PATROCINIO RAYMUNDO V. DOROTEO PEÑAS
, no mor e
96 Phil. 311
FACTS: Raymundo and Peñas were validly married
to each other in Manila on Mar. 29, 1941. The spouses
lived together until 1949, but had no children, nor did
they acquire conjugal property. Sometime in July, 1949,
the husband lived maritally with another woman,
Carmen Paredes.
At the instance of the deserted wife, an information for
concubinage was fi led on Oct. 30, 1949. The husband
Peñas was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment
by the CFI (now RTC) on May 25, 1950. Pending his
appeal on July 14, 1950, the wife instituted the present
proceedings
praying for a decree of absolute divorce. The conviction
of Peñas was affi rmed by the Court of Appeals on Oct.
31, 1951.
The trial court found that the acts of concubinage
that gave rise to the action as well as the judgment of
conviction by the CFI took place before the repeal of
Act 2710 (the Divorce Law) by the new Civil Code
(which became effective on August 30, 1950, as held by
this court in Lara v. Del Rosario, 50 O.G. 1957).
Nevertheless, said trial court did not grant the divorce
on the ground that
the wife had acquired no right to a divorce which can
be recognized after the effective date of the new Civil
Code in view of Art. 2254 (“no vested or acquired right
can arise from acts or omissions which are against the
law or which infringe upon the rights of others”). Thus,
it concluded that the criminal act of the husband did
not give the wife any vested right, and since divorce is
abolished under the THE FAMILY CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
new Civil Code, the divorce decree should not be
granted, even if the divorce proceedings were
instituted prior to the effective date of the new Civil
Code.
HELD: (a) The trial court is not correct. It should be
apparent upon refl ection that the prohibition of Art.
2254 must be directed at the offender, not the
offended party who is in no way responsible for the
violation of legal duty.
The interpretation adopted by the court below r esults
in depriving a victim of any redress because of the very
act that injured him. The Code Commission, speaking of
Art. 2254, said: “It is evid ent that no one can validly
claim any vested or acquired right if the sa me is
founded upon his having violated the law or invaded
the rights of others.”
In other words, it is the wrongdoer who is punished,
not the victim.
1
(b) Despite the change of legislation (i.e.
divorce under the new Civil Code), the wife is protected
by Art. 2253 which provides that “The Civil Code of
1819 and other previous laws shall govern rights
originating under said laws, from acts or events which
took place under their regime, even though this Code
may regulate them in different manner, or may not
recognize them.
True, the new Code does not recognize absolute
divorce, but only legal separation, thereby impliedly
repealing Act 2710, but other provisions clearly
safeguard rights and actions arising under the
preceding law.
(c) The present case is readily distinguished from
the case of divorce proceedings instituted under
Executive Order No. 141 of the Japanese occupation
Executive Commission, and which were pending at
liberation. We ruled in Peña de Luz v. CFI, 43 O.G., p.
4102, that such pending divorce proceedings must be
dismissed because the occupation divorce ceased to be
in force and effect upon liberation of the national
territory and because the proclamation of General
Douglas McArthur in Leyte on Oct. 23, 1944 had
abrogated all occupation legislation absolutely and
without qualifi cation. The repeal of Act 2710 by the
new Civil Code is in a different position since the
transitional provisions of a latter law expressly
prescribe, as we have seen the subsistence of rights
derived from acts that took place under the prior
legislation.
(d) It is of no moment that the conviction of the
husband only became final after the new Civil Code,
denying absolute divorce, came into effect, for this
Court has already ruled in Chereau v. Fuentebella (43
Phil. 220) that Sec. 8 of Act 2710 (“a divorce shall not
be granted without the guilt of the defendant being
established by fi nal sentence in a criminal action”) is
only evidentiary in character, since it merely “has
referenc e of course, to the species of proof required to
establish the basal fact on which the right to the
divorce rests” (i.e., it is not a condition precedent that
there be fi nal judgment prior to fi ling of the divorce
suit; it is enough that at the time of litigation, fi nal
sentence can be presented as proof).
(e) Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed
and new judgment shall be entered granting a decree
of absolute divorce as prayed for.
[NOTE: The importance of this case lies in the fact,
that as long as the divorce proceeding had already
been brought befor e Aug. 30, 1950, same will be
allowed to continue. Moreover, even if the fi nal
judgment of conviction is made after Aug. 30, 1950 —
this is all right and divorce can still be granted. Had,
however, the divorce case been brought after the
effec tive date of the new Code
(Aug. 30, 1950), it would not have pros pered.].
PASTOR B. TENCHAVEZ, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
VS.
VICENTA F. ESCANO, ET.AL.,DEFEN DANTS-APPELLEES.
FACTS:
VicentaEscaño, 27, exchanged marriage vows
with Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on February 24,
1948, before a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was
duly registered with the local civil registrar. However,
the two were unable to live together after the marriage
and as of June 1948, they were already estranged.
Vicenta left for the United Stated in 1950. On the same
year she filed a verified complaint for divorce against
Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the ground of
“Extr eme cruelty, entirely mental in character.”
A decree of divorce, “final and absolute” was issued in
open court by the said tribunal. She married an
American, lived with him in California, ha d several
children with him and, on 1958, acquired American
Citizenship.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on
31 May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escaño, her parents,
Mamerto and Mena Escaño whom he charged with
having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining
her husband, and alienating her affections, and against
the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its
Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the
marriage, and asked for legal s eparation and one
million pesos in damages. Vicenta’s parents denied that
they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts,
and counterclaimed for moral damages.
Issue:
Whether or not the divorce sought by VicentaEscaño is
valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
Held:
No. VicentaEscaño and Pastor Tenchavez’
marriage remain existent and undissolved under the
Philippine Law. Escaño’s divorce and second marriage
cannot be deemed valid under the Philippine Law to
which Escaño was bound since in the time the divorce
decree was issued, Escaño, like her husband, was still a
Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not complying
with her wifely duties, deserting her husband without
any justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in
order to secure a decree of absolute divorce, and finally
getting married again are acts which constitute a willful
infliction of injury upon the husband’s feelings in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
2
policy, thus entitling Tenchavez to a decree of l egal
separation under our law on the basis of adultery.
G.R. No. 170022 January 9, 2013
REPUBL IC OF THE PHIL IPPIN ES, Petitioner,
vs.
CESAR ENCELAN, Respondent.
DECI SI ON
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed
by petitioner Republic of the Philippines challenging
the October 7, 2005 amended decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) that r econsidered its March 22, 2004
decision3(original decision) in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. In
its original decision, the CA set aside the June 5, 2002
decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 95-74257, which The
Factual Antecedents
On August 25, 1979, Cesar married Lolita5 and the
union bore two children, Maricar and Manny.6 To
support his family, Cesar went to work in Saudi Arabia
on May 15, 1984. On June 12, 1986, Cesar, while still in
Saudi Arabia, learned that Lolita had been having an
illicit affair with Alvin Perez. Sometime in 1991,7 Lolita
allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and
lived with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been
separated. On June 16, 1995, Cesar filed with the RTC a
petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity
of his marriage based on Lolita’s psychological
incapacity.8
Lolita denied that she had an affair with Alvin; she
contended that Alvin used to be an associate in her
promotions business. She insisted that she is not
psychologically incapacitated and that she left their
home because of irreconcilable differences with her
mother-in-law.9
At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolita’s
infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family
home.10He testified that he continued to provide
financial support for Lolita and their children even after
he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.11
Cesar presented the psychological evaluation report12
on Lolita prepared by Dr. Fareda Fatima Flores of the
National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Flores found
that Lolita was "not suffering from any form of major
psychiatric illness,"13 but had been "unable to provide
the expectations expected of her for a good and lasting
marital relationship";14 her "transferring from one job
to the other depicts some interpersonal problems with
co-workers as well as her impatience in attaining her
ambitions";15 and "her refusal to go with her husband
abroad signifies her reluctance to work out a good
marital and family relationship."16
The RTC Ruling
In its June 5, 2002 decision,17 the RTC declared Cesar’s
marriage to Lolita void, finding sufficient basis to
declare Lolita psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations.
The petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), appealed to the CA.
The CA Ruling
The CA originally18 set aside the RTC’s verdict, finding
that Lolita’s abandonment of the conjugal dwelling and
infidelity were not serious cases of personality
disorder/psychological illness. Lolita merely refused to
comply with her marital obligations which she was
capable of doing. The CA significantly observed that
infidelity is only a ground for legal separation, not for
the declaration of the nullity of a marriage.
Cesar sought reconsideration19 of the CA’s decision
and, in due course, attained his objective. The CA set
aside its original decision and entered another, which
affirmed the RTC’s decision. In its amended decision,20
the CA found two circumstances indicative of Lolita’s
serious psychological incapacity that resulted in her
gross infidelity: (1) Lolita’s unwarranted refusal to
perform her marital obligations to Cesar; and (2)
Lolita’s willful and deliberate act of abandoning the
conjugal dwelling.
The OSG then filed the present petition.
The Petition
The OSG argues that Dr. Flores’ psychological
evaluation report did not disclose that Lolita had been
suffering from a psychological illness nor did it establish
its juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability;
infidelity and abandonment do not constitute
psychological incapacity, but are mer ely grounds for
legal separation.
The Case for the Respondent
Cesar submits that Lolita’s infidelity and refusal to
perform her marital obligations established her grave
and incurable psychological incapacity.
The Issue
The case presents to us the legal issue of whether ther e
exists sufficient basis to nullify Cesar’s marriage to
Lolita on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The Court’s Ruling
We grant the petition. No sufficient basis exists to
annul Cesar’s marriage to Lolita on the ground of
psychological incapacity.
Applicable Law and Jurisprudence
on Psychological Incapacity
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological
incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage. It provides that "a marriage contracted by
any party who, at the time of the celebration, was
3
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only
after its solemnization."
In interpreting this provision, we have repeatedly
stressed that psychological incapacity contemplates
"downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume the basic marital obligations";21 not
mer ely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill
will, on the part of the errant spouse.22 The plaintiff
bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedenc e
(i.e., the existence at the time of the celebration of
marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of
the errant spouse.23
Cesar failed to prove Lolita’s
psychological incapacity
In this case, Cesar’s testimony failed to prove Lolita’s
alleged psychological incapacity. Cesar testified on the
dates when he learned of Lolita’s alleged affair and her
subsequent abandonment of their home,24 as well as
his continued financial support to her and their children
even after he learned of the affair,25 but he merely
mentioned in passing Lolita’s alleged affair with Alvin
and her abandonment of the conjugal dwelling.
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the
conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply
grounds for legal separation.26 To constitute
psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the
unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations of
a disordered personality that completely prevented the
erring spouse from discharging the essential marital
obligations.27 No evidence on record exists to support
Cesar’s allegation that Lolita’s infidelity and
abandonment were manifestations of any
psychological illness.
Cesar mistakenly relied on Dr. Flores’ psychological
evaluation report on Lolita to prove her alleged
psychological incapacity. The psychological evaluation,
in fact, established that Lolita did not suffer from any
major psychiatric illness.28 Dr. Flores’ observation on
Lolita’s interpersonal problems with co-workers,29 to
our mind, does not suffice as a consideration for the
conclusion that she was – at the time of her marriage –
psychologically incapacitated to enter into a marital
union with Cesar. Aside from the time element
involved, a wife’s psychological fitness as a spouse
cannot simply be equated with her professional/work
relationship; workplace obligations and responsibilities
are poles apart from their marital counterparts. While
both spring from human relationship, their relatedness
and relevance to one another should be fully
established for them to be compared or to serve as
measures of comparison with one another. To be sure,
the evaluation report Dr. Flores prepared and
submitted cannot serve this purpose. Dr. Flores’ further
belief that Lolita’s refusal to go with Cesar abroad
signified a reluctance to work out a good marital
relationship30 is a mere generalization unsupported by
facts and is, in fact, a rash conclusion that this Court
cannot support.
In sum, we find that Cesar failed to prove the existence
of Lolita’s psychological incapacity; thus, the CA
committed a reversible error when it reconsidered its
original decision.
Once again, we stress that marriage is an inviolable
social institution31 protected by the State. Any doubt
should be resolved in favor of its existence its existence
and continuation and against its dissolution and
nullity.32 It cannot be dissolved at the whim of the
parties nor by transgressions made by one party to the
other during the marriage.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition and SET ASIDE the
October 7, 2005 amended decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75583. Accordingly, we
DISMISS respondent Cesar Encelan's petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lolita Castillo-
Encelan.
Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-48183 November 10, 1941
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODOLFO A. SCHNECKENBURGER, ET AL., defendants-
appellants.
Topic: Consent as a defense in an action for legal
separation
FACTS:
• May 15, 1926: accused Rodolfo married the
complainant Elena Ramirez Cartagena
• After 7 years (due to incompatibility of
characters) they agreed to live separately from each
other
• May 25, 1935: they executed document—
agreement, which states that “Que ambos
comparecientes convienen en vivir separados el uno
del otro por el resto de su vida y se comprometen, y
obligan reciprocamente a no molastarse ni intervenir ni
mezclarse bajo ningun concepto en la vida publica o
privada de los mismos, entre si, quendado cada uno de
los otorgantes en completa libertad de accion en
calquier acto y todos concepto.
4
• June 15, 1935: accused w/o leaving the
Philippines secured a divorce decree from civil court of
Juarez, Bravos District of Chihuahua Mexico
• May 11, 1936: he contracted another marriage
with co-accused Julia Medel before the justice of the
peace of Malabon
• Because of the nullity of the divorce decree,
complainant herein instituted two actions against the
accused, one for bigamy and another for concubinage
• Charge for bigamy culminated in the
conviction of accused;
• Meanwhile, before the trial for the charge of
concubinage commenc ed, accused interposed the plea
of double jeopardy and the case was initially dismissed;
upon appeal, the CA held the dismissal before trial to
be premature and without deciding the question of
double jeopardy, remanded the case to the trial court
for trial on the merits
TC: accused was convicted of concubinage through
reckless imprudence
ISSUE:
Whether the accused should be acquitted of
concubinage in view of the agreement executed by
Rodolfo and Elena upon their separation
HELD: Yes. The agreement constituted a consent given
by Elena to Rodolfo, hence, Rodolfo should be
acquitted. Judgment is reversed.
• No double jeopardy - the defense of bigamy
for which he was convicted and that of concubinage for
which he stood trial in the court are two distinct
offenses in the law
• BIGAMY: celebration of second marriage
while the first is still existing; offense against civil status
which may be prosecuted at the instance of the state
• CONCUBINAGE: mer e cohabitation by the
husband with a woman who is not his wife; offense
against chastity and may be prosecuted only at the
instance of the offended party
• Upon the other hand, the accused should
have been acquitted of the crime of concubinage
o the document executed by and between th e
accused and the complainant in which they agreed ,
while illegal for the purpose for which it was executed ,
constitutes nevertheless a valid consent to the act of
concubinage within the meaning of Art. 344 of the RPC
o by such agreement, each party clearly
intended to for ego the illicit acts of the other
• Previously, the court held that the consent
which bars the offended party from instituting a
criminal prosecution in cases of adultery, concubinage,
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousnes s is
that which has been given expressly or impliedly after
the crime has been committed. However, in this case,
the Court sees this to be a narrow view.
• As the term "pardon" unquestionably refers to
the offense after its commission, "consent" must have
been intended agreeably with its ordinary usage, to
refer to the offense prior to its commission. No logical
difference can indeed be perceived between prior and
subsequent consent, for in both instances as the
offended party has chosen to compromise with his/her
dishonor, he/she becomes unworthy to come to court
and invoke its aid in the vindication of the wrong
• Prior consent is as effective as subsequent
consent to bar the offended aprty from prosecuting the
offense
• An agreement of the tenor entered into
between the parties herein, operates, within the plain
language and manifest policy of the law, to bar the
offended party from prosecuting the offense
Article 344 of the RPC provides:
The offended party cannot institute criminal
prosecution without including both the guilty parties, if
they are both alive, nor, in any case, if he shall have
consented or pardoned the offenders.
Pacete vs Carriaga
231 SCRA 321
FACTS:
Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint on October 1979,
for the Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between her
erstwhile husband Enrico Pacete and one Clarita de la
Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her
and Pacete, accounting and separation of property.
She averred in her complaint that she was married to
Pacete on April 1938 and they had a child named
Consuelo; that Pacete subsequently contracted a
second marriage with Clarita de la Concepcion and that
she learned of such marriage only on August 1979.
Reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible
since he evidently preferred to continue living with
Clarita.
The defendants were each served with summons. They
filed an extension within which to file an answer, which
the court partly granted. Due to unwanted
5
misunderstanding, particularly in communication, the
defendants failed to file an answer on the date set by
the court. Ther eafter, the plaintiff filed a motion to
declare the defendants in default, which the court
forthwith granted. The court rec eived plaintiffs’
evidence during the hearings held on February 15, 20,
21, and 22, 1980. After trial, the court rendered a
decision in favor of the plaintiff on March 17,1980.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC gravely abused its
discretion in denying petitioner’s motion for extension
of time to file their answer, in declaring petitioners in
default and in rendering its decision on March 17, 1980
which decreed the legal separation of Pacete and
Alanis and held to be null and void the marriage of
Pacete to Clarita.
HELD: The Civil Code provides that “no decree of legal
separation shall be promulgated upon a stipulation of
facts or by confession of judgment. In case of non-
appearance of the defendant, the court shall order the
prosecuting attorney to inquire whether or not
collusion between parties exists. If there is no collusion,
the prosecuting attorney shall intervene for the State in
order to take care that the evidence for the plaintiff is
not fabricated.”
The above stated provision calling for the intervention
of the state attorneys in case of uncontested
proceedings for legal separation (and of annulment of
marriages, under Article 88) is to emphasize that
marriage is more than a mere contract.
Article 103 of the Civil Code, now Article 58 of the
Family Code, further mandates that an action for legal
separation must “in no case be tried before six months
shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,”
obviously in order to provide the parties a “cooling-off”
period. In this interim, the court should take steps
toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The significance of the above substantive provisions of
the law is further or underscored by the inclusion of a
provision in Rule 18 of the Rules of Court which
provides that no defaults in actions for annulments of
marriage or for legal separation. Therefor e, “if the
defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or
for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall
order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether
or not a collusion between the parties exists, and if
there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order
to see to it that the evidence submitted is not
fabricated.”
DOLINA V. VALLECERA
GR No. 182367- [December 15, 2010]
DOCTRINE:
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in
proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if
the same is not admitted or acknowledged. If filiation is
beyond question, support follows as matter of
obligation.
FACTS:
In 2008, Cherryl Dolina filed a petition with aprayer for
the issuance of a temporary protection order against
Glenn Vallecera before RTC for alleged woman and
child abuse under RA 9262. In the pro forma complaint
cherryl added a prayer for support for their supposed
child. She based such prayer on the latter’s certificate
of live birth which listed Vallecera ‘s employer, to
withhold from his pay such amount of support as the
RTC may deem appropriate.
Vallecera opposed petition and claimed that Dolina’s
petition was essentially one for financial support rather
than for protection against woman and child abuses,
that he was not the child’s father and that the
signature in the birth certificate was not here. He also
added that the petition is a harassment suit intended
to for him to acknowledge the child as his and
therefore give financial support.
RTC dismissed petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolina’s
action for temporary protection and denied
her application for temporary support for her child?
HELD:
Yes.
6
RATIO:
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain
support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262 under
which she filed the case is the protection and safety of
women and children who are victims of abuse or
violence. Although the issuance of a protection order
against the respondent in the case can include the
grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this
assumes that both are entitled to a protection order
and to legal support. In this case neither her or her
child lived with Vallecera.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in
proper action, first establish the filiation of the child, if
the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since
Dolina’s demand for support for her son is based on her
claim that he is Vallecera’s illegitimate child, the latter
is not entitled to such s upport if he had not
acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his
relation to him. The child’s remedy is to file through her
mother a judicial action against Vallecera for
compulsory recognition. If filiation is beyond question,
support follows as matter of obligation. In short,
illegitimate children are entitled to support and
successional rights but their filiation must be duly
proved.
Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an
action against Vallecera for compulsory recognition in
order to establish filiation and then demand support.
Alternatively, she may directly file an action for
support, where the issue of compulsory recognition
may be integrated and resolved.
OCAMPO vs. FLORENCIANO
Overview: This is an action for legal separa tion which
Jose de Ocampo filed against his wife Serafina on the
ground of adultery. The case was dismissed by th e
Court of first Instance which was affirmed by the Court
Appeals holding that there was confession of judgmen t
, plus condonation or consent to the adultery and
prescrip tion.
Facts:
Jose de Ocampo (Petitioner) and SerafinaFlorenciano
(Respondent) got married on April 5, 1938 and as a
result of such union, they begot several children.
Sometime in March 1951, Ocampo discovered that his
wife was maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas.
He sent his wife to Manila to study beauty culture.
Again, Ocampo discovered that aside from Jose Arcalas,
Serafina was going out with several other men. Serafina
left Ocampo after she finished her study and since then
the two lived separately.
After Ocampo caught his wife in the act of having illicit
relations with NelsomOrzame on June 18, 1955, he
signified his intention of filing a petition for legal
separation. Serafina conformed to his intention
provided that she will not be charged with adultery in a
criminal action.
Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation but the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija dismissed it
holding there was confession of judgment, plus
condonation or consent to the adultery and
prescription which was AFFIRMED by the Court of
Appeals.
CA’s decision:
With regard to the defendant’s adultery with Jose
Arcalas,the husband’s right to legal separa tion had
prescribed because his action was not filed within one
year from March 1951 when plain tiff discovered her
infidelity(art.102,NCC).
As to the adultery with Nelson Orzame, after discovery
of such, the husband expressed his wish to file a
petition fo r legal separation which the defendant had
readily agreed to. Befo re the fiscal, the defendant even
reiterated her conformity to the legal separa tion and
admitted having sexual relations with Nelson Orza me.
The Appellate Court had interpreted such facts as a
confession of judgment under Art.101 and thus, legal
separation could not be decreed.
Issue:
Whether or not a decree for legal separation be
granted.
Ruling:
Yes. As the Court understand the article, it does no t
exclude, as evidence, any admission o r confession mad e
by the defendant outsid e of the court. It merely
prohibits a decree of separation upon a confession of
judgment. Confession of judgment usually happens
when the defendant appears in court and confesses th e
right of plaintiff to judgment o r files a pleading
expressly agreeing to the plaintiff’s demand.
Supposing the statement of defendant constitutes a
confession of judgment, inasmuch as there is evidence
of the adultery independent of suchstatement , th e
decree may and should be granted, since it would not
be based on her confession, but upon evidence
presen ted by the plaintiff. What the la w prohibits is a
judgment based ex clusively o r mainly on defendant’s
confession. If a confession defea ts the a ction ipso fa cto ,
any defendant who opposes the separation will
immediately confess judgmen t fo r th e purpose of
preventing it.
The fact that the defendant “like also” to be legally
separated from her husband, is not an obstacle to the
successful prosecution of the action. When the court is
informed that defendant equally desires the separation
and admitted the commission of the offense, it should
be doubly careful lest a collusion exists. However, the
Court of Appeals did not find collusion.
There would be collusion if the parties had arranged by
making it appear that a matrimonial offense had been
committed although it was not, or if the parties had
connived to bring about a legal separation even in the
absence of grounds therefor.
According to the evidence pr esented in the instant
case, the offense of adultery had really took place. The
defendant could not have falsely told the adulterous
acts to the Fiscal, because her story might send her to
jail the moment her husband request the Fiscal to
prosecute. She could not have practiced deception at
such a personal risk.
In connection to this, collusion may not be inferred
from the mere fact that the guilty party confesses to
the offense and thus enables the other party to
procure evidence necessary to prove it (Williams vs.
Williams, Rosen weig vs. Rosenweig). And proof that
defendant desires the divorce and makes no defense, it
not by itself collusion (Pohlman vs. Pohlman).
The plaintiff’s failure to actively search for the
defendant and take her home (after the latter left him
in 1952) does not constitute condonation or consent to
her adulterous relations with Orzame. It was not his
duty to search for her to bring her home. Hers was the
obligation to return.
Finding no obstacles to the aggrieved husband’s
petition, the Supreme Court her eby REVERSED the
decision being appealed and decree a legal separation
between the spouses. Cost against SerafinaFlorenciano.