RENATO CAYETANO vs.

CHRISTIAN MONSOD [September 3, 1991]

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon Aquino to the position of Chairman of COMELEC
thru a letter to the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. On June 5, 1991, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed Monsod’s nomination and on June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office and assumed office
as Chairman.

Renato Cayetano, as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and appointment be declared null and void.

ISSUE: W/N Monsod possess the qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least 10 years.

HELD: YES. Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960
with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the IBP since its inception in 1972-73.

After graduating from the UP College of Law and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his
father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two
years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating
loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the Philippines in 1970, he
worked with the Meralco Group, served as CEO of an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate,
and since 1986, has rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or CEO. As former
Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable
in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the COMELEC. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in initiating,
lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the urban land reform bill.
Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quasi-judicial body, which
conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman
of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the President of the Commission,
Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with individual
freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for the House of Representative.

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law, particularly the modern concept of law
practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty.
Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor — verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement — that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years .

Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested
according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by
law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who
should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing
authority can decide. [Luego v. CSC] PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED. [J. Paras]

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."

“To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are now employed in
the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on qualifications
regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or involve actual practice of law outside the COA We
have to interpret this to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal
knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for
appointment as members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.”
Separate Opinions: 14-member Court, 5 believe Monsod is engaged in the practice of law; 4 stating
that he did not practice law; 2 believe there was no error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion; one on official leave; and 2 abstaining.
J. PADILLA: I am convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
Questions involving the construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution. As declared in Angara v.
Electoral Commission, "upon the judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the
Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries." The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a COMELEC
Chairman. Among these are that he must have been "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the bounden
duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and complied with.
As commonly understood, "practice" refers to the actual performance or application of knowledge as distinguished
from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes an active, habitual, repeated, or customary action. To "practice" law, or any
profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an employment or profession actively, habitually,
repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in
the "practice of medicine." A CPA who works as a clerk, cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same
way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal
Department of a corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the practice of law. Commission on
Appointments in a Memorandum enumerated several factors determinative of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice
of law."
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a
lawyer. Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in frequent or customary action, a succession of acts
of the same kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v. Villanueva).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for compensation, as a
service of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva). Hence, charging for services such
as preparation of documents involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term "practice of law". If
compensation is expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law; are
practicing law.
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is
within the term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Hence, where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge of law but
involves no attorney-client relationship, such as teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to be
engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer.
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did
perform any of the tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY for at least 10 years prior to his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which could be latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to
the practice of law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal opinion or advice, such were isolated
transactions or activities which do not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged in the practice of
law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts.
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active
and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
J. Cruz: I fear that the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase "practice of law" as to render the
qualification practically toothless. From the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the uncomfortable
feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the
application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the
definition as they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become involved in litigation." It is conceded that
Monsod has been engaged in business and finance, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing lawyer.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an
activity where membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice
of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme
Court and all lower courts. The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years." The
deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental,
intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous.

MAURICIO ULEP vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC. [June 17, 1993]

Mauricip Ulep prays that the respondent cease and desist from issuing advertisements similar to the following 1 and to
perpetually prohibit them from making advertisements pertaining to the exercise of the law profession other than those allowed
by law." Ulep submits that the subject advertisements are “champterous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and
destructive of the confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar.”

TLC: claims that it is not engaged in the practice of law but in the rendering of "legal support services" through paralegals with
the use of modern computers and electronic machines. Assuming that the services advertised are legal services, the act of
advertising these services should be allowed. [John Bates vs. State Bar of Arizona]

ISSUE: W/N the services offered by The Legal Clinic, Inc., as advertised by it constitutes practice of law.

Integrated Bar of the Philippines: Notwithstanding the subtle manner by which respondent endeavored to distinguish the two
terms, i.e., "legal support services" vis-a-vis "legal services", the same are essentially without substantial distinction. The use of
the name "The Legal Clinic, Inc." gives the impression that respondent-corporation is being operated by lawyers and that it
renders legal services. While the respondent repeatedly denies that it offers legal services to the public, the advertisements in
question give the impression that respondent is offering legal services. The advertisements in question leave no room for doubt
in the minds of the reading public that legal services are being offered by lawyers, whether true or not.

Also, the advertisements in question are meant to induce the performance of acts contrary to law, morals, public order and
public policy. By simply reading the questioned advertisements, it is obvious that the message being conveyed is that Filipinos
can avoid the legal consequences of a marriage celebrated in accordance with our law, by simply going to Guam for a divorce.
This is not only misleading, but encourages, or serves to induce, violation of Philippine law.

The IBP is aware of the fact that providing computerized legal research, electronic data gathering, storage and retrieval,
standardized legal forms, investigators for gathering of evidence, and like services will greatly benefit the legal profession and
should not be stifled but instead encouraged. However, when the conduct of such business by non-members of the Bar
encroaches upon the practice of law, there can be no choice but to prohibit such business. There might be nothing
objectionable if respondent is allowed to perform all of its services, but only if such services are made available exclusively to
members of the Bench and Bar. Respondent would then be offering technical assistance, not legal services.

Philippine Bar Association: From all indications, "The Legal Clinic, Inc." is offering and rendering legal services through its reserve
of lawyers. It has been held that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court, but includes drawing of deeds,
incorporation, rendering opinions, and advising clients as to their legal right and then take them to an attorney and ask the latter
to look after their case in court

It is apt to recall that only natural persons can engage in the practice of law, and such limitation cannot be evaded by
a corporation employing competent lawyers to practice for it. Obviously, this is the scheme or device by which respondent "The
Legal Clinic, Inc." holds out itself to the public and solicits employment of its legal services. It is an odious vehicle for deception,
especially so when the public cannot ventilate any grievance for malpractice against the business conduit.

Precisely, the limitation of practice of law to persons who have been duly admitted as members of the Bar is to subject the
members to the discipline of the Supreme Court. Although respondent uses its business name, the persons and the lawyers who
act for it are subject to court discipline. The practice of law is not a profession open to all who wish to engage in it nor can it be
assigned to another. It is a personal right limited to persons who have qualified themselves under the law. It follows that not only
respondent but also all the persons who are acting for respondent are the persons engaged in unethical law practice.

Philippine Lawyers' Association: As advertised, The Legal Clinic offers the general public its advisory services on Persons and
Family Relations Law, particularly regarding foreign divorces, annulment of marriages, secret marriages, absence and adoption;
Immigration Laws, particularly on visa related problems, immigration problems; the Investments Law of the Philippines and such
other related laws. Its advertised services unmistakably require the application of the aforesaid law, the legal principles and
procedures related thereto, the legal advices based thereon and which activities call for legal training, knowledge and
experience.

1
ANNEX A: SECRET MARRIAGE? P560.00 for a valid marriage. Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
ANNEB B: An Attorney in Guam, is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Applying the test laid down by the Court in the Agrava Case, the activities of respondent fall squarely and are embraced in what
lawyers and laymen equally term as "the practice of law." 7

U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle: While it appears that lawyers are prohibited under the present Code of Professional Responsibility
from advertising, it appears in the instant case that legal services are being advertised not by lawyers but by an entity staffed by
"paralegals." Clearly, measures should be taken to protect the general public from falling prey to those who advertise legal
services without being qualified to offer such services.

Women Lawyer's Association of the Philippines:Annexes "A" and "B" of the petition are clearly advertisements to solicit cases
for the purpose of gain which, as provided for under the above cited law, are illegal and against the Code of Professional
Responsibility of lawyers in this country.

Federacion Internacional de Abogados: In determining whether a man is practicing law, we should consider his work for any
particular client or customer, as a whole. I can imagine defendant being engaged primarily to advise as to the law defining his
client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client's obligations to his employees, to guide his client along the path charted
by law. This, of course, would be the practice of the law. But such is not the fact in the case before me. Defendant's primarily
efforts are along economic and psychological lines. The law only provides the frame within which he must work, just as the
zoning code limits the kind of building the limits the kind of building the architect may plan. The incidental legal advice or
information defendant may give, does not transform his activities into the practice of law. Let me add that if, even as a minor
feature of his work, he performed services which are customarily reserved to members of the bar, he would be practicing law. A
person engaged in a lawful calling (which may involve knowledge of the law) is not engaged in the practice of law provided that:

(a) The legal question is subordinate and incidental to a major non-legal problem;.
(b) The services performed are not customarily reserved to members of the bar; .
(c) No separate fee is charged for the legal advice or information.

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedures, knowledge, training
and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristic of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give advice or render any kind of service that involves legal knowledge or skill.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. It includes legal advice and counsel, and the preparation of
legal instruments and contract by which legal rights are secured, although such matter may or may not be pending in a court.

In the practice of his profession, a licensed attorney at law generally engages in three principal types of professional activity:
legal advice and instructions to clients to inform them of their rights and obligations, preparation for clients of documents
requiring knowledge of legal principles not possessed by ordinary layman, and appearance for clients before public tribunals
which possess power and authority to determine rights of life, liberty, and property according to law, in order to assist in
proper interpretation and enforcement of law. 14

Legal support services basically consists of giving ready information by trained paralegals to laymen and lawyers, which are
strictly non-diagnostic, non-advisory, through the extensive use of computers and modern information technology in the
gathering, processing, storage, transmission and reproduction of information and communication.

That fact that the corporation employs paralegals to carry out its services is not controlling. It is engaged in the practice of law
by virtue of the nature of the services it renders which thereby brings it within the ambit of the statutory prohibitions against
the advertisements which it has caused to be published and are now assailed in this proceeding.

While we deem it necessary that the question as to the legality or illegality of the purpose/s for which the Legal
Clinic, Inc. was created should be passed upon and determined, we are constrained to refrain from lapsing into an
obiter on that aspect since it is clearly not within the adjudicative parameters of the present proceeding which is
merely administrative in nature. It is, of course, imperative that this matter be promptly determined, albeit in a
different proceeding and forum. This interdiction, just like the rule against unethical advertising, cannot be
subverted by employing some so-called paralegals supposedly rendering the alleged support services.

The remedy for the apparent breach of this prohibition by respondent is the concern and province of the Solicitor
General who can institute the corresponding quo warranto action.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to RESTRAIN and ENJOIN herein respondent, The Legal Clinic, Inc., from issuing
or causing the publication or dissemination of any advertisement in any form which is of the same or similar tenor
and purpose as Annexes "A" and "B" of this petition, and from conducting, directly or indirectly, any activity,
operation or transaction proscribed by law or the Code of Professional Ethics as indicated herein.

In the Matter of the Petitions for Admission to the Bar of Unsuccessful Candidates of 1946 to 1953; ALBINO
CUNANAN, ET AL. [March 18, 1954]

Republic Act No. 972, popularly known as the "Bar Flunkers' Act of 1953."
Sec 1.Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, any bar candidate who obtained a general
average of 70% in any bar examinations after July 4, 1946 up to the August 19, 1951 bar examinations; 71% in the 1952; 72% in
the 1953; 73% in the 1954; 74% in the 1955, without obtaining a grade below 50% in any subject, shall be allowed to take and
subscribe the corresponding oath of office as member of the Philippine Bar.
Sec 2. Any bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject in any bar examination after July 4, 1946 shall be deemed
to have passed in such subject or subjects and such grade or grades shall be included in computing the passing general average
that said candidate may obtain in any subsequent examinations that he may take.

The reason for relaxing the standard 75% passing grade is the tremendous handicap which students during the years
immediately after the Japanese occupation has to overcome such as the insufficiency of reading materials and the inadequacy of
the preparation of students who took up law soon after the liberation.

Of the 9,675 candidates who took the examinations from 1946 to 1952, 5,236 passed. And now it is claimed that in
addition 604 candidates be admitted (which in reality total 1,094), because they suffered from "insufficiency of
reading materials" and of "inadequacy of preparation."

ISSUE: W/N RA no. 972 is unconstitutional.

HELD: YES, it is UNCONSTITUTIONAL. By its declared objective, the law is contrary to public interest because it
qualifies 1,094 law graduates who confessedly had inadequate preparation for the practice of the profession, as was
exactly found by this Tribunal in the aforesaid examinations. The public interest demands of legal profession
adequate preparation and efficiency, precisely more so as legal problem evolved by the times become more difficult.
To the legal profession is entrusted the protection of property, life, honor and civil liberties. To approve officially of
those inadequately prepared individuals to dedicate themselves to such a delicate mission is to create a serious social
danger. Moreover, the statement that there was an insufficiency of legal reading materials is grossly exaggerated.
There were abundant materials.

This law has no precedent in its favor. When similar laws in other countries had been promulgated, the judiciary
immediately declared them without force or effect. It is not within our power to offer a precedent to uphold the
disputed law. In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been disputably a
judicial function and responsibility.

Even considering the power granted to Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter supplement the rules
promulgated by this Court regarding the admission to the practice of law, to our judgment and proposition that the
admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of the attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly
belonging to Congress, is unacceptable.

The distinction between the functions of the legislative and the judicial departments is that it is the province of the
legislature to establish rules that shall regulate and govern in matters of transactions occurring subsequent to the
legislative action, while the judiciary determines rights and obligations with reference to transactions that are past or
conditions that exist at the time of the exercise of judicial power, and the distinction is a vital one and not subject to
alteration or change either by legislative action or by judicial decree.

In decreeing the bar candidates who obtained in the bar examinations of 1946 to 1952, a general average of 70%
without falling below 50 per cent in any subject, be admitted in mass to the practice of law, the disputed law is not a
legislation; it is a judgment — a judgment revoking those promulgated by this Court during the aforecited year
affecting the bar candidates concerned.
Although this Court certainly can revoke these judgments even now, for justifiable reasons, it is no less certain that
only this Court, and not the legislative nor executive department, that may do so. Any attempt on the part of any of
these departments would be a clear usurpation of its functions, as is the case with the law in question.

Section 13. The Supreme Court shall have the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in
all courts, and the admission to the practice of law. Said rules shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade and shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. The existing laws on pleading, practice and procedure are hereby repealed
as statutes, and are declared Rules of Court, subject to the power of the Supreme Court to alter and modify the same. The
Congress shall have the power to repeal, alter, or supplement the rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure, and
the admission to the practice of law in the Philippines. — Constitution of the Philippines, Art. VIII, sec. 13.

It will be noted that the Constitution has not conferred on Congress and this Tribunal equal responsibilities
concerning the admission to the practice of law. The primary power and responsibility which the Constitution
recognizes continue to reside in this Court. The power to repeal, alter and supplement the rules does not signify nor
permit that Congress substitute or take the place of this Tribunal in the exercise of its primary power on the
matter.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities say, merely to
fix the minimum conditions for the license. The law in question, like those in the case of Day and Cannon, has been
found also to suffer from the fatal defect of being a class legislation, and that if it has intended to make a
classification, it is arbitrary and unreasonable. The general rule is well settled by unanimity of the authorities that a
classification to be valid must rest upon material differences between the person included in it and those excluded
and, furthermore, must be based upon substantial distinctions.

As the rule has sometimes avoided the constitutional prohibition, must be founded upon pertinent and real
differences, as distinguished from irrelevant and artificial ones. In other words, there must be such a difference
between the situation and circumstances of all the members of the class and the situation and circumstances of all
other members of the state in relation to the subjects of the discriminatory legislation as presents a just and natural
cause for the difference made in their liabilities and burdens and in their rights and privileges. A law is not general
because it operates on all within a clause unless there is a substantial reason why it is made to operate on that class
only, and not generally on all.

It was indicated that those who failed in 1944, 1941 or the years before, with the general average indicated, were
not included because the Tribunal has no record of the unsuccessful candidates of those years. This fact does not
justify the unexplained classification of unsuccessful candidates by years, from 1946-1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955.
Neither is the exclusion of those who failed before said years under the same conditions justified. The fact that this
Court has no record of examinations prior to 1946 does not signify that no one concerned may prove by some other
means his right to an equal consideration.

This purpose, manifest in the said law, is the best proof that what the law attempts to amend and correct are not the
rules promulgated, but the will or judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking its place. This is doing directly
what the Tribunal should have done during those years according to the judgment of Congress. In other words, the
power exercised was not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which continue in force. What was done was to
stop or suspend them. And this power is not included in what the Constitution has granted to Congress, because it
falls within the power to apply the rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to which such duty been confided.

RESOLUTION
1. That (a) the portion of article 1 of Republic Act No. 972 referring to the examinations of 1946 to 1952, and (b) all of article 2 of
said law are unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without force and effect.
2. That, for lack of unanimity in the eight Justices, that part of article 1 which refers to the examinations subsequent to the
approval of the law, that is from 1953 to 1955 inclusive, is valid and shall continue to be in force, in conformity with section 10,
article VII of the Constitution.
Consequently, (1) all the above-mentioned petitions of the candidates who failed in the examinations of 1946 to 1952 inclusive
are denied, and (2) all candidates who in the examinations of 1953 obtained a general average of 71.5% or more, without having
a grade below 50% in any subject, are considered as having passed, whether they have filed petitions for admission or not. After
this decision has become final, they shall be permitted to take and subscribe the corresponding oath of office as members of the
Bar on the date or dates that the chief Justice may set.

IN RE: DISQUALIFICATION OF HARON MELING IN 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS [June 8, 2004]

1
In 2002, Atty. Froilan Melendrez filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant a Petition to disqualify Haron Meling from
taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
Philippine Shari’a Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that
he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the MTCC of Cotabato City, namely: 2 Criminal Cases for Grave Oral
Defamation, and a Criminal Case for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
In 2001, Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners
and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the
latter. Furthermore, Meling has been using the title "Attorney" in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of
Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.
MELING: he did not disclose the criminal cases because retired Judge Corocoy Moson advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled, Meling considered the
three cases as "closed and terminated." Moreover, Meling adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral
turpitude. As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his communications really contained
the word "Attorney" as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
OBC: Meling should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases. Furthermore,
granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to
ascertain his good moral character. The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is
his act of concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing his
communications as "Atty. Haron Meling" knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. The unauthorized use of
the appellation "attorney" may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court. OBC recommended that
Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyer’s Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar
Examinations. Further, it recommended that Meling’s membership in the Shari’a Bar be suspended until further
orders from the Court. SC: CONCURED with the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the [2002] Bar Examinations.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral
character. The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the practice
of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the
applicant to aver that he or she "has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation
before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal
of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her."
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENT: imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of good
moral character of the applicant. The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would aid the Court
in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of
such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or
insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.
In Alawi v. Alauya, respondent therein used the title "Attorney" in several correspondence in connection with the
rescission of a contract entered into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that persons who pass the
Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice law before Shari’a courts.
While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both
be considered "counselors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is
an "attorney." The title "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law
and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain
members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Meling as a member of the
Philippine Shari’a Bar. His membership in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from
the Court. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of
Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW; BENJAMIN DACANAY [December 17, 2007]
Benjamin Dacanay was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in
December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s
free medical aid program and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
In 2006, pursuant to RA 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), Dacanay reacquired his
Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate
General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.

ISSUE: W/N Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in 2004.

Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant
for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least 21 years of age, of good moral
character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of
good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in
any court in the Philippines.

OBC: by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, Dacanay has again met all the qualifications and
has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the
practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar; SC: approved the recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant with certain modifications.

Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a
member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good
and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

GENERAL RULE: Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words,
the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law
is a privilege denied to foreigners.
EXCEPTION: when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but
subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to
resume law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino
citizenship pursuant to its provisions "he shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in
such practice." Before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice,
he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:

(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially
significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal
developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a
lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar. The petition of
Attorney Benjamin Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and
submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the
Philippine bar.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS vs. BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR CO. [November 29, 1971]

Petitioners were complainants in a case entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the
Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants Enrique
Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final.
Cipriano Cid & Associates: filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30% of the total backwages; Atty. Atanacio
Pacis also filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount.
COMPLAINANTS: filed a manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their
backwages
Quentin Muning: filed a "Petition for the Award of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages.
Muning’s petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is not a lawyer.
CIR: awarded 25% of the backwages as compensation for professional services rendered in the case, apportioned
with Cipriano Cid & Associates receiving 10%, Quintin Muning receiving 10%, and Atty Pacis receiving 5%.

ISSUE: W/N QUENTIN MUNING, a non-lawyer, may recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered.

HELD: NO. As enunciated in Amalgamated Laborers' Association vs. Court of Industrial Relations, an agreement
providing for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president is allowed to share in said fees
with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court
of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as in the present case.

Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875: “In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner thereof, the parties
shall not be required to be represented by legal counsel.” The aforesaid provision is no justification for a ruling, that
the person representing the party-litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is entitled to
attorney's fees: for the same section adds that “it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing Officer to
examine and cross examine witnesses on behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly presentation of
evidence,” thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively entrusted to duly qualified members of
the bar.

The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or defend in the said court on behalf of a party-
litigant does not by itself entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. Section 24, Rule 138, of
the Rules of Court imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to the recovery of
attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless the client's representative in court be a lawyer.

Since respondent Muning is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with Enrique Entila and
Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot, therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands
that legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to those possessing tested qualifications
and who are sworn, to observe the rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial
disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public. The general rule above-stated (referring to
non-recovery of attorney's fees by non-lawyers) cannot be circumvented when the services were purely legal, by
seeking to recover as an "agent" and not as an attorney.

The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded attorney's fees should suffice to
refute the possible argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations should be
excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not weigh the
aforesaid reasons and cannot justify an exception.

Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual practice of law before the Court of Industrial
Relations, and many of them like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their appearances as
"representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this is a serious situation demanding corrective
action that respondent court should actively pursue and enforce by positive action to that purpose. But since this
matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it may not be taken up in the present case. The orders under
review are hereby set aside insofar as they awarded 10% of the backwages as attorney's fees for respondent
Quintin Muning.

WILFREDO CATU vs. ATTY. VICENTE RELLOSA [February 19, 2008]

Wilfredo Catu is a co-owner of a lot and the building in Manila. His mother and brother, Regina and Antonio Catu,
contested the possession of Elizabeth Diaz-Catu and Antonio Pastor of one of the units in the building. The latter
ignored demands to vacate the premises. Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against
Elizabeth and Pastor in MeTC-Manila. Atty. Vicente Rellosa entered his appearance as counsel for the defendants in
that case. In turn, Wilfredo filed the instant administrative complaint, claiming that Rellosa committed an act of
impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that
he presided over the conciliation proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

RELLOSA: claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to hear complaints referred to the
barangay's Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and
Pastor. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the
ejectment case. It was then that Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her
case for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the commission of a patent injustice
against her.

IBP-CBD: found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. Under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
“A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he intervened while in said service.”

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 which
stated that “Public officials and employees during their incumbency shall not engage in the private practice of
profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to
conflict with their official functions.”

For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondent's suspension from the practice of law for one
month with a stern warning that the commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. This
was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors.

SC: Modified the FINDINGS and PENALTY of IBP. Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility because that Rule applies only to a lawyer who has left government service and in
connection "with any matter in which he intervened while in said service." In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,11 we ruled that
Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which [they] had intervened while in said service." Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at
the time he committed the act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 is the general law which applies to all public officials and employees. For elective local
government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160 governs. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice of
profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on
engaging in the private practice of profession by public officials and employees.

While certain local elective officials (like governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are expressly
subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no such
interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay. Since they are
excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their profession. And this
stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve full time. Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent
was not forbidden to practice his profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization
from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations. A civil service officer or employee whose
responsibilities do not require his time to be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private
practice of law only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned.
As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior written permission of the Secretary of
Interior and Local Government before he entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to
do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a
violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their
paramount duty to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy and importance
of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission, respondent not only engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”

For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical standards of the legal profession,
respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that “A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL
TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF
THE INTEGRATED BAR.”

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity
of the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member
of the bar.18 Every lawyer should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession.

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation of the lawyer's
oath20 and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Atty. Vicente Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons
1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of six months effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any repetition
of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the word delicadeza.
JULIO ZETA vs. FELICISIMO MALINAO [December 20, 1978]

An administrative complaint against Felicisimo Malinao, court interpreter of the Court of First Instance of Catbalogan,
Samar, was filed by one [“Julio Zeta”] charging as follows:

l — ILLEGALLY APPEARING IN COURT. — MR. Malinao has been appearing in the municipal court of
this town for parties like attorney when he is not an attorney..

2 — GRAVE MISCONDUCT IN OFFICE. — Being employed in the Court of First Instance he would
instigate persons, especially in his barrio to grab land, rob, or coerce. He incites them telling them
not to be afraid as he is a court employee and has influence over the judges.

3 — CRIME OF FALSIFICATION. — Information has it that he is unfaithfully filing his time record in
the CFI. Even if he has been out practicing in the municipal courts sometimes he would fill his time
record as present. He receives salary for those absent days.

4 — VIOLATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER AND CIVIL SERVICE LAW.- It is prohibited for a civil service
employee to engage in private practice any profession or business without permission from the
Department Head. Mr. Malinao has not secured that permission because he should not be allowed
to practice as he is not an attorney.

MALINAO: His participation for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could not engage the services of counsel by
reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality.

CFI: Judge Restituto Duran of Sta. Rita, Samar, declared that according to his docket books the respondent appeared
as counsel for Vicente Baculanlan in a criminal case in the Municipal Court of Sta. Rita, Samar, for grave threats and in
a criminal case for the same accused and Romulo Villagracia for illegal possession of firearm.

Judge Miguel Avestruz of Daram, Samar, declared that the respondent appeared as counsel in a civil case in the
Municipal Court of Daram, Samar for forcible entry.

Judge Juanito Reyes declared the respondent appeared as counsel for the defendant in a civil case of the Municipal
Court of Zumarraga for forcible entry.

SC: Respondent, apart from appearing as counsel in various municipal courts without prior permission of his
superiors in violation of civil service rules and regulations, falsified his time record of service by making it appear
therein that he was present in his office on occasions when in fact he was in the municipal courts appearing as
counsel, without being a member of the bar, which, furthermore, constitutes illegal practice of law. We, therefore,
adopt the above findings of fact of the Investigator.

The defense of respondent that "his participation for defendants' cause was gratuitous as they could not engage the
services of counsel by reason of poverty and the absence of one in the locality" cannot, even if true, carry the day for
him, considering that in appearing as counsel in court, he did so without permission from his superiors and, worse,
he falsified his time record of service to conceal his absence from his office on the dates in question. Indeed, the
number of times that respondent acted as counsel under the above circumstances would indicate that he was doing
it as a regular practice obviously for considerations other than pure love of justice.

The offense committed by respondent warrants a more drastic sanction than that of reprimand recommended by
Judge Zosa. We find no alternative than to separate him from the service, with the admonition that he desist from
appearing in any court or investigative body wherein Only members of the bar are allowed to practice.

Thus, Felicisimo Malinao is hereby ordered dismissed from his position as interpreter in the Court of First Instance,
Zumarraga, Western Samar with prejudice to reemployment in the judicial branch of the government.
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH [March 19, 1997]

Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his oath-
taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide. The aforesaid criminal case
arose from the death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and
seven other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight accused later withdrew their
initial pleas and upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment imposing on each of the accused a sentence of
imprisonment of from 2 yrs, 4 mos. 1 day to 4 yrs. Afterwards, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application
for probation. In 1994, petitioner was discharge from probation. Petitioner then filed before this Court a petition to
be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.

SC: Argosino was required to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.

ARGOSINO: submitted 15 certifications which contained letters from 2 senators, 5 trial court judges, and 6 members
of religious orders. Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in
honor of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the 8 accused.

Atty. Gilbert Camaligan: still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son
was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused
took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength
and treachery. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He
therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

SC: The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral qualifications
required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice. It is the sworn duty of
this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession of the law but, also of
equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer's oath, thereby further tarnishing the public image of
lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.

The senseless beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required
for admission to the bar since they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for. However, the Court is
prepared to consider de novo the question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in
moral character referred to above. After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al
Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the
following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad
moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for
civic duties and public service. The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death
of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general
tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.

We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer
should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's oath. If all
lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.

The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As
a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate members of
society.
Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll
of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.

PATRICK CARONAN vs. RICHARD CARONAN a.k.a. "ATTY. PATRICK A. CARONAN" [March 19, 1997]

Patrick and Richard Caronan are siblings. Richard is older by one year. Patrick graduated from the University of
Makati with a degree in Business Administration; Richard enrolled at the Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila in
1991, transferred to the Philippine Military Academy in 1992, and was discharged from PMA in 1993.

In 2004, their mother informed Patrick that Richard passed the Bar Examinations and that he used Patrick;’s name
and college records from the University of Makati to enroll at St. Mary's University's College of Law in Nueva Vizcaya
and take the Bar Exams. Patrick brushed these aside as he did not anticipate any adverse consequences to him.

Sometime in 2009, after his promotion as Store Manager, Patrick was informed that the NBI was requesting his
presence in relation to an investigation involving Richard, who was using the name "Atty. Patrick Caronan." Patrick
later learned that Richard had been using his name to perpetrate crimes and commit unlawful activities. Patrick
then took it upon himself to inform other people that he is the real "Patrick Caronan" and that respondent's real
name is Richard Caronan. However, due to the controversies involving respondent's use of the name "Patrick
Caronan," complainant developed a fear for his own safety and security. He also became the subject of conversations
among his colleagues, which eventually forced him to resign from his job at PSC. Hence, complainant filed the
present Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the former's name and identity, and illegal practice
of law.

RICHARD: denied all the allegations against him and invoked res judicata as a defense. He maintained that his
identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been resolved in a CBD Case where the IBP Board of
Governors dismissed the administrative case filed by Agtarap against him.

IBP: found respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming complainant's name, identity, and academic records.
Richard failed to controvert all the allegations against him and did not present any proof to prove his identity. On the
other hand, complainant presented clear and overwhelming evidence that he is the real "Patrick Caronan."

ISSUE: W/N (a) the name "Patrick Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys; and (b) the name "Richard Caronan"
be barred from being admitted to the Bar.

HELD: YES to BOTH. Respondent falsely used complainant's name, identity, and school records to gain admission to
the Bar. Since the real "Patrick Caronan" never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the
name "Patrick Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys.

The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard Caronan," be barred from
admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar
Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course.

Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he
has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in
an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school
course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subject as
major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history, and economics.

In the case at hand, Richard never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a
year later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without graduating. Clearly, respondent has not
completed the requisite pre-law degree. The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on
complete his college education and earn a law degree under his real name. However, his false assumption of his
brother's name, identity, and educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law,
after all, is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a
privilege limited to citizens of good moral character. In In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S.
Meling in the 2002 Bar Examinations and for Disciplinary Action as Member of the Philippine Shari 'a Bar, Atty.
Froilan. Melendrez,59the Court explained the essence of good moral character:
Good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or from the opinion generally
entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where he is known. Moral character is
not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The standard of personal and professional
integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good
moral character includes at least common honesty.

Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when he
assumed the name, identity, and school records of his own brother and dragged the latter into controversies which
eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years. Good moral
character is essential in those who would be lawyers. This is imperative in the nature of the office of a lawyer, the
trust relation which exists between him and his client, as well as between him and the court.

Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary qualifications to
be a lawyer. He also tarnished the image of lawyers with his alleged unscrupulous activities, which resulted in the
filing of several criminal cases against him. Certainly, respondent and his acts do not have a place in the legal
profession where one of the primary duties of its members is to uphold its integrity and dignity.

WHEREFORE, respondent Richard Caronan a.k.a. "Atty. Patrick Caronan" (respondent) is found GUILTY of falsely
assuming the name, identity, and academic records of complainant Patrick Caronan (complainant) to obtain a law
degree and take the Bar Examinations. Accordingly, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate civil and/or criminal
cases, the Court hereby resolves that:

(1) the name "Patrick A. Caronan" is ordered DROPPED and STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys;

(2) respondent is PROHIBITED from engaging in the practice of law or making any representations as a lawyer;

(3) respondent is BARRED from being admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar in the future;

(4) the Identification Cards issued by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to respondent under the name "Atty.
Patrick A. Caronan" and the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificates issued in such name
are CANCELLED and/or REVOKED; and

(5) the Office of the Court Administrator is ordered to CIRCULATE notices and POST in the bulletin boards of all courts
of the country a photograph of respondent with his real name, " Richard A. Caronan," with a warning that he is not a
member of the Philippine Bar and a statement of his false assumption of the name and identity of "Patrick A.
Caronan."
IN RE: PETITION TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES, EPIFANIO MUNESES [July 24, 2012]

Epifanio Muneses became a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in 1966. He lost his privilege to practice
law when he became a citizen of the US in 1981. In 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA
9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen
before the Philippine Consulate General in Washington. He intends to retire in the Philippines. Thus, in 2009, he filed
a petition with the Office of the Bar Confidant praying that he be granted the privilege to practice law in the
Philippines.

SC: Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is a continuing requirement for the practice of
law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioner’s membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege to engage
in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason
of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship
upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country
and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
However, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends
to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage
in such practice. The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected with public
interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to
protect and promote the public welfare.

Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of
the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of
membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are the conditions required for membership in good
standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these
conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for
the continued exercise of his professional privilege.

OBC required the herein petitioner to submit the following
documents in relation to his petition:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of
Immigration;
5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of
annual membership dues;
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.
In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the following:
1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship
issued by the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter
attesting to his good moral character as well as his updated
payment of annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance
period; and
8. Certification of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-
MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his
compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the
requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications for membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume
his practice of law.

THUS, the petition of Attorney Epifanio Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition that he shall re-take
the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.
STEPHAN and VIRGINIA BRUNET vs. ATTY. RONALD GUAREN [March 10, 2014]

Spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet engaged the services of Atty. Ronald Guaren for the titling of a residential lot
they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres. Atty. Guaren asked for a fee of ₱10,000 including expenses relative to its
proceeding, where full payment shall be made after the delivery of the title. Atty. Guaren asked for and was given an
advance fee of Pl,000. Atty. Guaren took all the pertinent documents relative to the titling of their lot. After, Atty.
Guaren asked for additional payment of ₱6,000. From 1997 to 2001, they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the
case and each time he would say that the titling was in progress. The spouses became bothered by the slow progress
of the case so they demanded the return of the money they paid. Atty. Guaren agreed to return the same provided
that ₱5,000 be deducted to answer for his professional fees. Thus, in 2002, spouses Brunet filed a complaint against
Atty. Guaren before the Commission on Bar Discipline. Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an
attorney-client relationship between them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in a case pending
before the MeTC of Cebu.

Atty. Guaren: admitted that he indeed charged complainants an acceptance fee of ₱10,000, but denied that the
amount was inclusive of expenses for the titling of the lot. He claimed that their agreement was that the case would
be filed in court after the complainants fully paid his acceptance fee.

Investigating Commissioner, CBD: found Atty. Guaren to have violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility when
he accepted the titling of complainants’ lot. Despite the acceptance of ₱7,000, he failed to perform his obligation and
allowed 5 years to elapse without any progress in the titling of the lot. Atty. Guaren should also be disciplined for
appearing in a case against complainants without a written consent from the latter. The CBD recommended that he
be suspended for 6 months; IBP Board of Governors: adopted and approved with modification the Report,
suspending Atty. Guaren from the practice of law for 3 months only.

SC: adopts the findings of the IBP Board of Governors on the unethical conduct of Atty. Guaren, except as to the
penalty.

The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money, is the primary
consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture, and law advocacy is not a capital that
necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service
and to the administration of justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their
personal interests or what they owe to themselves.

Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him.

CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of ₱7,000 as partial payment of his
acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for the titling of complainants' lot
despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence when
he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Ronald Guaren is found GUILTY of having violated Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for 6 MONTHS effective from receipt of this
Resolution, with a warning that a similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
VICTOR LINGAN vs. ATTYS. ROMEO CALUBAQUIB and JIMMY BALIGA [June 30, 2014]
In 2006, this court found Attys. Romeo Calubaquib and Jimmy Baliga guilty of violating Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility and of the Lawyer's Oath. Respondents allowed their secretaries to notarize
documents in their stead, in violation of the Notarial Law. This court suspended respondents from the practice of
law for one year, revoked their notarial commissions, and disqualified them from reappointment as notaries public
for two years.
After this court had suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, the Commission on Human Rights issued the
resolution suspending him from his position as Director/Attorney VI of the CHR Regional Office for Region II.
According to CHR, Atty. Baliga's suspension from the practice of law "prevent[ed] [him] from assuming his post [as
Regional Director] for want of eligibility in the meantime that his authority to practice law is suspended."
ATTY. BALIGA: argued that he cannot be suspended for acts not connected with his functions as CHR Regional
Director. According to Atty. Baliga, his suspension from the practice of law did not include his suspension from public
office.
LINGAN: claimed that the discharge of the functions of a CHR Regional Director necessarily required the practice of
law. A CHR Regional Director must be a member of the bar and is designated as Attorney VI. Since this court
suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, Atty. Baliga was in effect "a non-lawyer”, disqualified to hold the
position of [Regional Director] [during the effectivity of the order of suspension]."
Office of the Bar Confidant: found that the period of suspension of Attys. Calubaquib and Baliga had already lapsed.
It recommended that respondents be required to file their respective motions to lift order of suspension with
certifications from the IBP and the Executive Judge of the court where they might appear as counsel and state that
they desisted from practicing law during the period of suspension. In compliance with this court's order, Attys.
Calubaquib and Baliga filed their respective motions to lift order of suspension. Atty. Baliga also filed his comment on
complainant Lingan's allegation that he continued performing his functions as Regional Director during his
suspension from the practice of law.
ATTY. BALIGA: alleged that as Regional Director, he "performed, generally, managerial functions." The Commission
allegedly has its own "legal services unit which takes care of the legal services matters of the Commission." Stating
that his functions as Regional Director did not require the practice of law, Atty. Baliga claimed thaf he "faithfully
complied with this court's resolution suspending him from the practice of law."
CHR: argued that "the penalty imposed upon Atty. Baliga as a member of the bar is separate and distinct from any
penalty that may be imposed upon him as a public official for the same acts." Atty. Baliga's suspension from the
practice of law is a "bar matter"39 while the imposition of penalty upon a CHR official "is an entirely different thing,
falling as it does within the exclusive authority of the Commission as disciplining body." Nevertheless, the
Commission manifested that it would defer to this court's resolution of the issue and would "abide by whatever
ruling or decision of the court.
As to Atty. Baliga's claim that he did not practice law while he held his position as Regional Director and only
performed generally managerial functions, complainant Lingan countered that Atty. Baliga admitted to defying the
order of suspension. Atty. Baliga admitted to performing the functions of a "lawyer-manager," 43 which under the
landmark case of Cayetano v. Monsod constituted practice of law. Complainant Lingan reiterated that the position
of Regional Director/ Attorney VI requires the officer "to be a lawyer [in] good standing." 45 Moreover, as admitted by
Atty. Baliga, he had supervision and control over Attorneys III, IV, and V. Being a "lawyer-manager," Atty. Baliga
practiced law while he held his position as Regional Director.
Office of the Bar Confidant: Atty. Baliga "should not [have been] allowed to perform his functions, duties, and
responsibilities as Regional Director which [required acts constituting] practice .of law."
ISSUE: W/N Atty. Baliga's motion to lift order of suspension should be granted.
HELD: NO. Atty. Baliga violated this court's order of suspension. He is thus suspended further from the practice of law
for six months.
Practice of law is "any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience." It includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal]
profession" or "[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill."
Work in government that requires the use of legal knowledge is considered practice of law. CHR is an independent
office created under the Constitution with power to investigate "all forms of human rights violations involving civil
and political rights." Under the Guidelines and Procedures in the Investigation and Monitoring of Human Rights
Violations and Abuses, and the Provision of CHR Assistance, the Regional Director has the following powers and
functions:
a. To administer oaths or affirmations with respect to "[Commission on Human Rights] matters;" 65
b. To issue mission orders in their respective regional offices; 66
c. To conduct preliminary evaluation or initial investigation of human rights complaints in the absence of the
legal officer or investigator;67
d. To conduct dialogues or preliminary conferences among parties and discuss "immediate courses of action
and protection remedies and/or possible submission of the matter to an alternative dispute resolution"; 68
e. To issue Commission on Human Rights processes, including notices, letter-invitations, orders, or subpoenas
within the territorial jurisdiction of the regional office; 69 and
f. To review and approve draft resolutions of human rights cases prepared by the legal officer.
These powers and functions are characteristics of the legal profession. Oaths and affirmations are usually
performed by members of the judiciary and notaries public, officers who are necessarily members of the bar.
Investigating human rights complaints are performed primarily by the Commission's legal officer. Discussing
immediate courses of action and protection remedies and reviewing and approving draft resolutions of human rights
cases prepared by the legal officer require the use of extensive legal knowledge.
The exercise of the powers and functions of a CHR Regional Director constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional
Director must be an attorney - a member of the bar in good standing and authorized to practice law. When the
Regional Director loses this authority, such as when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the
Regional Director loses a necessary qualification to the position he or she is holding. The disbarred or suspended
lawyer must desist from holding the position of Regional Director.
In ordering Atty. Baliga suspended from office as Regional Director, the Commission on Human Rights did not violate
Atty. Baliga's right to due process. First, he was only suspended after: investigation by the Commission on Human
Rights Legal and Investigation Office. Second, the Commission gave Atty. Baliga an opportunity to be heard when he
filed his motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Baliga's performance of generally managerial functions was not supported by the record. It was also immaterial.
He held the position of CHR Regional Director because of his authority to practice law. Without this authority, Atty.
Baliga was disqualified to hold that position. All told, performing the functions of a Commission on Human Rights
Regional Director constituted practice of law. Atty. Baliga should have desisted from holding his position as Regional
Director.
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. -
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as
an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The Commission on Human Rights erred in issuing the resolution in April, 2007. This resolution caused Atty. Baliga
to reassume his position as Regional Director/ Attorney VI despite lack of authority to practice law.
We remind the Commission on Human Rights that we have the exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of
law.81 The Commission cannot, by mere resolutions and .other issuances, modify or defy this court's orders of
suspension from the practice of law. Although the Commission on Human Rights has the power to appoint its
officers and employees,82 it can only retain those with the necessary qualifications in the positions they are holding.
As for Atty. Baliga, we remind him that the practice of law is a "privilege burdened with conditions." 83 To enjoy the
privileges of practicing law, lawyers must "[adhere] to the rigid standards of mental fitness, [maintain] the highest
degree of morality[,] and [faithfully comply] with the rules of [the] legal profession." 84
WHEREFORE, we FURTHER SUSPEND Atty. Jimmy Baliga from the practice of law for 6 months. Atty. Baliga shall serve
a total of 1 year and 6 months of suspension from the practice of law.

DONNA MARIE AGUIRRE vs. EDWIN RANA [June 10, 2003]

Edwin Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. On May 21, 2001, one day before the
scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees, Donna Marie Aguirre filed against Rana a Petition for
Denial of Admission to the Bar. Aguirre charged Raba with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation
of law, and grave misrepresentation.
Aguirre alleges that Rana, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections
before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers, Masbate. Allegedly, Rana filed with the MBEC a pleading dated
May 19, 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of
Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, Rana represented himself as "counsel for and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate,
George Bunan," and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan. Aguirre claims that Rana filed the pleading as
a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.
Further, as a municipal government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate,
Rana is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body. The Court issued a
resolution allowing Rana to take the lawyer’s oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is
cleared of the charges against him.
RANA: admits that Bunan sought his "specific assistance" to represent him before the MBEC. Rana claims that "he
decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law." Rana admits signing the
May 19, 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing, but he did not sign the
pleading as a lawyer or represented himself as an "attorney" in the pleading. Rana also claims that he submitted his
resignation on May 11, 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. Rana further claims that the
complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing
candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.
AGUIRRE: alleges that on May 19, 2001, Emily Estipona-Hao filed a petition for proclamation as the winning
candidate for mayor. Rana signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. When respondent appeared as counsel
before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as
a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government.
OBC: found that Rana appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May 2001 elections and that Rana
actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings
even before he took the lawyer’s oath on May 22, 2001. The OBC believes that respondent’s misconduct casts a
serious doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondent’s
unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law.
SC: Rana engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing.
Rana was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various
pleadings, without license to do so. Rana called himself "counsel" knowing fully well that he was not a member of
the Bar. Having held himself out as "counsel" knowing that he had no authority to practice law, Rana has shown
moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of
law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking
admission had practiced law without a license. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad, a candidate passed the bar examinations but
had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a
person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of court. 7
It is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent
passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-
law. Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be performed, namely:
his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of Attorneys.
WHEREFORE, Edwin Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL MEDADO [September 24, 2013]
Michael Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1979 and
passed the same year's bar examinations with a general weighted average of 82.7. In 1980, he took the Attorney’s
Oath at the Philippine International Convention Center. He was scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on May 13,
1980, but he failed to do so on his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll of
Attorneys given by the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a vacation.
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the Notice to Sign the Roll of
Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance
of the PICC was probably just an attendance record. By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working.
Thus, he operated "under the mistaken belief that since he had already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of
Attorneys was not as urgent, nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer"; and "the matter of signing in the Roll of
Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten. In 2005, when Medado attended
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education seminars, he was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE
compliances to be credited but he was unable to provide his roll number. In 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition,
praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.
OBC: recommended that the instant petition be denied for petitioner’s gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter
lack of merit. Medado could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of Attorneys.
SC: We grant Medado’s prayer in the instant petition, subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a
penalty equivalent to suspension from the practice of law. Not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys
would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty reserved for the most serious
ethical transgressions of members of the Bar. In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted.
1. Medado demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in
the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was not a third party who called this Court’s attention to petitioner’s omission;
rather, it was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of more than 30 years.
2. For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from the practice of law. This fact
demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics of the profession, and that he
has prima facie shown that he possesses the character required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
3. Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner.
All these demonstrate Medado’s worth to become a full-fledged member of the Philippine Bar. While the practice of
law is not a right but a privilege, this Court will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have
shown mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession. That said, however, we cannot fully
exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for his years of inaction.
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years, without having
signed in the Roll of Attorneys. He justifies this behavior by characterizing his acts as "neither willful nor intentional
but based on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment." While an honest mistake of fact could be used to
excuse a person from the legal consequences of his acts as it negates malice or evil motive, a mistake of law cannot
be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know the law and its consequences.
Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of 'the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides “A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.”
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the unauthorized practice of law, the
unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9
is the lawyer's duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar
candidates. As aspiring members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the ethical
standards of the legal profession.
As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However, we see it fit to
impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign in the Roll of Attorneys one year after receipt
of this Resolution. For his transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise see it
fit to fine him in the amount of ₱32,000. During the one year period, petitioner is warned that he is not allowed to
engage in the practice of law, and is sternly warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has
signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court.