments, agencies and
instrumentalities. However, a complaint may be filed directly
with the CSC, and the Commission has the authority to hear
and decide the case, although it may opt to deputize a
department or an agency to conduct the investigation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the May 21,
2007 Decision and August 23, 2007 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97284 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, Civil Service Commission
Resolution Nos. 061821 and 061908 dated October 16, 2006
and November 7, 2006, respectively, as well as its Order]
dated December 11, 2006 placing respondent under
preventive suspension are hereby REINSTATED. The CSC is
ordered to proceed hearing the administrative case against
respondent with dispatch.
POLICE POWER
G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION
and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Petitioners,vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR
ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
Facts: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim
signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled “An
Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time
Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels,
Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar
Establishments in the City of Manila” (the Ordinance).” The
ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow
the admission and charging of room rates for less than 12
hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC),
Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and
Development Corporation (STDC), who own and operate
several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to
67
intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on
the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests
as operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the
ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it
“strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and
jealously guarded by the Constitution.” Reference was made to
the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private
enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as
the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the
observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to
dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying
for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that
the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to
Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local Government Code which
confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment,
operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses,
hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other
similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.
Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised
Manila Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it
may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety,
the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the
morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the
violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is
unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy
and freedom of movement; it is an invalid exercise of police
power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in
their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and
affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that
the ordinance did not violate the right to privacy or the freedom
of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of
establishments that admit individuals for short time stays.
Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only
constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful
method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since
it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method
since the establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the
adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-
being of its constituents in general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
Issue: Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of
police power of the State.
Held: No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid
exercise of police power, and as such, it is unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the
recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision
in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc.,
v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common thread that runs
through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the
singularity of the localities covered under the respective
ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of
regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in
transient lodging establishments. This could be described as
the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels
and hotels but the services offered by these establishments
have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case
about the extent to which the State can intrude into and
regulate the lives of its citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A
long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for
an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and
pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be
unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be
general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and
distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and
renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban is evidently
sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local

government units by the Local Government Code through such
implements as the general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity
of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its
people. Police power has been used as justification for
numerous and varied actions by the State.
The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if
not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit
sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by
themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the
ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of
these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic
view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its
effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the
only restraint imposed by the law that they were capacitated to
act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners.
Yet, they also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to
invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons – those
persons who would be deprived of availing short time access
or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question.
The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental
rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was
defined by Justice Malcolm to include “the right to exist and the
right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term
cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of
the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of
man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by
his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for
the common welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right
must be recognized and the invasion of it should be justified by
a compelling state interest. Jurisprudence accorded
recognition to the right to privacy independently of its
identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of
constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop
short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a
wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of
lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite
for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power measure.
It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an
interference with private rights and the means must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be
evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More
importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the
purposes of the measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the
public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police
measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is
in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished
simply by applying existing laws. Less intrusive measures such
as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers
through active police work would be more effective in easing
the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws
and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These
measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of
the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is
apparent that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by
merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to
those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and
prostitutes can in fact collect “wash rates” from their clientele
by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel
rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely
affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the
legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. The
State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly
intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well¬-intentioned
the ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical
intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their
patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of
68
the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the
rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The
ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room
more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating
innocuous intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 9, is
REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 179554 December 16, 2009
Petitioner: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
Respondent: Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending
and Promotions, Inc.
Facts: In 1997, the Government, through the Department of
Transportation and Communications, entered into a build-
lease-transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with Metro Rail
Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act
No. 6957 (Build, Operate and Transfer Law), under which
MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject to the condition that
MRTC would own MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of
which the ownership would transfer to the Government. In
1998, respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending
& Promotions, Inc. (Trackworks) entered into a contract for
advertising services with MRTC. Trackworks thereafter
installed commercial billboards, signages and other advertising
media in the different parts of the MRT3. In 2001, however,
MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle the billboards,
signages and other advertising media pursuant to MMDA
Regulation No. 96-009, whereby MMDA prohibited the posting,
installation and display of any kind or form of billboards, signs,
posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center
island, posts, trees, parks and open space. After Trackworks
refused the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle
the former’s billboards and similar forms of advertisement.
Issue: Whether MMDA has the power to dismantle, remove or
destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media
installed by Trackworks on the interior and exterior structures
of the MRT3.
Ruling: That Trackworks derived its right to install its
billboards, signages and other advertising media in the MRT3
from MRTC’s authority under the BLT agreement to develop
commercial premises in the MRT3 structure or to obtain
advertising income therefrom is no longer debatable. Under the
BLT agreement, indeed, MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years,
upon the expiration of which MRTC would transfer ownership
of the MRT3 to the Government.
Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of
the MRT3 during the time material to this case, and until this
date, MRTC’s entering into the contract for advertising services
with Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership by the
former. In fact, in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v.
Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions,
Inc., this Court expressly recognized Trackworks’ right to install
the billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant
to said contract. The latter’s right should, therefore, be
respected.
It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate
to justify the dismantling of Trackworks’ billboards, signages
and other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on
its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards,
signages and other advertising media installed on the MRT3
structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development
Authority v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc., Metropolitan
Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co.,
Inc., and Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Garin,
the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA’s powers were
limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting
of policies, installing a system, and administration. Nothing in
Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone
legislative power.
The Court also agrees with the CA’s ruling that
MMDA Regulation No. 96-009 and MMC Memorandum
Circular No. 88-09 did not apply to Trackworks’ billboards,
signages and other advertising media. The prohibition against

posting, installation and display of billboards, signages and
other advertising media applied only to public areas, but
MRT3, being private property pursuant to the BLT agreement
between the Government and MRTC, was not one of the areas
as to which the prohibition applied.
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. vs Court of Appeals
Acebedo Optical Company, Inc. applied for a business permit
to operate in Iligan City. After hearing the sides of local
optometrists, Mayor Camilo Cabili of Iligan granted the permit
but he attached various special conditions which basically
made Acebedo dependent upon prescriptions or limitations to
be issued by local optometrists. Acebedo basically is not
allowed to practice optometry within the city (but may sell
glasses only). Acebedo however acquiesced to the said
conditions and operated under the permit. Later, Acebedo was
charged for violating the said conditions and was subsequently
suspended from operating within Iligan. Acebedo then assailed
the validity of the attached conditions. The local optometrists
argued that Acebedo is estopped in assailing the said
conditions because it acquiesced to the same and that the
imposition of the special conditions is a valid exercise of police
power; that such conditions were entered upon by the city in its
proprietary function hence the permit is actually a contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not the special conditions attached by the
mayor is a valid exercise of police power.
HELD: NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to
operate its business and not to practice optometry (the latter
being within the jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry). The
conditions attached by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be
given any legal application therefore estoppel does not apply. It
is neither a valid exercise of police power. Though the mayor
can definitely impose conditions in the granting of permits, he
must base such conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the
conditions are ultra vires. Lastly, the granting of the license is
not a contract, it is a special privilege – estoppel does not
apply.
EMINENT DOMAIN
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V. SECRETARY
OF DAR, G.R. No. 78742 (175 SCRA 343), July 14, 1989
FACTS: These are consolidated cases involving common legal
questions including serious challenges to the constitutionality
of R.A. No. 6657 also known as the “Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988"
In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the
P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter
alia of separation of powers, due process, equal protection and
the constitutional limitation that no private property shall be
taken for public use without just compensation.
In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim
that the power to provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program as decreed by the Constitution belongs to the
Congress and not to the President, the also allege that
Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for
violation of the constitutional provisions on just compensation,
due process and equal protection. They contended that the
taking must be simultaneous with payment of just
compensation which such payment is not contemplated in
Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.
In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O
Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued by the President and
that the said executive orders violate the constitutional
provision that no private property shall be taken without due
process or just compensation which was denied to the
petitioners.
In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they
cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right
of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has
so far not issued the implementing rules of the decree. They
therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to
compel the respondents to issue the said rules.
ISSUE: Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid
exercise of Police power or Power of Eminent Domain.
69
RULING: Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain,
though there are traditional distinction between the police
power and the power of eminent domain, property condemned
under police power is noxious or intended for noxious purpose,
the compensation for the taking of such property is not subject
to compensation, unlike the taking of the property in Eminent
Domain or the power of expropriation which requires the
payment of just compensation to the owner of the property
expropriated.
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC [244 SCRA
272; G.R. No. 119694; 22 May 1995]
Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated Resolution No.
2772 directing newspapers to provide free Comelec space of
not less than one-half page for the common use of political
parties and candidates. The Comelec space shall be allocated
by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates to
enable them to make known their qualifications, their stand on
public Issue and their platforms of government. The Comelec
space shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination
of vital election information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc. (PPI), a non-
profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers,
asks the Supreme Court to declare Comelec Resolution No.
2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates
the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the
government against the taking of private property for public use
without just compensation. On behalf of the respondent
Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that the Resolution is a
permissible exercise of the power of supervision (police power)
of the Comelec over the information operations of print media
enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure
a fair, impartial and credible election.
Issue: Whether or not Comelec Resolution No. 2772 is
unconstitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court declared the Resolution as
unconstitutional. It held that to compel print media companies
to donate “Comelec space” amounts to “taking” of private
personal property without payment of the just compensation
required in expropriation cases. Moreover, the element of
necessity for the taking has not been established by
respondent Comelec, considering that the newspapers were
not unwilling to sell advertising space. The taking of private
property for public use is authorized by the constitution, but not
without payment of just compensation. Also Resolution No.
2772 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of
the state. In the case at bench, there is no showing of
existence of a national emergency to take private property of
newspaper or magazine publishers.
FORFOM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL RAILWAYS
G.R. No. 124795 December 10, 2008
Forfom is the registered owner of several parcels of land in
San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna under Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCT) Nos. T-34384, T-34386 and 34387, all of the
Registry of Deeds of Laguna. Said parcels of land were
originally registered in the name of Felix Limcaoco,
predecessor-in-interest of Forfom, under OriginalCertificates of
Title (OCT) Nos. (0-326) 0-384 and (0-328) 0-386.In a cabinet
meeting held on 1 November 1972, then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos approved the PresidentialCommuter Service
Project, more commonly known as the Carmona Project of the
President. Per Resolution No.751 dated 2 November 1972 of
the PNR Board of Directors, its General Manager was
authorized to implementthe project. The San Pedro-Carmona
Commuter Line Project was implemented with the installation
of railroadfacilities and appurtenances.During the construction
of said commuter line, several properties owned by private
individuals/corporationswere traversed as right-of-way. Among
the properties through which the commuter line passed was a
100,128square-meter portion owned by Forfom covered by
TCT Nos. T-34384, T-34386 and T-34387.On 24 August 1990,
Forfom filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binan,
Laguna a complaint2 for Recovery of Posssession of Real
Property and/or Damages. It alleged that PNR, with the aid of

military men, and without its consent and against its will,
occupied 100,128 square meters of its property located in San
Pedro,Laguna and installed thereon railroad and railway
facilities and appurtenances. It further alleged that PNRrented
out portions of the property to squatters along the railroad
tracks. Despite repeated verbal and written demands for the
return of the property or for the payment of its price, PNR failed
to comply. It prayed that PNRbe ordered to vacate the property
and to cause the eviction of all shanties and squatters that
PNR had takenin as lessees, and that it be restored to the
peaceful occupation and enjoyment thereof.The trial court
found that the properties of Forfom were taken by PNR without
due process of law and without just compensation. Although
the power of eminent domain was not exercised in accordance
with law, and PNR occupied petitioner's properties without
previous condemnation proceedings and payment of just
compensation, the RTC ruled that, by its acquiescence, Forfom
was estopped from recovering the properties subject of this
case. As to its right to compensation and damages, it said that
the same could not be denied.The trial court declared that
P10.00 per square meter was the fair and equitable market
value of the real properties at the time of the taking thereof.
ISSUES:
1) Can petitioner Forfom recover possession of its property
because respondent PNR failed to file any expropriation case
and to pay just compensation?
2) Is the time when just compensation should be fixed at the
time of the taking or, as Forfom maintains, atthe time when the
price is actually paid?
HELD:
1) In the case at bar, the expropriator (PNR) entered the
property of Forfom, a private land. The entranceinto Forfom's
property was permanent, not for a fleeting or brief period. PNR
has been in control,possession and enjoyment of the subject
land since December 1972 or January 1973. PNR's entry
intothe property of Forfom was with the approval of then
President Marcos and with the authorization of thePNR's Board
of Directors. The property of Forfom measuring around eleven
hectares was devoted topublic use - railroad tracks, facilities
and appurtenances for use of the Carmona Commuter
Service.With the entrance of PNR into the property, Forfom
was deprived of material and beneficial use andenjoyment of
the property. It is clear from the foregoing that there was a
taking of property within theconstitutional sense.It can be
gathered from the records that Forfom accepted the fact of the
taking of its land when itnegotiated with PNR for just
compensation, knowing fully well that there was no
expropriation case filedat all. Forfom's inaction for almost
eighteen (18) years to question the absence of expropriation
proceedings and its discussions with PNR as to how much
petitioner shall be paid for its land preclude it from questioning
the PNR's power to expropriate or the public purpose for which
the power was exercised. In other words, it has waived its right
and is estopped from assailing the takeover of its land on the
ground that there was no case for expropriation that was
commenced by PNR.
2) Where actual taking was made without the benefit of
expropriation proceedings, and the owner sought recovery of
the possession of the property prior to the filing of expropriation
proceedings, theCourt has invariably ruled that it is the value of
the property at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes
of compensation.51 In the case at bar, the just compensation
should be reckoned from thetime of taking which is January
1973. The determination thereof shall be made in the
expropriation caseto be filed without delay by the PNR after the
appointment of commissioners as required by the rules.
REPUBLIC OF THE G.R. No. 170147PHILIPPINES,
represented by the PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE
AUTHORITY (PEZA),SPOUSES AGUSTIN and IMELDA
CANCIO,
January 30, 2009
On January 15, 1979, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Proclamation No. 1811[5] which reserved certain
parcels of land of the public domain in Lapu Lapu City in favor
of petitioner (then Export Processing Zone Authority or EPZA)
70
for the establishment of the Mactan Export Processing Zone.
However, some of the parcels covered by the proclamation,
including that of respondent spouses Agustin and Imelda
Cancio, were private land.
Petitioner eventually laid out the development of the
economic zone and subsequently leased out respondents
47,540 sq. m. lot to an investor in the economic zone, Maitland
Smith Inc. (Maitland).
On May 19, 2001, petitioner offered to purchase
respondents lot at P1,100 per sq. m. or P52,294,000 for the
whole property. The letter containing the offer further instructed
respondents to consider and accept, otherwise we will initiate
expropriation proceedings in the proper court.
Instead of accepting the offer, respondents filed an
unlawful detainer case against Maitland in the Municipal Trial
Court of Lapu Lapu City.
Thereafter, petitioner commenced expropriation
proceedings for respondents property with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Lapu Lapu City, Branch 54 on August 27,
2001.[6] Accordingly, it sought a writ of possession for the
property for which it was willing to deposit 10% of the offered
amount or a total of P5,229,400 with the Land Bank of the
Philippines in accordance with Administrative Order (A.O.) No.
50.[7]
Respondents, however, filed a motion to require
petitioner to comply with RA 8974,[8] specifically Section 4(a)
thereof, which requires that, upon the filing of the complaint for
expropriation, the implementing agency shall immediately pay
the owner of the property an amount equivalent to 100% of the
current zonal valuation thereof for purposes of the issuance of
a writ of possession.
In its January 14, 2002 order (first order), the trial
court granted respondents motion.
Petitioner moved for its reconsideration. It argued
that RA 8974 was inapplicable as the payment required under
the law applied only to instances where the property was still in
the owners possession and had yet to be transferred to the
government. It could not be validly invoked when the property
was already in the governments possession, as in this case. It
also averred that it should be made to pay only the price of the
land at the time of its taking. Corollarily, if it was ordered to pay
the amount required under RA 8974, it would be unjustly
penalized for its own improvements to the property.
This time, the RTC agreed with petitioners position.
On February 26, 2002 (second order), the court a quo granted
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration,
contending that petitioner should make the required payment
under the law because RA 8974, which took effect before the
commencement of the expropriation case, applied to all actions
of such nature regardless of whether the government agency
was already in possession or not. The court a quo issued its
September 5, 2002 order (third order) which reversed its
second order and reinstated the first one.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in
the CA, assailing the first and third orders of the RTC. The
appellate court sustained the RTCs ruling.
Hence, this petition.
The issue before us is whether or not RA 8974 is applicable
to this case for purposes of the issuance of the writ of
possession.[9] It is petitioners stance that it is not. It cited A.O.
No. 50 as its legal authority when it offered to purchase
respondents property in an amount equivalent to ten percent
(10%) higher than the zonal value thereof.[10] Consequently,
petitioner prayed in its complaint for expropriation[11] that it be
issued a writ of possession upon a showing that the amount
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the offered amount has
been duly deposited. Respondents, on the other hand, agree
that RA 8974 is the controlling law in this case as the complaint
for expropriation was instituted when said law was already in
effect.
We deny the petition. RA 8974 governs this case, not
A.O. No. 50 as petitioner insists.
A perusal of RA 8974 readily reveals that it applies to
instances when the national government expropriates property
for national government infrastructure projects.[12] Undeniably,
the economic zone is a national government project a matter
undisputed by both parties. Also, the complaint for
expropriation was filed only on August 27, 2001 or almost one

year after the law was approved on November 7, 2000. Thus,
there is no doubt about its applicability to this case.
We note that this expropriation case is still in its initial
stages. The trial court had yet to approve a writ of possession
in petitioners favor when the issue of payment of just
compensation cropped up. Both parties seemed to have
confused the requirement of paying 100% of the current zonal
valuation of the property (as a prerequisite to the issuance of a
writ of possession) with the payment of just compensation
itself.
In establishing the amount of just compensation, the
parties may present evidence relative to the propertys fair
market value, as provided under Section 5 of RA 8974.[21]
Thus:
Sec. 5. Standards for the Assessment of the Value of
the Land Subject of Expropriation Proceedings or Negotiated
Sale. In order to facilitate the determination of just
compensation, the court may consider, among other well-
established factors, the following relevant standards:
a) The classification and use for which the property is
suited;
b) The developmental costs for improving the land;
c) The value declared by the owners;
d) The current selling price of similar lands in the
vicinity;
e) The reasonable disturbance compensation for the
removal and/or demolition of certain improvements
on the land and for the value of improvements
thereon;
f) The size, shape or location, tax declaration and zonal
valuation of the land;
g) The price of the land as manifested in the ocular
findings, oral as well as documentary evidence
presented; and
h) Such facts and events as to enable the affected
property owners to have sufficient funds to acquire
similarly-situated lands of approximate areas as
those required from them by the government, and
thereby rehabilitate themselves as early as possible.
This must be so as just compensation should take into
account the consequential benefits and damages which may
arise from the expropriation.[22] Furthermore, it is well to
remember that the concept of just compensation does not
mean fairness to the property owner alone. It must also be just
to the public which ultimately bears the cost of
expropriation.[23]
Lastly, RA 8974 provides that the court shall determine
the just compensation to be paid the owner within sixty (60)
days from the date of filing of the expropriation case.[24] In this
case, almost eight years have passed since petitioner
commenced the expropriation proceedings on August 27,
2001. We, however, hold that it is still feasible to comply with
the spirit of the law by requiring the trial court to make such
determination within sixty (60) days from finality of this
decision, in accordance with the guidelines laid down in RA
8974 and its implementing rules.[25]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Raymunda Martinez
G.R. No. 169008 (August 14, 2007)
Facts: After compulsory acquisition by the Department of
Agrarian Reform, on November 16,1993, of respondent
Martinez's 62.5369-hectare land in Barangay Agpudlos, San
Andres,Romblon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, or the
Comprehensive Agrarian ReformLaw of 1988 (CARL),
petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines offered P1,955,485.60
as just compensation, for which respondent rejected. Thus, the
Department of AgrarianReform Adjudication Board, through its
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator conducted summary
administrative proceedings for the preliminary determination of
justcompensation in accordance with Section 16 (d) of the
CARL.
On September 4, 2002, PARAD Virgilio M. Sorita,
rendered judgment ordering the LBPto pay landowner-
protestant RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ for her property covered
withthe total amount of TWELVE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
SEVENTY NINETHOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY TWO
and 50/100 Pesos (Php12,179,492.50).
71
A petition for the fixing of just compensation was then
filed by LBP's counsel before theSpecial Agrarian Court (SAC)
of the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan, Romblon.
Meanwhile, respondent, still asserting the finality of
PARAD Sorita's decision, filed before the Office of the PARAD
a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution, whichwas
eventually granted on November 11, 2003. The PARAD denied
LBP's motion for reconsideration and ordered the issuance of a
writ of execution on February 23, 2004.
LBP, on March 12, 2004, moved to quash the said
February 23, 2004 PARAD resolution.On April 6, 2004, even
as the motion to quash was yet unresolved, LBP instituted a
petition for certiorari before the CA. The CA, on September 28,
2004 dismissed the petition.
Issue: Whether or not the PARAD, gravely abused its
discretion when it issued a writ of execution despite the
pendency of LBP's petition for fixing of just compensation with
the SAC?
Held: In this case, petitioner moved to quash the PARAD
resolutions and at the same time petitioned for their annulment
via certiorari under Rule 65. In both proceedings, the parties
are identical and the reliefs prayed for are the same. In the two
actions, petitioner also has a singular stance: the PARAD
resolutions should not be executed in view of the pendency of
the petition for fixing of just compensation with the SAC. Thus
a situation is created where the two for a could come up with
conflicting decisions. This is precisely the evil sought to be
avoided by the rule against forum-shopping.
We find petitioner not entitled to the grant of a writ of
certiorari by the appellate court because the Office of the
PARAD did not gravely abuse its discretion when it undertook
to execute the September 4, 2002 decision. Rule XIII, Section
11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure.
In Philippine Veterans Bank v. Court of Appeals and
in Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v.
Lubrica, we explained the consequence of the said rule to the
effect that the adjudicator's decision on land valuation attains
finality after the lapse of the 15-day period. Considering
therefore that, in this case, LBP's petition with the SAC for the
fixing of just compensation was filed 26 days after its receipt of
the PARAD's decision, or eleven days beyond the
reglementary period, the latter had already attained finality.
The PARAD could very well issue the writ of execution.
HON. VICENTE P. EUSEBIO, LORNA A. BERNARDO,
VICTOR ENDRIGA, and the CITY OF PASIG,Petitioners, v.
JOVITO M. LUIS, LIDINILA LUIS SANTOS, ANGELITA
CAGALINGAN, ROMEO M. LUIS, and VIRGINIA LUIS-
BELLESTEROS,*Respondents.
Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 53591 and 53589
with an area of 1,586 square meters. Said parcel of land was
taken by the City of Pasig sometime in 1980 and used as a
municipal road now known as A. Sandoval Avenue, Barangay
Palatiw, Pasig City. On February 1, 1993, the Sanggunian of
Pasig City passed Resolution No. 15 authorizing payments to
respondents for said parcel of land. However, the Appraisal
Committee of the City of Pasig, in Resolution No. 93-13 dated
October 19, 1993, assessed the value of the land only at
P150.00 per square meter. In a letter dated June 26, 1995,
respondents requested the Appraisal Committee to consider
P2,000.00 per square meter as the value of their land.
One of the respondents also wrote a letter dated
November 25, 1994 to Mayor Vicente P. Eusebio calling the
latter's attention to the fact that a property in the same area, as
the land subject of this case, had been paid for by petitioners
at the price of P2,000.00 per square meter when said property
was expropriated in the year 1994 also for conversion into a
public road. Subsequently, respondents' counsel sent a
demand letter dated August 26, 1996 to Mayor Eusebio,
demanding the amount ofP5,000.00 per square meter, or a
total of P7,930,000.00, as just compensation for respondents'
property. In response, Mayor Eusebio wrote a letter dated
September 9, 1996 informing respondents that the City of
Pasig cannot pay them more than the amount set by the
Appraisal Committee.

Thus, on October 8, 1996, respondents filed a Complaint for
Reconveyance and/or Damages (Civil Case No. 65937)
against herein petitioners before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155. Respondents prayed that the
property be returned to them with payment of reasonable rental
for sixteen years of use at P500.00 per square meter, or
P793,000.00, with legal interest of 12% per annum from date
of filing of the complaint until full payment, or in the event that
said property can no longer be returned, that petitioners be
ordered to pay just compensation in the amount of
P7,930,000.00 and rental for sixteen years of use at P500.00
per square meter, orP793,000.00, both with legal interest of
12% per annum from the date of filing of the complaint until full
payment. In addition, respondents prayed for payment of moral
and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and costs.
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision3 dated
January 2, 2001, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants:
1. Declaring as ILLEGAL and UNJUST the action of the
defendants in taking the properties of plaintiffs covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 53591 and 53589 without
their consent and without the benefit of an expropriation
proceedings required by law in the taking of private property for
public use;
2. Ordering the defendants to jointly RETURN the subject
properties to plaintiffs with payment of reasonable rental for its
use in the amount of P793,000.00 with legal interest at the rate
of 6% per annum from the filing of the instant Complaint until
full payment is made;
3. In the event that said properties can no longer be returned to
the plaintiffs as the same is already being used as a public
road known as A. Sandoval Avenue, Pasig City, the
defendants are hereby ordered to jointly pay the plaintiffs the
fair and reasonable value therefore at P5,000.00 per square
meter or a total of P7,930,000.00 with payment of reasonable
rental for its use in the amount of P500.00 per square meter or
a total of P793,000.00, both with legal interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from the filing of the instant Complaint until full
payment is made; andcralawlibrary
4. Ordering the defendants to jointly pay the plaintiffs attorney's
fees in the amount ofP200,000.00.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners then appealed the case to the CA, but the
CA affirmed the RTC judgment in its Decision dated November
28, 2003.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION (NPC) vs. HEIRS OF
SANGKAY G.R. 165828 August 24, 2011
FACTS: Pursuant to its legal mandate under Republic Act No.
6395, NPC undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power
Plant Project in the 1970s to generate electricity for Mindanao.
The project included the construction of several underground
tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus
River to the hydroelectric plants.
On November 21, 1997, the respondents as the
owners of land situated in Iligan City, sued NPC in the RTC for
the recovery of damages and of the property, the alternative
prayer for the payment of just compensation.They alleged that
they had belatedly discovered that one of the underground
tunnels of NPC that diverted the water flow of the Agus River
for the operation of the Hydroelectric Project traversed their
land; that the underground tunnel had been constructed
without their knowledge and consent; that the presence of the
tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial
and residential value of their land; and that their land had also
become an unsafe place for habitation because of the loud
sound of the water rushing through the tunnel and the constant
shaking of the ground, forcing them and their workers to
relocate to safer grounds.
NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had no
right to compensation under section 3(f) of Republic Act No.
6395, under which a mere legal easement on their land was
established; that their cause of action, should they be entitled
to compensation, already prescribed due to the tunnel having
been constructed in 1979; and that by reason of the tunnel
72
being an apparent and continuous easement, any action
arising from such easement prescribed in five years.
Issue: Whether the Heirs of Macabangkit’s right to claim just
compensation had prescribed under section 3(i) of Republic
Act No. 6395, or, alternatively, under Article 620 and Article
646 of the Civil Code.
Held: NO. Five-year prescriptive period under Section 3(i) of
Republic Act No. 6395 does not apply to claims for just
compensation
Section 3. Powers and General Functions of the
Corporation. – The powers, functions, rights and activities of
the Corporation shall be the following:
Provided, further, That said action for damages is filed
within five years after the rights of way, transmission lines,
substations, plants or other facilities shall have been
established;
Provided, finally, That after said period, no suit shall
be brought to question the said rights of way, transmission
lines, substations, plants or other facilities;
We rule that the prescriptive period provided under
Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 is applicable only to an
action for damages, and does not extend to an action to
recover just compensation like this case. Consequently, NPC
cannot thereby bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to
recover just compensation for their land.
The action to recover just compensation from the
State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for
damages. The former, also known as inverse condemnation,
has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact
by the governmental defendant, even though no formal
exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted
by the taking agency.
Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The
measure is not the taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word
just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation
in order to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered
for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and
ample.
On the other hand, the latter action seeks to vindicate
a legal wrong through damages, which may be actual, moral,
nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary enshrined in
Article 19 and like provisions on human relations in the Civil
Code, and the exercise results to the damage of another, a
legal wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held
responsible.
The action to recover just compensation is based on
the Constitution while the action for damages is predicated on
statutory enactments. Indeed, the former arises from the
exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain against
private property for public use, but the latter emanates from the
transgression of a right. The fact that the owner rather than the
expropriator brings the former does not change the essential
nature of the suit as an inverse condemnation for the suit is not
based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against the
taking of property without just compensation.
It would very well be contrary to the clear language of
the Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation for
private property taken for a public use solely on the basis of
statutory prescription.
Due to the need to construct the underground tunnel,
NPC should have first moved to acquire the land from the
Heirs of Macabangkit either by voluntary tender to purchase or
through formal expropriation proceedings. In either case, NPC
would have been liable to pay to the owners the fair market
value of the land, for Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395
expressly requires NPC to pay the fair market value of such
property at the time of the taking, thusly:
(h) To acquire, promote, hold, transfer, sell, lease,
rent, mortgage, encumber and otherwise dispose of property
incident to, or necessary, convenient or proper to carry out the
purposes for which the Corporation was created: Provided,
That in case a right of way is necessary for its transmission
lines, easement of right of way shall only be sought: Provided,
however, That in case the property itself shall be acquired by
purchase, the cost thereof shall be the fair market value at the
time of the taking of such property.

This was what NPC was ordered to do in National
Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, where NPC had denied the right
of the owners to be paid just compensation despite their land
being traversed by the underground tunnels . There, NPC
similarly argued that the underground tunnels constituted a
mere easement that did not involve any loss of title or
possession on the part of the property owners. (held in this
case)The manner in which the easement was created by
petitioner, however, violates the due process rights of
respondents as it was without notice and indemnity to them
and did not go through proper expropriation proceedings.
Petitioner could have, at any time, validly exercised the power
of eminent domain to acquire the easement over respondents’
property as this power encompasses not only the taking or
appropriation of title to and possession of the expropriated
property but likewise covers even the imposition of a mere
burden upon the owner of the condemned property.
Significantly, though, landowners cannot be deprived of their
right over their land until expropriation proceedings are
instituted in court. The court must then see to it that the taking
is for public use, that there is payment of just compensation
and that there is due process of law.
Issue: WON NPC’s construction of the tunnel constituted
taking of the land, and entitled owners to just compensation.
The Court held in National Power Corporation v.
Ibrahim that NPC was "liable to pay not merely an easement
fee but rather the full compensation for land" traversed by the
underground tunnels, viz:
Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner only occupies
the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely an
easement fee but rather the full compensation for land. This is
so because in this case, the nature of the easement practically
deprives the owners of its normal beneficial use. Respondents,
as the owner of the property thus expropriated, are entitled to a
just compensation which should be neither more nor less,
whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the
money equivalent of said property.
NPC’s construction adversely affected the owners’
rights and interests because the subterranean intervention by
NPC prevented them from introducing any developments on
the surface, and from disposing of the land or any portion of it,
either by sale or mortgage.
There was a full taking on the part of NPC,
notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and
actually dispossessed. It is settled that the taking of private
property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an
actual physical taking or appropriation. Indeed, the
expropriator’s action may be short of acquisition of title,
physical possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a
taking.
Compensable taking includes destruction, restriction,
diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the
common and necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a
lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value.
It is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the
use of his property, nor material whether the property is
removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect
changes hands.
As a result, NPC should pay just compensation for the
entire land. In that regard, the RTC pegged just compensation
at P500.00/square meter based on its finding on what the
prevailing market value of the property was at the time of the
filing of the complaint, and the CA upheld the RTC.
We rule that the reckoning value is the value at the
time of the filing of the complaint, as the RTC provided in its
decision. Compensation that is reckoned on the market value
prevailing at the time either when NPC entered or when it
completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be just, for it
would compound the gross unfairness already caused to the
owners by NPC’s entering without the intention of formally
expropriating the land, and without the prior knowledge and
consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit. NPC’s entry denied
elementary due process of law to the owners since then until
the owners commenced the inverse condemnation
proceedings. The Court is more concerned with the necessity
to prevent NPC from unjustly profiting from its deliberate acts
of denying due process of law to the owners. As a measure of
simple justice and ordinary fairness to them, therefore,
73
reckoning just compensation on the value at the time the
owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings
is entirely warranted.
Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al. v. Republic of the
Philippines, et al./
Expropriation; abandonment of public purpose. In this case,
the Mactan Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA)
and/or its predecessor agency had not actually used the lots
subject of the final decree of expropriation in Civil Case No. R-
1881 for the purpose they were originally taken by the
government, i.e., for the expansion and development of Lahug
Airport. In fact, the Lahug Airport had been closed and
abandoned. Also, in this case, it was preponderantly
established by evidence that the National Airport Corporation,
MCIAA’s predecessor, through its team of negotiators, had
given assurance to the affected landowners that they would be
entitled to repurchase their respective lots in the event they are
no longer used for airport purposes. The SC held that the
government acquires only such rights in expropriated parcels
of land as may be allowed by the character of its title over the
properties. This means that in the event the particular public
use for which a parcel of land is expropriated is abandoned,
the owner shall not be entitled to recover or repurchase it as a
matter of right, unless such recovery or repurchase is
expressed in or irresistibly deducible from the condemnation
judgment. The SC held that the decision in Civil Case No. R-
1881 enjoined MCIAA, as a condition of approving
expropriation, to allow recovery or repurchase upon
abandonment of the Lahug airport project. In effect, the
government merely held the properties condemned in trust
until the proposed public use or purpose for which the lots
were condemned was actually consummated by the
government. Since the government failed to perform the
obligation that is the basis of the transfer of the property, then
the lot owners can demand the reconveyance of their old
properties after the payment of the condemnation price. A
condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the
purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing which it
should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it
behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its
private owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot
plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it
pleases and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of
expropriation.Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al. v. Republic of
the Philippines, et al./Mactan-Cebu International Airport
[MCIAA] v. Ricardo L. Inocian, in his personal capacity and as
Attorney-in-Fact of Olympia E. Esteves, et al. and Aletha Suico
Magat in her personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of
Philip M. Suico, et al. G.R. Nos. 168770 & 168812, February 9,
2011.
Expropriation; reconveyance of expropriated property.
In accordance with Art. 1187 of the Civil Code on mutual
compensation, MCIAA may keep whatever income or fruits it
may have obtained from the parcels of land expropriated. In
turn, the landowners need not require the accounting of
interests earned by the amounts they received as just
compensation. Following Art. 1189 of the Civil Code providing
that if the thing is improved by its nature, or by time, the
improvement shall inure to the benefit of the creditor, the
landowners do not have to settle the appreciation of the values
of their respective lots as part of the reconveyance process,
since the value increase is merely the natural effect of nature
and time. Anunciacion Vda. De Ouano, et al. v. Republic of the
Philippines, et al./Mactan-Cebu International Airport [MCIAA] v.
Ricardo L. Inocian, in his personal capacity and as Attorney-in-
Fact of Olympia E. Esteves, et al. and Aletha Suico Magat in
her personal capacity and as Attorney-in-Fact of Philip M.
Suico, et al.G.R. Nos. 168770 & 168812, February 9, 2011.
DUE PROCESS
LUMIQUED VS EXEVEA282 SCRA 125
FACTS: Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He
was charged by Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty
due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was
alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements
and that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth
P116,000.00.Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly

removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two
complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee
hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3and 10,
1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the
second hearing date, he moved for its resetting toJuly 17,
1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The
committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his
counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the
committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The
Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of
Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel
Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued.
ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to
be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?
HELD: The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel,
which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in
the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an
accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute
right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal
proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry.
In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in
criminal proceedings to have competent and independent
counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not
accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The
investigation conducted by the committee created by
Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining
if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the
complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not
indispensable to due process unless required by the
Constitution or the law. There is nothing in the Constitution that
says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to
berepresented by counsel and that, without such
representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings.
The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not
indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the
dueprocess clause such that without the participation of its
members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The
ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at
all except only with a lawyer at his side.In administrative
proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain one’s side. Whatever irregularity
attended the proceedings conducted by the committee was
cured by Lumiqued s appeal and his subsequent filing of
motions for reconsideration.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE v. LANTION
FACTS: Secretary Of Justice Franklin Drilon, representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in
Manila the “extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
Philippines and the Government of the U.S.A. The Philippine
Senate ratified the said Treaty.
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received
from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S Note Verbale No.
0522 containing a request for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jiminez to the United States. On the same
day petitioner designate and authorizing a panel of attorneys to
take charge of and to handle the case. Pending evaluation of
the aforestated extradition documents, Mark Jiminez through
counsel, wrote a letter to Justice Secretary requesting copies
of the official extradition request from the U.S Government and
that he be given ample time to comment on the request after
he shall have received copies of the requested papers but the
petitioner denied the request for the consistency of Article 7 of
the RP-US Extradition Treaty stated in Article 7 that the
Philippine Government must present the interests of the United
States in any proceedings arising out of a request for
extradition.
ISSUE: Whether or not to uphold a citizen’s basic due process
rights or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty.
RULING: Petition dismissed. The human rights of person,
whether citizen or alien , and the rights of the accused
guaranteed in our Constitution should take precedence over
treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the
government to the individual deserve preferential consideration
when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government
74
of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a
source of binding obligations under generally accepted
principles of international law incorporated in our Constitution
as part of the law of the land.
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever
municipal tribunals are confronted with situation in which there
appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and
the provision of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Petitioner (Secretary of Justice) is ordered to furnish Mark
Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers, and to grant him (Mark Jimenez) a reasonable period
within which to file his comment with supporting evidence.
“ Under the Doctrine of Incorporation, rules of
international law form part of the law of the land and no further
legislative action is needed to make such rules applicable in
the domestic sphere.
“ The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever
municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which
there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international
law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local
state.
“Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so
as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that
municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally
accepted principles of international law in observance of the
incorporation clause in the above cited constitutional provision.
“ In a situation, however, where the conflict is
irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of
international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates
that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts,
for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law and
are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.
“The fact that international law has been made part of
the law of the land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of
international law over national or municipal law in the municipal
sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most
countries, decrees that rules of international law are given
equal standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative
enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogate
priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute
may repeal a treaty. In states where the Constitution is the
highest law of the land, such as the Republic of the Philippines,
both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they are in
conflict with the constitution.
Government Of The USA V. Hon. Purganan (2002)
FACTS: Petition is a sequel to the case “Sec. of Justice v.
Hon. Lantion”. The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr.
Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its supporting
papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which
to file a comment and supporting evidence. But, on motion for
reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision
but held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice
and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed with
the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of
an order for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD
1069 in order to prevent the flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC
could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an “Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion” praying for his application for
an arrest warrant be set for hearing. After the hearing, as
required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his
Memorandum. Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in
case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the
amount of P100,000. The court ordered the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at
P1M in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and
posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted
provisional liberty.
Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order for the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his
temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best to
take cognizance as there is still no local jurisprudence to guide
lower court.

ISSUES:
i. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first
hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest warrant
under Section 6 of PD No. 1069
ii. Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail
iii. Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process
HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is
CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court of
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings
before it.
i. YES. By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further
conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such
early stage. From the knowledge and the material then
available to it, the court is expected merely to get a good first
impression or a prima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy
initial determination as regards the arrest and detention of the
accused. The prima facie existence of probable cause for
hearing the petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant
was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting
documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom
that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion when he set the matter for hearing upon
motion of Jimenez. The silence of the Law and the Treaty
leans to the more reasonable interpretation that there is no
intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the
entire proceedings. It also bears emphasizing at this point that
extradition proceedings are summary in nature. Sending to
persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for their
arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give
them ample opportunity to prepare and execute an escape
which neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended.
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is
invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To determine
probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the
Constitution itself requires only the examination under oath or
affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may
produce.
The Proper Procedure to “Best Serve The Ends Of
Justice” In Extradition Cases
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting
documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon as
possible, a prima facie finding whether
a) they are sufficient in form and substance
b) they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law
c) the person sought is extraditable
At his discretion, the judge may require the
submission of further documentation or may personally
examine the affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite
of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is
possible, the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the
judge. On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case
is determined, then the magistrate must immediately issue a
warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time
summoned to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled
summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the
judge must not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the
pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity
to escape and frustrate the proceedings.
ii. Yes. The constitutional provision on bail on Article III,
Section 13 of the Constitution, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114
of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws.
It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because
extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or
acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from
the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he
would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. In extradition, the presumption of
innocence is not at issue. The provision in the Constitution
stating that the “right to bail shall not be impaired even when
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended” finds
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application “only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or
offenses inherent in or directly connected with invasion.”
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be
extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument
to grant him one in the present case. Extradition proceedings
are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for
which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts
trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition
court
Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule
Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. It is subject
to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each
case. Bail may be applied for and granted as an exception,
only upon a clear and convincing showing
1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk
or a danger to the community; and
2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited
by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants
provisional liberty in extradition cases therein
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory
basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles
of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of
proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity, precision
and emphatic forcefulness.
It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for
and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of
public knowledge that the United States was requesting his
extradition. Therefore, his constituents were or should have
been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case.
Thus, the court ruled against his claim that his election to
public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special
circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to
giving him the power to grant bail to himself. It would also
encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the
extradition proceedings even more. Extradition proceedings
should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while
safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic
contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that
purpose.
That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be
taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within
reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon
the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
iii. NO. Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due
process and to fundamental fairness. The doctrine of right to
due process and fundamental fairness does not always call for
a prior opportunity to be heard. A subsequent opportunity to
be heard is enough. He will be given full opportunity to be
heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the
Petition for Extradition. Indeed, available during the hearings
on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard
and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the
summary nature of extradition.
It is also worth noting that before the US government
requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had
already been conducted in that country. He already had that
opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he
ran away.
Other Doctrines:
Five Postulates of Extradition
1) Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of
Crime
In this era of globalization, easier and faster international
travel, and an expanding ring of international crimes and
criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state. We
need to cooperate with other states in order to improve our
chances of suppressing crime in our own country.
2) The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the
Accused
By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines
is deemed to have reposed its trust in the reliability or
soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner,
as well as in the ability and the willingness of the latter to grant

basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case
therein.
3) The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
An extradition proceeding is sui generis:
a) It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation
all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights.
It does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence
of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the
court of the state where he will be extradited.
b) An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while
criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.
c) In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a
criminal case requires proof “beyond reasonable doubt” for
conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited “upon
showing of the existence of a prima facie case”
d) Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes
executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition
proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable
but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.
Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial
assistance through which a person charged with or convicted
of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try
that person. The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings
in court is only to determine whether the extradition request
complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person
sought is extraditable.
4) Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in
good faith with our obligations under the Treaty. Accordingly,
the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper
5) There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the
accused were willing to submit to trial in the requesting
country. Prior acts of herein respondent:
a) leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of
his indictment proceedings there; and
b) remaining in the requested state despite learning that the
requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he is
charged with are bailable
Extradition is Essentially Executive
Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial,
responsibility arising out of the presidential power to conduct
foreign relations and to implement treaties. Thus, the
Executive Department of government has broad discretion in
its duty and power of implementation.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Telecommunications And Broadcast Attorneys Of The
Phils. Vs. COMELEC
289 SCRA 337 G.R. No. 132922
April 21, 1998
Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast
Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization
of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting companies. It
was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case
as, among other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to
suffer from actual or threatened injury as a result of the subject
law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had the
requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge.
Petitioner operates radio and television broadcast stations in
the Philippinesaffected by the enforcement of Section 92, B.P.
No. 881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P.
No. 881 which provides:
“Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio
and television time to be known as the “Comelec Time” which
shall be allocated equally and impartially among the
candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and
television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of all radio
broadcasting and television stations are hereby amended so
as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the
period of campaign.”
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same
law requires COMELEC to procure print space in newspapers
and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides that air time
shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it
76
contends that Section 92 singles out radio and television
stations to provide free air time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to
several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in
connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995
senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more
should it be required to do so again this year. Petitioners claim
that the primary source of revenue of the radio and television
stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require
these stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust
taking of private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it
lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one hour each
day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lost
P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it
provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily for such.
Issue: Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio
and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the
laws.
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes
taking of property without due process of law and without just
compensation.
Held: Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting,
whether radio or by television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there
are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are
frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting
companies, which are given franchises, do not own the
airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit
broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the
temporary privilege to use them. Thus, such exercise of the
privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by
the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the
privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising radio
and television stations, the state spends considerable public
funds in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio
and television stations to provide free air time as against
newspapers and magazines which require payment of just
compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise
without merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires
spending of public funds which it does not do in the case of
print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide free
air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry
gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own
the airwaves, no private property is taken by the requirement
that they provide air time to the COMELEC.
People v. Jalosjos [G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]
FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-
fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on
two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending
appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he
be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance
of a non-bailable offense.
ISSUE Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial
differentiation which removes the accused-appellant as a
prisoner from the same class as all persons validly confined
under law by reason of the “mandate of the sovereign will”.
RULING NO. While the Constitution guarantees: “x x x nor
shall any person be denied the equal protection of laws.”, this
simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be treated
alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. The
duties imposed by the “mandate of the people” are
multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality.
The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise
of government authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded. Here, election to the position of Congressman is
not a reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement.
The functions and duties of the office are not substantial
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners

interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the
purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the
same class. Hence, the performance of legitimate and even
essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to
free a person validly in prison.
Biraogo et al. v. The Philippine Truth Commission
GR No. 192935; December 7, 2010
J. Mendoza
FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30,
2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office
of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of
graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories
during the previous administration, and to submit its finding
and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body.
But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate,
arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between
contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess
evidence of graft and corruption and make recommendations.
It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite
people in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is
a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if
probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information
in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its
functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it
arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public office
and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31
of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No.
1 because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power
to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto
inexistent like the “Truth Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and
statutes when it vested the “Truth Commission” with quasi-
judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the
Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution
and the DOJ created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as
it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials
and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is
their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other
administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal
standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of
Congress because the President’s executive power and power
of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct
investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and
that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised Administrative
Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970
and settled jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or
form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress
to appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a
mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or
supersede the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ,
because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body
and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s
jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal
protection clause because it was validly created for laudable
purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions
and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of
powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create and to
77
appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and
commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman
and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING: The power of judicial review is subject to limitations,
to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling
for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the
power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as
members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired,
so is the power of each member thereof, since his office
confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of
that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the
prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution
in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to
question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he
sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and
direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question.” In private suits, standing is
governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that
“every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is “the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public
suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a “public right” in assailing
an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative
of the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek
judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest in
the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as
a “citizen” or “taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must
have “a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The
Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the
petition covers matters of transcendental importance to justify
the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention
of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that
our laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President
are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.
One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power to
create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to
ascertain facts and determine if laws have been faithfully
executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies
to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is
entitled to know so that he can be properly advised and guided
in the performance of his duties relative to the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment
or allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is
no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of
Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the
amount to be earmarked for the operation of the commission
because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the
Office of the President will be the very source of the funds for
the commission. The amount that would be allocated to the
PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations
so there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ
or erode their respective powers. If at all, the investigative
function of the commission will complement those of the two

offices. The function of determining probable cause for the
filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to
be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to
investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise and
guide the President in the performance of his duties relative to
the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its
apparent transgression of the equal protection clause
enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987
Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public
bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a
similar manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is
to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution
through the state’s duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid
must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally
to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the
members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as
violative of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of
truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during
the previous administration only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class,
that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated
constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution. Superficial differences
do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past
administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount
law of the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights determined and all
public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the
Constitution should be stricken down for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED.
Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
G.R. No. 199082 September 18, 2012 JOSE MIGUEL T.
ARROYO, Petitioner, vs.DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Equal Protection Clause
Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team is in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because its sole purpose
is the investigation and prosecution of certain persons and
incidents. They argue that there is no substantial distinction
between the allegations of massive electoral fraud in 2004 and
2007, on the one hand, and previous and subsequent national
elections, on the other hand; and no substantial distinction
between petitioners and the other persons or public officials
who might have been involved in previous election offenses.
They insist that the Joint Panel was created to target only the
Arroyo Administration as well as public officials linked to the
Arroyo Administration. To bolster their claim, petitioners
explain that Joint Order No. 001-2011 is similar to Executive
Order No. 1 (creating the Philippine Truth Commission) which
this Court had already nullified for being violative of the equal
protection clause.
78
Respondents, however, refute the above contentions and
argue that the wide array of the possible election offenses and
broad spectrum of individuals who may have committed them,
if any, immediately negate the assertion that the assailed
orders are aimed only at the officials of the Arroyo
Administration.
We agree with the respondents.
The equal protection clause is enshrined in Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.74
The concept of equal protection has been laid down in Biraogo
v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010:75
One of the basic principles on which this government
was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied
in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal
protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due
process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has been embodied in a
separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific
guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from
the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on
the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act
assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the
sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection
simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly-situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statute or by its improper execution
through the state's duly-constituted authorities. In other words,
the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to
govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective.76
Unlike the matter addressed by the Court’s ruling in
Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, Joint Order
No. 001-2011 cannot be nullified on the ground that it singles
out the officials of the Arroyo Administration and, therefore, it
infringes the equal protection clause. The Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 was expressly created for the purpose of
investigating alleged graft and corruption during the Arroyo
Administration since Executive Order No. 177 specifically
referred to the "previous administration"; while the Joint
Committee was created for the purpose of conducting
preliminary investigation of election offenses during the 2004
and 2007 elections. While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among
those subjected to preliminary investigation, not all
respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were public
officers who were investigated upon in connection with their
acts in the performance of their official duties. Private
individuals were also subjected to the investigation by the Joint
Committee.
The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent
undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality.
Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, it
does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all
persons under like circumstances and conditions shall be
treated alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced.78
We once held that the Office of the Ombudsman is
granted virtually plenary investigatory powers by the
Constitution and by law and thus may, for every particular
investigation, whether commenced by complaint or on its own
initiative, decide how best to pursue each investigation. Since
the Office of the Ombudsman is granted such latitude, its
varying treatment of similarly situated investigations cannot by
itself be considered a violation of any of the parties’ rights to
the equal protection of the laws.79 This same doctrine should
likewise apply in the present case.
Thus, as the constitutional body granted with the
broad power of enforcing and administering all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum and recall,80 and tasked to ensure free,

orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections,81 the
Comelec has the authority to determine how best to perform
such constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the
Comelec issues various resolutions prior to every local or
national elections setting forth the guidelines to be observed in
the conduct of the elections. This shows that every election is
distinct and requires different guidelines in order to ensure that
the rules are updated to respond to existing circumstances.
Moreover, as has been practiced in the past,
complaints for violations of election laws may be filed either
with the Comelec or with the DOJ. The Comelec may even
initiate, motu proprio, complaints for election offenses.82
Pursuant to law and the Comelec’s own Rules,
investigations may be conducted either by the Comelec itself
through its law department or through the prosecutors of the
DOJ. These varying procedures and treatment do not,
however, mean that respondents are not treated alike. Thus,
petitioners’ insistence of infringement of their constitutional
right to equal protection of the law is misplaced.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. AZUCENA
SAAVEDRA BATUGAS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 183110, October 7, 2013
FACTS: On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for
Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. Azucena
was born in Zamboanga del Sur to Chinese Parents. Since
birth she has not departed the Philippines. Azucena can speak
English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her primary,
secondary, and tertiary educations were taken in Philippine
schools. She then practice her teaching in various school in the
Philippines. In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married
Santiago Batuigas a natural-born Filipino citizen. They have
five children. All of them studied in Philippine public and private
schools and are all professionals, three of whom are now
working abroad. After all the jurisdictional requirements
mandated by Section 97 of CA 473 had been complied with,
the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in
a lawful occupation or in some known lucrative trade.
ISSUE:Whether or not the petition for naturalization be
granted.
RULING: Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine
citizenship through either judicial naturalization under CA 473
or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139
(the "Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third
option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to
alien women married to Filipino husbands is found under
Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that: "any woman who is
now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines
and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed
a citizen of the Philippines."
Under this provision, foreign women who are married
to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso facto Philippine
citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they
possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of
their marriage nor do they have to submit themselves to
judicial naturalization. Copying from similar laws in the United
States which has since been amended, the Philippine
legislature retained Section 15 of CA 473, which then reflects
its intent to confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru
derivative naturalization.
Azucena is a teacher by profession and has actually
exercised her profession before she had to quit her teaching
job to assume her family duties and take on her role as joint
provider, together with her husband, in order to support her
family. Together, husband and wife were able to raise all their
five children, provided them with education, and have all
become professionals and responsible citizens of this country.
Certainly, this is proof enough of both husband and wife’s
lucrative trade. Azucena herself is a professional and can
resume teaching at any time. Her profession never leaves her,
and this is more than sufficient guarantee that she will not be a
charge to the only country she has known since birth.
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main
objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an alien wife
is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family members,
thus:
79
It is, therefore, not congruent with our cherished
traditions of family unity and identity that a husband should be
a citizen and the wife an alien, and that the national treatment
of one should be different from that of the other. Thus, it cannot
be that the husband’s interests in property and business
activities reserved by law to citizens should not form part of the
conjugal partnership and be denied to the wife, nor that she
herself cannot, through her own efforts but for the benefit of the
partnership, acquire such interests. Only in rare instances
should the identity of husband and wife be refused recognition,
and we submit that in respect of our citizenship laws, it should
only be in the instances where the wife suffers from the
disqualifications stated in Section 4 of the Revised
Naturalization Law.
Chavez v. PCGG, 299 SCRA 744
FACTS: Petitioner asks this Court to define the nature and the
extent of the people’s constitutional right to information on
matters of public concern. Petitioner, invoking his constitutional
right to information and the correlative duty of the state to
disclose publicly all its transactions involving the national
interest, demands that respondents make public any and all
negotiations and agreements pertaining to PCGG’s task of
recovering the Marcos’s’ ill-gotten wealth.
ISSUE: Are the negotiations leading to a settlement on ill-
gotten wealth of the Marcos’s within the scope of the
constitutional guarantee of access to information?
HELD: Yes. Considering the intent of the framers of the
Constitution, it is incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as
well as other government representatives, to disclose sufficient
public information on any proposed settlement they have
decided to take up with the ostensible owners and holders of
ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to
definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to
intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common assertions
are still in the process of being formulated or are in the
“exploratory” stage. There is a need, of course, to observe the
same restrictions on disclosure of information in general --
such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or
foreign relations, intelligence and other classified information.
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ
vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL
BAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
FACTS: The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates
Authority ("PEA" for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEA's then
on-going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and
Development Corporation ("AMARI" for brevity) to reclaim
portions of Manila Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin
PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI involving such
reclamation. PEA asserts that in cases of on-going
negotiations the right to information is limited to "definite
propositions of the government." PEA maintains the right does
not include access to "intra-agency or inter-agency
recommendations or communications during the stage when
common assertions are still in the process of being formulated
or are in the 'exploratory stage'."
ISSUE: Are negotiations leading to a settlement with PIATCO
within the scope of the constitutional guarantee of access to
information?
HELD: Yes. Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains
the people's right to information on matters of public concern:
“…Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as
to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law." Further, The State
policy (Sec 28, Art II) of full transparency in all transactions
involving public interest reinforces the people's right to
information on matters of public concern.
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to
promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of

the government, as well as provide the people sufficient
information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights.
Information on on-going evaluation or review of bids
or proposals being undertaken by the bidding or review
committee is not immediately accessible under the right to
information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going,
there are no "official acts, transactions, or decisions" on the
bids or proposals. However, once the committee makes its
official recommendation, there arises a "definite proposition" on
the part of the government.
Romulo L. Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations, et. Al. G.R. No. 180643
25 March 2008
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the DOTC entered into a contract
with ZTE for the supply of equipment and services for the NBN
Project in the amount of nearly Php6B and was to be financed
by the Republic of China. Several Resolutions regarding the
investigation and implications on national security and
government-xto-government contracts regarding the NBN
Project were introduced in Senate. Respondent Committees
initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain
personalities and cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project.
Petitioner was summoned to appear and he testified to the
Committees for eleven (11) hours, but refused to answer three
important questions, invoking his right to executive privilege.
For failing to appear in the other days that he was summoned,
Neri was held in contempt.
ISSUES:
Whether Neri can invoke executive privilege;
Whether the invocation of executive privilege violate Sec. 28,
Art. II and Sec. 7, Art. III; and
Whether the Committees gravely abused their discretion by
holding Neri in contempt.
RULING: The communications elicited by the three questions
are covered by executive privilege. Despite the revocation of
E.O. 464, there is a recognized claim of executive privilege.
The privilege is said to be a necessary guarantee of
presidential advisors to provide “the President and those who
assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process
of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way
many would be unwilling to express except privately.”
Furthermore, the claim was properly invoked by the letter
provided by Executive Secretary Ermita stating the precise and
certain reason that the said information may impair the
country’s diplomatic as well as economic relations with the
Republic of China.
The petitioner was able to appear in at least one of
the days where he was summoned and expressly manifested
his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators,
with the exception only of those covered by his claim of
executive privilege. The right to public information and full
public disclosure of transactions, like any other right, is subject
to limitation. These include those that are classified by the
body of jurisprudence as highly confidential. The information
subject to this case belongs to such kind.
The Committees violated Sec. 21, Art. VI of the
Constitution for having failed to publish its Rules of Procedure.
Inquiries are required to be in accordance with the “duly
published rules of procedure.” Without these, the aid of
legislation are procedurally infirm
CENTER FOR PEOPLE EMPOWERMENT IN GOVERNANCE
(CenPEG) v. COMMISSIONON ELECTIONS
(2010)Refresher:
Comelec failed to provide plaintiffs with the source code of
identified canvassmachines despite repeated requests and
demands. CenPEG is now praying for the issuanceof a writ of
mandamus, despite the lapse of the May 2010 elections,
claiming that the sourcecode remained important and relevant
"not only for compliance with the law, and thepurpose thereof,
but especially in the backdrop of numerous admissions of
errors and claimsof fraud."
Issue: W/N COMELEC could be compelled to release the
source code to CenPEG- YES
80
Doctrine: pertinent portion of Section 12 of R.A. 9369 is clear
in that "once an AEStechnology is selected for implementation,
the Commission shall promptly make the sourcecode of that
technology available and open to any interested political party
or groups whichmay conduct their own review thereof."- The
COMELEC has offered no reason not to comply with this
requirement of the law.Indeed, its only excuse for not
disclosing the source code was that it was not yet
availablewhen CenPEG asked for it and, subsequently, that
the review had to be done, apparently forsecurity reason,
"under a controlled environment." The elections had passed
and thatreason is already stale.
In Re: Edillon, 84 SCRA 568 (AC 1928)
FACTS: Atty. Marcial Edillon was dibarred due to non-payment
of his IBP dues, hence the petitioner on this case. He claimed
that the provisions of Sec. 10 of Rule 139-A of the Rules of
Court is unconstitutional as he is being compelled, as a
precondition in maintaining his good standing as a lawyer, to
pay and settle his dues to the IBP. Petitioner stubbornly
insisted his take and refused to admit full competence of the
court in this matter. But after some time in realization, his
recalcitrance and defiance were gone in his subsequent
communication with the court. He appealed that his health,
advanced age, and concern to his former clients’ welfare be
considered in his prayer so that he can again practice law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Edillon should be reinstated as
member of the bar.
HELD: YES. Admission to the bar is a privilege burdened with
condition. Failure to abide entails loss of such privilege.
Considered in addition was the two (2) years Atty. Edillon was
barred to practice law, and the dictum of Justice Malcolm in
Villavicencio v. Lukban that “the power to discipline, especially
if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised in a
preservative and not on the vindictive principle”. After contrition
on the part of the petitioner, the court finds reinstatement in
order.
MALABANAN V. RAMENTO
Facts: Petitioners were officers of the Supreme Student
Council of Respondent University. They sought and were
granted by the school authorities a permit to hold a meeting
from 8am to 12am. Pursuant to such permit, along with other
students, they held a general assembly at the Veterinary
Medicine and Animal Science (VMAS) Basketball Court. The
place indicated in such permit, not in the basketball court as
therein stated, but at the second floor lobby. At such gathering,
they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their
opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal
Science. They continued their language severely critical of the
university authorities and using megaphones in the process.
There was, as a result, disturbance of classes being held. Also,
non academic employees within hearing distance, stopped
their work because of noise created. They were asked to
explain why they should not be held liable for holding an
assembly.
Issue: Whether or not the suspension of students for one
academic year was violative of the constitutional rights of
freedom of assembly and free speech?
Decision: Yes, necessarily their exercise to discuss matters
affecting their welfare or involving public interest is not
subjected to previous restraint or subsequent punishment
unless there be a showing of clear and present danger to a
substantive evil that the State has a right to prevent. The
peaceable character of an assembly could be lost, however, by
an advocacy or disorder. If assembly is to be held in school
premises, permit must be sought from its school authorities
who are devoid to deny such request. In granting such permit,
there may be conditions as to the time and place of an
assembly to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of
non-academic personnel. However, in violation of terms,
penalty incurred should not be disproportionate to the offense.
UNITED PEPSI-COLA VS. LAGUESMA
 81

NOVEMBER 17, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ out by the rank-and-file employees of an organization (first-
G.R. No. 122226 March 25, 1998 level managers/supervisors). What distinguishes them from the
UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION (UPSU), rank-and-file employees is that they act in the interest of the
petitioner, employer in supervising such rank-and-file employees.
vs. “Managerial employees” may therefore be said to fall
HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA and PEPSI-COLA
into two distinct categories: the “managers” per se, who
PRODUCTS, PHILIPPINES, INC. respondents.
compose the former group described above, and the
“supervisors” who form the latter group.
FACTS: Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. It
#1: It appears that this question was the subject of
appears that on March 20, 1995 the union filed a petition for
two previous determinations by the Secretary of Labor and
certification election on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-
Employment, in accordance with which this case was decided
Cola Products Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was
by the med-arbiter.
denied by the med-arbiter and, on appeal, by the Secretary of
To qualify as managerial employee, there must be a
Labor and Employment, on the ground that the route managers
clear showing of the exercise of managerial attributes under
are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for union
paragraph (m), Article 212 of the Labor Code as amended.
membership under the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor
Designations or titles of positions are not controlling. As to the
Code, which provides:
route managers and accounting manager, we are convinced
that they are managerial employees. Their job descriptions
Ineligibility of managerial employees to join any labor
clearly reveal so (Worker’s Alliance Trade Union (WATU) v.
organization; right of supervisory employees. — Managerial
Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines, Inc., Nov. 13, 1991)
employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor
This finding was reiterated in Case No. OS-A-3-71-92.
organization. Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for
entitled In Re: Petition for Direct Certification and/or
membership in a labor organization of the rank-and-file
Certification Election-Route Managers/Supervisory Employees
employees but may join, assist or form separate labor
of Pepsi-Cola Products Phils.Inc.
organizations of their own.
* doctrine of res judicata certainly applies to adversary
administrative proceedings
Petitioner brought this suit challenging the validity of
Thus, we have in this case an expert’s view that the
the order, dismissed.
employees concerned are managerial employees within the
Hence, this petition. Pressing for resolution its
purview of Art. 212.
contention that the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code,
At the very least, the principle of finality of
so far as it declares managerial employees to be ineligible to
administrative determination compels respect for the finding of
form, assist or join unions, contravenes Art. III, §8 of the
the Secretary of Labor that route managers are managerial
Constitution which provides:
employees as defined by law in the absence of anything to
The right of the people, including those employed in
show that such determination is without substantial evidence to
the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
support it.
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
The Court now finds that the job evaluation made by
abridged.
the Secretary of Labor is indeed supported by substantial
evidence. The nature of the job of route managers is given in a
ISSUES:
four-page pamphlet, prepared by the company, called “Route
(1) whether the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products
Manager Position Description,” the pertinent parts of which
Philippines, Inc. are managerial employees and
read:
(2) whether Art. 245, insofar as it prohibits managerial
A. BASIC PURPOSE
employees from forming, joining or assisting labor unions,
A Manager achieves objectives through others.
violates Art. III, §8 of the Constitution.
As a Route Manager, your purpose is to meet the
sales plan; and you achieve this objective through the skillful
HELD: YES and NO
MANAGEMENT OF YOUR JOB AND THE MANAGEMENT
As a class, managers constitute three levels of a
OF YOUR PEOPLE.
pyramid: (1) Top management; (2) Middle Management; and
These then are your functions as Pepsi-Cola Route
(3) First-line Management [also called supervisors].
Manager. Within these functions — managing your job and
FIRST-LINE MANAGERS — The lowest level in an
managing your people — you are accountable to your District
organization at which individuals are responsible for the work
Manager for the execution and completion of various tasks and
of others is called first-line or first-level management. First-line
activities which will make it possible for you to achieve your
managers direct operating employees only; they do not
sales objectives.
supervise other managers. Examples of first-line managers are
Xxxx
the “foreman” or production supervisor in a manufacturing
Distinction is evident in the work of the route
plant, the technical supervisor in a research department, and
managers which sets them apart from supervisors in general.
the clerical supervisor in a large office. First-level managers
Unlike supervisors who basically merely direct operating
are often called supervisors.
employees in line with set tasks assigned to them, route
MIDDLE MANAGERS — The term middle
managers are responsible for the success of the company’s
management can refer to more than one level in an
main line of business through management of their respective
organization. Middle managers direct the activities of other
sales teams. Such management necessarily involves the
managers and sometimes also those of operating employees.
planning, direction, operation and evaluation of their individual
Middle managers’ principal responsibilities are to direct the
teams and areas which the work of supervisors does not entail.
activities that implement their organizations’ policies and to
The route managers cannot thus possibly be classified as
balance the demands of their superiors with the capacities of
mere supervisors because their work does not only involve, but
their subordinates. A plant manager in an electronics firm is an
goes far beyond, the simple direction or supervision of
example of a middle manager.
operating employees to accomplish objectives set by those
TOP MANAGERS — Composed of a comparatively
above them.
small group of executives, top management is responsible for
While route managers do not appear to have the
the overall management of the organization. It establishes
power to hire and fire people (the evidence shows that they
operating policies and guides the organization’s interactions
only “recommended” or “endorsed” the taking of disciplinary
with its environment. Typical titles of top managers are “chief
action against certain employees), this is because thisis a
executive officer,” “president,” and “senior vice-president.”
function of the Human Resources or Personnel Department of
Actual titles vary from one organization to another and are not
the company.
always a reliable guide to membership in the highest
management classification.
# 2: Constitutionality of Art. 245
A distinction exists between those who have the
Art.245 is the result of the amendment of the Labor
authority to devise, implement and control strategic and
Code in 1989 by R.A. No. 6715, otherwise known as the
operational policies (top and middle managers) and those
Herrera-Veloso Law. Unlike the Industrial Peace Act or the
whose task is simply to ensure that such policies are carried
provisions of the Labor Code which it superseded, R.A. No.

6715 provides separate definitions of the terms “managerial”
and “supervisory employees,” as follows:
Art. 212. Definitions. . . .
(m) “managerial employee” is one who is vested with
powers or prerogatives to lay down and execute management
policies and/or to hire transfer, suspend, lay off, recall,
discharge, assign or discipline employees. Supervisory
employees are those who, in the interest of the employer,
effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise
of such authority is not merely routinary or clerical in nature but
requires the use of independent judgment. All employees not
falling within any of the above definitions are considered rank-
and-file employees for purposes of this Book.
The distinction between top and middle managers,
who set management policy, and front-line supervisors, who
are merely responsible for ensuring that such policies are
carried out by the rank and file, is articulated in the present
definition. 30 When read in relation to this definition in Art.
212(m), it will be seen that Art. 245 faithfully carries out the
intent of the Constitutional Commission in framing Art. III, §8 of
the fundamental law.
*Framer’s Intent: MR. LERUM. My amendment is on
Section 7, page 2, line 19, which is to insert between the words
“people” and “to” the following: WHETHER EMPLOYED BY
THE STATE OR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS. In other
words, the section will now read as follows: “The right of the
people WHETHER EMPLOYED BY THE STATE OR PRIVATE
ESTABLISHMENTS to form associations, unions, or societies
for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.”
Nor is the guarantee of organizational right in Art. III,
§8 infringed by a ban against managerial employees forming a
union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, §8 is subject to the
condition that its exercise should be for purposes “not contrary
to law.” In the case of Art. 245, there is a rational basis for
prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining labor
organizations.
ACOSTA V COURT OF APPEALS
Facts: Petitioners are teachers from different public schools in
metro manila. On various dates in September and October
1990, petitioners did not report for work and instead,
participated in mass actions by public school teachers at the
liwasang bonifacio for the purpose of petitioning the
government for redress of their grievances. On the basis of
reports submitted by their respective school principals that
petitioners participated in said mass actions and refused to
comply with the return-to-work order issued September 17,
1990 by then Secretary Isidro D. Cariño of the department of
education, culture and sports (DECS), petitioners were
administratively charged with such offenses as grave
misconduct, gross neglect of duty, gross violation of civil
service law, rules and regulations and reasonable office
regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross
insubordination, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service and absence without official leave. Petitioners failed to
answer the charges. Secretary Cariño found petitioners guilty
as charged and ordered their immediate dismissal from the
service. Is hereby meted out the penalty of six (6) months
suspension without pay. Petitioners appealed that respondent
court of appeals grievously erred when it affirmed the assailed
resolutions of CSC.
Issues: WON respondent court of appeals grievously erred
when it affirmed the assailed resolutions of the civil service
commission that wrongly penalized petitioners whose only
“offense” was to exercise their consitutional right to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances?
WON respondent court of appeals grievously erred when it
affirmed the assailed resolutions of the civil service
commission that wrongly denied petitioners their right to
backwages?
Decision: No. Petition denied. In Bangalisan v. Court of
appeals, petitioners, are being penalized not because they
exercised their right of peaceable assembly and petition for
redress of grievances but because of their successive
unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced adverse
effects upon their students for whose education they are
82
responsible. The actuations of petitioners definitely constituted
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service,
punishable under the civil service law, rules and regulations.as
aptly stated by the solicitor general, “it is not the exercise by
the petitioners of their constitutional right to peaceable
assemble that was punished, but the manner in which they
exercised such right which resulted in the temporary stoppage
or disruption of public service and classes in various public
schools in metro manila. For, indeed, there are efficient and
non-disruptive avenues, other than the mass actions in
question, whereby petitioners could petition the government for
redress of grievances.
As a general proposition, a public official is not
entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any
service. While there recognized instances when backwages
may be awarded to a suspended or dismissed public official
who is later ordered reinstated, as pointed by petitioners in
citing bangalisan, the factual circumstances of the case at bar
impel the Court to rule otherwise.
NON IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
PACIFIC WIDE REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION vs. PUERTO AZUL LAND, INC. (2
consolidated cases)
The Facts:In G.R. No. 180893 Puerto Azul Land, Inc. (PALI) is
the owner and developer ofthe Puerto Azul Complex
situated in Ternate, Cavite. Its business involves the
development of Puerto Azul into a satellite city with
residential areas, resort, tourism and retail commercial centers
with recreational areas. In order to finance its operations, it
obtained loans from various banks, the principal amount
of which amounted to P640, 225,324.00.PALI and its
accommodation mortgagors, i.e., Ternate Development
Corporation (TDC), Ternate Utilities, Inc.(TUI), and Mrs.
Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez, secured the loans. PALI’s business
did very well. However, it started encountering problems
when the Philippine Stock Exchange rejected the listing of its
shares in its initial public offering which sent a bad signal to the
real estate market. This resulted in potential investors and real
estate buyers shying away from the business venture. The
situation was aggravated by the1997 Asian financial crisis
and the decline of the real estate market. Consequently, PALI
was unable to keep up with the payment of its obligations, both
current and those that were about to fall due. One of its
creditors, the Export and Industry Bank (EIB), later substituted
by Pacific Wide Realty and Development Corporation
(PWRDC), filed foreclosure proceedings on PALI’s
mortgaged properties.
Thrust to a corner, PALI filed a petition for
suspension of payments and rehabilitation, accompanied by a
proposed rehabilitation plan and three (3) nominees for the
appointment of a rehabilitation receiver. RTC issued a Stay
Order and appointed Patrick V. Coiled as rehabilitation
receiver. Creditor EIB filed a motion to replace the appointed
rehabilitation receiver which was denied. On April, 20, 2005,
Coiled filed his rehabilitation report and recommendation,
wherein he proposed that PALI should be rehabilitated rather
than be dissolved and liquidated. On June9, 2005, PALI filed a
revised rehabilitation plan. EIB and the other creditors of PALI
filed their respective comments/opposition to the
report/recommendations of the rehabilitation receiver. EIB,
together with another creditor opal, Tranche I (SPV-MC), Inc.,
filed an urgent motion to disqualify the appointed
rehabilitation receiver. The RTC denied the motion. On
December 13, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision approving
PALI’s petition for suspension of payments and rehabilitation.
The Decision provides: (1) The creditors shall have,
as first option, the right to be paid with real estate properties
being offered by the petitioner in diction end Pago; (2)
Creditors who will not opt for diction shall be paid in
accordance with the restructuring of the obligations as
recommended by the Receiver. Finding the terms of the
rehabilitation plan and the qualifications of the
appointed rehabilitation receiver unacceptable, EIB
appealed to CA which dismissed said petition. EIB filed
MR but the same was denied. In G.R. No. 178768EIB entered
its appearance before the rehabilitation court and moved for
the clarification of the stay order and/or leave to continue the

extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate’s owned by PALI’s
accommodation mortgagors. PALI argued that the foreclosure
sought would pre-empt the rehabilitation proceedings
and would give EIB undue preference overall’s other
creditors. RTC denied EIB’s motion. EIB filed an urgent
motion to order PALI and/or the mortgagor
TUI/rehabilitation receiver to pay all the taxes due on TCT No.
133164. EIB claimed that the property covered butt No.
133164, registered in the name of TUI, was one of the
properties used to secure PALI’s loan from EIB. The said
property was subject to a public auction by the Treasurer’s
Office of Pasay City for non-payment of realty taxes. EIB
prayed that PALI or TUI be ordered to pay the realty taxes due
on TCT No. 133164. PALI opposed the motion, arguing that
the rehabilitation court’s stay order stopped the enforcement of
all claims, whether for money or otherwise, against a debtor, its
guarantors, and its sureties not solidarity liable to the debtor;
thus, TCT No. 133164 was covered by the stay order.RTC
ordered the modification of the Stay Order in such a manner
that TCT No. 133614 which is mortgaged with creditor
EIB be excluded from the Stay Order. EIB may settle the
realty taxes of third party mortgagor with the local
government of Pasay City. To protect the creditor EIB, the
latter may foreclose on TCT No. 133614.PALI filed an urgent
motion for a status quo order. Codirected EIB to refrain from
taking any steps to implement the foreclosure sale. The
City Treasurer of Pasay City was, likewise, directed to
respect the stay order.
August 16, 2005 - RTC issued an Order reiterating
that Techno. 133164, under the name of TUI, was excluded
from the stay order and that may foreclose TCT No. 133164
and settle the delinquency taxes of third-party mortgagor TUI
with the local government of Pasay City.
PALI filed an urgent motion to modify the Order dated
August16, 2005 but was denied. PALI filed with the CA a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 ascribing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the rehabilitation court in allowing the
foreclosure of a mortgage constituted over the property
of an accommodation mortgagor, to secure the loan
obligations of corporation. This time, petition was granted
such that the subject property shall not be foreclosed.
The Issues
(1) Whether the terms of the rehabilitation plan are
unreasonable and in violation of the non-impairment clause.
(2) Whether the rehabilitation court erred when it allowed the
foreclosure of the accommodation mortgagee’s property and
excluded the same from the coverage of the stay order.
The Ruling of the Court
Rehabilitation contemplates a continuance of
corporate life and activities in an effort to restore and
reinstate the corporation to its former position of successful
operation and solvency. The purpose of rehabilitation
proceedings is tenable the company to gain a new lease on
life and thereby allow creditors to be paid their claims from its
earnings. The rehabilitation of a financially distressed
corporation benefits its employees, creditors, stockholders and,
in a larger sense, the general public. Under the Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation, “rehabilitation" is
defined as the restoration of the debtor to apposition of
successful operation and solvency, if it is shown that its
continuance of operation is economically feasible and its
creditors can recover by way of the present value of
payments projected in the plan, more if the
corporation continues as a going concern than if it is
immediately liquidated. An indispensable requirement in
the rehabilitation of distressed corporation is the
rehabilitation plan which shall include (a) the desired
business targets or goals and the duration and coverage
of the rehabilitation; (b) the terms and conditions of such
rehabilitation which shall include the manner of its
implementation, giving due regard to the interests of
secured creditors; (c) the material financial commitments
to support the rehabilitation plan; (d) the means for the
execution of the rehabilitation plan, which may include
conversion of the debts or any portion thereof to
equity, restructuring of the debts, diction end Pago, or sale of
assets roof the controlling interest; (e) a liquidation
analysis that estimates the proportion of the claims that the
83
creditors and shareholders would receive if the debtor’s
properties were liquidated; and (f) such other relevant
information to enable reasonable investor to make an
informed decision on the feasibility of the rehabilitation plan
(Section 5 of the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate
Rehabilitation)In G.R. No. 180893, the rehabilitation plan is
contested on the ground that the same is unreasonable
and results in the impairment of the obligations of contract.
PWRDC contests the following stipulations in PALI’s
rehabilitation plan: fifty percent (50%) reduction of the
principal obligation; condonation of the accrued and
substantial interests and penalty charges; repayment over a
period of ten years, with minimal interest of two percent (2%)
for the first five years and five percent (5%) for the next five
years until fully paid, and only upon availability of cash flow for
debt service. There was nothing onerous in the terms
of PALI’s rehabilitation plan. The restructuring of the debts of
PALI is part and parcel of its rehabilitation. There is
nothing unreasonable or onerous about the 50%
reduction of the principal amount when, as found by the
court a quo, a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) acquired the
credits of PALI from its creditors at deep discounts of as much
as 85%. Meaning, PALI’s creditors accepted only 15% of their
credit’s value.
Stated otherwise, if PALI’s creditors are in a
position toaccept 15% of their credit’s value, with more
reason that theyshould be able to accept 50% thereof as full
settlement bytheir debtor. PWRDC’s contention that there is a
violation of the impairment clause is without merit because this
case does not involve a law or an executive issuance declaring
the modification of the contract among debtor PALI, its
creditors and its accommodation mortgagors. Successful
rehabilitation of a distressed corporation willbenefit its
debtors, creditors, employees, and the economy ingeneral.
The court may approve a rehabilitation plan even over the
opposition of creditors holding a majority of the totalliabilities
of the debtor if, in its judgment, the rehabilitation of the debtor
is feasible and the opposition of the creditors is manifestly
unreasonable.
The rehabilitation plan, once approved, is binding
upon the debtor and all persons who may be affected by it,
including the creditors, whether or not such persons have
participated in the proceedings or have opposed the plan or
whether or not their claims have been scheduled. Inigo. The
governing law concerning rehabilitation and suspension
of actions for claims against corporations is Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 902-A, as amended (P.D. No.902-A).
Section 6(c) of P.D. No. 902-A mandates that, upon
appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation
receiver, board, or body, all actions for claims
against corporations, partnerships or associations under
management or receivership pending before any court,
tribunal, board, orebody shall be suspended. Stated differently,
all actions for claims against a corporation pending before any
court, tribunal or board shall ipso jure be suspended in
whatever stage such actions may be found. The justification
for the suspension of actions or claim spending
rehabilitation proceedings is to enable the management
committee or rehabilitation receiver to effectively exercise
its/his powers free from any judicial or extrajudicial interference
that might unduly hinder or prevent the "rescue" of the
debtor company.
To allow such other action to continue would
only add to the burden of the management committee
or rehabilitation receiver, whose time, effort and resources
would be wasted in defending claims against the corporation
instead of being directed toward its restructuring and
rehabilitation. Lastly, even assuming that the value of the PALI
property covered by the MTI [Mortgage Trust Indenture] is
indeedP1.877 Billion, however, the total claim of EIB against
Polis more than P1.4 Billion Pesos is still counting as to date.
Hence, not redeeming the auctioned TCT No. 133614 from the
Pasay City Government definitely renders creditor EIB not
possessing adequate protection over the property securing its
claim against petitioner Palate rehabilitation court committed
no reversible error when it removed TCT No. 133164 from the
coverage of the stay order. The Interim Rules of Procedure on
Corporate Rehabilitation is silent on the enforcement of claims
specifically against the properties of accommodation
mortgagors.

It only covers the suspension, during the pendency of
the rehabilitation, of the enforcement of all claims against the
debtor, its guarantors and sureties not solidarity liable with the
mortgagor. The newly adopted Rules of Procedure on
Corporate Rehabilitation has a specific provision for
this special arrangement among a debtor, its creditor
and its accommodation mortgagor. Section 7(b), Rule 3 of the
said Rules explicitly allows the foreclosure by a creditor of
a property not belonging to a debtor under corporate
rehabilitation, as it provides: SEC. 7. Stay Order.— x x x (b)
staying enforcement of all claims, whether for money or
otherwise and whether such enforcement is by court
action or otherwise, against the debtor, its guarantors and
persons not solidarity liable with the debtor; provided, that the
stay order shall not cover claims against letters of credit
and similar security arrangements issued by a third party to
secure the payment of the debtor’s obligations; provided,
further, that the stay order shall not cover foreclosure by a
creditor of property not belonging to a debtor under corporate
rehabilitation; provided, however, that where the owner of such
property sought to be foreclosed is also a guarantor or one
who is not solidarity liable, said owner shall be entitled to the
benefit of excursion as such guarantor. Thus, the property
covered by TCT No. 133164 is hereby declared excluded from
the coverage of the Stay Order.
HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ v. PICOP RESOURCES,
INC.G.R. No. 162243, December 3, 2009
Chico-Nazario, J.:
Doctrine:
A timber license is not a contract within the purview of the
non-impairment clause.
Facts: PICOP filed with the DENR an application to have its
Timber License Agreement (TLA) No. 43converted into an
IFMA.PICOP filed before the (RTC) City a Petition for
Mandamus against then DENR Sec Alvarez for unlawfully
refusing and/or neglecting to sign and execute the IFMA
contract of PICOP even as the latter has complied with all the
legal requirements for the automatic conversion of TLA No. 43,
as amended, into an IFMA. The cause of action of PICOP
Resources, Inc. (PICOP) in its Petition for Mandamus with the
trial court is clear: the government is bound by contract, a 1969
Document signed by then President Ferdinand Marcos, to
enter into an Integrated Forest Management Agreement
(IFMA) with PICOP.
Issue: Whether the 1969 Document is a contract recognized
under the non-impairment clause by which the government
may be bound (for the issuance of the IFMA)
Held: NO. Our definitive ruling in Opposa v. Factoran that a
timber license is not a contract within the purview of the non-
impairment clause is edifying. We declared:
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or
rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property or a
property right protected byte due process clause of the
Constitution.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-
impairment clause, which reads: "SEC. 10. No law impairing
the obligation of contracts shall be passed." cannot be invoked.
The Presidential Warranty cannot, in any manner, be
construed as a contractual undertaking assuring PICOP of
exclusive possession and enjoyment of its concession areas.
Such an interpretation would result in the complete abdication
by the State in favor of PICOP of the sovereign power to
control and supervise the exploration, development and
utilization of the natural resources in the area.
Diaz vs. Secretary of Finance (2011)
Facts: Petitioners Renato V. Diaz and Aurora Ma. F. Timbale
(petitioners) filed this petition for declaratory relief assailing the
validity of the impending imposition of value-added tax (VAT)
by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) on the collections of
tollway operators. Court treated the case as one of prohibition.
Petitioners hold the view that Congress did not, when it
enacted the NIRC, intend to include toll fees within the
meaning of "sale of services" that are subject to VAT; that a toll
fee is a "user's tax," not as ale of services; that to impose VAT
84
on toll fees would amount to a tax on public service; and that,
since VAT was never factored into the formula for computing
toll fees, its imposition would violate then on-impairment clause
of the constitution. The government avers that the NIRC
imposes VAT on all kinds of services of franchise grantees,
including tollway operations; that the Court should seek the
meaning and intent of the law from the words used in the
statute; and that the imposition of VAT on tollway operations
has been the subjects early as 2003 of several BIR rulings and
circulars. The government also argues that petitioners have no
right to invoke the non-impairment of contracts clause since
they clearly have no personal interest in existing toll operating
agreements (TOAs) between the government and tollway
operators. At any rate, the non-impairment clause cannot limit
the State's sovereign taxing power which is generally read into
contracts.
Issue: May toll fees collected by tollway operators be
subjected to VAT (Are tollway operations a franchise and/or a
service that is subject to VAT)?
Ruling: When a tollway operator takes a toll fee from a
motorist, the fee is in effect for the latter's use of the tollway
facilities over which the operator enjoys private proprietary
rights that its contract and the law recognize. In this sense, the
tollway operator is no different from the service providers under
Section108 who allow others to use their properties or facilities
for a fee. Tollway operators are franchise grantees and they do
not belong to exceptions that Section 119 spares from the
payment of VAT. The word "franchise" broadly covers
government grants of a special righto do an act or series of
acts of public concern. Tollway operators are, owing to the
nature and object of their business, "franchise grantees." The
construction, operation, and maintenance of toll facilities on
public improvements are activities of public consequence that
necessarily require a special grant of authority from the state.
A tax is imposed under the taxing power of the government
principally for the purpose of raising revenues to fund public
expenditures. Toll fees, on the other hand, are collected by
private tollway operators as reimbursement for the costs and
expenses incurred in the construction, maintenance and
operation of the tollways, as well as to assure them a
reasonable margin of income. Although toll fees are charged
for the use of public facilities, therefore, they are not
government exactions that can be properly treated as a tax.
Taxes may be imposed only by the government under its
sovereign authority, toll fees may be demanded by either the
government or private individuals or entities, as an attribute of
ownership.
FREE ACCESS TO COURTS
RE: REQUEST OF NATIONAL COMMITTEE ON LEGAL AID
TO EXEMPT LEGAL AID CLIENTS FROM PAYING FILING,
DOCKET ANDOTHER FEES. A.M. No. 08-11-7-SC
Facts: The Misamis Oriental Chapter of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) promulgated Resolution No. 24, series of
2008. The resolution requested the IBP’s National Committee
on Legal Aid (NCLA) to ask for the exemption from the
Payment of filing, docket and other fees of clients of the legal
aid offices in the various IBP chapters.
Issue: Should indigent litigant be exempted from paying
docket fees?
Ruling: Yes. The Constitution guarantees the rights of the
poor to free access to the courts and to adequate legal
assistance. Recipients of the service of the NCLA and legal aid
offices of IBP chapters may enjoy free access to courts by
exempting them from the payment of fees assessed in
connection with the filing of a complaint or action in court. With
these twin initiatives, the guarantee of Section 11, Article III of
Constitution is advanced and access to justice is increased by
bridging a significant gap and removing a major roadblock.
Where there is a right, there must be a remedy. The remedy
must not only be effective and efficient, but also readily
accessible. For a remedy that is inaccessible is no remedy at
all.

SEARCH AND SEIZURE
Lim Vs Felix
FACTS: On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the
morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate
Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate
province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and
his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes,
Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed
by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of
Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot,
although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. An
investigation of the incident then followed.
Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary
investigation, the designated investigator filed an amended
complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing
Vicente Lim, Sr. et al of the crime of multiple murder and
frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, the
court issued an order concluding that a probable cause has
been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of
named accused..
On October 30, 1989, Fiscal Alfane filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations
of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a
recommendation of no bail.
On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr.
and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of
venue w/c was authorized, from the RTC of Masbate to the
RTCt of Makati to avoid miscarriage of justice. The cases were
raffled to Branch 56 presided by respondent Judge Nemesio S.
Felix.
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with
the respondent court several motions and manifestations,
among others was an order be issued requiring the transmittal
of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation
conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the
best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal
determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima
facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence of
guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution
that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall
have himself been personally convinced of such probable
cause.
Respondent court issued an order denying for lack of
merit the motions and manifestations and issued warrants of
arrest against the accused including the petitioners herein.
ISSUE : Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest
without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's certification
and recommendation that a probable cause exists.
HELD: If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the
Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the
investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not personally
determined probable cause. The determination is made by the
Provincial Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not
been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of
discretion.
Manalili vs CA
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari seeking the reversal of
CA’s decision in affirming TC’s decision on convicting Manalili
of Illegal possession of prohibited drug violating RA
6425.Police operatives Espiritu, Lumabas and driver Enriquez
conducted surveillance along the front of Kalookan Cemetery
based on the information that drug addicts were roaming
around in the area, saw a man who appeared to be high on
drugs and introduced themselves as policemen. Said man
avoided them and tried to resist, when they asked what the
man washolding in his hand, the man held out his wallet and
allowed Espiritu to examine it, who found what he suspected to
becrushed mj leaves. The man was brought to the Anti-
Narcotics Unit and turned out to be Manalili. The substance
found on Manalili’s wallet was sent to NBI Foresic Chemistry
Section and was confirmed as mj.Manalili’s version of the story
was that early afternoon he was riding in a tricycle when 3
policemen stopped the tricycle and informed them of the
85
suspected possession of mj, the policemen bodily searched
both Manalili and the driver andupon finding nothing illegal on
their persons, let the driver go but brought Manalili along to the
police station. Manalili while on the way to the station saw a
neighbor whom he signaled to follow them and when he was
again searched in the station, he was asked to strip his pants
where they found nothing illegal. Said neighbor then asked the
policemen to let Manalili go seeing as they had not found
anything illegal but Manalili was put on a cell who was brought
to a fiscal later that day and was told not to say anything
despite his saying that the policemen had not found mj on his
person. Said tricycle driver and neighbor testified on court as to
how the 2 searches yielded nothing illegal on Manalili’s person.
Issues:
1.W/N evidence seized during a stop-and-frisk is admissible.
2. W/N Manalili’s actions constituted a waiver of his rights.
3. W/N the evidence is sufficient to prove Manalili’s guilt.
Ruling:
I. In Terry vs Ohio, a stop-and-frisk was defined as the
vernacular designation of the right of a police officer to stop a
citizen on the street, interrogate him and pat him for weapons:
W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which
leadshim reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that
criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom
he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in
the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself
asa policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where
nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel
hisreasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled
for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct
acarefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons
in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used
toassault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly
beintroduced in evidence against the person from whom they
were taken.It did not, however abandon the rule that the police
must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval
of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure,
excused only by exigent circumstances. As People vs
Lacernaenumerated 5 recognized exceptions to the rule
against warrantless searches and seizures: 1) search
incidental to lawfularrest; 2) search of moving vehicles; 3)
seizure in plain view; 4) customs search; 5) waiver of the
accused of his rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures. From Espiritu’s experience as a member of the Anti -
Narcotics Unit of Caloocan City Police, Manalili’s suspicious
behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were high.
II. SG’s contention that Manalili effectively waived the
inadmissibility of the evidence illegally obtained when he failed
toraise this issue or object during trial. A valid waiver of right
against unreasonable searches and seizures require
theconcurrence of these requisites: 1) the right to be waived
existed; 2) the person waiving it had knowledge; and 3)
he/shehad actual intention to relinquish the right. In this case
however, it is deemed that Manalili has waived such right for
failureto raise its violation before the trial court, at the earliest
opportunity possible. Issues not raised below cannot be
pleadedfor the first time on appeal
III. Manalili’s contention that the charge was trumped up to
extort money and testimonies of the arresting officers were
inconsistent, it held that the trial court’s assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses particularly when affirmed by CA is
accorded great weight and respect as it had opportunity to
observe their demeanor and deportment as they testifiedbefore
it.The elements of illegal possession of mj are: a) the accused
is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be
aprohibited drug; b) such possession is not authorized by law;
and c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said
drug. The substance found on Manalili’s wallet was identified
as mj which was prohibited and knowingly without authority.
Considering that he was high and tried to avoid and resist,
such behavior clearly shows that he knew he was holding mj
and it was prohibited by law.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDISON SUCRO G.R.
No. 93239 March 18, 1991
 86

Facts:Pat. Roy fulgencio, a member of the INP Kalibo, Aklan • The accused claimed that there was no proper
was instructed by P/Lt Vicente Seraspi Jr., Station commander,
warrant for the search while the police claimed that the plants
to monitor the activities of appellant. Fulgencio positioned
were found in plain view
himself to a house, adjacent of which i a chapel. Fulgencio saw
Issue:
appellant enter the chapel taking something which turn out
later to be marijuana from a compartment of a cart found inside • was the search and seizure of the marijuana plants in
the chapel and return to the street where he handed the same the case lawful?
to a buyer. • Were the seized plants admissible in evidence
Fulgencio radioed Seraspi and reported the activity,
against the accused?
Seraspi instructed Fulgencio to continue monitoring.
At about 6:30 PM Fulgencio again called up Sraspi to • Has the prosecution proved the appellant's guilt
report the third buyer later identified as Ronnie Macabante, beyond reasonable doubt?
was transacting with appellant. • Is the sentence of death by legal injection correct?
At that point, the team seraspi proceeded to the area
and fulgencio told seraspi to intercept Macabante and
Held:
Appellant. Team Seraspi caught up with macabante at a
crossing. Upon seeing the police Macabante throw something • The plants were not in plain view because for the
at the ground which turned to a tea bag of marijuana. doctrine to apply, the following elements must be present: (1)a
Macabante admitted that he brought the same from appellant. prior valid intrusion based on the warrantless arrest in which
The police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant. the police are legallly present in the pursuit of the official
duties; (2)the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the
Issue: police who have the right to be where they are; (3)the evidence
1. Whether or not the arrest without warrant of the accused is must be immediately apparent; (4)plain view justified mere
lawful seizure of evidence without further search
2. Whether or not the evidence resulting from arrest is • The confession is not admissible as well. In trying to
admissible
elicit information from the accused, the police was investigating
him as a suspect. At this point, he was already under custodial
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that under Section 5 Rule
investigation and had a right to counsel.
113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure for the instance that
arrest without warrant is considered lawful. – A peace officer
G.R. No. 128222 June 17, 1999PEOPLE OF THE
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a)
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.CHUA HO SAN @ TSAY
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
HO SAN, accused-appellant.
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and
FACTS OF THE CASE: In response to reports of rampant
he has probable cause to believe based on personal
smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Chief of Police
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
Jim Lagasca Cid of Bacnotan Police Station, LaUnion began
arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be
patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala, he intercepted
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
a radio call at around 12:45 p.m. from Barangay Captain Juan
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
Almoite of Barangay Tammocalao requesting for police
while being transferred from one confinement to another. In
assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had
cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
spotted. According to Almoite, the vessel looked different from
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
the boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
poised to dock at Tammocalao shores.
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
Cid and six of his men led by SPO1Reynoso Badua,
An offense is committed in the presence or within the
proceeded immediately to Tammocalao beach and there
view of an officer when the officer sees the offense, although at
conferred with Almoite. Cid then observed that the speedboat
the distance, or hears the disturbance created thereby and
ferried a lonemale passenger, who was later identified as Chua
proceed at once at the scene – the act of surveillance.
Ho San. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger
Second requirement: the act of macabante, throwing
alighted, carrying a multicolored strawbag, and walked towards
of the marijuana and the admission, constitute that he just
the road. Upon seeing the police officers, the man changed
committed an illegal act which the police officer had personal
direction. Badua held Chua’s right arm to prevent him from
knowledge, being members of the team which monitors
fleeing. They then introduced themselves as police officers;
Sucro’s nefarious activity
however, Chua did not understand what they’re saying. And by
People vs bati – police officers have personal
resorting of “sign language”, Cid motioned with his hands for
knowledge of the actual commission of the crime when it had
the man to open his bag. The man acceded tothe request. The
earlier conducted surveillance activities.
said bag was found to contain several transparent plastics
Evidence - admissible because the arrest is valid
containing yellowish crystalline substances, which was later
identified to bemethamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
People of the Philippines vs. Abe Valdez y Dela CruzG.R.
Chua was then brought to Bacnotan Police Station, where he
No. 129296September 25, 2000
was provided with an interpreter to inform him of his
constitutional rights.
Facts: A police team composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay,
SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, PO1 Romulo
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest, search and
G. Tobias, and PO2 Alfemer I. Balut were sent to Sitio Bulan,
seizure conducted by the Police Officers constitute a valid
Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya on an anonymous tip
exemption from the warrant requirement.
regarding the presence of a marijuana plantation that was
situated near the appelant's hut. They were ordered by their
RULING: The Court held in the negative. The Court explains
superior to “uproot the said marijuana plants and arrest the
that the Constitution bars State intrusions to a person’s body,
cultivator of the same.”
personal effects or residence except if conducted by virtue of a
• Upon their arrival, they found the apellant alone in his valid of a valid search warrant issued in accordance with the
hut. After further investigation of the area, they found seven Rules. However, warrantless searches may be permitted in the
five-foot high marijuana plants approximately 25 meters away following cases, to wit:(1)search of moving vehicles,(2)seizure
from the appelants hut. They asked the accused who owned in plain view,(3)customs searches,(4)waiver or consent
the plants and he admitted that they belonged to him. As searches
ordered, the police uprooted the plants which weighed 2.194
kg.
PEOPLE VS. TANGLIBEN [184 SCRA 220; G.R. No.L-
63630; 6 Apr 1990]

Facts: Patrolmen Silverio and Romeo Punzalan were
conducting surveillance at the San Fernando Victory Liner
Terminal. At around 9:30pm they noticed a person, Medel
Tangliben, carrying a traveling bag who acted suspiciously.
They confronted him, inspected his bag, and there they found
marijuana leaves. The accused was then taken to the Police
Headquarters for further investigations. The TC found
Tangliben guilty of violating sec.4 art. 2 of the RA 6425 or the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
Issue: Whether or Not there was an unlawful search due to
lack of search warrant.
Held: No. Rule 113 sec. 5 provides the a peace officer or a
private person may w/o a warrant arrest a person when in his
presence the person to be arrested has committed, is
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
In the present case, the accused was found to have
been committing possession of marijuana and can be therefore
searched lawfully even without a search warrant. Another
reason is that this case poses urgency on the part of the
arresting police officers. It was found out that an informer
pointed to the accused telling the policemen that the accused
was carrying marijuana. The police officers had to act quickly
and there was not enough time to secure a search warrant.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. OSCAR CONDE [GR
113269, 10 April 2001]
FACTS: On 25 May 1992 at about 8:00 A.M., Apollo Romero
was home sitting by the window and drinking coffee when he
saw 4 men in Santolan Street block the path of 2 Indian
nationals (bombay) on a motorcycle. Oscar Conde y Lutoc
poked a gun at the two Indians while his three companions
(Alejandro Perez Jr. y Carsillar, Allan Atis y Abet, and another
unidentified man) approached and stabbed the Indians. Atis
took the goods which were being sold by the two Indians on
installment. After the stabbing, the four men fled from the crime
scene towards Mabolo Street. PO3 Rodencio Sevillano of the
Intelligence and Investigation Division (IID) of the PNP,
Kalookan City investigated the incident. On 30 May 1992, the
police arrested Conde, Perez and Atis. Police recovered the
weapons used in the robbery, when Felicidad Macabare,
Conde's wife, went to the police station to talk to Conde. These
weapons were discovered inside her bag after a routine
inspection. Sevillano admitted, however, that they did not have
a warrant of arrest when they apprehended the accused. Nor
did they have a search warrant when they inspected
Felicidad's bag and when they searched the house of a certain
Jimmy where they found the stolen items. Conde, Perez and
Atis were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide. The
accused entered pleas of not guilty. On 15 December 1993 the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 129, Kalookan City found Conde,
Atis and Perez guilty of the special complex crime of robbery
with homicide and sentenced each of them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties
under the law, and to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs
of each of the victims, Sukhdev Singh and Biant Singh, in the
amount of P50,000.00. Conde, et. al. appealed. However, the
counsel de parte for Perez, Atty. Jose M. Marquez, failed to file
brief for Perez, prompting this Court to dismiss his appeal. The
decision of the trial court became final and executory with
respect to Perez. Hence the present appeal concerns only Atis
and Conde, who filed their separate briefs.
ISSUE: Whether the illegal warrantless arrest, which was
waived, is sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment
rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free of error.
RULING: The arrests of Conde, et. al. came after the lapse of
5 days from the time they were seen committing the crime. At
the time they were arrested, the police were not armed with
any warrants for their arrests. Section 5 of Rule 113, of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure 27 enumerates the
instances when an arrest can be made without warrant,
namely: (a) When, in his presence the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
87
to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another. None
of the above circumstances is present herein. Conde, et. al.
were merely walking along Tandang Sora Avenue and were
not committing any crime. Neither can it be said that the crime
had just been committed as 5 days had already passed from
the time of the robbery with homicide. It cannot also be said
that the arresting officers had probable cause based on
personal knowledge, as PO3 Sevillano admitted that they
learned about the suspects from Apollo Romero and certain
unnamed informants. Further, the lapse of 5 days gave the
police more than enough time to conduct surveillance of the
appellants and apply for a warrant of arrest. Clearly, the rights
of Conde, et. al., provided in Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution
28 were violated. Unfortunately, they did not assert their
constitutional rights prior to their arraignment. This is fatal to
their case. An accused is estopped from assailing the legality
of his arrest if he failed to move for the quashing of the
Information against him before his arraignment. When they
entered their pleas on arraignment without invoking their rights
to question any irregularity, which might have accompanied
their arrests, they voluntarily submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court and the judicial process. Any objection,
defect, or irregularity attending their arrests should had been
made before they entered their pleas. It is much too late for
them to raise the question of their warrantless arrests. Their
pleas to the information upon arraignment constitute clear
waivers of their rights against unlawful restraint of liberty.
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not sufficient
cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after trial free from error. The warrantless
arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all other proceedings
including those leading to the conviction of the appellants and
his co-accused, nor can the state be deprived of its right to
convict the guilty when all the facts on record point to their
culpability.
PEOPLE VS. MALMSTEDT [198 SCRA 401; G.R. No. 91107;
19 Jun 1991]
Facts: In an information filed against the accused- appellant
Mikael Malmstead was charged before the RTC of La Trinidad,
Benguet, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425,
as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended.
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national,
entered the Philippines for the third time in December 1988 as
a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and
1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio
City. Upon his arrival thereat in the morning of the following
day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two
(2) days. Then in the 7 in the morning of May 11, 1989, the
accused went to Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada.
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day
(11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer
of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp
Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at
Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the
purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera
Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area
was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming from
Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited
drugs. Moreover, information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning that a
Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession
prohibited drugs. The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM
officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a
checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the
morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera
Region.
The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection
from the front going towards the rear of the bus. Accused who
was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear
thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on
accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist to

be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other
identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the
officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was
bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a
pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as
ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open
one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned out to
contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for
questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused
stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags and
opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the
teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside
the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after
the officers had opened the bags that accused finally
presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the
NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further
investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the
teddy bears and they were found to also contain hashish.
Representative samples were taken from the hashish found
among the personal effects of accused and the same were
brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
In the chemistry report, it was established that the
objects examined were hashish. a prohibited drug which is a
derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against
accused for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
ACCUSED’S DEFENSE
During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty."
For his defense, he raised the issue of illegal search of his
personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted
by the NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2)
travelling bags were not owned by him, but were merely
entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in
Sagada. He further claimed that the Australian couple intended
to take the same bus with him but because there were no more
seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride
and asked accused to take charge of the bags, and that they
would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.
The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael
Malmstedt established beyond reasonable doubt.
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court
finding him guilty of the crime charged, accused argues that
the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was
made without a search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited
drugs which were discovered during the illegal search are not
admissible as evidence against him.
Issue: Whether or Not the contention of the accused is valid,
and therefore the RTC ruling be reversed.
Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the
search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to
obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may
be made by a peace officer or a private person under the
following circumstances.
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he
has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to
be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Accused was searched and arrested while
transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually
being committed by the accused and he was caught in
flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal
88
effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing
provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to
a lawful arrest. While it is true that the NARCOM officers were
not armed with a search warrant when the search was made
over the personal effects of accused, however, under the
circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause
for said officers to believe that accused was then and there
committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonable, discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed,
and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched. Warrantless search of the
personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court
as valid, because of existence of probable cause, where the
smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the
accused, 10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously, 11
and attempted to flee.
The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court
is hereby affirmed. Costs against the accused-appellant.
Valmonte vs. De Villa
Facts: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region
District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter
of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters,
AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within
its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose
of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining
peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to
the social, economic and political development of the National
Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order,
the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Petitioners aver that, because of the
installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are
worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at
the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the
military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars
and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and
check-ups, especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of
a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their
safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin
Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela,
Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the
members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along
McArthur Highway at Malinta,Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or
refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing
to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air.
Issue: WON the installation of checkpoints violates the right of
the people against unreasonable searches and seizures
Held: Petitioner's concern for their safety and apprehension at
being harassed by the military manning the checkpoints are
not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints per se illegal.
No proof has been presented before the Court to show that, in
the course of their routine checks, the military, indeed,
committed specific violations of petitioners'' rights against
unlawful search and seizure of other rights. The constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right invokable only by those whose rights have been
infringed, or threatened to be infringed. Not all searches and
seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. The setting up of the questioned checkpoints may
be considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to
pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense
and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may not also be regarded as measures to thwart
plots to destabilize the govt, in the interest of public security.
Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence
and promote public welfare and an individual’s right against a
warrantless search w/c is, however, reasonably conducted, the
former should prevail. True, the manning of checkpoints by the
military is susceptible of abuse by the military in the same
manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse.
But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and
even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these
abnormal times, when conducted w/in reasonable limits, are
part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a peaceful
community.

People vs. de Gracia [GR 102009-10, 6 July 1994]
Facts: The incidents took place at the height of the coup d'etat
staged in December, 1989 by ultra-rightist elements headed by
the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of the
Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the Government. At that
time, various government establishments and military camps in
Metro Manila were being bombarded by the rightist group with
their "tora-tora" planes.
At around midnight of 30 November 1989, the 4th
Marine Battalion of the Philippine Marines occupied Villamor
Air Base, while the Scout Rangers took over the Headquarters
of the Philippine Army, the Army Operations Center, and
Channel 4, the government television station. Also, some
elements of the Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay
occupied the Greenhills Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro
Manila. On 1 December 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the
Intelligence Division, National Capital Region Defense
Command, was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a
surveillance of the Eurocar Sales Office located at Epifanio de
los Santos Avenue (EDSA) in Quezon City, together with his
team composed of Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon
Briones, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt.
Ramos.
The surveillance, which actually started on the night
of 30 November 1989 at around 10:00 p.m., was conducted
pursuant to an intelligence report received by the division that
said establishment was being occupied by elements of the
RAM-SFP as a communication command post. Sgt. Crispin
Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around 10 to
15 meters away from the Eurocar building near P. Tuazon
Street, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to
conduct his surveillance on foot. A crowd was then gathered
near the Eurocar office watching the on-going bombardment
near Camp Aguinaldo. After a while a group of 5 men
disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked towards
the car of the surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria,
who was then seated in front, saw the approaching group and
immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car and leave the
area. As they passed by the group, then only 6 meters away,
the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the
team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on
the right thigh. Nobody in the surveillance team was able to
retaliate because they sought cover inside the car and they
were afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the
cross-fire.
As a consequence, at around 6:30 a.m. of 5
December 1989, searching them composed of F/Lt. Virgilio
Babao as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt.
Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion
under one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office.
They were able to find and confiscate 6 cartons of M-16
ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of
different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the
rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at
the right portion of the building. St. Oscar Obenia, the first one
to enter the Eurocar building, saw Rolando De Gracia inside
the office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously
peeping through a door. De Gracia was the only person then
present inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col.
Matillano was also found. As a result of the raid, the team
arrested de Gracia, as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto
Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building. They were
then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the
explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team.
No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because,
according to them, at that time there was so much disorder
considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being
mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous
firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact
that the courts were consequently closed. The group was able
to confirm later that the owner of Eurocar office is a certain Mr.
Gutierrez and that de Gracia is supposedly a "boy" therein. de
Gracia was charged in two separate informations for illegal
possession of ammunition and explosives in furtherance of
rebellion, and for attempted homicide (Criminal Cases Q-90-
11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively), which were tried jointly
by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103. During
the arraignment, de Gracia pleaded not guilty to both charges.
89
However, he admitted that he is not authorized to posses any
firearms, ammunition and/or explosive. The parties likewise
stipulated that there was a rebellion during the period from
November 30 up to 9 December 1989. On 22 February 1991,
the trial court rendered judgment acquitting de Gracia of
attempted homicide, but found him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of illegal possession of firearms in
furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him to serve the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. De Gracia appealed.
Issue: Whether the military operatives made a valid search
and seizure during the height of the December 1989 coup
d’etat.
Held: It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the
Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search warrant at
that time. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence
reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the
RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on
the premises wherein the surveillance team was fired at by a
group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the
military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof
refused to open the door despite the requests for them to do
so, thereby compelling the former to break into the office. The
Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is
definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual
depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and
solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The presence of an
unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives
could not be justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition,
there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of
simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of the office
and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by
rebel forces. The courts in the surrounding areas were
obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses
therein were deserted. Under the foregoing circumstances, the
case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against
a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives,
taking into account the facts obtaining in this case, had
reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
committed. There was consequently more than sufficient
probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the
situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to
apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial
judge himself manifested that on 5 December 1989 when the
raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency
and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully
be dispensed with.
Social Justice Society vs Dangerous Drugs Board
NOTE: This is consolidated with Laserna vs Dangerous Drugs
Board (G.R. No. 158633) and Pimentel vs COMELEC (G.R.
No. 161658)
In 2002, Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002 was implemented. Section 36
thereof requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,
officers and employees of public and private offices, and
persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with certain
offenses.
In December 2003, COMELEC issued Resolution No.
6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with
the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections.
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., a senator and a candidate for re-election
in the May elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec.
36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated
December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they
impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to
those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to
enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a
maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for,
elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both
the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and
Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other
candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an
additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first

be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in
the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to
expand the qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 36 of RA 9165 and Resolution
6486 are constitutional.
HELD: No. Pimentel’s contention is valid. Accordingly, Sec. 36
of RA 9165 is unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an
administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that
issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is
the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be
valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their
defined functions, the three departments of government have
no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.
The provision “[n]o person elected to any public office
shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test” is not tenable as it enlarges the
qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications
on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution
prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator
to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be
sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the
democratic process of election should not be defeated by
unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.
Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R. No. 181881, 18 October
2011
Facts Respondent CSC Chair Constantino-David received an
anonymous letter complaint alleging of an anomaly taking
place in the Regional Office of the CSC. The respondent then
formed a team and issued a memo directing the team “to back
up all the files in the computers found in the Mamamayan
Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.”
Several diskettes containing the back-up files
sourced from the hard disk of PALD and LSD computers were
turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the
diskettes were examined by the CSC’s Office for Legal Affairs
(OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes
containing files copied from the computer assigned to and
being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42
documents, were draft pleadings or lettersin connection with
administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the
basis of this finding, Chairperson David issued the Show-
Cause Order, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on
extended leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit
within five days from notice.
In his Comment, petitioner denied the accusations
against him and accused the CSC Officials of “fishing
expedition” when they unlawfully copied and printed personal
files in his computer.
He was charged of violating R.A. No. 6713 (Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees). He assailed the formal charge and filed an
Omnibus Motion ((For Reconsideration, to Dismiss and/or to
Defer) assailing the formal charge as without basis having
proceeded from an illegal search which is beyond the authority
of the CSC Chairman, such power pertaining solely to the
court.
The CSC denied the omnibus motion and treated the
motion as the petitioner’s answer to the charge. In view of the
absence of petitioner and his counsel, and upon the motion of
the prosecution, petitioner was deemed to have waived his
right to the formal investigation which then proceeded ex parte.
The petitioner was dismissed from service. He filed a petition
to the CA which was dismissed by the latter on the ground that
it found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondents. He filed a motion for reconsideration which was
further denied by the appellate court. Hence, this petition.
Issue WON the search conducted by the CSC on the
computer of the petitioner constituted an illegal search and was
a violation of his constitutional right to privacy
90
Ruling The search conducted on his office computer and the
copying of his personal files was lawful and did not violate his
constitutional right.
In this case, the Court had the chance to present the
cases illustrative of the issue raised by the petitioner.
Katz v. United States 389 U.S. 437 (1967), the US Supreme
Court held that the act of FBI agents in electronically recording
a conversation made by petitioner in an enclosed public
telephone booth violated his right to privacy and constituted a
“search and seizure”. Because the petitioner had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth
to make a personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth
Amendment extends to such area. Moreso, the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan noted that the existence of
privacy right under prior decisions involved a two-fold
requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable (objective).
Mancusi v. DeForte 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20
L.Ed2d 1154 (1968),thus “recognized that employees may
have a reasonable expectation of privacy against intrusions by
police.”
O’Connor v. Ortega 480 U.S. 709 (1987), the Court
categorically declared that “[i]ndividuals do not lose Fourth
Amendment rights merely because they work for the
government instead of a private employer.” In O’Connor the
Court recognized that “special needs” authorize warrantless
searches involving public employees for work-related reasons.
The Court thus laid down a balancing test under which
government interests are weighed against the employee’s
reasonable expectation of privacy. This reasonableness test
implicates neither probable cause nor the warrant requirement,
which are related to law enforcement.
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs
Board G.R. Nos. 157870, 158633 and 161658, November 3,
2008, 570 SCRA 410, 427, (citing Ople v. Torres, G.R. No.
127685, July 23, 1998, 293 SCRA 141, 169), recognized the
fact that there may be such legitimate intrusion of privacy in the
workplace.
The Court ruled that the petitioner did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer
files.
As to the second point of inquiry, the Court answered
in the affirmative. The search authorized by the CSC Chair, the
copying of the contents of the hard drive on petitioner’s
computer reasonable in its inception and scope.
The Court noted that unlike in the case of Anonymous
Letter-Complaint against Atty. Miguel Morales, Clerk of Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila A.M. Nos. P-08-2519 and P-
08-2520, November 19, 2008, 571 SCRA 361, the case at bar
involves the computer from which the personal files of the
petitioner were retrieved is a government-issued computer,
hence government property the use of which the CSC has
absolute right to regulate and monitor.
WRIT OF AMPARO
Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo G.R. No. 180906,
October 7, 2008r
Facts: Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were
abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the
suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA.
After 18 months of detention and torture, the bothers escaped
on August 13, 2007.
Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for
Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to
stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of
their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case
was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on
October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a
manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing
petition as amparo petition.
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted
the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA ordered the
Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the
AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and
unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos’ custody,
confirm the present places of official assignment of two military
 91

officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records petitioner further maintained that the immediate recourse to the
of the Manalo brothers while under military custody. The SC to the availment of the writ of amparo is exigent as the
Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the continued restraint to his right to travel is illegal.
AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the • Jan 24 2008‐respondent represented by the OSG said that
decision promulgated by the CA.
the secretary of justice had the right to issue the HDO.• RTC
Issue: Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or can
dismissed the petition for writ of amparo and CA affirmed.•
be protected by existing laws.
Petitioner maintains that the writ of amparo does not only
exclusively apply to situations of extrajudicial killings and
Held: Yes. The right to the security of person is not merely a
enforced disappearances but encompasses the whole gamut
textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. At its
of liberties protected by the Constitution.
core is the immunity of one’s person against government
Petitioner argues that “[liberty] includes the right to
intrusion. The right to security of person is “freedom from fear,”
exist and the right to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or
a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity and security.
servitude and includes the right of the citizens to be free to use
In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court
his faculties in all lawful ways.” Part of the right to liberty
ruled that there is a continuing violation of the Manalos right to
guaranteed by the Constitution is the right of a person to travel.
security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy
available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security
Issue: WON petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated by
has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful
the issuance of the HDO? WON right to travel is covered by
act or omission by public officials or employees and by private
writ of amparo?
individuals or entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape,
the Manalos have been under concealment and protection by
Held: The petition fails.Ratio:1) FIRST, defined what Amparo
private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and
is:Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:
security. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction,
SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a
detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion
remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
that there is an apparent threat that they will again be
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful
abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable
individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and
through a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court explained.
enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
(GR No. 180906, The Secretary of National Defense v.
2) in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo
Manalo, October 7, 2008)
et al.,[11] made a categorical pronouncement that the Amparo
Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of
Distinguish the production order under the Rule on
“extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances,” or to
the Writ of Amparo from a search warrant.
threats thereof, thus: x x x As the Amparo Rule was intended
to address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and
SUGGESTED ANSWER:The production order under the Rule
“enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is
on the Writ of Amparo should not be confused with a search
confined to these two instances or to threats thereof.
warrant for law enforcement under Art. III, sec. 2 of the 1987
“Extralegal killings” are “killings committed without due process
Constitution. It said that the production order should be likened
of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.”
to the production of documents or things under sec. 1, Rule 27
On the other hand, “enforced disappearances” are “attended
of the Rules of Civil Procedure which states that “upon motion
by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
of any party showing good cause therefor, the court in which
abduction of a person by a government official or organized
an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and
groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect
permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on
acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to
behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents,
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a
papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places
tangible things, not privileged, which constitute or contain
such persons outside the protection of law.
evidence material to any matter involved in the action and
which are in his possession, custody or control.” (GR No.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF
180906, The Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo, October
AMPARO AND WRIT OF HABEAS DATA INFAVOR OF
7, 2008)
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZGR NO. 191805NOVEMBER 15,
2011
Father Robert Reyes v. CA, Raul Gonzales (DOJ)
Facts: Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa
Facts:• This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), apeasant
decision and resolution of the court of appeals.
organization affiliated with Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas
• Nov 30, 2007‐petitioner was among those arrested in the (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of
Manila Peninsula Hotel siege. Petitioner among with 50 others the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its members
were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
• Dec 1 2007‐upon request of the DILG, respondent DOJ Sec Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured
repeatedly when he refused to confess to his membership in
Raul Gonzales issued a Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45
the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of
ordering respondent Commissioner of immigration to include in
Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers
the HDO list of the Bureau of Immigration and Departation
for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of
(BID) the name of the petitioner and 49 others.
Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed
• Dec 2 2007‐after finding probable cause against petitioner against former Pres. Arroyo, etal. The writs were granted but
and 36 others for the crime of rebellion. The DOJ filed the the CA dropped Pres Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may
information before the RTC of Makati City. not be sued in any case during her tenure of office or actual
• Dec 13 2007‐the RTC issued an order dismissing the charge incumbency.
for rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of
Issue: Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be
probable cause. The trial court said that there wasn’t enough
used in amparo and habeas data cases.
evidence to substantiate that they were part of the rebellion.
• Dec 18 2007‐petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco Chavez Held: Yes. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command
wrote the DOJ secretary requesting the lifting of the HDO in responsibility pertains to the"responsibility of commanders for
view of the dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioner. crimes committed by subordinate members of the armedforces
• Jan 3 2008‐petitioner filed a petition claiming that despite the or other persons subject to their control in international wars or
domesticconflict." Although originally used for ascertaining
dismissal of his criminal case his name still stands in the HDO
criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has
list—that when he flew to HK the BID officers still questioned
also found application in civil cases for human rights abuses.
but he was still able to leave for HK. In short, nahhassle siya…
This development in the use of command responsibility in civil

proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has
been liberally extended even to cases not criminal in nature.
Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may likewise
find application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ
of amparo.
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command
responsibility may be used to determine whether respondents
are accountable for and have the duty to address the
abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts to devise
remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing
precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of command
responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility
and accountability in extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances.
In other words, command responsibility may be
loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those
accountable individuals that have the power to effectively
implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue.
In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal
responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to
be in the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved
party. Such identification of the responsible and accountable
superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal
liability which, of course, is still subject to further investigation
by the appropriate government agency.
Thus, although there is no determination of criminal,
civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of command
responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain
responsibility and accountability within these foregoing
definitions.
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
Gamboa vs Chan et al 2012
The Facts: Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O.275) issued by
then President Gloria Arroyo on December 8, 2009, entitled
“Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged
Existence of Private Armies in the Country” created a
body,later on referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission, to
investigate the existence of privates armed groups (PAGs) in
the country with the view to eliminating them before the 2010
elections. At the end of the investigation, the Zenarosa
Commission submitted its report, Among its highlights are:
(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion
regarding the status of PAGs in the Philippines.
(b) The Report stated that “x x x the PNP organized one
dedicated Special Task Group (STG) for each private armed
group (PAG) to monitor and counteract their activities.”
(c) Attached as Appendix “F” of the Report is a tabulation
generated by the PNP and captioned as “Status of PAGs
Monitoring by STGs as of April 19, 2010,” which classifies
PAGs in the country according to region, indicates their
identity, and lists the prominent personalities with whom these
groups are associated.
Included in the report was the name of Marynette,
Gamboa, then mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Sur. A press
conference was thereafter conducted to present the report, as
well as the status of the private armed groups, and the manner
by which the report was validated, which relied heavily on PNP
reporting.
Alleging that an ABS-CBN news broadcast , as well
as articles in print media identified her as one of those
maintaining private armed groups, Mayor Marynette filed a
petition for issuance of writ of habeas data, averring that her
right to privacy was violated and her reputation maligned and
destroyed. The respondents were sued in their capacity as
official of the PNP Ilocos Norte. She prayed for the following
reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-
Ilocos Norte database; (b) withdrawal of all information
forwarded to higher PNP officials; (c) rectification of the
damage done to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to refrain
from forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e)
restraining respondents from making baseless reports.
After finding the petition sufficient on its face, the RTC
issued the writ, instructed respondents to submit all information
and reports forwarded to and used by the Zeñarosa
Commission as basis to include her in the list of persons
maintaining PAGs; directed respondents, and any person
acting on their behalf, to cease and desist from forwarding to
92
the Zeñarosa Commission, or to any other government entity,
any information that they may have gathered against her
without the approval of the court; and ordered respondents to
make a written return of the writ together with supporting
affidavits; and scheduled the summary hearing of the case on
23 July 2010. In their Return of the writ, the respondents
averred that they merely acted in the performance of their duty
in conducting the investigation and surveillance of Gamboa,
and, the information in their database pertained to two criminal
cases where she was implicated.
They also argued that the petition was incomplete for
failure to comply with the requisites of the Rule of Habeas
Data, such as the manner by which her right to privacy was
violated; the action she took to secure the data; and location of
the files, registers and databases. They also alleged that the
petition was not the proper remedy to address the alleged
besmirching of Gamboa’s reputation.
The RTC dismissed the complaint. While it held that
Gamboa’s inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs
violated her right to privacy, Gamoba had not shown that the
information gathered originated from the respondents who
forwarded the same to the commission without the benefit of
further validation. She should have impleaded the Zenarosa
Commission as a necessary if not compulsory party to the
petition. Gamboa elevated her case to the Supreme Court.
The Issue: Whether or not Marynette is entitled to the writ of
habeas data.
The Ruling: In determining whether Gamboa should be
granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data, this Court is
called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right to privacy;
second, explain the writ of habeas data as an extraordinary
remedy that seeks to protect the right to informational privacy;
and finally, contextualize the right to privacy vis-à-vis the state
interest involved in the case at bar.
The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long
been recognized as a constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe
v. Mutuc, thus enunciated:
The due process question touching on an alleged
deprivation of liberty as thus resolved goes a long way in
disposing of the objections raised by plaintiff that the provision
on the periodical submission of a sworn statement of assets
and liabilities is violative of the constitutional right to privacy.
There is much to be said for this view of Justice Douglas:
“Liberty in the constitutional sense must mean more than
freedom from unlawful governmental restraint; it must include
privacy as well, if it is to be a repository of freedom. The right
to be let alone is indeed the beginning of all freedom.” As a
matter of fact, this right to be let alone is, to quote from Mr.
Justice Brandeis “the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.”
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does
not likewise compel respect for his personality as a unique
individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands
respect.
The Writ of Habeas Data
The writ of habeas data is an independent and
summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy,
honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual,
and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
informational privacy.⁠7 It seeks to protect a person’s right to
control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances
in which such information is being collected through unlawful
means in order to achieve unlawful ends.⁠8 It must be
emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ to be
granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy
on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the
other. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads:
Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available
to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data

information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state
interest of dismantling PAGs far outweighs the alleged
intrusion on the private life of Gamboa, especially when the
collection and forwarding by the PNP of information against her
was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of
the writ of habeas data must be denied.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The
assailed Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9
September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Laoag City, Br.
13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of
habeas data, is AFFIRMED.
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION
Felipe Navarro vs Court of Appeals
FACTS: Two local media men, Stanley Jalbuena, Enrique
Lingan, in Lucena City wnet to the police station to report
alledged indecent show in one of the night establishment
shows in the City. At the station, a heated confrontation
followed between victim Lingan and accused policeman
Navarro who was then having drinks outside the headquarters,
lead to a fisticuffs. The victim was hit with the handle of the
accused's gun below the left eyebrow, followed by a fist blow,
resulted the victim to fell and died under treatment. The
exchange of words was recorded on tape, specifically the
frantic exclamations made by Navarro after the altercation that
it was the victim who provoked the fight. During the trial,
Jalbuena, the other media man , testified. Presented in
evidence to confirm his testimony was a voice recording he
had made of the heated discussion at the police station
between the accused police officer Navarro and the deceased,
Lingan, which was taken without the knowledge of the two.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the voice recording is admissible in
evidence in view of RA 4200, which prohibits wire tapping.
2. Whether the mitigating circumstances of sufficient
provocation or threat on the part of the offended party and lack
of intention to commit so grave a wrong may be appreciated in
favor of the accused.
HELD:
1. The answer is affirmative, the tape is admissible in view
of RA 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. Jalbuena's testimony
is confirmed by the voice recording he had made.
The law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or
recording of private communications (Ramirez v Cpourt of
Appeals, 248 SCRA 590 [1995]). Snce the exchange between
petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape
recording is not prohibited.
2. The remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the
acts of the accused, constituted sufficient provocation.
Provocation is said to be any unjust or improper conduct of the
offended party capable of exciting, annoying or irritating
someone. The provocation must be sufficient and must
immediately precede the act; and in order to be sufficient, it
must be adequate to excite a person to commit the wrong,
which must be accordingly proportionate in gravity. The
mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave
a wrong must also be considered. The exclamations made by
Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him
showed that he had no intent to kill the latter.
RAMIREZ V CA
Facts: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro
Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the private
respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a “hostile
and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s
dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and
public policy.”
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim
transcript of the event and sought damages. The transcript on
93
which the civil case was based was culled from a tape
recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and
alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation
was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the
Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled “An Act
to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other purposes.”
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the
RTC later on granted, on the ground that the facts charged do
not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
The CA declared the RTC’s decision null and void
and denied the petitioner’s MR, hence the instant petition.
Issue: W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by
one of the parties in the conversation
Held: Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, ” An Act to Prohibit
and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
Private Communication and Other Purposes,” provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized
by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word,
to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or
walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally
makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties
to any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes
no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by
the statute ought to be a party other than or different from
those involved in the private communication. The statute’s
intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier “any”.
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, “even a (person) privy to a communication who
records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator” under this
provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records,
moreover, supports the respondent court’s conclusion that in
enacting R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to
make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private
conversations or communications taken either by the parties
themselves or by third persons.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a
violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200
penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the devices
enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual
made a secret recording of a private communication by means
of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under
Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in
his COMMENT before the respondent court: “Nowhere (in the
said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a
violator, the nature of the conversation, as well as its
communication to a third person should be professed.”
Petitioner’s contention that the phrase “private
communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include
“private conversations” narrows the ordinary meaning of the
word “communication” to a point of absurdity. The word
communicate comes from the latin word communicare,
meaning “to share or to impart.” In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the “process by
which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals
through a common system of symbols (as language signs or
gestures)”
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal
or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of
“meanings or thoughts” which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988,
between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the
latter’s office. Any doubts about the legislative body’s meaning

of the phrase “private communication” are, furthermore, put to
rest by the fact that the terms “conversation” and
“communication” were interchangeably used by Senator
Tañada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.
Zulueta vs. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 699 (1996)
The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable, except upon lawful order of the court, or when public
safety or order requires otherwise as prescrbied by law. Any
evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceeding section,
shall inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private
respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1962, petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in
the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's
secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet of her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
respondents between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours,
greeting cards, cancelled check, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport,
and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for
use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for
disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner
had filed against her husband.
ISSUE: Whether or not the papers and other materials
obtained from forcible entrusion and from unlawful means are
admissible as evidence in court regarding marital separation
and disqualification from medical practice.
HELD: Indeed the documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injuction declaring
"the privacy of communication and correspondence to be
inviolable" is no less applicable simply because it is the wife
(who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infedility) who
is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the
constitution is if there is a "lawful order from the court or which
public safety or order require otherwise, as prescribed by law."
Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify
anyone of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the
other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
marital infedility. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed her/his integrity or her/his right to privacy as an individual
and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to
her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication
between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband
nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent
of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither
may be examined without the consent of the other as to any
communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one
thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the
other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.
Waterous Drug Corp. V NLRC
Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by
Waterous Drug Corp.
Catolico sold to YSP Inc. 10 bottles of Voren Tablets
at P384 per unit. However, the normal selling price is P320 per
unit. Catolico overcharged by P64 per unit for a total of P640.
YSP sent a check payable to Catolico as a “refund” for the
jacked-up price. It was sent in an envelope addressed to her.
Saldana, the clerk of Waterous Drug Corp. opened the
envelope and saw that there was a check for P640 for
Catolico.
Waterous Drug Corp. ordered the termination of
Catolico for acts of dishonesty.
NLRC: Dismissed the Petition. Evidence of
respondents (check from YSP) being rendered inadmissible,
by virtue of the constitutional right invoked by complainants.
Petitioners: In the light of the decision in the People v.
Marti, the constitutional protection against unreasonable
94
searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one’s person
from interference by government and cannot be extended to
acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the
ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Issue: W/N the check is admissible as evidence
Held: Yes. (People vs. Marti) Marti ruling: The Bill of Rights
does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures perpetrated by private individuals.
It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens
have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and
as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both
criminal and civil liabilities. Despite this, the SC ruled that there
was insufficient evidence of cause for the dismissal of Catolico
from employment Suspicion is not among the valid causes
provided by the Labor Code for the termination of Employment.
Marquez vs. Disierto
FACTS: Respondent Ombudsman Desierto ordered petitioner
Marquez to produce several bank documents for purposes of
inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at
Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where
petitioner is the branch manager.
The order is based on a pending investigation at the
Office of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for
violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the
Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates Authority
and AMARI.
Petitioner wanted to be clarified first as to how she
would comply with the orders without her breaking any law,
particularly RA. No. 1405.
ISSUE: Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in
camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an
exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A.
No.1405).
HELD: No. We rule that before an in camera inspection may
be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of
competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly
identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the
pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The
bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be
present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover
only the account identified in the pending case
BLAS F. OPLEv.RUBEN D. TORRES, ALEXANDER
AGUIRRE, HECTOR VILLANUEVA, CIELITO
HABITO,ROBERT BARBERS, CARMENCITA REODICA,
CESAR SARINO, RENATO VALENCIA, TOMAS P. AFRICA,
HEADOF THE NATIONAL COMPUTER CENTER and
CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Facts: The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part
of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the righto
privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as
"the most comprehensive of rights and the rightmost valued by
civilized men." Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate
Administrative Order No. 308 entitled “Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" on two
important constitutional grounds, viz :
(1)it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate,
and(2)it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected
zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to
be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against
further erosion. A.O. No. 308 was published in four
newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and
January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the
instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary
Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who
as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are
charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8,
1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its
implementation.
Issue: WON the petitioner has the stand to assail the validity
of A.O. No. 308

Ruling: YES. As is usual in constitutional litigation,
respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing
to sue of thepetitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar.
More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no
legalinterest to uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O.
No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. These submissions do
not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a
distinguished member of our Senate. Asa Senator, petitioner is
possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the
issue that the issuance of A.O.No. 308 is a usurpation of
legislative power.
As taxpayer and member of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the
legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of
GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for
adjudication of the Petition at bar is not affected by the fact that
the implementing rules of A.O.No. 308 have yet to be
promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid
per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature
for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects.
Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the
implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules.
As early as January 19, 1997, respondent Social Security
System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the
manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.
Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly
announced that representatives from the GSIS and the SSS
have completed the guidelines for the national identification
system. All signals from the respondents show their
unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not
wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its
constitutionality. In this light, the dissenter’s insistence that we
tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance as its
result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle
and a fundamental right
G.R. No. 164785, March 15, 2010
ELISEO F. SORIANO vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA,
et al.
Facts This is a motion for reconsideration of the Decision of
the Court dated April 29, 2009, modifying that of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) by
imposing the penalty of three-month suspension on the
television show Ang Dating Daan, instead of on petitioner
Soriano, as host of that program.
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner,
as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV,
made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before
the MTRCB, affidavit-complaints were filed against petitioner
in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent Michael
M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark,
was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV
program Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the
televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious
discourse and within the protection of Section 5, Art. III.
Decision No. The sanction imposed on the TV program in
question does not constitute prior restraint, but partakes of the
nature of subsequent punishment for past violation committed
by petitioner in the course of the broadcast of the program on
August 10, 2004. The vulgar language petitioner used on
prime-time television can in no way be characterized as
suitable for all ages, and is wholly inappropriate for children.
Petitioner failed to consider that the medium he used
to make his statements was a television broadcast, which is
accessible to children of virtually all ages. The interest of the
government in protecting children who may be subjected to
petitioner’s invectives must take precedence over his desire to
air publicly his dirty laundry. As emphasized in Gonzalez v.
Kalaw Katigbak, the freedom of broadcast media is, in terms of
degree of protection it deserves, lesser in scope, especially as
regards television, which reaches every home where there is a
set, and where children will likely be among the avid viewers of
the programs shown.
G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010
95
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT NETWORK,
INC., et al, vs. ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, et al.
Facts Before the Court are six petitions challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), An Act to
Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism,
otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007, signed
into law on March 6, 2007.
Issue Whether or not the definition of the crime of terrorism
under RA 9372 in that terms like widespread and extraordinary
fear and panic among the populace and coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand are nebulous,
intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad, leaving law
enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the
prohibited acts, thus the Act is unconstitutional.
Decision No. The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines,as
grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws.
A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge
against a criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth
grounds. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being
vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of
the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible
absent an actual or imminent charge against them.
In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that
the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element
of "unlawful demand" in the definition of terrorism must
necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression
protected by the free speech clause.
Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA
9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually committed
to trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the
other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the
government to accede to an "unlawful demand." Given the
presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or
highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition
cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected
speech.
Petitioners have established neither an actual charge
nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a
limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of
"terrorism" is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds
litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative
counseling on a statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios
nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed
legislative lobbying in Congress.
G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006
BAYAN, KARAPATAN, et al. vs. EDUARDO ERMITA, et al.
Facts All petitioners assail Batas Pambansa No. 880, some of
them in toto and others only Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a), and
14(a), as well as the policy of CPR. They seek to stop violent
dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no rally" policy and
the CPR policy recently announced.
KMU, et al., claim that on October 4, 2005, a rally
KMU co-sponsored was to be conducted at the Mendiola
bridge but police blocked them along C.M. Recto and Lepanto
Streets and forcibly dispersed them, causing injuries to several
of their members. They further allege that on October 6, 2005,
a multi-sectoral rally which KMU also co-sponsored was
scheduled to proceed along España Avenue in front of the
University of Santo Tomas and going towards Mendiola bridge.
Police officers blocked them along Morayta Street and
prevented them from proceeding further. They were then
forcibly dispersed, causing injuries on one of them.
Issue Whether or not B.P. No. 880 is unconstitutional as it is a
curtailment of the right to peacefully assemble and petition for
redress of grievances because it puts a condition for the valid
exercise of that right.
Decision No. In Primicias, this Court said: The right to freedom
of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances, are fundamental
personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by
the constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled
principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil
societies that the exercise of those rights is not absolute for it

may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the
rights of the community or society.
B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of public
assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the time,
place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted to in
Osmeña v. Comelec, where the Court referred to it as a
"content-neutral" regulation of the time, place, and manner of
holding public assemblies. Not every expression of opinion is a
public assembly. The law refers to "rally, demonstration,
march, parade, procession or any other form of mass or
concerted action held in a public place." So it does not cover
any and all kinds of gatherings. Neither is the law overbroad. It
regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and
petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present
danger of the substantive evils Congress has the right to
prevent.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content
of the speech is not relevant to the regulation. As to the
delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise
and sufficient standard – the clear and present danger test
stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to "imminent and grave
danger of a substantive evil" in Sec. 6(c) substantially means
the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard.
G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al. vs.
HONORABLE MANILA MAYOR JOSE "LITO" ATIENZA
Facts Petitioners Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) and
lawyers H. Harry L. Roque and Joel R. Butuyan appeal the
June 28, 2006 Decision and the October 26, 2006 Resolution
of the Court of Appeals that found no grave abuse of discretion
on the part of respondent Jose "Lito" Atienza, the then mayor
of Manila, in granting a permit to rally in a venue other than the
one applied for by the IBP.
On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National
President Jose Anselmo Cadiz (Cadiz), filed with the Office of
the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally
at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m.
to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in by IBP officers and members,
law students and multi-sectoral organizations.
Respondent issued a permit dated June 16, 2006
allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated
therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of Mendiola
Bridge, which permit the IBP received on June 19, 2006. The
rally pushed through on June 22 at the Mendiola Bridge.
Issue Whether or not Mayor Atienza committed grave abuse of
discretion when he modified the permit to rally by changing the
venue of the rally.
Decision Yes. In the present case, the question of the legality
of a modification of a permit to rally will arise each time the
terms of an intended rally are altered by the concerned official,
yet it evades review, owing to the limited time in processing the
application where the shortest allowable period is five days
prior to the assembly. The susceptibility of recurrence compels
the Court to definitively resolve the issue at hand.
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely
abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the
IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his
perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that
may warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be
heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant
may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the
permit.
Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at
modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a
clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an
indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the
issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, which "blank" denial or modification would,
when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it,
render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.
A.M. No. P-02-1651. August 4, 2003
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA, complainant, vs. SOLEDAD S.
ESCRITOR, respondent.
96
Facts In a sworn letter-complaint dated July 27, 2000,
complainant Alejandro Estrada wrote to Judge Jose F.
Caoibes, Jr., presiding judge of Branch 253, Regional Trial
Court of Las Pias City, requesting for an investigation of
rumors that respondent Soledad Escritor, court interpreter in
said court, is living with a man not her husband. They allegedly
have a child of eighteen to twenty years old. Judge Caoibes
referred the letter to Escritor who stated that there is no truth
as to the veracity of the allegation and challenged Estrada to
appear in the open and prove his allegation in the proper
forum.
Respondent Escritor testified that when she entered
the judiciary in 1999, she was already a widow, her husband
having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been living with
Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty
years and that they have a son. But as a member of the
religious sect known as the Jehovah's Witnesses and the
Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, their conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In fact,
after ten years of living together, she executed on July 28,
1991 a Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness.
Issue Whether or not respondent's right to religious freedom
should carve out an exception from the prevailing
jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government
employees are held administratively liable.
Decision No. The Court stressed that in the area of religious
liberty, it is basic that it is not sufficient to merely show a
rational relationship of the substantial infringement to the
religious right and a colorable state interest. (I)n this highly
sensitive constitutional area, [o]nly the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests, give occasion for
permissible limitation.
It is apparent from the OCA's reliance upon this ruling
that the state interest it upholds is the preservation of the
integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high
standard of morality and decency. However, there is nothing in
the OCA's memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how
this interest is so compelling that it should override
respondents plea of religious freedom nor is it shown that the
means employed by the government in pursuing its interest is
the least restrictive to respondents religious exercise.
To properly settle the issue in the case at bar, the
government should be given the opportunity to demonstrate
the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the
respondents stance that her conjugal arrangement is not
immoral and punishable as it comes within the scope of free
exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her
conduct where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the
Courts action would be an unconstitutional encroachment of
her right to religious freedom.
G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009
ELISEO F. SORIANO vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA,
et al.
Facts On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as
host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37,
made obscene remarks against INC. Two days after, before
the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints
were lodged by Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private
respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against
petitioner in connection with the above broadcast. Respondent
Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s
remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the
TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
Issue Whether or not Soriano’s statements during the
televised “Ang Dating Daan” part of the religious discourse and
within the protection of Section 5, Art. III.
Decision No. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case,
and considering the adverse effect of petitioner’s utterances on
the viewers’ fundamental rights as well as petitioner’s clear
violation of his duty as a public trustee, the MTRCB properly
suspended him from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three
months. Furthermore, it cannot be properly asserted that
petitioner’s suspension was an undue curtailment of his right to
free speech either as a prior restraint or as a subsequent

punishment. Aside from the reasons given above (re the
paramount of viewers rights, the public trusteeship character of
a broadcaster’s role and the power of the State to regulate
broadcast media), a requirement that indecent language be
avoided has its primary effect on the form, rather than the
content, of serious communication. There are few, if any,
thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive
language.
There is nothing in petitioners statements subject of
the complaints expressing any particular religious belief,
nothing furthering his avowed evangelical mission. The fact
that he came out with his statements in a televised bible
exposition program does not automatically accord them the
character of a religious discourse. Plain and simple insults
directed at another person cannot be elevated to the status of
religious speech. Even petitioners attempts to place his words
in context show that he was moved by anger and the need to
seek retribution, not by any religious conviction. His claim,
assuming its veracity, that some INC ministers distorted his
statements respecting amounts Ang Dating Daan owed to a TV
station does not convert the foul language used in retaliation
as religious speech. We cannot accept that petitioner made his
statements in defense of his reputation and religion, as they
constitute no intelligible defense or refutation of the alleged lies
being spread by a rival religious group. They simply illustrate
that petitioner had descended to the level of name-calling and
foul-language discourse. Petitioner could have chosen to
contradict and disprove his detractors, but opted for the low
road.
G.R. No. 124382. August 16, 1999
PASTOR DIONISIO V. AUSTRIA vs. HON. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Fourth Division), et al.
Facts The Seventh Day Adventists(SDA) is a religious
corporation under Philippine law. The petitioner was a pastor of
the SDA for 28 years from 1963 until 1991, when his services
were terminated.
On various occasions from August to October 1991,
Austria received several communications form Ibesate, the
treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking him to admit
accountability and responsibility for the church tithes and
offerings collected by his wife, Thelma Austria, in his district
and to remit the same to the Negros Mission.
A fact-finding committee was created to investigate.
The petitioner received a letter of dismissal citing multiple
grounds. Petitioner filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for
illegal dismissal, and sued the SDA for reinstatement and
backwages plus damages. Decision was rendered in favor of
petitioner. SDA appealed to the NLRC. Decision was rendered
in favor of respondent.
Issue Whether or not the termination of the services of
petitioner is an ecclesiastical affair, and, as such, involves the
separation of church and state.
Decision No. While the State is prohibited from interfering in
purely ecclesiastical affairs, the Church is likewise barred from
meddling in purely secular matters. The case at bar does not
concern an ecclesiastical or purely religious affair as to bar the
State from taking cognizance of the same. An ecclesiastical
affair is one that concerns doctrine, creed, or form or worship
of the church, or the adoption and enforcement within a
religious association of needful laws and regulations for the
government of the membership, and the power of excluding
from such associations those deemed unworthy of
membership. Based on this definition, an ecclesiastical affair
involves the relationship between the church and its members
and relate to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and
governance of the congregation. To be concrete, examples of
this so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot
meddle are proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of
religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other
activities with which attached religious significance. The case
at bar does not even remotely concern any of the abovecited
examples. While the matter at hand relates to the church and
its religious minister it does not ipso facto give the case a
religious significance. Simply stated, what is involved here is
the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister
as an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation
97
whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship or doctrines of
the church. In this case, petitioner was not excommunicated or
expelled from the membership of the SDA but was terminated
from employment. Indeed, the matter of terminating an
employee, which is purely secular in nature, is different from
the ecclesiastical act of expelling a member from the religious
congregation.
G.R. No. 186498. March 26, 2010.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RONALDO
DE GUZMAN y DANZIL, appellant.
Facts On June 10, 2003, the police received a report about De
Guzman's drug-dealing, after which a buy-bust team was
immediately formed. After a short briefing, the team proceeded
to De Guzman's house. Once there, the confidential informant
introduced appellant to Senior Police Officer (SPO)1 Daniel
Llanillo, who was designated as poseur-buyer. Llanillo tried to
buy P200 worth of shabu. He handed two marked P100 bills to
De Guzman, and the latter, in turn, gave him two heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets containing what was suspected as
shabu. Thereafter, Llanillo gave the prearranged signal to the
rest of the team.
De Guzman was charged with Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs, punishable under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
9165. In a decision dated December 5, 2006, the trial court
found De Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged. His conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals
(CA) in a Decision dated June 26, 2008.
Issue Whether or not the police officers complied with the
mandatory procedures under R.A. No. 9165, enough to convict
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Decision No. The Constitution mandates that an accused in a
criminal case shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is laden
with the burden to overcome such presumption of innocence
by presenting the quantum of evidence required.
In a prosecution for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act, the existence of the dangerous drug is a condition sine
qua non for conviction. The dangerous drug is the very corpus
delicti of the crime. The identity of the prohibited drug must be
established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the
elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the
substance illegally possessed and sold in the first place is the
same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be
established with the same degree of certitude as that needed
to sustain a guilty verdict. The corpus delicti should be
identified with unwavering exactitude. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in that it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence
are removed.
The Court finds that the apprehending officers failed
to comply with the guidelines set under R.A. No. 9165 and its
IRR. The failure to follow the procedure mandated under R.A.
No. 9165 and its IRR must be adequately explained. The
justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact.
The court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they
even exist. The presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty cannot by itself overcome the presumption of
innocence nor constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.