B.

RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT

1. DEFINITION; ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT; PROHIBITED ACTS

PEOPLE VS DIAZ
GR No. 112175
26 July 1996

FACTS: Three women (Navarro, Fabricante, and Ramirez) were enrolled at the Henichi Techno Exchange Cultural
Foundation in Davao City, studying Niponggo, when they were informed by their teacher, Mrs. Aplicador, that she
knew of a Mr. Paulo Lim who also knew of one Engineer Erwin Diaz who was recruiting applicants for Brunei.

Accompanied by Mrs. Aplicador, the three women went to Mr. Lim who told them that his children had already
applied with Engr. Diaz. The four women were then accompanied by Mr. Lim to the CIS Detention Center where
Engr. Diaz was already being detained. After Navarro and Ramirez had already given 20k as placement fee,
Fabricante went to the office of the POEA and found out the Engr. Diaz was not licensed. Fabricante informed the
two women about her discovery and they all withdrew their applications. Engr. Diaz refunded their payments.

The trial court held Engr. Diaz guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale.
ISSUE: WON Diaz was engaged in illegal recruitment.
HELD: YES. Diaz was neither a licensee nor a holder of authority to qualify him to lawfully engage in recruitment
and placement activity. Appellant told the three women that he was recruiting contract workers for abroad,
particularly Brunei, and promised them job opportunities if they can produce various amounts of money for
expenses and processing of documents. He manifestly gave the impression to the three women that he had the
ability to send workers abroad. Misrepresenting himself as a recruiter of workers for Brunei, he promised them
work for a fee and convinced them to give their money for the purpose of getting an employment overseas.

AQUINO VS. COURT OF APPEALS, NOVEMBER 21, 1991 (NO DIGEST, PLS.READ FULL TEXT)

PEOPLE V. SEÑORON, JANUARY 30, 1997 (NO DIGEST, PLS.READ FULL TEXT)

1
PEOPLE V PANIS
142 SCRA 664 1986
Facts:Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City
alleging that SerapioAbug, private respondent herein, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor
as a holder of authority to operate a fee-charging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally operate a private fee-charging employment agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising
employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals named therein, in violation of Article 16 in relation to
Article 39 of the Labor Code.

Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense because he was
accused of illegally recruiting only one person in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b),
he claimed, there would be illegal recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised
or offered any employment for a fee."

The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under Article 39 in relation to
Article 16 of the Labor Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However, as the first two cited articles penalize
acts of recruitment and placement without proper authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations,
application of the definition of recruitment and placement in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.

Issue:Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violating Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor
Code.

Held:Article 13(b) of P. D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, states that, "(b) 'Recruitment and placement'
refers to any act of canvassing, 'enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not:
Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."

As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception
thereto but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in
recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a
fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers."

At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against illegal recruitment
and placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing
hard-earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a
cynical deception at the hands of their own countrymen.

PEOPLE VS GOCE
GR No 113161 August 29, 1995

Parties:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOMA GOCE y OLALIA, DAN GOCE and NELLY D. AGUSTIN, accused. NELLY D. AGUSTIN,accused-appellant.

2
Regalado, J.

Facts:
On January 12, 1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate and in large scale, punishable
under Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code as amended by Section 1(b) of Presidential Decree No. 2018, was filed
against spouses Dan and Loma Goce and herein accused-appellant Nelly Agustin in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 5.
On January 21, 1987, a warrant of arrest was issued against the three accused but not one of them was arrested.
Hence, on February 2, 1989, the trial court ordered the case archived but it issued a standing warrant of arrest
against the accused.Thereafter, on learning of the whereabouts of the accused, at around midday of February 26,
1993, Nelly Agustin was apprehended by the Parañaque police.
On November 19, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment finding herein appellant guilty as a principal in the crime
of illegal recruitment in large scale, and sentencing her to serve the penalty of life imprisonment, as well as to pay
a fine of P100,000.00.

In her appeal, appellant Agustin raises the following arguments:

(1) her act of introducing complainants to the Goce couple does not fall within the meaning of illegal recruitment
and placement under Article 13(b) in relation to Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) there is no proof of conspiracy to commit illegal recruitment among appellant and the Goce spouses; and
(3) there is no proof that appellant offered or promised overseas employment to the complainants.

Appellant counsel agreed to stipulate that she was neither licensed nor authorized to recruit applicants for
overseas employment. Appellant, however, denies that she was in any way guilty of illegal recruitment.

It is appellant's defensive theory that all she did was to introduce complainants to the Goce spouses. Being a
neighbor of said couple, and owing to the fact that her son's overseas job application was processed and facilitated
by them, the complainants asked her to introduce them to said spouses. Allegedly out of the goodness of her
heart, she complied with their request.

Issues:
Whether or not appellant Agustin actions in relation with the Goce couple constitute illegal recruitment.

Held:
Appellant is accused of violating Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code. Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 2018, provides that any recruitment activity, including the prohibited practices
enumerated in Article 34 of said Code, undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed
illegal and punishable under Article 39 thereof. The same article further provides that illegal recruitment shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage if any of these qualifying circumstances exist, namely,
(a) when illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate,i.e., if it is carried out by a group of three or more persons
conspiring and/or confederating with one another; or
(b) when illegal recruitment is committed in large scale, i.e., if it is committed against three or more persons
individually or as a group.

Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not; provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for
a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. On the other
hand, referral is the act of passing along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview of
a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer, placement officer or bureau.

There is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of having the ability to send a worker abroad." It is
undisputed that appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send

3
people abroad for work such that the latter were convinced to give her the money she demanded in order to be so
employed.

Decision:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-
appellant Nelly D. Agustin.

DARVIN VS CA
G.R. No. 125044
July 13, 1998

FACTS: Imelda Darvin was convicted of simple illegal recruitment under the Labor Code by the RTC. It stemmed
from a complaint of one Macaria Toledo who was convinced by the petitioner that she has the authority to recruit
workers for abroad and can facilitate the necessary papers in connection thereof. In view of this promise, Macaria
gave her P150,000 supposedly intended for US Visa and air fare.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, hence this petition.

ISSUE:WON appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal recruitment.

HELD: Art. 38 of the Labor Code provides:

a.)Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 43 of the Labor Code, to
be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article
39 of the Labor Code.

Applied to the present case, to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant, two elements need to be shown: (1)
the person charged with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities: and (2) the said person does not
have a license or authority to do so.

In the case, the Court found no sufficient evidence to prove that accused-appellant offered a job to
private respondent. It is not clear that accused gave the impression that she was capable of providing the private
respondent work abroad. What is established, however, is that the private respondent gave accused-appellant
P150,000.By themselves, procuring a passport, airline tickets and foreign visa for another individual, without more,
can hardly qualify as recruitment activities. Aside from the testimony of private respondent, there is nothing to
show that appellant engaged in recruitment activities.

At best, the evidence proffered by the prosecution only goes so far as to create a suspicion that appellant
probably perpetrated the crime charged. But suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence
being proof beyond reasonable doubt. When the People’s evidence fail to indubitably prove the accused’s
authorship of the crime of which he stand accused, then it is the Court’s duty, and the accused’s right, to proclaim
his innocence.

PEOPLE V. YABUT (incomplete digest. pls.read full text)

October 5, 1999

Spouses Yabut on several occasions received money from complainants promising them they will be able to work
in Japan. After several cancellation of their scheduled departure, complainants discovered that said spouses were
not licensed to engage in recruitment and placement activities. Wife eluded arrest and remains at-large. Husband
contends that he was not engaged in recruitment for overseas employment and but only in processing visas. He
was acquitted of the crime of estafa.

4
Issue: W/N accused could be convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale despite his acquittal of the crime of
estafa?

HELD: Yes.
It is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal
recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa Art. 315 of the RPC. The former is mala prohibitum where the
criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction, while estafa is mala in se where the criminal intent of
the accused is crucial for conviction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROMULO SAULO, AMELIA DE LA CRUZ, and CLODUALDO DE
LA CRUZ, accused.

ROMULO SAULO, accused-appellant.

[G.R. No. 125903. November 15, 2000]

FACTS:

Accused-appellant, together with Amelia de la Cruz and Clodualdo de la Cruz, were charged with violation
of Article 38 (b) of the Labor Code[1] illegal recruitment in large scale and the accused were also charged with
three counts of estafa.

During a meeting sometime in April or May, 1990, ROMULO SAULO told BENNY MALIGAYA that she would
be able to leave for Taiwan as a factory worker once she gave him the fees for the processing of her documents.
Sometime in May, 1990, Maligaya also met with AMELIA DE LA CRUZ and CLODUALDO DE LA CRUZ at their house
in Baesa, Quezon City and they assured her that they were authorized by the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) to recruit workers for Taiwan. Maligaya paid accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz the
amount of P35,000.00, which is evidenced by a receipt signed by accused-appellant and Amelia de la Cruz. Seeing
that he had reneged on his promise to send her to Taiwan, Maligaya filed a complaint against accused-appellant
with the POEA.

Meanwhile, ANGELES JAVIER was told by Ligaya, accused-appellants wife, to apply for work abroad
through accused-appellant. At a meeting in accused-appellants Quezon City residence, Javier was told by accused-
appellant that he could get her a job in Taiwan as a factory worker and that she should give him P35,000.00 for
purposes of preparing Javier’s passport. Javier gave an initial amount of P20,000.00 to accused-appellant, but she
did not ask for a receipt as she trusted him. As the overseas employment never materialized, Javier was prompted
to bring the matter before the POEA.

On April 19, 1990, LEODIGARIO MAULLON, upon the invitation of his neighbor Araceli Sanchez, went to
accused-appellants house in order to discuss his prospects for gaining employment abroad. As in the case of
Maligaya and Javier, accused-appellant assured Maullon that he could secure him a job as a factory worker in
Taiwan if he pays him for the processing of his papers. Maullon pay to accused-appellants wife, who issued a
receipt. Thereafter, Maullon paid an additional amount in the presence of accused-appellant and Amelia de la
Cruz, which payment is also evidenced by a receipt. Finally, Maullon pay to a certain Loreta Tumalig, a friend of
accused-appellant, as shown by a receipt. Again, accused-appellant failed to deliver on the promised employment.
Maullon thus filed a complaint with the POEA.

ISSUE: Whether or not ROMULO SAULO is guilty of the act of Illegal Recruitment and estafa.

5
HELD: Yes. The Court finds that the trial court was justified in holding that accused-appellant was engaged in
unlawful recruitment and placement activities. The prosecution clearly established that accused-appellant
promised the three complainants - Benny Maligaya, Angeles Javier and Leodigario Maullon employment in Taiwan
as factory workers and that he asked them for money in order to process their papers and procure their passports.
It is not disputed that accused-appellant is not authorized nor licensedby the Department of Labor and
Employment to engage in recruitment and placement activities. The absence of the necessary license or authority
renders all of accused-appellants recruitment activities criminal.

It is also well established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both illegal
recruitment and estafa. The reason for this is that illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum, whereas estafa is
malum in se, meaning that the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction in the former, but is
required in the latter.

WHEREFORE, Decision of the Trial Court is AFFIRMED subject to MODIFICATIONS.

ATHENNA INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES, INC., petitioner, vs. NONITO VILLANOS, respondent.

G.R. No. 151303. April 15, 2005

R.A. 8042 Migrant Workers Act

QUISUMBING,J:

Facts:

The petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in recruitment and placement of workers for overseas
employment. Respondent applied to work overseas as caretaker thru petitioner. The petitioner asked for a
placement fee amounting to P100,000 but the respondent begged to reduced the fee and it was reduced to
P94,000 with the petitioner paying only P30,000 and the remaining will be paid through salary deductions. Upon
arrival on Taiwan, he was assigned to a mechanical shop, owned by Hsien, as a hydraulic installer/repairer for car
lifters, instead of the job for which he was hired. He did not, however, complain because he needed money to pay
for the debts he incurred back home. Barely a month after his placement, he was terminated by Hsien and
received his salary and instructed for departure to the Philippines. Upon arrival, the respondent went to
petitioner’s office and demanded for the reimbursement of P30,000 but instead the petitioner gave him a
summary of expenses relating his deployment. The respondent filed a complaint before Adjudication Office of the
POEA. However, because of financial constraints, he had to go home to Polanco, Zamboanga del Norte and filed a
complaint against petitioner for illegal dismissal, violation of contract, and recovery of unpaid salaries and other
benefits before the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. 9, Dipolog City. In its defense, petitioner alleged that
under the employment contract, respondent was to undergo a probationary period of forty (40) days. However, at
the job site, respondent was found to be unfit for his work, thus he resigned from his employment and requested
for his repatriation signing a statement to that effect. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision holding petitioner and
Wei Yu Hsien solidarily liable for the wages representing the unserved portion of the employment contract, the
amount unlawfully deducted from respondent’s monthly wage, moral damages, exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees. On appeal, the NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter and dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. It
found that respondent was not at all dismissed, much less illegally. Respondent seasonably filed a motion for
reconsideration, which the NLRC denied in its second resolution. respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals and
granted the petition and reversing the questioned resolutions of the NLRC.

6
Issue:

1. Did the respondent voluntarily resign or was he illegally dismissed?

2. Assuming that the respondent was illegally dismissed, was it proper for the Court of Appeals to affirm in toto the
monetary awards in the Decision of the Labor Arbiter?

Held:

The SC denied the petition and affirmed with modification the resolution by the Court of Appeals. On the first
issue, An employee voluntarily resigns when he finds himself in a situation where he believes that personal reasons
cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service; thus, he has no other choice but to disassociate himself
from his employment. In this case respondent avers that petitioner did not explain why he was unqualified nor
inform of any qualifications needed for the job prior to his deployment as mandated by Art 281[9] of the Labor
Code and failed to prove the legality of the dismissal, despite the fact that the burden of proof lies on the
employment and recruitment agency. On the second issue, the SC declared the petitioner solidarily liable with Wei
Yu Hsien to pay the unexpired portion based on Sec 10 RA 8042. Lastly, because of the breach of contract and bad
faith alleged against the employer and the petitioner, we must sustain the award of P50,000 in moral damages and
P50,000 as exemplary damages, in addition to attorney’s fees of ten percent (10%) of the aggregate monetary
awards.

ROSA C. RODOLFO VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

498 SCRA 377 (2006)

“Promises or offers for a fee employment” is sufficient to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment.

Petitioner Rosa C. Rodolfo approached private complainants Necitas Ferre and Narciso Corpus individually and
invited them to apply for overseas employment in Dubai. Rodolfo, being their neighbor, Ferre and Corpus agreed
and went to the former’s office. The office bore the business name ―Bayside Manpower Export Specialist‖. In that
office, Ferre gave P1,000.00 as processing fee and another P4,000.00. Likewise, Corpus gave Rodolfo P7,000.00.
Rodolfo then told Ferre and Corpus that they were scheduled to leave for Dubai. However, private complainants
and all the other applicants were not able to depart on the scheduled date as their employer allegedly did not
arrive. Thus, their departure was rescheduled, but the result was the same. Suspecting that they were being
hoodwinked, Ferre and Corpus demanded of Rodolfo to return their money. Except for the refund of P1,000.00 to
Ferre, Rodolfo was not able to return Ferre’s and Corpus’ money. Ferre, Corpus and three others then filed a case
for illegal recruitment in large scale with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) against Rodolfo.

The RTC rendered judgement against Rodolfo but in imposing the penalty, the RTC took note of the fact that while
the information reflected the commission of illegal recruitment in large scale, only the complaint of two (Ferre and
Corpus) of the five complainants was proven. Rodolfo appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the
petition but modified the penalty imposed by the trial court. The CA also dismissed Rodolfo’s Motion for
Reconsideration.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rodolfo is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale

HELD:
The elements of the offense of illegal recruitment, which must concur, are: (1) that the offender has no valid
license or authority required by law to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) that the

7
offender undertakes any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement under Article 13(b), or any
prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code. If another element is present that the
accused commits the act against three or more persons, individually or as a group, it becomes an illegal
recruitment in a large scale.

Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines ―recruitment and placement‖ as ―*a+ny act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising
or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not.‖

That the first element is present in the case at bar, there is no doubt. Jose Valeriano, Senior Overseas Employment
Officer of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, testified that the records of the POEA do not show
that Rodolfo is authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. A Certification to that effect was in fact
issued by Hermogenes C. Mateo, Chief of the Licensing Division of POEA.

The second element is doubtless also present. The act of referral, which is included in recruitment, is ―the act of
passing along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview of a selected applicant for
employment to a selected employer, placement officer or bureau.‖ Rodolfo’s admission that she brought private
complainants to the agency whose owner she knows and her acceptance of fees including those for processing
betrays her guilt.

Rodolfo issued provisional receipts indicating that the amounts she received from the private complainants were
turned over to Luzviminda Marcos and Florante Hinahon does not free her from liability. For the act of recruitment
may be ―for profit or not.‖ It is sufficient that the accused ―promises or offers for a fee employment‖ to warrant
conviction for illegal recruitment. Parenthetically, why Rodolfo accepted the payment of fees from the private
complainants when, in light of her claim that she merely brought them to the agency, she could have advised them
to directly pay the same to the agency, she proferred no explanation.

On Rodolfo’s reliance on Señoron, true, the Court held that issuance of receipts for placement fees does not make
a case for illegal recruitment. But it went on to state that it is ―rather the undertaking of recruitment activities
without the necessary license or authority‖ that makes a case for illegal recruitment.

2. REGULATION OF RECRUITMENT AND PLACEMENT ACTIVITIES

EASTERN ASSURANCE V. SECRETARY OF LABOR

J&B Manpower is an overseas employment agency registered with the POEA and Eastern Assurance was its surety
beginning January 1985. From 1983 to December 1985, J&B recruited 33 persons but none of them were ever
deployed. These 33 persons sued J&B and the POEA as well as the Secretary of Labor ruled in favor of the 33
workers and ordered J&B to refund them (with Eastern Assurance being solidarily liable). Eastern Assurance
assailed the ruling claiming that POEA and the Secretary of Labor have no jurisdiction over non-employees (since
the 33 were never employed, in short, no employer-employee relations).
ISSUE: Whether or not Eastern Assurance can be held liable in the case at bar.
HELD: Yes. But only for the period covering from January 1985 when the surety took effect (as already held by the
Labor Secretary). The Secretary of Labor was given power by Article 34 (Labor Code) and Section 35 and 36 of EO
797 (POEA Rules) to “restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies,” but also to
“promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions” governing said
activities.
Implicit in these powers is the award of appropriate relief to the victims of the offenses committed by the
respondent agency or contractor, specially the refund or reimbursement of such fees as may have been
fraudulently or otherwise illegally collected, or such money, goods or services imposed and accepted in excess of

8
what is licitly prescribed. It would be illogical and absurd to limit the sanction on an offending recruitment agency
or contractor to suspension or cancellation of its license, without the concomitant obligation to repair the injury
caused to its victims.
Though some of the cases were filed after the expiration of the surety bond agreement between J&B and Eastern
Assurance, notice was given to J&B of such anomalies even before said expiration. In this connection, it may be
stressed that the surety bond provides that notice to the principal is notice to the surety. Besides, it has been held
that the contract of a compensated surety like respondent Eastern Assurance is to be interpreted liberally in the
interest of the promises and beneficiaries rather than strictly in favor of the surety.

CAPRICORN TRAVEL AND TOURS VS. CA, APRIL 3, 1990 (no digest, short case lang, read full text)

STRONGHOLD V CA G.R. NO. 88050 JANUARY 30, 1992

J. Cruz

Facts:

Acting on behalf of its foreign principal, Qatar National Fishing Co., Pan Asian Logistics and Trading, a domestic
recruiting and placement agency, hired Adriano Urtesuela as captain of the vessel M/V Oryx for the stipulated
period of twelve months. The required surety bond, in the amount of P50,000.00, was submitted by Pan Asian and
Stronghold Insurance Co. to answer for the liabilities of the employer. Urtesuela assumed his duties, but three
months later his services were terminated and he was repatriated to Manila. He filed a complaint against Pan
Asian and his former employer with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration for breach of contract
and damages.

In due time, the POEA rendered a decision in his favor for the amount of P6,374.94, representing his salaries for
the unexpired portion of his contract. The judgment eventually became final and executory, not having been
appealed on time. A writ of execution was issued against Pan Asian but could be enforced only against its cash
bond of P10,000.00, the company having ceased to operate. Urtesuela then filed a complaint with the Insurance
Commission against Stronghold on the basis of the surety bond.

The liability of the surety under this bond didn’t exceed the sum of P50,000.00.

After hearing, the Insurance Commission held that the complaint should be reformed because the provisions in the
surety bond were not stipulations pour autrui to entitle Urtesuela to bring the suit himself. It held that the proper
party was the POEA. This ruling was reversed on appeal by the respondent court in its decision dated April 20,
1989. It was there declared that, as the actual beneficiary of the surety bond, Urtesuela was competent to sue
Stronghold, which as surety was solidarily liable with Pan Asian for the judgment rendered against the latter by the
POEA.

The petitioner asked for reversal of the Court of Appeals. It submits that the decision of the POEA is not binding
upon it because it was not impleaded in the complaint.

Issue: WON the POEA decision was not binding because Stronghold wasn’t impleaded in the complaint.

Held: No. Petition dismissed.

Ratio:

In the surety bond, the petitioner unequivocally bound itself:

9
To answer for all liabilities which the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration may adjudge/impose against
the Principal in connection with the recruitment of Filipino seamen.

The petitioner agreed to answer for whatever decision might be rendered against the principal, whether or not the
surety was impleaded in the complaint and had the opportunity to defend itself. There is nothing in the stipulation
calling for a direct judgment against the surety as a co-defendant in an action against the principal.

The petitioner would still have to explain its other agreement that "notice to the Principal is notice to the surety."
This was in fact another special stipulation on the printed form of the surety bond prepared by the petitioner.
Under this commitment, the petitioner is deemed, by the implied notice, to have been given an opportunity to
participate in the litigation and to present its side, if it so chose, to avoid liability.

The petitioner contends, however, that the said stipulation is unconstitutional and contrary to public policy,
because it is a virtual waiver of the right to be heard to the prejudice of the surety. Hence, disregarding the
stipulation, the petitioner should be deemed as having received no notice at all of the complaint.

The Court cannot agree. The circumstance that the chance to be heard is not availed of does not disparage that
opportunity and deprive the person of the right to due process. Due process is not violated where a person is not
heard because he has chosen, for whatever reason, not to be heard. It should be obvious that if he opts to be
silent where he has a right to speak, he cannot later be heard to complain that he was unduly silenced.

If the petitioner believed then that it was onerous and illegal, what it should have done was object when its
inclusion as a condition in the surety bond was required by the POEA. Even if the POEA had insisted on the
condition, as now claimed, there was still nothing to prevent the petitioner from refusing altogether to issue the
surety bond. The fact is that, whether or not the petitioner objected, it in the end filed the surety bond with the
suggested condition. The consequence of its submission is that it cannot now argue that it is not bound by that
condition because it was coerced into accepting it.

MANUELA S. CATAN/M.S. CATAN PLACEMENT AGENCY V. THE NLRC AND FRANCISCO REYES

G.R. No. 77279 April 15, 1988

Ponente: Cortes. J.

FACTS:

Petitioner Catan, a duly licensed recruitment agency, as agent of Ali and Fahd Shabokshi Group, a Saudi
Arabian firm recruited private respondent Francisco D. Reyes to work in Saudi Arabia. The term of contract is for
one (1) year, however, the contract provided for automatic renewal.

Said contract was automatically renewed when private respondent was not repatriated by hi Saudi
employer but instead was assigned to work as a crusher plant operator.

On March 30, 1983 while he was working as a crusher plant operator, his ankle was crushed under the
machine he was operating.

On May 15, 1983 after expiration of renewed term, private respondent returned to the Philippines. His
ankle was operated on at the Sta. Mesa Heights Medical Center for which he incurred expenses.

On September 9, 1983, he returned to Saudi and resume to his work and on May 15, 1984, he was
repatriated. And upon his return, he had ankle treated for which he incurred further expenses.

10
 Private respondent filed a claim against Catan placement agency on the basis of the provision in the
employment contract that the employer shall compensate the employee if he is injured or permanently disabled in
the course of employment.

POEA rendered judgment in favor of the complainant. Ordering the respondent placement agency to pay SEVEN
THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE and 60/100 (P7, 985.60), TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND NINTY SIX 20/100
(P29, 096.20) and 10% for attorney’s fees.

On appeal, respondent NLRC affirmed the decision of the POEA.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Placement Agency is liable for disability benefits to private respondent, since the time
he was injured his original contract had already expired?

HELD: Yes, Catan Placement Agency is liable for disability benefits to private respondent.

Private respondents contract of employment can not be said to have expired on May 14, 1982 as it was
automatically renewed since no notice of its termination was given by either or both parties at a month before its
termination. As stipulated in their contract.

M. S. Catan Agency was at the time of complainant's accident resulting in his permanent partial disability was (sic)
no longer the accredited agent of its foreign principal, foreign respondent herein, yet its responsibility over the
proper implementation of complainant's employment/service contract and the welfare of complainant himself in
the foreign job site, still existed, the contract of employment in question not having expired yet. This must be so,
because the obligations covenanted in the recruitment agreement entered into by and between the local agent
and its foreign principal are not coterminus with the term of such agreement so that if either or both of the parties
decide to end the agreement, the responsibilities of such parties towards the contracted employees under the
agreement do not at all end, but the same extends up to and until the expiration of the employment contracts of
the employees recruited and employed pursuant to the said recruitment agreement. Otherwise, this will render
nugatory the very purpose for which the law governing the employment of workers for foreign jobs abroad was
enacted.
ROYAL CROWN INTERNATIONALE, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSI0N and VIRGILIO P.
NACIONALES, respondents

Facts:

In 1983, petitioner, a duly licensed private employment agency, recruited and deployed private respondent for
employment with ZAMEL as an architectural draftsman in Saudi Arabia.

On February 13, 1984, ZAMEL terminated the employment of private respondent on the ground that his
performance was below par. For three (3) successive days thereafter, he was detained at his quarters and was not
allowed to report to work until his exit papers were ready. On February 16, 1984, he was made to board a plane
bound for the Philippines.

Private respondent then filed on April 23, 1984 a complaint for illegal termination against petitioner and ZAMEL.

11
Based on a finding that petitioner and ZAMEL failed to establish that private respondent was terminated for just
and valid cause, the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office of the POEA issued a decision ordering the former
to pay, jointly and severally, the complainant.

Petitioner Royal Crown Internationale seeks the nullification of a resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) which affirmed a decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA)
holding it liable to pay, jointly and severally with Zamel-Turbag Engineering and Architectural Consultant (ZAMEL),
private respondent Virgilio P. Nacionales' salary and vacation pay corresponding to the unexpired portion of his
employment contract with ZAMEL.

Issue:

I. Whether or not petitioner as a private employment agency may be held jointly and severally
liable with the foreign-based employer for any claim which may arise in connection with the implementation of the
employment contracts of the employees recruited and deployed abroad;

II. Whether or not sufficient evidence was presented by petitioner to establish the termination of
private respondent's employment for just and valid cause.

Ruling:

I. In applying for its license to operate a private employment agency for overseas recruitment and
placement, petitioner was required to submit, among others, a document or verified undertaking whereby it
assumed all responsibilities for the proper use of its license and the implementation of the contracts of
employment with the workers it recruited and deployed for overseas employment [Section 2(e), Rule V, Book 1,
Rules to Implement the Labor Code (1976)]. It was also required to file with the Bureau a formal appointment or
agency contract executed by the foreign-based employer in its favor to recruit and hire personnel for the former,
which contained a provision empowering it to sue and be sued jointly and solidarily with the foreign principal for
any of the violations of the recruitment agreement and the contracts of employment [Section 10 (a) (2), Rule V,
Book I of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code (1976)].

II. The NLRC upheld the POEA finding that petitioner's evidence was insufficient to prove
termination from employment for just and valid cause. And a careful study of the evidence thus far presented by
petitioner reveals to this Court that there is legal basis for public respondent's conclusion.

The Court holds, therefore, that the NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in upholding the POEA's finding of insufficiency of evidence to prove termination for just and valid
cause.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition.

TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, et.al., respondents.

G.R. No. 109583 September 5, 1997

FACTS:

12
 Trans Action Overseas Corp. (Trans Action), a private fee-charging employment agency, recruited the
private respondents for employment in Hongkong as domestic helpers through its agents. The private respondents
paid placement but Trans Action failed to deploy them. The former demanded refund but it was of no avail so they
instituted a complaint against petitioner for violation of Articles 34(a) and 32 of the Labor Code to which the Labor
Undersecretary Nieves rendered the assailed decision favoring the private respondents and ordering Trans Action
to pay private respondents specified amounts for 28 counts of violation of Article 32 and 5 counts of Article 34 and
with a corresponding suspension of license in the aggregate period of 66 months. Further, considering that under
the 1987 POEA Schedule of Penalties, any suspension amounting to a period of 12 months merits the penalty of
cancellation, the license of Trans Action to participate in overseas placement of workers was also cancelled. The
Undersecretary provisionally lifted the cancellation of Trans Action’s license upon the latter’s motion but after the
resolution of the case, the order for the revocation of license was reinstated.

ISSUE:
1. Does the Secretary of Labor have the jurisdiction to hear and decide illegal recruitment cases, including the
authority to cancel recruitment licenses?
2. Is the 1987 POEA Schedule of Penalties, from which the cancellation of the license was based, valid for not
being registered with the UP Law Center as required under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987?

RULING:

The Court held that under Article 35 of the Labor Code the Secretary of Labor has the power to revoke or
cancel a license for the violation of the rules and regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor himself and its sub
agencies in implementing the provisions of the law pursuant to Article 36 of the Code. The 1987 POEA Schedule of
Penalties was issued pursuant to Article 34 and it is valid because it simply contains a listing and specification of
offenses. It does not prescribe additional rules and regulations governing overseas employment but only detailed
the administrative sanctions imposable for some enumerated prohibited acts and therefore does not require
registration with the UP Law Center.

In any case, however, the license of the respondent agency was cancelled on the authority of Article 35 of the
Labor Code, as amended, and not pursuant to the assailed Revised Rules on Schedule of Penalties. Hence, the
petition has no merit and was therefore dismissed and the decision of the Secretary of Labor was affirmed.

G.R. No. 81510 March 14, 1990

HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,

vs.

HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.

FACTS: This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure
under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.

On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro filed with the POEA a complaint against petitioner. Having ascertained that
the petitioner had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D.
Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER.

13
The POEA brought a team to the premises of Salazar to implement the order. There it was found that petitioner
was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team served said Closure and Seizure order
on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed
the team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development (Phil.). However, when required
to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent
performers — practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team confiscated
assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.

A few days after, petitioner filed a letter with the POEA demanding the return of the confiscated properties. They
alleged lack of hearing and due process, and that since the house the POEA raided was a private residence, it was
robbery.

On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be barred are already
fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as one for certiorari in view of the
grave public interest involved.

ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants
of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code?

HELD: PETITION GRANTED. it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. Neither may it be done
by a mere prosecuting body.

We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence,
the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c), of the
Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was validly issued, is
clearly in the nature of a general warrant. We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be
seized, otherwise, it is null and void

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:

Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of
arrest and search:

The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner
of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

REPUBLIC V. HUMAN LINK MANPOWER, APRIL 22, 2015 (no digest)

3. CONTRACTS

VIR-JEN Shipping and Marine Services, Inc., vs. NLRC

G.R. No. L-58011 & L-58012 November 18, 1983

EN BANC, GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Facts:

14
Certain seamen entered into a contract of employment for a 12-month period. Some three months after the
commencement of their employment, the seamen demanded a 50 % increase of their salaries and benefits. The
seamen demanded this increase while their vessel was en route to a port in Australia controlled by thye
International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF), a militant international labor organization with affiliates in
different ports of the world, which reputedly can tie a vessel in a port by preventing its loading and unloading
unless it paid its seamen their prescribed ITF rates.

In reply, the agent of the owner of the vessel agreed to pay a 25% increase, but when the vessel arrived in Japan
shortly afterwards, the seamen were repatriated to Manila and their contract terminated. There is no showing that
the Seamen were given the opportunity to at least comment for the cancellation of their contracts, although they
had served only three (3) out of the twelve (12) months' duration of their contracts.

The private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of earned wages with the National
Seamen Board (NSB). The Vir-jen Shipping and Marine Services Inc. in turn filed a complaint for breach of contract
and recovery of excess salaries and overtime pay against the private respondents. On July 2, 1980, the NSB
rendered a decision declaring that the seamen breached their employment contracts when they demanded and
received from Vir-jen Shipping wages over and above their contracted rates. The dismissal of the seamen was
declared legal and the seamen were ordered suspended.

The seamen appealed the decision to the NLRC which reversed the decision of the on the ground that the
termination of the contract by the petitioner was without valid cause. Hence, the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the findings of the NSB is more credible than the NLRC that the seamen did not violate their
contract.

Held:

The decision sought to be reconsidered appears to be a deviation from the Court's decision, speaking through the
First Division, in Wallem Shipping, Inc. v. Hon. Minister of Labor (102 SCRA 835). Faced with two seemingly
conflicting resolutions of basically the same issue by its two Divisions, the Court. therefore, resolved to transfer the
case to the Court en banc.

We sustain the decision of the respondent National labor Relations Commission.

The contention that manning industries in the Philippines would not survive if the instant case is not decided in
favor of the petitioner is not supported by evidence. The Wallem case was decided on February 20, 1981. There
have been no severe repercussions, no drying up of employment opportunities for seamen, and none of the dire
consequences repeatedly emphasized by the petitioner. Why should Vir-jen be all exception?

Filipino seamen are admittedly as competent and reliable as seamen from any other country in the world.
Otherwise, there would not be so many of them in the vessels sailing in every ocean and sea on this globe. It is
competence and reliability, not cheap labor that makes our seamen so greatly in demand. Filipino seamen have
never demanded the same high salaries as seamen from the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and other
developed nations. But certainly they are entitled to government protection when they ask for fair and decent
treatment by their employer.-, and when they exercise the right to petition for improved terms of employment,
especially when they feel that these are sub-standard or are capable of improvement according to internationally
accepted rules. In the domestic scene, there are marginal employers who prepare two sets of payrolls for their

15
employees — one in keeping with minimum wages and the other recording the sub-standard wages that the
employees really receive, The reliable employers, however, not only meet the minimums required by fair labor
standards legislation but even go way above the minimums while earning reasonable profits and prospering. The
same is true of international employment. There is no reason why this Court and the Ministry of Labor and.
Employment or its agencies and commissions should come out with pronouncements based on the standards and
practices of unscrupulous or inefficient shipowners, who claim they cannot survive without resorting to tricky and
deceptive schemes, instead of Government maintaining labor law and jurisprudence according to the practices of
honorable, competent, and law-abiding employers, domestic or foreign.

Prescinding from the above, we now hold that neither the National Seamen Board nor the National Labor Relations
Commission should, as a matter of official policy, legitimize and enforce cubious arrangements where shipowners
and seamen enter into fictitious contracts similar to the addendum agreements or side contracts in this case
whose purpose is to deceive. The Republic of the Philippines and its ministries and agencies should present a more
honorable and proper posture in official acts to the whole world, notwithstanding our desire to have as many job
openings both here and abroad for our workers. At the very least, such as sensitive matter involving no less than
our dignity as a people and the welfare of our workingmen must proceed from the Batasang Pambansa in the form
of policy legislation, not from administrative rule making or adjudication

Decision:

WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are hereby GRANTED. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin and Relova, JJ., concur.

PRIL – Overseas Employment Contract – 95

SUZARA VS BENIPAYO (1989)

Facts:
1. Suzara et al entered into employment contracts with Magsaysay lines to work aboard vessels
owned/operated/manned by the latter for a period of 12 calendar months and with different rating/position,
salary, overtime pay and allowance. The contracts were approved by the National Seamen Board.
2. Upon arrival at the port of Vancouver, Canada, demands for increase in wages were made through the
help of the International Transport Worker’s Federation (ITF), a militant worldwide especially in Canada, Australia,
Scandinavia, and various European countries, interdicting foreign vessels and demanding wage increases for third
world seamen.
3. Wages were increased but complaints were filed by Magsaysay before the NSB. NSB ordered the return of
the additional wages paid for being obtained thru violent means and for lacking NSB approval. NLRC affirmed the
order.
4. Meanwhile, Magsaysay filed estafa charges against the seamen.
5. In this petition, the seamen seeks for the reversal of the NLRC decision and the quashal of the complaints
for estafa.

Issue:
Whether the increase in wages needed the approval of the NSB to be legal (NO)

Ratio:
1. There is nothing in the record supporting the finding that the workers resorted to violent means to obtain
an increase in their wages.

16
2. It is impractical for the NSB to require the petitioners, caught in the middle of a labor struggle between
the ITF and owners of ocean going vessels halfway around the world in Vancouver, British Columbia to first secure
the approval of the NSB in Manila before signing an agreement which the employer was willing to sign
3. Accdg to the case of Vir-Jen: The form contracts approved by the National Seamen Board are designed to
protect Filipino seamen not foreign shipowners who can take care of themselves. The standard forms embody the
basic minimums which must be incorporated as parts of the employment contract. (Section 15, Rule V, Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Labor Code).lâwphî1.ñèt They are not collective bargaining agreements or
immutable contracts which the parties cannot improve upon or modify in the course of the agreed period of time
4. The NSB, the Department of Labor and Employment and all its agencies exist primarily for the
workingman's interest and the nation's as a whole.

SEAGULL MARITIME CORP. AND PHILIMARE SHIPPING & EQUIPMENT SUPPLY vs. NERRY D. BALATONGAN,
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION
G.R. No. 82252 February 28, 1989

The reason why the law requires that the POEA should approve and verify a contract under Article 34(i) of
the Labor Code is to insure that the employee shall not thereby be placed in a disadvantageous position and that
the same are within the minimum standards of the terms and conditions of such employment contract set by the
POEA. This is why a standard format for employment contracts has been adopted by the Department of Labor.
However, there is no prohibition against stipulating in a contract more benefits to the employee than those
required by law.

Facts:
A "crew Agreement" was entered into by private respondent and Philimare whereby the latter employed
the former as able seaman on board its vessel "Santa Cruz" with a monthly salary of US $ 300.00. Said agreement
was processed and approved by the National Seaman's Board (NSB). While on board said vessel the said parties
entered into a supplementary contract of employment stating that the employer shall be obliged to insure the
employee during his engagement against death or permanent invalidity caused by accident on board. On October
6, 1983 Balatongan met an accident in the Suez Canal, Egypt as a result of which he was hospitalized at the Suez
Canal Authority Hospital. Later, he was repatriated to the Philippines and was hospitalized at the Makati Medical
Center On August 19, 1985 the medical certificate was issued describing his disability as "permanent in nature."
Balatongan demanded payment for his claim for total disability insurance but his claim was denied for having been
submitted to the insurers beyond the designated period for doing so. Respondent then filed a complaint with the
POEA for non-payment of his claim for permanent total disability with damages and attorney's fees. POEA
rendered its decision in favor of the respondent and ordered petitioner to pay him the amount for his permanent
total disability insurance

Issue:WON POEA erred in applying the Supplemental Contract

Held:
No. The supplementary contract of employment was entered into between petitioner and private
respondent to modify the original contract of employment The reason why the law requires that the POEA should
approve and verify a contract under Article 34(i) of the Labor Code is to insure that the employee shall not thereby
be placed in a disadvantageous position and that the same are within the minimum standards of the terms and
conditions of such employment contract set by the POEA. This is why a standard format for employment contracts
has been adopted by the Department of Labor. However, there is no prohibition against stipulating in a contract
more benefits to the employee than those required by law. Thus, in this case wherein a "supplementary contract"
was entered into affording greater benefits to the employee than the previous one, and although the same was
not submitted for the approval of the POEA, the public respondents properly considered said contract to be valid
and enforceable. Indeed, said pronouncements of public respondents have the effect of an approval of said
contract. Moreover, as said contract was voluntarily entered into by the parties the same is binding between
them. 11 Not being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order, its validity must be

17
sustained. 12 By the same token, the court sustains the ruling of public respondents that the provision in the
supplementary contract whereby private respondent waives any claim against petitioners for damages arising
from death or permanent disability is against public policy, oppressive and inimical to the rights of private
respondent. The said provision defeats and is inconsistent with the duty of petitioners to insure private respondent
against said contingencies as clearly stipulated in the said contract. There is no question that under the said
supplementary contract of employment, it is the duty of the employer, petitioners herein, to insure the employee,
during his engagement, against death and permanent invalidity caused by accident on board up to $ 50,000.00.
Consequently, it is also its concomitant obligation to see to it that the claim against the insurance company is duly
filed by private respondent or in his behalf, and within the time provided for by the terms of the insurance
contract. t was only on August 19, 1985 that he was issued a medical certificate describing his disability to be
permanent in nature. It was not possible for private respondent to file a claim for permanent disability with the
insurance company within the one-year period from the time of the injury, as his disability was ascertained to be
permanent only thereafter. Petitioners did not exert any effort to assist private respondent to recover payment of
his claim from the insurance company. They did not even care to dispute the finding of the insurer that the claim
was not flied on time. 14 Petitioners must, therefore, be held responsible for its omission, if not negligence, by
requiring them to pay the claim of private respondent.

196. G.R. No. 109808 March 1, 1995

ESALYN CHAVEZ vs. BONTO-PEREZ
Facts:
Chavez, an entertainment dancer, entered into a standard employment contract for overseas Filipino
artists and entertainers through Philippine representative, Centrum Placement & Promotions Corporation and was
approved by POEA. The contract had a duration of two (2) to six (6) months, and petitioner was to be paid a
monthly compensation of US$1,5000.00. Subsequently, Chavez executed the following side agreement with her
Japanese employer through her local manager, Jaz Talents Promotion to wit:
I, ESALYN CHAVEZ, DANCER, do hereby with my own free will and voluntarily have the honor to authorize
your good office to please deduct the amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS ($250) from my
contracted monthly salary of SEVEN HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS ($750) as monthly commission for my
Manager, Mr. Jose A. Azucena, Jr.
That, my monthly salary (net) is FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS ($500)
Chavez instituted the case at bench for underpayment of wages with the. She prayed for the payment of
Six Thousand U.S. Dollars (US$6,000.00), representing the unpaid portion of her basic salary for six months.
Centrum averred Chavez cannot now demand to pay her the salary based on the processed Employment
Contract for she is now considered in bad faith and hence, estopped from claiming thereto thru her own act of
consenting and agreeing to receive a salary not in accordance with her contract of employment. Moreover, her
self-imposed silence for a long period of time worked to her own disadvantage as she allowed laches to prevail.
Issue:
WON petitioner can claim her upon her allegation of underpayment of wages.
Ruling:
Yes, the Court ruled that the “side agreement” which authorize her Japanese Employer to deduct
US$250.00 from her monthly basic salary is void because it is against our existing laws, morals and public policy.
This side agreement is a scheme all too frequently resorted to by unscrupulous employers against our helpless
overseas workers who are compelled to agree to satisfy their basic economic needs. It cannot supersede the
standard employment contract approved by the POEA with the following stipulation appended thereto:
It is understood that the terms and conditions stated in this Employment Contract are in
conformance with the Standard Employment Contract for Entertainers prescribed by the POEA under
Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1986. Any alterations or changes made in any part of this contract
without prior approval by the POEA shall be null and void.
Secondly. The doctrine of laches cannot be applied to petitioner. The question of laches is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court, and since it is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
considerations. It cannot be worked to defeat justice or to perpetrate fraud and injustice. Petitioner filed her claim
well within the three-year prescriptive period for the filing of money claims set forth in Article 291 of the Labor
Code.

18
 INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC., FIRCROFT SHIPPINGCORPORATION and TIMES SURETY &
INSURANCE CO., INC.,petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION andCONSTANCIA PINEDA,
respondents
G.R. No.115497, September 16, 1996

NATURE Special Civil Action for Certiorari for the reversal of the Resolution of the NLRC
Plaintiff InterorientMaritimeEnterprises, Inc., et al.
Defendant National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), et al.
Ponente J., Panganiban

EMPLOYER: INTERORIENT MARITIME ENTERPRISES, INC.

Employment agency that hired Jeremias Pineda; and
Fircroft Shipping Corporation
The foreign principal of Interorient.

EMPLOYEE: JEREMIAS PINEDA

Oiler who worked for Fircroft Shipping Corporation

FACTS.
1. Jeremias Pineda was contracted to work as an oiler on board of “MV Amazonia” for a period of 9 months.
2. MV Amazonia is owned by Fircroft Shipping Corporation.
3. [December 21, 1988] Jeremias started working as an Oiler.
4. Pineda worked as an Oiler for a period of nine (9) months withadditional three (3) months upon mutual
consent of both parties with a monthlysalary of US$276.00, fixed overtime rate of US$83.00
5. [September 28, 1989] Jeremias finished his contract and wasdischarged from the port of Dubai for
repatriation to Manila.
6. His flightschedule from Dubai to the Philippines necessitated a stopover at Bangkok,Thailand, and during
said stopover he disembarked on his own free will and failedto join the connecting flight to Hongkong
with final destination to Manila.
7. [October 2, 1989] He met his death when he was shot by a Thai Policeman inBangkok, Thailand.
8. That considering that the Jeremias was sufferingfrom mental disorders aggravated by threats on his life by
his fellow seamen, theShip Captain should not have allowed him to travel alone.
9. [October 5, 1990] The Agency received a fax transmission from the Department of ForeignAffairs to the
effect that Jeremias Pineda was shot by a Thai Officer on duty.
10. Constancia Pineda, the mother of Jeremias, claims for the death compensation benefits of her son against
petitioners.
11. [November 16, 1992] Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Administrator
FelicisimoJoson rendered his decision in favor of Constancia.
12. *March 30, 1994+ The NLRC affirmed the POEA Administrator’s decision.

ISSUE/S and RULING:

1. W/N the petitioners can be held liable for the death ofseaman Jeremias Pineda? – YES.

The SC discussed first as to the mental state of Jeremias.

The circumstances prior to and surrounding his death provide substantialevidence of the existence of such mental
defect or disorder. Such mental disorder becameevident when he failed to join his connecting flight to Hongkong,
having during saidstopover wandered out of the Bangkok airport's immigration area on his own.
The SC canperceive no sane and sufficient reason for a Pinoy overseas contract worker or seaman towant to while
away his time in a foreign land, when he is presumably unfamiliar with itsnative tongue, with nothing to do and no
source of income, and after having been absentfrom kith and kin, hearth and home for almost an entire year. Nor

19
can the SC find any plausiblereason for him to be wielding a knife and scaring away passersby, and even taking a
stabat an armed policeman, unless he is no longer in full possession of his sanity.

For the SC,these circumstances are sufficient in themselves to produce a firm conviction that Jeremias in this case
was no longer in full control of his senses when he left hiswork. To reiterate, in this case, no more than substantial
evidence is required.

The SC likewise agreed with the findings of the POEA Administrator that Jeremias was no longer acting sanely
when he attacked the Thai policeman. The report of thePhilippine Embassy in Thailand dated October 9, 1990
depicting the deceased's strangebehavior shortly before he was shot dead, after having wandered around Bangkok
for fourdays, clearly shows that the man was not in full control of his own self.

The SC agrees with the POEA Administrator when it ruledthat since Pineda attacked the Thaipoliceman when he
was no longer in complete control of his mental faculties, thePar. 6, Section C, Part II of POEA’s Standard Format
Contract of Employment for Seamen exempting theemployer from liability should not apply in the instant case.

Likewise, if Jeremias had been on drugs, then the Thai Police and the Philippine Embassy in Bangkok should have
mentioned the same on their reports.

2. W/N the death of Pineda was work-related? – YES.

Petitioners argue that the death of Pineda was not work related.

Though thetermination of the employment contract was duly effected in Dubai, still, the responsibilityof the
foreign employer to see to it that Pineda was duly repatriated to the point of hiringsubsisted.

Section 4, Rule VIII of the Rules and Regulations Governing OverseasEmployment clearly provides for the duration
of the mandatory personal accident and lifeinsurance covering accidental death, dismemberment and disability of
overseas workers:

"Section 4. Duration of Insurance Coverage. — The minimum coverage shalltake effect upon payment of the
premium and shall be extended worldwide, onand off the job, for the duration of the worker's contract plus sixty
(60) calendardays after termination of the contract of employment; provided that in no caseshall the duration of
the insurance coverage be less than one year."

The foreign employer may not have been obligated by its contract to provide a companionfor a returning
employee, but it cannot deny that it was expressly tasked by its agreementto assure the safe return of said worker.
The uncaring attitude displayed by petitionerswho, knowing fully well that its employee had been suffering from
some mental disorder,nevertheless still allowed him to travel home alone, is appalling to say the least.
Suchattitude harks back to another time when the landed gentry practically owned the serfs,and disposed of them
when the latter had grown old, sick or otherwise lost theirusefulness.

DECISION.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the Decisionassailed in this petition is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.Petition GRANTED.

RESPONDENTS WON.

NOTES.

Par.6, Section C, Part II of the POEA's Standard Format Contract of Employment for Seamenstates that:

20
"No compensation shall be payable in respect of any injury, incapacity, disabilityor death resulting from a
(deliberate or) willful act on his own life by theseaman, provided, however, that the employer can prove that such
injury,incapacity, disability or death is directly attributable to the seaman."

PLACEWELL INTERNATIONAL SERVICES CORP. vs. CAMOTE (pls.review, not sure sa ISSUE)
G.R. No. 169973, June 26, 2006

FACTS: Petitioner Placewell International Services Corporation (PISC) deployed respondent Ireneo B. Camote to
work as building carpenter for SAAD Trading and Contracting Co. (SAAD) at the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) for a
contract duration of two years, with a corresponding salary of US$370.00 per month. At the job site, respondent
was allegedly found incompetent by his foreign employer; thus the latter decided to terminate his services.
However, respondent pleaded for his retention and consented to accept a lower salary of SR 800.00 per month.
Thus, SAAD retained respondent until his return to the Philippines two years after.

On November 27, 2001, respondent filed a sworn Complaint for monetary claims against petitioner alleging that
when he arrived at the job site, he and his fellow Filipino workers were required to sign another employment
contract written in Arabic under the constraints of losing their jobs if they refused; that for the entire duration of
the new contract, he received only SR 590.00 per month; that he was not given his overtime pay despite rendering
nine hours of work everyday; that he and his co-workers sought assistance from the Philippine Embassy but they
did not succeed in pursuing their cause of action because of difficulties in communication.

ISSUE: Whether there is estoppel by laches

HELD: R.A. No. 8042 explicitly prohibits the substitution or alteration to the prejudice of the worker, of
employment contracts already approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) from
the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same
without the approval of the DOLE. The subsequently executed side agreement of an overseas contract worker with
her foreign employer which reduced her salary below the amount approved by the POEA is void because it is
against our existing laws, morals and public policy. The said side agreement cannot supersede her standard
employment contract approved by the POEA.

Petitioner’s contention that respondent is guilty of laches is without basis. Laches has been defined as the failure
of or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier, or to assert a right within reasonable time, warranting a presumption that
the party entitled thereto has either abandoned it or declined to assert it. Thus, the doctrine of laches presumes
that the party guilty of negligence had the opportunity to do what should have been done, but failed to do so.
Conversely, if the said party did not have the occasion to assert the right, then, he can not be adjudged guilty of
laches. Laches is not concerned with the mere lapse of time; rather, the party must have been afforded an
opportunity to pursue his claim in order that the delay may sufficiently constitute laches.

In the instant case, respondent filed his claim within the three-year prescriptive period for the filing of money
claims set forth in Article 291 of the Labor Code from the time the cause of action accrued. Thus, we find that the
doctrine of laches finds no application in this case.

SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. v. NLRC

480 SCRA 146
JANUARY 25, 2006

FACTS: Respondent Divina Montehermozo is a domestic helper deployed to Taiwan by Sunace International
Management Services (Sunace) under a 12-month contract. Such employment was made with the assistance of
Taiwanese broker Edmund Wang. After the expiration of the contract, Montehermozo continued her employment
with her Taiwanese employer for another 2 years.

21
When Montehermozo returned to the Philippines, she filed a complaint against Sunace, Wang, and her Taiwanese
employer before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). She alleges that she was underpaid and was
jailed for three months in Taiwan. She further alleges that the 2-year extension of her employment contract was
with the consent and knowledge of Sunace. Sunace, on the other hand, denied all the allegations.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Montehermozo and found Sunace liable thereof. The National Labor Relations
Commission and Court of Appeals affirmed the labor arbiter’s decision. Hence, the filing of this appeal.

ISSUE: WON the 2-year extension of Montehermozo’s employment was made with the knowledge and consent of
Sunace

HELD: The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the principal, employer,
not the other way around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer cannot, therefore, be imputed to its
agent Sunace.

There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under the 2-year employment
contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its "owner" cannot be held solidarily liable
for any of Montehermozo’s claims arising from the 2-year employment extension. As the New Civil Code provides,
Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns, and heirs, except in case where the rights and
obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.
Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points out, there was an implied revocation of its agency relationship with its
foreign principal when, after the termination of the original employment contract, the foreign principal directly
negotiated with Montehermozo and entered into a new and separate employment contract in Taiwan. Article
1924 of the New Civil Code states that the agency is revoked if the principal directly manages the business
entrusted to the agent, dealing directly with third persons.

PAUL V. SANTIAGO, petitioner, vs. CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., respondent.

G.R. No. 162419

July 10, 2007

FACTS:

Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc. (respondent) for about 5 yrs. In
February 3, 1998, petitioner signed a new contract of employment with respondent, with the duration of 9
months. The contract was approved by POEA. Petitioner was to be deployed on board the “MSV Seaspread” which
was scheduled to leave the port of Manila for Canada on 13 February 1998.

A week before the date of departure, Capt. Pacifico Fernandez, respondent’s Vice President, sent a facsimile
message to the captain of “MSV Seaspread,”, saying that it received a phone call from Santiago’s wife and some
other callers who did not reveal their identity and gave him some feedbacks that Paul Santiago this time, if allowed
to depart, will jump ship in Canada like his brother Christopher Santiago. The captain of “MSV Seaspread replied
that it cancel plans for Santiago to return to Seaspread.

Petitioner thus told that he would not be leaving for Canada anymore. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal, damages, and attorney’s fees against respondent and its foreign principal, Cable and Wireless (Marine)
Ltd. The Labor Arbiter (LA) favored petitioner and ruled that the employment contract remained valid but had not
commenced since petitioner was not deployed and that respondent violated the rules and regulations governing

22
overseas employment when it did not deploy petitioner, causing petitioner to suffer actual damages. On appeal by
respondent, NLRC ruled that there is no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent
because the employment contract shall commence upon actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or
seaport at the point of hire and with a POEA-approved contract. In the absence of an employer-employee
relationship between the parties, the claims for illegal dismissal, actual damages, and attorney’s fees should be
dismissed. But the NLRC found respondent’s decision not to deploy petitioner to be a valid exercise of its
management prerogative. Petitioner filed MR but it was denied. He went to CA. CA affirmed the decision of NLRC.
Petitioner’s MR was denied. Hence this case.

ISSUE:When does an employer- employee relationship begin in the case at bar.

RULING:

There is some merit in the petition. The parties entered into an employment contract whereby petitioner was
contracted by respondent to render services on board “MSV Seaspread” for the consideration of US$515.00 per
month for 9 months, plus overtime pay. However, respondent failed to deploy petitioner from the port of Manila
to Canada. Considering that petitioner was not able to depart from the airport or seaport in the point of hire, the
employment contract did not commence, and no employer-employee relationship was created between the
parties. However, a distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the
commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this case
coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed on the object and
the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein. The commencement of the employer-employee
relationship would have taken place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even
before the start of any employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment
contract was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action
against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be deployed as
agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.

Neither the manning agent nor the employer can simply prevent a seafarer from being deployed without a valid
reason. Respondent’s act of preventing petitioner from departing the port of Manila and boarding “MSV
Seaspread” constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise to petitioner’s cause of action. Respondent unilaterally and
unreasonably reneged on its obligation to deploy petitioner and must therefore answer for the actual damages he
suffered.

Despite the absence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent, the Court rules
that the NLRC has jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters is not limited to claims
arising from employer-employee relationships. Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act), provides that:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the NLR) shall
have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within 90 calendar days after the filing of the
complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of
damages.”

Since the present petition involves the employment contract entered into by petitioner for overseas employment,
his claims are cognizable by the labor arbiters of the NLRC.

23
Respondent is liable to pay petitioner only the actual damages in the form of the loss of nine (9) months’ worth of
salary as provided in the contract. He is not, however, entitled to overtime pay. While the contract indicated a
fixed overtime pay, it is not a guarantee that he would receive said amount regardless of whether or not he
rendered overtime work. Even though petitioner was prevented without valid reason from rendering regular much
less overtime service, the fact remains that there is no certainty that petitioner will perform overtime work had he
been allowed to board the vessel. The amount stipulated in the contract will be paid only if and when the
employee rendered overtime work. Realistically speaking, a seaman, by the very nature of his job, stays on board a
ship or vessel beyond the regular eight-hour work schedule. For the employer to give him overtime pay for the
extra hours when he might be sleeping or attending to his personal chores or even just lulling away his time would
be extremely unfair and unreasonable.

The Court also holds that petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees in the concept of damages and expenses of
litigation. Respondent’s basis for not deploying petitioner is the belief that he will jump ship just like his brother, a
mere suspicion that is based on alleged phone calls of several persons whose identities were not even confirmed.
This Court has upheld management prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good faith for the advancement
of the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under
special laws or under valid agreements. Respondent’s failure to deploy petitioner is unfounded and unreasonable
However, moral damages cannot be awarded in this case. because respondent’s action was not tainted with bad
faith, or done deliberately to defeat petitioner’s rights, as to justify the award of moral damages.

Seafarers are considered contractual employees and cannot be considered as regular employees under the Labor
Code. Their employment is governed by the contracts they sign every time they are rehired and their employment
is terminated when the contract expires. The exigencies of their work necessitates that they be employed on a
contractual basis.

WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED IN PART.

5. OTHER MATTERS INCIDENTAL TO OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT

G.R. No. 152214 September 19, 2006

EQUI-ASIA PLACEMENT, INC., petitioner,

vs. DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (DFA) represented by the HON. DOMINGO L. SIAZON, JR., SECRETARY,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE), represented by HON. BIENVENIDO
LAGUESMA, respondents.

Facts:

On September 2000, Manny dela Rosa Razon, a native of Lemery, Batangas and an overseas Filipino worker, died
of acute cardiac arrest while asleep (bangungot) at the dormitory of the Samsong Textile Processing Factory in
South Korea. Informed thereof, the Philippine Overseas Labor Office (POLO) at South Korea immediately relayed
the incident to the Philippine Embassy in South Korea. Forthwith, the [Labor] Attaché of the Philippine Embassy
dispatched a letter to Eleuterio Gardiner, administrator of the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA),
telling him about what happened and to inform the relatives of Razon.

In turn, the OWWA indorsed the matter, for appropriate action, to Director R. Casco of the Welfare Employment
Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (WEO-POEA).

24
Upon verification by the WEO-POEA on its data base, it was discovered that Manny Razon was recruited and
deployed byEqui-Asia Placement, and was sent to South Korea in April 2000 to work-train at Yeongjin Machinery,
Inc. Thereupon, POEA addressed the first assailed telegram-directive to the President/GM of the petitioner. We
quote the telegram:

"PLEASE PROVIDE PTA [Prepaid Ticket Advice] FOR THE REPATRIATION OF REMAINS AND
BELONGINGS OF OFW MANNY DELA ROSA RAZON AS PER REQUEST OF PHILIPPINE EMBASSY,
KOREA, YOU ARE GIVEN TWO (2) DAYS FROM RECEIPT HEREOF WITHIN WHICH TO PROVIDE SAID
TICKET AND ASSISTANCE, FAILURE TO DO SO WILL CONSTRAIN US TO IMPOSE APPROPRIATE
SANCTION UNDER OUR RULES"

Responding thereto, petitioner, thru its President Daniel Morga, Jr., faxed the following message to the Assistance
and Welfare Division of the POEA:

"In connection with your telegram, this is to report to your good office the following:

2. He violated his employment/training/dispatching contracts on June 25, 2000 by unlawfully

escaping/running away (TNT) from his company assignment without prior KFSMB authorization
and working/staying in unknown company/place;

In view thereof, we cannot heed your requests as embodied in your telegram. However, his
relatives can avail of the benefits provided for by OWWA in cases involving undocumented/illegal
Filipino workers abroad.

On the same date, Director Casco of the WEO-POEA sent to the petitioner the second assailed letter-directive,
which pertinently reads:

"Mmay we remind you that pursuant to Sections 52, 53, 54 and 55 of the Implementing Rules
Governing RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of
1995, the repatriation of OFW, his/her remains and transport of his personal effects is the
primary responsibility of the principal or agency and to immediately advance the cost of plane
fare without prior determination of the cause of worker's repatriation. The Rules further provide
for the procedure to be followed in cases when the foreign employer/agency fails to provide for
the cost of the repatriation, compliance of which is punishable by suspension of the license of
the agency or such sanction as the Administration shall deem proper. Hence, you are required to
provide the PTA for the deceased OFW in compliance with the requirement in accordance with
R.A. 8042. You are given forty-eight (48) hours upon receipt hereof within which to provide said
ticket. Failure in this regard will constrain us to impose the appropriate sanction under our rules.

Petitioner wrote back Director Casco, thus:

"Please be informed that under the provisions of Section 53 as well as, and in relation to,
Section 55 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, the action to be imposed by POEA for non-compliance therewith
within 48 hours are violative of due process and/or the principle on due delegation of power.

This is so because Sec. 15 of R.A. 8042 clearly contemplates prior notice and hearing before
responsibility thereunder could be established against the agency that sets up the defense of
sole fault – in avoidance of said responsibility. Besides, the sections in question unduly grant the
powers to require advance payment of the plane fare, to impose the corresponding penalty of

25
 suspension in case of non-compliance therewith, when the law itself does not expressly provide
for the grant of such powers.

Nonetheless, and apprehensive of the adverse repercussions which may ensue on account of its non-compliance
with the directive, petitioner advanced under protest the costs for the repatriation of the remains of Razon.

CA rendered a Decision dismissing the petition.CA stated that petitioner was mainly accusing the POEA of grave
abuse of discretion when it ordered petitioner to pay, in advance, the costs for the repatriation of the remains of
Razon.CA ruled that POEA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion as its directives to petitioner were issued
pursuant to existing laws and regulations. It likewise held that a petition for certiorari, which was the remedy
availed of by petitioner, is not the proper remedy as the same is only available when "there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Section 62 of the Omnibus Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 or Republic Act 8042 ("Omnibus
Rules") states that "the Labor Arbiters of NLRC shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
all claims arising out of employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino
workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages,
subject to the rules and procedures of the NLRC." There is, therefore, an adequate remedy available to petitioner.

Lastly, the Court of Appeals declared that it could not strike down as unconstitutional Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55 of
the Omnibus Rules as the unconstitutionality of a statute or rules may not be passed upon unless the issue is
directly raised in an appropriate proceeding.

Issue: W/N CA erred in dismissing the petition.

Held:No

Ratio:

At the center of this petition are the following provisions of the omnibus rules:

Section 52. Primary Responsibility for Repatriation. – The repatriation of the worker, or his/her remains,
and the transport of his/her personal effects shall be the primary responsibility of the principal or agency
which recruited or deployed him/her abroad. All costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal or
the agency concerned.

Section 53. Repatriation of Workers. – The primary responsibility to repatriate entails the obligation on
the part of principal or agency to advance the cost of plane fare and to immediately repatriate the worker
should the need for it arise, without a prior determination of the cause of the termination of the worker's
employment. However, after the worker has returned to the country, the principal or agency may recover
the cost of repatriation from the worker if the termination of employment was due solely to his/her fault.

Every contract for overseas employment shall provide for the primary responsibility of agency to advance
the cost of plane fare, and the obligation of the worker to refund the cost thereof in case his/her fault is
determined by the Labor Arbiter.

Section 54. Repatriation Procedure. – When a need for repatriation arises and the foreign employer fails
to provide for it cost, the responsible personnel at site shall simultaneously notify OWWA and the POEA
of such need. The POEA shall notify the agency concerned of the need for repatriation. The agency shall
provide the plane ticket or the prepaid ticket advice (PTA) to the Filipinos Resource Center or to the
appropriate Philippine Embassy; and notify POEA of such compliance. The POEA shall inform OWWA of
the action of the agency.

26
 Section 55. Action on Non-Compliance. – If the employment agency fails to provide the ticket or PTA
within 48 hours from receipt of the notice, the POEA shall suspend the license of the agency or impose
such sanctions as it may deem necessary. Upon notice from the POEA, OWWA shall advance the costs of
repatriation with recourse to the agency or principal. The administrative sanction shall not be lifted until
the agency reimburses the OWWA of the cost of repatriation with legal interest.

Said provisions, on the other hand, are supposed to implement Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 which
provides:

SEC. 15. Repatriation of Workers; Emergency Repatriation Fund. – The repatriation of the worker and the
transport of his personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which, recruited or
deployed the worker overseas. All costs attendant to repatriation shall be borne by or charged to the
agency concerned and/or its principal. Likewise, the repatriation of remains and transport of the personal
belongings of a deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal and/or
the local agency. However, in cases where the termination of employment is due solely to the fault of the
worker, the principal/employer or agency shall not in any manner be responsible for the repatriation of
the former and/or his belongings.

It bears emphasizing that administrative bodies are vested with two basic powers, the quasi-legislative and the
quasi-judicial. In Abella, Jr. v. Civil Service Commission, we discussed the nature of these powers to be –

In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body adjudicates the rights of persons before it,
in accordance with the standards laid down by the law. The determination of facts and the applicable law,
as basis for official action and the exercise of judicial discretion, are essential for the performance of this
function. On these considerations, it is elementary that due process requirements, as enumerated
in AngTibay, must be observed. These requirements include prior notice and hearing.

On the other hand, quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies through the
promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-
delegation of certain powers flowing from the separation of the great branches of the government. Prior
notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process, are not required since there is
no determination of past events or facts that have to be established or ascertained. As a general rule,
prior notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern
future conduct.

In this case, petitioner assails certain provisions of the Omnibus Rules. However, these rules were clearly
promulgated by DFA and DOLE the exercise of their quasi-legislative powers or the authority to promulgate rules
and regulations. Because of this, petitioner was, thus, mistaken in availing himself of the remedy of an original
action for certiorari as obviously, only judicial or quasi-judicial acts are proper subjects thereof. If only for these,
the petition deserves outright dismissal. Be that as it may, we shall proceed to resolve the substantive issues raised
in this petition for review in order to finally remove the doubt over the validity of Sections 52, 53, 54, and 55 of the
Omnibus Rules.

It is now well-settled that delegation of legislative power to various specialized administrative agencies is allowed
in the face of increasing complexity of modern life. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies, as the
principal agencies tasked to execute laws with respect to their specialized fields, the authority to promulgate rules
and regulations to implement a given statute and effectuate its policies. All that is required for the valid exercise of
this power of subordinate legislation is that the regulation must be germane to the objects and purposes of the
law; and that the regulation be not in contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by the
law. Under the first test or the so-called completeness test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is
to enforce it. The second test or the sufficient standard test, mandates that there should be adequate guidelines or

27
limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from
running riot.

Basically, petitioner is impugning the subject provisions of the Omnibus Rules for allegedly expanding the scope of
Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 by: first, imposing upon it the primary obligation to repatriate the remains of
Razon including the duty to advance the cost of the plane fare for the transport of Razon's remains; and second, by
ordering it to do so without prior determination of the existence of employer-employee relationship between itself
and Razon.

Petitioner's argument that Section 15 does not provide that it shall be primarily responsible for the repatriation of
a deceased OFW is specious and plain nitpicking.While Republic Act No. 8042 does not expressly state that
petitioner shall be primarily obligated to transport back here to the Philippines the remains of Razon, nevertheless,
such duty is imposed upon him as the statute clearly dictates that "the repatriation of remains and transport of the
personal belongings of a deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the
principal and/or the local agency." The mandatory nature of said obligation is characterized by the legislature's use
of the word "shall." That the concerned government agencies opted to demand the performance of said
responsibility solely upon petitioner does not make said directives invalid as the law plainly obliges a local
placement agency to bear the burden of repatriating the remains of a deceased OFW with or without recourse to
the principal abroad.

Nor do we see any reason to stamp Section 53 of the Omnibus Rules as invalid for allegedly contravening Section
15 of the law which states that a placement agency shall not be responsible for a worker's repatriation should the
termination of the employer-employee relationship be due to the fault of the OFW. To our mind, the statute
merely states the general principle that in case the severance of the employment was because of the OFW's own
undoing, it is only fair that he or she should shoulder the costs of his or her homecoming. Section 15 of Republic
Act No. 8042, however, certainly does not preclude a placement agency from establishing the circumstances
surrounding an OFW's dismissal from service in an appropriate proceeding. As such determination would most
likely take some time, it is only proper that an OFW be brought back here in our country at the soonest possible
time lest he remains stranded in a foreign land during the whole time that recruitment agency contests its liability
for repatriation. As aptly pointed out by the Solicitor General –

Such a situation is unacceptable.

24. This is the same reason why repatriation is made by law an obligation of the agency and/or its
principal without the need of first determining the cause of the termination of the worker's employment.
Repatriation is in effect an unconditional responsibility of the agency and/or its principal that cannot be
delayed by an investigation of why the worker was terminated from employment. To be left stranded in a
foreign land without the financial means to return home and being at the mercy of unscrupulous
individuals is a violation of the OFW's dignity and his human rights. These are the same rights R.A. No.
8042 seeks to protect.

As for the sufficiency of standard test, this Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following:
"public interest," "justice and equity," "public convenience and welfare," and "simplicity, economy and welfare."

ACUÑA VS CA (2006) G.R. 159832

MERCEDITA ACUÑA, MYRNA RAMONES, and JULIET MENDEZ, Petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JOIN
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION and/or ELIZABETH ALAÑON,Respondents.
Facts:

28
Petitioners are Filipino overseas workers deployed by private respondent Join International Corporation (JIC), a
licensed recruitment agency, to its principal, 3D Pre-Color Plastic, Inc., (3D) in Taiwan, Republic of China, under a
uniformly-worded employment contract for a period of two years. Private respondent Elizabeth Alañon is the
president of Join International Corporation.

Sometime in September 1999, petitioners filed with private respondents applications for employment abroad.
After their papers were processed, petitioners claimed they signed a uniformly-worded employment contract with
private respondents which stipulated that they were to work as machine operators with a monthly salary of
NT$15,840.00, exclusive of overtime, for a period of two years.

On December 9, 1999, they left for Taiwan. Upon arriving at the job site, a factory owned by 3D, they were made
to sign another contract which stated that their salary was only NT$11,840.00. They were informed that the
dormitory which would serve as their living quarters was still under construction. They were requested to
temporarily bear with the inconvenience but were assured that their dormitory would be completed in a short
time. Petitioners alleged that they were brought to a "small room with a cement floor so dirty and smelling with
foul odor". Forty women were jampacked in the room and each person was given a pillow. Since the ladies'
comfort room was out of order, they had to ask permission to use the men's comfort room. Petitioners claim they
were made to work twelve hours a day, from 8:00 p.m. to 8:00 a.m.

On December 16, 1999, due to unbearable working conditions, they were constrained to inform management that
they were leaving. They booked a flight home, at their own expense. Before they left, they were made to sign a
written waiver. In addition, petitioners were not paid any salary for work rendered on December 11-15, 1999.
Immediately upon arrival in the Philippines, petitioners went to private respondents' office, narrated what
happened, and demanded the return of their placement fees and plane fare. Private respondents refused.

On December 28, 1999, private respondents offered a settlement. Petitioner Mendez received P15,080. The next
day, petitioners Acuña and Ramones went back and received P13,640 10 and P16,200, respectively. They claim
they signed a waiver, otherwise they would not be refunded.

On January 14, 2000, petitioners Acuña and Mendez invoking Republic Act No. 8042 filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal and non-payment/underpayment of salaries or wages, overtime pay, refund of transportation fare,
payment of salaries/wages for 3 months, moral and exemplary damages, and refund of placement fee before the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Issue: Whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed under Rep. Act No. 8042, thus entitling them to benefits
plus damages.

Held: No illegal dismissal. Constructive dismissal covers the involuntary resignation resorted to when continued
employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution in
pay; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to an
employee. Court found that petitioners did not deny that the accommodations were not as homely as expected.
Petitioners' admitted that they were told by the principal, upon their arrival, that the dormitory was still under
construction and were requested to bear with the temporary inconvenience and the dormitory would soon be
finished. Petitioners did not refute private respondents' assertion that they had deployed approximately sixty
other workers to their principal, and to the best of their knowledge, no other worker assigned to the same
principal has resigned, much less, filed a case for illegal dismissal. These cited circumstances do not reflect malice
by private respondents nor do they show the principal's intention to subject petitioners to unhealthy
accommodations. Under these facts, we cannot rule that there was constructive dismissal.

29
Overtime pay is granted despite petitioners lack of proof that they actually rendered overtime work, since their
employment records were in the custody of the principal employer. It is a time-honored rule that in controversies
between a worker and his employer, doubts reasonably arising from the evidence, or in the interpretation of
agreements and writing should be resolved in the worker's favor. private respondents are solidarily liable with
the foreign principal for the overtime pay claims of petitioners.

On the award of moral and exemplary damages, we hold that such award lacks legal basis. Moral and exemplary
damages are recoverable only where the dismissal of an employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or
constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy. The person claiming moral damages must prove the existence of bad faith by clear and convincing
evidence, for the law always presumes good faith. Petitioners failed to prove bad faith, fraud or ill motive on the
part of private respondents. Moral damages cannot be awarded.

Without the award of moral damages, there can be no award of exemplary damages, nor attorney's fees.

Quitclaims are valid. Quitclaims executed by the employees are commonly frowned upon as contrary to public
policy and ineffective to bar claims for the full measure of the workers' legal rights, considering the economic
disadvantage of the employee and the inevitable pressure upon him by financial necessity. Nonetheless, the so-
called "economic difficulties and financial crises" allegedly confronting the employee is not an acceptable ground
to annul the compromise agreement unless it is accompanied by a gross disparity between the actual claim and
the amount of the settlement.

Records reveal that petitioners were not in any way deceived, coerced or intimidated into signing a quitclaim
waiver in the amounts of P13,640, P15,080 and P16,200 respectively. Nor was there a disparity between the
amount of the quitclaim and the amount actually due the petitioners. After conversion to Philippine pesos, the
amount of the quitclaim paid to petitioners was actually higher than the amount due them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without prejudice to the filing of illegal recruitment complaint against the
respondents pursuant to Section 6(i) of The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995 (Rep. Act No. 8042).
SERRANO v. GALLANT MARITIME SERVICES INC. & MARLOWE NAVIGATION CO., INC.
G.R. No. 167614. March 24, 2009

Facts:

Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd. (respondents) under a POEA-
approved Contract of Employment. On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance
and representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the end of April. However, respondents did not deliver
on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence, petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to
the Philippines on May.

Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998 up to March 19, 1999, but at
the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served only two (2) months and seven (7) days of his contract, leaving an
unexpired portion of nine (9) months and twenty-three (23) days.

Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for constructive dismissal and for payment of
his money claims. LA rendered the dismissal of petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits. Respondents appealed to
the NLRC to question the finding of the LA. Likewise, petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not
applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal
dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts.

30
 Petitioner also appealed to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple
Integrated Services, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission that in case of illegal dismissal, OFWs are entitled to their salaries
for the unexpired portion of their contracts. Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration; he questioned the
constitutionality of the subject clause. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the constitutional challenge
against the subject clause. CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary rate; however, the CA skirted the
constitutional issue raised by petitioner.

The last clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, to wit:

Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of
his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of
US$1,400.00 covering the period of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of his employment
contract or a total of US$4,200.00.

Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded
by the NLRC and the CA, he is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to his salaries for the entire
nine months and 23 days left of his employment contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00

Issue:
1.) Is petitioner entitled to his monetary claim which is the lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of his 12-
month employment contract, and not just for a period of three months?
2.) Should petitioner’s overtime and leave pay form part of the salary basis in the computation of his monetary award,
because these are fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his contract?

Held:
1.) Yes. Petitioner is awarded his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his employment contract consisting of nine
months and 23 days computed at the rate of US$1,400.00 per month. The subject clause “or for three months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional.

In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term employment who were illegally discharged were
treated alike in terms of the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their salaries for the entire
unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause,
illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their employment contract have since been differently
treated in that their money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is imposed on local workers with fixed-
term employment.

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the
monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of OFWs with
an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or local workers with fixed-
term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.

The Court further holds that the subject clause violates petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it deprives him
of property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing valid governmental purpose. The subject clause being
unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment
contract, pursuant to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.

2.) No. The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE
Department Order No. 33, series 1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which salary is understood as

31
the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work
“performed” in excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is compensation for any work “performed” on designated rest
days and holidays.

By the foregoing definition alone, there is no basis for the automatic inclusion of overtime and holiday pay in the
computation of petitioner's monetary award; unless there is evidence that he performed work during those periods.

G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.

FACTS:

 Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency. Responding
to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her application for a quality control job in
Taiwan.
 Joy’s application was accepted. Joy was later asked to sign a oneyear employment contract for a monthly
salary of NT$15,360.00. She alleged that Sameer Overseas Agency required her to pay a placement fee
of P70,000.00 when she signed the employment contract.
 Joy was deployed to work for TaiwanWacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her
employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year. In Taiwan, she was asked to
work as a cutter.
 Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal
informedJoy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that "she should immediately report to
their office to get her salary and passport." She was asked to "prepare for immediate repatriation."
 Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.
According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.
 Subsequently, Joy filed a complaint with the NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed that she
was illegally dismissed. She asked for the return of her placement fee, the withheld amount for
repatriation costs, payment of her salary for 23 months as well as moral and exemplary damages. She
identified Wacoal as Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’s foreign principal.
 Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that respondent's termination was due to her inefficiency,
negligence in her duties, and her "failure to comply with the work requirements [of] her foreign
[employer]." The agency also claimed that it did not ask for a placement fee of P70,000.00. As evidence, it
showed an official receipt bearing the amount of P20,360.00. Petitioner added that Wacoal's
accreditation with petitioner had already been transferred to the Pacific Manpower & Management
Services, Inc. (Pacific). Thus, petitioner asserts that it was already substituted by Pacific Manpower.
 Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal of petitioner’s claims against it. It alleged that there was no
employer-employee relationship between them. Therefore, the claims against it were outside the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. Pacific Manpower argued that the employment contract should first be
presented so that the employer’s contractual obligations might be identified. It further denied that it
assumed liability for petitioner’s illegal acts.
 Thereafter, the Labor Arbiter dismissed Joy’s complaint.
 Joy appealed to the NLRC.
 In a resolution, the NLRC declared that Joy was illegally dismissed. It reiterated the doctrine that the
burden of proof to show that the dismissal was based on a just or valid cause belongs to the employer. It
found that Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to prove that there were just causes for
termination. There was no sufficient proof to show that respondent was inefficient in her work and that

32
 she failed to comply with company requirements. Furthermore, procedural due process was not observed
in terminating respondent.
 The Commission denied the agency’s motion for reconsideration
 Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency caused the filing of a petition for certiorari
with the CA assailing the NLRC’s resolutions.
 The CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC with respect to the finding of illegal dismissal.
 Dissatisfied, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency filed this petition.

ISSUE:

WON, the CA erred when it affirmed the ruling of the NLRC finding respondent illegally dismissed.

RULING:

No. CA has validly affirmed the ruling of the NLRC.

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for causing Joy’s dismissal. The
employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law.

Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at work. 58 They may also
impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply with these standards. 59 Failure to comply may be a
just cause for their dismissal.60 Certainly, employers cannot be compelled to retain the services of an employee
who is guilty of acts that are inimical to the interest of the employer. 61 While the law acknowledges the plight and
vulnerability of workers, it does not "authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the employer." Management
prerogative is recognized in law and in our jurisprudence. This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is
"tempered with the employee’s right to security of tenure." 63Workers are entitled to substantive and procedural
due process before termination. They may not be removed from employment without a validor just cause as
determined by law and without going through the proper procedure. Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by
our Constitution.

Employees are not stripped of their security of tenure when they move to work in a different jurisdiction. With
respect to the rights of overseas Filipino workers, we follow the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place
where the contract is made) which governs in this jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of
employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules
and regulations, and other laws affecting labor apply in this case. Furthermore, settled is the rule that the courts of
the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. Herein the Philippines,
employment agreements are more than contractual in nature. The Constitution itself, in Article XIII, Section 3,
guarantees the special protection of workers, to wit:

The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full
employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self
organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike
in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage.
They shall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law. By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may only be terminated for a just or authorized
cause and after compliance with procedural due process requirements.

Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes of termination by the employer. Thus:

Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

33
 (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or
representative in connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

Petitioner’s allegation that respondent was inefficient in her work and negligent in her duties69 may, therefore,
constitute a just cause for termination under Article 282(b), but only if petitioner was able to prove it.

The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer. "The employer must
affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause." Failure to show that
there was valid or just cause for termination would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.

To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the employer has set
standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be judged; 2) the standards of conduct
and workmanship must have been communicated tothe employee; and 3) the communication was made at a
reasonable time prior to the employee’s performance assessment. This is similar to the law and jurisprudence on
probationary employees, which allow termination ofthe employee only when there is "just cause or when [the
probationary employee] fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made
known by the employer to the employee at the time of his [or her] engagement." 72

However, we do not see why the application of that ruling should be limited to probationary employment. That
rule is basic to the idea of security of tenure and due process, which are guaranteed to all employees, whether
their employment is probationary or regular. The pre-determined standards that the employer sets are the bases
for determining the probationary employee’s fitness, propriety, efficiency, and qualifications as a regular
employee. Due process requires that the probationary employee be informed of such standards at the time of his
or her engagement so he or she can adjust this or her character or workmanship accordingly. Proper adjustment to
fit the standards upon which the employee’s qualifications will be evaluated will increase one’s chances of being
positively assessed for regularization by his or her employer.

Assessing an employee’s work performance does not stop after regularization. The employer, on a regular basis,
determines if an employee is still qualified and efficient, based on work standards. Based on that determination,
and after complying with the due process requirements of notice and hearing, the employer may exercise its
management prerogative of terminating the employee found unqualified.

The regular employee must constantly attempt to prove to his or her employer that he or she meets all the
standards for employment. This time, however, the standards to be met are set for the purpose of retaining
employment or promotion. The employee cannot be expected to meet any standard of character or workmanship
if such standards were not communicated to him or her. Courts should remain vigilant on allegations of the
employer’s failure to communicatework standards that would govern one’s employment "if *these are+ to
discharge in good faith [their] duty to adjudicate." In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to
comply with her foreign employer’s work requirements and was inefficient in her work. No evidence was shown to
support such allegations. Petitioner did not even bother to specify what requirements were not met, what
efficiency standards were violated, or what particular acts of respondent constituted inefficiency.

34
There was also no showing that respondent was sufficiently informed of the standards against which her work
efficiency and performance were judged. The parties’ conflict as to the position held by respondent showed that
even the matter as basic as the job title was not clear. The bare allegations of petitioner are not sufficient to
support a claim that there is just cause for termination. There is no proof that respondent was legally terminated.
Respondent’s dismissal less than one year from hiring and her repatriation on the same day show not only failure
on the part of petitioner to comply with the requirement of the existence of just cause for termination. They
patently show that the employers did not comply with the due process requirement.

A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal. 75 The employer is
required to give the charged employee at least two written notices before termination. One of the written notices
must inform the employee of the particular acts that may cause his or her dismissal. The other notice must
"*inform+ the employee of the employer’s decision."78 Aside from the notice requirement, the employee must also
be given "an opportunity to be heard." Petitioner failed to comply with the twin notices and hearing requirements.
Respondent started working on June 26, 1997. She was told that she was terminated on July 14, 1997 effective on
the same day and barely a month from her first workday. She was also repatriated on the same day that she was
informed of her termination. The abruptness of the termination negated any finding that she was properly notified
and given the opportunity to be heard. Her constitutional right to due process of law was violated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED with modification. Petitioner Sameer
Overseas Placement Agency is ORDERED to pay respondent Joy C. Cabiles the amount equivalent to her salary for
the unexpired portion of her employment contract at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this
judgment. Petitioner is also ORDERED to reimburse respondent the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary and pay
respondent attorney's fees of NT$300.00 at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment.

YAP vs. THENAMARIS SHIP’S MANAGEMENT and INTERMARE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC., G.R. No. 179532
May 30, 2011 Sec. 10 of R.A. 8042 (pls.review)
OCTOBER 6, 2017

FACTS:

Claudio S. Yap was employed as electrician of the vessel, M/T SEASCOUT by Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc. in
behalf of its principal, Vulture Shipping Limited. The contract of employment entered into by Yap and Capt.
Francisco B. Adviento, the General Manager of Intermare, was for a duration of 12 months. On 23 August 2001,
Yap boarded M/T SEASCOUT and commenced his job as electrician. However, on or about 8 November 2001, the
vessel was sold. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) was informed about the sale on 6
December 2001 in a letter signed by Capt. Adviento. Yap, along with the other crewmembers, was informed by the
Master of their vessel that the same was sold and will be scrapped.

Yap received his seniority bonus, vacation bonus, extra bonus along with the scrapping bonus. However, with
respect to the payment of his wage, he refused to accept the payment of one-month basic wage. He insisted that
he was entitled to the payment of the unexpired portion of his contract since he was illegally dismissed from
employment. He alleged that he opted for immediate transfer but none was made. He then filed a complaint for
Illegal Dismissal with Damages and Attorney’s Fees before the Labor Arbiter.

The LA rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, finding the latter to have been constructively and illegally
dismissed by respondents. The NLRC affirmed the decision but held that instead of an award of salaries
corresponding to nine months, petitioner was only entitled to salaries for three months as provided under Section
10 of R.A. No. 8042. Petitioner however questions the award of wages and assails Sec. 10 of R.A. 8042 as
unconstitutional.

35
ISSUE: Is the 5th par. Sec 10 of R.A. 8042 violative of substantive due process?

RULING:

Yes.

The Court declared in Serrano vs. Gallant Maritime that the clause “or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” provided in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is unconstitutional
for being violative of the rights of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs) to equal protection of the laws. In an
exhaustive discussion of the intricacies and ramifications of the said clause, this Court, in Serrano, pertinently held:

The Court concludes that the subject clause contains a suspect classification in that, in the computation of the
monetary benefits of fixed-term employees who are illegally discharged, it imposes a 3-month cap on the claim of
OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in their contracts, but none on the claims of other OFWs or
local workers with fixed-term employment. The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens
it with a peculiar disadvantage.

Moreover, this Court held therein that the subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental
purpose; hence, the same violates not just therein petitioner’s right to equal protection, but also his right to
substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution

SKIPPERS UNITED PACIFIC, INC. VS. DOZA, G.R. NO. 175558, FEBRUARY 8, 2012

Facts:
Petitioner deployed De Gracia, Lata and Aprosta to work on board the vessel MV Wisdom Star.
On December 3 1998, Skippers alleges that De Garcia smelling strongly of alcohol, went to the cabin of Gabriel
Oleszek, MV Wisdom Stars’ Master. Skippers claims that he was rude and shouted noisily to the master. De Gracia
left the master’s cabin after a few minutes and was heard shouting very loudly somewhere down the corridors.
The incident was evidenced by the Captain’s Report sent on said date.
Furthermore, Skippers also claim that on January 22, 1999, Aprosta, De Gracia, Lata and Daza arrived in the
master’s cabin and demanded immediate repatriation because they were not satisfied with the ship. De Gracia, et
al. threatened that they may become crazy any moment and demanded for all outstanding payments due to them.
The incident is evidenced by a telex of Cosmoship MV Wisdom to skippers but had conflicting dates.
De Gracia claims that Skippers failed to remit their respective allotments, compelling them to vent their grievances
with the Romanian Seafarers Union. On January 28, 1999, the Filipino seafarers were unceremoniously discharged
and immediately repatriated. Upon arrival in the Philippines, they filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the LA.
The LA dismissed the seafarers’ complaint as the seafarers’ demand for immediate repatriation due to the
dissatisfaction with the ship is considered a voluntary pre-termination of employment. Such act was deemed akin
to resignation recognized under Article 285 of the LC. The LA gave credence to the telex of the master’s report that
the seafarers indeed demanded immediate repatriation.
The NLRC agreed with the LA’s decision.
The CA however reversed the LA’s and the NLRC’s decision. The Court deemed the telex message as a self-serving
document that does not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify the conclusion that petitioners indeed voluntarily
demanded their immediate repatriation.
Aggrieved, Skippers appeals the case with the Supreme Court.

36
Issue:
Whether or not the seafarer’s demand for immediate repatriation can be considered an act of voluntary
resignation.

Held:
For a worker's dismissal to be considered valid, it must comply with both procedural and substantive due process.
The legality of the manner of dismissal constitutes procedural due process, while the legality of the act of dismissal
constitutes substantive due process.
Procedural due process in dismissal cases consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing. The employer
must furnish the employee with two written notices before the termination of employment can be effected: (1)
the first notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2)
the second notice informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. Before the issuance of the
second notice, the requirement of a hearing must be complied with by giving the worker an opportunity to be
heard. It is not necessary that an actual hearing be conducted.
Substantive due process, on the other hand, requires that dismissal by the employer be made under a just or
authorized cause under Articles 282 to 284 of the Labor Code.
In this case, there was no written notice furnished to De Gracia, et al., regarding the cause of their dismissal.
Cosmoship furnished a written notice (telex) to Skippers, the local manning agency, claiming that De Gracia, et al.,
were repatriated because the latter voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts. This telex was given credibility and
weight by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC in deciding that there was pre-termination of the employment contract
"akin to resignation" and no illegal dismissal. However, as correctly ruled by the CA, the telex message is "a biased
and self-serving document that does not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence." If, indeed, De Gracia, et
al., voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts, then De Gracia, et al., should have submitted their written
resignations.
Article 285 of the Labor Code recognizes termination by the employee of the employment contract by "serving
written notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance." Given that provision, the law contemplates the
requirement of a written notice of resignation. In the absence of a written resignation, it is safe to presume that
the employer terminated the seafarers. In addition, the telex message relied upon by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC
bore conflicting dates of 22 January 1998 and 22 January 1999, giving doubt to the veracity and authenticity of the
document. In 22 January 1998, De Gracia, et al., were not even employed yet by the foreign principal.

STOLT NIELSEN TRANSPORTATION GROUP & CHUNG GAI V. SULPECIO MEDEQUILLO

Actual deployment of the seafarer is a suspensive condition for the commencement of the employment. We agree
with petitioners on such point. However, even without actual deployment, the perfected contract gives rise to
obligations on the part of petitioners.

FACTS. On 6 March 1995, SulpecioMadequillo (respondent) filed a complaint before the Adjudication Office of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) against Stolt Nielsen et al for illegal dismissal under a first
contract and for failure to deploy under a second contract. Sulpecio alleged that :

1. On 6 November 1991(First Contract), he was hired by Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services, Inc on behalf of
its principal Chung-Gai Ship Management of Panama as Third Assistant Engineer on board the
vessel “Stolt Aspiration” for a period of nine (9) months;
2. He would be paid with a monthly basic salary of $808.00 and a fixed overtime pay of $404.00 or a
total of $1,212.00 per month during the employment period commencing on 6 November
1991;
3. On 8 November 1991, he joined the vessel MV “Stolt Aspiration”;
4. On February 1992 or for nearly three (3) months of rendering service and while the vessel was at
Batangas, he was ordered by the ship’s master to disembark the vessel and repatriated back

37
 to Manila for no reason or explanation;
5. Upon his return to Manila, he immediately proceeded to the petitioner’s office where he was
transferred employment with another vessel named MV “Stolt Pride” under the same terms
and conditions of the First Contract;
6. On 23 April 1992, the Second Contract was noted and approved by the POEA;
7. The POEA, without knowledge that he was not deployed with the vessel, certified the Second
Employment Contract on 18 September 1992.
8. Despite the commencement of the Second Contract on 21 April 1992, petitioners failed to deploy
him with the vessel MV “Stolt Pride”;
9. He made a follow-up with the petitioner but the same refused to comply with the Second
Employment Contract.
10. On 22 December 1994, he demanded for his passport, seaman’s book and other employment
documents. However, he was only allowed to claim the said documents in exchange of his
signing a document;
11. He was constrained to sign the document involuntarily because without these documents, he
could not seek employment from other agencies.

He prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees for his illegal dismissal and in view
of the Petitioners’ bad faith in not complying with the Second Contract.

The case was transferred to the Labor Arbiter of the DOLE upon the effectivity of the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.

Labor Arbiter: respondent was constructively dismissed by the petitioners. The petitioners appealed. NLRC
affirmed with modifications.The NLRC upheld the finding of unjustified termination of contract for failure on the
part of the petitioners to present evidence that would justify their non-deployment of the respondent.It denied
the claim of the petitioners that the monetary award should be limited only to three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term of the contract. It ruled that the factual incidents material to the case transpired within 1991-
1992 or before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995
which provides for such limitation.

However, the NLRC upheld the reduction of the monetary award with respect to the deletion of the overtime pay
due to the non-deployment of the respondent.

Stolt’s main defense: the first employment contract between them and the private respondent is
different from and independent of the second contract subsequently executed upon repatriation of
respondent to Manila.

Held/ Ratio:

(1) The second contract novated the first.

Novation is the extinguishment of an obligation by the substitution or change of the obligation by a

subsequent one which extinguishes or modifies the first, either by changing the object or principal conditions, or,
by substituting another in place of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor. In
order for novation to take place, the concurrence of the following requisites is indispensable:
1. There must be a previous valid obligation,
2. There must be an agreement of the parties concerned to a new contract,
3. There must be the extinguishment of the old contract, and
19
4. There must be the validity of the new contract.

38
On the issue on novation, the SC adopted the findings of the LA and the CA:
It is evident that novation took place in this particular case. The parties impliedly extinguished
the first contract by agreeing to enter into the second contract to placate Medequillo, Jr. who
was unexpectedly dismissed and repatriated to Manila… The records also reveal that the 2nd
contract extinguished the first contract by changing its object or principal. These contracts
were for overseas employment aboard different vessels. The first contract was for
employment aboard the MV “Stolt Aspiration” while the second contract involved working in
another vessel, the MV “Stolt Pride.” Petitioners and Madequillo, Jr. accepted the terms and
conditions of the second contract. Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the first contract was a
“previous valid contract” since it had not yet been terminated at the time of Medequillo, Jr.’s
repatriation to Manila. The legality of his dismissal had not yet been resolved with finality.
Undoubtedly, he was still employed under the first contract when he negotiated with
petitioners on the second contract. As such, the NLRC correctly ruled that petitioners could
only be held liable under the second contract.

With the finding that respondent “was still employed under the first contract when he negotiated with
petitioners on the second contract” novation became an unavoidable conclusion.

(2) On the issue of prescription: Recovery of damages under the first contract was already time barred.

We need not dwell on the issue of prescription. It was settled by the Court of Appeals with its ruling that recovery
of damages under the first contract was already time-barred. Thus:

Accordingly, the prescriptive period of three (3) years within which Medequillo
Jr. may initiate money claims under the 1st contract commenced on the date of his
repatriation. xxx The start of the three (3) year prescriptive period must therefore be
reckoned on February 1992, which by Medequillo Jr.’s own admission was the date of his
repatriation to Manila. It was at this point in time that Medequillo Jr.’s cause of action
already accrued under the first contract. He had until February 1995 to pursue a case for
illegal dismissal and damages arising from the 1st contract. With the filing of his Complaint-
Affidavit on March 6, 1995, which was clearly beyond the prescriptive period, the cause of
action under the 1st contract was already time-barred.

(3) MAIN ISSUE: Even with the non-deployment of Sulpecio, he still has right of action against
petitioner.

The issue that proceeds from the fact of novation is the consequence of the non-deployment of
respondent.

(a) Actual deployment is a suspensive condition for the commencement of the employment.

The petitioners argue that under the POEA Contract, actual deployment of the seafarer is a
suspensive condition for the commencement of the employment. We agree with petitioners on such
point. However, even without actual deployment, the perfected contract gives rise to obligations on
the part of petitioners.

The POEA Standard Employment Contract provides that employment shall commence “upon the
actual departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport in the port of hire.” We adhere to the
terms and conditions of the contract so as to credit the valid prior stipulations of the parties before the

39
 controversy started.

(b) This does not mean however that the seafarer has no remedy in case of non-deployment.

Thus, even if by the standard contract employment commences only “upon actual departure of the
seafarer”, this does not mean that the seafarer has no remedy in case of non-deployment without
any valid reason. Parenthetically, the contention of the petitioners of the alleged poor performance of
respondent while on board the first ship MV “Stolt Aspiration” cannot be sustained to justify the non-
deployment, for no evidence to prove the same was presented.

We rule that distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the
commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this
case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed
on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein. The
commencement of the employer-employee relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken place
had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any
employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract
was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action
against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to be
deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.

(c) Penalty of reprimand is the not the proper penalty.

The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment 35 dated 31 May 1991 provides for
the consequence and penalty against in case of non-deployment of the seafarer without any valid
reason.

The appellate court correctly ruled that the penalty of reprimand36 provided under Rule IV, Part VI of
the POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-based Overseas
Workers is not applicable in this case. The breach of contract happened on February 1992 and the law
applicable at that time was the 1991 POEA Rules and Regulations Governing Overseas Employment.
The penalty for non-deployment as discussed is suspension or cancellation of license or fine.

(4) Thus, respondent is entitled to an award of actual damages based on RA 8042 in relation to the NCC.

Now, the question to be dealt with is how will the seafarer be compensated by reason of the
unreasonable non-deployment of the petitioners?

The POEA Rules Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Seafarers do not provide for the award
of damages to be given in favor of the employees. The claim provided by the same law refers to a valid contractual
claim for compensation or benefits arising from employer-employee relationship(eh in this case nga, no E-E-R yet)
or for any personal injury, illness or death at levels provided for within the terms and conditions of employment of
seafarers. However, the absence of the POEA Rules with regard to the payment of damages to the affected
seafarer does not mean that the seafarer is precluded from claiming the same. The sanctions provided for non-
deployment do not end with the suspension or cancellation of license or fine and the return of all documents at no
cost to the worker. As earlier discussed, they do not pretend a seafarer from instituting an action for damages
against the employer or agency which has failed to deploy him.

We thus decree the application of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act) which
provides for money claims by reason of a contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment. The law
provides:

40
 Sec. 10. Money Claims. – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of
the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of
any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims
for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.

Applying the rules on actual damages, Article 2199 of the New Civil Code provides that one is entitled
to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Respondent is
thus liable to pay petitioner actual damages in the form of the loss of nine (9) months’ worth of salary as provided
in the contract.This is but proper because of the non-deployment of respondent without just cause.

ESTATE OF NELSON R. DULAY, represented by his wife MERRIDY JANE P. DULAY, Petitioner, vs. ABOITIZ JEBSEN
MARITIME, INC. and GENERAL CHARTERERS, INC., Respondents.

G.R. No. 172642; June 13, 2012

Justice PERALTA; Third Division

FACTS:

Nelson was employed by General Charterers Inc. (GCI), a subsidiary of Aboitiz Jebsen Maritime Inc. He initially
worked as an ordinary seaman and later as bosun on a contractual basis. Nelson was detailed in GCIs’ vessel, the
MV Kickapoo Belle. Twenty five days after the completion of his employment contract, Nelson died due to acute
renal failure. Nelson was a bona fide member of the Associated Marine Officers and Seaman’s Union of the
Philippines (AMOSUP), GCI’s collective bargaining agent. Nelson’s widow, Merridy Jane, thereafter claimed for
death benefits through the grievance procedure of the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between AMOSUP
and GCI. However, the grievance procedure was "declared deadlocked" as the latter refused to grant the benefits
sought by the widow.

Merridy Jane filed a complaint with the NLRC Sub-Regional Arbitration Board in General Santos City against GCI for
death and medical benefits and damages. Joven Mar, Nelson’s brother, received P20,000.00 from GCI pursuant to
article 20(A)2 of the CBA and signed a "Certification" acknowledging receipt of the amount and releasing AMOSUP
from further liability. Merridy Jane contended that she is entitled to the aggregate sum of Ninety Thousand Dollars
($90,000.00) pursuant to [A]rticle 20 (A)1 of the CBA.

The Labor Arbiter took cognizance of the case by virtue of Article 217 (a), paragraph 6 of the Labor Code and the
existence of a reasonable causal connection between the employer-employee relationship and the claim asserted.
It ordered the GCI to pay P4,621,300.00, the equivalent of US$90,000.00 less P20,000.00, at the time of judgment.
The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision as to the grant of death benefits under the CBA but reversed the
latter’s ruling as to the proximate cause of Nelson’s death. The CA ruled that jurisdiction belongs to the voluntary
arbitrator and not the labor arbiter and the money claim involves the interpretation and application of CBA.

41
ISSUE:

Who has jurisdiction over interpretation and implementation of CBA involving Overseas Filipino Workers?

LAW:

Section 10 of R.A. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995; Rule
VII, Section 7 of the present Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended by R. A. No. 10022; Article , 217(c) & 261 of the Labor Code

RULING:

R.A. 8042 is a special law governing overseas Filipino workers. However, there is no specific provision
thereunder which provides for jurisdiction over disputes or unresolved grievances regarding the interpretation or
implementation of a CBA. Section 10 of R.A. 8042 simply speaks, in general, of “claims arising out of an employer-
employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment
including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms of damages.” On the other hand, Articles 217(c) and
261 of the Labor Code are very specific in stating that voluntary arbitrators have jurisdiction over cases arising
from the interpretation or implementation of collective bargaining agreements. In the present case, the basic issue
raised by Merridy Jane in her complaint filed with the NLRC is: which provision of the subject CBA applies insofar as
death benefits due to the heirs of Nelson are concerned. This issue clearly involves the interpretation or
implementation of the said CBA. Thus, the specific or special provisions of the Labor Code govern.

CBA is the law or contract between the parties. Article 13.1 of the CBA entered into by and between respondent
GCI and AMOSUP provides that the Company and the Union agree that in case of dispute or conflict in the
interpretation or application of any of the provisions of this Agreement, or enforcement of Company policies, the
same shall be settled through negotiation, conciliation or voluntary arbitration. The provisions of the CBA are in
consonance with Rule VII, Section 7 of the present Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, as amended by Republic Act No. 10022, which states that for OFWs
with collective bargaining agreements, the case shall be submitted for voluntary arbitration in accordance with
Articles 261 and 262 of the Labor Code. With respect to disputes involving claims of Filipino seafarers wherein the
parties are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, the dispute or claim should be submitted to the
jurisdiction of a voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators. It is only in the absence of a collective bargaining
agreement that parties may opt to submit the dispute to either the NLRC or to voluntary arbitration.

TOMAS VS. SALAC, ET AL., G.R. NO. 152642, NOVEMBER 13, 2012 (pls.review)

685 SCRA 245 – Labor Law – Labor Standards – Constitutionality of Sections 6, 7, 9, 10, 29, and 30 of the Migrant
Workers Act or R.A. No. 8042

42
This case is a consolidation of the following cases: G.R. No. 152642, G.R. No. 152710, G.R. No. 167590, G.R. Nos.
182978-79, and G.R. Nos. 184298-99.
G.R. No. 152642 and G.R. No. 152710
In G.R. No. 152642, in 2002, Rey Salac et al, who are recruiters deploying workers abroad, sought to enjoin the
Secretary of Labor, Patricia Sto. Tomas, the POEA, and TESDA, from regulating the activities of private recruiters.
Salac et al invoked Sections 29 and 30 of the Republic Act 8042 or the Migrant Workers Act which provides that
recruitment agency in the Philippines shall be deregulated one year from the passage of the said law; that 5 years
thereafter, recruitment should be fully deregulated. RA 8042 was passed in 1995, hence, Salac et al insisted that as
early as 2000, the aforementioned government agencies should have stopped issuing memorandums and circulars
regulating the recruitment of workers abroad.
Sto. Tomas then questioned the validity of Sections 29 and 30.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 29 and 30 are valid.
HELD: The issue became moot and academic. It appears that during the pendency of this case in 2007, RA 9422 (An
Act to Strengthen the Regulatory Functions of the POEA) was passed which repealed Sections 29 and 30 of RA
8042.
G.R. 167590
In this case, the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) questioned the validity of the following
provisions of RA 8042:
a. Section 6, which defines the term “illegal recruitment”. PASEI claims that the definition by the law is vague as it
fails to distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters;
b. Section 7, which penalizes violations against RA 8042. PASEI argues that the penalties for simple violations
against RA 8042, i.e., mere failure to render report or obstructing inspection are already punishable for at least 6
years and 1 day imprisonment an a fine of at least P200k. PASEI argues that such is unreasonable;
c. Section 9, which allows the victims of illegal recruitment to have the option to either file the criminal case where
he or she resides or at the place where the crime was committed. PASEI argues that this provision is void for being
contrary to the Rules of Court which provides that criminal cases must be prosecuted in the place where the crime
or any of its essential elements were committed;
d. Section 10, which provides that corporate officers and directors of a company found to be in violation of RA
8042 shall be themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims
and damages. PASEI claims that this automatic liability imposed upon corporate officers and directors is void for
being violative of due process.
RTC Judge Jose Paneda of Quezon City agreed with PASEI and he declared the said provisions of RA 8042 as void.
Secretary Sto. Tomas petitioned for the annulment of the RTC judgment.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 6, 7, 9, and 10 of RA 8042 are void.
HELD: No, they are valid provisions.
a. Section 6: The law clearly and unambiguously distinguished between licensed and non-licensed recruiters. By its
terms, persons who engage in “canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring
workers” without the appropriate government license or authority are guilty of illegal recruitment whether or not
they commit the wrongful acts enumerated in that section. On the other hand, recruiters who engage in the
canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate government license or authority, are guilty of
illegal recruitment only if they commit any of the wrongful acts enumerated in Section 6.
b. Section 7: The penalties are valid. Congress is well within its right to prescribed the said penalties. Besides, it is
not the duty of the courts to inquire into the wisdom behind the law.

43
c. Section 9: The Rules on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 15(a) of Rule 110, itself, provides that the rule on
venue when it comes to criminal cases is subject to existing laws. Therefore, there is nothing arbitrary when
Congress provided an alternative venue for violations of a special penal law like RA 8042.
d. Section 10: The liability of corporate officers and directors is not automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily
liable with their company, there must be a finding that they were remiss in directing the affairs of that company,
such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.
G.R. 182978-79, and G.R. 184298-99
In this case, Jasmin Cuaresma, a nurse working in Saudi Arabia was found dead. Her parents received insurance
benefits from the OWWA (Overseas Workers Welfare Administration). But when they found out based on an
autopsy conducted in the Philippines that Jasmin was raped and thereafter killed, her parents (Simplicio and Mila
Cuaresma) filed for death and insurance benefits with damages from the recruitment and placement agency which
handled Jasmin (Becmen Service Exporter and Promotion, Inc.).
The case reached the Supreme Court where the Supreme Court ruled that since Becmen was negligent in
investigating the true cause of death of Jasmin ( a violation of RA 8042), it shall be liable for damages. The Supreme
Court also ruled that pursuant to Section 10 of RA 8042, the directors and officers of Becmen are
themselves jointly and solidarily liable with Becmen.
EufrocinaGumabay and the other officers of Becmen filed a motion for leave to intervene. They aver that Section
10 is invalid.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section is invalid.
HELD: No. As earlier discussed, Section 10 is valid. The liability of Gumabay et al is not automatic. However, the SC
reconsidered its earlier ruling that Gumabay et al are solidarily and jointly liable with Becmen there being no
evidence on record which shows that they were personally involved in their company’s particular actions or
omissions in Jasmin’s case.
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM (FOR WAGES AND OTHER BENEFITS)

G.R. No. 179652 May 8, 2009

PEOPLE’S BROADCASTING (BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.), Petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION
VII, and JANDELEON JUEZAN, Respondents.

FACTS: The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the decision and the resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
The petition traces its origins to a complaint filed by Jandeleon Juezan (respondent) against People’s Broadcasting
Service, Inc. (Bombo Radyo Phils., Inc) (petitioner) for illegal deduction, non-payment of service incentive leave,
13th month pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment of
wages and non-coverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth (non-diminution of benefits in the amount allegedly
6K) before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City.2 On the basis of
the complaint, the DOLE conducted a plant level inspection on 23 September 2003. Labor Inspector wrote under
the heading “Findings/Recommendations” “non-diminution of benefits” and “Note: Respondent deny employer-
employee relationship with the complainant- see Notice of Inspection results.”

PETITIONER’S POSITION: Management representative informed that complainant is a drama talent hired on a per
drama ” participation basis” hence no employer-employeeship [sic] existed between them. As proof of this,
management presented photocopies of cash vouchers, billing statement, employments of specific undertaking (a
contract between the talent director & the complainant), summary of billing of drama production etc. They (mgt.)
has [sic] not control of the talent if he ventures into another contract w/ other broadcasting industries.

44
RULING OF DOLE REGIONAL DIRECTOR: respondent is an employee of petitioner, and that the former is entitled to
his money claims amounting toP203,726.30. MR denied; Appeal with the DOLE Secretary, dismissed the appeal on
the ground that petitioner did not post a cash or surety bond and instead submitted a Deed of Assignment of Bank
Deposit.

APPEAL WITH THE CA: claiming that it was denied due process when the DOLE Secretary disregarded the evidence
it presented and failed to give it the opportunity to refute the claims of respondent. Petitioner maintained that
there is no employer-employee relationship had ever existed between it and respondent because it was the drama
directors and producers who paid, supervised and disciplined respondent. It also added that the case was beyond
the jurisdiction of the DOLE and should have been considered by the labor arbiter because respondent’s claim
exceeded P5,000.00. CA denied.

WITH THE SC: petitioner argues that the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), and not the DOLE Secretary,
has jurisdiction over respondent’s claim, in view of Articles 217 and 128 of the Labor Code.
RESPONDENT’S POSITION: respondent posits that the Court of Appeals did not abuse its discretion. He
invokes Republic Act No. 7730, which “removes the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his
duly authorized representatives, from the effects of the restrictive provisions of Article 129 and 217 of the Labor
Code, regarding the confinement of jurisdiction based on the amount of claims.”; and wrong mode of appeal.

ISSUE: WON the Secretary of Labor have the power to determine the existence of an employer-employee
relationship.

HELD: No
To resolve this pivotal issue, one must look into the extent of the visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE
found in Article 128 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act 7730. It reads:

Article 128 (b) Notwithstanding the provisions of Articles 129 and 217 of this Code to the contrary, and in cases
where the relationship of employer-employee still exists, the Secretary of Labor and Employment or his duly
authorized representatives shall have the power to issue compliance orders to give effect to the labor standards
provisions of this Code and other labor legislation based on the findings of labor employment and enforcement
officers or industrial safety engineers made in the course of inspection xxx

The provision is quite explicit that the visitorial and enforcement power of the DOLE comes into play only “in
cases when the relationship of employer-employee still exists.” Of course, a person’s entitlement to labor
standard benefits under the labor laws presupposes the existence of employer-employee relationship in the
first place.The clause signifies that the employer-employee relationship must have existed even before the
emergence of the controversy. Necessarily, the DOLE’s power does not apply in two instances, namely: (a) where
the employer-employee relationship has ceased; and (b) where no such relationship has ever existed.
The first situation is categorically covered by Sec. 3, Rule 11 of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards
Cases15 issued by the DOLE Secretary. It reads:

Rule II MONEY CLAIMS ARISING FROM COMPLAINT/ROUTINE INSPECTION

Sec. 3. Complaints where no employer-employee relationship actually exists. Where employer-employee
relationship no longer exists by reason of the fact that it has already been severed, claims for payment of
monetary benefits fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the labor arbiters. Accordingly, if on the face
of the complaint, it can be ascertained that employer-employee relationship no longer exists, the case, whether
accompanied by an allegation of illegal dismissal, shall immediately be endorsed by the Regional Director to the
appropriate branch of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Clearly the law accords a prerogative to the NLRC over the claim when the employer-employee relationship has
terminated or such relationship has not arisen at all. The reason is obvious. In the second situation especially, the
existence of an employer-employee relationship is a matter which is not easily determinable from an ordinary
inspection, necessarily so, because the elements of such a relationship are not verifiable from a mere ocular

45
examination. The determination of which should be comprehensive and intensive and therefore best left to the
specialized quasi-judicial body that is the NLRC.

It can be assumed that the DOLE in the exercise of its visitorial and enforcement power somehow has to make a
determination of the existence of an employer-employee relationship. Such prerogatival determination, however,
cannot be coextensive with the visitorial and enforcement power itself. Indeed, such determination is merely
preliminary, incidental and collateral to the DOLE’s primary function of enforcing labor standards provisions. The
determination of the existence of employer-employee relationship is still primarily lodged with the NLRC.

Thus, before the DOLE may exercise its powers under Article 128, two important questions must be resolved: (1)
Does the employer-employee relationship still exist, or alternatively, was there ever an employer-employee
relationship to speak of; and (2) Are there violations of the Labor Code or of any labor law?

A mere assertion of absence of employer-employee relationship does not deprive the DOLE of jurisdiction over the
claim under Article 128 of the Labor Code. At least a prima facie showing of such absence of relationship, as in this
case, is needed to preclude the DOLE from the exercise of its power.

Without a doubt, petitioner, since the inception of this case had been consistent in maintaining that respondent
is not its employee. Certainly, a preliminary determination, based on the evidence offered, and noted by the
Labor Inspector during the inspection as well as submitted during the proceedings before the Regional Director
puts in genuine doubt the existence of employer-employee relationship. From that point on, the prudent
recourse on the part of the DOLE should have been to refer respondent to the NLRC for the proper dispensation
of his claims.Furthermore, as discussed earlier, even the evidence relied on by the Regional Director in his order
are mere self-serving declarations of respondent, and hence cannot be relied upon as proof of employer-employee
relationship.

Petition GRANTED.
___________
Other Issues (Just in case it will be asked)
 Aside from lack of jurisdiction, there is another cogent reason to to set aside the Regional Director’s 27
February 2004 Order. A careful study of the case reveals that the said Order, which found respondent as an
employee of petitioner and directed the payment of respondent’s money claims, is not supported by
substantial evidence, and was even made in disregard of the evidence on record.
 Even if the labor inspector had noted petitioner’s manifestation and documents in the Notice of
Inspection Results, it is clear that he did not give much credence to said evidence, as he did not find the need
to investigate the matter further. The labor inspector could have exerted a bit more effort and looked into
petitioner’s payroll, for example, or its roll of employees, or interviewed other employees in the premises.
 The Court further examined the records and discovered to its dismay that even the Regional Director
turned a blind eye to the evidence presented by petitioner and relied instead on the self-serving claims of
respondent.

REPONDENT’S CLAIM IN HIS POSITION PAPER: hired by petitioner in September 1996 as a radio talent/spinner,
working from 8:00 am until 5 p.m., six days a week, on a gross rate of P60.00 per script, earning an average
of P15,0000.00 per month, payable on a semi-monthly basis xxx In support of his position paper, respondent
attached a photocopy of an identification card purportedly issued by petitioner, bearing respondent’s picture and
name with the designation “Spinner”; at the back of the I.D., the following is written: ” This certifies that the card
holder is a duly Authorized MEDIA Representative of BOMBO RADYO PHILIPPINES …
Certificates were also submitted by respondent to support his claim.

EXISTENCE OF EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE RELATIONSHIP: Furthermore, respondent’s pieces of evidence—the

identification card and the certification issued by petitioner’s Greman Solante— are not even determinative of an
employer-employee relationship. The certification, issued upon the request of respondent, specifically stated that

46
“MR. JANDELEON JUEZAN is a program employee of PEOPLE’S BROADCASTING SERVICES, INC. (DYMF- Bombo
Radyo Cebu),” it is not therefore “crystal clear that complainant is a station employee rather than a program
employee hence entitled to all the benefits appurtenant thereto,”26 as found by the DOLE Regional Director.
Respondent should be bound by his own evidence. Moreover, the classification as to whether one is a “station
employee” and “program employee,” as lifted from Policy Instruction No. 40,27 dividing the workers in the
broadcast industry into only two groups is not binding on this Court, especially when the classification has no basis
either in law or in fact.

Even the identification card purportedly issued by petitioner is not proof of employer-employee relationship since
it only identified respondent as an “Authorized Representative of Bombo Radyo…,” and not as an employee.
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: It has long been established that in administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings,
substantial evidence is sufficient as a basis for judgment on the existence of employer-employee relationship.
Substantial evidence, which is the quantum of proof required in labor cases, is “that amount of relevant evidence
which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.”

 In the instant case, save for respondent’s self-serving allegations and self-defeating evidence, there is no
substantial basis to warrant the Regional Director’s finding that respondent is an employee of petitioner.
RE APPEAL BOND: The purpose of an appeal bond is to ensure, during the period of appeal, against any occurrence
that would defeat or diminish recovery by the aggrieved employees under the judgment if subsequently
affirmed.40 The Deed of Assignment in the instant case, like a cash or surety bond, serves the same purpose. First,
the Deed of Assignment constitutes not just a partial amount, but rather the entire award in the appealed Order.
Second, it is clear from the Deed of Assignment that the entire amount is under the full control of the bank, and
not of petitioner, and is in fact payable to the DOLE Regional Office, to be withdrawn by the same office after it
had issued a writ of execution. For all intents and purposes, the Deed of Assignment in tandem with the Letter
Agreement and Cash Voucher is as good as cash. Third, the Court finds that the execution of the Deed of
Assignment, the Letter Agreement and the Cash Voucher were made in good faith, and constituted clear
manifestation of petitioner’s willingness to pay the judgment amount.

MODE OF APPEAL: it is settled, as a general proposition, that the availability of an appeal does not foreclose
recourse to the extraordinary remedies, such as certiorari and prohibition, where appeal is not adequate or equally
beneficial, speedy and sufficient xxx
This Court has even recognized that a recourse to certiorari is proper not only where there is a clear deprivation of
petitioner’s fundamental right to due process, but so also where other special circumstances warrant immediate
and more direct action. After all, this Court has previously ruled that the extraordinary writ of certiorari will lie if it
is satisfactorily1avvphiestablished that the tribunal had acted capriciously and whimsically in total disregard of
evidence material to or even decisive of the controversy

PEOPLE'S BROADCASTING SERVICE (BOMBO RADYO PHILS., INC.), Petitioner, vs.THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, DOLE REGION VII, and JANDELEON
JUEZAN, Respondents.
G.R. No. 179652; March 6, 2012
Justice VELASCO, JR.; EN BANC

FACTS:

Private respondent Jandeleon Juezan filed a complaint against petitioner with the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office No. VII, Cebu City, for illegal deduction, nonpayment of service incentive
leave, 13th month pay, premium pay for holiday and rest day and illegal diminution of benefits, delayed payment
of wages and noncoverage of SSS, PAG-IBIG and Philhealth. The DOLE Regional Director found that private
respondent was an employee of petitioner, and was entitled to his money claims. The Acting DOLE Secretary
dismissed petitioner’s appeal on technical grounds. The CA held that DOLE Secretary had jurisdiction over the

47
matter, as the jurisdictional limitation imposed by Article 129 of the Labor Code on the power of the DOLE
Secretary under Art. 128(b) had been repealed by R.A. 7730.
The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of CA, and dismissed the complaint against
petitioner. The Court found that there was no employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private
respondent. It was held that while the DOLE may make a determination of the existence of an employer-employee
relationship, this function could not be co-extensive with the visitorial and enforcement power provided in Art.
128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730. The NLRC is the primary agency in determining the existence of
an employer-employee relationship.
The Public Attorney’s Office sought clarification as to when the visitorial and enforcement power of the
DOLE be not considered as co-extensive with the power to determine the existence of an employer-employee
relationship. The DOLE sought clarification as well, as to the extent of its visitorial and enforcement power under
the Labor Code, as amended.

ISSUE:
Is DOLE empowered to determine the existence of employer-employee relationship?

LAW:
Article 128, 129, 217 of the Labor Code as amended by R.A. 7730.

RULING:
Under Art. 128(b) of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 7730, the DOLE is fully empowered to
make a determination as to the existence of an employer-employee relationship in the exercise of its visitorial and
enforcement power, subject to judicial review, not by the NLRC. If a complaint is brought before the DOLE to give
effect to the labor standards provisions of the Labor Code or other labor legislation, and there is a finding by the
DOLE that there is an existing employer-employee relationship, the DOLE exercises jurisdiction to the exclusion of
the NLRC. If the DOLE finds that there is no employer-employee relationship, the jurisdiction is properly with the
NLRC. If a complaint is filed with the DOLE, and it is accompanied by a claim for reinstatement, the jurisdiction is
properly with the Labor Arbiter, under Art. 217(3) of the Labor Code, which provides that the Labor Arbiter has
original and exclusive jurisdiction over those cases involving wages, rates of pay, hours of work, and other terms
and conditions of employment, if accompanied by a claim for reinstatement.
In the present case, the finding of the DOLE Regional Director that there was an employer-employee
relationship has been subjected to review by the Supreme Court, with the finding being that there was no
employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private respondent, based on the evidence presented.
The DOLE had no jurisdiction over the case, as there was no employer-employee relationship present. Thus, the
dismissal of the complaint against petitioner is proper.
GEORGE A. ARRIOLAvs.PILIPINO STAR .NGAYON, INC. and/or MIGUEL G. BELMONTE
G.R. No. 175689 August 13, 2014
 A columnist whose column is removed by the newspaper from publication is not ipso facto terminated
from work by the newspaper company.
 Money claims arising from employer-employee relationship: covered by Article 291 of the Labor Code.
 Money claims, such as backwages, consequent to an illegal dismissal case: covered by Article 1146 of the
Civil Code.
FACTS:

George Arriola was a column writer for the newspaper Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. since 1986. His column thereat
was “Tinig ng Pamilyang OFWs”.

48
On November 15, 2002, he filed a case for illegal dismissal against Pilipino Star as he averred that on November 15,
1999, he was arbitrarily dismissed when his column was removed from publication by Pilipino Star.

In its defense, Pilipino Star argued that they never removed Arriola; that it was Arriola who abandoned his work
because he went on to write for a rival newpaper, Imbestigador.

Labor arbiter: ruled in favor of Pilipino Star. The labor arbiter held that Arriola’s case was filed out of time as it was
filed three years and one day from the date he was allegedly illegally dismissed. The labor arbiter cited Art. 291 of
the Labor Code:

Art. 291. MONEY CLAIMS. All money claims arising from employer-employee relations accruing during the
effectivity of this Code shall be filed within three (3) years from the time the cause of action accrued; otherwise
they shall be forever barred.

NLRC: sustained the Labor Arbiter's findings and affirmed in toto the decision. The Commission likewise denied
Arriola's motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

CA: Arriola raised a factual issue "beyond the province of certiorari to resolve." Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals
resolved the factual issue "in the interest of substantial justice."
Arriola was not illegally dismissed. Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. had the management prerogative to determine which
columns to maintain in its newspaper. Its removal of "Tinig ng Pamilyang OFWs" from publication did not mean
that it illegally dismissed Arriola. His employment, according to the appellate court, did not depend on the
existence of the column.

The appellate court enumerated the following factual findings belying Arriola's claim of illegal dismissal:

In his complaint, Arriola alleged that he did not receive his salary for the period covering November 1,
1999 to November 30, 1999. This implied that he had worked for the whole month of November 1999.
a)
However, this was contrary to his claim that Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. dismissed him on November 15,
1999.

Sometime in 1999, an Aurea Reyes charged Arriola with libel. Pilipino Star Ngayon Inc.'s counsel
b) represented Arriola in that case and filed a counter-affidavit on November 24, 1999, nine days after
Arriola's alleged illegal dismissal.

c) Pilipino Star Ngayon, Inc. never sent Arriola any notice of dismissal or termination.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Arriola’s suit involves a money claim contemplated by Art. 291 of the Labor Code.

HELD:

No. Art. 291 of the Labor Code only covers the following claims:

1. overtime pay

2. holiday pay

49
 3. service incentive leave pay

4. bonuses

5. salary differentials

6. illegal deductions by an employer, and

7. money claims arising from seafarer contracts.

It does not cover “money claims” consequent to an illegal dismissal such as backwages. It also does not cover
claims for damages due to illegal dismissal. These claims are governed by Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which provides:

Art. 1146. The following actions must be instituted within four years:

(1) Upon injury to the rights of the plaintiff... xxx

Further, in an illegal dismissal case, the claim for backwages, the money claim, is just but one of the reliefs that an
employee prays before the arbiter.

As such, Arriola’s claim for backwages is still filed within the prescriptive period of four years.

However, Arriola’s case must still be dismissed because it was established that he in fact abandoned his work. In
the first place, it is a newspaper’s prerogative whether or not to remove a particular column from publication. The
removal of a certain column does not ipso facto mean the removal of the columnist. That being, Arriola should
have reported to work even if his column was removed.

AUTO BUS TRANSPORT SYSTEMS, INC. v. ANTONIO BAUTISTA

G.R. No. 156367, May 16, 2005

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.

FACTS: Antonio Bautista has been employed by Autobus, as driver-conductor and was paid on commission basis,
seven percent (7%) of the total gross income per travel, on a twice a month basis. One day, while Bautista was
driving Autobus No. 114, he accidentally bumped the rear portion of Autobus No. 124. Bautista averred that the
accident happened because he was compelled by the management to go back to Roxas, Isabela, although he had
not slept for almost 24 hours, as he had just arrived in Manila from Roxas, Isabela. He further alleged that he was
not allowed to work until he fully paid 30% of the cost of repair of the damaged buses and that his pleas for
reconsideration were ignored by management. After a month, management sent him a letter of termination. Thus,
he instituted a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Money Claims for nonpayment of 13th month pay and service
incentive leave pay. Autobus maintained that Bautista’s employment was replete with offenses. Furthermore,
Autobus avers that in the exercise of its management prerogative, Bautista's employment was terminated only
after the latter was provided with an opportunity to explain.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint but ordered Autobus to pay his 13th month pay from the date of his
hiring to the date of his dismissal, as well as his service incentive leave pay for all the years he had been in service.

50
Autobus appealed to the NLRC which deleted the award of 13th month pay based on the Rules and Regulations
Implementing Presidential Decree No. 851, particularly Sec. 3 which exempts employers of those who are paid on
purely commission, boundary, or task basis. Records showed that Bautista, in his position paper, admitted that he
was paid on a commission basis. The award of service incentive leave pay was maintained. Thus, Autobus sought a
reconsideration which was denied by NLRC. CA affirmed the decision of the NLRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Bautista is entitled to service incentive leave.

HELD: The contention of Autobus that Bautista is not entitled to the grant of service incentive leave just because
he was paid on purely commission basis is misplaced. What must be ascertained in order to resolve the issue of
propriety of the grant of service incentive leave to respondent is whether or not he is a field personnel.

Along the routes that are plied by these bus companies, there are its inspectors assigned at strategic places who
board the bus and inspect the passengers, the punched tickets, and the conductor’s reports. There is also the
mandatory once-a-week car barn or shop day, where the bus is regularly checked as to its mechanical, electrical,
and hydraulic aspects, whether or not there are problems thereon as reported by the driver and/or conductor.
They too, must be at a specific place at a specified time, as they generally observe prompt departure and arrival
from their point of origin to their point of destination. In each and every depot, there is always the Dispatcher
whose function is precisely to see to it that the bus and its crew leave the premises at specific times and arrive at
the estimated proper time. These, are present in the case at bar. The driver, the complainant herein, was
therefore under constant supervision while in the performance of this work. He cannot be considered a field
personnel.

Therefore, Bautista is not a field personnel but a regular employee who performs tasks usually necessary and
desirable to the usual trade of business of Autobus. Accordingly, Bautista is entitled to the grant of service
incentive leave.

HEALTH, SAFETY AND SOCIAL WELFARE BENEFITS

JOSE B. SARMIENTO VS. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM (NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION) –(pls.review)

May 11, 1988 GR No. L-65680

Gutierrez, Jr.,J.

Facts

The late Flordeliza Sarmiento was employed by the National Power Corporation in Quezon City as accounting clerk
in May 1974. At the time of her death on August 12, 1981 she was manager of the budget division. The deceased’s
illness was a cancer known as “differential squarrous cell carcinoma”, and sought treatment in various hospitals.
And on August 12, 1981,she succumbed to cardiorespiratory arrest due to parotid carcinoma, and she was 20 years
old. Believing that the deceased’s fatal illness having been contracted during her employment was service-
connected, Jose B. Sarmiento filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626. On September 9, 1982, the GSIS,
through its Medical Services Center, denied the claim. It was pointed out that the illness of Flordeliza was not
caused by employment and employment conditions. Dissatisfied with the respondent’s decision of denial, Jose
Sarmiento wrote a letter to the GSIS requesting that the records of the claim be elevated to the Employees’
Compensation Commission for review pursuant to the law and the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation.
The respondent Commission affirmed the GSIS’ decision, it found that the deceased’s death is not compensable

51
because she did not contract nor suffer from the same reason of her work but by reason of embryonic rests and
epithelial growth.

Issue

Whether or not the deceased’s illness under PD 626, compensable?

Held

Under PD 626, a compensable illness means illness accepted as an occupational disease and listed by the
Employees’ Compensation Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof by the employee
that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions.

BELARMINO V. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION185 SCRA 304GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.

FACTS

Oania Belarmino was a classroom teacher of the Department of Education Culture and Sports assigned at the
Burucan Elementary School in Dimasalang, Masbate for11 years. On January 14, 1982, Mrs. Belarmino who was in
her 8th month of pregnancy, accidentally slipped and fell on the classroom floor. She complained of abdominal pain
and stomach cramps but she continued reporting for work because there was much work to do. On January 25,
1982, she went into labor and prematurely delivered a baby girl at home .Her abdominal pain persisted even after
delivery .When she was brought to the hospital, her physician informed her that she was suffering from septicemia
post partum due to infected lacerations of the vagina .After she was discharged from the hospital, she died three
days thereafter .The GSIS denied the claim on the ground that septicemia post partum, the cause of death is an
occupational disease and neither was there any showing that the ailment was contracted by reason of her
employment. On appeal to the Employees Compensation Commission, latter also denied the claim affirming the
denial of the claim by GSIS.

ISSUE

Whether of not the cause death of Mrs. Belarmino is not work-related and therefore not compensable.

HELD

NO. The death of Mrs. Belarmino from septicemia post partum is compensable because an employment accident
and the conditions of her employment contributed to its development. The condition of the classroom floor
caused Mrs. Belarmino to slip and fall and suffer injury as a result. The fall precipitated the onset of recurrent
abdominal pains which culminated in the premature termination of her pregnancy with tragic consequences to
her. Her fall on the classroom floor brought about her premature delivery which caused the development of
postpartum septicemia which resulted in death. Her fall therefore was the proximate cause. 1.That set in motion
an unbroken chain of events, leading to her demise. The right to compensation extends to disability due to disease
supervening upon and proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury. Where the primary injury is
shown to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise
arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant’s
own negligence or misconduct. Mrs. Belarmino’s fall was the primary injury that arose in the course of her
employment as a classroom teacher, hence, all the medical consequences flowing from it: her recurrent abdominal
pains, the premature delivery of her baby, her septicemia post partum and death are compensable.

52
HINOGUIN V. EMPLOYEES’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION172 SCRA 350FELICIANO, J.

FACTS

Sgt. Lemick Hinoguin was a sergeant in “A” company, 14th Infantry Battalion, 5th Infantry Division .The
headquarters of the 14th Infantry Battalion was located at Bical, Muñoz, Nueva Ecija..On August 1, 1985, Sgt.
Hinoguin, Cpl. Rogelio Clavo and Dft. Nicomedes Alibuyog sought permission from Capt. Frankie Besas, to go on
overnight pass to Aritao, Nueva Viscaya. Capt. Besas orally granted them permission to go to Aritao and to take
their issued firearms with them considering that Aritao was regarded as “a critical place.”.The three soldiers went
to Dft. Alibuyog’s home for a meal and some drinks. At around 7:00 PM, the soldiers headed back to the
headquarters. They boarded a tricycle, Hinoguin and Clavo seating themselves in the tricycle cab while Alibuyog
occupied the seat behind the tricycle driver. When they reached the poblacion, Alibuyog dismounted from the
tricycle. Not noticing that his rifle’s safety lever was on “semi-automatic,” he accidentally touched the trigger,
firing a single shot in the process and hitting Sgt. Hinoguin in the left lower abdomen. Sgt. Hinoguin died a few days
after the incident.8.In the investigation conducted by the 14th Infantry Battalion, it was found that the shooting of
Sgt. Hinoguin was purely accidental in nature and that he died in the lineof duty. The Life of Duty Board of Officers
recommended that all benefits due the legal dependents of the late Sgt. Hinoguin be given.9.However, when the
father of the deceased made a claim from GSIS, the same was denied on the ground that the deceased was not at
his work place nor performing his duty as a soldier of the Philippine Army at the time of his death. This denial was
confirmed by the ECC.

ISSUE

Whether or not the death of Sgt. Hinoguin compensable under the applicable statute and regulations.

HELD

YES. The amended Implementing Rules provides in part as follows: SEC. 1.

Conditions to Entitlement

– (a) The beneficiaries of a deceased employee shall be entitled to an income benefit if all of the following
conditions are satisfied: The employee had been duly reported to the System; He died as a result of injury or
sickness; and The System has been duly notified of his death, as well as the injury or sickness which caused his
death. His employer shall be liable for the benefit if such death occurred before the employer is duly reported for
coverage of the System. Art. 167 (k) of the Labor Code defines

Grounds –

(a) For the injury and resulting disability or death to be compensable, the injury must be the result of an
employment accident satisfying all of the following grounds:(1)The employee must have been injured at the place
where his work requires him to be.(2)The employee must have been performing his official functions; and(3)If the
injury is sustained elsewhere, the employee must have been executing an order for the employer.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) vs. THE HONORABLECOURT OF APPEALS and FELONILA ALEGRE,

FACTS:

Private respondent Felonila Alegre’s deceased husband, SPO2 Florencio A. Alegre, was a police officer assigned to
the Philippine National Police station in the town of Vigan, Ilocos Sur.On December 6, 1994, he was driving his

53
tricycle and ferrying passengers within the vicinity of Imelda Commercial Complex when SPO4 Alejandro Tenorio,
Jr., Team/Desk Officer of the Police Assistance Center located at said complex, confronted him regarding his tour
of duty.SPO2 Alegre allegedly snubbed SPO4 Tenorio and even directed curse words upon the latter. A verbal
tussle then ensued between the two which led to the fatal shooting of the deceased police officer. On account of
her husband’s death, private respondent seasonably filed a claim for death benefits with petitioner Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 626. In its decision on August 7, 1995, the
GSIS, denied the claim on the ground that at the time of SPO2 Alegre’s death, he was performing a personal
activity which was notwork-connected which was later on affirmed by the Employees’ Compensation
Commission(ECC. Private respondent finally obtained a favorable ruling in the Court of Appeals when it reversed
the ECC’s decision and ruled that SPO2 Alegre’s death was work-connected and, therefore, compensable. Hence;
GSIS filed a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court; reiterating its position that SPO2 Alegre’s death
lacks the requisite element of compensability which is, that the activity being performed at the time of death must
be work-connected.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the SPO2 Alegre’s death is compensable pursuant to the applicable laws and regulations.

HELD:

Taking together existing jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to claims for death
benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where his work requires him to be; (b) that the
employee must have been performing his official functions; and(c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the
employee must have been executing an order for the employer, it is not difficult to understand then why SPO2
Alegre’s widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending
to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in
nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or permission of his superior officer. That he may be called
upon at any time to render police work as he is considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and was not on an
approved vacation leave will not change the conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed in a situation
where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In fact, he was refusing to render one
pointing out that he already complied with the duty detail. At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to
policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope of
the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) vs. THE HONORABLECOURT OF APPEALS and FELONILA
ALEGRE,

FACTS:

Private respondent Felonila Alegre’s deceased husband, SPO2 Florencio A. Alegre, was a police officer assigned to
the Philippine National Police station in the town of Vigan, Ilocos Sur.On December 6, 1994, he was driving his
tricycle and ferrying passengers within the vicinity of Imelda Commercial Complex when SPO4 Alejandro Tenorio,
Jr., Team/Desk Officer of the Police Assistance Center located at said complex, confronted him regarding his tour
of duty.SPO2 Alegre allegedly snubbed SPO4 Tenorio and even directed curse words upon the latter. A verbal
tussle then ensued between the two which led to the fatal shooting of the deceased police officer. On account of
her husband’s death, private respondent seasonably filed a claim for death benefits with petitioner Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 626. In its decision on August 7, 1995, the
GSIS, denied the claim on the ground that at the time of SPO2 Alegre’s death, he was performing a personal

54
activity which was notwork-connected which was later on affirmed by the Employees’ Compensation
Commission(ECC. Private respondent finally obtained a favorable ruling in the Court of Appeals when it reversed
the ECC’s decision and ruled that SPO2 Alegre’s death was work-connected and, therefore, compensable. Hence;
GSIS filed a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court; reiterating its position that SPO2 Alegre’s death
lacks the requisite element of compensability which is, that the activity being performed at the time of death must
be work-connected.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the SPO2 Alegre’s death is compensable pursuant to the applicable laws and regulations.

HELD:

Taking together existing jurisprudence and the pertinent guidelines of the ECC with respect to claims for death
benefits, namely: (a) that the employee must be at the place where his work requires him to be; (b) that the
employee must have been performing his official functions; and(c) that if the injury is sustained elsewhere, the
employee must have been executing an order for the employer, it is not difficult to understand then why SPO2
Alegre’s widow should be denied the claims otherwise due her. Obviously, the matter SPO2 Alegre was attending
to at the time he met his death, that of ferrying passengers for a fee, was intrinsically private and unofficial in
nature proceeding as it did from no particular directive or permission of his superior officer. That he may be called
upon at any time to render police work as he is considered to be on a round-the-clock duty and was not on an
approved vacation leave will not change the conclusion arrived at considering that he was not placed in a situation
where he was required to exercise his authority and duty as a policeman. In fact, he was refusing to render one
pointing out that he already complied with the duty detail. At any rate, the 24-hour duty doctrine, as applied to
policemen and soldiers, serves more as an after-the-fact validation of their acts to place them within the scope of
the guidelines rather than a blanket license to benefit them in all situations that may give rise to their deaths.

G.R. No. 136200 June 8, 2000

CELERINO VALERIANO vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION and GOVERNMENT SERVICE

INSURANCESYSTEM,

The Facts:

Celerino S. Valeriano was employed as a fire truck driver assigned at the San Juan Fire Station. Sometime on the
evening of July 3, 1985, petitioner was standing along Santolan Road, Quezon City, when he met a friend by the
name of Alexander Agawin. They decided to proceed to Bonanza Restaurant in EDSA, Quezon City, for dinner. On
their way home at around 9:30PM, the owner-type jeepney they were riding in figured in a head-on collision with
another vehicle at the intersection of N. Domingo and Broadway streets in Quezon City. Due to the strong impact
of the collision, petitioner was thrown out of the vehicle and was severely injured. As a result of the mishap,
petitioner was brought to several hospitals for treatment. On September 16, 1985, he filed a claim for income
benefits under PD 626, with the Government Security Insurance Service. His claim for benefits was opposed on the
ground that the injuries he sustained did not directly arise or result from the nature of his work .Under the present
compensation law, injury and the resulting disability or death is compensable if the injury resulted from an
accident arising out of and in the course of employment. It means that the injury or death must be sustained while
the employee is in the performance of his official duty; that the injury is sustained at the place where his work
requires him to be; and if the injury is sustained elsewhere, that the employee is executing an order for the
employer. The aforementioned conditions are found wanting in the instant case. The accident that the appellant

55
met in the instant case occurred outside of his time and place of work. Neither was appellant performing his
official duties as a fireman at the time of the accident. In fact, appellant just left the Bonanza Restaurant where he
and his friends had dinner. Apparently, the injuries appellant sustained from the accident did not arise out of [and]
in the course of his employment

The Issues:

WHETHER PETITIONER'S INJURIES ARE WORK-CONNECTED.

HELD:

Thus, for injury to be compensable, the standard of "work connection" must be substantially satisfied. The injury
and the resulting disability sustained by reason of employment are compensable regardless of the place where the
injured occurred, if it can be proven that at the time of the injury, the employee was acting within the purview of
his or her employment and performing an act reasonably necessary or incidental thereto .Petitioner Valeriano was
not able to demonstrate solidly how his job as a fire truck driver was related to the injuries he had suffered. That
he sustained the injuries after pursuing a purely personal and social function — having dinner with some friends —
is clear from the records of the case. His injuries were not acquired at his work place; nor were they sustained
while he was performing an act within the scope of his employment or in pursuit of an order of his superior. Thus,
we agree with the conclusion reached by the appellate court that his injuries and consequent disability were not
work-connected and thus not compensable.

SALVADOR LAZO vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION & GOVERNMENTSERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM

G.R. No. 78617June 18, 1990

FACTS:

Salvador Lazo, is a security guard of the Central Bank of the Philippines assigned to its main office in Malate,
Manila. His regular tour of duty is from 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. On 18 June
1986, the petitioner rendered duty from2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to 10:00 o'clock in the evening. But, as the
security guard who wasto relieve him failed to arrive, the petitioner rendered overtime duty up to 5:00 o'clock in
the morning of 19 June 1986, when he asked permission from his superior to leave early in order to take home to
Binangonan, Rizal, his sack of rice.On his way home, at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning of 19 June 1986, the
passenger jeepney the petitioner was riding on turned turtle due to slippery road. As a result, he sustained injuries
and was taken to the Angono Emergency Hospital for treatment. He was later transferred to the National
Orthopedic Hospital where he was confined until 25 July 1986.For the injuries he sustained, petitioner filed a claim
for disability benefits under PD 626, as amended. His claim, however, was denied by the GSIS for the reason that
—It appears that after performing your regular duties as Security Guard from 2:00 P.M. to 10:00P.M. on June 18,
1986, you rendered overtime duty from 10:00 P.M. to 5:06 A.M. of the following day; that at about 5:06 A.M. after
asking permission from your superior you were allowed to leave the Office to do certain personal matter — that of
bringing home a sack of riceand that, while on your way home, you met a vehicular accident that resulted to (sic)
your injuries. From the foregoing informations, it is evident that you were not at your work place performing your
duties when the incident occurred. 1It was held that the condition for compensability had not been satisfied. Upon
review of the case, the respondent Employees Compensation Commission affirmed the decision since the accident
which involved the petitioner occurred far from his work place and while he was attending to a personal matter.
Hence, the present recourse.

56
ISSUE: Whether petitioner's injury comes within the meaning of and intendment of the phrase 'arising out of and
in the course of employment?

HELD:

We held that 'where an employee, after working hours, attempted to ride on the platform of a service truck of the
company near his place of work, and, while thus attempting, slipped and fell to the ground and was run over by
the truck, resulting in his death, the accident may be saidto have arisen out of or in the course of employment, for
which reason his death is compensable. The fact standing alone, that the truck was in motion when the employee
boarded, is insufficient to justify the conclusion that he had been notoriously negligent, where it does not appear
that the truck was running at a great speed.' And, in a later case, Iloilo Dock &Engineering Co. vs. Workmen's
Compensation Commission, 26 SCRA 102, 103, We ruled that'(e)mployment includes not only the actual doing of
the work, but a reasonable margin of time and space necessary to be used in passing to and from the place where
the work is to be done. If the employee be injured while passing, with the express or implied consent of the
employer, to or from his work by a way over the employer's premises, or over those of another in such proximity
and relation as to be in practical effect a part of the employer's premises, the injury is one arising out of and in the
course of the employment as much as though it had happened while the employee was engaged in his work at the
place of its performance.

NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC./BARBER SHIP MANAGEMENT LTD. VS. ESMERALDO C. ILLESCAS
(pls.review)

G.R. No. 183054, September 29, 2010

FACTS: Respondent Esmeraldo C. Illescas entered into a Contract of Employment with petitioner NFD International
Manning Agents, Inc., acting for and in behalf of its foreign principal, co-petitioner Barber Ship Management, Ltd.
Under the contract, respondent was employed as Third Officer of M/VShinrei for a period of 9 months. When
respondent had been on board the vessel for seven months, he was ordered to carry fire hydrant caps from the
deck to the engine workshop, then back to the deck to refit the caps. The next day, while carrying a heavy
basketful of fire hydrant caps, respondent felt a sudden snap on his back, with pain that radiated down to the left
side of his hips. Petitioner was referred to a doctor upon arrival of M/VShinrei at the port of Hay Point, Australia.
The doctor declared that respondent was unfit to work, and recommended that respondent return home for
further management.Upon arrival in the Philippines, Dr. Alegre advised respondent to undergo diagnostic tests of
his lumbo-sacral spine which revealed multi-level disc dessication, broad-based central and left-sided posterior
disc herniation, L4 L5, with severe canal stenosis. Dr. Alegre recommended laminectomy and discectomy.
Respondent underwent a laminectomy with discectomy at the St. Luke's Medical Center. Thereafter, he underwent
physical rehabilitation. As his condition did not improve, respondent sought Medical Center Muntinlupa for the
assessment and evaluation of his health condition and/or disability. It was found that respondent sustained partial
permanent disabilityand was declared that respondent was unfit to work at sea in any capacity as a seaman.

Petitioners received a letterdated December 16, 2003 from respondent's counsel, demanding the
payment of disability benefit. Since the parties failed to arrive at an agreement, the NLRC directed them to file
their Position Papers.The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision finding respondent entitled to disability benefit under
the CBA.Petitioners appealed the Labor Arbiter's decision to the NLRC.In the NLRC Decision, respondent was
awarded the disability benefit under Section 32 of the POEA Standard Contract for Seafarers and not the benefit
being claimed under the CBA. The NLRC also deleted the attorney's fees awarded to respondent on the ground
that there was no unlawful withholding of payment of benefits in view of petitioners' compromise offer. Upon
appeal, the Court of Appeals justified the award of attorney's fees under Article 111of the Labor Code and Article

57
2208of the Civil Code, as respondent was forced to litigate and has incurred expenses to protect his right and
interest.

ISSUE:Whether or not respondent is entitled to attorney's fees.

RULING: YES. In regard to the award of attorney's fees, the Court agrees with the Court of Appeals that respondent
is entitled to the same under Article 2208 of the Civil Code.

This case involves the propriety of the award of disability compensation under the CBA to respondent,
who worked as a seaman in the foreign vessel of petitioner Barber Ship Management Ltd. Even if petitioners did
not withhold payment of a smaller disability benefit, respondent was compelled to litigate to be entitled to a
higher disability benefit. Moreover, in HFS Philippines, Inc. v. PilarandIloreta v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc.,
the Court sustained the NLRC's award of attorney's fees, in addition to disability benefits to which the concerned
seamen-claimants were entitled. It is no different in this case wherein respondent has been awarded disability
benefit and attorney's fees by the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals. It is only just that respondent be also
entitled to the award of attorney's fees. In Iloreta v. Philippine Transmarine Carriers, Inc., the Court found the
amount of US$1,000.00 as reasonable award of attorney's fees.

G.R. No. L-48488 April 25, 1980

GLORIA D. MENEZ, vs. EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION COMMISSION, GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCESYSTEM

(DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION & CULTURE),

FACTS:

Petition for review on certiorari from the decision en banc dated March 1, 1978 of the Employees' Compensation
Commission in ECC Case No. 0462, affirming the denial by the Government Service Insurance System of the claim
of petitioner for benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626 (now Title II the New Labor Code) and dismissing said
claim. Petitioner Gloria D. Menez was employed by the Department (now Ministry) of Education& Culture as a
school teacher. She retired on August 31, 1975 under the disability retirement plan at the age of 54 years after 32
years of teaching, due to rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis. Before her retirement, she was assigned at Raja
Soliman High School in Tondo-Binondo, Manila near a dirty creek. On October 21, 1976, petitioner filed a claim for
disability benefits under Presidential Decree No. 626, as amended, with respondent Government Service Insurance
System. On October 25, 1976, respondent GSIS denied said claim on the ground that petitioner's ailments,
rheumatoid arthritis and pneumonitis, are not occupational diseases taking into consideration the nature of her
particular work. In denying aforesaid claim, respondent GSIS thus resolved:Upon evaluation based on general
accepted medical authorities, your ailments are found to be the least causally related to your duties and conditions
of work. We believe that your ailments are principally traceable to factors which are definitely not work-
connected. Moreover, the evidences you have, submitted have not shown that the said ailments directly resulted
from your occupation as Teacher IV of Raja Soliman High School,Manila

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner’s ailments are causally related to her duties and conditions of work, hence,
she is entitled to disability benefit from the GSIS.

HELD:

Republic Act 4670, otherwise known as the Magna Charta for Public School Teachers, recognized the enervating
effects of these factors (duties and activities of a school teacher certainly involve physical, mental and emotional

58
stresses) on the health of school teachers when it directed in one of its provisions that "Teachers shall be
protected against the consequences of employment injury in accordance with existing laws. The effects of the
physical and nervous strain on the teachers' health shall be recognized as compensable occupational diseases in
accordance with laws" (Pantoja vs. Republic, et al.. L-43317,December 29, 1978).

CLEMENTE VS GSIS G.R. NO. L-47521 JULY 31, 1987

Clemente, petitioner vs GSIS, respondents

G.R. No. L-47521 July 31, 1987

Doctrine:

Article 4 Constructions in favor of Labor. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of
this Code, including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.

It clashes with the injunction in the Labor Code (Article 4, New Labor Code) that, as a rule, doubts should be
resolved in favor of the claimant-employee

Court has held in appropriate cases that the conservative posture of the respondents is not consistent with the
liberal interpretation of the Labor Code and the social justice guarantee embodied in the Constitution in favor of
the workers

Facts:

Petitioner's husband, the late Pedro Clemente, was for ten (10) years a janitor in the Department of Health
(Dagupan City), assigned at the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic, Laoag City. He was hospitalized from November 3 to 14,
1976 at the Central Luzon Sanitarium, Tala Sanitarium, Tala, Caloocan City, due to his ailment of "nephritis," as per
medical certification of his attending physician, Dr. Winifredo Samson. He was also found to be suffering from such
ailments as portal cirrhosis and leprosy, otherwise known as Hansen's Disease. On November 14, 1976, Pedro
Clemente died of uremia due to nephritis. Thereafter, petitioner filed with the GSIS a claim for employees'
compensation under the Labor Code, as amended. The GSIS denied the claim of the petitioner because the
ailments of her husband are not occupational diseases taking into consideration the nature of his work and/or (sic)
or were not in the least causally related to his duties and conditions of work.

Petitioner requested for reconsideration of the GSIS' denial of her claim, stating that the ailments of her husband
were contracted in the course of employment and were aggravated by the nature of his work. Petitioner alleged
that her husband, as janitor of the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic (Laoag City), worked in direct contact with persons
suffering from different skin diseases and was exposed to obnoxious dusts and other dirt which contributed to his
ailment of Hansen's disease.

GSIS forwarded the records of the petitioner' claim for review by the ECC. ECC affirmed the GSIS' action of denial
and rendered its own decision dismissing petitioner's claim. ECC's decision was anchored upon the findings that
the ailments are not listed as occupational diseases; that there was no substantial evidence of causal connection;
and that, in fact, the evidence was that the deceased had already contracted the Hansen's disease before his
employment.

As the illnesses of the deceased are admittedly, not listed under Annex "A" of the Rules as occupational diseases,
the petitioner bases her claim under the theory of increased risk. She alleges that the deceased, as janitor of the

59
Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic, was exposed to patients suffering from various kinds of skin diseases, including Hansen's
disease or leprosy. She avers that for ten years, the deceased had to clean the clinic and its surroundings and to
freely mix with its patients. She claims that it was during this time that he was attacked by other dreadful diseases
such as uremia, cancer of the liver, and nephritis.

Issue: W/ON Nephritis can be considered as a ground for compensation due to the nature of work

Held: Yes. We note that the major ailments of the deceased, i.e. nephritis, leprosy, etc., could be traced from
bacterial and viral infections. In the case of leprosy, it is known that the source of infection is the discharge from
lesions of persons with active cases. It is believed that the bacillus enters the body through the skin or through the
mucous membrane of the nose and throat.

The husband of the petitioner worked in a skin clinic. As janitor of the Ilocos Norte Skin Clinic, Mr. Clemente was
exposed to different carriers of viral and bacterial diseases. He had to clean the clinic itself where patients with
different illnesses come and go. He had to put in order the hospital equipments that had been used. He had to
dispose of garbage and wastes that accumulated in the course of each working day. He was the employee most
exposed to the dangerous concentration of infected materials, and not being a medical practitioner, least likely to
know how to avoid infection. It is, therefore, not unreasonable to conclude that Mr. Clemente's working conditions
definitely increased the risk of his contracting the aforementioned ailments. This Court has held in appropriate
cases that the conservative posture of the respondents is not consistent with the liberal interpretation of the Labor
Code and the social justice guarantee embodied in the Constitution in favor of the workers. It clashes with the
injunction in the Labor Code (Article 4, New Labor Code) that, as a rule, doubts should be resolved in favor of the
claimant-employee.

NARAZO V. ECC (NO DIGEST)

ORATE V. CA (NO DIGEST)

Art. 179

ORTEGA V. SSC (NO DIGEST)

YSMAEL MARITIME V. AVELINO, JUNE 30, 1987 (NO DIGEST)

SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION V. AZOTE, APRIL 15, 2015 R.A. 8291 (GSIS) (NO DIGEST)

60