Co, Selynn

Article III. Section 1. I. Procedural Due Process A. Judicial Proceedings 2. Aspects of the Proceedings

Martinez v. CA – 237 SCRA 575 [1994]

FACTS: An Information was filed before the RTC charging Manuel Martinez with libel arising from the allegedly
derogatory and scurrilous imputations against then vice president, Laurel in his article, “The Sorrows of Laurel,”
published in his Manila Times column.

Martinez’ motion for reinvestigation was denied, and the case was set for arraignment and pre-trial conference, but
was cancelled these were cancelled in view of the presiding judge’s retirement. Laurel filed a motion to set the case.
Action was held in abeyance pending the assumption of duty of the judge’s successor.

Martinez filed a petition with the Department of Justice seeking review of the resolution finding a prima facie case
against him. Accordingly, the motion to suspend proceedings was granted by the RTC, pending the resolution of the
petition for review in the DOJ.

Laurel, once more, attempted to have the case set, but no action was taken.

By way of letter to the city prosecutor, Acting Justice Secretary Bello III declared that the language used in the
article was not actionable as libel, and the case should be dismissed. Consequently, a motion to dismiss was filed. At
the hearing, the complainant’s counsel manifested that he had received no copy of the motion to dismiss. The RTC
directed the case prosecutor to provide him with such copy, but it appeared that the prosecutor did not comply with
an order. Notwithstanding this, the case was dismissed.

Laurel went to the CA, assailing the validity of the petition for review filed with the DOJ, and the RTC’s granting of
the motion to dismiss despite absence of notice to Laurel, basing its decision not on evidence on record, but on the
opinion f the Secretary of Justice. The CA granted his appeal and remanded the case for arraignment of the accused.
It found the review by Secretary Bello ran counter to prevailing jurisprudence and DOJ circulars.

ISSUES/HELD:
1. W/N double jeopardy applies?
Appeal against the order of dismissal was not foreclosed by the order of double jeopardy. It only attaches (a) upon a
valid indictment, (b) before a competent court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.

Under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right to appeal from a final judgment in a criminal case is granted to
“any party,” except when the accused is place in double jeopardy.

2. W/N Laurel’s right to due process was violated?

The grant of the motion to dismiss was based upon considerations other than the judge’s own personal individual
conviction that there was no case against the accused. Whether to approve or disapprove the stand taken by the
prosecution is not the exercise of discretion required in cases like this. The trial judge must himself be convinced
that there was indeed no sufficient evidence against the accused, and this conclusion can be arrived at only after an
assessment of the evidence in the possession of the prosecution. What was imperatively required was the trial
judge’s own assessment of such evidence, it not being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial
discretion merely to accept the prosecution’s word for its supposed insufficiency.

The dismissal order was issued in violation of complainant’s right to due process, having not been furnished a copy
of the motion, and the judge’s basing of judgment of the Secretary of Justice’s opinion.

Petition is denied.