"CAN I SPEAK MORE CLEARLY THAN I UNDERSTAND?

"
A PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE
IN HENRY OF GHENT, DUNS SCOTUS AND OCKHAM

E.J.ASHWORTH
University of Waterloo

0. The title of this paper is somewhat misleading. The problem I intend to

discuss is certainly one of religious language, but none of the three authors I
am concerned with would have put the problem in the terms used above. The
question Henry of Ghent (d. 1293) asked in his Summae Quaestionum Ordi-
nariarum was: "Can God be more truly understood than he is signified or
named?". Duns Scotus (1265-1308) and William Ockham (1280/85-1349)
put their questions in yet another way. In their commentaries on Book I, Dis-
tinction 22, of Peter Lombard's Sentences, they asked respectively: "Is God
nameable by us by a name signifying his essence?" (Duns Scotus 1966: 301)
and "Can itinerant man impose a name to signify the divine essence distinctly?"
(Ockham, Sent., sign. z vi rb). The concern of all these authors arose from their
beliefs that a spoken word can only signify if it is subordinated to an appropriate
concept in the speaker's mind, and that our concept of God is an imperfect
one. When we inquire about the relationship between the words we use of God
and the idea we have of him, it may seem that our words are more precise than
our ideas warrant; yet it may also seem that our words fail to do justice to what
we know about God. These apparent variations in the relation between word
and concept have to be explained, given the natural assumption that our words
will be neither more nor less precise than our ideas.
Before I consider the actual texts, I will discuss briefly two essential back-
ground issues, the notion of signification, and the question whether words
signify ideas or things. The notion of signification was of course closely related
to the notion of a sign, which Augustine had defined (1975: 87) as "Something
which is itself sensed and which indicates to the mind something beyond the
mind itself."1 Accordingly, for a word to signify was for it to make known,
reveal, express, or represent. Exactly which of these descriptions was most
appropriate depended on the context, for in addition to written and spoken

Historiographia Linguistica 7:1-2 (1980), 29-38. DOI 10.1075/hl.7.1-2.04ash

ISSN 0302-5160 / E-ISSN 1569-9781 © John Benjamins Publishing Company
30 E.J. ASHWORTH

language, it was taken for granted that there was a mental language formed
of elements all of which were naturally meaningful. A spoken word could
make known an object or reveal it by causing (or by expressing) a concept,
but a mental term, being itself a concept, could not be thought of in this way.
In the early 16th century the Parisian author Raulin (c. 1443-1514) explained
that concepts signified in their capacity as formal representations of objects, but
that spoken words signified because they were objective representations (Raulin
1500, sign. g v ra-rb). That is, they were both the object and the cause of a cog-
nition. Thus the explicitly causal definition of signification, "to signify is to
constitute an understanding",2 applied, he said, only to signs which had objec-
tive signification and not to concepts. What it was that a spoken word made
known could be an object in the world, a formal element of an object in the
world, the speaker's concept of that object, or the definition of that object.3
Indeed, a spoken word could also make known itself or its speaker, but these
ways of making known were accidental to it as a conventionally significant
unit. It should be obvious that the notion of significatio is by no means to
be identified either with meaning or with reference, though elements of both
meaning and reference were certainly involved.
Although the question what a spoken name signified or made known could
be answered in a variety of ways, medieval authors thought it important to
establish an order of priority, particularly in the light of Aristotle's remark
that spoken words were signs of passions in the mind (De Interpretatione 16 a
3). Hence in many medieval commentaries on the De Interpretatione there was
a Questio devoted to the topic: "Do spoken words signify concepts or things?"4
Everyone agreed that concepts played an essential role in the significative
process, for we cannot refer to objects we do not know; nor can we speak
meaningfully when we have nothing in mind. Equally, everyone agreed that
words, at least some of the time, are used to pick out objects in the world. If I
say "Some men are running" what I say is true (if at all) of individual men and
not of my concepts. However, there was still room for debate. Thomas Aquinas
thought that spoken words primarily signify concepts, and only secondarily
signify objects in the world; whereas Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus (at least
in the Ordinatio) and Ockham believed that words often directly signified
things without signifying concepts at all. As Henry put it, (fo.cclxxii v:L)
concepts are medii between spoken words and things, but they are not media in
significando because when spoken words are uttered to teach about things
they are immediately signs of those things. He added that, when spoken words
are uttered to express our thoughts, they immediately signify concepts.
Obviously the stand taken by Henry, Duns Scotus and Ockham on the
primary signification of words had a great deal to do with their problem about
religious language. If one believes that words primarily signify concepts and only
 HENRY OF GHENT, DUNS SCOTUS AND OCKHAM 31

signify external objects secondarily, by means of the appropriate concepts,

then it becomes implausible to suppose that one's words can be used more
precisely than the intermediary concept will warrant. Thomas Aquinas made
this point quite clear in his own discussion of Sentences I, Distinction 22,
where he wrote (1929:532):

Since according to Aristotle, spoken words are signs of concepts, as was mentioned
above, the same judgment must be made about the cognition of a thing and about
the naming of a thing. Hence, just as we know God imperfectly, so we name him
imperfectly as if by stammering, as Gregory remarked.

However, if concepts are not intermediaries in the significative process, then

different judgments can indeed be made "about the cognition of a thing and
about the naming of a thing".

1. Let us now turn to Henry of Ghent's account of human discourse about God
(Art.LXXIII, fo.cclxiii v-fo.cclxxx v). He began by discussing two possible
accounts of the origin of spoken language, the Stoic view that words have
a natural meaning based on some kind of similarity between the word used
and the things named,6 and the Peripatetic view that spoken language is purely
conventional in origin (Q,l, fo.cclxiiii r-fo.cclxvii v). He argued that there was
nothing in principle about words and things which would rule out a natural
relationship of the sort required, but claimed that humans could only base
their language on such a relationship if they had specific, determinate and
distinct knowledge of tilings, of the sort expressed in definitions (fo.cclxvi r:N).
Since the Fall, no human being has enjoyed a perfect knowledge of the essence
of things, not even sensible things, and so our words cannot be naturally mean-
ingful (fo.cclxvi v: Q). Moreover, even if natural meaning were possible in the
case of sensible things it would never be possible in the case of God (fo.cclxvii
r:Q).
Like Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologica la 13) Henry argued that our
knowledge of God is essentially imperfect. God can be known to us only
through our knowledge of creatures (fo.cclxvii v:B), and hence the words we
use of God were first and most frequently applied to creatures (fo.cclxxi r:B).
However, there is a sense in which some words at least are used per prius of
God. When we call creatures wise or good, we know that they are wise or good
only as an effect of God's wisdom and goodness and hence in dignitate such
words belong primarily to God, as cause (fo.cclxxi v:D). He appealed to a
doctrine of analogy to explain why words were used of God and creatures
neither in precisely the same sense, i. e., univocally,nor in completely different
senses i.e., equivocally (fo.cclxx r:R). Here too his arguments are very similar
32 E.J. ASHWORTH

to those of Thomas Aquinas, though Henry's account of the matter is longer

and more detailed.
The tenth question of Henry's article on theological language is the one we
are most interested in: "Whether God can be more truly understood than he
is signified or named?" (fo.cclxxix r-v). The starting point for Henry's discussion
was a quotation from Augustine, De Trinitate VII c.4: "The supereminence of
the deity goes beyond the faculty of ordinary speech. God is more truly thought
of than he is spoken of, and he is more truly than he is thought to be." 7 He
began by drawing a distinction between two cases: the case of one and the
same person at one and the same time who is both thinking about and speaking
of an object; and the case in which different people are involved, or possibly
one person at different times (fo.cclxxix r:B-C). In the latter case it makes
perfectly good sense to suppose that the degree of understanding and the preci-
sion of speech can vary widely. Given that people speak a common language, in
which words and their definitions are known, we can easily imagine two speakers,
one of whom has a good understanding of Trinitarian doctrine and one of whom
does not (fo.cclxxix r:B, fo.cclxxix v:G-H). The latter, when he says that the
divine persons are many by distinction, speaks just as accurately as the former
can, though he presumably is not aware of the full implications of his statement.
He is relying on common usage. Moreover, the former speaker can fail to think
through what he knows, and may inadvertently or carelessly remark that the
divine persons are many through diversity or difference. In this instance he is
signifying God less perfectly than does the speaker with the lesser understanding.
In other words, his reference to God is successful, but his description of God
is inaccurate.
The more interesting case is the first, in which only one person is involved.
Can this person use words to convey more or less than he understands at the
moment of speech; and if he conveys less than he understands could this be for
some reason other than carelessness or inadvertence? In a passage rich with
allusions to Augustine (fo.cclxxixr-v, D-E), Henry argued that spoken words,
being material, are an imperfect instrument, and not to be compared with the
sharpness of the understanding. Hence our concepts may be richer than we can
convey, not only where divine matters are concerned, but also in the case of
natural matters. Speech can be inadequate even where the understanding is
perfect, but the more imperfect the understanding, the more inadequate speech
is likely to be. We cannot speak of what we cannot sense, but we can sense
that of which we cannot speak. Our words will be particularly lacking when
it comes to expressing the immensity of God, of which we can nevertheless
be dimly aware. On the linguistic side, our lack is greatest when we are con-
cerned with the determinate distinct cognition of a thing which is understood
by way of definition and argument. Where the confused cognition which corres-
 HENRY OF GHENT, DUNS SCOTUS AND OCKHAM 33

ponds to definable terms is concerned, the less intelligent can express his con-
cept just as perfectly as the more intelligent (fo.cclxxix r:D).
In general the picture of the loose fit between speech and understanding
presented by Henry is a plausible one. To use a non-theological example, most
English speakers can use the word 'electron' more or less accurately, but when
it comes to defining electrons or reasoning about them a variety of situations
is possible. The same sentence may be uttered by a three-year old parrotting
what he has heard, by an intelligent twelve-year old, by a graduate student
in physics, and by a Nobel prize-winner. Even though the words are the same,
it seems clear that the degree of understanding varies widely. It is also easy to
imagine the Nobel prize-winner failing to express his understanding. What is
more controversial is whether we would wish to take the further step of saying
that the physicist cannot in principle express all he understands about electrons.
Certainly some experiences cannot be verbally expressed (how do I describe
hearing a symphony?) but does this apply to knowledge? And is my awareness
of God more like hearing a symphony than it is like the acquisition of a body of
knowledge? Unfortunately there is no space to pursue these questions here.

2. Ockham's approach was quite different. I will start by looking briefly at

Ordinatio I d.3 q.2 (Sent., sign. m vii va-n ii rb) where Ockham discussed our
knowledge of God. He agreed with Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent that
our knowledge of God is imperfect. We cannot know God's essence or any-
thing intrinsic to him or anything which is really identical to him in itself. That
is, we cannot know God by means of an act of understanding which terminates
only in God, for that would require intuitive or abstractive knowledge which
we do not have (Sent., sign.m viii va:E-F). However, Ockham claimed, we
can know God's essence by means of a composite concept which is proper
to him, even though the parts of this concept have been abstracted from things
other than God (Sent., sign.m viii va:F). Thus, if we say "Some being is good-
ness and wisdom" we exhibit knowledge of God, because this claim can be
verified of him, and him alone, but our knowledge involves knowledge not just
of God but of the various concepts we are employing (Sent., sign.m viii vb:G).
He added that the concepts were common to God and creatures, thus rejecting
the doctrine of analogy accepted by Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent.
In Distinction 22, the one we are primarily concerned with here, he launched
a direct attack on Thomas Aquinas (Sent., sign z vi rb-z vii va). First he quoted
the first paragraph of the Responsio of Summa Theologiae la 13 1 in which
Thomas argued that words signify by means of concepts and that we know
God only as the source of creatures, and by the modes of preeminence and
negation [secundum habitudinem principii et per modum excellentiae et remo-
tionis] (Thomas Aquinas, Summ. theol, p.48; Ockham, Sent., sign.z vi vb:H).
34 E.J. ASHWORTH

Ockham dismissed both these points, the first because of his earlier arguments
to show that words signify things immediately (Sent, sign.z vi rb-va, A-G),
and the second on the grounds that it would license us to say that God was
an angel (or even an ass) simply because he was the cause of an angel, more excel-
lent than an angel, or not identical to an angel (Sent., sign.z vii ra:I).
Ockham next argued that even if we were to accept the Thomist view of the
link between words and concepts we would not be committed to accept the
conclusion that words cannot signify God distinctly (Sent., sign.z vii ra:I).
His argument goes as follows: Thomas says that names can signify God only
according as our intellect knows him; the intellect knows God only as he is
represented by creatures; therefore he is signified by a name only as he is rep-
resented by creatures, i. e., imperfectly and indistinctly. But, contrary to
Thomas, the indistinctness of a representation does not follow from its imper-
fection. God is indeed represented imperfectly by creatures, but he is at the
same time represented distinctly, and hence he can be signified distinctly by
spoken words. Ockham explained that "to know or to represent something
distinctly is nothing other than to know or represent everything intrinsic to it",
and he argued that if creatures are to represent God at all, they must do so
distinctly because "every ratio which is real in the divine essence is that unique
essence absolutely or a person or a relation." He noted that elsewhere Thomas
Aquinas (Sent. I d.22, p.538) had argued for distinctions of reason in the divine
essence, so that on his view one formal element [ratio] of God could be repre-
sented without another being represented, but Ockham denied that any such
distinction of reason was possible in relation to God. His argument would have
been clearer if he had said more about representation. Elsewhere (Quot.4 q.3,
sign.f 2 ra) he suggested that an object A can represent an object B by being
a cognition of B, by causing a cognition of B, or by being such that the cogni-
tion of A leads to the cognition of B. In the last case, exemplified by a statue,
some prior knowledge (for instance, by way of memory) of B is also required.
Presumably creatures represent God in the second sense, and presumably they
can represent God distinctly, i. e., as a complete essence, without causing dis-
tinct knowledge, i. e., knowledge of that essence, and nothing but that essence.
Thus the relation between the creature and what it represents has to be distin-
guished from the relation between the cognition brought about by means of the
creaturely representation and the ultimate object of the cognition.
That the word 'distinct' can be used in more than one sense becomes much
clearer when Ockham turns from his criticism of Thomas Aquinas to the state-
ment of his own views (Sent, sign.z vii rb-va:I-L). Here he reiterates that human
beings cannot have a distinct understanding of God since we cannot know
God in himself and without a mediating concept. However, we can understand
God to be distinct from all other things, and in so far as we can do that, we
 HENRY OF GHENT, DUNS SCOTUS AND OCKHAM 35

impose a name to signify God distinctly. Ockham explained that three senses
of "signify distinctly" could be used: 1) to signify something in such a way
that nothing else is signified or connoted; 2) to signify something in such a way
that nothing else is signified, though something else may be connoted; 3) to
signify something in such a way that on the utterance of the word according
to its common use nothing else occurs to the speaker or the hearer. This third
sense is inapplicable, because all our talk of God involves concepts which are
common to God and creatures, and these will be called to mind by any utter-
ance. However, in the first two senses our language can signify God distinctly.8
One should bear in mind here that Ockham defined signification in terms of sup-
position (Quot.5.q.l6, sign.n 3 ra-rb).
Generally speaking, a word signifies what it supposes for, and hence what
it denotes, refers to, or can be verified of. Thus the word 'deity' distinctly
signifies God because it denotes only God. Though he gave no examples of the
second case, we can use 'immaterial' as an example, and remark that "immaterial
infinite substance" signifies God distinctly because it both signifies him primari-
ly and supposes for him, even though it secondarily signifies or connotes materi-
al objects.9 Ockham adduced some examples to support his general thesis. For
instance, we cannot see the sun distinctly, nor can we understand it distinctly,
but the word "sun" signifies the sun distinctly because it picks out that object
which is the sun and that alone (Sent., sign z vii va). Again, we can use the name
A to signify whatever animal I meet tomorrow. A signifies that animal (or
perhaps several?) distinctly, even though I now have no distinct knowledge of
the animal, and perhaps will still lack distinct knowledge after my meeting with
it (Sent., sign.z vii rb). Thus the phrase "whatever animal I meet tomorrow" may
turn out to signify the cat next door in the sense of denoting that animal,
though I have not, strictly speaking referred to the cat next door. It seems then
that there is no direct link between the successful denotation of an object by
means of an utterance and the degree of our understanding of that object.
Distinct signification in Ockham's sense requires knowledge that the object
denoted is a distinct object, but it does not require a full understanding of that
object's nature. In some cases one need not even know what object is denoted.

3. Ockham was in essential agreement with the position adopted by Duns

Scotus in his much briefer treatment of the question "Is God nameable by us
by a name signifying his essence?". Duns Scotus began (1966:301) by saying
that he took the view of Thomas Aquinas that nothing could be named by us
more properly than it was understood to be false.10 He said that he would offer
no arguments instead, he offered an example. Suppose that we see a wall as
having both whiteness and shape. Because the colour can vary while the shape
remains, and the shape can vary while the colour remains, we conclude that
36 E.J. ASHWORTH

there is some substratum. We can name this substratum A, and can use the
general term 'body' of it, yet we have no specific notion of it. All we understand
of it is that it is This being', and hence we can name it more truly than we can
understand it. Just the same situation obtains with respect to God (p.301).
We have a general understanding of him as "This infinite being which depends on
nothing", and we can refer to the divine nature by such names as 'God', yet
we have no particular understanding of the divine nature which our terms
denote. We do not understand it as 'This essence'. "Whence", he wrote, "I
believe that we have many names of God which properly signify the divine
nature, even though we do not understand it."11

4. Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus and Ockham differed in the way they sup-
ported their positions and in their epistemological assumptions; yet there are
two extremely important subjects on which they agreed: first, that the problem
of religious language was not one of religious language alone; and second, that
the Thomistic connection between spoken language and understanding had
to be loosened. They all accepted the doctrine whereby spoken language was
subordinated to mental language; and they all accepted the commonsense
view that in the absence of mental activity speaking becomes mere parrotting,
but these beliefs did not blind them to the fact that language has functions
which are to some extent independent of the individual's ability to under-
stand the world. As Henry of Ghent emphasized, language has a descriptive
function, and because words are common currency, human beings can describe
more, or less, accurately than they understand. As Duns Scotus and Ockham
emphasized, language also has a denotative function, and human beings can
use words to denote objects even if they know little about these objects. Signifi-
cation and naming are essentially linguistic activities, and they must be assessed
as such. Our words can have degrees of truth and distinctness which our under-
standing lacks, just as our understanding can go beyond our words.

Author's address:

E. J. Ashworth
Department of Philosophy
University of Waterloo
WATERLOO, Ontario
CANADA N2L3G1
 HENRY OF GHENT, DUNS SCOTUS AND OCKHAM 37

NOTES

1) The more usual reference is to De Doctrina Christiana II, but Henry of Ghent made
heavy use of De Dialectica.
2) For discussion of this definition, see Spade 1975a:214-15.
3) The Latin translation of Metaphysics IV.7:1012 a 23 was "ratio quam significat
nomen est definitio" (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica la 13.6, p.68) and accordingly
a word was often said to signify a ratio. But ratio had a variety of meanings, including
"concept", "definition", "a formal element of things" and "the essence of things." For
discussion see McCord Adams in Paul of Venice (1978:272-73).
4) For full discussion and references see Ashworth, forthcoming. It should be noted
that the debate explicitly concerned categorematic words of first intention, e. g., 'man',
'anmial' rather than 'species', 'concept', 'but'.
5) "Respondeo dicendum, quod cum voces sint signa intellectuum, secundum Philo-
sophum, ubi supra, idem judicium est de cognitione rei et nominatione ejus. Unde sicut
Deum imperfecte cognoscimus, ita etiam imperfecte nominamus, quasi balbutiendo, ut
dicit Gregorius."
6) Henry drew much of his material from Augustine, De Dialectica VI, pp.91-99. The
topic of natural meaning was ignored in commentaries on Aristotle's logic until the seven-
teenth century, when it suddenly became popular.
7) Henry of Ghent, fo.cclxxix r:A. "In contrarium est Augustinus vii de Trinitate ca iiii
ubi dicit. Excedit supereminentia deitatis usitati eloquii facultatem. Verius etenim cogitatur
deus quam dicitur, et verius est quam cogitatur." Ockham's follower Biel commented (Sent.
I.d.22 sign.h vi vb-h vii ra) that God "verius cogitatur quam dicitur" only in the sense that
thoughts had a natural signification, whereas words had only conventional signification.
"Non tamen ideo sequitur: quod illud quod naturaliter significat: distinctius significet
quolibet significante ad placitum."
8) Biel noted that this applies to concepts (mental words) as well as to spoken words:
"Et ita sicut vox distinctius significat quam intelligatur: ita conceptus distinctius significat
quam ipso conceptu intelligatur . . . " (sign.h vi vb).
9) For a discussion of Ockham's doctrine of connotation, see Spade 1975b.
10) He does not refer to Thomas by name. "Ad quod dicendum - sine argumentis -
quod, ut mihi videtur, haec propositio falsa est quod 'nihil potest nominari a nobis magis
proprie quam intelligatur', sicut quidam dicunt quod sicut intelligimus sic significamus,
et quia non intelligimus Deum nisi ex creaturis, ideo non significamus nisi per nomina ac-
cepta a creaturis. Hoc enim falsum est."
11) "Unde credo quod multa nomina habemus de Deo quae proprie significant naturam
divinam, quam tamen non intelligimus."

SUMMARY

The problem discussed in this paper has to do with the relation between our
imperfect understanding of God and the words in which we speak of him.
Thomas Aquinas had argued that spoken words primarily signify concepts, and
as a result he believed that no words could be used to signify or name God more
distinctly than our concepts warranted. However, Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus,
38 E. J. ASHWORTH

and Ockham rejected these claims. They argued that words signified things
primarily and that as a result the truth or distinctness of our speech need not
be closely related to the truth or distinctness of our understanding. Henry of
Ghent focussed on the problem of description. He claimed that because words
have a common use, a man could describe an object more truly than his degree
of understanding warranted. He also claimed that, in the case of God, we tend
to speak less truly than our understanding warrants, because our understanding
grasps more about God than can be put into words. Duns Scotus and Ockham
focussed on the problem of denotation. They both argued that we can use words
to denote God's essence, even though we cannot understand God's essence.
Like Henry, they used examples which show their awareness that their remarks
apply to language in general, and not just to religious language.

RÉSUMÉ

Le probléme discuté dans le présent article touche à la question du lien entre

notre connaissance imparfaite de Dieu et les mots que nous employons pour
parler de lui. Thomas d'Aquin s'efforça de démontrer que les mots du langage
signifient d'abord les concepts; en conséquence, il croyait qu'aucun mot ne peut
être employé pour signifier ou nommer Dieu avec une précision plus grande
que celle garantie par nos concepts. Henri de Gand, Duns Scot et Ockham, par
contre, rejetérent ces affirmations.Ils soutenaient que les mots signifient d'abord
les choses et qu'en conséquence, il n'est pas nécessaire de lier étroitement la
vérité ou à la précision de notre discours à la vérité ou à la précision de notre
compréhension. Henri de Gand centra sa réflexion sur le probléme de la des-
cription. Puisque les mots ont un usage commun, soutenait-il, un homme peut
décrire un objet avec une vérité plus grande que celle garantie par son degré de
compréhension. I1 soutenait donc que, dans le cas de Dieu, nous avons tendance
à parler avec une vérité moins grande que celle garantie par notre compréhen-
sion, parce que notre compréhension saisit de Dieu plus que ce qu'on peut
mettre dans des mots. Duns Scot et Ockham centrérent leur réflexion sur le
probléme de la dénotation. I1s soutenaient tous les deux que nous pouvons
utiliser des mots pour denoter l'essence de Dieu, même si nous ne pouvons pas
comprendre l'essence de Dieu. Comme Henri de Gand, ils emploient des exem-
ples où ils se montrent conscients du fait que leurs remarques s'appliquent au
langage en general, et pas seulement au langage religieux.