EN BANC
PROF. MERLIN M. MAGALLONA, G.R No. 187167
AKBAYAN PARTY-LIST REP. RISA
HONTIVEROS, PROF. HARRY C. Present:
ROQUE, JR., AND UNIVERSITY OF
THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF CORONA, C.J.,
LAW STUDENTS, ALITHEA CARPIO,
BARBARA ACAS, VOLTAIRE VELASCO, JR.,
ALFERES, CZARINA MAY LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
ALTEZ, FRANCIS ALVIN ASILO, BRION,
SHERYL BALOT, RUBY AMOR PERALTA,
BARRACA, JOSE JAVIER BAUTISTA, BERSAMIN,
ROMINA BERNARDO, VALERIE DEL CASTILLO,
PAGASA BUENAVENTURA, EDAN ABAD,
MARRI CAETE, VANN ALLEN VILLARAMA, JR.,
DELA CRUZ, RENE DELORINO, PEREZ,
PAULYN MAY DUMAN, SHARON MENDOZA, and
ESCOTO, RODRIGO FAJARDO III, SERENO, JJ.
GIRLIE FERRER, RAOULLE OSEN
FERRER, CARLA REGINA GREPO,
ANNA MARIE CECILIA GO, IRISH
KAY KALAW, MARY ANN JOY LEE,
MARIA LUISA MANALAYSAY,
MIGUEL RAFAEL MUSNGI,
MICHAEL OCAMPO, JAKLYN HANNA
PINEDA, WILLIAM RAGAMAT,
MARICAR RAMOS, ENRIK FORT
REVILLAS, JAMES MARK TERRY
RIDON, JOHANN FRANTZ RIVERA IV,
CHRISTIAN RIVERO, DIANNE MARIE
ROA, NICHOLAS SANTIZO, MELISSA
CHRISTINA SANTOS, CRISTINE MAE
TABING, VANESSA ANNE TORNO,
MARIA ESTER VANGUARDIA, and
MARCELINO VELOSO III,
Petitioners,
- versus -
HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, HON. ALBERTO
ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HON.
ROLANDO ANDAYA, IN HIS CAPACITY
AS SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
HON. DIONY VENTURA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR OF
THE NATIONAL MAPPING &
RESOURCE INFORMATION
AUTHORITY, and HON. HILARIO
DAVIDE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
PERMANENT MISSION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Promulgated:
TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
Respondents. July 16, 2011
x ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 95221 (RA 9522) adjusting the countrys
archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories.
The Antecedents
In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)2 demarcating the
maritime baselines of the Philippines as an archipelagic State.3 This law followed
the framing of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone in
1958 (UNCLOS I),4 codifying, among others, the sovereign right of States parties
over their territorial sea, the breadth of which, however, was left undetermined.
Attempts to fill this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva in
1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA 3046 remained unchanged
for nearly five decades, save for legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446
[RA 5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the drawing of baselines
around Sabah in North Borneo.
In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the statute now
under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant
with the terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS
III),5 which the Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984.6 Among others, UNCLOS
III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and contour of baselines of archipelagic
States like the Philippines7 and sets the deadline for the filing of application for the
extended continental shelf.8 Complying with these requirements, RA 9522
shortened one baseline, optimized the location of some basepoints around the
Philippine archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan
Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as regimes of islands whose islands
generate their own applicable maritime zones.
Petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, in their respective
capacities as citizens, taxpayers or x x x legislators,9 as the case may be, assail the
constitutionality of RA 9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces
Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippine states
sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution,10 embodying
the terms of the Treaty of Paris11 and ancillary treaties,12 and (2) RA 9522 opens the
countrys waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and
aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening
the countrys nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of
relevant constitutional provisions.13
In addition, petitioners contend that RA 9522s treatment of the KIG as regime of
islands not only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.14 To buttress their argument of territorial
diminution, petitioners facially attack RA 9522 for what it excluded and included its
failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its use of UNCLOS IIIs
framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and
the Scarborough Shoal.
Commenting on the petition, respondent officials raised threshold issues
questioning (1) the petitions compliance with the case or controversy requirement
for judicial review grounded on petitioners alleged lack of locus standi and (2) the
propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of
RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defended RA 9522 as the countrys
compliance with the terms of UNCLOS III, preserving Philippine territory over the
KIG or Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the
countrys security, environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines
claim over Sabah.
Respondents also question the normative force, under international law, of
petitioners assertion that what Spain ceded to the United States under the Treaty
of Paris were the islands and all the waters found within the boundaries of the
rectangular area drawn under the Treaty of Paris.
We left unacted petitioners prayer for an injunctive writ.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:
1. Preliminarily
1. Whether petitioners possess locus standi to bring this suit; and
2. Whether the writs of certiorari and prohibition are the proper remedies to
assail the constitutionality of RA 9522.
2. On the merits, whether RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
The Ruling of the Court
On the threshold issues, we hold that (1) petitioners possess locus standi to bring
this suit as citizens and (2) the writs of certiorari and prohibition are proper
remedies to test the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, we find no basis
to declare RA 9522 unconstitutional.
On the Threshold Issues
Petitioners Possess Locus
Standi as Citizens
Petitioners themselves undermine their assertion of locus standi as legislators and
taxpayers because the petition alleges neither infringement of legislative
prerogative15 nor misuse of public funds,16 occasioned by the passage and
implementation of RA 9522. Nonetheless, we recognize petitioners locus standi as
citizens with constitutionally sufficient interest in the resolution of the merits of the
case which undoubtedly raises issues of national significance necessitating urgent
resolution. Indeed, owing to the peculiar nature of RA 9522, it is understandably
difficult to find other litigants possessing a more direct and specific interest to
bring the suit, thus satisfying one of the requirements for granting citizenship
standing.17
The Writs of Certiorari and Prohibition
Are Proper Remedies to Test
the Constitutionality of Statutes
In praying for the dismissal of the petition on preliminary grounds, respondents
seek a strict observance of the offices of the writs of certiorari and prohibition,
noting that the writs cannot issue absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion
in the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial powers on the part of
respondents and resulting prejudice on the part of petitioners.18
Respondents submission holds true in ordinary civil proceedings. When this Court
exercises its constitutional power of judicial review, however, we have, by tradition,
viewed the writs of certiorari and prohibition as proper remedial vehicles to test
the constitutionality of statutes,19 and indeed, of acts of other branches of
government.20 Issues of constitutional import are sometimes crafted out of
statutes which, while having no bearing on the personal interests of the petitioners,
carry such relevance in the life of this nation that the Court inevitably finds itself
constrained to take cognizance of the case and pass upon the issues raised, non-
compliance with the letter of procedural rules notwithstanding. The statute sought
to be reviewed here is one such law.
RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional
RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool
to Demarcate the Countrys
Maritime Zones and Continental
Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to
Delineate Philippine Territory
Petitioners submit that RA 9522 dismembers a large portion of the national
territory21 because it discards the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine
territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties, successively encoded in the
definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory
provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the
territorial sea recognized at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly
ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris technical
description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of
nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area
delineated in the Treaty of Paris.22
Petitioners theory fails to persuade us.
UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss) of territory. It is a
multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones
(i.e., the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone
[24 nautical miles from the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles
from the baselines]), and continental shelves that UNCLOS III delimits.23 UNCLOS
III was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among United Nations
members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the worlds oceans
and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States graduated
authority over a limited span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.
On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS III
States parties to mark-out specific basepoints along their coasts from which
baselines are drawn, either straight or contoured, to serve as geographic starting
points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and continental shelf. Article
48 of UNCLOS III on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
Article 48. Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone,
the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf. The breadth of the
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the
continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in
accordance with article 47. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS III States
parties to delimit with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental
shelves. In turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international community of the
scope of the maritime space and submarine areas within which States parties
exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over territorial
waters (Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and
sanitation laws in the contiguous zone (Article 33), and the right to exploit the living
and non-living resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and
continental shelf (Article 77).
Even under petitioners theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands
and all the waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the
baselines of the Philippines would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA
9522 because this is the only way to draw the baselines in conformity with UNCLOS
III. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other portions of the
rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the outermost islands
and drying reefs of the archipelago.24
UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition,
enlargement or, as petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional
international law typology, States acquire (or conversely, lose) territory through
occupation, accretion, cession and prescription,25 not by executing multilateral
treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with
the treatys terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial
livelihood of subsistence fishermen.28 A comparison of the configuration of the
baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 and the extent of maritime space
encompassed by each law, coupled with a reading of the text of RA 9522 and its
congressional deliberations, vis--vis the Philippines obligations under UNCLOS III,
belie this view.
The configuration of the baselines drawn under RA 3046 and RA 9522 shows that
RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046, save for at least nine
basepoints that RA 9522 skipped to optimize the location of basepoints and adjust
the length of one baseline (and thus comply with UNCLOS IIIs limitation on the
maximum length of baselines). Under RA 3046, as under RA 9522, the KIG and the
claims to land features are outside UNCLOS III, and are instead governed by the
rules on general international law.26
RA 9522s Use of the Framework
of Regime of Islands to Determine the
Maritime Zones of the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, not Inconsistent
with the Philippines Claim of Sovereignty
Over these Areas
Petitioners next submit that RA 9522s use of UNCLOS IIIs regime of islands
framework to draw the baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable
maritime zones of the KIG, weakens our territorial claim over that area.27 Petitioners
add that the KIGs (and Scarborough Shoals) exclusion from the Philippine
archipelagic baselines results in the loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of
territorial waters, prejudicing the
Scarborough Shoal lie outside of the baselines drawn around the Philippine
archipelago. This undeniable cartographic fact takes the wind out of petitioners
argument branding RA 9522 as a statutory renunciation of the Philippines claim
over the KIG, assuming that baselines are relevant for this purpose.
Petitioners assertion of loss of about 15,000 square nautical miles of territorial
waters under RA 9522 is similarly unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary,
RA 9522, by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the Philippines total
maritime space (covering its internal waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic
zone) by 145,216 square nautical miles, as shown in the table below:29
 Extent of maritime area using RA
3046, as amended, taking into
account the Treaty of Paris
delimitation (in square nautical
miles)
Extent of maritime area
using RA 9522, taking into
account UNCLOS III (in
square nautical miles)

Internal or
archipelagic 166,858 171,435
waters

Territorial Sea 274,136 32,106

Exclusive
Economic 382,669
Zone

TOTAL 440,994 586,210

Thus, as the map below shows, the reach of the exclusive economic zone drawn
under RA 9522 even extends way beyond the waters covered by the rectangular
demarcation under the Treaty of Paris. Of course, where there are overlapping
exclusive economic zones of opposite or adjacent States, there will have to be a
delineation of maritime boundaries in accordance with UNCLOS III.30
Further, petitioners argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine territory
because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA
9522 itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines continued claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:
SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise
exercises sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as Regime of Islands
under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS):
a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596
and
b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)
Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of
the Philippine archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The
Philippines would have committed a breach of two provisions of UNCLOS III. First,
Article 47 (3) of UNCLOS III requires that [t]he drawing of such baselines shall not
depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.
Second, Article 47 (2) of UNCLOS III requires that the length of the baselines shall
not exceed 100 nautical miles, save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of
baselines which can reach up to 125 nautical miles.31
Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG32 and
the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an
appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine
archipelago,33 such that any straight baseline loped around them from the nearest
basepoint will inevitably depart to an appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago.
The principal sponsor of RA 9522 in the Senate, Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago,
took pains to emphasize the foregoing during the Senate deliberations:
What we call the Kalayaan Island Group or what the rest of the world call[] the
Spratlys and the Scarborough Shoal are outside our archipelagic baseline
because if we put them inside our baselines we might be accused of violating the
provision of international law which states: The drawing of such baseline shall not
depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the archipelago.
So sa loob ng ating baseline, dapat magkalapit ang mga islands. Dahil malayo ang
Scarborough Shoal, hindi natin masasabing malapit sila sa atin although we are
still allowed by international law to claim them as our own.
This is called contested islands outside our configuration. We see that our
archipelago is defined by the orange line which [we] call[] archipelagic baseline.
Ngayon, tingnan ninyo ang maliit na circle doon sa itaas, that is Scarborough Shoal,
itong malaking circle sa ibaba, that is Kalayaan Group or the Spratlys. Malayo na
sila sa ating archipelago kaya kung ilihis pa natin ang dating archipelagic baselines
para lamang masama itong dalawang circles, hindi na sila magkalapit at baka hindi
na tatanggapin ng United Nations because of the rule that it should follow the
natural configuration of the archipelago.34 (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, the length of one baseline that RA 3046 drew exceeded UNCLOS IIIs
limits. The need to shorten this baseline, and in addition, to optimize the location
of basepoints using current maps, became imperative as discussed by respondents:
[T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to enable the Philippines to
draw the outer limits of its maritime zones including the extended continental shelf
in the manner provided by Article 47 of [UNCLOS III]. As defined by R.A. 3046, as
amended by R.A. 5446, the baselines suffer from some technical deficiencies, to
wit:
1. The length of the baseline across Moro Gulf (from Middle of 3 Rock Awash to
Tongquil Point) is 140.06 nautical miles x x x. This exceeds the maximum length
allowed under Article 47(2) of the [UNCLOS III], which states that The length of
such baselines shall not exceed 100 nautical miles, except that up to 3 per cent of
the total number of baselines enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length,
up to a maximum length of 125 nautical miles.
2. The selection of basepoints is not optimal. At least 9 basepoints can be skipped
or deleted from the baselines system. This will enclose an additional 2,195 nautical
miles of water.
3. Finally, the basepoints were drawn from maps existing in 1968, and not
established by geodetic survey methods. Accordingly, some of the points,
particularly along the west coasts of Luzon down to Palawan were later found to
be located either inland or on water, not on low-water line and drying reefs as
prescribed by Article 47.35

Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines claim over the KIG and the
Scarborough Shoal, Congress decision to classify the KIG and the Scarborough
Shoal as Regime[s] of Islands under the Republic of the Philippines consistent with
Article 12136 of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine States responsible observance
of its pacta sunt servanda obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of
UNCLOS III, any naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above
water at high tide, such as portions of the KIG, qualifies under the category of
regime of islands, whose islands generate their own applicable maritime zones.37
Statutory Claim Over Sabah under
RA 5446 Retained
Petitioners argument for the invalidity of RA 9522 for its failure to textualize the
Philippines claim over Sabah in North Borneo is also untenable. Section 2 of RA
5446, which RA 9522 did not repeal, keeps open the door for drawing the baselines
of Sabah:
Section 2. The definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the
baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah, situated in North
Borneo, over which the Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty. (Emphasis supplied)
UNCLOS III and RA 9522 not
Incompatible with the Constitutions
Delineation of Internal Waters
As their final argument against the validity of RA 9522, petitioners contend that the
law unconstitutionally converts internal waters into archipelagic waters, hence
subjecting these waters to the right of innocent and sea lanes passage under
UNCLOS III, including overflight. Petitioners extrapolate that these passage rights
indubitably expose Philippine internal waters to nuclear and maritime pollution
hazards, in violation of the Constitution.38
Whether referred to as Philippine internal waters under Article I of the
Constitution39 or as archipelagic waters under UNCLOS III (Article 49 [1]), the
Philippines exercises sovereignty over the body of water lying landward of the
baselines, including the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath.
UNCLOS III affirms this:
Article 49. Legal status of archipelagic waters, of the air space over archipelagic
waters and of their bed and subsoil.
1. The sovereignty of an archipelagic State extends to the waters enclosed by the
archipelagic baselines drawn in accordance with article 47, described as
archipelagic waters, regardless of their depth or distance from the coast.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the archipelagic waters, as well
as to their bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
xxxx
4. The regime of archipelagic sea lanes passage established in this Part shall not in
other respects affect the status of the archipelagic waters, including the sea
lanes, or the exercise by the archipelagic State of its sovereignty over such waters
and their air space, bed and subsoil, and the resources contained therein.
(Emphasis supplied)
The fact of sovereignty, however, does not preclude the operation of municipal
and international law norms subjecting the territorial sea or archipelagic waters to
necessary, if not marginal, burdens in the interest of maintaining unimpeded,
expeditious international navigation, consistent with the international law principle
of freedom of navigation. Thus, domestically, the political branches of the
Philippine government, in the competent discharge of their constitutional powers,
may pass legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to regulate
innocent and sea lanes passage.40 Indeed, bills drawing nautical highways for sea
lanes passage are now pending in Congress.41
In the absence of municipal legislation, international law norms, now codified in
UNCLOS III, operate to grant innocent passage rights over the territorial sea or
archipelagic waters, subject to the treatys limitations and conditions for their
exercise.42 Significantly, the right of innocent passage is a customary international
law,43 thus automatically incorporated in the corpus of Philippine law.44 No modern
State can validly invoke its sovereignty to absolutely forbid innocent passage that
is exercised in accordance with customary international law without risking
retaliatory measures from the international community.
The fact that for archipelagic States, their archipelagic waters are subject to both
the right of innocent passage and sea lanes passage45 does not place them in lesser
footing vis--vis continental coastal States which are subject, in their territorial sea,
to the right of innocent passage and the right of transit passage through
international straits. The imposition of these passage rights through archipelagic
waters under UNCLOS III was a concession by archipelagic States, in exchange for
their right to claim all the waters landward of their baselines, regardless of their
depth or distance from the coast, as archipelagic waters subject to their territorial
sovereignty. More importantly, the recognition of archipelagic States archipelago
and the waters enclosed by their baselines as one cohesive entity prevents the
treatment of their islands as separate islands under UNCLOS III.46 Separate islands
generate their own maritime zones, placing the waters between islands separated
by more than 24 nautical miles beyond the States territorial sovereignty, subjecting
these waters to the rights of other States under UNCLOS III.47
Petitioners invocation of non-executory constitutional provisions in Article II
(Declaration of Principles and State Policies)48 must also fail. Our present state of
jurisprudence considers the provisions in Article II as mere legislative guides, which,
absent enabling legislation, do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional
rights x x x.49 Article II provisions serve as guides in formulating and interpreting
implementing legislation, as well as in interpreting executory provisions of the
Constitution. Although Oposa v. Factoran50treated the right to a healthful and
balanced ecology under Section 16 of Article II as an exception, the present petition
lacks factual basis to substantiate the claimed constitutional violation. The other
provisions petitioners cite, relating to the protection of marine wealth (Article XII,
Section 2, paragraph 251) and subsistence fishermen (Article XIII, Section 752), are
not violated by RA 9522.
Petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS III,
Congress was not bound to pass RA 9522.54 We have looked at the relevant
provision of UNCLOS III55 and we find petitioners reading plausible. Nevertheless,
the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to Congress, not to this Court.
Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep price. Absent
an UNCLOS III compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines
will find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the
breadth of its maritime zones and continental shelf is measured. This is recipe for
a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open invitation to the seafaring powers to
freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and submarine areas around
our archipelago; and second, it weakens the countrys case in any international
dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely
avoided.
The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the Philippine
archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-
recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines maritime zones and
continental shelf. RA 9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the
Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones, consistent with the Constitution and
our national interest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. SO ORDERED.

In fact, the demarcation of the baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its
exclusive economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the exploitation of all
living and non-living resources within such zone. Such a maritime delineation binds
the international community since the delineation is in strict observance of
UNCLOS III. If the maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international
community will of course reject it and will refuse to be bound by it.

UNCLOS III favors States with a long coastline like the Philippines. UNCLOS III
creates a sui generis maritime space the exclusive economic zone in waters
previously part of the high seas. UNCLOS III grants new rights to coastal States to
exclusively exploit the resources found within this zone up to 200 nautical
miles.53 UNCLOS III, however, preserves the traditional freedom of navigation of
other States that attached to this zone beyond the territorial sea before UNCLOS
III.

RA 9522 and the Philippines Maritime Zones

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-36409 October 26, 1973
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LORETA GOZO, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Jaime M.
Lantin and Solicitor Norberto P. Eduardo for plaintiff-appellee.
Jose T. Nery for defendant-appellant.
FERNANDO, J.:
Appellant seeks to set aside a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Zambales,
convicting her of a violation of an ordinance of Olongapo, Zambales, requiring a
permit from the municipal mayor for the construction or erection of a building, as
well as any modification, alteration, repair or demolition thereof. She questions its
validity, or at the very least, its applicability to her, by invoking due process,1 a
contention she would premise on what for her is the teaching of People v.
Fajardo.2 If such a ground were far from being impressed with solidity, she stands
on quicksand when she would deny the applicability of the ordinance to her, on
the pretext that her house was constructed within the naval base leased to the
American armed forces. While yielding to the well-settled doctrine that it does not
thereby cease to be Philippine territory, she would, in effect, seek to emasculate
our sovereign rights by the assertion that we cannot exercise therein administrative
jurisdiction. To state the proposition is to make patent how much it is tinged with
unorthodoxy. Clearly then, the lower court decision must be affirmed with the sole
modification that she is given thirty days from the finality of a judgment to obtain
a permit, failing which, she is required to demolish the same.
The facts are undisputed. As set forth in the decision of the lower court: "The
accused bought a house and lot located inside the United States Naval Reservation
within the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. She demolished the house and
built another one in its place, without a building permit from the City Mayor of
Olongapo City, because she was told by one Ernesto Evalle, an assistant in the City
Mayor's office, as well as by her neighbors in the area, that such building permit
was not necessary for the construction of the house. On December 29, 1966, Juan
Malones, a building and lot inspector of the City Engineer's Office, Olongapo City,
together with Patrolman Ramon Macahilas of the Olongapo City police force
apprehended four carpenters working on the house of the accused and they
brought the carpenters to the Olongapo City police headquarters for interrogation.
... After due investigation, Loreta Gozo was charged with violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 14, S. of 1964 with the City Fiscal's Office." 3 The City Court of
Olongapo City found her guilty of violating Municipal Ordinance No. 14, Series of
1964 and sentenced her to an imprisonment of one month as well as to pay the
costs. The Court of Instance of Zambales, on appeal, found her guilty on the above
facts of violating such municipal ordinance but would sentence her merely to pay
a fine of P200.00 and to demolish the house thus erected. She elevated the case to
the Court of Appeals but in her brief, she would put in issue the validity of such an
ordinance on constitutional ground or at the very least its applicability to her in
view of the location of her dwelling within the naval base. Accordingly, the Court
of Appeals, in a resolution of January 29, 1973, noting the constitutional question
raised, certified the case to this Court.
There is, as mentioned in the opening paragraph of this petition, no support in law
for the stand taken by appellant.
1. It would be fruitless for her to assert that local government units are devoid of
authority to require building permits. This Court, from Switzer v. Municipality of
Cebu,4 decided in 1911, has sanctioned the validity of such measures. It is much
too late in the day to contend that such a requirement cannot be validly imposed.
Even appellant, justifiably concerned about the unfavorable impression that could
be created if she were to deny that such competence is vested in municipal
corporations and chartered cities, had to concede in her brief: "If, at all; the
questioned ordinance may be predicated under the general welfare clause ... ."5 Its
scope is wide, well-nigh all embracing, covering every aspect of public health,
public morals, public safety, and the well being and good order of the community.6
It goes without saying that such a power is subject to limitations. Certainly, if its
exercise is violative of any constitutional right, then its validity could be impugned,
or at the very least, its applicability to the person adversely affected could be
questioned. So much is settled law. Apparently, appellant has adopted the view
that a due process question may indeed be raised in view of what for her is its
oppressive character. She is led to such a conclusion, relying on People v.
Fajardo.7 A more careful scrutiny of such a decision would not have led her astray,
for that case is easily distinguishable. The facts as set forth in the opinion follow:
"It appears that on August 15, 1950, during the incumbency of defendant-
appellant Juan F. Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao, Camarines Sur, the
municipal council passed the ordinance in question providing as follows: "... 1. Any
person or persons who will construct or repair a building should, before
constructing or repairing, obtain a written permit from the Municipal Mayor. ... 2.
A fee of not less than P2.00 should be charged for each building permit and P1.00
for each repair permit issued. ... 3. [Penalty]-Any violation of the provisions of the
above, this ordinance, shall make the violator liable to pay a fine of not less than
P25 nor more than P50 or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor more than
24 days or both, at the discretion of the court. If said building destroys the view of
the Public Plaza or occupies any public property, it shall be removed at the expense
of the owner of the building or house. ... ." Four years later, after the term of
appellant Fajardo as mayor had expired, he and his son-in-law, appellant Babilonia,
filed a written request with the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to
construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station on a parcel of land registered
in Fajardo's name, located along the national highway and separated from the
public plaza by a creek ... . On January 16, 1954, the request was denied, for the
reason among others that the proposed building would destroy the view or beauty
of the public plaza ... . On January 18, 1954, defendants reiterated their request for
a building permit ..., but again the request was turned down by the mayor.
Whereupon, appellants proceeded with the construction of the building without a
permit, because they needed a place of residence very badly, their former house
having been destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they had been living on leased
property."8
Clearly then, the application of such an ordinance to Fajardo was oppressive. A
conviction therefore for a violation thereof both in the justice of the peace court
of Baao, Camarines Sur as well as in the Court of First Instance could not be
sustained. In this case, on the contrary, appellant never bothered to comply with
the ordinance. Perhaps aware of such a crucial distinction, she would assert in her
brief: "The evidence showed that even if the accused were to secure a permit from
the Mayor, the same would not have been granted. To require the accused to
obtain a permit before constructing her house would be an exercise in futility. The
law will not require anyone to perform an impossibility, neither in law or in fact: ...
."9 It would be from her own version, at the very least then, premature to anticipate
such an adverse result, and thus to condemn an ordinance which certainly lends
itself to an interpretation that is neither oppressive, unfair, or unreasonable. That
kind of interpretation suffices to remove any possible question of its validity, as
was expressly announced in Primicias v. Fugoso. 10 So it appears from this portion
of the opinion of Justice Feria, speaking for the Court: "Said provision is susceptible
of two constructions: one is that the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with
unregulated discretion to grant or refuse to grant permit for the holding of a lawful
assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other public places
of the City of Manila; and the other is that the applicant has the right to a permit
which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latter's reasonable
discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the
purpose, with a view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient
use of the streets and public places by others, and to provide adequate and proper
policing to minimize the risk of disorder. After a mature deliberation, we have
arrived at the conclusion that we must adopt the second construction, that is,
construe the provisions of the said ordinance to mean that it does not confer upon
the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in
issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places where the
parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held." 11 If, in a case
affecting such a preferred freedom as the right to assembly, this Court could
construe an ordinance of the City of Manila so as to avoid offending against a
constitutional provision, there is nothing to preclude it from a similar mode of
approach in order to show the lack of merit of an attack against an ordinance
requiring a permit. Appellant cannot therefore take comfort from any broad
statement in the Fajardo opinion, which incidentally is taken out of context,
considering the admitted oppressive application of the challenged measure in that
litigation. So much then for the contention that she could not have been validly
convicted for a violation of such ordinance. Nor should it be forgotten that she did
suffer the same fate twice, once from the City Court and thereafter from the Court
of First Instance. The reason is obvious.Such ordinance applies to her.
2. Much less is a reversal indicated because of the alleged absence of the rather
novel concept of administrative jurisdiction on the part of Olongapo City. Nor is
novelty the only thing that may be said against it. Far worse is the assumption at
war with controlling and authoritative doctrines that the mere existence of military
or naval bases of a foreign country cuts deeply into the power to govern. Two
leading cases may be cited to show how offensive is such thinking to the juristic
concept of sovereignty, People v. Acierto, 12 and Reagan v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. 13 As was so emphatically set forth by Justice Tuason in Acierto:
"By the Agreement, it should be noted, the Philippine Government merely consents
that the United States exercise jurisdiction in certain cases. The consent was given
purely as a matter of comity, courtesy, or expediency. The Philippine Government
has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the Philippine territory
or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under
the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but
not exclusive jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not
only jurisdictional rights not granted, but also all such ceded rights as the United
States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to make use of. The first
proposition is implied from the fact of Philippine sovereignty over the bases; the
second from the express provisions of the treaty." 14 There was a reiteration of such
a view in Reagan. Thus: "Nothing is better settled than that the Philippines being
independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire domain.
There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees
are supreme, its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to
whom it applies must submit to its terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both
territorial and personal. Necessarily, likewise, it has to be exclusive. If it were not
thus, there is a diminution of sovereignty." 15 Then came this paragraph dealing
with the principle of auto-limitation: "It is to be admitted any state may, by its
consent, express or implied, submit to a restriction of its sovereign rights. There
may thus be a curtailment of what otherwise is a power plenary in character. That
is the concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation, which, in the succinct language of
Jellinek, "is the property of a state-force due to which it has the exclusive capacity
of legal self-determination and self-restriction." A state then, if it chooses to, may
refrain from the exercise of what otherwise is illimitable competence." 16 The
opinion was at pains to point out though that even then, there is at the most
diminution of jurisdictional rights, not its disappearance. The words employed
follow: "Its laws may as to some persons found within its territory no longer control.
Nor does the matter end there. It is not precluded from allowing another power to
participate in the exercise of jurisdictional right over certain portions of its territory.
If it does so, it by no means follows that such areas become impressed with an
alien character. They retain their status as native soil. They are still subject to its
authority. Its jurisdiction may be diminished, but it does not disappear. So it is with
the bases under lease to the American armed forces by virtue of the military bases
agreement of 1947. They are not and cannot be foreign territory." 17
Can there be anything clearer, therefore, than that only a turnabout, unwarranted
and unjustified, from what is settled and orthodox law can lend the slightest degree
of plausibility to the contention of absence of administrative jurisdiction. If it were
otherwise, what was aptly referred to by Justice Tuason "as a matter of comity,
courtesy, or expediency" becomes one of obeisance and submission. If on a
concern purely domestic in its implications, devoid of any connection with national
security, the Military-Bases Agreement could be thus interpreted, then sovereignty
indeed becomes a mockery and an illusion. Nor does appellant's thesis rest on less
shaky foundation by the mere fact that Acierto and Reagan dealt with the
competence of the national government, while what is sought to be emasculated
in this case is the so-called administrative jurisdiction of a municipal corporation.
Within the limits of its territory, whatever statutory powers are vested upon it may
be validly exercised. Any residual authority and therein conferred, whether
expressly or impliedly, belongs to the national government, not to an alien country.
What is even more to be deplored in this stand of appellant is that no such claim
is made by the American naval authorities, not that it would do them any good if
it were so asserted. To quote from Acierto anew: "The carrying out of the provisions
of the Bases Agreement is the concern of the contracting parties alone. Whether,
therefore, a given case which by the treaty comes within the United States
jurisdiction should be transferred to the Philippine authorities is a matter about
which the accused has nothing to do or say. In other words, the rights granted to
the United States by the treaty insure solely to that country and can not be raised
by the offender." 18 If an accused would suffer from such disability, even if the
American armed forces were the beneficiary of a treaty privilege, what is there for
appellant to take hold of when there is absolutely no showing of any alleged grant
of what is quaintly referred to as administrative jurisdiction? That is all, and it is
more than enough, to make manifest the futility of seeking a reversal.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of November 11, 1969 is affirmed insofar as it
found the accused, Loreta Gozo, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of a violation of
Municipal Ordinance No. 14, series of 1964 and sentencing her to pay a fine of
P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and modified insofar
as she is required to demolish the house that is the subject matter of the case, she
being given a period of thirty days from the finality of this decision within which to
obtain the required permit. Only upon her failure to do so will that portion of the
appealed decision requiringdemolition be enforced. Costs against the accused.
Footnotes
1 According to Article III, Section 1, paragraph 1 of the Constitution: "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."
2 104 Phil. 443 (1958).
3 Decision, Appendix A to the Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, 1A-1B.
4 20 Phil. 111. Cf. People v. Cruz, 54 Phil. 25 (1929); Tan Chat v. Municipality of
Iloilo, 60 Phil. 465 (1934); Hipolito v. City of Manila, 87 Phil. 180 (1950); Uy Matiao
and Co. v. The City of Cebu, 93 Phil. 300 (1953) ; University of the East v. City of
Manila, 96 Phil. 316 (1954); Verzosa v. City of Baguio, 109 Phil. 571 (1960) ; Lopera
v. Vicente, L-18102, June 30, 1962, 5 SCRA 549; People v. Soria, L-18982, January
31, 1963, 7 SCRA 242.
5 Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, 10. She would cite Sec. 2238 of the Revised
Administrative Code, but strict accuracy would demand that she should refer to
the specific provision in the Olongapo city charter.
6 Cf. United States v. Alexander, 8 Phil. 29 (1907): Punzalan v. Ferriols, 19 Phil. 214
(1911); United States v. Espiritusanto, 23 Phil. 610 (1912); United States v. Ten Yu,
24 Phil. 1 (1912); United States v. Abundan, 24 Phil. 165 (1913); Case v. Board of
Health, 24 Phil. 250 (1913); United States v. Hilario, 24 Phil. 392 (1913).; United
States v. Chan Tienco, 25 Phil. 89 (1913); United States v. Joson, 26 Phil. 1 (1913);
Rivera v. Campbell, 34 Phil. 348 (1916) ; United States v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 103
(1918); Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, 41 Phil. 103 (1920); Vinco v. Municipality of
Hinigaran, 41 Phil. 790 (1917); People v. Cruz, 54 Phil. 24 (1929); Tan Chat v.
Municipality of Iloilo, 60 Phil. 465 (1934); People v. Lardizabal, 61 Phil. 360 (1935); These are two separate appeals by certiorari from the decision dated March 25,
Malabon Sugar Co. v. Municipality of Malabon, 61 Phil. 717 (1935); People v. Chan, 1963 (G.R. No. L-21484) and the order dated May 21, 1964 (G.R. No. L-23605) as
65 Phil. 611 (1938); People v. Sabarre, 65 Phil. 684 (1938); People v. Esguerra, 81 affirmed by the resolutions en banc, of the Court of Industrial Relations, in Cases
Phil. 33 (1948); Ebona v. Municipality of Daet, 85 Phil. 369 (1950); Manila Race Horse Nos. 3450-ULP and 1327-MC, respectively. The parties, except the Confederation
Trainers Asso. v. De la Fuente, 88 Phil. 60 (1951); Vega v. Municipal Board of the of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), being practically the
City of Iloilo, 94 Phil. 949 (1954); Co Kiam v. City of Manila, 96 Phil. 649 (1955); same and the principal issues involved related, only one decision is now rendered
Physical Therapy Org. of the Phil. v. Municipal Board of Manila, 101 Phil. 1142 in these two cases.
(1957); Uy Ha v. City Mayor, 108 Phil. 400 (1960); Gaerlan v. Baguio City Council,
109 Phil. 1100 (1960); Gerena v. City of Manila 110 Phil. 958 (1961). The Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) was a
government agency created under Republic Act No. 821, as amended. Its
7 104 Phil. 443 (1958). administrative machinery was reorganized and its name changed to Agricultural
8 Ibid, 444-445. Credit Administration (ACA) under the Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844).
9 Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, 11. On the other hand, the ACCFA Supervisors' Association (ASA) and the ACCFA
10 80 Phil. 71 (1948). Workers' Association (AWA), hereinafter referred to as the Unions, are labor
11 Ibid, 77. organizations composed of the supervisors and the rank-and-file employees,
12 92 Phil. 534 (1953). respectively, in the ACCFA (now ACA).
13 L-26379, Dec. 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 968.
14 92 Phil. 534, 542. G.R. No. L-21484
15 30 SCRA 968, 973.
16 Ibid. On September 4, 1961 a collective bargaining agreement, which was to be effective
17 Ibid, 973-974. for a period of one (1) year from July 1, 1961, was entered into by and between the
18 92 Phil. 534, 542. Unions and the ACCFA. A few months thereafter, the Unions started protesting
against alleged violations and non-implementation of said agreement. Finally, on
EN BANC October 25, 1962 the Unions declared a strike, which was ended when the strikers
voluntarily returned to work on November 26, 1962.
G.R. No. L-21484 November 29, 1969
On October 30, 1962 the Unions, together with its mother union, the Confederation
THE AGRICULTURAL CREDIT and COOPERATIVE FINANCING ADMINISTRATION of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint with
(ACCFA), petitioner, the Court of Industrial Relations against the ACCFA (Case No. 3450-ULP) for having
vs. allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practice, namely: violation of the collective
ACCFA SUPERVISORS' ASSOCIATION, ACCFA WORKERS' ASSOCIATION, and THE bargaining agreement in order to discourage the members of the Unions in the
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents. exercise of their right to self-organization, discrimination against said members in
the matter of promotions, and refusal to bargain. The ACCFA denied the charges
Deogracias E. Lerma and Esmeraldo U. Guloy for petitioner Agricultural Credit and
and interposed as affirmative and special defenses lack of jurisdiction of the CIR
Cooperative Financing Administration.
over the case, illegality of the bargaining contract, expiration of said contract and
Office of the Agrarian Counsel, Department of Justice for petitioner Agricultural
lack of approval by the office of the President of the fringe benefits provided for
Credit Administration
therein. Brushing aside the foregoing defenses, the CIR in its decision dated March
J. C. Espinas and Associates for respendents Confederation of Unions in
25, 1963 ordered the ACCFA:
Government Corporations Offices, et al. Mariano B. Tuason for respondent Court
of Industrial Relations. 1. To cease and desist from committing further acts tending to discourage the
members of complainant unions in the exercise of their right to self-organization;
MAKALINTAL, J.:
2. To comply with and implement the provision of the collective bargaining
contract executed on September 4, 1961, including the payment of P30.00 a month
living allowance;
3. To bargain in good faith and expeditiously with the herein complainants.
The ACCFA moved to reconsider but was turned down in a resolution dated April
25, 1963 of the CIR en banc. Thereupon it brought this appeal by certiorari.
The ACCFA raises the following issues in its petition, to wit:
1. Whether or not the respondent court has jurisdiction over this case, which in
turn depends on whether or not ACCFA exercised governmental or proprietary
functions.
2. Whether or not the collective bargaining agreement between the petitioner and
the respondent union is valid; if valid, whether or not it has already lapsed; and if
not, whether or not its (sic) fringe benefits are already enforceable.
3. Whether or not there is a legal and/or factual basis for the finding of the
respondent court that the petitioner had committed acts of unfair labor practice.
4. Whether or not it is within the competence of the court to enforce the collective
bargaining agreement between the petitioner and the respondent unions, the
same having already expired.
G.R. No. L-23605
During the pendency of the above mentioned case (G.R. No. L-21484), specifically
on August 8, 1963, the President of the Philippines signed into law the Agricultural
Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844), which among other things required
the reorganization of the administrative machinery of the Agricultural Credit and
Cooperative Financing Administration (ACCFA) and changed its name to
Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA). On March 17, 1964 the ACCFA
Supervisors' Association and the ACCFA Workers' Association filed a petition for
certification election with the Court of Industrial Relations (Case No. 1327-MC)
praying that they be certified as the exclusive bargaining agents for the supervisors
and rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the ACA. The trial Court in its order
dated March 30, 1964 directed the Manager or Officer-in-Charge of the ACA to
allow the posting of said order "for the information of all employees and workers
thereof," and to answer the petition. In compliance therewith, the ACA, while
admitting most of the allegations in the petition, denied that the Unions
represented the majority of the supervisors and rank-and-file workers, respectively,
in the ACA. It further alleged that the petition was premature, that the ACA was not
the proper party to be notified and to answer the petition, and that the employees
and supervisors could not lawfully become members of the Unions, nor be
represented by them. However, in a joint manifestation of the Unions dated May
7, 1964, with the conformity of the ACA Administrator and of the Agrarian Counsel
in his capacity as such and as counsel for the National Land Reform Council, it was
agreed "that the union petitioners in this case represent the majority of the
employees in their respective bargaining units" and that only the legal issues raised
would be submitted for the resolution of the trial Court.
Finding the remaining grounds for ACA's opposition to the petition to be without
merit, the trial Court in its order dated May 21, 1964 certified "the ACCFA Workers'
Association and the ACCFA Supervisors' Association as the sole and exclusive
bargaining representatives of the rank-and-file employees and supervisors,
respectively, of the Agricultural Credit Administration." Said order was affirmed by
the CIR en banc in its resolution dated August 24, 1964.
On October 2, 1964 the ACA filed in this Court a petition for certiorari with urgent
motion to stay the CIR order of May 21, 1964. In a resolution dated October 6,
1964, this Court dismissed the petition for "lack of adequate allegations," but the
dismissal was later reconsidered when the ACA complied with the formal
requirement stated in said resolution. As prayed for, this Court ordered the CIR to
stay the execution of its order of May 21, 1964.
In this appeal, the ACA in effect challenges the jurisdiction of the CIR to entertain
the petition of the Unions for certification election on the ground that it (ACA) is
engaged in governmental functions. The Unions join the issue on this single point,
contending that the ACA forms proprietary functions.
Under Section 3 of the Agricultural Land Reform Code the ACA was established,
among other governmental agencies,1 to extend credit and similar assistance to
agriculture, in pursuance of the policy enunciated in Section 2 as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It is the policy of the State:
(1) To establish owner-cultivatorships and the economic family-size farm as the
basis of Philippine agriculture and, as a consequence, divert landlord capital in
agriculture to industrial development;
(2) To achieve a dignified existence for the small farmers free from pernicious
institutional restraints and practices;
(3) To create a truly viable social and economic structure in agriculture conducive
to greater productivity and higher farm incomes;
(4) To apply all labor laws equally and without discrimination to both industrial and
agricultural wage earners;
(5) To provide a more vigorous and systematic land resettlement program and
public land distribution; and
(6) To make the small farmers more independent, self-reliant and responsible
citizens, and a source of genuine strength in our democratic society.
The implementation of the policy thus enunciated, insofar as the role of the ACA
therein is concerned, is spelled out in Sections 110 to 118, inclusive, of the Land
Reform Code. Section 110 provides that "the administrative machinery of the
ACCFA shall be reorganized to enable it to align its activities with the requirements
and objective of this Code and shall be known as the Agricultural Credit
Administration." Under Section 112 the sum of P150,000,000 was appropriated out
of national funds to finance the additional credit functions of the ACA as a result
of the land reform program laid down in the Code. Section 103 grants the ACA the
privilege of rediscounting with the Central Bank, the Development Bank of the
Philippines and the Philippine National Bank. Section 105 directs the loaning
activities of the ACA "to stimulate the development of farmers' cooperatives,"
including those "relating to the production and marketing of agricultural products
and those formed to manage and/or own, on a cooperative basis, services and
facilities, such as irrigation and transport systems, established to support
production and/or marketing of agricultural products." Section 106 deals with the
extension by ACA of credit to small farmers in order to stimulate agricultural
production. Sections 107 to 112 lay down certain guidelines to be followed in
connection with the granting of loans, such as security, interest and supervision of
credit. Sections 113 to 118, inclusive, invest the ACA with certain rights and powers
not accorded to non-governmental entities, thus:
SEC. 113. Auditing of Operations. — For the effective supervision of farmers'
cooperatives, the head of the Agricultural Credit Administration shall have the
power to audit their operations, records and books of account and to issue
subpoena and subpoena duces tecum to compel the attendance of witnesses and
the production of books, documents and records in the conduct of such audit or
of any inquiry into their affairs. Any person who, without lawful cause, fails to obey
such subpoena or subpoena duces tecum shall, upon application of the head of
Agricultural Credit Administration with the proper court, be liable to punishment
for contempt in the manner provided by law and if he is an officer of the
Association, to suspension or removal from office.
SEC. 114. Prosecution of officials. — The Agricultural Credit Administration,
through the appropriate provincial or city fiscal, shall have the power to file and
prosecute any and all actions which it may have against any and all officials or
employees of farmers' cooperatives arising from misfeasance or malfeasance in
office.
SEC. 115. Free Notarial Service. — Any justice of the peace, in his capacity as notary
ex-officio, shall render service free of charge to any person applying for a loan
under this Code either in administering the oath or in the acknowledgment of
instruments relating to such loan.
SEC. 116. Free Registration of Deeds. — Any register of deeds shall accept for
registration, free of charge any instrument relative to a loan made under this Code.
SEC. 117. Writing-off Unsecured and Outstanding Loans. — Subject to the approval
of the President upon recommendation of the Auditor General, the Agricultural
Credit Administration may write-off from its books, unsecured and outstanding
loans and accounts receivable which may become uncollectible by reason of the
death or disappearance of the debtor, should there be no visible means of
collecting the same in the foreseeable future, or where the debtor has been verified
to have no income or property whatsoever with which to effect payment. In all
cases, the writing-off shall be after five years from the date the debtor defaults.
SEC. 118. Exemption from Duties, Taxes and Levies. — The Agricultural Credit
Administration is hereby exempted from the payment of all duties, taxes, levies,
and fees, including docket and sheriff's fees, of whatever nature or kind, in the
performance of its functions and in the exercise of its powers hereunder.
The power to audit the operations of farmers' cooperatives and otherwise inquire
into their affairs, as given by Section 113, is in the nature of the visitorial power of
the sovereign, which only a government agency specially delegated to do so by
the Congress may legally exercise.
On March 19, 1964 Executive Order No. 75 was promulgated. It is entitled:
"Rendering in Full Force and Effect the Plan of Reorganization Proposed by the
Special Committee on Reorganization of Agencies for Land Reform for the
Administrative Machinery of the Agricultural Land Reform Code," and contains the
following pertinent provisions:
Section 3. The Land Reform Project Administration2 shall be considered a single
organization and the personnel complement of the member agencies including
the legal officers of the Office of the Agrarian Counsel which shall provide legal
services to the LRPA shall be regarded as one personnel pool from which the
requirements of the operations shall be drawn and subject only to the civil service
laws, rules and regulations, persons from one agency may be freely assigned to
positions in another agency within the LRPA when the interest of the service so
demands.
Section 4. The Land Reform Project Administration shall be considered as one
organization with respect to the standardization of job descriptions position
classification and wage and salary structures to the end that positions involving the
same or equivalent qualifications and equal responsibilities and effort shall have
the same remuneration.
Section 5. The Civil Service laws, rules and regulations with respect to promotions,
particularly in the consideration of person next in rank, shall be made applicable to
the Land Reform Project Administration as a single agency so that qualified
individuals in one member agency must be considered in considering promotion
to higher positions in another member agency.
The implementation of the land reform program of the government according to
Republic Act No. 3844 is most certainly a governmental, not a proprietary, function;
and for that purpose Executive Order No. 75 has placed the ACA under the Land
Reform Project Administration together with the other member agencies, the
personnel complement of all of which are placed in one single pool and made
available for assignment from one agency to another, subject only to Civil Service
laws, rules and regulations, position classification and wage structures.
The appointing authority in respect of the officials and employees of the ACA is
the President of the Philippines, as stated in a 1st indorsement by his office to the
Chairman of the National Reform Council dated May 22, 1964, as follows:
Appointments of officials and employees of the National Land Reform Council and
its agencies may be made only by the President, pursuant to the provisions of
Section 79(D) of the Revised Administrative Code. In accordance with the policy
and practice, such appointments should be prepared for the signature of the
Executive Secretary, "By Authority ofthe President".3
When the Agricultural Reform Code was being considered by the Congress, the
nature of the ACA was the subject of the following exposition on the Senate floor:
Senator Tolentino: . . . . "The ACA is not going to be a profit making institution. It
is supposed to be a public service of the government to the lessees and farmer-
owners of the lands that may be bought after expropriation from owners. It is the
government here that is the lender. The government should not exact a higher
interest than what we are telling a private landowner now in his relation to his
tenants if we give to their farmers a higher rate of interest . . . ." (pp. 17 & 18, Senate
Journal No. 16, July 3, 1963)
The reason is obvious, to pinpoint responsibility for many losses in the government,
in order to avoid irresponsible lending of government money — to pinpoint
responsibility for many losses . . . .
Senator Manglapus: ". . . But assuming that hypothesis, that is the reason why we
are appropriating P150,000,000.00 for the Agricultural Credit Administration which
will go to intensified credit operations on the barrio level . . ." (p. 3, Senate Journal
No. 7).
That it is the reason why we are providing for the expansion of the ACCFA and the
weeding out of the cooperative activity of the ACCFA and turning this over to the
Agricultural Productivity Commission, so that the Agricultural Credit
Administration will concentrate entirely on the facilitation of credit on the barrio
level with the massive support of 150 million provided by the government. . . . (pp.
4 & 5 of Senate Journal No. 7, July 3, 1963)
. . . But by releasing them from this situation, we feel that we are putting them in a
much better condition than that in which they are found by providing them with a
business-like way of obtaining credit, not depending on a paternalistic system but
one which is business-like — that is to say, a government office, which on the barrio
level will provide them that credit directly . . . . (p. 40, Senate Journal No. 7, July 3,
1963) (emphasis supplied).
The considerations set forth above militate quite strongly against the recognition
of collective bargaining powers in the respondent Unions within the context of
Republic Act No. 875, and hence against the grant of their basic petition for
certification election as proper bargaining units. The ACA is a government office or
agency engaged in governmental, not proprietary functions. These functions may
not be strictly what President Wilson described as "constituent" (as distinguished
from "ministrant"),4 such as those relating to the maintenance of peace and the
prevention of crime, those regulating property and property rights, those relating
to the administration of justice and the determination of political duties of citizens,
and those relating to national defense and foreign relations. Under this traditional
classification, such constituent functions are exercised by the State as attributes of
sovereignty, and not merely to promote the welfare, progress and prosperity of
the people — these letter functions being ministrant he exercise of which is
optional on the part of the government.
The growing complexities of modern society, however, have rendered this
traditional classification of the functions of government quite unrealistic, not to say
obsolete. The areas which used to be left to private enterprise and initiative and
which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only "because it
was better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private
individual or group of individuals,"5 continue to lose their well-defined boundaries
and to be absorbed within activities that the government must undertake in its
sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times. Here
as almost everywhere else the tendency is undoubtedly towards a greater
socialization of economic forces. Here of course this development was envisioned,
indeed adopted as a national policy, by the Constitution itself in its declaration of
principle concerning the promotion of social justice.
It was in furtherance of such policy that the Land Reform Code was enacted and
the various agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes.
There can be no dispute as to the fact that the land reform program contemplated
in the said Code is beyond the capabilities of any private enterprise to translate
into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, say, the establishment
and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. And when, aside from the
governmental objectives of the ACA, geared as they are to the implementation of
the land reform program of the State, the law itself declares that the ACA is a
government office, with the formulation of policies, plans and programs vested no
longer in a Board of Governors, as in the case of the ACCFA, but in the National
Land Reform Council, itself a government instrumentality; and that its personnel
are subject to Civil Service laws and to rules of standardization with respect to
positions and salaries, any vestige of doubt as to the governmental character of its
functions disappears.
In view of the foregoing premises, we hold that the respondent Unions are not
entitled to the certification election sought in the Court below. Such certification is
admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of the employees with respect to
terms and conditions of employment, including the right to strike as a coercive
economic weapon, as in fact the said unions did strike in 1962 against the ACCFA
(G.R. No. L-21824).6 This is contrary to Section 11 of Republic Act No. 875, which
provides:
SEC. 11. Prohibition Against Strike in the Government — The terms and conditions
of employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof, are governed by law and it is declared to be the policy of
this Act that employees therein shall not strike for the purposes of securing
changes or modification in their terms and conditions of employment. Such
employees may belong to any labor organization which does not impose the
obligation to strike or to join in strike: Provided, However, that this section shall
apply only to employees employed in governmental functions of the Government
including but not limited to governmental corporations.7
With the reorganization of the ACCFA and its conversion into the ACA under the
Land Reform Code and in view of our ruling as to the governmental character of
the functions of the ACA, the decision of the respondent Court dated March 25,
1963, and the resolution en banc affirming it, in the unfair labor practice case filed
by the ACCFA, which decision is the subject of the present review in G. R. No. L-
21484, has become moot and academic, particularly insofar as the order to bargain
collectively with the respondent Unions is concerned.
What remains to be resolved is the question of fringe benefits provided for in the
collective bargaining contract of September 4, 1961. The position of the ACCFA in
this regard is that the said fringe benefits have not become enforceable because
the condition that they should first be approved by the Office of the President has
not been complied with. The Unions, on the other hand, contend that no such
condition existed in the bargaining contract, and the respondent Court upheld this
contention in its decision.
It is to be listed that under Section 3, Article XIV, of the agreement, the same "shall
not become effective unless and until the same is duly ratified by the Board of
Governors of the Administration." Such approval was given even before the formal
execution of the agreement, by virtue of "Resolution No. 67, Regular Meeting No.
7, FY 1960-61, held on August 17, 1961," but with the proviso that "the fringe
benefits contained therein shall take effect only if approved by the office of the
President." The condition is, therefore, deemed to be incorporated into the
agreement by reference.
On October 23, 1962 the Office of the President, in a letter signed by the Executive
Secretary, expressed its approval of the bargaining contract "provided the salaries
and benefits therein fixed are not in conflict with applicable laws and regulations,
are believed to be reasonable considering the exigencies of the service and the
welfare of the employees, and are well within the financial ability of the particular
corporation to bear."
On July 1, 1963 the ACCFA management and the Unions entered into an
agreement for the implementation of the decision of the respondent Court
concerning the fringe benefits, thus:
In the meantime, only Cost of Living Adjustment, Longevity Pay, and Night
Differential Benefits accruing from July 1, 1961 to June 30, 1963 shall be paid to all
employees entitled thereto, in the following manner:
The decisions and orders appealed from are set aside and/or modified in
accordance with the foregoing pronouncements. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Sanchez, Castro, Teehankee and Barredo,
JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., concurs in the result.

A) The sum of P180,000 shall be set aside for the payment of:

1) Night differential benefits for Security Guards.

2) Cost of Living Adjustment and Longevity Pay.

3) The unpaid balance due employees on Item A (1) and (2) this paragraph shall be
paid in monthly installments as finances permit but not beyond December 20,
1963.

3. All benefits accruing after July 1, 1963, shall be allowed to accumulate but
payable only after all benefits accruing up to June 30, 1963, as per CIR decision
hereinabove referred to shall have been settled in full; provided, however, that
commencing July 1, 1963 and for a period of only two (2) months thereafter (during
which period the ACCFA and the Unions shall negotiate a new Collective
Bargaining Agreement) the provisions of the September 4, 1961 Collective
Bargaining Agreement shall be temporarily suspended, except as to Cost of Living
Adjustment and "political" or non-economic privileges and benefits thereunder.

On July 24, 1963 the ACCFA Board of Governors ratified the agreement thus
entered into, pursuant to the provision thereof requiring such ratification, but with
the express qualification that the same was "without prejudice to the pending
appeal in the Supreme Court . . . in Case No. 3450-ULP." The payment of the fringe
benefits agreed upon, to our mind, shows that the same were within the financial
capability of the ACCFA then, and hence justifies the conclusion that this particular
condition imposed by the Office of the President in its approval of the bargaining
contract was satisfied.

We hold, therefore, that insofar as the fringe benefits already paid are concerned,
there is no reason to set aside the decision of the respondent Court, but that since
the respondent Unions have no right to the certification election sought by them
nor, consequently, to bargain collectively with the petitioner, no further fringe
benefits may be demanded on the basis of any collective bargaining agreement.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-5 September 17, 1945
CO KIM CHAM (alias CO KIM CHAM), petitioner,
vs.
EUSEBIO VALDEZ TAN KEH and ARSENIO P. DIZON, Judge of First Instance of
Manila, respondents.1
Marcelino Lontok for petitioner.
P. A. Revilla for respondent Valdez Tan Keh.
Respondent Judge Dizon in his own behalf.
FERIA, J.:
This petition for mandamus in which petitioner prays that the respondent judge of
the lower court be ordered to continue the proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of
said court, which were initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the
Philippines established during the Japanese military occupation of these Islands.
The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the proceedings
in said case on the ground that the proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by
General Douglas MacArthur had the effect of invalidating and nullifying all judicial
proceedings and judgements of the court of the Philippines under the Philippine
Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines established during the
Japanese military occupation, and that, furthermore, the lower courts have no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue judicial proceedings pending in the
courts of the defunct Republic of the Philippines in the absence of an enabling law
granting such authority. And the same respondent, in his answer and
memorandum filed in this Court, contends that the government established in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation were no de facto governments.
On January 2, 1942, the Imperial Japanese Forces occupied the City of Manila, and
on the next day their Commander in Chief proclaimed "the Military Administration
under law over the districts occupied by the Army." In said proclamation, it was
also provided that "so far as the Military Administration permits, all the laws now
in force in the Commonwealth, as well as executive and judicial institutions, shall
continue to be effective for the time being as in the past," and "all public officials
shall remain in their present posts and carry on faithfully their duties as before."
A civil government or central administration organization under the name of
"Philippine Executive Commission was organized by Order No. 1 issued on January
23, 1942, by the Commander in Chief of the Japanese Forces in the Philippines, and
Jorge B. Vargas, who was appointed Chairman thereof, was instructed to proceed
to the immediate coordination of the existing central administrative organs and
judicial courts, based upon what had existed therefore, with approval of the said
Commander in Chief, who was to exercise jurisdiction over judicial courts.
The Chairman of the Executive Commission, as head of the central administrative
organization, issued Executive Orders Nos. 1 and 4, dated January 30 and February
5, 1942, respectively, in which the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Courts of First
Instance, and the justices of the peace and municipal courts under the
Commonwealth were continued with the same jurisdiction, in conformity with the
instructions given to the said Chairman of the Executive Commission by the
Commander in Chief of Japanese Forces in the Philippines in the latter's Order No.
3 of February 20, 1942, concerning basic principles to be observed by the Philippine
Executive Commission in exercising legislative, executive and judicial powers.
Section 1 of said Order provided that "activities of the administration organs and
judicial courts in the Philippines shall be based upon the existing statutes, orders,
ordinances and customs. . . ."
On October 14, 1943, the so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated,
but no substantial change was effected thereby in the organization and jurisdiction
of the different courts that functioned during the Philippine Executive Commission,
and in the laws they administered and enforced.
On October 23, 1944, a few days after the historic landing in Leyte, General Douglas
MacArthur issued a proclamation to the People of the Philippines which declared:
1. That the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines is, subject to the
supreme authority of the Government of the United States, the sole and only
government having legal and valid jurisdiction over the people in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control;
2. That the laws now existing on the statute books of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines and the regulations promulgated pursuant thereto are in full force and
effect and legally binding upon the people in areas of the Philippines free of enemy
occupation and control; and
3. That all laws, regulations and processes of any other government in the
Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal
effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and control.
On February 3, 1945, the City of Manila was partially liberated and on February 27,
1945, General MacArthur, on behalf of the Government of the United States,
solemnly declared "the full powers and responsibilities under the Constitution
restored to the Commonwealth whose seat is here established as provided by law."
In the light of these facts and events of contemporary history, the principal
questions to be resolved in the present case may be reduced to the following:(1)
Whether the judicial acts and proceedings of the court existing in the Philippines
under the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines
were good and valid and remained so even after the liberation or reoccupation of
the Philippines by the United States and Filipino forces; (2)Whether the
proclamation issued on October 23, 1944, by General Douglas MacArthur,
Commander in Chief of the United States Army, in which he declared "that all laws,
regulations and processes of any of the government in the Philippines than that of
the said Commonwealth are null and void and without legal effect in areas of the
Philippines free of enemy occupation and control," has invalidated all judgements
and judicial acts and proceedings of the said courts; and (3) If the said judicial acts
and proceedings have not been invalidated by said proclamation, whether the
present courts of the Commonwealth, which were the same court existing prior to,
and continued during, the Japanese military occupation of the Philippines, may
continue those proceedings pending in said courts at the time the Philippines were
reoccupied and liberated by the United States and Filipino forces, and the
Commonwealth of the Philippines were reestablished in the Islands.
We shall now proceed to consider the first question, that is, whether or not under
the rules of international law the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts
established in the Philippines under the Philippine Executive Commission and the
Republic of the Philippines were good and valid and remained good and valid even
after the liberation or reoccupation of the Philippines by the United States and
Filipino forces.
1. It is a legal truism in political and international law that all acts and proceedings
of the legislative, executive, and judicial departments of a de facto government are
good and valid. The question to be determined is whether or not the governments
established in these Islands under the names of the Philippine Executive
Commission and Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military
occupation or regime were de facto governments. If they were, the judicial acts and
proceedings of those governments remain good and valid even after the liberation
or reoccupation of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.
There are several kinds of de facto governments. The first, or government de
facto in a proper legal sense, is that government that gets possession and control
of, or usurps, by force or by the voice of the majority, the rightful legal governments
and maintains itself against the will of the latter, such as the government of
England under the Commonwealth, first by Parliament and later by Cromwell as
Protector. The second is that which is established and maintained by military forces
who invade and occupy a territory of the enemy in the course of war, and which is
denominated a government of paramount force, as the cases of Castine, in Maine,
which was reduced to British possession in the war of 1812, and Tampico, Mexico,
occupied during the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States. And the
third is that established as an independent government by the inhabitants of a
country who rise in insurrection against the parent state of such as the government
of the Southern Confederacy in revolt not concerned in the present case with the
first kind, but only with the second and third kinds of de facto governments.
Speaking of government "de facto" of the second kind, the Supreme Court of the
United States, in the case of Thorington vs. Smith (8 Wall., 1), said: "But there is
another description of government, called also by publicists a government de
facto, but which might, perhaps, be more aptly denominated a government of
paramount force. Its distinguishing characteristics are (1), that its existence is
maintained by active military power with the territories, and against the rightful
authority of an established and lawful government; and (2), that while it exists it
necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience
rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, or wrongdoers,
for those acts, though not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual
governments of this sort are established over districts differing greatly in extent
and conditions. They are usually administered directly by military authority, but
they may be administered, also, civil authority, supported more or less directly by
military force. . . . One example of this sort of government is found in the case of
Castine, in Mine, reduced to British possession in the war of 1812 . . . U. S. vs. Rice
(4 Wheaton, 253). A like example is found in the case of Tampico, occupied during
the war with Mexico, by the troops of the United States . . . Fleming vs. Page (9
Howard, 614). These were cases of temporary possessions of territory by lawfull
and regular governments at war with the country of which the territory so
possessed was part."
The powers and duties of de facto governments of this description are regulated
in Section III of the Hague Conventions of 1907, which is a revision of the provisions
of the Hague Conventions of 1899 on the same subject of said Section III provides
"the authority of the legislative power having actually passed into the hands of the
occupant, the latter shall take steps in his power to reestablish and insure, as far as
possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented,
the laws in force in the country."
According to the precepts of the Hague Conventions, as the belligerent occupant
has the right and is burdened with the duty to insure public order and safety during
his military occupation, he possesses all the powers of a de factogovernment, and
he can suspended the old laws and promulgate new ones and make such changes
in the old as he may see fit, but he is enjoined to respect, unless absolutely
prevented by the circumstances prevailing in the occupied territory, the municipal
laws in force in the country, that is, those laws which enforce public order and
regulate social and commercial life of the country. On the other hand, laws of a ordinary tribunals, substantially as they were before the occupation. This
political nature or affecting political relations, such as, among others, the right of enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion.
assembly, the right to bear arms, the freedom of the press, and the right to travel The judges and the other officials connected with the administration of justice may,
freely in the territory occupied, are considered as suspended or in abeyance during if they accept the authority of the United States, continue to administer the
the military occupation. Although the local and civil administration of justice is ordinary law of the land as between man and man under the supervision of the
suspended as a matter of course as soon as a country is militarily occupied, it is American Commander in Chief." (Richardson's Messages and Papers of President,
not usual for the invader to take the whole administration into his own hands. In X, p. 209.)
practice, the local ordinary tribunals are authorized to continue administering
As to "de facto" government of the third kind, the Supreme Court of the United
justice; and judges and other judicial officers are kept in their posts if they accept
States, in the same case of Thorington vs. Smith, supra, recognized the
the authority of the belligerent occupant or are required to continue in their
government set up by the Confederate States as a de factogovernment. In that
positions under the supervision of the military or civil authorities appointed, by the
case, it was held that "the central government established for the insurgent States
Commander in Chief of the occupant. These principles and practice have the
differed from the temporary governments at Castine and Tampico in the
sanction of all publicists who have considered the subject, and have been asserted
circumstance that its authority did no originate in lawful acts of regular war; but it
by the Supreme Court and applied by the President of the United States.
was not, on the account, less actual or less supreme. And we think that it must be
The doctrine upon this subject is thus summed up by Halleck, in his work on classed among the governments of which these are examples. . . .
International Law (Vol. 2, p. 444): "The right of one belligerent to occupy and
In the case of William vs. Bruffy (96 U. S. 176, 192), the Supreme Court of the United
govern the territory of the enemy while in its military possession, is one of the
States, discussing the validity of the acts of the Confederate States, said: "The same
incidents of war, and flows directly from the right to conquer. We, therefore, do
general form of government, the same general laws for the administration of
not look to the Constitution or political institutions of the conqueror, for authority
justice and protection of private rights, which had existed in the States prior to the
to establish a government for the territory of the enemy in his possession, during
rebellion, remained during its continuance and afterwards. As far as the Acts of the
its military occupation, nor for the rules by which the powers of such government
States do not impair or tend to impair the supremacy of the national authority, or
are regulated and limited. Such authority and such rules are derived directly from
the just rights of citizens under the Constitution, they are, in general, to be treated
the laws war, as established by the usage of the of the world, and confirmed by the
as valid and binding. As we said in Horn vs. Lockhart (17 Wall., 570; 21 Law. ed.,
writings of publicists and decisions of courts — in fine, from the law of nations. . . .
657): "The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds of
The municipal laws of a conquered territory, or the laws which regulate private
society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of the laws.
rights, continue in force during military occupation, excepts so far as they are
Order was to be preserved, police regulations maintained, crime prosecuted,
suspended or changed by the acts of conqueror. . . . He, nevertheless, has all the
property protected, contracts enforced, marriages celebrated, estates settled, and
powers of a de facto government, and can at his pleasure either change the
the transfer and descent of property regulated, precisely as in the time of
existing laws or make new ones."
peace. No one, that we are aware of, seriously questions the validity of judicial or
And applying the principles for the exercise of military authority in an occupied legislative Acts in the insurrectionary States touching these and kindered subjects,
territory, which were later embodied in the said Hague Conventions, President where they were not hostile in their purpose or mode of enforcement to the
McKinley, in his executive order to the Secretary of War of May 19,1898, relating authority of the National Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens
to the occupation of the Philippines by United States forces, said in part: "Though under the Constitution'. The same doctrine has been asserted in numerous other
the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately cases."
operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the municipal laws of the
And the same court, in the case of Baldy vs. Hunter (171 U. S., 388, 400), held: "That
conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property and
what occured or was done in respect of such matters under the authority of the
provide for the punishment of crime, are considered as continuing in force, so far
laws of these local de facto governments should not be disregarded or held to be
as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or
invalid merely because those governments were organized in hostility to the Union
superseded by the occupying belligerent; and in practice they are not usually
established by the national Constitution; this, because the existence of war
abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the
between the United States and the Confederate States did not relieve those who
are within the insurrectionary lines from the necessity of civil obedience, nor
destroy the bonds of society nor do away with civil government or the regular
administration of the laws, and because transactions in the ordinary course of civil
society as organized within the enemy's territory although they may have indirectly
or remotely promoted the ends of the de facto or unlawful government organized
to effect a dissolution of the Union, were without blame 'except when proved to
have been entered into with actual intent to further invasion or insurrection:'" and
"That judicial and legislative acts in the respective states composing the so-called
Confederate States should be respected by the courts if they were not hostile in
their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National
Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens under the Constitution."
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission,
which was organized by Order No. 1, issued on January 23, 1942, by the
Commander of the Japanese forces, was a civil government established by the
military forces of occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second
kind. It was not different from the government established by the British in Castine,
Maine, or by the United States in Tampico, Mexico. As Halleck says, "The
government established over an enemy's territory during the military occupation
may exercise all the powers given by the laws of war to the conqueror over the
conquered, and is subject to all restrictions which that code imposes. It is of little
consequence whether such government be called a military or civil government.
Its character is the same and the source of its authority the same. In either case it
is a government imposed by the laws of war, and so far it concerns the inhabitants
of such territory or the rest of the world, those laws alone determine the legality or
illegality of its acts." (Vol. 2, p. 466.) The fact that the Philippine Executive
Commission was a civil and not a military government and was run by Filipinos and
not by Japanese nationals, is of no consequence. In 1806, when Napoleon occupied
the greater part of Prussia, he retained the existing administration under the
general direction of a french official (Langfrey History of Napoleon, 1, IV, 25); and,
in the same way, the Duke of Willington, on invading France, authorized the local
authorities to continue the exercise of their functions, apparently without
appointing an English superior. (Wellington Despatches, XI, 307.). The Germans, on
the other hand, when they invaded France in 1870, appointed their own officials,
at least in Alsace and Lorraine, in every department of administration and of every
rank. (Calvo, pars. 2186-93; Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 505, note 2.)
The so-called Republic of the Philippines, apparently established and organized as
a sovereign state independent from any other government by the Filipino people,
was, in truth and reality, a government established by the belligerent occupant or
the Japanese forces of occupation. It was of the same character as the Philippine
Executive Commission, and the ultimate source of its authority was the same —
the Japanese military authority and government. As General MacArthur stated in
his proclamation of October 23, 1944, a portion of which has been already quoted,
"under enemy duress, a so-called government styled as the 'Republic of the
Philippines' was established on October 14, 1943, based upon neither the free
expression of the people's will nor the sanction of the Government of the United
States." Japan had no legal power to grant independence to the Philippines or
transfer the sovereignty of the United States to, or recognize the latent sovereignty
of, the Filipino people, before its military occupation and possession of the Islands
had matured into an absolute and permanent dominion or sovereignty by a treaty
of peace or other means recognized in the law of nations. For it is a well-established
doctrine in International Law, recognized in Article 45 of the Hauge Conventions
of 1907 (which prohibits compulsion of the population of the occupied territory to
swear allegiance to the hostile power), the belligerent occupation, being essentially
provisional, does not serve to transfer sovereignty over the territory controlled
although the de jure government is during the period of occupancy deprived of
the power to exercise its rights as such. (Thirty Hogshead of Sugar vs. Boyle, 9
Cranch, 191; United States vs. Rice, 4 Wheat., 246; Fleming vs. Page, 9 Howard, 603;
Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S., 345.) The formation of the Republic of the Philippines
was a scheme contrived by Japan to delude the Filipino people into believing in
the apparent magnanimity of the Japanese gesture of transferring or turning over
the rights of government into the hands of Filipinos. It was established under the
mistaken belief that by doing so, Japan would secure the cooperation or at least
the neutrality of the Filipino people in her war against the United States and other
allied nations.
Indeed, even if the Republic of the Philippines had been established by the free will
of the Filipino who, taking advantage of the withdrawal of the American forces
from the Islands, and the occupation thereof by the Japanese forces of invasion,
had organized an independent government under the name with the support and
backing of Japan, such government would have been considered as one
established by the Filipinos in insurrection or rebellion against the parent state or
the Unite States. And as such, it would have been a de facto government similar to
that organized by the confederate states during the war of secession and
recognized as such by the by the Supreme Court of the United States in numerous
cases, notably those of Thorington vs. Smith, Williams vs. Bruffy, and
Badly vs. Hunter, above quoted; and similar to the short-lived government
established by the Filipino insurgents in the Island of Cebu during the Spanish-
American war, recognized as a de facto government by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of McCleod vs. United States (299 U. S., 416). According
to the facts in the last-named case, the Spanish forces evacuated the Island of Cebu
on December 25, 1898, having first appointed a provisional government, and
shortly afterwards, the Filipinos, formerly in insurrection against Spain, took
possession of the Islands and established a republic, governing the Islands until General Douglas MacArthur on October 23, 1944, which declares null and void all
possession thereof was surrendered to the United States on February 22, 1898. And laws, regulations and processes of the governments established in the Philippines
the said Supreme Court held in that case that "such government was of the class during the Japanese occupation, for it would not have been necessary for said
of de facto governments described in I Moore's International Law Digest, S 20, . . . proclamation to abrogate them if they were invalid ab initio.
'called also by publicists a government de facto, but which might, perhaps, be more
2. The second question hinges upon the interpretation of the phrase "processes of
aptly denominated a government of paramount force . . '." That is to say, that the
any other government" as used in the above-quoted proclamation of General
government of a country in possession of belligerent forces in insurrection or
Douglas MacArthur of October 23, 1944 — that is, whether it was the intention of
rebellion against the parent state, rests upon the same principles as that of a
the Commander in Chief of the American Forces to annul and void thereby all
territory occupied by the hostile army of an enemy at regular war with the
judgments and judicial proceedings of the courts established in the Philippines
legitimate power.
during the Japanese military occupation.
The governments by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
The phrase "processes of any other government" is broad and may refer not only
Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de facto governments,
to the judicial processes, but also to administrative or legislative, as well as
it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the courts of justice
constitutional, processes of the Republic of the Philippines or other governmental
of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and
agencies established in the Islands during the Japanese occupation. Taking into
valid, and, by virtue of the well-known principle of postliminy (postliminium) in
consideration the fact that, as above indicated, according to the well-known
international law, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of
principles of international law all judgements and judicial proceedings, which are
the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General
not of a political complexion, of the de facto governments during the Japanese
Douglas MacArthur. According to that well-known principle in international law,
military occupation were good and valid before and remained so after the
the fact that a territory which has been occupied by an enemy comes again into
occupied territory had come again into the power of the titular sovereign, it should
the power of its legitimate government of sovereignty, "does not, except in a very
be presumed that it was not, and could not have been, the intention of General
few cases, wipe out the effects of acts done by an invader, which for one reason or
Douglas MacArthur, in using the phrase "processes of any other government" in
another it is within his competence to do. Thus judicial acts done under his control,
said proclamation, to refer to judicial processes, in violation of said principles of
when they are not of a political complexion, administrative acts so done, to the
international law. The only reasonable construction of the said phrase is that it
extent that they take effect during the continuance of his control, and the various
refers to governmental processes other than judicial processes of court
acts done during the same time by private persons under the sanction of municipal
proceedings, for according to a well-known rule of statutory construction, set forth
law, remain good. Were it otherwise, the whole social life of a community would
in 25 R. C. L., p. 1028, "a statute ought never to be construed to violate the law of
be paralyzed by an invasion; and as between the state and the individuals the evil
nations if any other possible construction remains."
would be scarcely less, — it would be hard for example that payment of taxes made
under duress should be ignored, and it would be contrary to the general interest It is true that the commanding general of a belligerent army of occupation, as an
that the sentences passed upon criminals should be annulled by the disappearance agent of his government, may not unlawfully suspend existing laws and
of the intrusive government ." (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 518.) And when promulgate new ones in the occupied territory, if and when the exigencies of the
the occupation and the abandonment have been each an incident of the same war military occupation demand such action. But even assuming that, under the law of
as in the present case, postliminy applies, even though the occupant has acted as nations, the legislative power of a commander in chief of military forces who
conqueror and for the time substituted his own sovereignty as the Japanese liberates or reoccupies his own territory which has been occupied by an enemy,
intended to do apparently in granting independence to the Philippines and during the military and before the restoration of the civil regime, is as broad as that
establishing the so-called Republic of the Philippines. (Taylor, International Law, p. of the commander in chief of the military forces of invasion and occupation
615.) (although the exigencies of military reoccupation are evidently less than those of
occupation), it is to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who was acting
That not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto governments, which are
as an agent or a representative of the Government and the President of the United
not of a political complexion, are and remain valid after reoccupation of a territory
States, constitutional commander in chief of the United States Army, did not intend
occupied by a belligerent occupant, is confirmed by the Proclamation issued by
to act against the principles of the law of nations asserted by the Supreme Court
of the United States from the early period of its existence, applied by the Presidents
of the United States, and later embodied in the Hague Conventions of 1907, as
above indicated. It is not to be presumed that General Douglas MacArthur, who
enjoined in the same proclamation of October 23, 1944, "upon the loyal citizens of
the Philippines full respect and obedience to the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines," should not only reverse the international policy
and practice of his own government, but also disregard in the same breath the
provisions of section 3, Article II, of our Constitution, which provides that "The
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the Nation."
Moreover, from a contrary construction great inconvenience and public hardship
would result, and great public interests would be endangered and sacrificed, for
disputes or suits already adjudged would have to be again settled accrued or
vested rights nullified, sentences passed on criminals set aside, and criminals might
easily become immune for evidence against them may have already disappeared
or be no longer available, especially now that almost all court records in the
Philippines have been destroyed by fire as a consequence of the war. And it is
another well-established rule of statutory construction that where great
inconvenience will result from a particular construction, or great public interests
would be endangered or sacrificed, or great mischief done, such construction is to
be avoided, or the court ought to presume that such construction was not intended
by the makers of the law, unless required by clear and unequivocal words. (25 R. C.
L., pp. 1025, 1027.)
The mere conception or thought of possibility that the titular sovereign or his
representatives who reoccupies a territory occupied by an enemy, may set aside or
annul all the judicial acts or proceedings of the tribunals which the belligerent
occupant had the right and duty to establish in order to insure public order and
safety during military occupation, would be sufficient to paralyze the social life of
the country or occupied territory, for it would have to be expected that litigants
would not willingly submit their litigation to courts whose judgements or decisions
may afterwards be annulled, and criminals would not be deterred from committing
crimes or offenses in the expectancy that they may escaped the penalty if
judgments rendered against them may be afterwards set aside.
That the proclamation has not invalidated all the judgements and proceedings of
the courts of justice during the Japanese regime, is impliedly confirmed by
Executive Order No. 37, which has the force of law, issued by the President of the
Philippines on March 10, 1945, by virtue of the emergency legislative power vested
in him by the Constitution and the laws of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
Said Executive order abolished the Court of Appeals, and provided "that all case
which have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of Appeals shall be
transmitted to the Supreme Court final decision." This provision impliedly
recognizes that the judgments and proceedings of the courts during the Japanese
military occupation have not been invalidated by the proclamation of General
MacArthur of October 23, because the said Order does not say or refer to cases
which have been duly appealed to said court prior to the Japanese occupation, but
to cases which had therefore, that is, up to March 10, 1945, been duly appealed to
the Court of Appeals; and it is to be presumed that almost all, if not all, appealed
cases pending in the Court of Appeals prior to the Japanese military occupation of
Manila on January 2, 1942, had been disposed of by the latter before the
restoration of the Commonwealth Government in 1945; while almost all, if not all,
appealed cases pending on March 10, 1945, in the Court of Appeals were from
judgments rendered by the Court of First Instance during the Japanese regime.
The respondent judge quotes a portion of Wheaton's International Law which say:
"Moreover when it is said that an occupier's acts are valid and under international
law should not be abrogated by the subsequent conqueror, it must be
remembered that no crucial instances exist to show that if his acts should be
reversed, any international wrong would be committed. What does happen is that
most matters are allowed to stand by the restored government, but the matter can
hardly be put further than this." (Wheaton, International Law, War, 7th English
edition of 1944, p. 245.) And from this quotion the respondent judge "draws the
conclusion that whether the acts of the occupant should be considered valid or
not, is a question that is up to the restored government to decide; that there is no
rule of international law that denies to the restored government to decide; that
there is no rule of international law that denies to the restored government the
right of exercise its discretion on the matter, imposing upon it in its stead the
obligation of recognizing and enforcing the acts of the overthrown government."
There is doubt that the subsequent conqueror has the right to abrogate most of
the acts of the occupier, such as the laws, regulations and processes other than
judicial of the government established by the belligerent occupant. But in view of
the fact that the proclamation uses the words "processes of any other government"
and not "judicial processes" prisely, it is not necessary to determine whether or not
General Douglas MacArthur had power to annul and set aside all judgments and
proceedings of the courts during the Japanese occupation. The question to be
determined is whether or not it was his intention, as representative of the President
of the United States, to avoid or nullify them. If the proclamation had, expressly or
by necessary implication, declared null and void the judicial processes of any other
government, it would be necessary for this court to decide in the present case
whether or not General Douglas MacArthur had authority to declare them null and
void. But the proclamation did not so provide, undoubtedly because the author
thereof was fully aware of the limitations of his powers as Commander in Chief of July 19, 1867. They give very large governmental powers to the military
Military Forces of liberation or subsequent conqueror. commanders designated, within the States committed respectively to their
jurisdiction; but we have found nothing to warrant the order here in question. . . .
Not only the Hague Regulations, but also the principles of international law, as they
The clearest language would be necessary to satisfy us that Congress intended that
result from the usages established between civilized nations, the laws of humanity
the power given by these acts should be so exercised. . . . It was an arbitrary stretch
and the requirements of the public of conscience, constitute or from the law of
of authority, needful to no good end that can be imagined. Whether Congress
nations. (Preamble of the Hague Conventions; Westlake, International Law, 2d ed.,
could have conferred the power to do such an act is a question we are not called
Part II, p. 61.) Article 43, section III, of the Hague Regulations or Conventions which
upon to consider. It is an unbending rule of law that the exercise of military power,
we have already quoted in discussing the first question, imposes upon the
where the rights of the citizen are concerned, shall never be pushed beyond what
occupant the obligation to establish courts; and Article 23 (h), section II, of the
the exigency requires. (Mithell vs. Harmony, 13 How., 115; Warden vs. Bailey, 4
same Conventions, which prohibits the belligerent occupant "to declare . . .
Taunt., 67; Fabrigas vs. Moysten, 1 Cowp., 161; s.c., 1 Smith's L.C., pt. 2, p. 934.)
suspended . . . in a Court of Law the rights and action of the nationals of the hostile
Viewing the subject before us from the standpoint indicated, we hold that the order
party," forbids him to make any declaration preventing the inhabitants from using
was void."
their courts to assert or enforce their civil rights. (Decision of the Court of Appeals
of England in the case of Porter vs. Fruedenburg, L.R. [1915], 1 K.B., 857.) If a It is, therefore, evident that the proclamation of General MacArthur of October 23,
belligerent occupant is required to establish courts of justice in the territory 1944, which declared that "all laws, regulations and processes of any other
occupied, and forbidden to prevent the nationals thereof from asserting or government in the Philippines than that of the said Commonwealth are null and
enforcing therein their civil rights, by necessary implication, the military void without legal effect in areas of the Philippines free of enemy occupation and
commander of the forces of liberation or the restored government is restrained control," has not invalidated the judicial acts and proceedings, which are not a
from nullifying or setting aside the judgments rendered by said courts in their political complexion, of the courts of justice in the Philippines that were continued
litigation during the period of occupation. Otherwise, the purpose of these by the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines during
precepts of the Hague Conventions would be thwarted, for to declare them null the Japanese military occupation, and that said judicial acts and proceedings were
and void would be tantamount to suspending in said courts the right and action good and valid before and now good and valid after the reoccupation of liberation
of the nationals of the territory during the military occupation thereof by the of the Philippines by the American and Filipino forces.
enemy. It goes without saying that a law that enjoins a person to do something
3. The third and last question is whether or not the courts of the Commonwealth,
will not at the same time empower another to undo the same. Although the
which are the same as those existing prior to, and continued during, the Japanese
question whether the President or commanding officer of the United States Army
military occupation by the Philippine Executive Commission and by the so-called
has violated restraints imposed by the constitution and laws of his country is
Republic of the Philippines, have jurisdiction to continue now the proceedings in
obviously of a domestic nature, yet, in construing and applying limitations imposed
actions pending in said courts at the time the Philippine Islands were reoccupied
on the executive authority, the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of
or liberated by the American and Filipino forces, and the Commonwealth
Ochoa, vs. Hernandez (230 U.S., 139), has declared that they "arise from general
Government was restored.
rules of international law and from fundamental principles known wherever the
American flag flies." Although in theory the authority the authority of the local civil and judicial
administration is suspended as a matter of course as soon as military occupation
In the case of Raymond vs. Thomas (91 U.S., 712), a special order issued by the
takes place, in practice the invader does not usually take the administration of
officer in command of the forces of the United States in South Carolina after the
justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary courts or tribunals to
end of the Civil War, wholly annulling a decree rendered by a court of chancery in
administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless absolutely
that state in a case within its jurisdiction, was declared void, and not warranted by
prevented, to respect. As stated in the above-quoted Executive Order of President
the acts approved respectively March 2, 1867 (14 Stat., 428), and July 19 of the
McKinley to the Secretary of War on May 19, 1898, "in practice, they (the municipal
same year (15 id., 14), which defined the powers and duties of military officers in
laws) are not usually abrogated but are allowed to remain in force and to be
command of the several states then lately in rebellion. In the course of its decision
administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as they were before the
the court said; "We have looked carefully through the acts of March 2, 1867 and
occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be adhered to on the
present occasion." And Taylor in this connection says: "From a theoretical point of
view it may be said that the conqueror is armed with the right to substitute his
arbitrary will for all preexisting forms of government, legislative, executive and
judicial. From the stand-point of actual practice such arbitrary will is restrained by
the provision of the law of nations which compels the conqueror to continue local
laws and institution so far as military necessity will permit." (Taylor, International
Public Law, p.596.) Undoubtedly, this practice has been adopted in order that the
ordinary pursuits and business of society may not be unnecessarily deranged,
inasmuch as belligerent occupation is essentially provisional, and the government
established by the occupant of transient character.
Following these practice and precepts of the law of nations, Commander in Chief
of the Japanese Forces proclaimed on January 3, 1942, when Manila was occupied,
the military administration under martial law over the territory occupied by the
army, and ordered that "all the laws now in force in the Commonwealth, as well as
executive and judicial institutions, shall continue to be affective for the time being
as in the past," and "all public officials shall remain in their present post and carry
on faithfully their duties as before." When the Philippine Executive Commission was
organized by Order No. 1 of the Japanese Commander in Chief, on January 23,
1942, the Chairman of the Executive Commission, by Executive Orders Nos. 1 and
4 of January 30 and February 5, respectively, continued the Supreme Court, Court
of Appeals, Court of First Instance, and justices of the peace of courts, with the
same jurisdiction in conformity with the instructions given by the Commander in
Chief of the Imperial Japanese Army in Order No. 3 of February 20, 1942. And on
October 14, 1943 when the so-called Republic of the Philippines was inaugurated,
the same courts were continued with no substantial change in organization and
jurisdiction thereof.
If the proceedings pending in the different courts of the Islands prior to the
Japanese military occupation had been continued during the Japanese military
administration, the Philippine Executive Commission, and the so-called Republic of
the Philippines, it stands to reason that the same courts, which had become
reestablished and conceived of as having in continued existence upon the
reoccupation and liberation of the Philippines by virtue of the principle of
postliminy (Hall, International Law, 7th ed., p. 516), may continue the proceedings
in cases then pending in said courts, without necessity of enacting a law conferring
jurisdiction upon them to continue said proceedings. As Taylor graphically points
out in speaking of said principles "a state or other governmental entity, upon the
removal of a foreign military force, resumes its old place with its right and duties
substantially unimpaired. . . . Such political resurrection is the result of a law
analogous to that which enables elastic bodies to regain their original shape upon
removal of the external force, — and subject to the same exception in case of
absolute crushing of the whole fibre and content." (Taylor, International Public Law,
p. 615.)
The argument advanced by the respondent judge in his resolution in support in his
conclusion that the Court of First Instance of Manila presided over by him "has no
authority to take cognizance of, and continue said proceedings (of this case) to
final judgment until and unless the Government of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines . . . shall have provided for the transfer of the jurisdiction of the courts
of the now defunct Republic of the Philippines, and the cases commenced and the
left pending therein," is "that said courts were a government alien to the
Commonwealth Government. The laws they enforced were, true enough, laws of
the Commonwealth prior to Japanese occupation, but they had become the laws
— and the courts had become the institutions — of Japan by adoption
(U.S. vs.Reiter. 27 F. Cases, No. 16146), as they became later on the laws and
institutions of the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the
Philippines."
The court in the said case of U.S. vs. Reiter did not and could not say that the laws
and institutions of the country occupied if continued by the conqueror or occupant,
become the laws and the courts, by adoption, of the sovereign nation that is
militarily occupying the territory. Because, as already shown, belligerent or military
occupation is essentially provisional and does not serve to transfer the sovereignty
over the occupied territory to the occupant. What the court said was that, if such
laws and institutions are continued in use by the occupant, they become his and
derive their force from him, in the sense that he may continue or set them aside.
The laws and institution or courts so continued remain the laws and institutions or
courts of the occupied territory. The laws and the courts of the Philippines,
therefore, did not become, by being continued as required by the law of nations,
laws and courts of Japan. The provision of Article 45, section III, of the Hague
Conventions of 1907 which prohibits any compulsion of the population of
occupied territory to swear allegiance to the hostile power, "extends to prohibit
everything which would assert or imply a change made by the invader in the
legitimate sovereignty. This duty is neither to innovate in the political life of the
occupied districts, nor needlessly to break the continuity of their legal life. Hence,
so far as the courts of justice are allowed to continue administering the territorial
laws, they must be allowed to give their sentences in the name of the legitimate
sovereign " (Westlake, Int. Law, Part II, second ed., p. 102). According to Wheaton,
however, the victor need not allow the use of that of the legitimate government.
When in 1870, the Germans in France attempted to violate that rule by ordering,
after the fall of the Emperor Napoleon, the courts of Nancy to administer justice in
the name of the "High German Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine," upon the
ground that the exercise of their powers in the name of French people and
government was at least an implied recognition of the Republic, the courts refused
to obey and suspended their sitting. Germany originally ordered the use of the
name of "High German Powers occupying Alsace and Lorraine," but later offered
to allow use of the name of the Emperor or a compromise. (Wheaton, International
Law, War, 7th English ed. 1944, p. 244.)
Furthermore, it is a legal maxim, that excepting that of a political nature, "Law once
established continues until changed by the some competent legislative power. It is
not change merely by change of sovereignty." (Joseph H. Beale, Cases on Conflict
of Laws, III, Summary Section 9, citing Commonwealth vs. Chapman, 13 Met., 68.)
As the same author says, in his Treatise on the Conflict on Laws (Cambridge, 1916,
Section 131): "There can no break or interregnum in law. From the time the law
comes into existence with the first-felt corporateness of a primitive people it must
last until the final disappearance of human society. Once created, it persists until a
change take place, and when changed it continues in such changed condition until
the next change, and so forever. Conquest or colonization is impotent to bring law
to an end; in spite of change of constitution, the law continues unchanged until
the new sovereign by legislative acts creates a change."
As courts are creatures of statutes and their existence defends upon that of the
laws which create and confer upon them their jurisdiction, it is evident that such
laws, not being a political nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty,
and continue in force "ex proprio vigore" unless and until repealed by legislative
acts. A proclamation that said laws and courts are expressly continued is not
necessary in order that they may continue in force. Such proclamation, if made, is
but a declaration of the intention of respecting and not repealing those laws.
Therefore, even assuming that Japan had legally acquired sovereignty over these
Islands, which she had afterwards transferred to the so-called Republic of the
Philippines, and that the laws and the courts of these Islands had become the
courts of Japan, as the said courts of the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction
upon them have continued in force until now, it necessarily follows that the same
courts may continue exercising the same jurisdiction over cases pending therein
before the restoration of the Commonwealth Government, unless and until they
are abolished or the laws creating and conferring jurisdiction upon them are
repealed by the said government. As a consequence, enabling laws or acts
providing that proceedings pending in one court be continued by or transferred
to another court, are not required by the mere change of government or
sovereignty. They are necessary only in case the former courts are abolished or
their jurisdiction so change that they can no longer continue taking cognizance of
the cases and proceedings commenced therein, in order that the new courts or the
courts having jurisdiction over said cases may continue the proceedings. When the
Spanish sovereignty in the Philippine Islands ceased and the Islands came into the
possession of the United States, the "Audiencia" or Supreme Court was continued
and did not cease to exist, and proceeded to take cognizance of the actions
pending therein upon the cessation of the Spanish sovereignty until the said
"Audiencia" or Supreme Court was abolished, and the Supreme Court created in
Chapter II of Act No. 136 was substituted in lieu thereof. And the Courts of First
Instance of the Islands during the Spanish regime continued taking cognizance of
cases pending therein upon the change of sovereignty, until section 65 of the same
Act No. 136 abolished them and created in its Chapter IV the present Courts of
First Instance in substitution of the former. Similarly, no enabling acts were enacted
during the Japanese occupation, but a mere proclamation or order that the courts
in the Island were continued.
On the other hand, during the American regime, when section 78 of Act No. 136
was enacted abolishing the civil jurisdiction of the provost courts created by the
military government of occupation in the Philippines during the Spanish-American
War of 1898, the same section 78 provided for the transfer of all civil actions then
pending in the provost courts to the proper tribunals, that is, to the justices of the
peace courts, Court of First Instance, or Supreme Court having jurisdiction over
them according to law. And later on, when the criminal jurisdiction of provost
courts in the City of Manila was abolished by section 3 of Act No. 186, the same
section provided that criminal cases pending therein within the jurisdiction of the
municipal court created by Act No. 183 were transferred to the latter.
That the present courts as the same courts which had been functioning during the
Japanese regime and, therefore, can continue the proceedings in cases pending
therein prior to the restoration of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, is
confirmed by Executive Order No. 37 which we have already quoted in support of
our conclusion in connection with the second question. Said Executive Order
provides"(1) that the Court of Appeals created and established under
Commonwealth Act No. 3 as amended, be abolished, as it is hereby abolished,"
and "(2) that all cases which have heretofore been duly appealed to the Court of
Appeals shall be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final decision. . . ." In so
providing, the said Order considers that the Court of Appeals abolished was the
same that existed prior to, and continued after, the restoration of the
Commonwealth Government; for, as we have stated in discussing the previous
question, almost all, if not all, of the cases pending therein, or which had
theretofore (that is, up to March 10, 1945) been duly appealed to said court, must
have been cases coming from the Courts of First Instance during the so-called
Republic of the Philippines. If the Court of Appeals abolished by the said Executive
Order was not the same one which had been functioning during the Republic, but
that which had existed up to the time of the Japanese occupation, it would have
provided that all the cases which had, prior to and up to that occupation on January
2, 1942, been dully appealed to the said Court of Appeals shall be transmitted to
the Supreme Court for final decision.

It is, therefore, obvious that the present courts have jurisdiction to continue, to final
judgment, the proceedings in cases, not of political complexion, pending therein
at the time of the restoration of the Commonwealth Government.

Having arrived at the above conclusions, it follows that the Court of First Instance
of Manila has jurisdiction to continue to final judgment the proceedings in civil
case No. 3012, which involves civil rights of the parties under the laws of the
Commonwealth Government, pending in said court at the time of the restoration
of the said Government; and that the respondent judge of the court, having refused
to act and continue him does a duty resulting from his office as presiding judge of
that court, mandamus is the speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, especially taking into consideration the fact that the question of jurisdiction
herein involved does affect not only this particular case, but many other cases now
pending in all the courts of these Islands.

In view of all the foregoing it is adjudged and decreed that a writ

of mandamus issue, directed to the respondent judge of the Court of First Instance
of Manila, ordering him to take cognizance of and continue to final judgment the
proceedings in civil case No. 3012 of said court. No pronouncement as to costs. So
ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla and Pablo, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[A.M. No. 90-11-2697-CA. June 29, 1992.]
LETTER OF ASSOCIATE JUSTICE REYNATO S. PUNO of the Court of Appeals dated
14 November 1990.
R E S O L U T I O N
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, a member of the Court of Appeals,
wrote a letter dated 14 November 1990 addressed to this Court, seeking the
correction of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals.
It appears from the records that petitioner was first appointed Associate Justice of
the Court of Appeals on 20 June 1980 but took his oath of office for said position
only on 29 November 1982, after serving as Assistant Solicitor General in the Office
of the Solicitor General since 1974. 1 service in the Court shall, for all intents and purpose be considered as continuous
On 17 January 1983, the Court of Appeals was reorganized and became the
Intermediate Appellate Court pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 entitled "An
Act Reorganizing the Judiciary. Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other
Purposes." 2 Petitioner was appointed Appellate Justice in the First Special Cases
Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court. On 7 November 1984, petitioner
accepted an appointment to be ceased to be a member of the Judiciary. 3
The aftermath of the EDSA Revolution in February 1986 brought about a
reorganization of the entire government, including the Judiciary. To effect the
reorganization of the Intermediate Appellate Court and other lower courts, a
Screening Committee was created, with the then Minister of Justice, now Senator
Neptali Gonzales as Chairman and then Solicitor General, now Philippine
Ambassador to the United Nations Sedfrey Ordoñez as Vice Chairman. President
Corazon C. Aquino, exercising legislative powers by virtue of the revolution, issued
Executive Order No. 33 to govern the aforementioned reorganization of the
Judiciary. 4 In a resolution of the Court en banc dated 29 November 1990, the Court granted
The Screening Committee recommended the return of petitioner as Associate
Justice of the new Court of Appeals and assigned him the rank of number eleven
(11) in the roster of appellate court justices. When the appointments were signed
by President Aquino on 28 July 1986, petitioner’s seniority ranking changed,
however, from number eleven (11) to number twenty six (26). 5
Petitioner now alleges that the change in his seniority ranking could only be
attributed to inadvertence for, otherwise, it would run counter to the provisions of
Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33, which reads:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"SECTION 2. Section 3, Chapter 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, is hereby amended
to read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 2. Organization. — There is hereby created a Court of Appeals which shall
consist of a Presiding Justice and fifty Associate Justices who shall be appointed by
the President of the Philippines. The Presiding Justice shall be so designated in his
appointment and the Associate Justice shall have precedence according to the
dates of their respective appointments, or when the appointments of two or more
shall bear the same date, according to the order in which their appointments were
issued by the President. Any Member who is reappointed to the Court after
rendering service in any other position in the government shall retain the
precedence to which he was entitled under his original appointment, and his
and uninterrupted." 6
Petitioner elaborates that President Aquino is presumed to have intended to
comply with her own Executive Order No. 33 so much so that the correction of the
inadvertent error would only implement the intent of the President as well as the
spirit of Executive Order No. 33 and will not provoke any kind of constitutional
confrontation (between the President and the Supreme Court). 7
Petitioner points to the case of Justice Oscar Victoriano, former Presiding Justice
of the Court of Appeals who, according to petitioner, was transferred from his
position as Justice of the Court of Appeals to the Ministry of Justice as
Commissioner of Land Registration and in 1986 was reappointed to the Court of
Appeals. Petitioner states that his (Victoriano’s) stint in the Commission of Land
Registration did not adversely affect his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals,
for, in his case, Executive Order No. 33 was correctly applied. 8
Justice Puno’s request. 9 It will be noted that before the issuance of said resolution,
there was no written opposition to, or comment on petitioner’s aforesaid request.
The dispositive portion of the resolution reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno for
correction of his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals is granted. The presiding
Justice of the Court of Appeals, the Honorable Rodolfo A. Nocon, is hereby directed
to correct the seniority rank of Justice Puno from number twelve (12) to number
five (5). Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Court Administrator and the
Judicial and Bar Council for their guidance and information." 10
A motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the Court en banc dated 29
November 1990 was later filed by Associate Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Luis
A. Javellana, two (2) of the Associate Justices affected by the ordered correction.
They contend that the present Court of Appeals is a new Court with fifty one (51)
members and that petitioner could not claim a reappointment to a prior court;
neither can he claim that he was returning to his former court, for the courts where
he had previously been appointed ceased to exist at the date of his last
appointment. 11
The Court en banc in a resolution dated 17 January 1992 required the petitioner to
file his comment on the motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated 29
November 1990.
In his Comment, petitioner argues that, by virtue of Executive Order No. 33 read in
relation to B.P. Blg. 129, his seniority ranking in the Court of Appeals is now number
five (5) for, though President Aquino rose to power by virtue of a revolution, she
had pledged at the issuance of Proclamation No. 3 (otherwise known as the
Freedom Constitution) that "no right provided under the unratified 1973
Constitution (shall) be absent in the Freedom Constitution." 12
Moreover, since the last sentence of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33 virtually
re-enacted the last sentence of Sec. 3, Chapter 1 of B.P. Blg. 129, statutory
construction rules on simultaneous repeal and re-enactment mandate, according
to petitioner, the preservation and enforcement of all rights and liabilities which
had accrued under the original statute. 13 Furthermore, petitioner avers that,
although the power of appointment is executive in character and cannot be
usurped by any other branch of the Government, such power can still be regulated
by the Constitution and by the appropriate law, in this case, by the limits set by
Executive Order NO. 33 14 for the power of appointment cannot be wielded in
violation of law. 15
Justices Javellana and Campos were required by the Court to file their reply to
Justice Puno’s comment on their motion for reconsideration of the resolution of
the Court en banc dated 24 January 1991.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In their Reply and Supplemental Reply, Associate Justices Javellana and Campos
submit that the appeal or request for correction filed by the petitioner was
addressed to the wrong party. They aver that as petitioner himself had alleged the
mistake to be an "inadvertent error" of the Office of the President, ergo, he should
have filed his request for correction also with said Office of the President and not
directly with the Supreme Court. 16 Furthermore, they point out that petitioner had
indeed filed with the Office of the President a request or petition for correction of
his ranking, (seniority) but the same was not approved such that his recourse
should have been an appropriate action before the proper court and impleading
all parties concerned. The aforesaid non-approval by the Office of the President
they argue, should be respected by the Supreme Court "not only on the basis of
the doctrine of separation of powers but also their presumed knowledge ability
and even expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce" 17 for it (the non-
approval) is a confirmation that petitioner’s seniority ranking at the time of his
appointment by President Aquino was, in fact, deliberate and not an "inadvertent
error" as petitioner would have the Court believe. 18
The resolution of this controversy is not a pleasant task for the Court since it
involves not only members of the next highest court of the land but persons who
are close to members of this Court. But the controversy has to be resolved. The
core issue in this case is whether the present Court of Appeals is a new court such
that it would negate any claim to precedence or seniority admittedly enjoyed by
petitioner in the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior
to Executive Order No. 33 or whether the present Court of Appeals is merely a
continuation of the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing
prior to said Executive Order No. 33.
It is the holding of the Court that the present Court of Appeals is a new entity,
different and distinct from the Court of Appeals or the Intermediate Appellate
Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33, for it was created in the wake of the
massive reorganization launched by the revolutionary government of Corazon C.
Aquino in the aftermath of the people power (EDSA) revolution in 1986.
A resolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the established
government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it" 19
or as "a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political
system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence." 20 In
Kelsen’s book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which "occurs
whenever the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order
. . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself." 21
It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more be readily determined from a reading of its provisions. Once such organs are
popularly known as the "people power revolution" that the Filipino people tore ascertained, it becomes an easy matter to locate their enactments. The rules in such
themselves away from an existing regime. This revolution also saw the enactments, along with those in the constitution, comprise the legal order of that
unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino government. constitutional state." 29 It is assumed that the legal order remains as a "culture
system" of the polity as long as the latter endures 30 and that a point may be
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as "an reached, however, where the legal system ceases to be operative as a whole for it
inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect is no longer obeyed by the population nor enforced by the officials. 31
radical reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a general
uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of making such change have It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not due to
proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable." 22 It has been said constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of
that "the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state" and the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr.
from there is derived "the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any Marcos at the winner in the 1986 presidential election. 32 Thus it can be said that
existing form of government without regard to the existing constitution." 23 the organization of Mrs. Aquino’s Government which was met by little resistance
and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and
The three (3) clauses that precede the text of the Provisional (Freedom) other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet
Constitution, 24 read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph officials, revampt of the Judiciary and the Military signalled the point where the
legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino.
"WHEREAS, the new government under President Corazon C. Aquino was installed
through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of The Court holds that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court
the New Armed Forces of the Philippines; existing prior to Executive Order No. 33 phased out as part of the legal system
abolished by the revolution and that the Court of Appeals established under
"WHEREAS, the heroic action of the people was done in defiance of the provisions Executive Order No. 33 was an entirely new court with appointments thereto
of the 1973 Constitution, as amended; having no relation to earlier appointments to the abolished courts, and that the
reference to precedence in rank contained in the last sentence of Sec. 2, BP Blg.
"WHEREFORE, I, Corazon C. Aquino, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the No. 129 as amended by Executive Order No. 33 refers to prospective situations as
powers vested in me by the sovereign mandate of the people, do hereby distinguished from retroactive ones.
promulgate the following Provisional Constitution."25cralaw:red
But even assuming, arguendo, that Executive Order No. 33 did not abolish the
These summarize the Aquino government’s position that its mandate is taken from precedence or seniority ranking resulting from previous appointment to the Court
"a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people." 26 of Appeals or Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to the 1986 revolution, it
is believed that President Aquino as head of then revolutionary government, could
Discussions and opinions of legal experts also proclaim that the Aquino disregard or set aside such precedence or seniority in ranking when she made her
government was "revolutionary in the sense that it came into existence in defiance appointments to the reorganized Court of Appeals in 1986.
of the existing legal processes" 27 and that it was a revolutionary government
"instituted by the direct action of the people and in opposition to the authoritarian It is to be noted that, at the time of the issuance of Executive Order No. 33,
values and practices of the overthrown government." 28 President Aquino was still exercising the powers of a revolutionary government,
encompassing both executive and legislative powers, such that she could, if she so
A question which naturally comes to mind is whether the then existing legal order desired, amend, modify or repeal any part of B.P. Blg. 129 or her own Executive
was overthrown by the Aquino government. "A legal order is the authoritative code Order No. 33. It should also be remembered that the same situation was still in
of a polity. Such code consists of all the rules found in the enactments of the organs force when she issued the 1986 appointments to the Court of Appeals. In other
of the polity. Where the state operates under a written constitution, its organs may words, President Aquino, at the time of the issuance of the 1986 appointments,
modified or disregarded the rule embodied in B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by
Executive Order No. 33, on precedence or seniority in the case of the petitioner, for
reasons known only to her. Since the appointment extended by the President to
the petitioner in 1986 for membership in the new Court of Appeals with its implicit
ranking in the roster of justices, was a valid appointment anchored on the
President’s exercise of her then revolutionary powers, it is not for the Court at this
time to question or correct that exercise.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration and the
seniority rankings of members of the Court of Appeals, including that of the
petitioner, at the time the appointments were made by the President in 1986, are
recognized and upheld.

SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 104768. July 21, 2003]
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus
Q. Ramas and Elizabeth Dimaano, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan (First Division)[1] dated 18 November 1991 and
25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037. The first Resolution dismissed petitioners
Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items to
respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in
its Amended Complaint, or in the alternative, for the remand of this case to the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further proceedings allowing petitioner to
complete the presentation of its evidence.
Antecedent Facts
Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA
Revolution, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (EO
No. 1) creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). EO No.
1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power (a) to conduct investigation
as may be necessary in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this
order and the power (h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purpose of this order. Accordingly, the PCGG, through
its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board)
tasked to investigate reports of unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired.[2]
Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged
unexplained wealth of respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (Ramas). On
27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and
recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. The relevant part
of the Resolution reads:
III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:
Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot
located at 15-Yakan St., La Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and
lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of 3,327 square meters.
The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly
at P700,000.00.
The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the
premises of Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of the PC
Command of Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt in the name of CAPT.
EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items could not have been in
the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent
Commanding General of the Philippine Army.
Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the
raiding team was also able to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00
and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.
Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command,
Philippine Army, stationed at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, disclosed that
Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent. That respondent usually goes and
stays and sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay Tengga,
Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and kisses
respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the
residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and
owned by MGen Ramas.
Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible
means of income and is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere
secretary.
Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military
equipment/items seized in her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of
respondent, he being the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. It is also
impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns the P2,870,000.00 and
$50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income.
This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of
respondent. There was an intention to cover the existence of these money because
these are all ill-gotten and unexplained wealth.Were it not for the affidavits of the
members of the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna,
the existence and ownership of these money would have never been known.
The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for valued at P700,000, which was not out of proportion to his salary and other
scrutiny and analysis by the Boards consultant. Although the amount legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash,
of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were not included, still it was disclosed communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house of
that respondent has an unexplained wealth of P104,134. 60. Dimaano.

IV. CONCLUSION: Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her
employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978
In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against
only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies, communications equipment,
respondent for ill-gotten and unexplained wealth in the amount of P2,974,134.00
jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding
and $50,000 US Dollars.
team.
V. RECOMMENDATION:
After termination of the pre-trial,[7] the court set the case for trial on the merits on
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be 9-11 November 1988.
prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing due to its
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known
lack of preparation for trial and the absence of witnesses and vital documents to
as The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property.[3]
support its case. The court reset the hearing to 17 and 18 April 1989.
Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act
On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in
No. 1379 (RA No. 1379) [4] against Ramas.
order to charge the delinquent properties with being subject to forfeiture as having
Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x.[8]
filed an Amended Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner),
Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with
represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff and Ramas as defendant. The Amended
petitioners presentation of evidence on the ground that the motion for leave to
Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano (Dimaano) as co-defendant.
amend complaint did not state when petitioner would file the amended
The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the complaint. The Sandiganbayan further stated that the subject matter of the
Philippine Army until 1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent amended complaint was on its face vague and not related to the existing
of the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office complaint. The Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the case had
of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to February 1979. The Amended Complaint further been pending in court, petitioner should proceed to present its evidence.
alleged that Ramas acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out of
After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement of the
proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately
trial.
acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his
power, authority and influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner manifested
Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate of the deposed President its inability to proceed to trial because of the absence of other witnesses or lack of
Ferdinand Marcos.[5] further evidence to present. Instead, petitioner reiterated its motion to amend the
complaint to conform to the evidence already presented or to change the
The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry,
averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired the monies or
found reasonable ground to believe that respondents have violated RA No.
properties subject of the forfeiture.
1379.[6] The Amended Complaint prayed for, among others, the forfeiture of
respondents properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State. The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a
year mainly because of its many postponements. Moreover, petitioner would want
Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory
the case to revert to its preliminary stage when in fact the case had long been ready
Counterclaim to the Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended that his
property consisted only of a residential house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City,
for trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to prepare for presentation of its
additional evidence, if any.
During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to present
further evidence. Giving petitioner one more chance to present further evidence or
to amend the complaint to conform to its evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the
trial to 18 May 1990. The Sandiganbayan, however, hinted that the re-setting was
without prejudice to any action that private respondents might take under the
circumstances.
However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to
trial because it had no further evidence to present. Again, in the interest of justice,
the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60 days within which to file an appropriate
pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however, warned petitioner that failure to act would
constrain the court to take drastic action.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v.
Migrino.[9] The Court held in Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute military officers by reason of mere position held without
a showing that they are subordinates of former President Marcos.
On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the dispositive
portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint,
without pronouncement as to costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for
lack of merit, but the confiscated sum of money, communications equipment,
jewelry and land titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.
The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon.
Ombudsman, who has primary jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A. No.
1379, for such appropriate action as the evidence warrants. This case is also
referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection
herewith.
SO ORDERED.
On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.
In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a Joint
Comment/Opposition to which petitioner filed its Reply on 10 January 1992.
On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the Motion
for Reconsideration.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:
(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the
Supreme Court in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[10] and Republic v. Migrino[11] which
involve the same issues.
(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was
conducted against Ramas and Dimaano.
(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case
against him.
(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONERS
EVIDENCE CANNOT MAKE A CASE FOR FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS NO
SHOWING OF CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR RELATIONSHIP BY CONSANGUINITY
OR AFFINITY BY AND BETWEEN RESPONDENT RAMAS AND RESPONDENT
DIMAANO NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS WERE
CLEARLY UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE, HAVING BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO
THE COMPLETION OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER.
B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTIONS
TAKEN BY THE PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL
COMPLAINT AND THE AMENDED COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE
WITH THE RULINGS OF THE SUPREME COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN,
194 SCRA 474 AND REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO, 189 SCRA 289, NOTWITHSTANDING
THE FACT THAT:
1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and Republic v. Migrino, supra,
are clearly not applicable to this case;
2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0037
was cured and/or waived by respondents with the filing of their respective answers
with counterclaim; and
3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper considering that they
were filed after commencement of the presentation of the evidence of the
petitioner and even before the latter was allowed to formally offer its evidence and
rest its case;
C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ARTICLES AND
THINGS SUCH AS SUMS OF MONEY, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY
AND LAND TITLES CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO
WERE ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE.[12]
The Courts Ruling
First Issue: PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents
This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in Cruz,
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[13] and Republic v. Migrino.[14]
The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to
investigate and cause the filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano
for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.
We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.
The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt
practices of AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired.[15] The PCGG
tasked the AFP Board to make the necessary recommendations to appropriate
government agencies on the action to be taken based on its findings.[16] The PCGG
gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGGs power under Section 3 of
EO No. 1 to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and
to carry out the purposes of this order. EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific
responsibilities, to wit:
SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in
regard to the following matters:
(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates,
whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the takeover and
sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them,
during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue
advantage of their public office and/ or using their powers, authority, influence,
connections or relationship.
(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may
assign to the Commission from time to time.
x x x.
The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth
and corrupt practices of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories
mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are: (1) AFP personnel who have
accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former President
Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative, subordinate or close
associate, taking undue advantage of their public office or using their powers,
influence x x x;[17] or (2) AFP personnel involved in other cases of graft and
corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG.[18]
Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas case to the
PCGG. Therefore, Ramas case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel
before the PCGG could exercise its jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that
Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former President Marcos because of his
position as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that
Ramas position enabled him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-
chief, undeniably making him a subordinate of former President Marcos.
We hold that Ramas was not a subordinate of former President Marcos in the sense
contemplated under EO No. 1 and its amendments.
Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a
subordinate as this term is used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that
he enjoyed close association with former President Marcos. Migrino discussed this
issue in this wise:
A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is
contemplated within the term subordinate. The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1
express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten wealth amassed by former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates
both here and abroad.
EO No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former
President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives,
subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest
or participation.
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is-
[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a
particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in
their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the
same kind or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co, Ltd. vs.
Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black on Interpretation of Laws,
2ndEd., 203].
[T]he term subordinate as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close
association with former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate
family member, relative, and close associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative,
business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO No. 2 .
xxx
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government
official or employee during the administration of former President Marcos. There
must be a prima facie showing that the respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth
by virtue of his close association or relation with former Pres. Marcos and/or his
wife. (Emphasis supplied)
Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank
of Major General[19] does not suffice to make him a subordinate of former President
Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1 and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide
a prima facie showing that Ramas was a close associate of former President
Marcos, in the same manner that business associates, dummies, agents or
nominees of former President Marcos were close to him. Such close association is
manifested either by Ramas complicity with former President Marcos in the
accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President or by former President
Marcos acquiescence in Ramas own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.
This, the PCGG failed to do.
Petitioners attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not
convince us. Petitioner argues that unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in
the instant case states that the AFP Board conducted the investigation pursuant to
EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379. Petitioner asserts that there
is a presumption that the PCGG was acting within its jurisdiction of investigating
crony-related cases of graft and corruption and that Ramas was truly a subordinate
of the former President. However, the same AFP Board Resolution belies this
contention. Although the Resolution begins with such statement, it ends with the
following recommendation:
V. RECOMMENDATION:
Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be
prosecuted and tried for violation of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, as amended, otherwise known
as The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property.[20]
Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents
under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of violation of Republic
Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any relation to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This
absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its amendments proves fatal to petitioners
case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose, and necessarily
its powers must be construed to address such specific and limited purpose.
Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do
not show that the properties Ramas allegedly owned were accumulated by him in
his capacity as a subordinate of his commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely
enumerated the properties Ramas allegedly owned and suggested that these
properties were disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate income without
showing that Ramas amassed them because of his close association with former
President Marcos. Petitioner, in fact, admits that the AFP Board resolution does not
contain a finding that Ramas accumulated his wealth because of his close
association with former President Marcos, thus:
10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the New Armed
Forces of the Philippines did not categorically find a prima facie evidence showing
that respondent Ramas unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close
association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted
that such omission was not fatal. The resolution of the Anti-Graft Board should be
read in the context of the law creating the same and the objective of the
investigation which was, as stated in the above, pursuant to Republic Act Nos. 3019
and 1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a;[21] (Emphasis
supplied)
Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing
that the ill-gotten wealth was accumulated by a subordinate of former President
Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO No. 1[22] clearly premises the creation
of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth amassed by former
President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal is clearly contrary to
the intent behind the creation of the PCGG.
In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[23] the Court outlined the cases that fall under the
jurisdiction of the PCGG pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2,[24] 14,[25] 14-A:[26]
A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in relation with
Sections 1, 2 and 3 of Executive Order No. 14, shows what the authority of the
respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute covers:
(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth under Republic Act No. 1379, accumulated by former President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in
the Philippines or abroad, including the take-over or sequestration of all business
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration,
directly or through his nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office
and/or using their powers, authority and influence, connections or relationships;
and
(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the acquisition
of said ill-gotten wealth as contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No.
1.
However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not otherwise
falling under the foregoing categories, require a previous authority of the President
for the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute in accordance with Section
2 (b) of Executive Order No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in
the Ombudsman and other duly authorized investigating agencies such as the
provincial and city prosecutors, their assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his
assistants and the state prosecutors. (Emphasis supplied)
The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and
prosecute forfeiture petitions not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The
preliminary investigation of unexplained wealth amassed on or before 25 February
1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the authority to file the
corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor General.[27] The
Ombudsman Act or Republic Act No. 6770 (RA No. 6770) vests in the Ombudsman
the power to conduct preliminary investigation and to file forfeiture proceedings
involving unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February 1986.[28]
After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued this case
despite the absence of a prima facie finding that Ramas was a subordinate of
former President Marcos. The petition for forfeiture filed with the Sandiganbayan
should be dismissed for lack of authority by the PCGG to investigate respondents
since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and its amendments apply to
respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended Complaint state
that there are violations of RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should have
recommended Ramas case to the Ombudsman who has jurisdiction to conduct the
preliminary investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases. As stated
in Migrino:
[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause
the prosecution of private respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and
1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from proceeding with the case, without
prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory agency. The
rule of law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only
the powers granted to it.
Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing
of the forfeiture petition by submitting their respective Answers with counterclaim
deserves no merit as well.
Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction
to waive in the first place. The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial
powers never granted to it. PCGGs powers are specific and limited. Unless given
additional assignment by the President, PCGGs sole task is only to recover the ill-
gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies.[29] Without these
elements, the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.
Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG to
investigate and prosecute their cases by filing their Motion to Dismiss as soon as
they learned of the pronouncement of the Court in Migrino. This case was decided
on 30 August 1990, which explains why private respondents only filed their Motion
to Dismiss on 8 October 1990.Nevertheless, we have held that the parties may raise
lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding.[30] Thus, we hold that there was
no waiver of jurisdiction in this case. Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by the
parties to an action.[31]
Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG
to conduct the preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the
proper preliminary investigation for violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the
Solicitor General may file the forfeiture petition with the Sandiganbayan.[32] The
right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not subject to
prescription, laches or estoppel.[33]
Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case
Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence
Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case
before completion of the presentation of petitioners evidence.
We disagree.
Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find
that petitioner has only itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation of
its evidence. First, this case has been pending for four years before the
Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner filed its Amended Complaint on 11
August 1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17 April 1989. Petitioner
had almost two years to prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time,
petitioner still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing
numerous motions for postponements and extensions. Even before the date set
for the presentation of its evidence, petitioner filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for
Leave to Amend the Complaint.[34]The motion sought to charge the delinquent
properties (which comprise most of petitioners evidence) with being subject to
forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x.
The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of petitioners
evidence since petitioner did not state when it would file the amended
complaint. On 18 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan set the continuation of the
presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and 9-11 October 1989, giving
petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989,
petitioner manifested its inability to proceed with the presentation of its
evidence. The Sandiganbayan issued an Order expressing its view on the matter,
to wit:
The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above events
because this case has been ready for trial for over a year and much of the delay
hereon has been due to the inability of the government to produce on scheduled
dates for pre-trial and for trial documents and witnesses, allegedly upon the failure
of the military to supply them for the preparation of the presentation of evidence
thereon. Of equal interest is the fact that this Court has been held to task in public
about its alleged failure to move cases such as this one beyond the preliminary
stage, when, in view of the developments such as those of today, this Court is now
faced with a situation where a case already in progress will revert back to the
preliminary stage, despite a five-month pause where appropriate action could have
been undertaken by the plaintiff Republic.[35]
On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting a
preliminary investigation on the unexplained wealth of private respondents as
mandated by RA No. 1379.[36]The PCGG prayed for an additional four months to
conduct the preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan granted this request
and scheduled the presentation of evidence on 26-29 March 1990. However, on
the scheduled date, petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of the
preliminary investigation the PCGG supposedly conducted. Again, the
Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until 18 May 1990 to continue with the
presentation of its evidence and to inform the court of what lies ahead insofar as
the status of the case is concerned x x x.[37] Still on the date set, petitioner failed to
present its evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990, petitioner filed its Re-Amended
Complaint.[38] The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that a case already pending
for years would revert to its preliminary stage if the court were to accept the Re-
Amended Complaint.
Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for
failure to complete the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan gave
petitioner more than sufficient time to finish the presentation of its evidence. The
Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioners delays and yet petitioner ended the long-
string of delays with the filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which would only
prolong even more the disposition of the case.
Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the
Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to
investigate and prosecute the case against private respondents. This alone would
have been sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the forfeiture
case against private respondents.
Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before
completion of the presentation of petitioners evidence.
Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure
Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties
confiscated from Dimaanos house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in
evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on petitioners case since these
properties comprise most of petitioners evidence against private respondents.
Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case against private
respondents if these properties are inadmissible in evidence.
On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a
search warrant captioned Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. Dimaano
was not present during the raid but Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The
raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt together with other
items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team seized these items: one
baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol,
caliber .45; communications equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000 and
US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.
Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted
the search and seizure on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA
revolution.[39]Petitioner argues that a revolutionary government was operative at
that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that President Aquino and
Vice President Laurel were taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino
people.[40] Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld
the operation of the 1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents
exclusionary right.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal
search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987
Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had already
reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the
government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use
the same in evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private
respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.
Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.
The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in
President Aquinos Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution
was done in defiance of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution.[41] The resulting
government was indisputably a revolutionary government bound by no
constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary
government, as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under
international law.
The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the
Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the
actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary government following
the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986 (immediately
before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the
protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (Covenant) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Declaration) remained in effect during the interregnum.
We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative
during the interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to
individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration remained in effect during the
interregnum.
During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government
were the supreme law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such
directives and orders. With the abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the
successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person
could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was
neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court
explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno:[42]
A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established
government in any country or state by those who were previously subject to it or
as a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the government or political
system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence. In Kelsen's
book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which occurs whenever
the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way
not prescribed by the first order itself.
It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more
popularly known as the people power revolution that the Filipino people tore
themselves away from an existing regime. This revolution also saw the
unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino government.
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as an
inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect
radical reforms in their system of government or institutions by force or a general
uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of making such change have
proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable. It has been said that
the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state and from
there is derived the right of the people to abolish, to reform and to alter any
existing form of government without regard to the existing constitution.
xxx
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to
constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of
the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr.
Marcos as the winner in the 1986 presidential election. Thus it can be said that the
organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government which was met by little resistance and
her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other
key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials,
revamp of the Judiciary and the Military signaled the point where the legal system
then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed by the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)
To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative
during the interregnum would render void all sequestration orders issued by the
Philippine Commission on Good Government (PCGG) before the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and
even the take-over of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial
action, would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of
Rights.
During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary
government bound by no constitution. No one could validly question the
sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights because there was no Bill of
Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom
Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as
contrary to the Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.
In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on Good
Government,[43] petitioner Baseco, while conceding there was no Bill of Rights
during the interregnum, questioned the continued validity of the sequestration
orders upon adoption of the Freedom Constitution in view of the due process
clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that the Freedom Constitution, and later
the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the validity of sequestration orders,
thus:
If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to
the validity and propriety of sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it should
be dispelled by the fact that these particular remedies and the authority of the
PCGG to issue them have received constitutional approbation and sanction. As
already mentioned, the Provisional or Freedom Constitution recognizes the power
and duty of the President to enact measures to achieve the mandate of the people
to . . . (r)ecover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the
previous regime and protect the interest of the people through orders of
sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts. And as also already adverted to,
Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution treats of, and ratifies the authority
to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25,
1986.
The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were fully
aware that the sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the
framers of both constitutions had to include specific language recognizing the
validity of the sequestration orders. The following discourse by Commissioner
Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is
instructive:
FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about the
arguments in defense of the present amendment.
For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salongas lecture in the Gregorio
Araneta University Foundation, of which all of us have been given a copy. On the
one hand, he argues that everything the Commission is doing is traditionally legal.
This is repeated by Commissioner Romulo also. Minister Salonga spends a major
portion of his lecture developing that argument. On the other hand, almost as an
afterthought, he says that in the end what matters are the results and not the legal
niceties, thus suggesting that the PCGG should be allowed to make some legal
shortcuts, another word for niceties or exceptions.
Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the CONCOM for
special protection? The answer is clear. What they are doing will not stand the test
of ordinary due process, hence they are asking for protection, for
exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes remedios, fine, as the saying stands, but let us
not say grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not an allowable
extrapolation. Hence, we should not give the exceptions asked for, and let me
elaborate and give three reasons:
First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the CONCOM
is to hasten constitutional normalization. Very much at the heart of the
constitutional normalization is the full effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We cannot, in
one breath, ask for constitutional normalization and at the same time ask for a
temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at the heart of constitutionalism.
That would be hypocritical; that would be a repetition of Marcosian protestation
of due process and rule of law. The New Society word for that is backsliding. It is
tragic when we begin to backslide even before we get there.
Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become ingrained. The
committee report asks for extraordinary exceptions from the Bill of Rights for six
months after the convening of Congress, and Congress may even extend this
longer.
Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice. What the
committee report is asking for is that we should allow the new government to
acquire the vice of disregarding the Bill of Rights.
Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The practitioners of
the vice begin to think that they have a vested right to its practice, and they will
fight tooth and nail to keep the franchise. That would be an unhealthy way of
consolidating the gains of a democratic revolution.
Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal niceties is
an argument that is very disturbing. When it comes from a staunch Christian like
Commissioner Salonga, a Minister, and repeated verbatim by another staunch
Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it becomes doubly disturbing and even
discombobulating. The argument makes the PCGG an auctioneer, placing the Bill
of Rights on the auction block. If the price is right, the search and seizure clause
will be sold. Open your Swiss bank account to us and we will award you the search
and seizure clause. You can keep it in your private safe.
Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage to the
hoarders of hidden wealth. The hoarders will release the hidden health if the
ransom price is paid and the ransom price is the Bill of Rights, specifically the due
process in the search and seizure clauses. So, there is something positively
revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale to the highest
bidder nor can it be used to ransom captive dollars. This nation will survive and
grow strong, only if it would become convinced of the values enshrined in the
Constitution of a price that is beyond monetary estimation.
For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional Commission is to
delete all of Section 8 of the committee report and allow the new Constitution to
take effect in full vigor. If Section 8 is deleted, the PCGG has two options. First, it
can pursue the Salonga and the Romulo argument that what the PCGG has been
doing has been completely within the pale of the law. If sustained, the PCGG can
go on and should be able to go on, even without the support of Section 8. If not
sustained, however, the PCGG has only one honorable option, it must bow to the
majesty of the Bill of Rights.
The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let me
conclude with what another Christian replied when asked to toy around with the
law. From his prison cell, Thomas More said, "I'll give the devil benefit of law for
my nations safety sake. I ask the Commission to give the devil benefit of law for
our nations sake. And we should delete Section 8.
Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)
Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment
excepting sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional
Commission still adopted the amendment as Section 26,[44] Article XVIII of the 1987
Constitution. The framers of the Constitution were fully aware that absent Section
26, sequestration orders would not stand the test of due process under the Bill of
Rights.
Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force
during the interregnum, absent a constitutional provision excepting sequestration
orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly render all sequestration orders void
during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino
people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the
same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.
The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government,
assumed responsibility for the States good faith compliance with the Covenant to
which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1) of the Covenant requires each
signatory State to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and
subject to its jurisdiction the rights[45] recognized in the present Covenant. Under
Article 17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure
that [n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his
privacy, family, home or correspondence.
The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article
17(2) that [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Although the
signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding document,
being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the
generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the
State.[46] Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under
international law to observe the rights[47] of individuals under the Declaration.
The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration
during the interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have
repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or the Declaration is another
matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court considers the
Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human
beings are proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the
Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary government did not repudiate the
Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973
Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not
escape responsibility for the States good faith compliance with its treaty
obligations under international law.
It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986
that the directives and orders of the revolutionary government became subject to
a higher municipal law that, if contravened, rendered such directives and orders
void. The Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights of the 1973
Constitution.[48] The Provisional Constitution served as a self-limitation by the
revolutionary government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers entrusted to it
by the people.
During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives
and orders issued by government officers were valid so long as these officers did
not exceed the authority granted them by the revolutionary government. The
directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the
Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned
the warrant since the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant,
issued by a judge upon proper application, specified the items to be searched and
seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically described in
the warrant.
However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the
warrant. As admitted by petitioners witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items
not included in the warrant, thus:
Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian
AJ AMORES
Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for weapons.
What else, aside from the weapons, were seized from the house of Miss Elizabeth
Dimaano?
Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance in the
house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the MSU
elements, your Honor.

A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US dollars, Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of Miss
some jewelries, land titles, sir. Elizabeth Dimaano?

Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the house
of Elizabeth Dimaano. Do you know the reason why your team also seized other
properties not mentioned in said search warrant?
A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was informed that
the reason why they also brought the other items not included in the search
warrant was because the money and other jewelries were contained in attach cases
and cartons with markings Sony Trinitron, and I think three (3) vaults or steel
safes. Believing that the attach cases and the steel safes were containing firearms,
they forced open these containers only to find out that they contained money.
xxx
Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the reason why
your team seized this money instead of weapons?
A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him decided
to bring along also the money because at that time it was already dark and they
felt most secured if they will bring that because they might be suspected also of
taking money out of those items, your Honor.[49]
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant, any other
properties or contraband which could be found in the residence of Miss Elizabeth
Dimaano?
A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items, for instance,
the communications equipment and money. However, I did not include that in the
application for search warrant considering that we have not established concrete
evidence about that. So when
Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to believe that
only weapons were in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?
A. Yes, your Honor.[50]
xxx

Cross-examination Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite rifle M-
16 and how many ammunition?
Atty. Banaag
A. Forty, sir.
Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this case was
applied before the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 1? Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, with the
fiscals office who charged Elizabeth Dimaano for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
A. Yes, sir. Ammunition?
Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and seizure of five A. Yes, sir.
(5) baby armalite rifles M-16 and five (5) boxes of ammunition?
Q. Do you know what happened to that case?
A. Yes, sir.
A. I think it was dismissed, sir.
xxx
Q. In the fiscals office?
AJ AMORES
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol had a
Memorandum Receipt in the name of Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?
A. I think that was the reason, sir.
Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the search warrant,
like for instance, jewelries. Why did you seize the jewelries?
A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring
along also the jewelries and other items, sir. I do not really know where it was taken
but they brought along also these articles. I do not really know their reason for
bringing the same, but I just learned that these were taken because they might get
lost if they will just leave this behind.
be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We thus
hold that these items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case
No. 0037, remanding the records of this case to the Ombudsman for such
appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and referring this case to the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax
liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

xxx

Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also included
in the search warrant?

A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money was
discovered to be contained in attach cases. These attach cases were suspected to
be containing pistols or other high powered firearms, but in the course of the
search the contents turned out to be money. So the team leader also decided to
take this considering that they believed that if they will just leave the money
behind, it might get lost also.

Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized by your
raiding team, like Transfer Certificates of Title of lands?

A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were opened.[51]

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not
include the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the
raiding team confiscated.The search warrant did not particularly describe these
items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The raiding team
had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items could be
the subject of warrantless search and seizure.[52] Clearly, the raiding team exceeded
its authority when it seized these items.

The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are
contraband per se,[53] and they are not, they must be returned to the person from
whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not declare that such person is the
lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant could not
EN BANC
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of
their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG
and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented
by its President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie
B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C.
Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria
Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A.
Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor
children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F
emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco,
Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of
their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta,
Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of
their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C.
Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho,
Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine
V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Michael Racho,
Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses
David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor
child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah
Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph
R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary,
Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M.
BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE
PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, Remedios
lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented
by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF
MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato
Marcos,Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S.
AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao,
M.D., as President and in his personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC.,
represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and
in his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA,
LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and
MARLON I. YAP,Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003 REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO,
M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO
vs.
PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE
LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON.
vs.
SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
x---------------------------------x Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the
G.R. No. 205043 Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioners, x---------------------------------x
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM G.R. No. 205491
SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA,
SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.
for themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
x---------------------------------x vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.
G.R. No. 205138
x---------------------------------x
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its
National President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. G.R. No. 205720
Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap,
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as
Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana,
Executive Director, and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z.
Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL
vs.
ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
III, Petitioners,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
vs.
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF
of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and
REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON.
Local Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social
FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON.
Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Economic and Development Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General,
Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine
Commission on Women, Respondents. x---------------------------------x

x---------------------------------x G.R. No. 206355

G.R. No. 205478 MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA
BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA
CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT
OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO,
JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-
GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI
SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES
LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N.
RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department
of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA,
Secretary of the Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of
the Department of Budget and Management,Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our
fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status,
well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his
beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good."1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a
developed country, leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy
and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards the
revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social services remains to
be a problem that concerns not only the poor, but every member of society. The
government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its very
purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of
the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as the main facet of a representative
government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming
societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement these measures
and bring concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz.
Seemingly distant is the judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert
governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders
until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action,
the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-
a-vis the most vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together -
the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of
population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic
society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived
consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates2 to sticker
campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized
by members of the clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical
ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep
division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support thereto,
however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by
Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from
various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it
to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the
profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the Court now faces
the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions-
in-intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong
and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and
taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming
Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation
Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and
several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the
generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc.,
and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force
Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City,
Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational
institution, and several others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the
Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens
and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of
Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria
Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers
and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his
capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines
Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers
and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys.
Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia
Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several
others,29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation,
Inc. and several others,31in their capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M.
Kashim in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as
a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an
accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the
constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners,
notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH
Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine
devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and
the life of the unborn from conception.35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against
hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal
access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer
and other health problems.36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that
the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes
the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners,
the use of public funds for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs
is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal
prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical
practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs
to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive
health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and
convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health professionals who are public
officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers,
medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses,
public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with
the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious
objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex
education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious
beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not
absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger
test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right
to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to
involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they
are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent
women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of
punishment.43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth,
a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to render reproductive health
services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of
the public would no longer be able to avail of the practitioners services.44
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the
RH Law discriminates against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the
government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that,
rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the RH Law seeks to
introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any
violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated
as "violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to
due process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own
affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of
services they shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in
corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own
discretion and judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full
range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his
own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although
exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by religious groups, they
are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to
perform the service or procedure.48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the
Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive
health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in
accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo
reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the
spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters
pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also
claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of
parental authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives.50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative
authority. The petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the
power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in
the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ),
Article VI of the Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs)
and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that
the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government
level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM
under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective
comments-in-intervention in defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside
from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions
in behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former officials of
the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto
G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana
Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective
Comments-in-Intervention in conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013,
Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the
petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1]
there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for
judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the RH Law;
and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed
legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court
issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and
implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty
(120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the
parties to determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and
the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments.
On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the cases were heard
on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further
orders of the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda
within sixty (60) days and, at the same time posed several questions for their
clarification on some contentions of the parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale,
dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as
June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the
Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices."
Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold,
dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a
duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of
a qualified medical practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions
relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and
devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical
product or device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as
classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any
person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on
Population, which recognized that the population problem should be considered
as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted measures
that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population
growth.67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16,
1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the
Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that
"family planning will be made part of a broad educational program; safe and
effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family size;
mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued
Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others,
made "family planning a part of a broad educational program," provided "family
planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made "available all
acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens
desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning
methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one
centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive
health.69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose
the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to
the commitments made in the International Conference on Population and
Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or
"The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the State to
provide for comprehensive health services and programs for women, including
family planning and sex education.71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on
galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million
Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in the year
2000 and over 92 million in 2010.72 The executive and the legislative, thus, felt that
the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was
enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and
information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure
that its objective to provide for the peoples' right to reproductive health be
achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health
providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning
methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health
education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to
carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make
effective the current laws on contraception, women's health and population
control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared
unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government
sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the
right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to
protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation
prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per
se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale
and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a
prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find deplorable and
repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire
bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the
remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the implementation of the
contraception program to the fullest extent possible using taxpayers' money. The
State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning methods
and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of,
and universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and
supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court
has synthesized and refined them to the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over
the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules,
it behooves the Court to resolve some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review
over the controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that
it should submit to the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and respect
the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a
majoritarian democratic process"75 and "characterized by an inordinate amount of
transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social
legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the
discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the
political departments, in particular, with Congress.77 It further asserts that in view
of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council,78 the
remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to
assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper
considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the
petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health
devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its
face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of
the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its
exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal
branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear, the
separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government,
which obtains not through express provision but by actual division in our
Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested
in the Congress of the Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.84 The
Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment
of powers among the three branches of government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of
separation of powers which imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the
nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of government,
in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as unconstitutional.
Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or
political instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten
or marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution
impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-equal branch done
within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to
cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to
determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null
because they were undertaken with grave abuse of discretion.88 Thus, while the
Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH
Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of
discretion results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to
protect those cherished rights and principles embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review
may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation
that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or
otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point. The Court may
pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches,
since its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that
they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as
mandated of them by the Constitution. If after said review, the Court finds no
constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing
the actions under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of
legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal
v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others.
In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy.
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The
duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is
upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it
becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to
decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano,
"judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation
of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of
government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries of
authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the
only, medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in
that balancing operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the
unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation.
Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by
four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b)
the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be
the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any
actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be implemented.97 They
claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for
adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its provisions and
that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely
affected by its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH
Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is
appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts
do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest,
however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite
and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion
of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the other; that is, it must
concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought
to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a
decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the
law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of
ripeness.101 A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has
had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be
considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been
accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened
injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result
of the act complained of102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the
Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of
Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued
that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there was yet no
concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the
intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act
in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under
a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of
the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and
that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and
its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to
carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject petitions
present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes
a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical
practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted
under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers
who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement
and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject
petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is
not a speech regulating measure.105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First
Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes
concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the
right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.107 After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom,
freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right
to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts are
externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been
generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld
the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it has expanded its
scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also those involving
religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for this
modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its
expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution
envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that
the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental
rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court
has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if the
RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the
simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this
Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law
has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective
petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners
cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against
them,111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that
are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance"
doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus
standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a
case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the
challenged governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one
can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his
own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the
statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not before the court.
This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires,
such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of
paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the
standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even
where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right of judicial review. In
the first Emergency Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed
to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only
an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed
through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally
on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to
sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a
Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is
invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the
Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-
traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or legislators, to
sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition
for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case
warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over
the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially
pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the
youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not
inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in
technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must
always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public,
but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance
of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the
right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and other
constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of
contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division among
a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise
issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court adjudication.
More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the
unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken
away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights
enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when
the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable
consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for
declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to
state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court
would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it
has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays
for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition
under Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it
violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-
one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional
standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population
control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or
population control measure,124 and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood"
and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it
as principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared
towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and
keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancy-preventing
products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full
range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning
methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the prevention
of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the
number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-
natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of
information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient,
effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods,
devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of
contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH
Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to
it and the RH Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other
positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-
and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract
infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for
Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In
Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph
G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress
to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror,
fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is
sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the
general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons
interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed
law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather
than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation."
[Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both
"reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane
to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the
first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human
rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these
rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which
includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right
to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must
not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of
the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is
misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or
different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or
indication of the real subject or scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable
human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to
believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents
of the assailed legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of
the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed
legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions
abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section
4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning
contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to implantation, contrary
to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized
ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient"
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal,
non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical
research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate to kill
the fertilized ovum which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the
petitioners assert that the State sanction of contraceptive use contravenes natural
law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to be used
as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients
are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency that will actually
supervise or administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective
patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be
used for abortifacient purposes.133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers
of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the
RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only
"non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods, devices products
and supplies shall be made accessible to the public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that
contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was
enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the World
Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field, it is asserted
that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and pass
judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an
abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's
right to life is not violated considering that various studies of the WHO show that
life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues
that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically provides that only
contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are
allowed.136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to
life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is
inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law,
custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1,
Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in
the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729,
entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on
contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of
male vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous
international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote
population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve long-term
economic development. Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and
other family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic
management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly,
reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights
and health and the overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from
R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A.
No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of Women" were legislated.
Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population program
has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion"
and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles
are not merely grounded on administrative policy, but rather, originates from the
constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and
guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when
life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage,
without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was
agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could express their own
views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the
particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This
is undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said
reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior
to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen because, amazingly,
there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that
conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins
at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous
with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm.142 On the other side of
the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of
the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of
Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words
of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle
of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must
be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense
they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be
construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba
legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed
that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a
lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it
should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word
"conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources,
means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming
pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity
capable of developing into a being like its parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the
fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life
capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In
Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality
first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less
than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the
State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has
life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as
death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme
Court, said that the State "has respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy"
and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life."
Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the
Framers regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of
"fertilization." The records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from the moment of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is
fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of
human life, it was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question
that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically
says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in
nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this upon fertilization.
Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies
itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these
processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the
fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At
the moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this
happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the
sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of 46 is found
only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if
the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it must be
human life. Its nature is human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not
"from the moment of fertilization" was not because of doubt when human life
begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by
us here before with the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the
comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the
moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under
the Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of
writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the
Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to Congress to define when life
begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and
that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined by science that life
begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we
should not give any doubt to Congress, too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point.
Actually, that is one of the questions I was going to raise during the period of
interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right
now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn
from the moment of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg
meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine
whether certain contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or not
because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of
the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next process is for
the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens
with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum
to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so
called contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called
abortifacient and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned
under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state
whether or not these certain contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and
based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered
abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the
Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the
mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon
fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is also
apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress
from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend
to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner
Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the
right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive device
is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide
on based on established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum
should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that
actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that
similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus,
constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to
the point that I would like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also the
lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I
would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of the term
"protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised
some of these implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation
of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical
answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the
moment of conception" we are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain
contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the
sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive.
There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some
contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg which
has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from the
moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these contraceptives
will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even
admitted by petitioners during the oral arguments. There it was conceded that
tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected. resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic composition
that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.
Justice Bersamin:
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human
To be protected.
development begins after the union of male and female gametes or germ cells
Atty. Noche: during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of
events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a secondary
Under Section 12, yes. oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of
the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell.
Justice Bersamin:
This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning,
So you have no objection to condoms? or primordium, of a human being."162

Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I
am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby
s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the
beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an
ovum and forms a viable zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote
from which the embryo develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by
medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person)
begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They
wrote: "Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark
because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism
is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present in each
pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is
restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic
unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper
on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein
concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA
maintains its strong position that fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage
that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the
moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit, no matter
what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human
embryology, a human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there
is no point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a
"potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical, legal, or political
conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism
and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well defined
"moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual
evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political, or religious view
of human life or of human embryos.164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical
parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the
Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and
that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-defined
moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon.
Lagman that life begins at implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and
conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They
are not identical and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the WHO, he wrote that
"medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the
commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can
be medically detected."167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or
scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of
the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living
human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes.168 Implantation has been
conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind.
To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to
the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of
any drug or device that would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine
wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and
abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in
protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature
from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court
cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured in the record
of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner
Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from
conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever
passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually
proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at
this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that
protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed out by Justice
Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to
protect to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the
uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the
Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized
ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms
shall be defined as follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods,
facilities, services and supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well-
being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes sexual
health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal relations. The
elements of reproductive health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to
decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have children; the number, spacing
and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction, free
of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the information and means to do
so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive health:
Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and
access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law,
presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative
order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the Midwifery Act, is
hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting
abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the
FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the
moment of fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only
drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion
and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb. Thus,
an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb,
upon determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law,
consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has
life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes
clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that induces abortion
(first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the
killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or
device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third
kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to
reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the
RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as
Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that protection will only be
given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes
that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and
two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all
the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's womb. After all, if life is only
recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants
- there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the
fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the
fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's
position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum
is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that instance of
implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined
by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or
destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law
that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a
certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the
condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is absurd. The
FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be
used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when
the contraceptive product or supply will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-
abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of Section
9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the
FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it cannot
be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under
the second paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any
means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be
used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely
abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law
defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall
be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the
FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern
family planning method, device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that
prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a
fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb in doses of its
approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and
recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well
taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a)
and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the
RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should,
therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier
"primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which may harm or
destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II,
Section 12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to
insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its
sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the
implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval
of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe
mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these
contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this, together with the definition of an
abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against
abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be included in the
PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the
primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb, but also those that do not have the secondary action of acting the
same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line
with the principle that laws should be construed in a manner that its
constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be
consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word " primarily" in
Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity
of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that
have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates
to the approval of contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn
from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution."175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in
the constitutional protection of life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires
the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and
family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of
the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and supplies of all national
hospitals.176Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk
of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use
oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out
that the risk is decreased when the use of contraceptives is discontinued. Further,
it is contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with
a threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of
ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial
infarction.177 Given the definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health"
under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the
assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and
satisfying sex lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not
self-executory, it being a mere statement of the administration's principle and
policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute
the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of women.181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard,
the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to
health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for
the health of the people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and
other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be
priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug
regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and
research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their
rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the
mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from
substandard or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing.
Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation
to implement these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS,183 it
was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the
constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as
requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would have the
power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This
can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather
than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions
of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would
give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall be
effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do
not question contraception and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the
status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of
contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed by a prescription of a
duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact
the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is
still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court
agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the effectivity of the RH
Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale,
distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require
the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists
adequate safeguards to ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are
made available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot
be dispensed and used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or
Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or
"An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of
Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes" are not
repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with
the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs
and devices are particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell,
dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or without consideration, any
contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a
duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of
a qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used
exclusively for the purpose of preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced
into the female reproductive system for the primary purpose of preventing
conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act
shall be punished with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an
imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the
discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921
provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine,
pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind or device shall be
compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the
consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy,
duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other
relevant statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the
unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely
unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original. Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH
Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall
procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning supplies for
the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government
bodies to plan and implement this procurement and distribution program. The
supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current levels
and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit
their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and
monitoring program consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the
guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must
consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the
contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these contraceptive
drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical
practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be
indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means.
As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden are assumed
by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be
held accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to
their use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been
submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its
determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the
agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the public are safe
for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack
on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of
contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as
expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that
hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient.
The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug
Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as operative
only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA,
not Congress, has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal
contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of
the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion or removal of a
particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal
contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-
abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National
Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a determination
by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress
that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective"
without the proper scientific examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not
covered by the constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of their
religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether
abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical practitioners who
essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but
also the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with
contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed
to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the transmission of life, and to the
reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign
rule of God in the transmission of Human life."188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives,
arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the
guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious
beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address
religious sentiments by making provisions for a conscientious objector, the
constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes
upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking reproductive
health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for
the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious
objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her
religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is
recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because although it allows a
conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking
reproductive health services and information - no escape is afforded the
conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking
reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other individuals to
conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred
to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the law referred
to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of
the RH Law, are also not recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that
the requirement to refer the matter to another health care service provider is still
considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They add
that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the Doctrine of
Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they
tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives
with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive
health services to indigents encroach upon the religious freedom of those upon
whom they are required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to
refer the person seeking reproductive health care services to another provider
infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an
unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic teachings.
While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts
prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury
to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to
justify regulation of religious freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or
threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the
people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human development,
health, education, information, choice and to make decisions according to religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood)
are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious
freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be
couples to attend family planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to
obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals
to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes their
religious beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or
imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim
that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and
information to contraception against their beliefs must be struck down as it runs
afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide
that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It
neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief.196 They point out that the RH
Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing accessible, effective and
quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line
with the State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of the
Constitution,197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices,
which deprive others of their right to reproductive health.198 They assert that the
assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that
no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will.199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be
allowed, the petitioners are effectively going against the constitutional right to
religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the
RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that the RH Law is
unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the
Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on
the entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not
violate the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully
balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand,
who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the citizen who
needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the health care
professional in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the
concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient
accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion without unnecessarily
infringing on the rights of others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the
duty to refer is limited in duration, location and impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents
claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for would-be
couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family planning,
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who object to any
information received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are
not compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to
reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on
matters of family life without intervention of the State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family
planning is the only method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy.
Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand
of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years and note the general
acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their
families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is
made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and
backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice,
has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a
single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards
all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed
fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to
be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our
fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to
build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall embody
our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our
patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of
independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice,
freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their
spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition
and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the
State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it instills into the
mind the purest principles of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the
contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain
benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax
exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in government
institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State
would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of
separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the
1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual
respect.1âwphi1 Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the
church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor
one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the church
cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry.
It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that
they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred
over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term
"church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any
other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious organization.
Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample
barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the
Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article
VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be
allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed,
directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher,
minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal
institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two
guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any
religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict
neutrality in affairs among religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the
establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the support or
prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the
inviolability of the human conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom
guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside
manifestations of one's belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious
freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any
religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion
by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S.
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free exercise of one's
chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the
religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience
directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect
or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate
invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be
characterized as being only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d
965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power,
a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular
goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless
the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve
contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual
religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits
government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and
practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the
two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either
the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs and practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the
guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe,
and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in
Gerona v. Secretary of Education:211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's
imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief,
limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange,
bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical when
weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the
freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to
travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State
and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to
regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public
welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court
adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by
the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent
neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent
and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case, it was
further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental
actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the
government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to
exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is to
remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's
religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a
declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from
its application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the
courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state
interest test is proper.218Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion
that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be
subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits.
Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society,
the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it.
Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious
liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious
freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of society and law. The
Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the
doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided
the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case
also used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After
Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the
"grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent
case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger" test in the
maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which
employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test
involved, in one form or another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases
on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set
the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of
society and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has
been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and immediate danger"
test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest"
test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts
of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag
and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present danger" and "grave and
immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or
immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been
overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not
appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves
purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is
proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has
different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-
term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests
of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is
therefore necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to prevail
over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a
preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of
all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation
of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire
constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment
of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in
order to build a just and humane society and establish a government." As held in
Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this
fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a
colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling
interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The
test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do
otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones
until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the state's
interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling
state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same
time affording protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test
used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the
end, the "compelling state interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of
the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be
preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether
the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem
reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the
same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court has
declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship,
ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical
matters which are outside the province of the civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the
Court extends only to public and secular morality. Whatever pronouncement the
Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it
has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on
ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to
determine whether the RH Law contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and
religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can be
compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions
against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom are the
following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including
their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable
human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the
right to education and information, and the right to choose and make decisions
for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs,
and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the
foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant
thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration
of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all
methods of family planning, including effective natural and modern methods
which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards such as
those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as
identified through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying
marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to
promote modern natural methods of family planning, especially the Billings
Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious
convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to
have the number of children they desire with due consideration to the health,
particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in
accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious convictions.
[Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning
methods that are in accordance with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs,
taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human rights
instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and
people's organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector
and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and
development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority needs of
women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to
the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared
responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of
children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family life
aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status,
sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions.
[Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of
contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using
contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent
neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government
can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the
government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to restrict
other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State
cannot enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply
because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs.
Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives
without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse
to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line
between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that
are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health
manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment
Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and
24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a medical
practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under
the law to another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious
objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by
government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with
the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds
application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious freedom
would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the
government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the
accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of
conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law deserves no less than strict
scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to
religious freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an
intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into
obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs, while the other
entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an
illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are
incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates
the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical
practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem
reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his
beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at
the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however,
a false compromise because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the
performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot,
in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may not be the
principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect
participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the
right to free speech, it being an externalization of one's thought and conscience.
This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of
religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to individuals in
communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being
silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in
his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind.223 While the RH Law
seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice
guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of
compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's
religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of
individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide
access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and
methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and spacing of the
birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of
health providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy.
Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the
mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious
belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion"
enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session,
found in the case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health
Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the
provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to delegate,
supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in
abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according
to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually
mean more complexity and uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was
the same - they could not be forced to assist abortions if it would be against their
conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and
hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care service
providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions
should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and
Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative
of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation
to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding
programs and services and in the performance of reproductive health procedures,
the religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the
Executive Secretary228 it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our
fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status,
well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his
beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of
others and with the common good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to
ensure compliance. Without set consequences for either an active violation or mere
inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is
bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a constitutionally-protected
right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a
healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another,
or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because
incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee
which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal
health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among
others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to
implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered
as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The
conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the religious belief
of public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be
considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded to
other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners
without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all,
the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that
guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires employment in the
government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in
the hierarchy of human values. The mind must be free to think what it wills, whether
in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse
or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in occasions or gatherings
or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom
of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom
of association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated
in the RH Law itself but also because it is violative of the equal protection clause in
the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the
RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page
52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of
religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with
qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not
thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law.
But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health professionals such as provincial, city or
municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives,
among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty
to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be
considered as conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who
can be conscientious objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be considered
conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the
constitutional right to the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must
prevail.230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents,
in defense of the subject provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more
compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of
services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory
character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the
law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in
vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the establishment of a more compelling state
interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not
to adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During the oral
arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of
the Stenographic Notes disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling
State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious objector which
refuses to do so because of his religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State
interest, this is an ordinary health legislation involving professionals. This is not a
free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State
of the relationship between medical doctors and their patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free
exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the
prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the
community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the government
fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means
the freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom
is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from
acting according to one's belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an
individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple
who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a
future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother decides to adopt or
use the information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she even
decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon
those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a
patient seeks consultation on reproductive health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of
the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to
demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could
limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious freedom. Also, the
respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show that the
means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive
means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be
momentary, considering that the act of referral by a conscientious objector is the
very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the
respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State
to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector.
The health concerns of women may still be addressed by other practitioners who
may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and
motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter
reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of
constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure
that the right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand
now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act
of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The Magna Carta of
Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and
programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health
services and programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The
State shall, at all times, provide for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-
responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle
and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality and morbidity:
Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services, due respect shall
be accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found
a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and the demands of
responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection from hazardous
drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and
infant health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services
without prejudice to the primary right and duty of parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually
transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and
cervical cancers, and other gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims
and survivors shall be provided with comprehensive health services that include
psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and assistance towards
healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to
ethical norms and medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of
women and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and
promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of
diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide
women in all sectors with appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information
and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in government
education and training programs, with due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth
and the development of moral character and the right of children to be brought
up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and
strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility
awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the
compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of
thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed
to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that
the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to
2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation,
the proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute a
compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social
healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure
that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind
conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth
in the law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render
reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious
beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the
performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the
mother should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical
practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing
the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral arguments, Atty. Liban,
representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on
grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an
emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the
doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is
impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche
explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH
Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein
intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to
bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life of the child and
the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives.
However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is
medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the
other. If the above principles are observed, the loss of the child's life or the mother's
life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be
guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because
both their lives are equally valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering
the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments
of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a
medical practitioner in this case would have been more than justified considering
the life he would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance
of a marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police
power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that
the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated. All the law requires is
for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family
planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or
artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who receive any information during
their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the
information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find
unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without
the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the
provisions of the Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It
argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than
promote its solidarity and total development.240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is
the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the
family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions
and the demands of responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other
conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth,
contains provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It
bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making
process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives the parents
of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent
or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on
any person of legal age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the
following persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of
disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail.
[Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation
and vasectomy which, by their very nature, should require mutual consent and
decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately related
to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution espouses that the
State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot
found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section
3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them " is equally recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By
giving absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and
barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge
between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and endanger
the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would
be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an
inviolable social institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter
which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would reach
would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number
of their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not to undergo the
procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive
unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right.
Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the
State should see to it that they chart their destiny together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710,
otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Women," provides that women shall have
equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the
joint decision on the number and spacing of their children. Indeed, responsible
parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility between
parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one
spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to undergo reproductive health
procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of
marital privacy and such state intervention would encroach into the zones of
spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to
privacy was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking
through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded
recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully
deserving of constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US
Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where Justice William O. Douglas
wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political
parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or
for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association
for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of
contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an
unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless,
it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in
Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor,
who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services,
whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to
modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or
guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the
decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is
not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just because there is
a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care,
advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural
mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that
their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity
in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of
parents. It imports the assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of the
State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental
control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on
matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the
establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's
privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-
held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of the
recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of
marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents
in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a
parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state
substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the
second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse under
Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation
between access to information about family planning services, on one hand, and
access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning
methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned,
the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the
minor referred to under the exception in the second paragraph of Section 7 that
would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child.
After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect
both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that
information to enable a person to make informed decisions is essential in the
protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with
respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that
parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are
not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and control over their minor child and
assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-
threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In such
cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the
spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It should be
emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care
urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii) 249 should be struck
down. By effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in
elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority
in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures." Save for the two
exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in the
first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their
constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an
affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof,
mandating the teaching of Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive
Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle
of academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these provisions effectively
force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they
believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their students.250 Citing various
studies conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in the country,
the petitioners aver that the prevalence of contraceptives has led to an increase of
out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the acceptance of
abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and
promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the
RH Law is premature because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has
yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of instruction that
will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the
religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus,
considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule
on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural
and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency
and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution affirms
the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to
become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the
role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role
shall be "primary," that is, that the right of parents in upbringing the youth is
superior to that of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in
the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of
the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation
building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-appropriate-
reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the development of
knowledge and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and
violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence
and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in adolescents;
women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and
development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the
RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of
responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and physical and emotional
changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided
under the assailed provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and
duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health
education program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-
community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very
well be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners. By
imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention
that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without
merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to
their participation in the reproductive health education program provided under
Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious
beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates
the due process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l)
mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be held
punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service provider." They
argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a
"private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law,
hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive health service instead of "private health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion
and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.
are also exempt from giving reproductive health information under Section 23(a)(l),
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being
or from rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health
providing of incorrect information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly, subject to the
information." qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning
The arguments fail to persuade.
methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. The
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of
and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: information and the rendering of medical procedures.
(1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers
health care service providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and provide
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing
incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For
of the Government muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used
ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:
in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken in accordance with their plain
meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is,
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept
subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.256 (1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or
intentionally provide incorrect information regarding programs and services on
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care
reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a full
service provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which
range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
defines a "public health service provider," viz:
methods;
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution,
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a
which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance
copy or model or with established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the
and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis,
requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the
treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury, disability or
truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with awareness or
deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public
deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l),
health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3)
they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public
public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay
as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public
health worker who has undergone training programs under any accredited
health and safety demand that health care service providers give their honest and
government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services
correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical
in the community after having been accredited to function as such by the local
practice. While health care service providers are not barred from expressing their
health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department
own personal opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive
of Health (DOH) .
health, their right must be tempered with the need to provide public health and
safety. The public deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause
under the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes them
the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use .
They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the poor, the
RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the
poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor,
especially those mentioned in the guiding principles259 and definition of
terms260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory
reproductive health education program imposed by the RH Law renders it
unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to
expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the
equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as
every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has
been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific
guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause.
But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice,
the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions
to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of the
equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction
against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express
terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted
authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires
the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental
objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of
the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government
including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a
state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever
guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test
of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the
same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or
embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be
regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as
to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary that the
classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of
the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial
similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the
classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging
to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially
distinguishable from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to
him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so
constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be
of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that
should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations
excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive
health care program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is
pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct
necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by providing that they be
given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to
health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and
other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be
priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled, women, and
children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized
couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is,
therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor
to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use of contraceptives, it does
not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the
"promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the
advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may
have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children.
While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with
the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane way, a
deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply
provide priority to the poor in the implementation of government programs to
promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the
mandatory reproductive health education program under Section 14, suffice it to
state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend
public educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient
to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests
between public educational institutions and private educational institutions,
particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private
educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to
consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the
constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17
of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health care
service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono reproductive health
services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires medical
practitioners to perform acts against their will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17
can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive
health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of
giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the imposition is
within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners
with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued
with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and
regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal
profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened with
conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power
includes the power of Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for the practice
of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public
morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such professions or trades,
even to the point of revoking such right altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes
the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and
compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only
encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare service
providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth,
no penalty is imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-
government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to
choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when, where and how to
provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or
threat is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the
rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth,
the Court does not consider the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a
necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived
legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be
emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as
their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive
health service, pro bona or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the
power to determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the
Essential Drugs List (EDL).266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have
the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health services
and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services
and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health services and
methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily
understood as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to
be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health
(DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have
the following functions, powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and
regulations issued pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation
of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health
products standards, and to recommend standards of identity, purity, safety,
efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis
for the issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance with
regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters,
distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments and facilities of
health products, as determined by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the
issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters,
wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users of health products to
report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has
caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer,
a patient, or any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for
health products, whether or not registered with the FDA Provided, That for
registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days
and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health
product found to have caused death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer
or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly
deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk management plan
which is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA
are specific to enable the agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the
country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines
available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers and
functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication,
the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by
permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods."
From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress intended that the
public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-
abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based
medical research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was
explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice,267 as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the
growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and
created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become
necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the
legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to
provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law
infringes upon the powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under
Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs
the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and facilities,
as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue
exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested
upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national
agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government
units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions
and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and
effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and
responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them from the national
agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their
respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a categorical
exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and
services.268 Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and
infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services funded by the
National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special
laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded from foreign
sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local
government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for
such projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is
that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has
no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the program
involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A
complete relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing
basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself
weighs against it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the
establishment of health care facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health
professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the
national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation. Local
autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes
to national priority programs which the local government is called upon to
implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged
to provide these services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be
construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For
said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue encroachment
by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local
governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments
can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its
autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the
organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the exemption
of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy
statements for the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied
upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the
regional government, which can, in no manner, be characterized as an abdication
by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare.
After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and
the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et
imperio in the relationship between the national and the regional
governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by
the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary
power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern
or common interest.275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to
say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or
invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted
by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court is not obliged
to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin
with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are
mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers
and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school are interested in the law as
an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present.277 Unless, a
natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to
strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the
petitioners, it was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law
or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law.
Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of
circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away
of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the
population control program of the government by providing information and
making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to the public,
especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it
seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal,
affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and
supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some sectors of
society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After
all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man
stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious
group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine
modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone
should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to
reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the
Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and
unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues
is not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if
population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth
remains in the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long
run. The European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a program
generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their
young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy. These young
workers represent a significant human capital which could have helped them
invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to
reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with
incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our
Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we have an ample supply of young able-
bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an
ageing population and the fewer younger generation would not be able to support
them? This would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down
below the replacement level of two (2) children per woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should
not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against
conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-
interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty
is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same
as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of
circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the wisdom of the
law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the
business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the
application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation
if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always, with apt judicial caution
and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting
the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled
jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must
confine itself to the judicial task of saying what the law is, as enacted by the
lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and
enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but
with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely
unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the
Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The
Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed
legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the
adoption of any family planning method should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court
declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the
following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a)
require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals
owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or
life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health
facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who
have suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without
written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who
fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services
on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined
under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without
the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they
limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly
Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who
fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case,
as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider
within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or
her religious beliefs;

6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section
5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer who refuses to support
reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;

7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the

rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they affect the
conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and

8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier
"primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and,
therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by
its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A.
No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.

SO ORDERED.
EN BANC The Solicitor General for respondents.

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993 DAVIDE, JR., J.:

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and
minors, and represented by their parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin
ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."
ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of
minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests
R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems
GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and represented by and continued rape of Mother Earth."
their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor,
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before
represented by his parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO,
Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA
Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all
CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and JANE
minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an
CASTRO, JOHANNA DESAMPARADO,
additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO
non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, represented by his parents GREGORIO II and
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and
CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA. ANGELA and
natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran,
MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents
Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel
and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents MARIO
C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The
and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all surnamed
complaint2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs
ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA,
"are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full
JOSE MA. and REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their
benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's
parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all
virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are
surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA
equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous
CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA,
that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further
minors and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP
asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all surnamed QUIPIT, minors,
unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO,
CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, . . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his
represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE behalf to —
PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs. (1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE
new timber license agreements.
ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch
66, respondents. and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the
premises."5
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago
of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is
endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique
species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic,
biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of
indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since
time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced
and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a
ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and
disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a
host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying
up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks
and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein
of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be found in the island of
Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the
consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of
soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum —
approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering
and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the
disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the disappearance
of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical
reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is
presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon
winds which result from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands
and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of
forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams
constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses,
irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and
catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon of global warming,
otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of
continued and deforestation are so capable of unquestionable demonstration that
the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding,
they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary,
photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares
of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2
million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land
area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth
rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago
and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth
forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber
license agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of
3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached
as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or
25 hectares per hour — nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included —
the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of this ensuing
decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation
and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact,
the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being
felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the
remaining forest stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs
— especially plaintiff minors and their successors — who may never see, use,
benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resource property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and
succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful
ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens
patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office.
On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all
logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the
continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act
violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with
a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora,
fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed
with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary
to the public policy enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in
pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State —
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and
nature can thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future
generations of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life
of dignity and well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's
is contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the State to —
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and
"make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)"
(Section 14, Article XIV, id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the
natural law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and
perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the
instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support
systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no
cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political
question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of
Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners
maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2)
the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves
the defendant's abuse of discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned
motion to dismiss.7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim — that
the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question — sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the
relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by
the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal
order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent
their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the
parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the petitioners
filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of
action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound
environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations),
Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and
the concept of man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation
embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a
healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave
abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more
areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-
impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case
because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be
considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be
revoked by the State when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in
their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which
any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and
nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly
entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens
patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action.
They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be
permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed
to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that
the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before
Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same
cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA
remains effective for a certain period of time — usually for twenty-five (25) years.
During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the
holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of
the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to
have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be
violative of the requirements of due process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters.
Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant
and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We
hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the
complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens
of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We
likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough
to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for
the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being
but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that
they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no
difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and
for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf
of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created world in its
entirety.9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be
equitably accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10Needless to say,
every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes,
at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of
that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now
proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration
and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do
not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's
challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help
but agree with the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the
noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a
specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong
they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the
Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague
conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action
in its Complaint against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed
with political color and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken
cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege
with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong
committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these
conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right — the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding
section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and
instill health consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does
not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights
altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation
— aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners — the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact,
these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they are
assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly
mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its
framers that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health
are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to
preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day would not be too
far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for
those to come — generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.
The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of
the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following
exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner
Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of
pollution — air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries
with it the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may
be provided for impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and
conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby
disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the Constitution
concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O.
No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of
the country's environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing
lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and
lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural
resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of
the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future
generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of
policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared the policy of the State to
ensure the sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation
of the country's forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources,
including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the environment, and
equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development
and the use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation
but for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and
apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications
relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987,15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the
Filipino people, the full exploration and development as well as the judicious
disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance
and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of
making the exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources
equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future
generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into
account social and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization,
development and conservation of our natural resources.
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2
of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the
DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being
subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. — (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources
shall be primarily responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the
State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives
which will serve as the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers
and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental
right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151
(Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code)
were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create,
develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive
in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social,
economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos,
and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a
life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of
each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and
healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty — under its mandate and by virtue
of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of
1987 — to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or
obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners
maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse
of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the
full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the
other; and its essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative
obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of
said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that
the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court
for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself.
No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said
allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically
admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such alleged
facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the
prayer in the complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the
rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care and circumspection in
passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of
action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and
deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively
nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in
disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements
under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments
under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima
facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be
granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that
insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead,
as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political
question. Policy formulation or determination by the executive or legislative
branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved
is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in
legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine
is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial
inquiry or review. The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution
states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice
Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power,
involving the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part
of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of
justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of the
political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme
Court, the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive
and the legislature and to declare their acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction
because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the meaning
of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable
and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented
before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from revolving it
under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper
cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-
impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared
that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch
our jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all
existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts"
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by
such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did
not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment
clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the
Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the
timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to
strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless
of changes in policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware
that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license must be
read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend,
modify, replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other
form of privilege granted herein . . .
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.
It is not a contract, property or a property right protested by the due process clause
of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization
and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A
timber license is not a contract within the purview of the due process clause; it is
only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever dictated by
public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful,
and is not a contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it
and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor
does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held
that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property
or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor
Executive Secretary: 26 contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will
use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments
to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public
by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to
to regulate it in the common interest.
the end that public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they
merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities, and do not In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment
and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced
clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary
or rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they
from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses
are not deemed contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause
for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other
[See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v.
instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a
Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
matter of right.
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED,
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed. 27 and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil
Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their
cannot be invoked.
complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the timber license agreements.
instant case does not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the
No pronouncement as to costs.
cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment
clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has SO ORDERED.
actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot
still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by
its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the
exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of
the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and
enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. this Court stated:
28

The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be

absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation
aimed at the promotion of public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other words,
the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited
by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health,
safety, moral and general welfare.

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted
in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General,30 to wit:

Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts
are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that
EN BANC other critical habitats, oil spills, and the unabated improper disposal of garbage.
And rightly so, for the magnitude of environmental destruction is now on a scale
METROPOLITAN MANILA G.R. Nos. 171947-48
few ever foresaw and the wound no longer simply heals by itself.[2] But amidst hard
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY,
evidence and clear signs of a climate crisis that need bold action, the voice of
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
cynicism, naysayers, and procrastinators can still be heard.
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, Present:
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION,
This case turns on government agencies and their officers who, by the nature of
CULTURE AND SPORTS,[1] DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
their respective offices or by direct statutory command, are tasked to protect and
AGRICULTURE, DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC
preserve, at the first instance, our internal waters, rivers, shores, and seas polluted
WORKS AND HIGHWAYS,
by human activities. To most of these agencies and their official complement, the
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, PHILIPPINE
pollution menace does not seem to carry the high national priority it deserves, if
COAST GUARD, PHILIPPINE
their track records are to be the norm. Their cavalier attitude towards solving, if not
NATIONAL POLICE MARITIME
mitigating, the environmental pollution problem, is a sad commentary on
GROUP, and DEPARTMENT OF
bureaucratic efficiency and commitment.
THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT,
At the core of the case is the Manila Bay, a place with a proud historic past, once
- versus -
brimming with marine life and, for so many decades in the past, a spot for different
CONCERNED RESIDENTS OF
contact recreation activities, but now a dirty and slowly dying expanse mainly
MANILA BAY, represented and
because of the abject official indifference of people and institutions that could have
joined by DIVINA V. ILAS,
otherwise made a difference.
SABINIANO ALBARRACIN,
MANUEL SANTOS, JR., DINAH
DELA PEA, PAUL DENNIS
This case started when, on January 29, 1999, respondents Concerned Residents of
QUINTERO, MA. VICTORIA
Manila Bay filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Imus, Cavite
LLENOS, DONNA CALOZA,
against several government agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup,
FATIMA QUITAIN, VENICE
rehabilitation, and protection of the Manila Bay. Raffled to Branch 20 and docketed
SEGARRA, FRITZIE TANGKIA,
as Civil Case No. 1851-99 of the RTC, the complaint alleged that the water quality
SARAH JOELLE LINTAG,
of the Manila Bay had fallen way below the allowable standards set by law,
HANNIBAL AUGUSTUS BOBIS,
specifically Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1152 or the Philippine Environment Code.
FELIMON SANTIAGUEL, and Promulgated:
This environmental aberration, the complaint stated, stemmed from:
JAIME AGUSTIN R. OPOSA,
Respondents. December 18, 2008
x x x [The] reckless, wholesale, accumulated and ongoing acts of omission or
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
commission [of the defendants] resulting in the clear and present danger to public
-x
health and in the depletion and contamination of the marine life of Manila Bay, [for
which reason] ALL defendants must be held jointly and/or solidarily liable and be
DECISION
collectively ordered to clean up Manila Bay and to restore its water quality to class
B waters fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.[3]
VELASCO, JR., J.:

The need to address environmental pollution, as a cause of climate change, has of

late gained the attention of the international community. Media have finally
trained their sights on the ill effects of pollution, the destruction of forests and
In their individual causes of action, respondents alleged that the continued neglect
of petitioners in abating the pollution of the Manila Bay constitutes a violation of,
among others:
(1) Respondents constitutional right to life, health, and a balanced
ecology;
(2) The Environment Code (PD 1152);
(3) The Pollution Control Law (PD 984);
(4) The Water Code (PD 1067);
(5) The Sanitation Code (PD 856);
(6) The Illegal Disposal of Wastes Decree (PD 825);
(7) The Marine Pollution Law (PD 979);
(8) Executive Order No. 192;
(9) The Toxic and Hazardous Wastes Law (Republic Act No. 6969);
(10) Civil Code provisions on nuisance and human relations;
(11) The Trust Doctrine and the Principle of Guardianship; and
(12) International Law
Inter alia, respondents, as plaintiffs a quo, prayed that petitioners be ordered to
clean the Manila Bay and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action
for the purpose.
The trial of the case started off with a hearing at the Manila Yacht Club followed
by an ocular inspection of the Manila Bay. Renato T. Cruz, the Chief of the Water
Quality Management Section, Environmental Management Bureau, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), testifying for petitioners, stated that
water samples collected from different beaches around the Manila Bay showed
that the amount of fecal coliform content ranged from 50,000 to 80,000 most
probable number (MPN)/ml when what DENR Administrative Order No. 34-90
prescribed as a safe level for bathing and other forms of contact recreational
activities, or the SB level, is one not exceeding 200 MPN/100 ml.[4]
Rebecca de Vera, for Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) and
in behalf of other petitioners, testified about the MWSS efforts to reduce pollution
along the Manila Bay through the Manila Second Sewerage Project. For its part,
the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) presented, as part of its evidence, its
memorandum circulars on the study being conducted on ship-generated waste
treatment and disposal, and its Linis Dagat (Clean the Ocean) project for the
cleaning of wastes accumulated or washed to shore.
The RTC Ordered Petitioners to Clean Up and Rehabilitate Manila Bay
On September 13, 2002, the RTC rendered a Decision[5] in favor of respondents.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
the abovenamed defendant-government agencies, jointly and solidarily, to clean
up and rehabilitate Manila Bay and restore its waters to SB classification to make it
fit for swimming, skin-diving and other forms of contact recreation. To attain this,
defendant-agencies, with defendant DENR as the lead agency, are directed, within
six (6) months from receipt hereof, to act and perform their respective duties by
devising a consolidated, coordinated and concerted scheme of action for the
rehabilitation and restoration of the bay.
In particular:
Defendant MWSS is directed to install, operate and maintain adequate [sewerage]
treatment facilities in strategic places under its jurisdiction and increase their
capacities.
Defendant LWUA, to see to it that the water districts under its wings, provide,
construct and operate sewage facilities for the proper disposal of waste.
Defendant DENR, which is the lead agency in cleaning up Manila Bay, to install,
operate and maintain waste facilities to rid the bay of toxic and hazardous
substances.
Defendant PPA, to prevent and also to treat the discharge not only of ship-
generated wastes but also of other solid and liquid wastes from docking vessels
that contribute to the pollution of the bay.
Defendant MMDA, to establish, operate and maintain an adequate and
appropriate sanitary landfill and/or adequate solid waste and liquid disposal as well
as other alternative garbage disposal system such as re-use or recycling of wastes.
Defendant DA, through the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources, to revitalize
the marine life in Manila Bay and restock its waters with indigenous fish and other
aquatic animals.
Defendant DBM, to provide and set aside an adequate budget solely for the
purpose of cleaning up and rehabilitation of Manila Bay.
Defendant DPWH, to remove and demolish structures and other nuisances that
obstruct the free flow of waters to the bay. These nuisances discharge solid and
liquid wastes which eventually end up in Manila Bay. As the construction and
engineering arm of the government, DPWH is ordered to actively participate in
removing debris, such as carcass of sunken vessels, and other non-biodegradable
garbage in the bay.
Defendant DOH, to closely supervise and monitor the operations of septic and
sludge companies and require them to have proper facilities for the treatment and
disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.
Defendant DECS, to inculcate in the minds and hearts of the people through
education the importance of preserving and protecting the environment.
Defendant Philippine Coast Guard and the PNP Maritime Group, to protect at all
costs the Manila Bay from all forms of illegal fishing.
No pronouncement as to damages and costs.
SO ORDERED.
The MWSS, Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), and PPA filed before the
Court of Appeals (CA) individual Notices of Appeal which were eventually
consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 76528.
On the other hand, the DENR, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),
Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), Philippine Coast Guard
(PCG), Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group, and five other executive
departments and agencies filed directly with this Court a petition for review under
Rule 45. The Court, in a Resolution of December 9, 2002, sent the said petition to
the CA for consolidation with the consolidated appeals of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA,
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 74944.
Petitioners, before the CA, were one in arguing in the main that the pertinent
provisions of the Environment Code (PD 1152) relate only to the cleaning of specific
pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. And apart from raising
concerns about the lack of funds appropriated for cleaning purposes, petitioners
also asserted that the cleaning of the Manila Bay is not a ministerial act which can
be compelled by mandamus.
The CA Sustained the RTC
By a Decision[6] of September 28, 2005, the CA denied petitioners appeal and
affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, stressing that the trial courts decision did
not require petitioners to do tasks outside of their usual basic functions under
existing laws.[7]
Petitioners are now before this Court praying for the allowance of their Rule 45
petition on the following ground and supporting arguments:
THE [CA] DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT HERETOFORE PASSED UPON
BY THE HONORABLE COURT, I.E., IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION
DECLARING THAT SECTION 20 OF [PD] 1152 REQUIRES CONCERNED
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO REMOVE ALL POLLUTANTS SPILLED AND
DISCHARGED IN THE WATER SUCH AS FECAL COLIFORMS.
ARGUMENTS
I
[SECTIONS] 17 AND 20 OF [PD] 1152 RELATE ONLY TO THE CLEANING OF SPECIFIC
POLLUTION INCIDENTS AND [DO] NOT COVER CLEANING IN GENERAL
II
THE CLEANING OR REHABILITATION OF THE MANILA BAY IS NOT A MINISTERIAL
ACT OF PETITIONERS THAT CAN BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS.
The issues before us are two-fold. First, do Sections 17 and 20 of PD 1152 under
the headings, Upgrading of Water Quality and Clean-up Operations, envisage a
cleanup in general or are they limited only to the cleanup of specific pollution
incidents? And second, can petitioners be compelled by mandamus to clean up
and rehabilitate the ManilaBay?
On August 12, 2008, the Court conducted and heard the parties on oral arguments.
Our Ruling
We shall first dwell on the propriety of the issuance of mandamus under the
premises.
The Cleaning or Rehabilitation of Manila Bay
Can be Compelled by Mandamus
Generally, the writ of mandamus lies to require the execution of a ministerial
duty.[8] A ministerial duty is one that requires neither the exercise of official
discretion nor judgment.[9] It connotes an act in which nothing is left to the
discretion of the person executing it. It is a simple, definite duty arising under
conditions admitted or proved to exist and imposed by law.[10] Mandamus is
available to compel action, when refused, on matters involving discretion, but not
to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion one way or the other.
Petitioners maintain that the MMDAs duty to take measures and maintain
adequate solid waste and liquid disposal systems necessarily involves policy
evaluation and the exercise of judgment on the part of the agency concerned. They
argue that the MMDA, in carrying out its mandate, has to make decisions, including
choosing where a landfill should be located by undertaking feasibility studies and
cost estimates, all of which entail the exercise of discretion.
Respondents, on the other hand, counter that the statutory command is clear and
that petitioners duty to comply with and act according to the clear mandate of the
law does not require the exercise of discretion. According to respondents,
petitioners, the MMDA in particular, are without discretion, for example, to choose
which bodies of water they are to clean up, or which discharge or spill they are to
contain. By the same token, respondents maintain that petitioners are bereft of
discretion on whether or not to alleviate the problem of solid and liquid waste
disposal; in other words, it is the MMDAs ministerial duty to attend to such services.
We agree with respondents.
First off, we wish to state that petitioners obligation to perform their duties as
defined by law, on one hand, and how they are to carry out such duties, on the
other, are two different concepts. While the implementation of the MMDAs
mandated tasks may entail a decision-making process, the enforcement of the law
or the very act of doing what the law exacts to be done is ministerial in nature and
may be compelled by mandamus. We said so in Social Justice Society v.
Atienza[11] in which the Court directed the City of Manila to enforce, as a matter of
ministerial duty, its Ordinance No. 8027 directing the three big local oil players to
cease and desist from operating their business in the so-called Pandacan Terminals
within six months from the effectivity of the ordinance. But to illustrate with respect
to the instant case, the MMDAs duty to put up an adequate and appropriate
sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal as well as other alternative
garbage disposal systems is ministerial, its duty being a statutory imposition. The
MMDAs duty in this regard is spelled out in Sec. 3(c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7924
creating the MMDA. This section defines and delineates the scope of the MMDAs
waste disposal services to include:
Solid waste disposal and management which include formulation and
implementation of policies, standards, programs and projects for proper and
sanitary waste disposal. It shall likewise include the establishment and operation
of sanitary land fill and related facilities and the implementation of other
alternative programs intended to reduce, reuse and recycle solid waste. (Emphasis
added.)
The MMDA is duty-bound to comply with Sec. 41 of the Ecological Solid Waste
Management Act (RA 9003) which prescribes the minimum criteria for the
establishment of sanitary landfills and Sec. 42 which provides the minimum
operating requirements that each site operator shall maintain in the operation of
a sanitary landfill. Complementing Sec. 41 are Secs. 36 and 37 of RA
9003,[12] enjoining the MMDA and local government units, among others, after the
effectivity of the law on February 15, 2001, from using and operating open dumps
for solid waste and disallowing, five years after such effectivity, the use of
controlled dumps.
The MMDAs duty in the area of solid waste disposal, as may be noted, is set forth
not only in the Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well.
This duty of putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as
discretionary, for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given
by law to public functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or
conscience.[13] A discretionary duty is one that allows a person to exercise
judgment and choose to perform or not to perform.[14] Any suggestion that the
MMDA has the option whether or not to perform its solid waste disposal-related
duties ought to be dismissed for want of legal basis.
A perusal of other petitioners respective charters or like enabling statutes and
pertinent laws would yield this conclusion: these government agencies are
enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to perform certain functions relating
directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation, protection, and preservation of
the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not to perform these duties.
Consider:
(1) The DENR, under Executive Order No. (EO) 192,[15] is the primary agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of
the countrys environment and natural resources. Sec. 19 of the Philippine Clean
Water Act of 2004 (RA 9275), on the other hand, designates the DENR as the
primary government agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation,
more particularly over all aspects of water quality management. On water
pollution, the DENR, under the Acts Sec. 19(k), exercises jurisdiction over all aspects
of water pollution, determine[s] its location, magnitude, extent, severity, causes and
effects and other pertinent information on pollution, and [takes] measures, using
available methods and technologies, to prevent and abate such pollution.
The DENR, under RA 9275, is also tasked to prepare a National Water Quality Status
Report, an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework, and a 10-year Water
Quality Management Area Action Plan which is nationwide in scope covering
the Manila Bay and adjoining areas. Sec. 19 of RA 9275 provides:
Sec. 19 Lead Agency.The [DENR] shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the implementation and enforcement of this Act x x x unless
otherwise provided herein. As such, it shall have the following functions, powers
and responsibilities:
a) Prepare a National Water Quality Status report within twenty-four (24)
months from the effectivity of this Act: Provided, That the Department shall
thereafter review or revise and publish annually, or as the need arises, said report;
b) Prepare an Integrated Water Quality Management Framework within twelve
(12) months following the completion of the status report;
c) Prepare a ten (10) year Water Quality Management Area Action Plan within
12 months following the completion of the framework for each designated water
management area. Such action plan shall be reviewed by the water quality
management area governing board every five (5) years or as need arises.
The DENR has prepared the status report for the period 2001 to 2005 and is in the
process of completing the preparation of the Integrated Water Quality
Management Framework.[16] Within twelve (12) months thereafter, it has to submit
a final Water Quality Management Area Action Plan.[17] Again, like the MMDA, the
DENR should be made to accomplish the tasks assigned to it under RA 9275.
Parenthetically, during the oral arguments, the DENR Secretary manifested that the
DENR, with the assistance of and in partnership with various government agencies
and non-government organizations, has completed, as of December 2005, the final
draft of a comprehensive action plan with estimated budget and time frame,
denominated as Operation Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy, for the
rehabilitation, restoration, and rehabilitation of the Manila Bay.
The completion of the said action plan and even the implementation of some of
its phases should more than ever prod the concerned agencies to fast track what
are assigned them under existing laws.
(2) The MWSS, under Sec. 3 of RA 6234,[18] is vested with jurisdiction, supervision,
and control over all waterworks and sewerage systems in the territory comprising
what is now the cities of Metro Manila and several towns of the provinces of Rizal
and Cavite, and charged with the duty:
(g) To construct, maintain, and operate such sanitary sewerages as may be
necessary for the proper sanitation and other uses of the cities and towns
comprising the System; x x x
(3) The LWUA under PD 198 has the power of supervision and control over local
water districts. It can prescribe the minimum standards and regulations for the
operations of these districts and shall monitor and evaluate local water standards.
The LWUA can direct these districts to construct, operate, and furnish facilities and
services for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewerage, waste, and storm
water. Additionally, under RA 9275, the LWUA, as attached agency of the DPWH, is
tasked with providing sewerage and sanitation facilities, inclusive of the setting up
of efficient and safe collection, treatment, and sewage disposal system in the
different parts of the country.[19] In relation to the instant petition, the LWUA is
mandated to provide sewerage and sanitation facilities in Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan,
Pampanga, and Bataan to prevent pollution in the Manila Bay.
(4) The Department of Agriculture (DA), pursuant to the Administrative Code of
1987 (EO 292),[20] is designated as the agency tasked to promulgate and enforce
all laws and issuances respecting the conservation and proper utilization of
agricultural and fishery resources. Furthermore, the DA, under the Philippine
Fisheries Code of 1998 (RA 8550), is, in coordination with local government units
(LGUs) and other concerned sectors, in charge of establishing a monitoring,
control, and surveillance system to ensure that fisheries and aquatic resources in
Philippine waters are judiciously utilized and managed on a sustainable
basis.[21] Likewise under RA 9275, the DA is charged with coordinating with the PCG
and DENR for the enforcement of water quality standards in marine
waters.[22] More specifically, its Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources(BFAR)
under Sec. 22(c) of RA 9275 shall primarily be responsible for the prevention and
control of water pollution for the development, management, and conservation of
the fisheries and aquatic resources.
(5) The DPWH, as the engineering and construction arm of the national
government, is tasked under EO 292[23] to provide integrated planning, design, and
construction services for, among others, flood control and water resource
development systems in accordance with national development objectives and
approved government plans and specifications.
In Metro Manila, however, the MMDA is authorized by Sec. 3(d), RA 7924 to
perform metro-wide services relating to flood control and sewerage management
which include the formulation and implementation of policies, standards,
programs and projects for an integrated flood control, drainage and sewerage
system.
On July 9, 2002, a Memorandum of Agreement was entered into between the
DPWH and MMDA, whereby MMDA was made the agency primarily responsible
for flood control in Metro Manila. For the rest of the country, DPWH shall remain
as the implementing agency for flood control services. The mandate of the MMDA
and DPWH on flood control and drainage services shall include the removal of
structures, constructions, and encroachments built along rivers, waterways,
and esteros (drainages) in violation of RA 7279, PD 1067, and other pertinent laws.
(6) The PCG, in accordance with Sec. 5(p) of PD 601, or the Revised Coast Guard
Law of 1974, and Sec. 6 of PD 979,[24] or the Marine Pollution Decree of 1976, shall
have the primary responsibility of enforcing laws, rules, and regulations governing
marine pollution within the territorial waters of the Philippines. It shall promulgate
its own rules and regulations in accordance with the national rules and policies set
by the National Pollution Control Commission upon consultation with the latter for
the effective implementation and enforcement of PD 979. It shall, under Sec. 4 of
the law, apprehend violators who:
a. discharge, dump x x x harmful substances from or out of any ship, vessel, barge,
or any other floating craft, or other man-made structures at sea, by any method,
means or manner, into or upon the territorial and inland navigable waters of the
Philippines;
b. throw, discharge or deposit, dump, or cause, suffer or procure to be thrown,
discharged, or deposited either from or out of any ship, barge, or other floating
craft or vessel of any kind, or from the shore, wharf, manufacturing establishment,
or mill of any kind, any refuse matter of any kind or description whatever other
than that flowing from streets and sewers and passing therefrom in a liquid state
into tributary of any navigable water from which the same shall float or be washed
into such navigable water; and
c. deposit x x x material of any kind in any place on the bank of any navigable water
or on the bank of any tributary of any navigable water, where the same shall be
liable to be washed into such navigable water, either by ordinary or high tides, or
by storms or floods, or otherwise, whereby navigation shall or may be impeded or
obstructed or increase the level of pollution of such water.
(7) When RA 6975 or the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG)
Act of 1990 was signed into law on December 13, 1990, the PNP Maritime Group
was tasked to perform all police functions over the Philippine territorial waters and
rivers. Under Sec. 86, RA 6975, the police functions of the PCG shall be taken over
by the PNP when the latter acquires the capability to perform such functions. Since
the PNP Maritime Group has not yet attained the capability to assume and perform
the police functions of PCG over marine pollution, the PCG and PNP Maritime
Group shall coordinate with regard to the enforcement of laws, rules, and
regulations governing marine pollution within the territorial waters of
the Philippines. This was made clear in Sec. 124, RA 8550 or the Philippine Fisheries
Code of 1998, in which both the PCG and PNP Maritime Group were authorized to
enforce said law and other fishery laws, rules, and regulations.[25]
(8) In accordance with Sec. 2 of EO 513, the PPA is mandated to establish, develop,
regulate, manage and operate a rationalized national port system in support of
trade and national development.[26] Moreover, Sec. 6-c of EO 513 states that the
PPA has police authority within the
ports administered by it as may be necessary to carry out its powers and functions
and attain its purposes and objectives, without prejudice to the exercise of the
functions of the Bureau of Customs and other law enforcement bodies within the
area. Such police authority shall include the following:
xxxx
b) To regulate the entry to, exit from, and movement within the port, of persons
and vehicles, as well as movement within the port of watercraft.[27]
Lastly, as a member of the International Marine Organization and a signatory to
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, as
amended by MARPOL 73/78,[28] the Philippines, through the PPA, must ensure the
provision of adequate reception facilities at ports and terminals for the reception
of sewage from the ships docking in Philippine ports. Thus, the PPA is tasked to
adopt such measures as are necessary to prevent the discharge and dumping of
solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes into
the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend the violators.
When the vessels are not docked at ports but within Philippine territorial waters, it
is the PCG and PNP Maritime Group that have jurisdiction over said vessels.
(9) The MMDA, as earlier indicated, is duty-bound to put up and maintain adequate
sanitary landfill and solid waste and liquid disposal system as well as other
alternative garbage disposal systems. It is primarily responsible for the
implementation and enforcement of the provisions of RA 9003, which would
necessary include its penal provisions, within its area of jurisdiction.[29]
Among the prohibited acts under Sec. 48, Chapter VI of RA 9003 that are frequently
violated are dumping of waste matters in public places, such as roads, canals
or esteros, open burning of solid waste, squatting in open dumps and landfills,
open dumping, burying of biodegradable or non- biodegradable materials in
flood-prone areas, establishment or operation of open dumps as enjoined in RA
9003, and operation of waste management facilities without an environmental
compliance certificate.
Under Sec. 28 of the Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992 (RA 7279),
eviction or demolition may be allowed when persons or entities occupy danger
areas such asesteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines,
waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks and
playgrounds. The MMDA, as lead agency, in coordination with the DPWH, LGUs,
and concerned agencies, can dismantle and remove all structures, constructions,
and other encroachments built in breach of RA 7279 and other pertinent laws along
the rivers, waterways, and esteros in Metro Manila. With respect to rivers,
waterways, and esteros in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna that
discharge wastewater directly or eventually into the Manila Bay, the DILG shall
direct the concerned LGUs to implement the demolition and removal of such
structures, constructions, and other encroachments built in violation of RA 7279
and other applicable laws in coordination with the DPWH and concerned agencies.
(10) The Department of Health (DOH), under Article 76 of PD 1067 (the Water
Code), is tasked to promulgate rules and regulations for the establishment of waste
disposal areas that affect the source of a water supply or a reservoir for domestic
or municipal use. And under Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the DOH, in coordination with the
DENR, DPWH, and other concerned agencies, shall formulate guidelines and
standards for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and the
establishment and operation of a centralized sewage treatment system. In areas
not considered as highly urbanized cities, septage or a mix sewerage-septage
management system shall be employed.
In accordance with Sec. 72[30] of PD 856, the Code of Sanitation of the Philippines,
and Sec. 5.1.1[31] of Chapter XVII of its implementing rules, the DOH is also ordered
to ensure the regulation and monitoring of the proper disposal of wastes by private
sludge companies through the strict enforcement of the requirement to obtain an
environmental sanitation clearance of sludge collection treatment and disposal
before these companies are issued their environmental sanitation permit.
(11) The Department of Education (DepEd), under the Philippine Environment Code
(PD 1152), is mandated to integrate subjects on environmental education in its
school curricula at all levels.[32] Under Sec. 118 of RA 8550, the DepEd, in
collaboration with the DA, Commission on Higher Education, and Philippine
Information Agency, shall launch and pursue a nationwide educational campaign
to promote the development, management, conservation, and proper use of the
environment. Under the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA 9003), on the
other hand, it is directed to strengthen the integration of environmental concerns
in school curricula at all levels, with an emphasis on waste management
principles.[33]
(12) The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is tasked under Sec. 2,
Title XVII of the Administrative Code of 1987 to ensure the efficient and sound
utilization of government funds and revenues so as to effectively achieve the
countrys development objectives.[34]
One of the countrys development objectives is enshrined in RA 9275 or the
Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004. This law stresses that the State shall pursue a
policy of economic growth in a manner consistent with the protection,
preservation, and revival of the quality of our fresh, brackish, and marine waters. It
also provides that it is the policy of the government, among others, to streamline
processes and procedures in the prevention, control, and abatement of pollution
mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to promote environmental
strategies and use of appropriate economic instruments and of control
mechanisms for the protection of water resources; to formulate a holistic national
program of water quality management that recognizes that issues related to this
management cannot be separated from concerns about water sources and
ecological protection, water supply, public health, and quality of life; and to provide
a comprehensive management program for water pollution focusing on pollution
prevention.
Thus, the DBM shall then endeavor to provide an adequate budget to attain the
noble objectives of RA 9275 in line with the countrys development objectives.
All told, the aforementioned enabling laws and issuances are in themselves clear,
categorical, and complete as to what are the obligations and mandate of each
agency/petitioner under the law. We need not belabor the issue that their tasks
include the cleanup of the Manila Bay.
Now, as to the crux of the petition. Do Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
encompass the cleanup of water pollution in general, not just specific pollution
incidents?
Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
Include Cleaning in General
The disputed sections are quoted as follows:
Section 17. Upgrading of Water Quality.Where the quality of water has
deteriorated to a degree where its state will adversely affect its best usage, the
government agencies concerned shall take such measures as may be necessary to
upgrade the quality of such water to meet the prescribed water quality standards.
Section 20. Clean-up Operations.It shall be the responsibility of the polluter to
contain, remove and clean-up water pollution incidents at his own expense. In case
of his failure to do so, the government agencies concerned shall undertake
containment, removal and clean-up operations and expenses incurred in said
operations shall be charged against the persons and/or entities responsible for
such pollution.
When the Clean Water Act (RA 9275) took effect, its Sec. 16 on the subject, Cleanup
Operations, amended the counterpart provision (Sec. 20) of the Environment Code
(PD 1152). Sec. 17 of PD 1152 continues, however, to be operational.
The amendatory Sec. 16 of RA 9275 reads:
SEC. 16. Cleanup Operations.Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 15 and 26
hereof, any person who causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies in excess of
the applicable and prevailing standards shall be responsible to contain, remove
and clean up any pollution incident at his own expense to the extent that the same
water bodies have been rendered unfit for utilization and beneficial use: Provided,
That in the event emergency cleanup operations are necessary and the polluter
fails to immediately undertake the same, the [DENR] in coordination with other
government agencies concerned, shall undertake containment, removal and
cleanup operations. Expenses incurred in said operations shall be reimbursed by
the persons found to have caused such pollution under proper administrative
determination x x x. Reimbursements of the cost incurred shall be made to the
Water Quality Management Fund or to such other funds where said disbursements
were sourced.
As may be noted, the amendment to Sec. 20 of the Environment Code is more
apparent than real since the amendment, insofar as it is relevant to this case, merely
consists in the designation of the DENR as lead agency in the cleanup operations.
Petitioners contend at every turn that Secs. 17 and 20 of the Environment Code
concern themselves only with the matter of cleaning up in specific pollution
incidents, as opposed to cleanup in general. They aver that the twin provisions
would have to be read alongside the succeeding Sec. 62(g) and (h), which defines
the terms cleanup operations and accidental spills, as follows:
g. Clean-up Operations [refer] to activities conducted in removing the pollutants
discharged or spilled in water to restore it to pre-spill condition.
h. Accidental Spills [refer] to spills of oil or other hazardous substances
in water that result from accidents such as collisions and groundings.
Petitioners proffer the argument that Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 merely direct the
government agencies concerned to undertake containment, removal, and cleaning
operations of a specific polluted portion or portions of the body of water
concerned. They maintain that the application of said Sec. 20 is limited only to
water pollution incidents, which are situations that presuppose the occurrence of
specific, isolated pollution events requiring the corresponding containment,
removal, and cleaning operations. Pushing the point further, they argue that the
aforequoted Sec. 62(g) requires cleanup operations to restore the body of water
to pre-spill condition, which means that there must have been a specific incident
of either intentional or accidental spillage of oil or other hazardous substances, as
mentioned in Sec. 62(h).
As a counterpoint, respondents argue that petitioners erroneously read Sec. 62(g)
as delimiting the application of Sec. 20 to the containment, removal, and cleanup
operations for accidental spills only. Contrary to petitioners posture, respondents
assert that Sec. 62(g), in fact, even expanded the coverage of Sec. 20. Respondents
explain that without its Sec. 62(g), PD 1152 may have indeed covered only pollution
accumulating from the day-to-day operations of businesses around
the Manila Bay and other sources of pollution that slowly accumulated in the bay.
Respondents, however, emphasize that Sec. 62(g), far from being a delimiting
provision, in fact even enlarged the operational scope of Sec. 20, by including
accidental spills as among the water pollution incidents contemplated in Sec. 17 in
relation to Sec. 20 of PD 1152.
To respondents, petitioners parochial view on environmental issues, coupled with
their narrow reading of their respective mandated roles, has contributed to the
worsening water quality of the Manila Bay. Assuming, respondents assert, that
petitioners are correct in saying that the cleanup coverage of Sec. 20 of PD 1152 is
constricted by the definition of the phrase cleanup operations embodied in Sec.
62(g), Sec. 17 is not hobbled by such limiting definition. As pointed out, the phrases
cleanup operations and accidental spills do not appear in said Sec. 17, not even in
the chapter where said section is found.
Respondents are correct. For one thing, said Sec. 17 does not in any way state that
the government agencies concerned ought to confine themselves to the
containment, removal, and cleaning operations when a specific pollution incident
occurs. On the contrary, Sec. 17 requires them to act even in the absence of a
specific pollution incident, as long as water quality has deteriorated to a degree
where its state will adversely affect its best usage. This section, to stress, commands
concerned government agencies, when appropriate, to take such measures as may
be necessary to meet the prescribed water quality standards. In fine, the underlying
duty to upgrade the quality of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any
pollution incident.
For another, a perusal of Sec. 20 of the Environment Code, as couched, indicates
that it is properly applicable to a specific situation in which the pollution is caused
by polluters who fail to clean up the mess they left behind. In such instance, the
concerned government agencies shall undertake the cleanup work for the polluters
account. Petitioners assertion, that they have to perform cleanup operations in
the Manila Bay only when there is a water pollution incident and the erring
polluters do not undertake the containment, removal, and cleanup operations, is
quite off mark. As earlier discussed, the complementary Sec. 17 of the Environment
Code comes into play and the specific duties of the agencies to clean up come in
even if there are no pollution incidents staring at them. Petitioners, thus, cannot
plausibly invoke and hide behind Sec. 20 of PD 1152 or Sec. 16 of RA 9275 on the
pretext that their cleanup mandate depends on the happening of a specific
pollution incident. In this regard, what the CA said with respect to the impasse over
Secs. 17 and 20 of PD 1152 is at once valid as it is practical. The appellate court
wrote: PD 1152 aims to introduce a comprehensive program of environmental
protection and management. This is better served by making Secs. 17 & 20 of
general application rather than limiting them to specific pollution incidents.[35]
Granting arguendo that petitioners position thus described vis--vis the
implementation of Sec. 20 is correct, they seem to have overlooked the fact that
the pollution of the Manila Bay is of such magnitude and scope that it is well-nigh
impossible to draw the line between a specific and a general pollution incident.
And such impossibility extends to pinpointing with reasonable certainty who the
polluters are. We note that Sec. 20 of PD 1152 mentions water pollution incidents
which may be caused by polluters in the waters of the Manila Bay itself or by
polluters in adjoining lands and in water bodies or waterways that empty into the
bay. Sec. 16 of RA 9275, on the other hand, specifically adverts to any person who
causes pollution in or pollutes water bodies, which may refer to an individual or an
establishment that pollutes the land mass near the Manila Bay or the waterways,
such that the contaminants eventually end up in the bay. In this situation, the water
pollution incidents are so numerous and involve nameless and faceless polluters
that they can validly be categorized as beyond the specific pollution incident level.
Not to be ignored of course is the reality that the government agencies concerned
are so undermanned that it would be almost impossible to apprehend the
numerous polluters of the Manila Bay. It may perhaps not be amiss to say that the
apprehension, if any, of the Manila Bay polluters has been few and far between.
Hence, practically nobody has been required to contain, remove, or clean up a
given water pollution incident. In this kind of setting, it behooves the Government
to step in and undertake cleanup operations. Thus, Sec. 16 of RA 9275, previously
Sec. 20 of PD 1152, covers for all intents and purposes a general cleanup situation.
The cleanup and/or restoration of the Manila Bay is only an aspect and the initial
stage of the long-term solution. The preservation of the water quality of the bay
after the rehabilitation process is as important as the cleaning phase. It is
imperative then that the wastes and contaminants found in the rivers, inland bays,
and other bodies of water be stopped from reaching the Manila Bay. Otherwise,
any cleanup effort would just be a futile, cosmetic exercise, for, in no time at all,
the Manila Bay water quality would again deteriorate below the ideal minimum
standards set by PD 1152, RA 9275, and other relevant laws. It thus behooves the
Court to put the heads of the petitioner-department-agencies and the bureaus and
offices under them on continuing notice about, and to enjoin them to perform,
their mandates and duties towards cleaning up the Manila Bay and preserving the
quality of its water to the ideal level. Under what other judicial discipline describes
as continuing mandamus,[36] the Court may, under extraordinary circumstances,
issue directives with the end in view of ensuring that its decision would not be set
to naught by administrative inaction or indifference. In India, the doctrine of
continuing mandamus was used to enforce directives of the court to clean up the
length of the Ganges River from industrial and municipal pollution.[37]
The Court can take judicial notice of the presence of shanties and other
unauthorized structures which do not have septic tanks along the Pasig-Marikina-
San Juan Rivers, the National Capital Region (NCR) (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias)
Rivers, the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycuayan-Marilao-
Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the
Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and connecting waterways, river banks,
and esteros which discharge their waters, with all the accompanying filth, dirt, and
garbage, into the major rivers and eventually the Manila Bay. If there is one factor
responsible for the pollution of the major river systems and the Manila Bay, these
unauthorized structures would be on top of the list. And if the issue of illegal or
unauthorized structures is not seriously addressed with sustained resolve, then
practically all efforts to cleanse these important bodies of water would be for
naught. The DENR Secretary said as much.[38]
Giving urgent dimension to the necessity of removing these illegal structures is Art.
51 of PD 1067 or the Water Code,[39] which prohibits the building of structures
within a given length along banks of rivers and other waterways. Art. 51 reads:
The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout
their entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20)
meters in agricultural areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their
margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the interest of recreation,
navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage.No person shall be allowed to stay in this
zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or
salvage or to build structures of any kind. (Emphasis added.)
Judicial notice may likewise be taken of factories and other industrial
establishments standing along or near the banks of the Pasig River, other major
rivers, and connecting waterways. But while they may not be treated as
unauthorized constructions, some of these establishments undoubtedly contribute
to the pollution of the Pasig River and waterways. The DILG and the concerned
LGUs, have, accordingly, the duty to see to it that non-complying industrial
establishments set up, within a reasonable period, the necessary waste water
treatment facilities and infrastructure to prevent their industrial discharge,
including their sewage waters, from flowing into the Pasig River, other major rivers,
and connecting waterways. After such period, non-complying establishments shall
be shut down or asked to transfer their operations.
At this juncture, and if only to dramatize the urgency of the need for petitioners-
agencies to comply with their statutory tasks, we cite the Asian Development Bank-
commissioned study on the garbage problem in Metro Manila, the results of which
are embodied in the The Garbage Book. As there reported, the garbage crisis in
the metropolitan area is as alarming as it is shocking. Some highlights of the report:
1. As early as 2003, three land-filled dumpsites in Metro Manila - the Payatas,
Catmon and Rodriquez dumpsites - generate an alarming quantity of lead and
leachate or liquid run-off. Leachate are toxic liquids that flow along the surface and
seep into the earth and poison the surface and groundwater that are used for
drinking, aquatic life, and the environment.
2. The high level of fecal coliform confirms the presence of a large amount of
human waste in the dump sites and surrounding areas, which is presumably
generated by households that lack alternatives to sanitation. To say
that Manila Bay needs rehabilitation is an understatement.
3. Most of the deadly leachate, lead and other dangerous contaminants and
possibly strains of pathogens seeps untreated into ground water and runs into
the Marikina and Pasig Riversystems and Manila Bay.[40]
Given the above perspective, sufficient sanitary landfills should now more than ever
be established as prescribed by the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act (RA
9003). Particular note should be taken of the blatant violations by some LGUs and
possibly the MMDA of Sec. 37, reproduced below:
Sec. 37. Prohibition against the Use of Open Dumps for Solid Waste.No open
dumps shall be established and operated, nor any practice or disposal of solid
waste by any person, including LGUs which [constitute] the use of open dumps for
solid waste, be allowed after the effectivity of this Act: Provided, further that no
controlled dumps shall be allowed (5) years following the effectivity of this Act.
(Emphasis added.)
RA 9003 took effect on February 15, 2001 and the adverted grace period of five (5)
years which ended on February 21, 2006 has come and gone, but no single sanitary
landfill which strictly complies with the prescribed standards under RA 9003 has
yet been set up.
In addition, there are rampant and repeated violations of Sec. 48 of RA 9003, like
littering, dumping of waste matters in roads, canals, esteros, and other public
places, operation of open dumps, open burning of solid waste, and the like. Some
sludge companies which do not have proper disposal facilities simply discharge
sludge into the Metro Manila sewerage system that ends up in
the Manila Bay. Equally unabated are violations of Sec. 27 of RA 9275, which
enjoins the pollution of water bodies, groundwater pollution, disposal of infectious
wastes from vessels, and unauthorized transport or dumping into sea waters of
sewage or solid waste and of Secs. 4 and 102 of RA 8550 which proscribes the
introduction by human or machine of substances to the aquatic environment
including dumping/disposal of waste and other marine litters, discharge of
petroleum or residual products of petroleum of carbonaceous
materials/substances [and other] radioactive, noxious or harmful liquid, gaseous or
solid substances, from any water, land or air transport or other human-made
structure.
In the light of the ongoing environmental degradation, the Court wishes to
emphasize the extreme necessity for all concerned executive departments and
agencies to immediately act and discharge their respective official duties and
obligations. Indeed, time is of the essence; hence, there is a need to set timetables
for the performance and completion of the tasks, some of them as defined for
them by law and the nature of their respective offices and mandates.
The importance of the Manila Bay as a sea resource, playground, and as a historical
landmark cannot be over-emphasized. It is not yet too late in the day to restore
the Manila Bay to its former splendor and bring back the plants and sea life that
once thrived in its blue waters. But the tasks ahead, daunting as they may be, could
only be accomplished if those mandated, with the help and cooperation of all civic-
minded individuals, would put their minds to these tasks and take responsibility.
This means that the State, through petitioners, has to take the lead in the
preservation and protection of the Manila Bay.
The era of delays, procrastination, and ad hoc measures is over. Petitioners must
transcend their limitations, real or imaginary, and buckle down to work before the
problem at hand becomes unmanageable. Thus, we must reiterate that different
government agencies and instrumentalities cannot shirk from their mandates; they
must perform their basic functions in cleaning up and rehabilitating
the Manila Bay. We are disturbed by petitioners hiding behind two untenable
claims: (1) that there ought to be a specific pollution incident before they are
required to act; and (2) that the cleanup of the bay is a discretionary duty.
RA 9003 is a sweeping piece of legislation enacted to radically transform and
improve waste management. It implements Sec. 16, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution,
which explicitly provides that the State shall protect and advance the right of the
people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony
of nature.
So it was that in Oposa v. Factoran, Jr. the Court stated that the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology need not even be written in the Constitution for it is
assumed, like other civil and political rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist
from the inception of mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications.[41] Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal
provision specifically prodding petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men
and women representing them cannot escape their obligation to future
generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of the Manila Bay clean and clear as
humanly as possible. Anything less would be a betrayal of the trust reposed in
them.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision of the CA
in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the September 13, 2002 Decision
of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATIONS in
view of subsequent developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of
the RTC Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed defendant-
government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve Manila Bay, and
restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea waters per Water
Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order No. 34 [1990]) to make
them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other forms of contact recreation.
In particular:
(1) Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development, and proper use of
the countrys environment and natural resources, and Sec. 19 of RA 9275,
designating the DENR as the primary government agency responsible for its
enforcement and implementation, the DENR is directed to fully implement
its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation,
restoration, and conservation of the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is
ordered to call regular coordination meetings with concerned government
departments and agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the
aforesaid plan of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.
(2) Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code of 1987 and
Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991,[42] the DILG, in exercising the
Presidents power of general supervision and its duty to promulgate guidelines in
establishing waste management programs under Sec. 43 of the Philippine
Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna,
Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial
establishments, and private homes along the banks of the major river systems in
their respective areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-
San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-
Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan)
Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and
other minor rivers and waterways that eventually discharge water into the Manila
Bay; and the lands abutting the bay, to determine whether they have wastewater
treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws,
ordinances, and rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be
ordered to require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said
facilities or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes,
sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these rivers,
waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or imposition of fines
and other sanctions.
(3) As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275,[43] the MWSS is directed to provide, install,
operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste water treatment facilities in
Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at the earliest possible time.
(4) Pursuant to RA 9275,[44] the LWUA, through the local water districts and in
coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate, and maintain
sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe collection, treatment,
and disposal of sewage in the provinces of Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and
Bataan where needed at the earliest possible time.
(5) Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550,[45] the DA, through the BFAR, is ordered to
improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is also directed to assist
the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in
developing, using recognized methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in
the Manila Bay.
(6) The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime Group, in
accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with each other, shall
apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other existing laws and regulations
designed to prevent marine pollution in the Manila Bay.
(7) Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513[46] and the International Convention for
the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is ordered to immediately adopt
such measures to prevent the discharge and dumping of solid and liquid wastes
and other ship-generated wastes into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked
at ports and apprehend the violators.
(8) The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and projects for
flood control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila, in coordination with
the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC), and other agencies, shall dismantle
and remove allstructures, constructions, and other encroachments established or
built in violation of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-
San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the Navotas-
Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and esteros in
Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of programs and projects
for flood control services in the rest of the country more particularly in Bulacan,
Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected
LGUs, PNP Maritime Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies,
shall remove and demolish all structures, constructions, and other encroachments
built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the Meycauayan-
Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River,
the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers, connecting waterways, and esteros that
discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a sanitary
landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1) year from finality of
this Decision.On matters within its territorial jurisdiction and in connection with the
discharge of its duties on the maintenance of sanitary landfills and like
undertakings, it is also ordered to cause the apprehension and filing of the
appropriate criminal cases against violators of the respective penal provisions of
RA 9003,[47] Sec. 27 of RA 9275 (the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on
pollution.
(9) The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA 9275, within
one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all licensed septic and sludge
companies have the proper facilities for the treatment and disposal of fecal sludge
and sewage coming from septic tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found
to be non-complying, a reasonable time within which to set up the necessary
facilities under pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.
(10) Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152,[48] Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56 of RA
9003,[49] the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention, waste
management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the school curricula
of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of students and, through them,
their parents and friends, the importance of their duty toward achieving and
maintaining a balanced and healthful ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire
Philippine archipelago.

(11) The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the General
Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the expenses relating to
the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the water quality of the Manila Bay,
in line with the countrys development objective to attain economic growth in a
manner consistent with the protection, preservation, and revival of our marine
waters.
(12) The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA, DPWH,
DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS, LWUA, and PPA, in line
with the principle of continuing mandamus, shall, from finality of this Decision,
each submit to the Court a quarterly progressive report of the activities undertaken
in accordance with this Decision.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 92024 November 9, 1990 establishment of a petrochemical plant in Batangas does not violate P.D. No. 949
and P.D. No. 1803.
CONGRESSMAN ENRIQUE T. GARCIA (Second District of Bataan), petitioner,
vs. Our resolution skirted the issue of whether the investor given the initial
THE BOARD OF INVESTMENTS, THE DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND INDUSTRY, inducements and other circumstances surrounding its first choice of plant site may
LUZON PETROCHEMICAL CORPORATION, and PILIPINAS SHELL change it simply because it has the final choice on the matter. The Court merely
CORPORATION, respondents. ruled that the petitioner appears to have lost interest in the case by his failure to
appear at the hearing that was set by the BOI after receipt of the decision, so he
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
may be deemed to have waived the fruit of the judgment. On this ground, the
This is a petition to annul and set aside the decision of the Board of Investments motion for partial reconsideration was denied.
(BOI)/Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) approving the transfer of the site of
A motion for reconsideration of said resolution was filed by the petitioner asking
the proposed petrochemical plant from Bataan to Batangas and the shift of
that we resolve the basic issue of whether or not the foreign investor has the right
feedstock for that plant from naphtha only to naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum
of final choice of plant site; that the non-attendance of the petitioner at the hearing
gas (LPG).
was because the decision was not yet final and executory; and that the petitioner
This petition is a sequel to the petition in G.R. No. 88637 entitled "Congressman had not therefor waived the right to a hearing before the BOI.
Enrique T. Garcia v. the Board of Investments", September 7, 1989, where this Court
In the Court's resolution dated January 17, 1990, we stated:
issued a decision, ordering the BOI as follows:
Does the investor have a "right of final choice" of plant site? Neither under the
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The Board of Investments is
1987 Constitution nor in the Omnibus Investments Code is there such a 'right
ordered: (1) to publish the amended application for registration of the Bataan
of final choice.' In the first place, the investor's choice is subject to processing and
Petrochemical Corporation, (2) to allow the petitioner to have access to its records
approval or disapproval by the BOI (Art. 7, Chapter II, Omnibus Investments Code).
on the original and amended applications for registration, as a petrochemical
By submitting its application and amended application to the BOI for approval, the
manufacturer, of the respondent Bataan Petrochemical Corporation, excluding,
investor recognizes the sovereign prerogative of our Government, through the BOI,
however, privileged papers containing its trade secrets and other business and
to approve or disapprove the same after determining whether its proposed project
financial information, and (3) to set for hearing the petitioner's opposition to the
will be feasible, desirable and beneficial to our country. By asking that his
amended application in order that he may present at such hearing all the evidence
opposition to the LPC's amended application be heard by the BOI, the petitioner
in his possession in support of his opposition to the transfer of the site of the BPC
likewise acknowledges that the BOI, not the investor, has the last word or the "final
petrochemical plant to Batangas province. The hearing shall not exceed a period
choice" on the matter.
of ten (10) days from the date fixed by the BOI, notice of which should be served
by personal service to the petitioner through counsel, at least three (3) days in Secondly, as this case has shown, even a choice that had been approved by the
advance. The hearings may be held from day to day for a period of ten (10) days BOI may not be 'final', for supervening circumstances and changes in the
without postponements. The petition for a writ of prohibition or preliminary conditions of a place may dictate a corresponding change in the choice of plant
injunction is denied. No costs. (Rollo, pages 450-451) site in order that the project will not fail. After all, our country will benefit only when
a project succeeds, not when it fails. (Rollo, pp. 538-539)
However, acting on the petitioner's motion for partial reconsideration asking that
we rule on the import of P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803 and on the foreign investor's claim Nevertheless, the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner was denied.
of right of final choice of plant site, in the light of the provisions of the Constitution
A minority composed of Justices Melencio-Herrera, Gancayco, Sarmiento and
and the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987, this Court on October 24, 1989, made
this ponente voted to grant the motion for reconsideration stating that the hearing
the observation that P.D. Nos. 949 and 1803 "do not provide that the Limay site
set by the BOI was premature as the decision of the Court was not yet final and
should be the only petrochemical zone in the country, nor prohibit the
executory; that as contended by the petitioner the Court must first rule on whether
establishment of a petrochemical plant elsewhere in the country, that the
or not the investor has the right of final choice of plant site for if the ruling is in the
affirmative, the hearing would be a useless exercise; that in the October 19, 1989
resolution, the Court while upholding validity of the transfer of the plant site did
not rule on the issue of who has the final choice; that they agree with the
observation of the majority that "the investor has no final choice either under the
1987 Constitution or in the Omnibus Investments Code and that it is the BOI who
decides for the government" and that the plea of the petitioner should be granted
to give him the chance to show the justness of his claim and to enable the BOI to
give a second hard look at the matter.
Thus, the herein petition which relies on the ruling of the Court in the resolution of
January 17, 1990 in G.R. No. 88637 that the investor has no right of final choice
under the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Investments Code.
Under P.D. No. 1803 dated January 16, 1981, 576 hectares of the public domain
located in Lamao, Limay, Bataan were reserved for the Petrochemical Industrial
Zone under the administration, management, and ownership of the Philippine
National Oil Company (PNOC).
The Bataan Refining Corporation (BRC) is a wholly government owned corporation,
located at Bataan. It produces 60% of the national output of naphtha.
Taiwanese investors in a petrochemical project formed the Bataan Petrochemical
Corporation (BPC) and applied with BOI for registration as a new domestic
producer of petrochemicals. Its application specified Bataan as the plant site. One
of the terms and conditions for registration of the project was the use of "naphtha
cracker" and "naphtha" as feedstock or fuel for its petrochemical plant. The
petrochemical plant was to be a joint venture with PNOC. BPC was issued a
certificate of registration on February 24, 1988 by BOI.
BPC was given pioneer status and accorded fiscal and other incentives by BOI, like:
(1) exemption from taxes on raw materials, (2) repatriation of the entire proceeds
of liquidation investments in currency originally made and at the exchange rate
obtaining at the time of repatriation; and (3) remittance of earnings on
investments. As additional incentive, the House of Representatives approved a bill
introduced by the petitioner eliminating the 48% ad valoremtax on naphtha if and
when it is used as raw materials in the petrochemical plant. (G.R. No. 88637,
September 7, 1989, pp. 2-3. Rollo, pp. 441-442)
However, in February, 1989, A.T. Chong, chairman of USI Far East Corporation, the
major investor in BPC, personally delivered to Trade Secretary Jose Concepcion a
letter dated January 25, 1989 advising him of BPC's desire to amend the original
registration certification of its project by changing the job site from Limay, Bataan,
to Batangas. The reason adduced for the transfer was the insurgency and unstable
labor situation, and the presence in Batangas of a huge liquefied petroleum gas
(LPG) depot owned by the Philippine Shell Corporation.
The petitioner vigorously opposed the proposal and no less than President Aquino
expressed her preference that the plant be established in Bataan in a conference
with the Taiwanese investors, the Secretary of National Defense and The Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces.
Despite speeches in the Senate and House opposing the Transfer of the project to
Batangas, BPC filed on April 11, 1989 its request for approval of the amendments.
Its application is as follows: "(l) increasing the investment amount from US $220
million to US $320 million; (2) increasing the production capacity of its naphtha
cracker, polythylene plant and polypropylene plant; (3) changing the feedstock
from naphtha only to "naphtha and/or liquefied petroleum gas;" and (4)
transferring the job site from Limay, Bataan, to Batangas. (Annex B to Petition;
Rollo, p. 25)
Notwithstanding opposition from any quarters and the request of the petitioner
addressed to Secretary Concepcion to be furnished a copy of the proposed
amendment with its attachments which was denied by the BOI on May 25, 1989,
BOI approved the revision of the registration of BPC's petrochemical project.
(Petition, Annex F; Rollo, p. 32; See pp. 4 to 6, Decision in G.R. No. 88637; supra.)
BOI Vice-Chairman Tomas I. Alcantara testifying before the Committee on Ways
and Means of the Senate asserted that:
The BOI has taken a public position preferring Bataan over Batangas as the site of
the petrochemical complex, as this would provide a better distribution of industries
around the Metro Manila area. ... In advocating the choice of Bataan as the project
site for the petrochemical complex, the BOI, however, made it clear, and I would
like to repeat this that the BOI made it clear in its view that the BOI or the
government for that matter could only recomend as to where the project should
be located. The BOI recognizes and respect the principle that the final chouce is
still with the proponent who would in the final analysis provide the funding or risk
capital for the project. (Petition, P. 13; Annex D to the petition)
This position has not been denied by BOI in its pleadings in G.R. No. 88637 and in
the present petition.
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
There is before us an actual controversy whether the petrochemical plant should
remain in Bataan or should be transferred to Batangas, and whether its feedstock
originally of naphtha only should be changed to naphtha and/or liquefied
petroleum gas as the approved amended application of the BPC, now Luzon
Petrochemical Corporation (LPC), shows. And in the light of the categorical
admission of the BOI that it is the investor who has the final choice of the site and
the decision on the feedstock, whether or not it constitutes a grave abuse of
discretion for the BOI to yield to the wishes of the investor, national interest
notwithstanding.
We rule that the Court has a constitutional duty to step into this controversy and
determine the paramount issue. We grant the petition.
First, Bataan was the original choice as the plant site of the BOI to which the BPC
agreed. That is why it organized itself into a corporation bearing the name Bataan.
There is available 576 hectares of public land precisely reserved as the
petrochemical zone in Limay, Bataan under P.D. No. 1803. There is no need to buy
expensive real estate for the site unlike in the proposed transfer to Batangas. The
site is the result of careful study long before any covetous interests intruded into
the choice. The site is ideal. It is not unduly constricted and allows for expansion.
The respondents have not shown nor reiterated that the alleged peace and order
situation in Bataan or unstable labor situation warrant a transfer of the plant site
to Batangas. Certainly, these were taken into account when the firm named
itself Bataan Petrochemical Corporation. Moreover, the evidence proves the
contrary.
Second, the BRC, a government owned Filipino corporation, located in Bataan
produces 60% of the national output of naphtha which can be used as feedstock
for the plant in Bataan. It can provide the feedstock requirement of the plant. On
the other hand, the country is short of LPG and there is need to import the same
for use of the plant in Batangas. The local production thereof by Shell can hardly
supply the needs of the consumers for cooking purposes. Scarce dollars will be
diverted, unnecessarily, from vitally essential projects in order to feed the furnaces
of the transferred petrochemical plant.
Third, naphtha as feedstock has been exempted by law from the ad valorem tax by
the approval of Republic Act No. 6767 by President Aquino but excluding LPG from
exemption from ad valorem tax. The law was enacted specifically for the
petrochemical industry. The policy determination by both Congress and the
President is clear. Neither BOI nor a foreign investor should disregard or
contravene expressed policy by shifting the feedstock from naphtha to LPG.
Fourth, under Section 10, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, it is the duty of the
State to "regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities." The
development of a self-reliant and independent national economy effectively
controlled by Filipinos is mandated in Section 19, Article II of the Constitution.
In Article 2 of the Omnibus Investments Code of 1987 "the sound development of
the national economy in consonance with the principles and objectives of
economic nationalism" is the set goal of government.
Fifth, with the admitted fact that the investor is raising the greater portion of the
capital for the project from local sources by way of loan which led to the so-called
"petroscam scandal", the capital requirements would be greatly minimized if LPC
does not have to buy the land for the project and its feedstock shall be limited to
naphtha which is certainly more economical, more readily available than LPG, and
does not have to be imported.
Sixth, if the plant site is maintained in Bataan, the PNOC shall be a partner in the
venture to the great benefit and advantage of the government which shall have a
participation in the management of the project instead of a firm which is a huge
multinational corporation.
In the light of all the clear advantages manifest in the plant's remaining in Bataan,
practically nothing is shown to justify the transfer to Batangas except a near-
absolute discretion given by BOI to investors not only to freely choose the site but
to transfer it from their own first choice for reasons which remain murky to say the
least.
And this brings us to a prime consideration which the Court cannot rightly ignore.
Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution provides that:
xxx xxx xxx
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound
agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full
and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
xxx xxx xxx Batangas and authorizing the change of feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha
and/or LPG for the main reason that the final say is in the investor all other
Every provision of the Constitution on the national economy and patrimony is
circumstances to the contrary notwithstanding. No cogent advantage to the
infused with the spirit of national interest. The non-alienation of natural resources,
government has been shown by this transfer. This is a repudiation of the
the State's full control over the development and utilization of our scarce resources,
independent policy of the government expressed in numerous laws and the
agreements with foreigners being based on real contributions to the economic
Constitution to run its own affairs the way it deems best for the national interest.
growth and general welfare of the country and the regulation of foreign
investments in accordance with national goals and priorities are too explicit not to One can but remember the words of a great Filipino leader who in part said he
be noticed and understood. would not mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one subservient
to foreign dictation. In this case, it is not even a foreign government but an ordinary
A petrochemical industry is not an ordinary investment opportunity. It should not
investor whom the BOI allows to dictate what we shall do with our heritage.
be treated like a garment or embroidery firm, a shoe-making venture, or even an
assembler of cars or manufacturer of computer chips, where the BOI reasoning WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted. The decision of the respondent Board
may be accorded fuller faith and credit. The petrochemical industry is essential to of Investments approving the amendment of the certificate of registration of the
the national interest. In other ASEAN countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, the Luzon Petrochemical Corporation on May 23, 1989 under its Resolution No. 193,
government superintends the industry by controlling the upstream or cracker Series of 1989, (Annex F to the Petition) is SET ASIDE as NULL and VOID. The
facility. original certificate of registration of BPC' (now LPC) of February 24, 1988 with
Bataan as the plant site and naphtha as the feedstock is, therefore, ordered
In this particular BPC venture, not only has the Government given unprecedented
maintained.
favors, among them:
SO ORDERED.
(1) For an initial authorized capital of only P20 million, the Central Bank gave an
eligible relending credit or relending facility worth US $50 million and a debt to Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
swap arrangement for US $30 million or a total accommodation of US $80 million
Fernan, C.J., Paras, JJ., took no part.
which at current exchange rates is around P2080 million.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.
(2) A major part of the company's capitalization shall not come from foreign
sources but from loans, initially a Pl Billion syndicated loan, to be given by both
government banks and a consortium of Philippine private banks or in common
parlance, a case of 'guiniguisa sa sariling manteca.' Separate Opinions

(3) Tax exemptions and privileges were given as part of its 'preferred pioneer
status.'
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J., dissenting Opinion:
(4) Loan applications of other Philippine firms will be crowded out of the Asian
This is the petitioner's second petition for certiorari and prohibition with
Development Bank portfolio because of the petrochemical firm's massive loan
application for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction against the
request. (Taken from the proceedings before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee).
respondents Board of Investments (BOI), Department of Trade and Industry (DTI),
but through its regulatory agency, the BOI, it surrenders even the power to make the Luzon Petrochemical Corporation (LPC), formerly Bataan Petrochemical
a company abide by its initial choice, a choice free from any suspicion of Corporation, and Pilipinas Shell Corporation (SHELL) on the transfer of the LPC
unscrupulous machinations and a choice which is undoubtedly in the best interests petrochemical plant site from Bataan to Batangas. The first case was docketed in
of the Filipino people. this Court as G.R. No. 88637 and was decided on September 7, 1989. Consistent
with my opinion in the first case, I vote once more to deny the petition.
The Court, therefore, holds and finds that the BOI committed a grave abuse of
discretion in approving the transfer of the petrochemical plant from Bataan to
The petitioner filed this second petition supposedly "upon the authority and transfer of the project to Batangas without giving due notice and an opportunity
strength" of this Court's statement in its Resolution of January 9, 1990 in G.R. No. to be heard to the vocal opponents of that move." (pp. 445-446, Rollo of G.R. No.
88637 that the foreign investor (LPC) does not have a right of final choice of plant 88637.)
site because its choice is subject to approval or disapproval by the BOI (p. 3, Rollo).
Although we did say in our decision in G.R. No. 88637 that the BOI, not the foreign
Ergo, the BOI has the "final choice."
investor, has the right of "final choice" of plant site for the LPC project, the Court
Petitioner contends that since the BOI had earlier approved Bataan as the plant site would be overstepping the bounds of its jurisdiction were it to usurp the
of the LPG petrochemical complex, and of "naphtha only" as the feedstock, that prerogative of the BOI to make that choice or change it.
approval was "final" and may not be changed. Hence, the BOI allegedly abused its
The petitioner's contention that the BOI abused its discretion in approving the
discretion: (1) in approving the transfer of the LPC's plant site from Bataan to
transfer of the LPC plant site to Batangas because the BOI, in effect, yielded to the
Batangas (in spite of the BOI's initial preference for Bataan) "upon the false and
investor's choice, is not well taken. The record shows that the BOI approved the
unlawful thesis that the foreign investor has the right of final choice by plant site"
transfer because "the BOI recognizes the justification given by the proponent of
(p. 13, Rollo), and (2) in allowing the LPC to shift feedstock from naphtha only, to
the project (p. 30, Rollo). The fact that the petitioner disagrees with the BOI's
naphtha and/or LPG, despite the disadvantages of using LPG. Petitioner prays the
decision does not make it wrong. The petitioner's recourse against the BOI's action
Court to annul the BOI's action and prohibit LPC from transferring its plant site to
is by an appeal to the President (Sec. 36, 1987 Investments Code), not to this Court.
Batangas and shifting feedstock to naphtha and/ or LPG (p. 22, Rollo).
This Court, in the exercise of its judicial power, may review and annul executive as
The petition is not well-taken. There is no provision in the 1987 Investments Code
well as legislative actions when they clash with the Constitution or with existing
prohibiting the amendment of the investor's application for registration of its
laws, or when any branch or instrumentality of the Government has acted with
project, such as, in this case, its plant site, the feedstock to be used, and the
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (Sec. 1, Art.
capitalization of the project.
VIII, 1987 Constitution) but the Court may not do more than that. It may not make
Neither does the law prohibit the BOI from approving the amended application. the decisions that the executive should have made nor pass the laws that the
legislature should have passed. Not even the much publicized "petroscam"
Since the investor may amend its application and the BOI may approve or
involving the financial arrangements (not the issue in this case) for the LPC project
disapprove the amendments, when may the BOI be deemed to have made a "final
would justify the intervention of this court in a matter that pertains to the exclusive
choice" regarding those aspects of the project which have been changed?
domain of the executive department. The court does not have a panacea for all the
Only the BOI or the Chief Executive is competent to answer that question, for the ills that afflict our country nor a solution for every problem that besets it.
matter of choosing an appropriate site for the investor's project is a political and
Did the BOI gravely abuse its discretion in approving the LPC's amended
economic decision which, under our system of separation of powers, only the
application for registration of its petrochemical project to warrant the intervention
executive branch, as implementor of policy formulated by the legislature (in this
of this Court? Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical
case, the policy of encouraging and inviting foreign investments into our country),
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction (Abad Santos vs. Prov.
is empowered to make. It is not for this Court to determine what is, or should be,
of Tarlac, 67 Phil. 480; Alafriz vs. Nable, 70 Phil. 278).
the BOI's "final choice" of plant site and feedstock, for, as we said in our decision
in G.R. No. 88637: In light of the LPC's justifications for the transfer of its project site and the shift
from one kind of feedstock to two, we are not prepared to hold that the BOI's
This Court ... does not possess the necessary technology and scientific expertise to
decision to approve the changes was the product of a capricious and arbitrary
detail e whether the transfer of the proposed BPC (now LPC) petrochemical
exercise of judgment on its part, despite the seemingly impressive arguments of
complex from Bataan to Batangas and the change of fuel from 'naphtha only to
the petitioner showing the advantages of establishing the petrochemical plant in
naphtha and/or LPG' will be best for the project and for our country. This Court is
Bataan and of using naphtha only as feedstock. We are not prepared to substitute
not about to delve into the economics and politics of this case. It is concerned
the judgment of the BOI on this matter with one crafted by this Court.
simply with the alleged violation of due process and the alleged extra limitation of
power and discretion on the part of the public respondents in approving the
With regard to the scandalously liberal financial accommodations that local banks
have allegedly agreed to grant to the LPC (the so-called "petroscam") to enable it
to raise a major part of its capital requirements from local sources (hence, a
betrayal of the people's expectation that foreign investors will bring in foreign
exchange to finance their projects in this country) it is significant that the petitioner
has not led an outcry for the disapproval and cancellation of the project on this
score. Apparently, the petitioner is not seriously disturbed by the moral
implications of the "scam" provided the petrochemical plant is set up in Bataan.
But this is exactly what the majority Decision has resulted in. It has made a
sweeping policy determination and has unwittingly transformed itself into what
might be termed a "government by the Judiciary," something never intended by
the framers of the Constitution when they provided for separation of powers
among the three co-equal branches of government and excluded the Judiciary
from policy-making.

The decision of the BOI to allow the transfer of the LPC petrochemical project to
Batangas and shift feedstock from naphtha only to naphtha and/or LPG, may
appear to the petitioner to be extremely unwise and inadvisable, but the Court may
not, for that reason annul the BOI's action or prohibit it from acting on a matter
that lies within its particular sphere of competence, for the Court is not a judge of
the wisdom and soundness of the actions of the two other co-equal branches of
the Government, but only of their legality and constitutionality.

WHEREFORE, I vote to deny the petition for certiorari and prohibition for lack of
merit.

Melencio-Herrera, Narvasa and Regalado, JJ., concur.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Consistent with my dissent in G.R. No. 88637, the first petition, I concur in the
dissent herein of Mme. Justice Aquino and merely wish to add that in its Decision,
the majority has actually imposed its own views on matters falling within the
competence of a policy-making body of the Government. It decided upon the
wisdom of the transfer of the site of the proposed project (pp. 8-9); the
reasonableness of the feedstock to be used (pp. 8-9); the undesirability of the
capitalization aspect of the project (p. 10), and injected its own concept of the
national interest as regards the establishment of a basic industry of strategic
importance to the country (p. 13).

It is true that the judicial power embodied in Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
speaks of the duty of Courts of justice to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. By no means, however, does it
vest in the Courts the power to enter the realm of policy considerations under the
guise of the commission of grave abuse of discretion.
[G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997]
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL, petitioner, vs. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos,[1] is invoked by petitioner in its
bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which
owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the provision
is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its
enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the national
economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.
The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under
Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through public
bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent MHC. The
winning bidder, or the eventual strategic partner, is to provide management
expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system, and financial
support to strengthen the profitability and performance of the Manila Hotel.[2] In a
close bidding held on 18 September 1995 only two (2) bidders participated:
petitioner Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation, which offered to
buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad,
a Malaysian firm, with ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state -
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC -
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by October
23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will lose the right to
purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer the Block of Shares to the
other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the
Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System Contract or
other type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for the
Manila Hotel x x x x
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale Agreement with
GSIS x x x x
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER -
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner after the
following conditions are met:
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later than October 23,
1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP (Committee on Privatization)/
OGCC (Office of the Government Corporate Counsel) are obtained. [3]
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic partner
and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to respondent
GSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per share tendered
by Renong Berhad.[4] In a subsequent letter dated 10 October 1995 petitioner sent
a managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three Million Pesos
(P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian Group, Messrs.
Renong Berhad x x x x[5] which respondent GSIS refused to accept.
On 17 October 1995, perhaps apprehensive that respondent GSIS has disregarded
the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC may be
hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner
came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995 the Court
issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from perfecting and
consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after it
was referred to it by the First Division. The case was then set for oral arguments
with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J.,
as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution
and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the Filipino nation and
has practically become a historical monument which reflects the vibrancy of
Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier generation of
Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of independence and its
power and capacity to release the full potential of the Filipino people. To all intents
and purposes, it has become a part of the national patrimony.[6]Petitioner also
argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the
business of the hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned
and controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of
the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any
transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by
the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987
Constitution, applies.[7]
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national
patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy
petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian
firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder
cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are
willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.[8]
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the
1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not a self-
executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s) x x x x Thus, for the
said provision to operate, there must be existing laws to lay down conditions under
which business may be done.[9]
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall
under the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all marine wealth
in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first and second
paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to respondents, while
petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that
have transpired therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the
hotel fall under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the
Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a
personality of its own separate and distinct from the Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the
constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is only
51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor the
land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC
cannot be considered part of the national patrimony.Moreover, if the disposition
of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should
have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding rules which
provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly
submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the
highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate that
the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes
place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of
Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since
Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the
condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had
not yet taken place.
Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should
fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious, whimsical
manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail as petitioner has
no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not have an imperative
duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the governance
and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute and unalterable
except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been defined as the
fundamental and paramount law of the nation.[10] It prescribes the permanent
framework of a system of government, assigns to the different departments their
respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed principles on which
government is founded. The fundamental conception in other words is that it is a
supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in accordance with which
all private rights must be determined and all public authority
administered.[11] Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a law or
contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and
effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme
law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.
Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and
principles. Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out
the purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government
providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and
securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens.[12] A provision
which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the
liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be determined
by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no language
indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action.[13]
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally
drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive codes
of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to that of
statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has evolved
into one more like that of a legislative body.Hence, unless it is expressly provided
that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the
presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing.If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-
executing, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify
the mandate of the fundamental law.[14] This can be cataclysmic. That is why the
prevailing view is, as it has always been, that -
x x x x in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather
than non-self-executing x x x x Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary
rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they shall
be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking
body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the
needed implementing statute.[15]
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is
clearly not self-executing, as they quote from discussions on the floor of the 1986
Constitutional Commission -
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the
Committee on Style. If the wording of PREFERENCE is given to QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS, can it be understood as a preference to qualified Filipinos vis-a-
vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we not make it clear? To qualified
Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT. What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove
the word QUALIFIED?
MR. RODRIGO. No, no, but say definitely TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS as against
whom? As against aliens or over aliens ?
MR. NOLLEDO. Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word
QUALIFIED because the existing laws or prospective laws will always lay down
conditions under which business may be done. For example, qualifications on
capital, qualifications on the setting up of other financial structures, et
cetera (underscoring supplied by respondents).
MR. RODRIGO. It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes.[16]
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way as not to
make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of style. But,
certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to enforce the
constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares with the
Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without impairing the self-
executing nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact legislation
to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution, further the
operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its enforcement,
provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights secured or the
determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the exercise of the
right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to or prescribe a
penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision does not
render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation. The omission
from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for enforcing a right or
liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not intended to be self-
executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the constitution does not
necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but any legislation must be in
harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of constitutional right and make
it more available.[17] Subsequent legislation however does not necessarily mean
that the subject constitutional provision is not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second par.,
of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the same
section which undoubtedly are not self-executing.[18] The argument is flawed. If the
first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress is still to enact
measures to encourage the formation and operation of enterprises fully owned by
Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still needs legislation to regulate
and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction, as
in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the same logic, the second paragraph can
only be self-executing as it does not by its language require any legislation in order
to give preference to qualified Filipinos in the grant of rights, privileges and
concessions covering the national economy and patrimony. A constitutional
provision may be self-executing in one part and non-self-executing in another.[19]
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions
are merely statements of principles and policies, which are basically not self-
executing and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation,
not as judicially enforceable rights - are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine
Amusements and Gaming Corporation[20] speaks of constitutional provisions on
personal dignity,[21] the sanctity of family life,[22] the vital role of the youth in
nation-building,[23] the promotion of social justice,[24] and the values of
education.[25]Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance[26] refers to constitutional provisions
on social justice and human rights[27] and on education.[28] Lastly, Kilosbayan, Inc.
v. Morato[29] cites provisions on the promotion of general welfare,[30] the sanctity
of family life,[31] the vital role of the youth in nation-building[32] and the promotion
of total human liberation and development.[33] A reading of these provisions
indeed clearly shows that they are not judicially enforceable constitutional rights
but merely guidelines for legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that
they are only principles upon which legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very
words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
se judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the
State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified
Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists
in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce such
right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject; consequently,
if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such
right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all
legislations must take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi
jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission[34] explains -
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed refers not
only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural heritage of our race. It
also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should
develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the
mental ability or faculty of our people.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage.[35] When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only
to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well
used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark - a living testimonial of Philippine
heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912,
it immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has
since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped
Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930s. It was the site of
the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth. Dubbed
as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government it plays host to
dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine
hospitality.[36]
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The
Heart and Memory of a City.[37] During World War II the hotel was converted by
the Japanese Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the
American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the
Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places for their final
stand. Thereafter, in the 1950s and 1960s, the hotel became the center of political
activities, playing host to almost every political convention. In 1970 the hotel
reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international recognitions, an
acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site
of a failed coup d etat where an aspirant for vice-president was proclaimed
President of the Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the
triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is
impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for
sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part
of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC
comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority
and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC
cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice
stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First
Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the
outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon
which the building stands.[38]
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our
Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by
Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission -
THE PRESIDENT. Commissioner Davide is recognized.
MR. DAVIDE. I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo
amendment. And the amendment would consist in substituting the words
QUALIFIED FILIPINOS with the following: CITIZENS OF THE PHILIPPINES OR
CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK
IS WHOLLY OWNED BY SUCH CITIZENS.
xxxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we
have to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80-percent Filipino, do
we not give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE. The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino. What
about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD. At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE. Is that the intention?
MR. MONSOD. Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the
preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.
MR. DAVIDE. I want to get that meaning clear because QUALIFIED FILIPINOS may
refer only to individuals and not to juridical personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD. We agree, Madam President.[39]
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO. Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read again.
MR. NOLLEDO. The amendment will read: IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES
AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY,
THE STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. And the word
Filipinos here, as intended by the proponents, will include not only individual
Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or entities fully-controlled by
Filipinos.[40]
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus -
MR. FOZ. Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo to
please restate his amendment so that I can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO. IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE STATE SHALL GIVE
PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS.
MR. FOZ. In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is qualified
and a Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino enterprise still be given a
preference?
MR. NOLLEDO. Obviously.
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino
enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO. The answer is yes.
MR. FOZ. Thank you.[41]
Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo
continues
MR. NOLLEDO. Yes, Madam President. Instead of MUST, it will be SHALL - THE
STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS. This embodies the so-
called Filipino First policy.That means that Filipinos should be given preference in
the grant of concessions, privileges and rights covering the national patrimony. [42]
The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission regarding
the subject provision was still further clarified by Commissioner Nolledo[43] -
Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the Pro-Filipino bias in all economic
concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy x x x x This provision was
never found in previous Constitutions x x x x
The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those
citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of
credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering
and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are
incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be
counterproductive and inimical to the common good.
In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has
to be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall
be chosen over the former.
Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by
respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was pre-qualified
by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the sole inference
here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven management
expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity ownership in another
hotel company, or it has an overall management and marketing proficiency to
successfully operate the Manila Hotel.[44]
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing
that the subject provision is not self-executory and requires implementing
legislation is quite disturbing.The attempt to violate a clear constitutional provision
- by the government itself - is only too distressing. To adopt such a line of
reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the Constitution. For,
even some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently need
implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the source of a
judicial remedy.We cannot simply afford the government a defense that arises out
of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding legislation. In fine,
the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional government is apt -
The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws, including
the Constitution, even before Congress acts - provided that there are discoverable
legal standards for executive action. When the executive acts, it must be guided by
its own understanding of the constitutional command and of applicable laws. The
responsibility for reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not
the sole prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask
Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the executive is
confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how constitutional
government operates.[45]
Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the
State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct
personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the sale
of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the State
acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed out
by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of
respondents GSIS and MHC a state action. In constitutional jurisprudence, the acts
of persons distinct from the government are considered state action covered by
the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a public function; (2) when
the government is so significantly involved with the private actor as to make the
government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the government has
approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of respondent GSIS in
selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the second and third
categories of state action. Without doubt therefore the transaction, although
entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of the State and therefore
subject to the constitutional command.[46]
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but also
to the government as elements of the State. After all, government is composed of
three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and judicial. Accordingly, a
constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly directed to the
three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this case the subject
constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the Executive Department
and respondent GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the
State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not
yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest bidder
shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and executed the
necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First
Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the
mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be
declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the
award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest
bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by the
dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed to be
known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional
provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by
respondent GSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the
Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts
must conform with the fundamental law of the land.Those which violate the
Constitution lose their reason for being.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the Highest
Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share.[47] Certainly,
the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to award the block of shares
immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or
even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of a strongerreason than the
constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public bidding
concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is no
question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the foreign
entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award should go to
the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to the Filipino First
Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly
stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent
to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting of
the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage
foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood
to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors must
consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person
therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or
instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the
Constitution and the laws of the forum.
The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning
the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning that
a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly, Filipinos and
foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be awarded the
sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to match the highest
bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us, while petitioner was
already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of the constitutional
mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by Renong Berhad. Thus
it did not have the right or personality then to compel respondent GSIS to accept
its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the bid of the foreign firm and the
apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of petitioners matching bid did the latter
have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless
perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to
foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign
group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market player,
and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is
regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still an
opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting that
the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad
pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to
award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary
agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the
bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal of
respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian
firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in the
1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation but
primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate
guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance,
the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to
defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to impede
and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments. Far from it,
the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but avowedly
sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is ordained by the
Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have not been more
appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa -
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to substitute its
judgment for that of the legislature or the executive about the wisdom and
feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the Supreme Court has not been
spared criticism for decisions perceived as obstacles to economic progress and
development x x x x in connection with a temporary injunction issued by the Courts
First Division against the sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its
partner, certain statements were published in a major daily to the effect that that
injunction again demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a major
obstacle to doing business here.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the Court
to intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the judge of
whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to make sure that they
do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not adopted or implemented
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will
never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed
criticism.[48]
Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability and
preventing further losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should not take
precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a budgetary,
objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and dignity. For
the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values. Indeed, the
Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance of a free
society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy as to draw
itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved.[49]
Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the necessary
and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the necessary clearances
whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and and to do such other acts and deeds as may be necessary for the purpose.
welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher
SO ORDERED.
purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such
basic concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudible, is merely a
policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism.[50]

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity
to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not
talking about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are talking
about a historic relic that has hosted many of the most important events in the
short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where
heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire
to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their official visits to the
Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant
role as an authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and
culture. In this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul - a place
with a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the
shaping of a country.[51]

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of
respondents to sell the historical landmark - this Grand Old Dame of hotels in Asia
- to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of the
Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in
whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nations soul for some pieces
of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be equally drawn
from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel - and all
that it stands for - is sold to a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish
if the nations cultural heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand,
how much dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is
safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the
plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policyprovision of the Philippine
Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the Constitution and
accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the nation, will continue to
respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, MANILA

HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE
GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from
selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD,
and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel
G.R. No. 161872 April 13, 2004
REV. ELLY CHAVEZ PAMATONG, ESQUIRE, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for President
on December 17, 2003. Respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) refused
to give due course to petitioner’s Certificate of Candidacy in its Resolution No.
6558 dated January 17, 2004. The decision, however, was not unanimous since
Commissioners Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include
petitioner as they believed he had parties or movements to back up his candidacy.
On January 15, 2004, petitioner moved for reconsideration of Resolution No.
6558. Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was docketed as SPP (MP) No. 04-
001. The COMELEC, acting on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and on
similar motions filed by other aspirants for national elective positions, denied the
same under the aegis of Omnibus Resolution No. 6604 dated February 11, 2004.
The COMELEC declared petitioner and thirty-five (35) others nuisance candidates
who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a
political party or are not supported by a registered political party with a national
constituency. Commissioner Sadain maintained his vote for petitioner. By then,
Commissioner Tancangco had retired.
In this Petition For Writ of Certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse the resolutions
which were allegedly rendered in violation of his right to "equal access to
opportunities for public service" under Section 26, Article II of the 1987
Constitution,1 by limiting the number of qualified candidates only to those who
can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are nominated by political
parties. In so doing, petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the
constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the
sovereign people to choose their leaders. The COMELEC supposedly erred in
disqualifying him since he is the most qualified among all the presidential
candidates, i.e., he possesses all the constitutional and legal qualifications for the
office of the president, he is capable of waging a national campaign since he has
numerous national organizations under his leadership, he also has the capacity to
wage an international campaign since he has practiced law in other countries, and
he has a platform of government. Petitioner likewise attacks the validity of the form
for the Certificate of Candidacy prepared by the COMELEC. Petitioner claims that
the form does not provide clear and reasonable guidelines for determining the
qualifications of candidates since it does not ask for the candidate’s bio-data and
his program of government.
First, the constitutional and legal dimensions involved.
Implicit in the petitioner’s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring
"equal access to opportunities for public office" is the claim that there is a
constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to
seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject
to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither
bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right.
There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust
or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution,
entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the
Article are generally considered not self-executing,2 and there is no plausible
reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the
rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any
judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action.3 The disregard of the provision does not give rise to
any cause of action before the courts.4
An inquiry into the intent of the framers5 produces the same determination that
the provision is not self-executory. The original wording of the present Section 26,
Article II had read, "The State shall broaden opportunities to public office and
prohibit public dynasties."6 Commissioner (now Chief Justice) Hilario Davide, Jr.
successfully brought forth an amendment that changed the word "broaden" to the
phrase "ensure equal access," and the substitution of the word "office" to "service."
He explained his proposal in this wise:
I changed the word "broaden" to "ENSURE EQUAL ACCESS TO" because what is
important would be equal access to the opportunity. If you broaden, it would
necessarily mean that the government would be mandated to create as many
offices as are possible to accommodate as many people as are also possible. That
is the meaning of broadening opportunities to public service. So, in order that we
should not mandate the State to make the government the number one employer
and to limit offices only to what may be necessary and expedient yet offering equal
opportunities to access to it, I change the word "broaden."7 (emphasis supplied)
Obviously, the provision is not intended to compel the State to enact positive
measures that would accommodate as many people as possible into public office.
The approval of the "Davide amendment" indicates the design of the framers to
cast the provision as simply enunciatory of a desired policy objective and not
reflective of the imposition of a clear State burden.
Moreover, the provision as written leaves much to be desired if it is to be regarded
as the source of positive rights. It is difficult to interpret the clause as operative in
the absence of legislation since its effective means and reach are not properly
defined. Broadly written, the myriad of claims that can be subsumed under this
rubric appear to be entirely open-ended.8 Words and phrases such as "equal
access," "opportunities," and "public service" are susceptible to countless
interpretations owing to their inherent impreciseness. Certainly, it was not the
intention of the framers to inflict on the people an operative but amorphous
foundation from which innately unenforceable rights may be sourced.
As earlier noted, the privilege of equal access to opportunities to public office may
be subjected to limitations. Some valid limitations specifically on the privilege to
seek elective office are found in the provisions9 of the Omnibus Election Code on
"Nuisance Candidates" and COMELEC Resolution No. 645210 dated December 10,
2002 outlining the instances wherein the COMELEC may motu proprio refuse to
give due course to or cancel a Certificate of Candidacy.
As long as the limitations apply to everybody equally without discrimination,
however, the equal access clause is not violated. Equality is not sacrificed as long
as the burdens engendered by the limitations are meant to be borne by any one
who is minded to file a certificate of candidacy. In the case at bar, there is no
showing that any person is exempt from the limitations or the burdens which they
create.
Significantly, petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality or validity of
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 dated
10 December 2003. Thus, their presumed validity stands and has to be accorded
due weight.
Clearly, therefore, petitioner’s reliance on the equal access clause in Section 26,
Article II of the Constitution is misplaced.
The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the
disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run
for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its
electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State
takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably,
the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical
confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in
preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never
exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same
time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships,
whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a
textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic
institutions. As the United States Supreme Court held:
[T]here is surely an important state interest in requiring some preliminary showing
of a significant modicum of support before printing the name of a political
organization and its candidates on the ballot – the interest, if no other, in avoiding
confusion, deception and even frustration of the democratic [process].11
The COMELEC itself recognized these practical considerations when it
promulgated Resolution No. 6558 on 17 January 2004, adopting the study
Memorandum of its Law Department dated 11 January 2004. As observed in the
COMELEC’s Comment:
There is a need to limit the number of candidates especially in the case of
candidates for national positions because the election process becomes a mockery
even if those who cannot clearly wage a national campaign are allowed to run.
Their names would have to be printed in the Certified List of Candidates, Voters
Information Sheet and the Official Ballots. These would entail additional costs to
the government. For the official ballots in automated counting and canvassing of
votes, an additional page would amount to more or less FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY
MILLION PESOS (₱450,000,000.00).
xxx[I]t serves no practical purpose to allow those candidates to continue if they
cannot wage a decent campaign enough to project the prospect of winning, no
matter how slim.12
The preparation of ballots is but one aspect that would be affected by allowance
of "nuisance candidates" to run in the elections. Our election laws provide various
entitlements for candidates for public office, such as watchers in every polling
place,13 watchers in the board of canvassers,14 or even the receipt of electoral
contributions.15Moreover, there are election rules and regulations the formulations
of which are dependent on the number of candidates in a given election.
Given these considerations, the ignominious nature of a nuisance candidacy
becomes even more galling. The organization of an election with bona
fide candidates standing is onerous enough. To add into the mix candidates with
no serious intentions or capabilities to run a viable campaign would actually impair
the electoral process. This is not to mention the candidacies which are palpably
ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note joke. The poll body would be bogged by
irrelevant minutiae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably
posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. It would be a senseless sacrifice
on the part of the State.
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is both legal
and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not before this Court. Thus,
the remand of this case for the reception of further evidence is in order.
A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is petitioner’s aspiration and offer to
serve in the government. It deserves not a cursory treatment but a hearing which
conforms to the requirements of due process.

Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the State
could exclude nuisance candidates and need not indulge in, as the song goes,
"their trips to the moon on gossamer wings."
The Omnibus Election Code and COMELEC Resolution No. 6452 are cognizant of
the compelling State interest to ensure orderly and credible elections by excising
impediments thereto, such as nuisance candidacies that distract and detract from
the larger purpose. The COMELEC is mandated by the Constitution with the
administration of elections16 and endowed with considerable latitude in adopting
means and methods that will ensure the promotion of free, orderly and honest
elections.17 Moreover, the Constitution guarantees that only bona fide candidates
for public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination.18 The determination of bona fidecandidates is governed by the
statutes, and the concept, to our mind is, satisfactorily defined in the Omnibus
Election Code.
Now, the needed factual premises.
As to petitioner’s attacks on the validity of the form for the certificate of candidacy,
suffice it to say that the form strictly complies with Section 74 of the Omnibus
Election Code. This provision specifically enumerates what a certificate of
candidacy should contain, with the required information tending to show that the
candidate possesses the minimum qualifications for the position aspired for as
established by the Constitution and other election laws.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. 04-001 is hereby
remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of further evidence, to determine the
question on whether petitioner Elly Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as
contemplated in Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
The COMELEC is directed to hold and complete the reception of evidence and
report its findings to this Court with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

However valid the law and the COMELEC issuance involved are, their proper
application in the case of the petitioner cannot be tested and reviewed by this
Court on the basis of what is now before it. The assailed resolutions of the
COMELEC do not direct the Court to the evidence which it considered in
determining that petitioner was a nuisance candidate. This precludes the Court
from reviewing at this instance whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in disqualifying petitioner, since such a review would necessarily take
into account the matters which the COMELEC considered in arriving at its decisions.

Petitioner has submitted to this Court mere photocopies of various documents

purportedly evincing his credentials as an eligible candidate for the presidency. Yet
this Court, not being a trier of facts, can not properly pass upon the reproductions
as evidence at this level. Neither the COMELEC nor the Solicitor General appended
any document to their respective Comments.
ARTICLE I
National Territory
The national territory comprises the Philippine archipelago, with all the islands and
waters embraced therein, and all other territories over which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction, consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains,
including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other
submarine areas. The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the
archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal
waters of the Philippines.
ARTICLE II
Declaration of Principles and State Policies
Principles
SECTION 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty
resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.
SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy,
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of
the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation,
and amity with all nations.
SECTION 3. Civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military. The Armed
Forces of the Philippines is the protector of the people and the State. Its goal is to
secure the sovereignty of the State and the integrity of the national territory.
SECTION 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people.
The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and, in the
fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions provided by law,
to render personal military or civil service.
SECTION 5. The maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and
property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment
by all the people of the blessings of democracy.
SECTION 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
State Policies
SECTION 7. The State shall pursue an independent foreign policy. In its relations
with other states the paramount consideration shall be national sovereignty,
territorial integrity, national interest, and the right to self-determination.
SECTION 8. The Philippines, consistent with the national interest, adopts and
pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory.
SECTION 9. The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure
the prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty
through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full employment,
a rising standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
SECTION 10. The State shall promote social justice in all phases of national
development.
SECTION 11. The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights.
SECTION 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.
SECTION 13. The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation-building and
shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual, and social
well-being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs.
SECTION 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.
SECTION 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people
and instill health consciousness among them.
SECTION 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
SECTION 17. The State shall give priority to education, science and technology,
arts, culture, and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social
progress, and promote total human liberation and development.
SECTION 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall
protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare.

SECTION 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.

SECTION 20. The State recognizes the indispensable role of the private sector,
encourages private enterprise, and provides incentives to needed investments.

SECTION 21. The State shall promote comprehensive rural development and
agrarian reform.

SECTION 22. The State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous cultural
communities within the framework of national unity and development.

SECTION 23. The State shall encourage non-governmental, community-based, or

sectoral organizations that promote the welfare of the nation.

SECTION 24. The State recognizes the vital role of communication and information
in nation-building.

SECTION 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.

SECTION 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.

SECTION 27. The State shall maintain honesty and integrity in the public service
and take positive and effective measures against graft and corruption.

SECTION 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts
and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest.