Republic of the Philippines Visayas Task Force, United States Army.
Whereupon, defendants' counsel
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-1 and L-2 December 4, 1945
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
JUAN NAVARRO and ANACLETO ATIENZA, defendants-appellees.
Acting Solicitor General Tañada for appellant.
Teodoro R. Dominguez for appellees.
BENGZON, J.:
On April 27, 1945, Juan Navarro and Anacleto Atienza, acting provincial
warden, respectively, of the Province of Mindoro, were charged with the
arbitrary detention of Esteban P. Beloncio (in criminal case No. 32) and of
Juan G. Beloncio II (in criminal case No. 33). Typical was the first information
alleging:
That from January 27, 1945, and for several days thereafter, in the
municipality of Calapan, Province of Mindoro, Commonwealth of the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the
said defendants Juan Navarro and Anacleto Atienza, acting
Provincial governor and Provincial Warden, respectively, both being
public officials to whom the custody and responsibility of prisoners
were entrusted for proper action, without any lawful or justifiable
cause and without legal grounds therefor, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously detain Esteban P. Beloncio in the
Provincial Jail of Mindoro which continued for more than fifteen days
but less than six months.
On April 28, 1945, the Judge of the Court of First Instance called the cases
for trial. The record is not completely clear as to what transpired therein. It is
apparent that a pre-trial was held, the judge asking the parties or their
attorneys some questions, which the latter answered, with the result that
admissions were made to the effect that Esteban P. Beloncio and Juan G.
Beloncio II had been detained for several days after January 27,1945, in the
provincial jail of Mindoro by order of the Commanding General, Western
lost no time in filing a motion, to quash, upon the ground that the facts
charged did not constitute a criminal offense. Ruling upon the motion, the
Honorable M. L. de la Rosa, Judge, dismissed the two cases, explaining in
part:
. . . Argumentando ambas partes, la defensa en favor de su mocion
de sobreseimiento, de esta fecha, y la acusacion, oponiendose a la
misma, conviene en que los referidos Esteban P. Beloncio y Juan G.
Beloncio II fueron detenidos y puestos en la carcel, como presos, por
las autoridades militares de las fuerzas Americanas, despues de la
reconquista de esta parte norte de Mindoro, que tuvo lugar hacia la
segunda mitad de enero ultimo, las cuales autoridades fueron
tambien quienes mas tarde nombraron a Juan Navarro, como
Gobernador Provincial de esta provincia, puesto que hasta ahora lo
ocupa, porque aun no se ha nombrado, por los funcionarios del
Commonwealth de Filipinas, su sucesor, y fue instruido a continuar
ejerciendo su cargo.
The provincial fiscal appealed.
The Solicitor General argues that "if the informations must be quashed on the
ground 'that the facts charged do not constitute an offense' elementary logic
dictates that the facts charged 'in the informations' must be the one
examined and analyzed to determined the sufficiency of the allegations." He
also maintains that it was error for the court to make findings of facts and
decide the criminal cases on the merits, before issue had been joined, and
before any evidence had been properly presented.
The defense thoroughly answered these points.
The office of the Solicitor general does not deny that the Beloncios had been
committed to jail by order of competent authorities of the American forces of
liberation. The record fails to show any motion for reconsideration by the
provincial fiscal disputing the admissions attributed to him in the court's
decision. Hence we are justified, in assuming, that such representations had
been made. Consequently when the defense urged that that the facts
charged did not constitute an offenses, invoking not only the allegations of
the information but also the admissions made by the fiscal, the trial judge
rightly sustained the motion. Because the Beloncios had been placed by
competent authority of the United State military forces in the official custody
of defendants, who were public officials entrusted with the detention of
prisoners, they could not very well be turned loose without a countermand.
The fiscal should have have mentioned other subsequent circumstances, if
any, establishing defendants' duty (which they failed to fulfill) to release the
Beloncios.
Separate Opinions
It must be noted that the section of the rule (sec. 2 [a], Rule 113) permitting a
motion to quash on the ground that "the facts charged do not constitute an
offenses" omits reference to the facts detailed "in the information." Other
sections of the same rule would imply that the issues is restricted to those PERFECTO, J., concurring:
alleged in the information (see secs. 9 and 10, Rule 113). Prima facie, the
"facts charged" are those described in the complaint, but they may be
amplified or qualified by others appearing to be additional circumstances, We concur. To attain the substantial ends of justice, procedural technicalities
upon admissions made by the people's representative, which admissions must be dispensed with, and the court rules must be interpreted so as to give
could anyway be submitted by him as amendments to the same information. them the resiliency demanded by the circumstances of the case. Court rules
It would seem to be pure technicality to hold that in the consideration of the must give way to judicial liberalism and legal progress. The law embodied in
motion the parties and judge were preclude from considering facts which the them must grow and develop. Even the calcareous shells of the large phylum
fiscal admitted to be true, simply because they were not described in the of mollusks, notwithstanding their rocky hardness and apparent fixity, grow in
complaint. Of course, it may be added that upon similar motions the court answer to the evolutionary requirements of biological laws.
and the fiscal are not required to go beyond the averments of the information,
nor is the latter to be inveigled into a premature and risky revelation of his Prosecution's statements belong to a class of evidence of the highest order
evidence. But we see no reason to prohibit the fiscal from making, in all in behalf of the accused. It is based on the same principle upon which
candor, admissions of undeniable facts, because the principle can never be estoppel is established, and from which the ad hominem argument in logic
sufficiently reiterate that such official's role is to see that justice is done: not derives its forces.
that all accused are convicted, but that the guilty are justly punished. less
reason can there be to prohibit the court from considering those admissions,
and deciding accordingly, in the interest of a speedy administration of
justice.lawphi1.net

The Beloncios were thus deprive of their liberty by order of the military
authorities, a few days after the liberation of Mindoro. Judicial notice may be
taken of the fact, that upon military occupation and before establishment of
the normal processes of civil government the liberties and rights of citizens
are likely to suffer temporary restrictions, what with the exigencies of military
strategy, or the confusion usually resulting from the situation. while the
infringement of constitutional precepts and privileges is not to be tolerated,
war necessities and consequences cannot be overlooked. At any rate, no
reasons are shown why the irregularity, if any, committed by others, should
be visited upon defendant-appellees. The acts imputed to them, as herein
recorded, do not, of themselves, constitute a punishable offense. The
appealed decision is affirmed. So ordered.

Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Jaranilla, Feria, De Joya, Pablo, Hilado and
Briones, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 187000 November 24, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
AQUILINO ANDRADE, ROMAN LACAP, YONG FUNG YUEN, RICKY YU,
VICENTE SY, ALVIN SO, ROMUALDO MIRANDA, SINDAO MELIBAS,
SATURNINO LIWANAG, ROBERTO MEDINA and RAMON
NAVARRO,Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
It is clearly provided by the Rules of Criminal Procedure that if the motion to
quash is based on an alleged defect in the information which can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order the amendment to be made.
For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, which seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated May 29, 2008 and Resolution2 dated February 26, 2009 of
the Court of Appeals (CA).
The antecedent facts are the following:
Pursuant to the instructions of then Director of the Bureau of Corrections,
Dionisio R. Santiago, on June 30, 2003, a random drug test was conducted
in the National Bilibid Prison (NBP) wherein the urine samples of thirty-eight
(38) inmates were collected and subjected to drug testing by the Chief
Medical Technologist and Assistant Medical Technologist of the Alpha
Polytechnic Laboratory in Quezon City, and out of that number, twenty-one
(21) urine samples tested positive.
After confirmatory tests doneby the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division, those
twenty-one (21) urine samples, which included that of herein respondents,
yielded positive results confirming the result of the initial screen test.
Necessarily, the twenty-one (21) inmates were charged with violation of
Section 15, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165) under identical
Informations,3 which read as follows:
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, accuses
AQUILINO ANDRADE for Violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165,
committed as follows:
That on or about June 30, 2003, in the New Bilibid Prisons, Muntinlupa City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, without having been authorized by law, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously use or in any manner introduced into the
physiological system of his body, Methamphetamine Hydrochloride,
otherwise known as "shabu," a dangerous drug inviolation of the aforecited
law.4
All respondents pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime charged during their
arraignment on June 29, 2006. Thereafter, the case was set for pre-trial and
trial on August 11, 2006.5
On August 29, 2006, respondents filed a Consolidated Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a
violation of Section 15, RA 9165, which reads:
6. A strict reading of the provisions of Section 15, Article II, RA 9165 reveals
that the accused did not commit the offense charged. Under RA 9165, the
offense of Violation of Section 15 thereof is committed by a person
apprehended or arrested for using dangerous drug, and who is found to be
positive for use of any dangerous drug after a confirmatory test, to wit:
xxxx
7. In the case at bar, the accused were never apprehended or arrested for
using a dangerous drug or for violating the provisions of RA 9165, which
would warrant drug testing and serve as basis for filing the proper information
in court. In fact, the accused were merely called to the Maximum Security
Conference Hall in the morning of June 30, 2003 and with seventeen (17)
other inmates made to undergo drug testing, pursuant to the directive of then
Sr. Usec. Santiago. It was only after they were found positive for dangerous
drugs that the information for Violation of Section 15, RA 9165 was filed
against each of them.
8. Section 36, Article III, RA 9165 further enumerates the persons subject to
mandatory and random drug tests, who if found positive after such drug test
shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15. x x x
xxxx
National penitentiary inmates or inmates of the Bureau of Corrections are not
included in the enumeration. Thus, even if the accused have been found
positive in the mandatory or random drug test conducted by BUCOR, they
cannot be held liable under Section 15.
9. Assuming for the sake of argument, but not admitting, that the accused
were apprehended or arrested for using a dangerous drug or for violating the
provisions of RA 9165 which led to the June 30, 2003 screen test, or that the
accused are subject to mandatory or random drug testing, the drug test
would be invalid absent a showing that the same was conducted within
twenty-four (24) hours after the apprehension or arrest of the offender
through a confirmatory test within fifteen (15) days receipt of the result in
accordance with the provisions of Section 38, Article II of RA 9165 x x x.
xxxx
10. In the case, the accused were not informed of the results of the screening
test, thus depriving them of the right to challenge the same through a
confirmatory drug test within the required fifteen (15)-day period after receipt
of the positive result.6
Respondents' lawyer, on the date set for hearing, manifested that he intends
to pursue the Motion to Dismiss filed by respondents' previous
counsel,7 hence, the pre-trial and trial were reset to September 29, 2006.
The pre-trial and trial were further reset to November 29, 20068 due to a
typhoon that occurred on the earlier scheduled date.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Muntinlupa, before the scheduled hearing
date for pre-trial and trial, issued an Order9 granting respondents'
Consolidated Motion to Dismiss,10 ruling as follows:
To be liable under this Act the following essential requisites must be present:
1. The offender must have been arrested or apprehended for use of
dangerous drugs; or apprehended or arrested for violation of RA
9165 and the apprehending or arresting officer has reasonable
ground to believe that the person arrested or apprehended on
account of physical signs or symptoms or other visible or outward
manifestation is under the influence of dangerous drugs; or must
have been one of those under Sec. 36 of Art. III of RA 9165 who
should be subjected to undergo drug testing;
2. The offender must have been found positive for use of dangerous
drug after a screening and confirmatory test;
3. The offender must not have been found in his/ or her possession
such quantity of dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of
this Act;
4. That if the offender arrested or apprehended has been found to be
positive for use of dangerous drugs after a screening laboratory
examination, the results of the screening laboratory examination of
test shall be challenged within fifteen (15) days after receipt of the
result through a confirmatory test conducted in any accredited
analytical laboratory equipment with a gas chromatograph/mass
spectrometry or some such modern method.
xxxx
It is clear from the foregoing facts that the inmates were not apprehended nor
arrested for violation of any provision of R.A. 9165. These inmates were in
the National Bilibid Prisons (NBP) serving sentences for different crimes
which may include also drug offenses. They were subjected to drug tests
only pursuant to the request made by then Director Dionisio Santiago.
Furthermore, they were not one of those persons enumerated in Section 36
of the said Act who may be subjected to mandatory drug testing. Hence, the
first essential requisite has not been complied with. If one essential
requisiteis absent, the Court believes that these inmates cannot be held
liable for the offense charged. They may be held liable administratively for
violation of the Bureau of Corrections or NBP rules and regulations governing
demeanor of inmates inside a penitentiary but not necessarily for violation of
Sec. 15 of R.A. 9165. The court need not discuss the other elements of the
crime as the same has become moot and academic in view of the absence of
the first essential element.
WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause for the offense charged in the
Information these cases are ordered DISMISSED with costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.11
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA after its Motion for
Reconsideration was denied.
The CA, in its Decision dated May 29, 2008, affirmed the trial court's Order,
the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DENIED. The assailed
Orders of the public respondent Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City,
Branch 204, in Criminal Cases Nos. 06-224, 06-229, 06-231, 06-232, 06-234,
06-235, 06-237, 06-238, 06-239 and 06-241, STAND.
SO ORDERED.12
Consequently, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration, but was denied
in a Resolution dated February26, 2009. Thus, the present petition.
Petitioner asserts the following argument:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS MAY NOT BE HELDLIABLE FOR VIOLATION OF
SECTION 15, ARTICLE II OF RA 9165.13 According to petitioner, the CA
erred because respondents had lost the remedy under Section 3(a), Rule
117 of the Rules of Court having been already arraigned before availing of
the said remedy.
Respondents, however, insist that the CA is correct in upholding the RTC's
decision dismissing the Informations filed against them. They claim that since
the ground they relied on is Section 3(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court,
their motion to quash may be filed even after they have entered their plea.
Basically, the issue presented before this Court is not so much as the
timeliness of the filing of the motion toquash, but whether the CA erred in
upholding the RTC's grant of respondents' motion and eventually dismissing
the case based on lack of probable cause.
This Court finds the present petition meritorious.
The ground relied upon by respondents in their "Motion to Dismiss," which is,
that the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute an offense, is
actually one of the grounds provided under a Motion to Quash in Section 3
(a),14 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
It must be emphasized that respondents herein filed their Motion after they
have been arraigned. Under ordinary circumstances, such motion may no
longer be allowed after arraignment because their failure to raise any ground
of a motion to quash before they plead is deemed a waiver of any of their
objections. Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 9. Failure to Move to Quash or to Allege Any Ground Therefor. - The
failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he
pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion
to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a
waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in
paragraphs (a),(b), (g), and (i) of Section 3 of this Rule.
However, since the ground asserted by respondents is one of the exceptions
provided under the above-provision, the timeliness of the filing is
inconsequential. The mistake lies inthe RTC's dismissal of the case.
The RTC judge went beyond her authority when she dismissed the cases
based on lack of probable cause and not on the ground raised by
respondents, to wit:
WHEREFORE, finding no probable cause for the offense charged in the
Informationthese cases are ordered DISMISSED with cost de officio.
SO ORDERED.15
Section 2,16 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure plainly
states that in a motion to quash, the court shall not consider any ground
other than those stated in the motion, except lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged. In the present case, what the respondents claim in their
motion to quash is that the facts alleged in the Informations do not constitute
an offense and not lack of probable cause as ruled by the RTC judge.
The RTC judge's determination of probable cause should have been only
limited prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest and not after the
arraignment. Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then
"personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence"17 to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a warrant
of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable cause exists. 18
In People v. Castillo and Mejia,19 this Court has stated:
There are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and
judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during
preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public
prosecutor who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable
cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the
crime as defined by law and thus should be held for trial. Otherwise stated,
such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a
criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been
correctly discharged by the public prosecutor, i.e.,whether or not he has
made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a case,
is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to
pass upon.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made
by the judge to ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued
against the accused. The judge must satisfy himself that based on the
evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under custody
in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable
cause, the judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.20
The difference is clear: The executive determination of probable cause
concerns itself with whether there is enough evidence to support an
Information being filed. The judicial determination of probable cause, on the
other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued. In
People v. Inting:21
x x x Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry
which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from
the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender
should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in
the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion
about the objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant of
arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper – whether
or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the
expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial – is the function of the
Prosecutor.22
While it is within the trial court’s discretion to make an independent
assessment of the evidence on hand, it isonly for the purpose of determining
whether a warrant of arrest should beissued. The judge does not act as an
appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the
prosecutor’s determination of probable cause; rather, the judge makes a
determination of probable cause independent of the prosecutor’s finding. 23
In truth, the court's duty in an appropriate case is confined merely to the
determination of whether the assailed executive or judicial determination of
probable cause was done without orin excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.24 In this particular case,
by proceeding with the arraignment of respondents, there was already an
admittance that there is probable cause. Thus, the RTC should not have
ruled on whether or not there is probable cause to hold respondents liable for
the crime committed since its duty is limited only to the determination of
whether the material averments in the complaint or information are sufficient
to hold respondents for trial.1âwphi1 In fact, in their motion, respondents
claimed that the facts alleged in the Informations do not constitute an
offense.
Considering that the RTC has already found probable cause, it should have
denied the motion to quash and allowed the prosecution to present its
evidence and wait for a demurrer to evidence to be filed by respondents, if
they opt to, or allowed the prosecution to amend the Information and in the
meantime suspend the proceedings until the amendment of the Information
without dismissing the case.
Section 4, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly
states that if the ground based upon is that "the facts charged do not
constitute an offense," the prosecution shall be given by the court an
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment, thus:
Section 4. Amendment of the complaint or information. - If the motion to
quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which
can be cured by amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be
made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct
the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails
to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the
same defect despite the amendment.25
If the defect in the information is curable by amendment, the motion to quash
shall be denied and the prosecution shall be ordered to file an amended
information.26 Generally, the fact that the allegations in the information do not
constitute an offense, or that the information does not conform substantially
to the prescribed form, are defects curable by amendment.27 Corollary to this
rule, the court should give the prosecution an opportunity to amend the
information.28 In the present case, the RTC judge outrightly dismissed the
cases without giving the prosecution an opportunity to amend the defect in
the Informations. In People v. Talao Perez,29 this Court ruled that, "...even
granting that the information in question is defective, as pointed out by the
accused, it appearing that the defects thereof can be cured by amendment,
the lower court should not have dismissed the case but should have ordered
the Fiscal to amend the information." When there is any doubt about the
sufficiency of the complaint or information, the court should direct its
amendment or that a new information befiled, and save the necessity of
appealing the case on technical grounds when the complaint might easily be
amended.30
Even the CA admitted that the RTC erred in that regard, thus:
Indeed, Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, requires that the
prosecution should first be given the opportunity to correct the defects in the
information before the courts may grant a motion to quash grounded on
Section 3(a), and it may only do so when the prosecution fails to make the
amendment, or the information suffers from the same defect despite the
amendment. Pursuant to this rule, it would thus seem that the trial court did
err in this regard.31

The CA, however, still upheld the ruling of the RTC, stating that "whatever
perceived error the trial court may have committed is inconsequential as any
intended amendment to the informations filed surely cannot cure the
defects,"32and to justify such conclusion, the CA proceeded to decide the
merits of the case based merely on the allegations in the Information. Such
pronouncement, therefore, is speculative and premature without giving the
prosecution the opportunity to present its evidence or, to at least, amend the
Informations. In People v. Leviste,33 we stressed that the State, like any other
litigant, is entitled to its day in court; in criminal proceedings, the public
prosecutor acts for and represents the State, and carries the burden of
diligently pursuing the criminal prosecution in a manner consistent with public
interest.34 The prosecutor's role in the administration of justice is to lay before
the court, fairly and fully, every fact and circumstance known to him or her to
exist, without regard to whether such fact tends to establish the guilt or
innocence of the accused and without regard to any personal conviction or
presumption on what the judge may or is disposed to do.35 The prosecutor
owes the State, the court and the accused the duty to lay before the court the
pertinent facts at his disposal with methodical and meticulous attention,
clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in his evidence
tothe end that the court's mind may not be tortured by doubts; that the
innocent may not suffer; and that the guilty may not escape unpunished. 36 In
the conduct of the criminal proceedings, the prosecutor has ample
discretionary power to control the conduct of the presentation of the
prosecution evidence, part of which is the option to choose what evidence to
present or who to call as witness.37Thus, the RTC and the CA, by not giving
the State the opportunity to present its evidence in court or to amend the
Informations, have effectively curtailed the State's right to due process.

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the present Petition for Review on

Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 29, 2008 and
Resolution dated February 26, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 100016 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-44079 December 19, 1985
JOSEFINO C. DRACULAN Provincial Fiscal of Isabela and PATRICIO T.
DURIAN, Fourth Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Isabela, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PROCORO DONATO, Judge, Court of First Instance of Isabela,
Branch V, respondent.
CUEVAS, J.:
Assailed and challenged in this petition for certiorari and MANDAMUS, for
allegedly having been issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, are two orders issued by the
Honorable respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. V-351 of the defunct
Court of First Instance of Isabela-Echague, Branch V. One dated April 13,
1976 1 denying petitioners' motion to dismiss; and another one, issued on
May 28, 1976 2 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order of dismissal.
The pertinent background facts are as follows:
On June 25, 1973, the Chief of Police of San Isidro, Isabela filed with the
Municipal Court of the said place, a complaint for Less Serious Physical
Injuries against Florencio Miguel. The case was docketed in the said court as
Criminal Case No. 63.
Tried after pleading not guilty upon arraignment, accused Miguel was
convicted as charged and thereafter accordingly sentenced in a decision
promulgated on November 14, 1973.
From the aforesaid decision, Miguel appealed to the then Court of First
Instance of Isabela, where his appeal was docketed as Criminal Case No. V-
351 and assigned to Branch V of the said court presided by the Honorable
respondent Judge. 'The record of the said case was then transmitted and
referred by the Clerk of Court to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela
Upon a review of the evidence made by the provincial fiscal's office,
petitioners found that accused-appellant Miguel should have been charged
with "Direct Assault Upon a Person in Authority" it appearing that Benjamin
Antonio, the offended party, is a person in authority then engaged in the
performance of his official duties when assaulted. In view thereof, petitioners'
office, then conducted a new preliminary investigation and upon a prima facie
showing that direct assault was actually the, crime committed by accused-
appellant Miguel, petitioners filed with the respondent court t a Motion to
Dismiss the appealed Less Serious Physical Injury case. Simultaneously, a
new information for Direct Assault was filed against Miguel which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. V-419 Upon receipt of the records of this
assault case, respondent Judge, in an order dated December 17, 1975,
directed that it be returned to the Fiscal's Office on the ground that it was
prematurely filed considering that at that time, the prosecution's motion to
dismiss the appeal was still pending resolution.
Undaunted by such a disposition, petitioners then filed a new information
which they caused to be docketed also as Criminal Case No. V-351 similar to
that of the appealed less serious physical injury case, and thereafter again
moved for the dismissal of the appealed case. Petitioners' motion was denied
and so with their motion for reconsideration of the order of denial.
Hence, the instant petition wherein it is prayed that the aforementioned
orders of respondent Judge dated April 13, 1976 and May 28, 1976 be
declared null and void; that respondent Judge be ordered to dismiss the
appealed less serious physical injury case; and that a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining respondent from proceeding with the trial of the appealed
less serious physical injury case be issued which should be made permanent
after hearing on the merits.
The petition is devoid of merit. Consequently, its dismissal is in order.
Criminal Case No. V-351 is an appeal, not an original case. It is before the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Isabela pursuant to the
appeal interposed by accused Florencio Miguel from the decision of the
Municipal Court of San Isidro convicting him of Less Serious Physical
Injuries. The Court of First Instance then took cognizance of such case in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. And since the appeal was subsequent to
the passage of Republic Act No. 6031, 3 which took effect on August 4, 1969,
the appeal must now be disposed of on the basis of the evidence presented
and admitted in the municipal court. No trial de novo is necessary but the
parties may merely submit and/or be required to file their respective briefs or
memoranda. 4
But since the proceeding before the San Isidro Municipal Court was not duly
recorded because of the absence of a qualified stenographer, the court of
First Instance of Isabela must now conduct a trial de novo of the case on
appeal.
The question therefore posed before us is—may the prosecution amend the
information and/or file a new information charging an offense different from
that with which accused-appellant was tried and convicted in the court
below?
Petitioners' answer to this query is in the affirmative, relying on Section 13 of
Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, 5 which provides:
Section 13. Amendment. The information or complaint may
be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at
any time before the defendant pleads; and thereafter and
during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the
discretion of the court, when the same can be done without
prejudice to the rights of the defendant.
If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has
been made in charging the proper offense, the court may
dismiss the original complaint or information and order the
filing of a new one charging the proper offense, provided the
defendant would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy,
and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their
appearance at the trial.
The above section contains two parts: one authorizes the amendment of an
information or complaint, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any
time before the defendant pleads, and thereafter, only as to matters of form.
The other provides that, if it appears at any time before judgment that a
mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court may
dismiss the original complaint or information and order the filing of a new one
charging the proper offense, provided the defendant would not be placed in
double jeopardy.
The amendment 6 or the filing of a new case where there had been a mistake
in charging the proper offense after the dismissal of an existing one, 7 spoken
of and therein provided for apply, only to an original case where no judgment
has as yet been rendered. Much less does the said section apply to an
appealed case such as the instant proceeding. 8
The reason is obvious and that is because the right to amend or to file a new
complaint or information charging the proper offense after the dismissal of
the original complaint or information, is subject to the rule on double
jeopardy, which petitioners in the instant case miserably missed,
In the case at bar, the original charges was that of less serious physical
injuries. Whether the new charge for direct assault with less serious physical
injuries is by way of amendment or through a new information is immaterial
since in both instances accused's former conviction would be a bar to a
subsequent prosecution for the second offense. This was the dictum laid
down in the case of People vs. Bonotan 9 and which doctrine was reiterated
in the recent case of Tacas vs. Cariaso 10 Thus:
The charge of direct assault upon a person in authority with
physical injuries contained in the fiscal's information is not
included in the charge contained in the complaint of the chief
of police, which is merely that of less serious physical
injuries unqualified by any allegation that those injuries were
inflicted upon the offended municipal councilor, admittedly a
person in authority, while he was in the performance of his
official duties or on the occasion thereof, a qualification
essential to the offense charged in the information. The
converse is no less obvious, that is, that the charge, of direct
assault upon a person in authority with physical injuries as
set out in the information necessarily includes the offense of
less serious physical injuries charged on the complaint,
specially because in both the information and the complaint,
the physical injuries inflicted are alleged to have required
medical assistance of a period of 14 days and incapacitated
the offended party from labor for the same period of time. As
proof that the offense charged in the information includes the
offense charged in the complaint, conviction of the
defendants of this latter offense may, without question, be
had under the information if the other ingredients of the
crime charged in said information are not proved. Hence, the
defense of double jeopardy was wen taken. The order of
dismissal was thus affirmed precisely or. the very same
constitutional ground relied upon in this petition. 11
We find the said pronouncement "on all fours" to the instant case. Petitioners'
submittal not being in accord therewith may not be sustained.
But the more serious repercussion of which the petitioners appeared
unmindful of, is the fact that with the withdrawal of the appeal, the old
judgment of conviction is revived and the accused loses his right to a review
of the evidence on appeal by way of questioning the validity of his conviction.
What is sought to be dismissed is not the main case, 12 but merely the appeal
which was docketed as Criminal Case No. V-351
WHEREFORE, finding the instant petition to be without merit, the same is
DISMISSED. The appropriate Regional Trial Court of Isabela to which
Criminal Case No. V-351 was reassigned is, therefore, hereby directed to
proceed immediately with the trial of the said case until its final termination.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion Jr., (Chairman), Abad Santos, Escolin and Alampay, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 97214 July 16, 1994
ERNESTO NAVALLO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Pepino Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.
VITUG, J.:
On 11 May 1978, an information charging petitioner with having violated
Article 217, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, was filed with the then
Court of First Instance ("CFI") of Surigao del Norte (docketed Criminal Case
No. 299). It read:
That on or before January 27, 1978 in the municipality of del
Carmen, Province of Surigao del Norte and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused who is the
Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the Numancia National
Vocational School, which school is also located at del
Carmen, Surigao del Norte and while a Collecting and
Disbursing Officer of the aforestated school therefore was
holding in trust moneys and/or properties of the government
of the Republic of the Philippines and holding in trust public
funds with all freedom, intelligence, criminal intent and intent
of gain, did then and there voluntarily, unlawfully, feloniously
and without lawful authority appropriate and misappropriate
to his own private benefit, public funds he was holding in
trust for the Government of the Philippines in the total sum of
SIXTEEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE
PESOS and SIXTY-TWO CENTAVOS (P16,483.62),
Philippine Currency, which total sum accused failed to
account during an audit and failed as well to restitute despite
demands by the office of the Provincial Auditor, to the
damage and prejudice of the Government equal to the
amount misappropriated.
Act contrary to par. 4 of Article 217, of the Revised Penal
Code with a penalty of Reclusion Temporal, minimum and
medium periods and in addition to penalty of perpetual
special disqualification and fine as provided in the same
Article. 1
A warrant of arrest was issued, followed by two alias warrants of arrest, but
accused-petitioner Ernesto Navallo still then could not be found.
Meanwhile, on 10 December 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect
creating the Sandiganbayan and conferring on it original and exclusive
jurisdiction over crimes committed by public officers embraced in Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code.
On 15 November 1984, Navallo was finally arrested. He was, however, later
released on provisional liberty upon the approval of his property bail bond.
When arraigned by the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") on 18 July 1985, he
pleaded not guilty. On 22 May 1986, upon motion of the prosecution, the
RTC transferred the case and transmitted its records to the Sandiganbayan.
On
27 January 1989, Special Prosecutor Luz L. Quiñones-Marcos opined that
since Navallo had already been arraigned before the case was transferred to
the Sandiganbayan, the RTC should continue taking cognizance of the case.
The matter was referred to the Office of the Ombudsman which held
otherwise. The information was docketed (Criminal Case No. 13696) with the
Sandiganbayan. A new order for Navallo's arrest was issued by the
Sandiganbayan. The warrant was returned with a certification by the RTC
Clerk of Court that the accused had posted a bail bond. The bond, having
been later found to be defective,
on 30 August 1989, a new bond was approved and transmitted to the
Sandiganbayan.
Navallo filed a motion to quash, contending (1) that the Sandiganbayan had
no jurisdiction over the offense and the person of the accused and (2) that
since the accused had already been arraigned by the RTC, the attempt to
prosecute him before the Sandiganbayan would constitute double jeopardy.
On 15 September 1989, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying
Navallo's motion. On 20 October 1989, Navallo was arraigned; he pleaded,
"not guilty," to the charge. Trial ensued.
Evidence for the Prosecution:
On 27 January 1978, the Provincial Auditor of Surigao del Norte, Antonio
Espino, made a preliminary audit examination of cash and other accounts of
Ernesto Navallo (then Collecting and Disbursing Officer of Numancia
National Vocational School). Espino found Navallo to be short of P16,483.62.
The auditor, however, was then merely able to prepare a cash count sheet
since he still had to proceed to other municipalities. Before departing, Espino
sealed the vault of Navallo.
On 30 January 1978, Leopoldo A. Dulguime was directed by Espino to
complete the preliminary examination and to conduct a final audit. Dulguime
broke the seal, opened the vault, and made a new cash count. Dulguime
next examined the cashbook of Navallo. Dulguime did not examine the
official receipts reflected in the cashbook, said receipts having been
previously turned over to the Officer of the Provincial Auditor. After the audit,
he had the cashbook likewise deposited with the same office. The audit
covered the period from July 1976 to January 1978 on the basis of postings
and record of collections certified to by Navallo. Dulguime confirmed
Navallo's shortage of P16,483.62. Dulguime made a Report of Examination
and wrote Navallo a letter demanding the restitution of the missing amount.
The latter neither complied nor offered any explanation for the shortage. The
official receipts and cashbook, together with some other records, were
subsequently lost or damaged on account of a typhoon that visited the
province.
Evidence for the Defense:
The accused, Navallo, testified that in 1970, he was a Clerk I in the
Numancia National Vocational School. In 1976, he was appointed Collecting
and Disbursing Officer of the school. His duties included the collection of
tuition fees, preparation of vouchers for salaries of teachers and employees,
and remittance of collections exceeding P500.00 to the National Treasury.
Even while he had not yet received his appointment papers, he, together
with, and upon the instructions of, Cesar Macasemo (the Principal and
Navallo's predecessor as Collecting and Disbursing Officer of the school),
was himself already doing entries in the cashbook. Navallo and Macasemo
thus both used the vault. Navallo said that he started the job of a
disbursement officer in June 1977, and began to discharge in full the duties
of his new position (Collection and Disbursement Officer) only in 1978. There
was no formal turn over of accountability from Macasemo to Navallo.
Gainsaying the prosecution's evidence, Navallo continued that the charge
against him was motivated by a personal grudge on the part of Espino. On
25 January 1978, he said, he was summoned to appear at the Numancia
National Vocational School where he saw Espino and Macasemo. The safe
used by him and by Macasemo was already open when he arrived, and the
cash which was taken out from the safe was placed on top of a table. He did
not see the actual counting of the money and no actual audit of his
accountability was made by Espino. Navallo signed the cash count only
because he was pressured by Macasemo who assured him that he
(Macasemo) would settle everything. The collections in 1976, reflected in the
Statement of Accountability, were not his, he declared, but those of
Macasemo who had unliquidated cash advances.
Navallo admitted having received the demand letter but he did not reply
because he was already in Manila looking for another employment. He was
in Manila when the case was filed against him. He did not exert any effort to
have Macasemo appear in the preliminary investigation, relying instead on
Macasemo's assurance that he would settle the matter. He, however,
verbally informed the investigating fiscal that the shortage represented the
unliquidated cash advance of Macasemo.
The Appealed Decision:
On 08 November 1990, after evaluating the evidence, the Sandiganbayan
reached a decision, and it rendered judgment, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ERNESTO
NAVALLO y GALON GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the crime of malversation of public funds defined
and penalized under Article 217, paragraph 4, of the Revised
Penal Code.
Accordingly and there being no modifying circumstances nor
reason negating the application of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended, the Court imposes upon the
accused the indeterminate sentence ranging from TEN (10)
YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum to
SIXTEEN (16) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS and ELEVEN
(11) DAYS of reclusion temporal as maximum; the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification, and a fine in the amount of
SIXTEEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE
PESOS AND SIXTY-TWO CENTAVOS (P16,483.62),
Philippine Currency.
The Court further orders the accused to restitute the amount
malversed to the Government.
SO ORDERED. 2
 Accused-petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Sandiganbayan in its resolution of 05 February 1991.
Hence, the instant petition.
Four issues are raised in this appeal —
1. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction to
try and decide the offense filed against petitioner in spite of
the fact that long before the law creating the Sandiganbayan
took effect, an Information had already been filed with the
then Court of First Instance of Surigao del Norte.
2. Whether or not double jeopardy set in when petitioner was
arraigned by the Regional Trial Court on July 18, 1985.
3. Whether or not petitioner was under custodial
investigation when he signed the certification prepared by
State Auditing Examiner Leopoldo Dulguime.
4. Whether or not the guilt of petitioner has been established
by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt as to warrant
his conviction for the offense imputed against him.
We see no merit in the petition.
On 10 December 1978, Presidential Decree No. 1606 took effect providing,
among other things, thusly:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. — The Sandiganbayan shall have
jurisdiction over:
(a) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, and Republic Act
No. 1379;
(b) Crimes committed by public officers and
employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled
corporations, embraced in Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes; and
(c) Other crimes or offenses committed by
public officers or employees, including those
employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, in relation to their
office.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 8. Transfer of cases. — As of the date of the effectivity
of this decree, any case cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan within its exclusive jurisdiction where
none of the accused has been arraigned shall be transferred
to the Sandiganbayan.
The law is explicit and clear. A case falling under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan shall be transferred to it so long as the accused has not as
yet been properly arraigned elsewhere on the date of effectivity of the
law, i.e., on 10 December 1978. The accused is charged with having violated
paragraph 4, Article 217, of the Revised Penal Code —
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property.
— Presumption of Malversation. — Any public officer who,
by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public
funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or
negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be
guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds
or property, shall suffer:
xxx xxx xxx
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and
maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than
twelve thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand
pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall
be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua.
an offense which falls under Title VII of the Revised Penal Code and,
without question, triable by the Sandiganbayan. Navallo's
arraignment before the RTC on 18 July 1985 is several years after
Presidential Decree No. 1606, consigning that jurisdiction to the
Sandiganbayan, had become effective.
Accused-petitioner, invoking Section 7, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules of
Court, pleads double jeopardy. We cannot agree. Double jeopardy requires
the existence of the following requisites:
(1) The previous complaint or information or other formal charge is sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction;
(2) The court has jurisdiction to try the case;
(3) The accused has been arraigned and has pleaded to the charge; and
(4) The accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is dismissed without his
express consent.
When all the above elements are present, a second prosecution for
(a) the same offense, or (b) an attempt to commit the said offense, or
(c) a frustration of the said offense, or (d) any offense which
necessarily includes, or is necessarily included in, the first offense
charged, can rightly be barred.
In the case at bench, the RTC was devoid of jurisdiction when it conducted
an arraignment of the accused which by then had already been conferred on
the Sandiganbayan. Moreover, neither did the case there terminate with
conviction or acquittal nor was it dismissed.
Accused-petitioner claims to have been deprived of his constitutional rights
under Section 12, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution. 3 Well-settled is the rule
that such rights are invocable only when the accused is under "custodial
investigation," or is "in custody investigation," 4 which we have since defined
as any "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." 5 A person under a normal audit examination is not under
custodial investigation. An audit examiner himself can hardly be deemed to
be the law enforcement officer contemplated in the above rule. In any case,
the allegation of his having been "pressured" to sign the Examination Report
prepared by Dulguime appears to be belied by his own testimony. To quote:
Q How were you pressured?
A Mr. Macasemo told me to sign the report
because he will be the one to settle
everything.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Why did you allow yourself to be
pressured when you will be the one
ultimately to suffer?
A Because he told me that everything will be
all right and that he will be the one to talk
with the auditor.
Q Did he tell you exactly what you will do
with the auditor to be relieved of
responsibility?
A No, your Honor.
Q Why did you not ask him?
A I was ashamed to ask him, your Honor,
because he was my
superior. 6
Navallo may have been persuaded, but certainly not pressured, to
sign the auditor's report. Furthermore, Navallo again contradicted
himself when, in his very petition to this Court, he stated:
Bearing in mind the high respect of the accused with his
superior officer and taking into consideration his gratitude for
the favors that his superior officer has extended him in
recommending him the position he held even if he was not
an accountant, he readily agreed to sign the auditor's report
even if he was not given the opportunity to explain the
alleged shortage. 7
Finally, accused-petitioner challenges the sufficiency of evidence against
him. Suffice it to say that the law he contravened itself creates a presumption
of evidence. Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code states that "(t)he failure
of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with
which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall
be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to
personal use." An accountable officer, therefore, may be convicted of
malversation even in the absence of direct proof of misappropriation as long
as there is evidence of shortage in his accounts which he is unable to
explain. 8Not least insignificant is the evaluation of the evidence of the
Sandiganbayan itself which has found thusly:
 The claim that the amount of the shortage represented the
unliquidated cash advance of Macasemo does not inspire
belief. No details whatsoever were given by the accused on
the matter such as, for instance, when and for what purpose
was the alleged cash advance granted, what step or steps
were taken by Navallo or Macasemo to liquidate it. In fact,
Navallo admitted that he did not even ask Macasemo as to
how he (Navallo) could be relieved of his responsibility for
the missing amount when he was promised by Macasemo
that everything would be all right. When Navallo was already
in Manila, he did not also even write Macasemo about the
shortage.

As to the collections made in 1976 which Navallo denied

having made, the evidence of the prosecution shows that he
assumed the office of Collecting and Disbursing Officer in
July 1976 and the cashbook which was examined during the
audit contained entries from July 1976 to January 1978,
which he certified to. Navallo confirmed that indeed he was
appointed Collecting and Disbursing Officer in 1976.

Finally, the pretense that the missing amount was the

unliquidated cash advance of Macasemo and that Navallo
did not collect tuition fees in 1976 was advanced for the first
time during the trial, that is, 12 long solid years after the audit
on January 30, 1978. Nothing was said about it at the time of
the audit and immediately thereafter.

Findings of fact made by a trial court are accorded the highest

degree of respect by an appellate tribunal and, absent a clear
disregard of the evidence before it that can otherwise affect the
results of the case, those findings should not be ignored. We see
nothing on record in this case that can justify a deviation from the
rule.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the decision of respondent

Sandiganbayan is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,

Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 185267 September 17, 2014
CESAR T. QUIAMBAO and ERIC C. PILAPIL, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ADERITO Z. YUJUICO and BONIFACIO
C. SUMBILLA, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by Cesar T. Quiambao
and Eric C. Pilapil (collectively the "petitioners") assailing the decision 2 dated
June 26, 2008 and the order3 dated October 23, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court, Pasig City, Branch 161 (RTC-Branch 161). These challenged RTC
rulings dismissed the petitioners' petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus in SCA Case No. 3193 for lack of merit.
The Factual Antecedents
Petioners Quiambao and Pilapil are the President and the Corporate
Secretary, respectively, of Strategic Alliance Development Corporation
(STRADEC), a domestic corporation duly organized and existing under the
laws of the Republic of the Philippines.4
● Criminal Case Nos. 89723-24
On August 12, 2005, the private respondents, Bonifacio C. Sumbilla and
Aderito Z. Yujuico, both directors and officers of STRADEC, filed before the
Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Pasig City a criminal complaint for
violation of Section 74 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 68 (B.P. 68),5 against the
petitioners and a certain Giovanni Casanova, then accountant of STRADEC.
After preliminary investigation, the petitioners were charged under two (2)
Informations6 for violation of Section 74of B.P. 68. The first criminal
information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 89723; while the second,
was docketed as CriminalCase No. 89724. These cases were raffled to
Branch 69 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasig City, presided by
Judge Jacqueline J. Ongpauco-Cortel.
On the same date, the petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Judicial
Determination of Probable Cause and to Defer the Issuance of Warrants of
Arrest Pending Determination7 with the MTC. The petitioners asserted that
the private respondents failed to adduce evidence to support a finding of
probable cause against them. They also alleged that their act of refusing to
turn over STRADEC’s stock and transfer books to the private respondents
was not punishable under the Corporation Code.
● The MTC’s Orders dated May 8, 2006 and August 16, 2006
On May 8, 2006, the MTC denied the motion insofar as it prayed for the
dismissal of Criminal Case No. 89724. Criminal Case No. 89723 was,
however, dismissed.8
The petitioners moved for partial reconsideration9 , but the MTC denied the
motion in its Order dated August 16, 2006.10 In the same Order, the court set
the arraignment of the petitioners on October 9, 2006.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari11 (with application
for issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary
Injunction) docketed as SCA No. 3047 with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 154
(RTC-Branch 154), seeking the partial annulment of the MTC’s Orders dated
May 8, 2006 and August 16, 2006.
The petitioners were arraigned on January 29, 2007.
● The RTC Branch-154’s Order dated June 4, 2007 (SCA No. 3047)
In an Order dated June 4, 2007 (RTC-Branch 154’s Order), the RTC-Branch
154, through Judge Abraham B. Borreta granted the Petition12 holding that
there was no probable cause to hold the petitioners for trial. Consequently, it
directed the MTC to dismiss Criminal Case No. 89724 for want of probable
cause.
The private respondents thereafter sought reconsideration but it was denied
by the RTC-Branch 154. Thus, they brought an appeal to this Court viaa
petition for review on certiorari (docketed as G.R. No. 180416) raising pure
questions of law.
● The MTC’s Orders dated June 18, 2007 and September 17, 2007
While G.R. No. 180416 remains pending before this Court, the MTC
dismissed Criminal Case No. 89724 on June 18, 2007 (Order of Dismissal),
pursuant to the RTC-Branch 154’s Order which reads:
Considering the Order of the Regional Trial Court Branch 154, reversing the
Order of thisCourt dated August 16, 2006, and considering further that the
private prosecutor is not armed with a written authority to actively
prosecutethe case, this case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
The private respondents thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration, which
the MTC granted. Upon learning that a petition for certiorari had been filed
before this court, the MTC issued an Order dated September 17, 2007
(Order of Revival) recalling the Order of Dismissal and reinstating the
criminal information in Criminal Case No. 89724. It further ordered the
suspension of the proceedings in G.R. No. 180416 to await the final outcome
of the pending case.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. They
thereafter filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus13 docketed
as SCA Case No. 3193 with the RTC-Branch 161.
● The RTC’s Decision dated June26, 2008 (SCA Case No. 3193)
The RTC-Branch 161, in a decision dated June 26, 2008, dismissed the
petition for lack of merit. It found that the MTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion whenit revived and archived Criminal Case No. 89724. Since the
RTC-Branch 154’s Order dated June 4, 2007 has not yet attained finality in
viewof the pendency of G.R. No. 180416, the MTC cannot be considered to
have acted with grave abuse of discretion when it issued the assailed orders.
Likewise, the RTC ruled that the Order of Revival was pursuant to Section
5(g) of Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides for the
inherent power of the courts to amend and control its process and orders so
as to make them conformable to law and justice.
The motion for reconsideration that followed was denied in an Order dated
October 23, 2008. Hence, the petitioners filed the present petition.
The Petition
The petitioners mainly argued that the RTC-Branch 161 had gravely erred in
upholding the MTC’s departure from the accepted and usual course of
judicial proceedings. They maintain that in dismissing their Rule 65 petition
(SCA Case No. 3193), the RTC-Branch 161 had refused to consider that the
MTC’s Order of Revival necessarily placed them in double jeopardy.
The petitioners also asserted that the RTC-Branch 161 had sanctioned the
MTC’s departure from the well-established rule that the power to prosecute
and appeal from the order or judgment of the courts in a criminal action lies
solely withthe State, acting through a public prosecutor. Since the private
respondents acted independently of and without the authority of the public
prosecutor, the MTC gravely abused its discretion when it entertained the
private respondents’ motion.
The Case for the Respondents
● The Private Respondents’ Comment
In their comment, the private respondents accused the petitioners of
resorting to willful and deliberate act of forum shopping, manifested by their
filing of the present petition for certiorari. They contended that as the RTC-
Branch 154’s Order isstill pending review by the First Division of this Court,
the instant petition was totally unnecessary and superfluous.
The private respondents also contended that contrary to the petitioners’
claim, double jeopardy had not yet attached. Since the dismissal of the case
was made provisionally and upon the express request of the petitioners, the
revival of the criminal information, according to the respondents, did notgive
rise to double jeopardy.
Lastly, on the issue of the respondents’ legal personality to move for
reconsideration, the private respondents maintain that the public prosecutor’s
failure to subscribe to the Motion for Reconsideration was not fatal.
● The Public Respondent’s Manifestation and Motion
Required to comment in the petition, the Solicitor General, representing the
public respondent, maintained that the MTC’s Order of Revival had placed
the petitioners indouble jeopardy. It alleged that herein private respondents
did not havethe legal personality to move for the reconsideration of the
MTC’s orders. Since there was no showing that the private respondents
acted by virtue of the public prosecutor’s authority, the filing of the motion for
reconsideration did not effectively stop the running of the reglementary
period to appeal from the MTC’s Order of Dismissal. Consequently, the
Order of Dismissal had attained finality and can no longer berevived by the
MTC.
The Issue Before the Court
The parties’ arguments, properly joined, present to us the following issues:
 1. Did the RTC-Branch 161 correctlydetermine whether the MTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reinstatement of
Criminal Case No. 89724?
2. Did the MTC’s dismissal of Criminal Case No. 89724 operate as
an acquittal of the petitioners for the crime charged?
3. Did the reinstatement or revival of Criminal Case No. 89724 place
the petitioners in double jeopardy?
Our Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
We note, at the outset, that the legal question before us revolves around the
MTC’s Order of Revival dated September 17, 2007. However, after going
deeply into the roots of the controversy, we find that the real root of the issue
stems back to the jurisdictional faux pas committed early on by the MTC
whenit issued its prior Order of Dismissal dated June 18, 2007.
The MTC acted without jurisdiction when it issued the Order of Dismissal
dated June 18, 2007
To recall, the petition for review on certiorari (docketed as G.R. No. 180416)
filed by the private respondents to question the RTC Branch 154’s Order,
remains pending before this Court. Being the subject of a pending review, the
RTC Order – directing the MTC to dismiss Criminal Case No. 89724 for want
of probable cause – was therefore not yet final and executory.
Nonetheless, despite the pendency of the petition for review before us, the
MTC, by virtue of the RTC’s "non-final" Order, dismissed Criminal Case No.
89724. Thus, we find that the MTC acted without jurisdiction when it issued
its Order of Dismissal dated June 18, 2007.
We held in PAA v. Court of Appeals14 that an appeal to this Court via a
Petition for Review on Certioraristays the judgment, award or order appealed
from. Thus, until after the appeal of the defendant shall have been resolved
by this Court with finality, and its records transmitted to the court of origin, the
judgment, award or order appealed from cannot be executed, enforced,
much less, modified by the court of origin. Once the case has been appealed
and given due course by this Court, the lower court or the court of origin
could no longer take cognizance of the issue under review. It cannot execute
the judgment appealed from because to do so would constitute
encroachment on the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
In Heirs of the Late Justice Jose B. L. Reyes v. CA,15 this Court emphasized
that:
A judgment of the Court of Appeals cannot be executed pending
appeal.Once final and executory, the judgment must be remanded to the
lower court, where a motion for its execution may be filed only after its entry.
In other words, before its finality, the judgment cannot be executed. There
can be no discretionary execution of a decision of the Court of Appeals.In the
second place, even in discretionary executions, the same must be firmly
founded upon good reasons. The court must state in a special order the
"good reasons" justifying the issuance of the writ. The good reasons allowing
execution pending appeal must constitute superior circumstances demanding
urgency thatwill outweigh the injuries or damages to the adverse party if the
decision is reversed.
In the third place, on September 14, 1998, petitioners elevated the decision
of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court by petition for review.By the
mere fact of the filing of the petition, the finality of the Court of Appeals'
decisionwas stayed, and there could be no entry of judgment therein, and,
hence, no premature execution could be had.The Court of Appeals adopted
its resolution granting execution pending appeal on September 18, 1998,
after the petition for review was already filed in the Supreme Court. It thereby
encroached on the hallowed grounds of the Supreme Court.
In the present case, the MTC’s Order of Dismissal is a jurisdictional error that
must be struck down as flawed for having been issued without jurisdiction. It
amounts to a premature execution which tended to render moot the issue
raised in the order appealed from and would render ineffective any decision
which might eventually be made by this Court.
Moreover, the jurisdiction over the issue of probable cause in Criminal Case
No. 89724 had already been acquired by this Court. From the moment the
case had been elevated to us, the MTC no longer had authority to further act
on the issue which was pending review. In fact, at the time the MTC issued
the Order of Dismissal, even the RTC had lost jurisdiction. Thus, inasmuch
as the case had already come under our exclusive appellate jurisdiction, the
MTC acted without jurisdiction when it issued the Order of Dismissal.
As explained in Vda. de Syquia v. Judge of First Instance et al.:16
x x x the perfecting(sic) of an appeal taken from said judgment deprives the
trial court of its jurisdiction over said judgment and said jurisdiction is
transferred to the appellate court, and the trial court cannot modify or revoke
any order of execution of the said judgment after the appeal taken therefrom
is perfected.
Similarly, in Desbarats v. De Vera17 we held that:
A modifying order allowing defendant to occupy the portion of the building he
is actually holding which was not for the protection and preservation of the
rights of the parties is conspicuously null and void; having been entered after
the records on appeal had been approved and, accordingly, after the Court of
First Instance had lost jurisdiction over the case.
The MTC’s Order of Revival is also void
Like the Order of Dismissal, the Order of Revival that followed should be
declared null and void. While said order merely sought to correct the
previous Order of Dismissal, it suffers from the same infirmity of having been
issued without jurisdiction.
As discussed above, the MTC no longer had the authority to dismiss Criminal
Case No. 89724 because the jurisdiction to act on and entertain the case had
already been acquired by this Court. Hence, it naturally follows that all the
issuances and/or orders issued by the lower court relative to the issue
pending review will become null and void.
There is no double jeopardy because the MTC, which ordered the dismissal
of the criminal case, is not a court of competent jurisdiction.
Since the MTC clearly had no jurisdiction to issue the Order of Dismissal and
the Order of Revival,there can be no double jeopardy.
Section 7, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as
amended provides:
SEC. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. – When an accused
has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge
sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the
dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for
any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the former complaint or information. x x x
Thus, double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are present: (1) a
first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been
validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in
the first. A first jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a
competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been
entered; and (e) when the accused has been acquitted or convicted, or the
case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.18
In this case, there is no question that the first four requisites are present in
the case at bar. However, in view of the nullity of the Order of Dismissal and
the Order of Revival, the fifth requisite – that the accused be acquitted or
convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent – is absent.
As held in Paulin v. Gimenez:19
Void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the
source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. No legal rights can
emanate from a resolution that is null and void.
In the subsequent case of People v. Albano (163 SCRA 511 [1988]), this
Court reiterated its previous ruling in the Bocar case, holding that the trial
court exceeded its jurisdiction and acted with grave abuse of discretion,
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, when it pre-emptively dismissed the case
and as a consequence thereof, deprived the prosecution of its right to
prosecute and prove its case, thereby violating its fundamental right to due
process. With such
violation, its orders are, therefore null and void and cannot constitute a
proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy.1âwphi1(Citations Omitted;
Emphasis Supplied)
Since the MTC did not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case
pending this Court's review of the RTC Order, its order of dismissal was a
total nullity and did not produce any legal effect. Thus, the dismissal neither
terminated the action on the merits, nor amounted to an acquittal.
The same can be said of the Order of Revival. Since both orders cannot be
the source of any right nor create any obligation, the dismissal and the
subsequent reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 89724 did not effectively
place the petitioners in double jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the present petition. The decision dated
June 26, 2008 and the order dated October 23, 2008 of the Regional Trial
Court Pasig City, Branch 161 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Orders dated June 18, 2007 and September 17, 2007 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Pasig City are hereby declared NULL AND VOID; it is hereby
DIRECTED to await the resolution of G .R. No. 180416 before taking any
action on the criminal proceedings.
 [G.R. No. 149453. April 1, 2003]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, CHIEF
STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO ZUO, STATE PROSECUTORS PETER
L. ONG and RUBEN A. ZACARIAS; 2ND ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR
CONRADO M. JAMOLIN and CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY
CLARO ARELLANO, petitioners, vs. PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court is the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration[1] of the
Resolution[2] dated May 28, 2002, remanding this case to the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 81, for the determination of several factual
issues relative to the application of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to
Q-99-81689 filed against the respondent and his co-accused with the said
court. In the aforesaid criminal cases, the respondent and his co-accused were
charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of eleven male
persons identified as Manuel Montero, a former Corporal of the Philippine
Army, Rolando Siplon, Sherwin Abalora, who was 16 years old, Ray Abalora,
who was 19 years old, Joel Amora, Jevy Redillas, Meleubren Sorronda, who
was 14 years old,[3] Pacifico Montero, Jr., of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the
Philippine Army, Welbor Elcamel, SPO1 Carlito Alap-ap of the Zamboanga
PNP, and Alex Neri, former Corporal of the 44th Infantry Batallion of the
Philippine Army, bandied as members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. The
respondent opposed petitioners motion for reconsideration. [4]
The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the
provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 were
with the express consent of the respondent as he himself moved for said
provisional dismissal when he filed his motion for judicial determination of
probable cause and for examination of witnesses. The Court also held therein
that although Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
could be given retroactive effect, there is still a need to determine whether the
requirements for its application are attendant. The trial court was thus directed
to resolve the following:
... (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the
accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party;
(3) whether the 2-year period to revive it has already lapsed; (4) whether there is any
justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period; (5) whether notices
to the offended parties were given before the cases of respondent Lacson were
dismissed by then Judge Agnir; (6) whether there were affidavits of desistance
executed by the relatives of the three (3) other victims; (7) whether the multiple
murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-
year bar.
The Court further held that the reckoning date of the two-year bar had to
be first determined whether it shall be from the date of the order of then Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissing the cases, or from the dates of receipt thereof by the
various offended parties, or from the date of effectivity of the new
rule. According to the Court, if the cases were revived only after the two-year
bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with
the said time-bar. It emphasized that the new rule fixes a time-bar to penalize
the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in
court. However, the State is not precluded from presenting compelling reasons
to justify the revival of cases beyond the two-year bar.
In support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that
(a) Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not
applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the
time-bar in said rule should not be applied retroactively.
The Court shall resolve the issues seriatim.
I. SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE IS NOT APPLICABLE TO CRIMINAL CASES NOS. Q-99-81679
TO Q-99-81689.
The petitioners aver that Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-
99-81689 because the essential requirements for its application were not
present when Judge Agnir, Jr., issued his resolution of March 29,
1999. Disagreeing with the ruling of the Court, the petitioners maintain that the
respondent did not give his express consent to the dismissal by Judge Agnir,
Jr., of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The respondent
allegedly admitted in his pleadings filed with the Court of Appeals and during
the hearing thereat that he did not file any motion to dismiss said cases, or
even agree to a provisional dismissal thereof. Moreover, the heirs of the
victims were allegedly not given prior notices of the dismissal of the said cases
by Judge Agnir, Jr. According to the petitioners, the respondents express
consent to the provisional dismissal of the cases and the notice to all the heirs
of the victims of the respondents motion and the hearing thereon are
conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second
paragraph of the new rule.
The petitioners further submit that it is not necessary that the case be
remanded to the RTC to determine whether private complainants were notified
of the March 22, 1999 hearing on the respondents motion for judicial
determination of the existence of probable cause. The records allegedly
indicate clearly that only the handling city prosecutor was furnished a copy of
the notice of hearing on said motion. There is allegedly no evidence that
private prosecutor Atty. Godwin Valdez was properly retained and authorized
by all the private complainants to represent them at said hearing. It is their
contention that Atty. Valdez merely identified the purported affidavits of
desistance and that he did not confirm the truth of the allegations therein.
The respondent, on the other hand, insists that, as found by the Court in
its Resolution and Judge Agnir, Jr. in his resolution, the respondent himself
moved for the provisional dismissal of the criminal cases. He cites the
resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. stating that the respondent and the other accused
filed separate but identical motions for the dismissal of the criminal cases
should the trial court find no probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrest against them.
The respondent further asserts that the heirs of the victims, through the
public and private prosecutors, were duly notified of said motion and the
hearing thereof. He contends that it was sufficient that the public prosecutor
was present during the March 22, 1999 hearing on the motion for judicial
determination of the existence of probable cause because criminal actions are
always prosecuted in the name of the People, and the private complainants
merely prosecute the civil aspect thereof.
The Court has reviewed the records and has found the contention of the
petitioners meritorious.
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed except with
the express consent of the accused and with notice to the offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become permanent one (1) year after
issuance of the order without the case having been revived. With respect to offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal
shall become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived.
Having invoked said rule before the petitioners-panel of prosecutors and
before the Court of Appeals, the respondent is burdened to establish the
essential requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely:
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves
for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the
accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case;
3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally;
4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of
the case.
The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the
application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison
d etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a
provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently
asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy
for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein.[5]
Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of
dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without
the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that
the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the
order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the
prosecution[6] without the criminal case having been revived. The public
prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served
with a copy of the order of dismissal.
Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in
writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or
implication to supply its meaning.[7]Where the accused writes on the motion of
a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my
conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a
provisional dismissal of the case.[8] The mere inaction or silence of the accused
to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case[9] or his failure to object to a
provisional dismissal[10]does not amount to express consent.
A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express
consent to such provisional dismissal.[11] If a criminal case is provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived
only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal
case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or
over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or
refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused
to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy[12] or that such revival
or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations.[13]
The case may be revived by the State within the time-bar either by the
refiling of the Information or by the filing of a new Information for the same
offense or an offense necessarily included therein. There would be no need of
a new preliminary investigation.[14] However, in a case wherein after the
provisional dismissal of a criminal case, the original witnesses of the
prosecution or some of them may have recanted their testimonies or may have
died or may no longer be available and new witnesses for the State have
emerged, a new preliminary investigation[15] must be conducted before an
Information is refiled or a new Information is filed. A new preliminary
investigation is also required if aside from the original accused, other persons
are charged under a new criminal complaint for the same offense or
necessarily included therein; or if under a new criminal complaint, the original
charge has been upgraded; or if under a new criminal complaint, the criminal
liability of the accused is upgraded from that as an accessory to that as a
principal. The accused must be accorded the right to submit counter-affidavits
and evidence. After all, the fiscal is not called by the Rules of Court to wait in
ambush; the role of a fiscal is not mainly to prosecute but essentially to do
justice to every man and to assist the court in dispensing that justice.[16]
In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second
requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-
81689. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional
dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed
a motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of
prosecution witnesses alleging that under Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution and the decision of this Court in Allado v. Diokno,[17] among other
cases, there was a need for the trial court to conduct a personal determination
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against respondent
and to have the prosecutions witnesses summoned before the court for its
examination. The respondent contended therein that until after the trial court
shall have personally determined the presence of probable cause, no warrant
of arrest should be issued against the respondent and if one had already been
issued, the warrant should be recalled by the trial court. He then prayed therein
that:
1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution be conducted by this Honorable Court, and for this purpose, an order be
issued directing the prosecution to present the private complainants and their
witnesses at a hearing scheduled therefor; and
2) warrants for the arrest of the accused-movants be withheld, or, if issued, recalled
in the meantime until the resolution of this incident.
[18]
Other equitable reliefs are also prayed for.
The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise, of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. Neither did he ever agree,
impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases. In fact, in
his reply filed with the Court of Appeals, respondent emphasized that:
... An examination of the Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and
for Examination of Prosecution Witnesses filed by the petitioner and his other co-
accused in the said criminal cases would show that the petitioner did not pray for the
dismissal of the case. On the contrary, the reliefs prayed for therein by the petitioner
are: (1) a judicial determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article III
of the Constitution; and (2) that warrants for the arrest of the accused be withheld,
or if issued, recalled in the meantime until the resolution of the motion. It cannot be
said, therefore, that the dismissal of the case was made with the consent of the
petitioner. A copy of the aforesaid motion is hereto attached and made integral part
hereof as Annex A.[19]
During the hearing in the Court of Appeals on July 31, 2001, the
respondent, through counsel, categorically, unequivocally, and definitely
declared that he did not file any motion to dismiss the criminal cases nor did
he agree to a provisional dismissal thereof, thus:
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is your stand that the dismissal made by the Court was
provisional in nature?
ATTY. FORTUN:
It was in (sic) that the accused did not ask for it. What they
wanted at the onset was simply a judicial determination of
probable cause for warrants of arrest issued. Then Judge
Agnir, upon the presentation by the parties of their witnesses,
particularly those who had withdrawn their affidavits, made
one further conclusion that not only was this case lacking in
probable cause for purposes of the issuance of an arrest
warrant but also it did not justify proceeding to trial.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And it is expressly provided under Section 8 that a case shall not
be provisionally dismissed except when it is with the express
conformity of the accused.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
And with notice to the offended party.
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor.
JUSTICE SALONGA:
Was there an express conformity on the part of the accused?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There was none, Your Honor. We were not asked to sign any
order, or any statement, which would normally be
required by the Court on pre-trial or on other matters,
including other provisional dismissal. My very limited
practice in criminal courts, Your Honor, had taught me that a
judge must be very careful on this matter of provisional
dismissal. In fact they ask the accused to come forward, and
the judge himself or herself explains the implications of a
provisional dismissal. Pumapayag ka ba dito. Puwede bang
pumirma ka?
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You were present during the proceedings?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE ROSARIO:
You represented the petitioner in this case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That is correct, Your Honor. And there was nothing of that sort
which the good Judge Agnir, who is most knowledgeable
in criminal law, had done in respect of provisional
dismissal or the matter of Mr. Lacson agreeing to the
provisional dismissal of the case.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Now, you filed a motion, the other accused then filed a motion for a
judicial determination of probable cause?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Did you make any alternative prayer in your motion that if there is
no probable cause what should the Court do?
ATTY. FORTUN:
That the arrest warrants only be withheld. That was the only
prayer that we asked. In fact, I have a copy of that particular
motion, and if I may read my prayer before the Court, it said:
Wherefore, it is respectfully prayed that (1) a judicial
determination of probable cause pursuant to Section 2, Article
III of the Constitution be conducted, and for this purpose, an
order be issued directing the prosecution to present the private
complainants and their witnesses at the scheduled hearing for
that purpose; and (2) the warrants for the arrest of the accused
be withheld, or, if issued, recalled in the meantime until
resolution of this incident.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
There is no general prayer for any further relief?
ATTY. FORTUN:
There is but it simply says other equitable reliefs are prayed for.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
Dont you surmise Judge Agnir, now a member of this Court,
precisely addressed your prayer for just and equitable relief to
dismiss the case because what would be the net effect of a
situation where there is no warrant of arrest being issued
without dismissing the case?
ATTY. FORTUN:
Yes, Your Honor. I will not second say (sic) yes the Good
Justice, but what is plain is we did not agree to the
provisional dismissal, neither were we asked to sign any
assent to the provisional dismissal.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
If you did not agree to the provisional dismissal did you not file any
motion for reconsideration of the order of Judge Agnir that the
case should be dismissed?
ATTY. FORTUN:
I did not, Your Honor, because I knew fully well at that time that
my client had already been arraigned, and the
arraignment was valid as far as I was concerned. So, the
dismissal, Your Honor, by Judge Agnir operated to benefit
me, and therefore I did not take any further step in
addition to rocking the boat or clarifying the matter further
because it probably could prejudice the interest of my
client.
JUSTICE GUERRERO:
 Continue.[20]
In his memorandum in lieu of the oral argument filed with the Court of
Appeals, the respondent declared in no uncertain terms that:
Soon thereafter, the SC in early 1999 rendered a decision declaring the
Sandiganbayan without jurisdiction over the cases. The records were remanded to the
QC RTC: Upon raffle, the case was assigned to Branch 81. Petitioner and the others
promptly filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause (Annex B). He
asked that warrants for his arrest not be issued. He did not move for the dismissal
of the Informations, contrary to respondent OSGs claim.[21]
The respondents admissions made in the course of the proceedings in
the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive on him. The respondent is
barred from repudiating his admissions absent evidence of palpable mistake
in making such admissions.[22]
To apply the new rule in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689
would be to add to or make exceptions from the new rule which are not
expressly or impliedly included therein.This the Court cannot and should not
do.[23]
The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any
motion for the provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-
99-81689 or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at
least three days before said hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the
Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private
interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or parties or the heirs
of the victims must be given adequate a priori notice of any motion for the
provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the
offended party or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there
is one, or through the public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the
offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with him
before the hearing or appear in court during the hearing. The proof of such
service must be shown during the hearing on the motion, otherwise, the
requirement of the new rule will become illusory. Such notice will enable the
offended party or the heirs of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and
effectively comment on or object to the motion on valid grounds, including: (a)
the collusion between the prosecution and the accused for the provisional
dismissal of a criminal case thereby depriving the State of its right to due
process; (b) attempts to make witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional
dismissal of the case with the consequent release of the accused from
detention would enable him to threaten and kill the offended party or the other
prosecution witnesses or flee from Philippine jurisdiction, provide opportunity
for the destruction or loss of the prosecutions physical and other evidence and
prejudice the rights of the offended party to recover on the civil liability of the
accused by his concealment or furtive disposition of his property or the
consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary attachment against his property.
In the case at bar, even if the respondents motion for a determination of
probable cause and examination of witnesses may be considered for the
nonce as his motion for a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689, however, the heirs of the victims were not notified
thereof prior to the hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999. It must be
stressed that the respondent filed his motion only on March 17, 1999 and set
it for hearing on March 22, 1999 or barely five days from the filing thereof.
Although the public prosecutor was served with a copy of the motion, the
records do not show that notices thereof were separately given to the heirs of
the victims or that subpoenae were issued to and received by them, including
those who executed their affidavits of desistance who were residents of
Dipolog City or Pian, Zamboanga del Norte or Palompon, Leyte.[24] There is as
well no proof in the records that the public prosecutor notified the heirs of the
victims of said motion or of the hearing thereof on March 22, 1999. Although
Atty. Valdez entered his appearance as private prosecutor,[25]he did so only for
some but not all the close kins of the victims, namely, Nenita Alap-ap, Imelda
Montero, Margarita Redillas, Rufino Siplon, Carmelita Elcamel, Myrna
Abalora, and Leonora Amora who (except for Rufino Siplon) [26] executed their
respective affidavits of desistance.[27] There was no appearance for the heirs
of Alex Neri, Pacifico Montero, Jr., and Meleubren Sorronda. There is no proof
on record that all the heirs of the victims were served with copies of the
resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the said cases. In fine, there never
was any attempt on the part of the trial court, the public prosecutor and/or the
private prosecutor to notify all the heirs of the victims of the respondents motion
and the hearing thereon and of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing
said cases. The said heirs were thus deprived of their right to be heard on the
respondents motion and to protect their interests either in the trial court or in
the appellate court.
Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were
not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred
by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 or file new Informations for
multiple murder against the respondent.
II. THE TIME-BAR IN SECTION 8, RULE 117 OF THE REVISED
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE SHOULD NOT BE APPLIED
RETROACTIVELY.
The petitioners contend that even on the assumption that the respondent
expressly consented to a provisional dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-
81679 to Q-99-81689 and all the heirs of the victims were notified of the
respondents motion before the hearing thereon and were served with copies
of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the eleven cases, the two-year
bar in Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should
be applied prospectively and not retroactively against the State. To apply the
time limit retroactively to the criminal cases against the respondent and his co-
accused would violate the right of the People to due process, and unduly
impair, reduce, and diminish the States substantive right to prosecute the
accused for multiple murder. They posit that under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code, the State had twenty years within which to file the criminal
complaints against the accused. However, under the new rule, the State only
had two years from notice of the public prosecutor of the order of dismissal of
Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 within which to revive the said
cases. When the new rule took effect on December 1, 2000, the State only had
one year and three months within which to revive the cases or refile the
Informations. The period for the State to charge respondent for multiple murder
under Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code was considerably and arbitrarily
reduced. They submit that in case of conflict between the Revised Penal Code
and the new rule, the former should prevail. They also insist that the State had
consistently relied on the prescriptive periods under Article 90 of the Revised
Penal Code. It was not accorded a fair warning that it would forever be barred
beyond the two-year period by a retroactive application of the new
rule.[28] Petitioners thus pray to the Court to set aside its Resolution of May 28,
2002.
For his part, the respondent asserts that the new rule under Section 8 of
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure may be applied
retroactively since there is no substantive right of the State that may be
impaired by its application to the criminal cases in question since [t]he States
witnesses were ready, willing and able to provide their testimony but the
prosecution failed to act on these cases until it became politically expedient in
April 2001 for them to do so.[29] According to the respondent, penal laws, either
procedural or substantive, may be retroactively applied so long as they favor
the accused.[30] He asserts that the two-year period commenced to run on
March 29, 1999 and lapsed two years thereafter was more than reasonable
opportunity for the State to fairly indict him.[31] In any event, the State is given
the right under the Courts assailed Resolution to justify the filing of the
Information in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 beyond the time-
bar under the new rule.
The respondent insists that Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure does not broaden the substantive right of double
jeopardy to the prejudice of the State because the prohibition against the
revival of the cases within the one-year or two-year periods provided therein is
a legal concept distinct from the prohibition against the revival of a provisionally
dismissed case within the periods stated in Section 8 of Rule 117. Moreover,
he claims that the effects of a provisional dismissal under said rule do not
modify or negate the operation of the prescriptive period under Article 90 of
the Revised Penal Code. Prescription under the Revised Penal Code simply
becomes irrelevant upon the application of Section 8, Rule 117 because a
complaint or information has already been filed against the accused, which
filing tolls the running of the prescriptive period under Article 90.[32]
The Court agrees with the respondent that the new rule is not a statute of
limitations. Statutes of limitations are construed as acts of grace, and a
surrender by the sovereign of its right to prosecute or of its right to prosecute
at its discretion. Such statutes are considered as equivalent to acts of amnesty
founded on the liberal theory that prosecutions should not be allowed to
ferment endlessly in the files of the government to explode only after witnesses
and proofs necessary for the protection of the accused have by sheer lapse of
time passed beyond availability.[33] The periods fixed under such statutes are
jurisdictional and are essential elements of the offenses covered. [34]
On the other hand, the time-bar under Section 8 of Rule 117 is akin to a
special procedural limitation qualifying the right of the State to prosecute
making the time-bar an essence of the given right or as an inherent part
thereof, so that the lapse of the time-bar operates to extinguish the right of the
State to prosecute the accused.[35]
The time-bar under the new rule does not reduce the periods under Article
90 of the Revised Penal Code, a substantive law.[36] It is but a limitation of the
right of the State to revive a criminal case against the accused after the
Information had been filed but subsequently provisionally dismissed with the
express consent of the accused. Upon the lapse of the timeline under the new
rule, the State is presumed, albeit disputably, to have abandoned or waived its
right to revive the case and prosecute the accused. The dismissal
becomes ipso factopermanent. He can no longer be charged anew for the
same crime or another crime necessarily included therein.[37] He is spared from
the anguish and anxiety as well as the expenses in any new
indictments.[38] The State may revive a criminal case beyond the one-year or
two-year periods provided that there is a justifiable necessity for the
delay.[39] By the same token, if a criminal case is dismissed on motion of the
accused because the trial is not concluded within the period therefor, the
prescriptive periods under the Revised Penal Code are not thereby
diminished.[40] But whether or not the prosecution of the accused is barred by
the statute of limitations or by the lapse of the time-line under the new rule, the
effect is basically the same. As the State Supreme Court of Illinois held:
This, in effect, enacts that when the specified period shall have arrived, the right of
the state to prosecute shall be gone, and the liability of the offender to be punishedto
be deprived of his libertyshall cease. Its terms not only strike down the right of action
which the state had acquired by the offense, but also remove the flaw which the
crime had created in the offenders title to liberty. In this respect, its language goes
deeper than statutes barring civil remedies usually do. They expressly take away only
the remedy by suit, and that inferentially is held to abate the right which such remedy
would enforce, and perfect the title which such remedy would invade; but this statute
is aimed directly at the very right which the state has against the offenderthe right to
punish, as the only liability which the offender has incurred, and declares that this
right and this liability are at an end. [41]
The Court agrees with the respondent that procedural laws may be
applied retroactively. As applied to criminal law, procedural law provides or
regulates the steps by which one who has committed a crime is to be
punished. In Tan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[42] this Court held that:
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent.The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of
any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the
retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The
reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws. It has been held that a person has no vested right in any particular
remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether
civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of procedure.
It further ruled therein that a procedural law may not be applied
retroactively if to do so would work injustice or would involve intricate problems
of due process or impair the independence of the Court. In a per
curiam decision in Cipriano v. City of Houma,[43] the United States Supreme
Court ruled that where a decision of the court would produce substantial
inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis for avoiding the
injustice of hardship by a holding of nonretroactivity.[44] A construction of which
a statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable,
mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, and injurious consequences. [45] This
Court should not adopt an interpretation of a statute which produces absurd,
unreasonable, unjust, or oppressive results if such interpretation could be
avoided.[46] Time and again, this Court has decreed that statutes are to be
construed in light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied. In construing a statute, the reason for the enactment should be kept
in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended
scope and purpose.[47]
Remedial legislation, or procedural rule, or doctrine of the Court designed
to enhance and implement the constitutional rights of parties in criminal
proceedings may be applied retroactively or prospectively depending upon
several factors, such as the history of the new rule, its purpose and effect, and
whether the retrospective application will further its operation, the particular
conduct sought to be remedied and the effect thereon in the administration of
justice and of criminal laws in particular.[48] In a per curiam decision in Stefano
v. Woods,[49] the United States Supreme Court catalogued the factors in
determining whether a new rule or doctrine enunciated by the High Court
should be given retrospective or prospective effect:
(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by
law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the
administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.
In this case, the Court agrees with the petitioners that the time-bar of two
years under the new rule should not be applied retroactively against the State.
In the new rule in question, as now construed by the Court, it has fixed a
time-bar of one year or two years for the revival of criminal cases provisionally
dismissed with the express consent of the accused and with a priori notice to
the offended party. The time-bar may appear, on first impression,
unreasonable compared to the periods under Article 90 of the Revised Penal
Code. However, in fixing the time-bar, the Court balanced the societal interests
and those of the accused for the orderly and speedy disposition of criminal
cases with minimum prejudice to the State and the accused. It took into
account the substantial rights of both the State and of the accused to due
process. The Court believed that the time limit is a reasonable period for the
State to revive provisionally dismissed cases with the consent of the accused
and notice to the offended parties. The time-bar fixed by the Court must be
respected unless it is shown that the period is manifestly short or insufficient
that the rule becomes a denial of justice.[50] The petitioners failed to show a
manifest shortness or insufficiency of the time-bar.
The new rule was conceptualized by the Committee on the Revision of
the Rules and approved by the Court en banc primarily to enhance the
administration of the criminal justice system and the rights to due process of
the State and the accused by eliminating the deleterious practice of trial courts
of provisionally dismissing criminal cases on motion of either the prosecution
or the accused or jointly, either with no time-bar for the revival thereof or with
a specific or definite period for such revival by the public prosecutor. There
were times when such criminal cases were no longer revived or refiled due to
causes beyond the control of the public prosecutor or because of the
indolence, apathy or the lackadaisical attitude of public prosecutors to the
prejudice of the State and the accused despite the mandate to public
prosecutors and trial judges to expedite criminal proceedings.[51]
It is almost a universal experience that the accused welcomes delay as it
usually operates in his favor,[52] especially if he greatly fears the consequences
of his trial and conviction. He is hesitant to disturb the hushed inaction by which
dominant cases have been known to expire.[53]
The inordinate delay in the revival or refiling of criminal cases may impair
or reduce the capacity of the State to prove its case with the disappearance or
nonavailability of its witnesses.Physical evidence may have been
lost. Memories of witnesses may have grown dim or have faded. Passage of
time makes proof of any fact more difficult.[54] The accused may become a
fugitive from justice or commit another crime. The longer the lapse of time from
the dismissal of the case to the revival thereof, the more difficult it is to prove
the crime.
On the other side of the fulcrum, a mere provisional dismissal of a criminal
case does not terminate a criminal case. The possibility that the case may be
revived at any time may disrupt or reduce, if not derail, the chances of the
accused for employment, curtail his association, subject him to public obloquy
and create anxiety in him and his family. He is unable to lead a normal life
because of community suspicion and his own anxiety. He continues to suffer
those penalties and disabilities incompatible with the presumption of
innocence.[55] He may also lose his witnesses or their memories may fade with
the passage of time. In the long run, it may diminish his capacity to defend
himself and thus eschew the fairness of the entire criminal justice system. [56]
The time-bar under the new rule was fixed by the Court to excise the
malaise that plagued the administration of the criminal justice system for
the benefit of the State and the accused; not for the accused only.
The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar
retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999
when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir,
Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new
rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed
cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge
Agnir, Jr. dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 on March
29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied
the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three
months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal
cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed under the new rule. On
the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have
two years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to
revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in
fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd,
unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration
of justice.
The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded
in the computation of the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was
not yet in effect at the time and the State could not be expected to comply with
the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that the State waived its right to revive
the criminal cases against respondent or that it was negligent for not reviving
them within the two-year period under the new rule. As the United States
Supreme Court said, per Justice Felix Frankfurter, in Griffin v. People:[57]
We should not indulge in the fiction that the law now announced has always been the
law and, therefore, that those who did not avail themselves of it waived their rights .
The two-year period fixed in the new rule is for the benefit of both the
State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and reduced by an
inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided merely to
benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an injustice of hardship to the
State and adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of
criminal laws in particular.
To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua
non to the revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the express consent
of the accused before the effective date of the new rule is to assume that the
State is obliged to comply with the time-bar under the new rule before it took
effect. This would be a rank denial of justice. The State must be given a period
of one year or two years as the case may be from December 1, 2000 to revive
the criminal case without requiring the State to make a valid justification for not
reviving the case before the effective date of the new rule. Although in criminal
cases, the accused is entitled to justice and fairness, so is the State. As the
United States Supreme Court said, per Mr. Justice Benjamin Cardozo,
in Snyder v. State of Massachussetts,[58] the concept of fairness must not be
strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance
true. In Dimatulac v. Villon,[59] this Court emphasized that the judges action
must not impair the substantial rights of the accused nor the right of the State
and offended party to due process of law. This Court further said:
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not to be dispensed
for the accused alone. The interests of society and the offended parties which have
been wronged must be equally considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not
necessarily a denial of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice,
for, to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean
injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the accused, on one
hand, and the State and offended party, on the other.
In this case, the eleven Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 01-101102
to 01-101112 were filed with the Regional Trial Court on June 6, 2001 well
within the two-year period.
In sum, this Court finds the motion for reconsideration of petitioners
meritorious.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Resolution of this Court, dated May 28,
2002, is SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 24,
2001, in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034 is REVERSED. The Petition of the
Respondent with the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No. 01-100933 is
DISMISSED for being moot and academic. The Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 81, is DIRECTED to forthwith proceed with Criminal
Cases Nos. 01-101102 to 01-101112 with deliberate dispatch.
No pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Mendoza, Panganiban, Austria-Martinez, Corona,