Alexandra S.

Roxas
LEGAL PROFESSION

I. LEGAL PROFESSION

A. SUPERVISION AND CONTROL

i. Constitution Art VIII, Sec 5 (5)

Article 5 Judicial Department

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.

(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation
thereto.

(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary
assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.

(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice,
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition
of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify
substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.

(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

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ii. Constitution Art XII, Sec 14 (c)

ARTICLE XII – National Economy and Patrimony

Section 14. The sustained development of a reservoir of national talents consisting of Filipino scientists,
entrepreneurs, professionals, managers, high-level technical manpower and skilled workers and craftsmen in all
fields shall be promoted by the State. The State shall encourage appropriate technology and regulate its transfer for
the national benefit.

The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by law.

iii. In Re Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534

IN RE CUNANAN [94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954]

Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” In
accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had
obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its
provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the
aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the
reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual
petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had
invoked Republic Act No. 972.

Issue: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

Held: RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from
insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement
of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function
and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission,
suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.

On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments
of the government.

It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say,

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merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

REPUBLIC ACT 6735,

INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ACT

R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution.
The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the committee
on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill
No. 497, which dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the
Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with
initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 solely, dealt with
initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral Conference
Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently
approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by the House of Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No.
6735.

FACTS:

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, “An
Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to
have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average
in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:

Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As per
its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a
permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take
account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.

As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in
force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:

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The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate
preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;

The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said candidates;

The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to practice of
law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid
down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court
on who can practice law; and

The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover,
the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions
denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to
alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.

B. POWER TO INTEGRATE THE PHILIPPINE BAR (IN

i. In Re Integrated Bar of the Philippines, 1973

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE

INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
49 SCRA 22
FACTS:

Republic Act. No. 6397 entitled “An Act Providing for the Integration of the Philippine Bar and
Appropriating Funds Therefore” was passed in September 1971, ordaining “Within two years from the
approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the Philippine
Bar.” The Supreme Court formed a Commission on Bar Integration and in December 1972, the Commission
earnestly recommended the integration of the bar. The Court accepted all comments on the proposed
integration.

ISSUES:

Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine bar?

Would the integration of the bar be constitutional?

Should the Court ordain the integration of the bar at this time?

RULING:

In ruling on the issues raised, the Court first adopted the definition given by the Commission to
“integration” in this wise: “Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire
lawyer population of the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable
amount) of every attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name
in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.” The term “Bar” refers to the collectivity of all persons

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whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or unified Bar) perforce must include all
lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so; the State. Bar
integration therefore, signifies the setting up by government authority of a national organization of the
legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the court.

Designed to improve the positions of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the rule of law,
integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action and
participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle of
maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.

On the first issue, the Court held that it may integrate the Bar in the exercise of its power “to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law.”
Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the Court’s constitutional authority over the Bar.

The second issue hinges on the following constitutional rights: freedom of association and of speech, as
well as the nature of the dues exacted from the lawyer, i.e., whether or not the Court thus levies a tax. The
Court held:

Integration is not violative of freedom of association because it does not compel a lawyer to become a
member of any group of which he is not already a member. All that it does is “to provide an official
national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which every lawyer is
already a member.” The lawyer too is not compelled to attend meetings, participate of activities, etc. The
only compulsion is the payment of annual dues. Assuming, however, that it does compel a lawyer to be a
member of an integrated bar, the court held that “such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police
power of the state”

Integration is also not violative of the freedom of speech just because dues paid b the lawyer may be used
for projects or programs, which the lawyer opposes. To rule otherwise would make every government
exaction a “free speech issue.” Furthermore, the lawyer is free to voice out his objections to positions
taken by the integrated bar.

The dues exacted from lawyers is not in the nature of a levy but is purely for purposes of regulation.

As to the third issue, the Court believes in the timeliness of the integration. Survey showed an
overwhelming majority of lawyers who favored integration.

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II. PRACTICE OF LAW (RULE 138)

RULE 138

Attorneys and Admission to Bar

Section 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or
hereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular
standing, is entitled to practice law.

Section 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. — Every applicant for admission as a
member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral
character, and resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.

Section 3. Requirements for lawyers who are citizens of the United States of America. — Citizens of the
United States of America who, before July 4, 1946, were duly licensed members of the Philippine Bar, in
active practice in the courts of the Philippines and in good and regular standing as such may, upon
satisfactory proof of those facts before the Supreme Court, be allowed to continue such practice after
taking the following oath of office:

I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the

Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I
will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor
consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of may knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as to the courts
as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation
or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

Section 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions. — Applicants for admission who, being
Filipino citizens, are enrolled attorneys in good standing in the Supreme Court of the United States or in
any circuit court of appeals or district court therein, or in the highest court of any State or Territory of the
United States, and who can show by satisfactory certificates that they have practiced at least five years in
any of said courts, that such practice began before July 4, 1946, and that they have never been suspended
or disbarred, may, in the discretion of the Court, be admitted without examination.

Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. — All applicants for admission other than those
referred to in the two preceding section shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily
show that they have regularly studied law for four years, and successfully completed all prescribed courses,
in a law school or university, officially approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit
of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate from the university or school of law, shall be filed as
evidence of such facts, and further evidence may be required by the court.

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No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed the following
courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law,
remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation,
medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.

Section 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he
presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of
law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college,
requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study
prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or
field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics.

Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. — All applicants for admission shall file with the clerk of
the Supreme Court the evidence required by section 2 of this rule at least fifteen (15) days before the
beginning of the examination. If not embraced within section 3 and 4 of this rule they shall also file within
the same period the affidavit and certificate required by section 5, and if embraced within sections 3 and 4
they shall exhibit a license evidencing the fact of their admission to practice, satisfactory evidence that the
same has not been revoked, and certificates as to their professional standing. Applicants shall also file at
the same time their own affidavits as to their age, residence, and citizenship.

Section 8. Notice of Applications. — Notice of applications for admission shall be published by the clerk of
the Supreme Court in newspapers published in Pilipino, English and Spanish, for at least ten (10) days
before the beginning of the examination.

Section 9. Examination; subjects. — Applicants, not otherwise provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this rule,
shall be subjected to examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social Legislation;
Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law (Constitutional Law, Public Corporations, and Public Officers);
International Law (Private and Public); Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and
Evidence); Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (in Pleadings and Conveyancing).

Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing. — Persons taking the examination
shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms. The questions shall be the same for all
examinees and a copy thereof, in English or Spanish, shall be given to each examinee. Examinees shall
answer the questions personally without help from anyone.

Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that it will be
difficult to read his answers without much loss of time., the Supreme Court may allow such examinee to
use a typewriter in answering the questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be used.

The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as are necessary to prevent the substitution of
papers or commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the examination papers.
No oral examination shall be given.

Section 11. Annual examination. — Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take
place annually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four days to be disignated by the chairman of the
committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall be distributed as follows: First day: Political and
International Law (morning) and Labor and Social Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law (morning)

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and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile Law (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day:
Remedial Law (morning) and legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (afternoon).

Section 12. Committee of examiners. — Examinations shall be conducted by a committee of bar examiners
to be appointed by the Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed of a Justice of the Supreme
Court, who shall act as chairman, and who shall be designated by the court to serve for one year, and eight
members of the bar of the Philippines, who shall hold office for a period of one year. The names of the
members of this committee shall be published in each volume of the official reports.

Section 13. Disciplinary measures. — No candidate shall endeavor to influence any member of the
committee, and during examination the candidates shall not communicate with each other nor shall they
give or receive any assistance. The candidate who violates this provisions, or any other provision of this
rule, shall be barred from the examination, and the same to count as a failure against him, and further
disciplinary action, including permanent disqualification, may be taken in the discretion of the court.

Section 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below
50 per cent in any subjects. In determining the average, the subjects in the examination shall be given the
following relative weights: Civil Law, 15 per cent; Labor and Social Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law,
15 per cent; Criminal Law; 10 per cent: Political and International Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent;
Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent.

Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers. — Not later than February 15th after the
examination, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, the committee shall file its report on the result
of such examination. The examination papers and notes of the committee shall be filed with the clerk and
may there be examined by the parties in interest, after the court has approved the report.

Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course. — Candidates who have failed the bar examinations
for three times shall be disqualified from taking another examination unless they show the satisfaction of
the court that they have enrolled in and passed regular fourth year review classes as well as attended a
pre-bar review course in a recognized law school.

The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this rule shall certify
under oath that the candidates have regularly attended classes and passed the subjects under the same
conditions as ordinary students and the ratings obtained by them in the particular subject.

Section 17. Admission and oath of successful applicants. — An applicant who has passed the required
examination, or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the bar, shall take and subscribe
before the Supreme Court the corresponding oath of office.

Section 18. Certificate. — The supreme Court shall thereupon admit the applicant as a member of the bar
for all the courts of the Philippines, and shall direct an order to be entered to that effect upon its records,
and that a certificate of such record be given to him by the clerk of court, which certificate shall be his
authority to practice.

Section 19. Attorney's roll. — The clerk of the Supreme Court shall kept a roll of all attorneys admitted to
practice, which roll shall be signed by the person admitted when he receives his certificate.

Section 20. Duties of attorneys. — It is the duty of an attorney:

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(a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and
obey the laws of the Philippines.

(b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers;

(c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such
defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are
consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an
artifice or false statement of fact or law;

(e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the secrets of his
client, and to accept no compensation in connection with his client's business except from him or
with his knowledge and approval;

(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged;

(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action or proceeding, or
delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;

(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the defenseless or
oppressed;

(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable means, regardless of his
personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present every defense that the law permits, to
the end that no person may be deprived of life or liberty, but by due process of law.

Section 21. Authority of attorney to appear. — an attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to

represent any cause in which he appears, and no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to
appear in court for his client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable
grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce
or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name
of the person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorneys
wilfully appear in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be
punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.

Section 22. Attorney who appears in lower court presumed to represent client on appeal. — An attorney
who appears de parte in a case before a lower court shall be presumed to continue representing his client
on appeal, unless he files a formal petition withdrawing his appearance in the appellate court.

Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. — Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any
case by any agreement in relation thereto made in writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of
ordinary judicial procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation,
or receive anything in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash.

Section 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have and
recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view to the

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importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the
professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert
witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its
own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid therefor
unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.

Section 25. Unlawful retention of client's funds; contempt. — When an attorney unjustly retains in his
hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an officer of
the Court who has misbehaved in his official transactions; but proceedings under this section shall not be a
bar to a criminal prosecution.

Section 26. Change of attorneys. — An attorney may retire at any time from any action or special
proceeding, by the written consent of his client filed in court. He may also retire at any time from an action
or special proceeding, without the consent of his client, should the court, on notice to the client and
attorney, and on hearing, determine that he ought to be allowed to retire. In case of substitution, the
name of the attorney newly employed shall be entered on the docket of the court in place of the former
one, and written notice of the change shall be given to the advance party.

A client may at any time dismiss his attorney or substitute another in his place, but if the contract between
client and attorney has been reduced to writing and the dismissal of the attorney was without justifiable
cause, he shall be entitled to recover from the client the full compensation stipulated in the contract.
However, the attorney may, in the discretion of the court, intervene in the case to protect his rights. For
the payment of his compensation the attorney shall have a lien upon all judgments for the payment of
money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgment, rendered in the case wherein his services
had been retained by the client.

Section 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for
corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of
soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.

Section 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. — The Court of
Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in
the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until
further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.

Section 29. Upon suspension by the Court of Appeals or Court of First Instance, further proceedings in
Supreme Court. — Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Court of First Instance shall forthwith
transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of the facts
upon which the same was based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the Supreme
Court shall make a full investigation of the facts involved and make such order revoking or extending the
suspension, or removing the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant.

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Section 30. Attorney to be heard before removal or suspension. — No attorney shall be removed or
suspended from the practice of his profession, until he has had full opportunity upon reasonable notice to
answer the charges against him, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself or
counsel. But if upon reasonable notice he fails to appear and answer the accusation, the court may
proceed to determine the matter ex parte.

Section 31. Attorneys for destitute litigants. — A court may assign an attorney to render professional aid
free of charge to any party in a case, if upon investigation it appears that the party is destitute and unable
to employ an attorney, and that the services of counsel are necessary to secure the ends of justice and to
protect the rights of the party. It shall be the duty of the attorney so assigned to render the required
service, unless he is excused therefrom by the court for sufficient cause shown.

Section 32. Compensation for attorneys de oficio. — Subject to availability of funds as may be provided by
the law the court may, in its discretion, order an attorney employed as counsel de oficio to be
compensates in such sum as the court may fix in accordance with section 24 of this rule. Whenever such
compensation is allowed, it shall be not less than thirty pesos (P30) in any case, nor more than the
following amounts: (1) Fifty pesos (P50) in light felonies; (2) One hundred pesos (P100) in less grave
felonies; (3) Two hundred pesos (P200) in grave felonies other than capital offenses; (4) Five Hundred
pesos (P500) in capital offenses.

Section 33. Standing in court of person authorized to appear for Government. — Any official or other
person appointed or designated in accordance with law to appear for the Government of the Philippines
shall have all the rights of a duly authorized member of the bar to appear in any case in which said
government has an interest direct or indirect.

Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his
litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid an
attorney. In any other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his
appearance must be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. — No judge or other official or employee of the superior
courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or
give professional advice to clients.

Section 36. Amicus Curiae. — Experienced and impartial attorneys may be invited by the Court to appear
as amici curiae to help in the disposition of issues submitted to it.

Section 37. Attorneys' liens. — An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his
client which have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a
lien to the same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance
of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall
have the caused a statement of his claim of such lien to be entered upon the records of the court
rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have the caused written notice thereof to be
delivered to his client and to the adverse paty; and he shall have the same right and power over such
judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and secure the payment of his just
fees and disbursements.

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RULE 138-A

Law Student Practice Rule

Section 1. Conditions for student practice. — A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of
the regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal
education program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil,
criminal or administrative case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent
clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Section 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the
direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the
law school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed
by the supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

Section 3. Privileged communications. — The Rules safeguarding privileged communications between

attorney and client shall apply to similar communications made to or received by the law student, acting
for the legal clinic.

Section 4. Standards of conduct and supervision. — The law student shall comply with the standards of
professional conduct governing members of the Bar. Failure of an attorney to provide adequate
supervision of student practice may be a ground for disciplinary action. (Circular No. 19, dated December
19, 1986).

A. CONCEPT

i. People v Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109

14 SCRA 109 – Legal Ethics – Practice of Law – Isolated Appearance

In 1959, Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in the municipality of Alaminos in Laguna. In said case,
the private offended party asked his lawyer friend, Ariston Fule to prosecute said case. Apparently, Fule was the
fiscal in San Pablo, Laguna. Villanueva the opposed the appearance of Fule as counsel for the offended party as
he said that according to the Rules of Court when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant
Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law
practice.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice.

HELD: No. Private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and
continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a
compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. In the case at bar, Fule is not
being compensated but rather he’s doing it for free for his friend who happened to be the offended party.
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of

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acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Further, the fact that the Secretary of
Justice approved Fule’s appearance for his friend should be given credence.

ii. Cayetano v Monsod, G.R. No. 110113, 3 September 1991

Cayetano v. Monsod
G.R. No. 100113, September 3, 1991

Facts:

Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of the
COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991. Petitioner
opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of having been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of the
COMELEC.

Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner
as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said confirmation and
the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.

Issue:

Whether the appointment of Chairman Monsod of Comelec violates Section 1 (1), Article IX-C of the 1987
Constitution?

Held:

The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C, that there shall be a Commission on Elections composed
of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their
appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for
any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman,
shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade
of 86-55%. He has been dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73.
He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years.

At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an individual
or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice alone are often
called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually

a partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations
and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the experienced attorneys. In
most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneys called "associates."

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Hence, the Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment rendered by
the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a
clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the Court's corrective power,
since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would
warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.

Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, he Court said that, Appointment is an essentially
discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only
condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been
preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide.

iii. Ulep v The Legal Clinic

223 SCRA 378 – 42 SCAD 287 – Legal Ethics – Advertisement in the Legal Profession – Practice of Law

In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales was to move toward
specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the services of big law firms. Now, Atty. Mauricio Ulep
filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of the latter’s advertisements which contain the following:

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am – 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila

GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic
beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota
Res. & Special Retiree’s Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees.
Adoption. Investment in the Phil. US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767

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It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled “Rx for Legal Problems” in Star Week of
Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is composed of specialists that can take care of
a client’s problem no matter how complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-Gabby
Concepcion situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are “specialists” in various fields,
can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor,
litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the US which now
allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the advertisement is merely making known
to the public the services that The Legal Clinic offers.
ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such is allowed; whether or not
its advertisement may be allowed.
HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not allowed. The Legal Clinic
is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include various legal problems wherein a client may
avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these
services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged
in the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction however, the services being offered by Legal Clinic which
constitute practice of law cannot be performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the
bar and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law.
Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional Responsibility provides
that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and objective
information or statement of facts. The standards of the legal profession condemn the lawyer’s advertisement of
his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a
manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods. Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote
divorce, secret marriage, bigamous marriage, and other circumventions of law which their experts can facilitate.
Such is highly reprehensible.
The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best advertising possible for a
lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the
outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the community has a way
of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-product of effective service which
is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial stimulus to generate it and to magnify his
success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-product of able service and the unwholesome result
of propaganda. The Supreme Court also enumerated the following as allowed forms of advertisement:

1. Advertisement in a reputable law list

2. Use of ordinary simple professional card
3. Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization

iv. Alawi v Alauya, A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P, 24 February 1997

ALAWI V. ALAUYA AM No. SDC-97-2-P – February 24 1997 Narvasa

SUBJECT: Canon 9 – Assisting in unauthorized practice of law

FACTS: Sophia Alawi was a sales representative of EB Villarosa & Partners Co., Ltd of Davao City, a real estate
housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari’a District in
Marawi City.

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Through Alawi’s agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installment by Alauya of one of the housing
units belonging to the Villarosa & Co. and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the
National Home Mortgage Finance Corp. (NHMFC). Not long afterwards, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of
Villarosa & Co. and to NHMFC advising of the termination of his contract with Villarosa & Co., as his consent was
vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence. According to him, he was
induced by Alawi to sign a blank contract on the assurance that Alawi would show the completed document to him
later for correction, but she never did.

Alawi, in response, filed a verified complaint praying that Alauya be dismissed or disciplined, for the reason, among
other that he usurped the title of attorney which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may use.

In response, Alauya first submitted a preliminary comment in which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan,
Asst. Div. Clerk of Court who signed the notices of resolution, to require explanation of him, pertaining him as a mere
assistant and that the resolution was a result of strong link between Alawi and Atty. Marasigan’s office.

Alauya justified his use of the title “attorney” by the assertion that it is lexically synonymous with “counselors-at-
law”, a title to which Shari’a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of “attorney” because
“counselor” is often mistaken for “councilor”, “konsehal” or the Maranao term “consial,” connoting a local legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

ISSUE: WON respondent Alauya is allowed to used the title “attorney” although only passing the Shari’a Bar.

HELD: No! Persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-pledged members of the Philippines Bar, hence may only
practice law before Shari’a courts. While one has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar, and one who was been admitted
to the Philippines Bar, may both be considered “counselors,” in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.” The title of “attorney” is reserved to those who, having
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted
to the IBP and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is only them who are authorized to practice law in
this jurisdiction. Respondent’s disinclination to use the title of “counselor” does not warrant his use of the title
attorney.

As a member of the Shari’s Bar and an officer of the Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent
than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive,
scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the
persons and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be characterized by prudence,
restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot
be excused, but his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged. Alauya was reprimanded for use
of excessively intemperate insulting or virulent language, i.e, language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for
usurping the title attorney; and is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be
dealt with more severely.

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B. QUALIFICATIONS

1. Legal Education

Pre-Law: RULES OF COURT, Rule 138 Sec 6

Section 6. Pre-Law. — No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he
presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of
law, he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college,
requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study
prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in arts or sciences with any of the following subjects as major or
field of concentration: political science, logic, english, spanish, history and economics.

Law Proper: RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, Sec 5;

Section 5. Additional requirements for other applicants. — All applicants for admission other than those
referred to in the two preceding section shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily
show that they have regularly studied law for four years, and successfully completed all prescribed courses,
in a law school or university, officially approved and recognized by the Secretary of Education. The affidavit
of the candidate, accompanied by a certificate from the university or school of law, shall be filed as
evidence of such facts, and further evidence may be required by the court.

No applicant shall be admitted to the bar examinations unless he has satisfactorily completed the following
courses in a law school or university duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law,
remedial law, criminal law, public and private international law, political law, labor and social legislation,
medical jurisprudence, taxation and legal ethics.

RA 7662 – Legal Education Reform Act

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7662

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR REFORMS IN THE LEGAL EDUCATION, CREATING FOR THE PURPOSE, A LEGAL EDUCATION
BOARD AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Legal Education Reform Act of 1993."

Section 2. Declaration of Policies. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to uplift the standards of legal education in
order to prepare law students for advocacy, counselling, problem-solving, and decision-making, to infuse in them the
ethics of the legal profession; to impress on them the importance, nobility and dignity of the legal profession as an equal
and indispensable partner of the Bench in the administration of justice and to develop social competence.

Towards this end, the State shall undertake appropriate reforms in the legal education system, require proper selection of
law students, maintain quality among law schools, and require legal apprenticeship and continuing legal education.

Section 3. General and Specific Objective of Legal Education. - (a) Legal education in the Philippines is geared to attain the
following objectives:

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LEGAL PROFESSION
(1) to prepare students for the practice of law;

(2) to increase awareness among members of the legal profession of the needs of the poor, deprived and
oppressed sectors of society;

(3) to train persons for leadership;

(4) to contribute towards the promotion and advancement of justice and the improvement of its
administration, the legal system and legal institutions in the light of the historical and contemporary
development of law in the Philippines and in other countries.

(b) Legal education shall aim to accomplish the following specific objectives:

(1) to impart among law students a broad knowledge of law and its various fields and of legal institutions;

(2) to enhance their legal research abilities to enable them to analyze, articulate and apply the law
effectively, as well as to allowthem to have a holistic approach to legal problems and issues;

(3) to prepare law students for advocacy, counselling, problem-solving and decision-making, and to
develop their ability to deal with recognized legal problems of the present and the future;

(4) to develop competence in any field of law as is necessary for gainful employment or sufficient as a
foundation for future training beyond the basic professional degree, and to develop in them the desire
and capacity for continuing study and self-improvement;

(5) to inculcate in them the ethics and responsibilities of the legal profession; and

(6) to produce lawyers who conscientiously pursue the lofty goals of their profession and to fully adhere
to its ethical norms.

Section 4. Legal Education Board; Creation and Composition. - To carry out the purpose of this Act, there is hereby created
the Legal Education Board, hereinafter referred to as the Board, attached solely for budgetary purposes and
administrative support to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports.

The Board shall be composed of a Chairman, who shall preferably be a former justice of the Supreme Court or Court of
Appeals, and the following as regular members: a representative of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP); a
representative of the Philippine Association of Law Schools (PALS); a representative from the ranks of active law
practitioners; and, a representative from the law students' sector. The Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports, or his representative, shall be an ex officio member of the Board.

With the exception of the representative of the law students' sector, the Chairman and regular members of the Board
must be natural-born citizen of the Philippines and members of the Philippine Bar, who have been engaged for at least ten
(10) years in the practice of law, as well as in the teaching of law in a duly authorized or recognized law school.

Section 5. Term of Office; Compensation. - The Chairman and regular members of the Board shall be appointed by the
President for a term of five (5) years without reappointment from a list of at least three (3) nominees prepared, with prior
authorization from the Supreme Court, by the Judicial and Bar Council, for every position or vacancy, and no such
appointment shall need confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Of those first appointed, the Chairman and
the representative of the IBP shall hold office for five (5) years, the representatives of the PALS and the PALP, for three (3)
years; and the representative from the ranks of active law practitioners and the representative of the law students' sector,
for one (1) year, without reappointment. Appointments to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpire portion of the term
of the predecessor.

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The Chairman and regular members of the Board shall have the same salary and rank as the Chairman and members,
respectively, of the Constitutional Commissions: Provided, That their salaries shall not be diminished during their term of
office.

Section 6. Office and Staff Support. - The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall provide the necessary office
and staff support to the Board, with a principal office to be located in Metropolitan Manila.

The Board may appoint such other officers and employees it may deem necessary in the performanceof its powers and
functions.

Section 7. Powers and Functions. - For the purpose of achieving the objectives of this Act, the Board shall havethe
following powers and functions:

(a) to administer the legal education system in the country in a manner consistent with the provisions of this Act;

(b) to supervise the law schools in the country, consistent with its powers and functions as herein enumerated;

(c) to set the standards of accreditation for law schools taking into account, among others, the size of enrollment,
the qualifications of the members of the faculty, the library and other facilities, without encroaching upon the
academic freedom of institutions of higher learning;

(d) to accredit law schools that meet the standards of accreditation;

(e) to prescribe minimum standards for law admission and minimum qualifications and compensation of faculty
members;

(f) to prescribe the basic curricula for the course of study aligned to the requirements for admission to the Bar,
law practice and social consciousness, and such other courses of study as may be prescribed by the law schools
and colleges under the different levels of accreditation status;

(g) to establish a law practice internship as a requirement for taking the Bar which a law student shall undergo
with any duly accredited private or public law office or firm or legal assistance group anytime during the law
course for a specific period that the Board may decide, but not to exceed a total of twelve (12) months. For this
purpose, the Board shall prescribe the necessary guidelines for such accreditation and the specifications of such
internship which shall include the actual work of a new member of the Bar.

(h) to adopt a system of continuing legal education. For this purpose, the Board may provide for the mandatory
attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses and for such duration as the Board may deem necessary; and

(i) to perform such other functions and prescribe such rules and regulations necessary for the attainment of the
policies and objectives of this Act.

Section 8. Accreditation of Law Schools. - Educational institutions may not operate a law school unless accredited by the
Board. Accreditation of law schools may be granted only to educational institutions recognized by the Government.

Section 9. Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. - The Board may withdraw or downgrade the accreditation status
of a law school if it fails to maintain the standards set for its accreditation status.

Section 10. Effectivity of Withdrawal or Downgrading of Accreditation. - The withdrawal or downgrading of accreditation
status shall be effetive after the lapse ofthe semester or trimester following the receipt by the school of the notice of
withdrawal or downgrading unless, in the meantime, the school meets and/or upgrades the standards or corrects the
deficiencies upon which the withdrawal or downgrading of the accreditation status is based.

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Section 11. Legal Education Fund. - There is hereby created a special endowment fund, to be known as the Legal
Education Fund, which shall be under the control of the Board, and administered as a separate fund by the Social Security
System (SSS) which shall invest the same with due and prudent regard to its solvency, safety and liquidity.

The Legal Education Fund shall be established out of, and maintained from, the amounts appropriated pursuant to
paragraph 2, Section 13 hereof, and from sixty percent (60%) of the privilege tax paid by every lawyer effective Fiscal Year
1994; and from such donations, legacies, grant-in-aid and other forms of contributions received by the Board for the
purposes of this Act.

Being a special endowment fund, only the interests earned on the Legal Education Fund shall be used exclusively for the
purposes of this Act, including support for faculty development grants, professorial chairs, library improvements and
similar programs for the advancement of law teaching and education in accredited law schools.

The Fund shall also be used for the operation of the Board. For this purpose, an amount not exceeding ten percent (10%)
of the interest on the Fund shall be utilized.

The Board, in consultation with the SSS, shall issue the necessary rules and regulations for the collection, administration
and utilization of the Fund.

Section 12. Coverage. - The provisions of this Act shall apply to all schools and colleges of law which are presently under
the supervision of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports. Hereafter, said supervision shall be transferred to the
Board. Law schools and colleges which shall be established following the approval of this Act shall likewise be covered.

Section 13. Appropriation. - The amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) is hereby authorized to be charged against
the current year's appropriation of the Contingent Fund for the initial expenses of the Board.

To form part of the Legal Education Fund, there shall be appropriated annually, under the budget of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports, the amount of Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) for a period of ten (10) years effective
Fiscal Year 1994.

Section 14. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or the application thereof to any
person, circumstance or transaction is held invalid, the validity of the remaining provisions of this Act and the applicability
of such provisions to other persons, circumstances and transactions shall not be affected thereby.

Section 15. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, executie orders, rules and regulations, issuances or parts thereof
inconsistent with this Act is hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

Section 16. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of its publication in the
Official Gazette or in any two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved: 23 December 1993.

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2. Citizenship

Constitution Art XII, Sec. 14 (2)

SEC. 14.
The sustained development of a reservoir of national talents consisting of Filipino scientists, entrepreneurs,
professionals, managers, high-level technical manpower and skilled workers and craftsmen in all fields shall be
promoted by the State. The State shall encourage appropriate technology and regulate its transfer for the national
benefit.
The practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens, save in cases prescribed by law.

RA 9225 – Dual Citizenship Act

Congress of the Philippines

Twelfth Congress
Third Regular Session

Begun held in Metro Manila on Monday, the twenty-eighth day of July, two thousand three.

Republic Act No. 9225 August 29, 2003

AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Short Title – this act shall be known as the "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003."

Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of
the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion."

Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.

Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18)
years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizenship of the
Philippines.

Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:

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(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must Meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and
other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath;

(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce
their oath of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;

(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a
license or permit to engage in such practice; and

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or
extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the country of which they are naturalized
citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned officers in the armed forces of the
country which they are naturalized citizens.

Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any other section
or provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.

Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 8. Effectivity Clause – This Act shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following its publication in theOfficial
Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general circulation.

Approved,

FRANKLIN DRILON JOSE DE VENECIA JR.

President of the Senate Speaker of the House of
Representatives

This Act, which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2130 and House Bill No. 4720 was finally passed by the the House of
Representatives and Senate on August 25, 2003 and August 26, 2003, respectively.

OSCAR G. YABES ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary of Senate Secretary General
House of Represenatives

Approved: August 29, 2003

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines

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Petition to Re-Acquire The privilege to Practice Law by Epifanio Muneses, B.M. No.
2112, July 24, 2012
IN RE EPIFANIO MUNESES Keywords:
(Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship) · Petitioner Epifanio B. Muneses became a lawyer
B.M. No. 2112 in 1966 but acquired American citizenship in 1981
· Restored citizenship in 2006 by virtue of RA 9225
· A Filipino lawyer who re-acquires citizenship
remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar but must
apply for a license or permit to engage in law practice.

On June 8, 2009, petitioner Epifanio B. Muneses with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be
granted the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
Petitioner became a member of the IBP in 1966 but lost his privilege to practice law when he became a American
citizen in 1981. In 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 or the “Citizenship Retention
and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003” by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate in
Washington, D.C. He intends to retire in the Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law.

The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar and is, in fact, a continuing
requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof means termination of the petitioner’s membership in the bar;
ipso jure the privilege to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re-
acquired their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic. Thus, a Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, remains to
be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not
automatic. R.A. No. 9225 provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must apply
with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice.

Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of law, the OBC required, and
incompliance thereof, petitioner submitted the following:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the
IC;
5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City
Chapter attesting to his good moral character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;
6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period; and
8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator, UC-MCLE Program,
University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance with the MCLE.

The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with the MCLE. After all the
requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding that the petitioner has met all the qualifications, the OBC
recommended that the petitioner be allowed to resume his practice of law.

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WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, subject to the condition that he shall
re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set by the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees.

The Facts

Epifanio B. Muneses, a Filipino and member of the Philippine Bar but lost the privilege because he became a citizen
of the United States of America on August 28, 1981. On September 15, 2006 reacquired his Philippine citizenship
pursuant to the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003" (R.A. No. 9225). He intends to retire in the
Philippines & return to the practice of law after compliance with the requirements of the Office of the Bar Confidant,
hence this petition.

Issue

If petitioner, after reacquiring Philippine citizenship, can practice law in the Philippines.

Decision

The court - In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, allowed Benjamin M. Dacanay (a Filipino citizen and a
barrister who migrated to Canada) to return to the practice of law after complying with R.A. No. 9225 and the
requirements of the Office of the Bar Confidant to wit:

1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;

2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;
5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
6. Certification from the IBP on updated payments of annual membership dues;
7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.

3. BAR EXAMINATIONS

Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec 7 – 16

Section 7. Time for filing proof of qualifications. — All applicants for admission shall file with the clerk of
the Supreme Court the evidence required by section 2 of this rule at least fifteen (15) days before the
beginning of the examination. If not embraced within section 3 and 4 of this rule they shall also file within
the same period the affidavit and certificate required by section 5, and if embraced within sections 3 and 4
they shall exhibit a license evidencing the

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Alexandra S. Roxas
LEGAL PROFESSION
fact of their admission to practice, satisfactory evidence that the same has not been revoked, and
certificates as to their professional standing. Applicants shall also file at the same time their own affidavits
as to their age, residence, and citizenship.

Section 8. Notice of Applications. — Notice of applications for admission shall be published by the clerk of
the Supreme Court in newspapers published in Pilipino, English and Spanish, for at least ten (10) days
before the beginning of the examination.

Section 9. Examination; subjects. — Applicants, not otherwise provided for in sections 3 and 4 of this rule,
shall be subjected to examinations in the following subjects: Civil Law; Labor and Social Legislation;
Mercantile Law; Criminal Law; Political Law (Constitutional Law, Public Corporations, and Public Officers);
International Law (Private and Public); Taxation; Remedial Law (Civil Procedure, Criminal Procedure, and
Evidence); Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (in Pleadings and Conveyancing).

Section 10. Bar examination, by questions and answers, and in writing. — Persons taking the examination
shall not bring papers, books or notes into the examination rooms. The questions shall be the same for all
examinees and a copy thereof, in English or Spanish, shall be given to each examinee. Examinees shall
answer the questions personally without help from anyone.

Upon verified application made by an examinee stating that his penmanship is so poor that it will be
difficult to read his answers without much loss of time., the Supreme Court may allow such examinee to
use a typewriter in answering the questions. Only noiseless typewriters shall be allowed to be used.

The committee of bar examiner shall take such precautions as are necessary to prevent the substitution of
papers or commission of other frauds. Examinees shall not place their names on the examination papers.
No oral examination shall be given.

Section 11. Annual examination. — Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take
place annually in the City of Manila. They shall be held in four days to be disignated by the chairman of the
committee on bar examiners. The subjects shall be distributed as follows: First day: Political and
International Law (morning) and Labor and Social Legislation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law (morning)
and Taxation (afternoon); Third day: Mercantile Law (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day:
Remedial Law (morning) and legal Ethics and Practical Exercises (afternoon).

Section 12. Committee of examiners. — Examinations shall be conducted by a committee of bar examiners
to be appointed by the Supreme Court. This committee shall be composed of a Justice of the Supreme
Court, who shall act as chairman, and who shall be designated by the court to serve for one year, and eight
members of the bar of the Philippines, who shall hold office for a period of one year. The names of the
members of this committee shall be published in each volume of the official reports.

Section 13. Disciplinary measures. — No candidate shall endeavor to influence any member of the
committee, and during examination the candidates shall not communicate with each other nor shall they
give or receive any assistance. The candidate who violates this provisions, or any other provision of this
rule, shall be barred from the examination, and the same to count as a failure against him, and further
disciplinary action, including permanent disqualification, may be taken in the discretion of the court.

Section 14. Passing average. — In order that a candidate may be deemed to have passed his examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling below
50 per cent in any subjects. In determining the average, the subjects in the examination shall be given the
following relative weights: Civil Law, 15 per cent; Labor and Social Legislation, 10 per cent; Mercantile Law,

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15 per cent; Criminal Law; 10 per cent: Political and International Law, 15 per cent; Taxation, 10 per cent;
Remedial Law, 20 per cent; Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, 5 per cent.

Section 15. Report of the committee; filing of examination papers. — Not later than February 15th after the
examination, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, the committee shall file its report on the result
of such examination. The examination papers and notes of the committee shall be filed with the clerk and
may there be examined by the parties in interest, after the court has approved the report.

Section 16. Failing candidates to take review course. — Candidates who have failed the bar examinations
for three times shall be disqualified from taking another examination unless they show the satisfaction of
the court that they have enrolled in and passed regular fourth year review classes as well as attended a
pre-bar review course in a recognized law school.

The professors of the individual review subjects attended by the candidates under this rule shall certify
under oath that the candidates have regularly attended classes and passed the subjects under the same
conditions as ordinary students and the ratings obtained by them in the particular subject.

Bar Matter No. 1153, 09 March 2010 (In Re Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza
Proposing Reforms in the Bar Examinations Through Amendments to Rule 138, Sec.
5 & 6 of the Rules of the Court)

Bar Matter No. 1153

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc dated March 9, 2010
"B.M. No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in the Bar Examinations
Through Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). - The Court Resolved to APPROVE the proposed
amendments to Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138, to wit:
SEC. 5.Additional Requirement for Other Applicants. — All applicants for admission other than those
referred to in the two preceding sections shall, before being admitted to the examination, satisfactorily
show that they have successfully completed all the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws
or its equivalent degree, in a law school or university officially recognized by the Philippine Government or
by the proper authority in the foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been granted.
No applicant who obtained the Bachelor of Laws degree in this jurisdiction shall be admitted to the bar
examination unless he or she has satisfactorily completed the following course in a law school or university
duly recognized by the government: civil law, commercial law, remedial law, criminal law, public and
private international law, political law, labor and social legislation, medical jurisprudence, taxation and
legal ethics.
A Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to the bar examination only
upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing: (a) completion of all courses leading to
the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree; (b) recognition or accreditation of the law school
by the proper authority; and (c) completion of all the fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic
program in a law school duly recognized by the Philippine Government.

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SEC. 6.Pre-Law. — An applicant for admission to the bar examination shall present a certificate issued by
the proper government agency that, before commencing the study of law, he or she had pursued and
satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission
thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a
bachelor's degree in arts or sciences.
A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her Bachelor of Laws degree or its equivalent in a
foreign law school must present proof of having completed a separate bachelor's degree course.
The Clerk of Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, is hereby directed to CIRCULARIZE this
resolution among all law schools in the country."

BAR MATTER 1153

Philippine Bar Now Open to Filipinos with Foreign Law Degrees

March 23, 2010
By Anna Katrina M. Martinez

The Supreme Court En Banc has recently approved the proposed amendments to Sections 5 and 6 of Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, allowing Filipino graduates of foreign law schools to take the Philippine Bar,
subject to certain conditions.

Section 5 of the Rule now provides that before being admitted to the examination, all applicants for
admission to the bar shall satisfactorily show that they have successfully completed all the prescribed
courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree in a law school or university officially
recognized by the Philippine Government or by the proper authority in the foreign jurisdiction where the
degree has been granted.

Section 5 now also provides that a Filipino citizen “who graduated from a foreign law school shall be
admitted to the bar examination only upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing: (a)
completion of all courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree; (b) recognition
or accreditation of the law school by the proper authority; and (c) completion of all fourth year subjects in
the Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law school duly recognized by the Philippine Government.”

SEC. 6.Pre-Law. — An applicant for admission to the bar examination shall present a certificate issued by
the proper government agency that, before commencing the study of law, he or she had pursued and
satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission
thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a
bachelor's degree in arts or sciences.

A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her degree in Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent in a
foreign law school must also present proof of completion of a separate bachelor’s degree.

The Supreme Court has directed the Clerk of Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, to circularize
its resolution approving the said amendments among all law schools in the country. (Bar Matter No. 1153,
Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in the Bar Examinations through Amendments to
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, March 9, 2010)

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Reforms in the Bar Examinations, B.M. No. 1161, 08 June 2004

(Reserved Section)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

BAR MATTER No. 1161

RE: PROPOSED REFORMS IN THE BAR EXAMINATIONS

RESOLUTION
ON
REFORM IN THE BAR EXAMINANTIONS

WHEREAS, pursuant to its Constitutional authority to promulgate rules concerning the

admission to the practice of law, the Supreme Court en banc item in its Resolution of 21 March
2000, created a "Special Study Group on Bar Examination Reforms" to conduct studies on steps
to further safeguard the integrity of the Bar Examinations and to make them effective tools in
measuring the adequacy of the law curriculum and the quality of the instruction given by law
schools";

WHEREAS, the Special Study Group, with Philippine Judicial Academy (PHILJA) Chancellor
Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera as a chairperson and retired Justice Jose Y. Feria and
retired Justice Camilo D. Quiason as members, submitted to the Supreme Court its Final
Report, dated 18 September 2000, containing its findings and recommendations;

WHEREAS, on 21 August 2001, the Supreme Court en banc referred, for further study, report
and recommendation, the Final Report of the Special Study Group to the Committee on Legal
Education and Bar Matters (CLEBM) headed by Justice Jose C. Vitug;

WHEREAS, in connection with the discussion on the proposed reforms in the bar examinations,
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, then a Member of the CLEBM, submitted a Paper,
entitled "Toward Meaningful Reforms in the Bar Examination" with a Primer, proposing
structural and administrative reforms, changes in the design and construction of questions, and
the methodological reforms concerning the marking anf grading of the essay questions in the
bar examination;

WHEREAS, proposals and comments were likewise received from the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Philippine Association of Law Schools, the Philippine Association of Law
Professors, the Commission on Higher Education, the University of the Philippines College of
Law, Arellano Law Foundation, the Philippine Lawyers Association, the Philippine Bar
Association and other prominent personalities from the Bench and the Bar;

WHEREAS, considering her Memorandum to the Chief Justice on "Proposed Technical

Assistance Project on Legal Education," dated 27 February 2003, Program Director Evelyn

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Toledo-Dumdum of the Program Management Office (PMO) was invited to a meeting of the
CLEBM;

WHEREAS, under the auspices of the PMO, the CLEBM conducted fur (4) regional round-table
discussions with the law deans, professors, the students and members of the Integrated Bar of
he Philippines for (a) the National Capital Region, at Manila Diamond Hotel on 19 November
2003; (b) Mindanao, at the Grand Regal Hotel Davao City on 23 January 2004; (c) the Visayas, at
the Montebello Hotel in Cebu City on January 2004; and (d) Luzon, at the Pan Pacific Hotel in
Manila on 6 February 2004.

WHEREAS, in a Special Meeting of the CLEBM at the Pan Pacific Hotel on 23 April 2004, the
Committee heard the views of Ms. Erica Moeser, the Chief Executive Officer and President of
the National Conference of Board Examiners in the United States of America on a number of
proposed bar reforms;

WHEREAS, the CLEBM, after extensive deliberation and consultation, has arived at certain
recommendations for consideration by the Supreme Court and submitted its report , dated 21
May 2004, to the Court en banc;

NOW, THEREFORE, the Court, sitting en banc, hereby RESOLVES to approve and adopt the
following Bar Examination Reforms:

A. For implementation within one (1) up to two (2) years:

1. Initial determination by the Chairman of admission to the bar examinations of
candidates (on the merits of the each case) to be passed upon by the Court en
banc.
2. Submission by law deans of a certification that a candidate has no derogatory
record in school and, if any, the details and status thereof.
3. Disqualification of a candidate after failing in three(3) examinations, provided,
that he may take a fourth and fifth examination if he successful completes a one
(1) year refresher course for each examination; provided, further, that upon the
effectivity of this Resolution, those who have already failed in five(5) or more
bar examinations shall be allowed to take only one (1) more bar examination
after copleting (1) year refresher course.
4. Promulgation of disciplinary measures for those involved in (a) attempts to
violate or vitiate the integrity and confidentiality of the bar examination process;
(b) improper conduct during the bar examination; and (c) improper conduct of
"bar examinations."
5. Disqualification of a Bar Examination Chairperson:
a. kinship with an examinee who if his or her spouse or relative within the
third civil degree of consanguinity;
b. having a member of his or her office staff as an examinee, or when the
spouse or child of such staff member is an examinee; and
c. being a member of the governing board, faculty or administration of a
law school.
6. Desirable qualifications of Examiners:
a. membership in good standing in the Philippine Bar;
b. competence in the assigned subject;

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Alexandra S. Roxas
LEGAL PROFESSION
c. a teacher of the subject or familiarity with the principles of test
construction; and
d. commitment to check test papers personally and promptly pending the
creation and organization of the readership panels provided for in item
B(6) below
7. Disqualifications of Examiners:
a. kinship with an examinee who is his or her spouse or relative within the
third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity;
b. having a member of his or her office staff as an examinee; or when the
spouse or child of such staff member is an examinee;
c. being a member of the governing board, faculty or administration of a
law school
d. teaching or lecturing in any law school, institution or review center
during the particular semester following the bar examinations;
e. having any interest or involvement in any law school, bar review center
or group; and
f. suspension or disbarment from the practice of law or the imposition of
any other serious disciplinary sanction.
8. Personal preparation, by handwriting or using a typewriter, of fifty (50) main
questions, excluding subdivisions, and their submission to the Chairperson in
sealed envelope at least forty-five (45) days before the schedule examination on
any particular subject; examiners should not use computers in preparing
questions;
9. Apportionment of examination questions among the various topics covered by
the subject;
10. Burning and shredding of rough drafts and carbon papers used in the
preparation of questions or in any other act connected with such preparation;
11. Publication of names candidates admitted to take the bar examinations;
12. Disqualification of a candidate who obtains a grade below 50% in any subject;
13. Fixing at June 30 of the immediately preceding year as the cut-off date for laws
and Supreme Court decisions and resolutions to be included in the bar
examinations; and
14. Consideration of suggested answers to bar examinations questions prepared by
the U.P. Law Center and submitted to the Chairperson.
B. For implementation within two (2) years up to five (5) years:
1. Adoption of objective multiple-choice questions for 30% to 40% of the total
number of questions;
2. Formulation of essay test questions and "model answers" as part of the
calibration of test papers;
3. Introduction of performance testing by way of revising and improving the essay
examination;1awphil.net
4. Designation of two(2) examiners per subject depending on the number of
examinees ;
5. Appointment of a tenured Board of Examiners with an incumbent Supreme
Court Justice as Chairperson;
6. Creation and organization of readership panels for each subject area to address
the issue of bias or subjectivity and facilitate the formulation of test questions
and the correction of examination booklets; and

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Alexandra S. Roxas
LEGAL PROFESSION
7. Adoption of the calibration method in the corrections of essay questions to
correct variations in the level of test standards.1awph!l.ñêt
C. For implementation within five(5) years and beyond is the further computerization or
automation of the bar examinations to facilitate application, testing, and reporting
procedures.
D. Items not covered by this resolution, such as those that pertain to a possible review of
the coverage and relative weights of the subjects of the bar examinations, are
maintained.
E. For referral to the Legal education Boards:
1. Accreditation and supervision of law schools.
2. Inclusion of a subject on clinical legal education in the law curriculum, including
an apprenticeship program in the Judiciary, prosecution service, and law offices.
3. Imposition of sanctions on law schools that fail to meet the standards as may be
prescribed by the Legal Education Board.
4. Mandatory Law School Admission Test.

This resolution shall take effect on the fifteenth day of July 2004, and shall be published in two
newspapers of general circulation in the Philippines.

Promulgated this 8th day of June 2004.

(Sgd.) HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief. Justice

(Sgd.) REYNATO S. PUNO (Sgd.) JOSE C. VITUG

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(Sgd.) ARTEMIO V. (Sgd.) LEONARDO A

PNGANIBAN QUISUMBING
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(Sgd.) CONSUELO YNARES- (Sgd.) ANGELINA SANDOVAL-

SANTIAGO GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(Sgd.) MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-

(Sgd.) ANTONIO T. CARPIO
MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(Sgd.) CONCHITA CARPIO-

(On leave) RENATO C. CORONA
MORALES
Associate Justice>
Associate Justice

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Alexandra S. Roxas
LEGAL PROFESSION

(Sgd.) ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. (Sgd.) ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(Sgd.) DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice

2010 Bar Matter No. 2265, 28 January 2001, In Re Reforms in the Bar
Examinations

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated FEBRUARY 8, 2011, which reads as follows:

"B.M. No. 2265 (Re: Letter of Justice Roberto A. Abad Proposing Changes for Improving the Conduct of the Bar
Examinations). - The Court Resolved to NOTE the Letter dated January 28, 2011 of Justice Roberto A. Abad re: Amendment
to Section 11, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court (Annual Examination), incident to the implementation of B.M. No. 2265
(Reforms in the 2011 Bar Examinations).

The Court further Resolved to APPROVE the Amendment to Section 11, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

"Section 11. Annual examination. - Examinations for admission to the bar of the Philippines shall take place annually in the
City of Manila. They shall be held in four days to be designated by the chairman of the committee on bar examiners. The
subjects shall be distributed as follows: First day: Political and International Law, and Labor and Social Legislation
(morning) and Taxation (afternoon); Second day: Civil Law (morning) and Mercantile Law (afternoon); Third day: Remedial
Law, and Legal Ethics and Forums (morning) and Criminal Law (afternoon); Fourth day: Trial Memorandum (morning) and
Legal Opinion (afternoon)". (adv107)

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.)ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL
Clerk of Court

Honorable Roberto A. Abad (x)

Associate Justice and Chairperson
2011 Committee on Bar Examinations
Supreme Court

Atty. Ma. Cristina B. Layusa (x)

Deputy Clerk of Court and Bar Confidant
Supreme Court

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Alexandra S. Roxas
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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

NOTICE

Sirs/Mesdames:

Please take notice that the Court en banc issued a Resolution dated JANUARY 18, 2011, which reads as follows:

"B.M. No. 2265 (Re: Reforms in the 2011 Bar Examinations [Letter of Justice Roberto A. Abad Proposing Changes for
Improving the Conduct of the Bar Examinations]. Acting on the Letter dated January 10, 2011 of Associate Justice Roberto
A. Abad, proposing to move the 2011 Bar Examinations from September to November, the Court Resolved to NOTE the
said Letter and GRANT the proposal of Justice Abad to MOVE the 2011 Bar Examinations from September to November.

The Court further Resolved to

(a) NOTE the Letter dated September 2, 2010 of Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, Chairperson, Committee on
Legal Education and Bar Matters, recommending the final approval by the Court En Banc of the proposed changes
for improving the conduct of the bar examinations by Justice Abad, inasmuch as the Court En Banc had
provisionally approved the proposals

(b) APPROVE the Reforms in the 2011 Bar Examinations, hereto attached as Annex "A"; and

(c) NOTE Resolution No. 12-991-2010 dated October 1, 2010 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod ng Cebu, Cebu City
Hall, praying anew that the Supreme Court, through the Bar Committee will extend the venue of the Bar
Examinations to Cebu City, and hold simultaneous annual examinations in Manila and Cebu City." (adv14)

Very truly yours,

ENRIQUETA E. VIDAL
Clerk of Court

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

B.M. No. 2265

RE: REFORMS IN THE 2011 BAR EXAMINATIONS

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Alexandra S. Roxas
LEGAL PROFESSION
Preliminary Statement

The Court has found merit in the proposed changes in the conduct of the bar examinations that the Chairperson of the
2011 Bar Examinations and Philippine Association of Law Schools recommended.

One recommendation concerns the description of the coverage of the annual bar examinations that in the past consisted
merely of naming the laws that each subject covered. This description has been regarded as too general and provides no
specific understanding of the entry-level legal knowledge required of beginning law practitioners.

A second recommendation addresses the predominantly essay-type of bar examinations that the Court conducts. Because
of the enormous growth of laws, doctrines, principles, and precedents, it has been noted that such examinations are
unable to hit a significant cross-section of the subject matter. Further, the huge number of candidates taking the
examinations annually and the limited time available for correcting the answers make fair correction of purely essay-type
examinations difficult to attain. Besides, the use of multiple choice questions, properly and carefully constructed, is a
method of choice for qualifying professionals all over the world because of its proven reliability and facility of correction.

A third recommendation opts for maintaining the essay-type examinations but dedicating these to the assessment of the
requisite communication skills, creativity, and fine intellect that bar candidates need for the practice of law.

Approved Changes

The Court has previously approved in principle the above recommended changes. It now resolves to approve the following
rules that shall govern the future conduct of the bar examinations:

1. The coverage of the bar examinations shall be drawn up by topics and sub-topics rather than by just stating the
covered laws. The test for including a topic or sub-topic in the coverage of the examinations is whether it covers
laws, doctrines, principles and rulings that a new lawyer needs to know to begin a reasonably prudent and
competent law practice.

The coverage shall be approved by the Chairperson of the Bar Examination in consultation with the academe,
subject to annual review and re-approval by subsequent Chairpersons.

2. The bar examinations shall measure the candidate’s knowledge of the law and its applications through
multiple-choice-questions (MCQs) that are to be so constructed as to specifically:

2.1. Measure the candidate’s knowledge of and ability to recall the laws, doctrines, and principles that
every new lawyer needs in his practice;

2.2. Assess the candidate’s understanding of the meaning and significance of those same laws, doctrines,
and principles as they apply to specific situations; and

2.3. Measure his ability to analyze legal problems, apply the correct law or principle to such problems,
and provide solutions to them.

3. The results of the MCQ examinations shall, if feasible, be corrected electronically.

4. The results of the MCQ examinations in each bar subject shall be given the following weights:

Political Law — 15%

Labor Law — 10%

Civil Law — 15%

Taxation — 10%

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LEGAL PROFESSION
Mercantile Law — 15%

Criminal Law — 10%

Remedial Law — 20%

Legal Ethics/Forms — 5%

5. Part of the bar examinations shall be of the essay-type, dedicated to measuring the candidate’s skills in writing
in English, sorting out the relevant facts in a legal dispute, identifying the issue or issues involved, organizing his
thoughts, constructing his arguments, and persuading his readers to his point of view. The essays will not be bar
subject specific.

5.1. One such essay examination shall require the candidate to prepare a trial memorandum or a decision
based on a documented legal dispute. (60% of essays)

5.2 Another essay shall require him to prepare a written opinion sought by a client concerning a potential
legal dispute facing him. (40% of essays)

6. The essays shall not be graded for technically right or wrong aswers, but for the quality of the candidate’s legal
advocacy. The passing standard for correction shall be work expected of a beginning practitioner, not a seasoned
lawyer.

7. The examiners in all eight bar subjects shall, apart from preparing the MCQs for their respective subjects, be
divided into two panels of four members each. One panel will grade the memorandum or decision essay while the
other will grade the legal opinion essay. Each member shall read and grade the examination answer of a bar
candidate independently of the other members in his panel. The final grade of a candidate for each essay shall be
the average of the grades given by the four members of the panel for that essay.

8. The results of the a) MCQ and b) essay-type examinations shall be given weights of 60% and 40%, respectively,
in the computation of the candidate’s final grade.

9. For want of historical data needed for computing the passing grade in MCQ kind of examinations, the
Chairperson of the 2011 Bar

Examinations shall, with the assistance of experts in computing MCQ examination grades, recommend to the
Court the appropriate conversion table or standard that it might adopt for arriving at a reasonable passing grade
for MCQs in bar examinations.

10. In the interest of establishing needed data, the answers of all candidates in the essay-type examinations in the
year 2011 shall be corrected irrespective of the results of their MCQ examinations, which are sooner known
because they are electronically corrected. In future bar examinations, however, the Bar Chairperson shall
recommend to the Court the disqualification of those whose grades in the MCQ are so low that it would serve no
useful purpose to correct their answers in the essay-type examinations.

11. Using the data and experience obtained from the 2011 Bar Examinations, future Chairpersons of Bar
Examination are directed to study the feasibility of:

11.1. Holding in the interest of convenience and economy bar examinations simultaneously in Luzon, the
Visayas, and Mindanao; and

11.2. Allowing those who pass the MCQ examinations but fail the essay-type examinations to take
removal examinations in the immediately following year.

12. All existing rules, regulations, and instructions that are inconsistent with the above are repealed.

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This Bar Matter shall take effect immediately, and shall be published in two newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines.

January 18, 2011.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

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Bar Matter No. 2502, N20 March 2012

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In Re 2003 Bar Examinations, Atty. Daniel De Guzman, M.M. No. 1722, 24 April
2009
Re: 2003 Bar Examinations, Atty. Daniel de Guzman, B.M. No. 1722, April 24, 2009
On 22 September 2003, the day following the bar examination in Mercantile Law, Justice Jose C. Vitug, Chairman of the 2003 Bar
Examinations

Committee, was apprised of a rumored leakage in the examination on the subject.

With this, the court decided to nullify mercantile law examination and hold another examination in place of this.
However, petitions were filed because of the emotional, physical and financial burden to the barristers. The petitions were
granted and the court decided to just spread the percentage of the mercantile law exam to the remaining 7 bar subjects.

The court appointed 3 retired justices into a Committee to investigate the leakage issue. The Investigating Committee was
tasked to determine and identify the source of leakage, the parties responsible therefor or who might have benefited therefrom,
recommend sanctions against all those found to have been responsible for, or who would have benefited from, the incident in
question and to recommend measures to the Court to safeguard the integrity of the bar examinations.

Cecilia Carbajosa, a bar examinee found the leakage when she obtained a copy of the leaked questions and found that they were
very similar to the questions in the bar exam. Upon meeting with the investigators, she provided a xerox of the leaked
questions. The copy was delivered to Justice Vitug, he found that 82% from examiner Atty. Balgos was included in the leakage.
He also received reports that Atty. Danilo de Guzman was the source of the leakage, as he faxed the questions to his fraternity
brother, Ronan Gravida four days before the bar exams.

Atty. Balgos, 71 years old, does not know how to use computer except to type. His secretary Cheryl Palma formatted the test,
printed it and was also the keeper the Balgos’ computer password. Balgos didn’t know his computer was linked to 16 computers
of his employees.

Balgos interrogated Silvestre Atienza, who interconnected the computers in the office. He, like Atty. De Guzman, is a member of
the Beta sigma Lambda fraternity.

It was proven that Balgos indeed prepared the questions and that they came from his computer. His legal assistant, Atty. De
Guzman, actually admitted downloading the questions and faxing them to his frat brothers Garvida, Arlan, and Erwin Tan.
Garvida then faxed it to his brothers in MLQU (Inigo and Bugain), who then passed copies to another, and most illustrious
brother, Ronald Collado who then spread it to the MLQU brothers of the fraternity.

The following were alleged, with the recommendation of De Guzman’s disbarment:

“Attorney Danilo De Guzman’s act of downloading Attorney Balgos’ test questions in mercantile law from the latter’s computer,
without his knowledge and permission, was a criminal act of larceny. It was theft of intellectual property; the test questions
were intellectual property of Attorney Balgos, being the product of his intellect and legal knowledge.”

“Besides theft, De Guzman also committed an unlawful infraction of Balgos’ right to privacy of communication and to security of
his papers and effects against unauthorized search and seizure—rights zealously protected by the Bill of Rights of our
Constitution. He transgressed the very first canon of the lawyers’ Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that a
lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and

promote respect for law and legal processes.”

“By transmitting and distributing the stolen test questions to some members of the Beta Sigma Lambda Fraternity, possibly for
pecuniary profit and to given them undue advantage over the other examiners in the mercantile law examination, De Guzman
abetted cheating or dishonesty by his fraternity brothers in the examination, which is violative of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, as well as
Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for members of the Bar, which provide:

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“De Guzman was guilty of grave misconduct unbecoming a member of the Bar. He violated the law instead of promoting respect
for it and degraded the noble profession of law instead of upholding its dignity and integrity. His actuations impaired public
respect for the Court, and damaged the integrity of the bar examinations as the final measure of a law graduate’s academic
preparedness to embark upon the practice of law.”

Also, it was alleged that others were also liable, such as Balgos himself, who was negligent and failed to prevent the leakage, as
well as the other fraternity brothers who took part in the leakage.

Issues:
1. Should De Guzman be disbarred? – YES
2. Is De Guzman the only one liable for the leakage? – NO

Held: (Recommendations of the Court)

1. Atty. De Guzman should be disbarred and should write a public apology, as well as pay damages to the Supreme Court.

2. Atty. Balgos should be reprimanded and also made to issue a written apology and FURTHER INVESTIGATION of Danilo De
Guzman, Cheryl Palma, Silvestre Atienza, Ronan Garvida, Arlan, Erwin Tan, Randy Iñigo, James Bugain, Ronald Collado and Allan
Guiapal by the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police, with a view to their criminal prosecution as
probable co-conspirators in the theft and leakage of the test questions in mercantile law.

RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS

ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN
B.M. NO. 1222, April 24, 2009, EN BANC, (Ynares-Santiago, J.)

FACTS:

Danilo De Guzman was disbarred for an issue regarding the 2003 Bar Examinations. Working as an assistant
lawyer in the Balgos & Perez, he leaked the exam questions to his fraternity brothers thinking that they were just
quizzers in a book supposedly written by the examiner who was one of the partners. He now prays that he be granted
judicial clemency and be reinstated as a member in good standing in the Philippine Bar.

He presented as evidence his track record in public service that has been going on even before he entered law
school. After his disbarment, he worked as the consultant of the City Government of Taguig and later, a member of
the Secretariat of the Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). It was coupled with testimonials and endorsements
from various individuals and entities all attesting to his good character.

ISSUE: Whether or not Danilo de Guzman should be reinstated as a member of the Bar?

HELD:

Yes. It is of no question that petitioner’s act in copying the exam questions from Atty. Balgos’ computer
without his knowledge and consent and which questions later turned out to be the Bar questions in Mercantile Law in
the 2003 Bar Examinations is not at all commendable. While we do believe that petitioner sincerely did not intend to
cause the damage that his action ensued, still, he must be sanctioned for unduly compromising the integrity of the bar
examinations.

The petitioner has since reformed and has sincerely reflected on his transgressions. Thus, in view of the
circumstances and likewise for the humanitarian considerations, the penalty of disbarment may now be commuted to
suspension.

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We deem petitioner worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty to 7 years of suspension,
inclusive of the 5 years he has already served his disbarment.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion is hereby GRANTED
IN PART. The disbarment of DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law is hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS
SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW, reckoned from February 4, 2004.

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4. GOOD MORAL CHARACTER AS A PREREQUISITE TO BAR ADMISSION

In Re: Argosino (1995)
The practice of law is a PRIVILEGE granted only to those who possess the STRICT INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL
QUALIFICATIONS required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration of justice.

i. In Re Argosino, 246 SCRA 14 (1995)

IN MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO

DOCTRINES:

The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of good moral character, with special education
qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.

Requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so far as the general public and proper administration
of justice is concerned.

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to the Bar.

Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek admission to the bar must be a
necessity more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members of the general public.

Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection
of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the participant was
possessed of good moral character.

Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated at the time of the application for
permission to take the bar examinations and more importantly at the time of application for admission to the bar
and to take the attorney's oath of office.

FACTS:

On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was charged with the crime of homicide in connection with
the death of one Raul Camaligan. The death of Camaligan stemmed from the affliction of severe physical injuries
upon him in course of "hazing" conducted as part of the university fraternity initiation rites. On February 11, 1993,
the accused were consequently sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years.

Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The
application was granted on June 18 1993. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him.

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Less than a month later, Argosino filed a petition to take the bar exam. He was allowed and he passed the exam, but
was not allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.

On April 15, 1994, Argosino filed a petition to allow him to take the attorney's oath and be admitted to the practice
of law. He averred that his probation period had been terminated. It is noted that his probation period did not last
for more than 10 months.

ISSUE: Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of attorney and be admitted to the practice of law

HELD:

Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the requirement of
good moral character imposed upon those who are seeking admission to the bar. He should show to the Court how
he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to
the community at large. In short, he must show evidence that he is a different person now, that he has become
morally fit for admission to the profession of law.

He is already directed to inform the Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names of the parents or
brothers and sisters of Camaligan from notice.

ii. In the Matter of the Disqualification of Bar Examinee Haron S.

Maling in the 2002 Bar Examination, 431 SCRA 146 (2004)
FACTS:

MELENDREZ filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling)
from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a
member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar.

Alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar Examinations that he has three (3)
pending criminal cases both for Grave Oral Defamation and for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

i. Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in
front of media practitioners and other people.

ii. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez’ wife causing
the injuries to the latter.

Alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of
Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar.

MELING explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their
former professor, advised him to settle misunderstanding.

Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over
them, considered the three cases that arose from a single incident as “closed and terminated.”

i. Denies the charges and added that the acts do not involve moral turpitude.

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Use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the word
“Attorney” as they were typed by the office clerk.

Office of Bar Confidant disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling:

Meling should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired
judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still pending.

Even if these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain
his good moral character.

ISSUE:

WON Meling’s act of concealing cases constitutes dishonesty. YES.

HELD:

PETITION IS GRANTED. MEMBERSHIP IS SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to
take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s
Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having
become moot and academic (Meling did not pass the bar).

Rule 7.01: “A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material
fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.”

He is aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as “attorney”
whoever may have typed the letters. i. Unauthorized use of the appellation
“attorney” may render a person liable for indirect contempt of court.

PRACTICE OF LAW IS A HIGH PERSONAL PRIVILEGE.

Limited to citizens of good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified.

Requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so far as the general public and the
proper administration of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning.

Application form of 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant that applicant to aver that he or she “has
not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer
or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or
crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against him/her.”

Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes
concealment, done under oath at that.

iii. Sec. 1, Rule 138, RULES OF COURT

Section 1. Who may practice law. — Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled
to practice law.

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iv. In Re Ching, 113 SCAD 488

Bar Matter No. 914, October 1, 1999

Re: Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar
vs.
Vicente D. Ching, petitioner

Facts:

Vicente D. Ching, a legitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien Chinese father, was born on April 11, 1964 in
Tubao La Union, under the 1935 Constitution. He has resided in the Philippines

He completed his Bachelor of Laws at SLU in Baguio on July 1998, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar
Examination.
The Resolution in this Court, he was allowed to take the bar if he submit to the Court the following documents as
proof of his Philippine Citizenship:
1. Certification issued by the PRC Board of Accountancy that Ching is a certified accountant;
2. Voter Certification issued COMELEC in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of his place; and
3. Certification showing that Ching was elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union
On April 5, 1999, Ching was one of the bar passers. The oath taking ceremony was scheduled on May 5, 1999.
Because of his questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take oath.
He was required to submit further proof of his citizenship.
The Office of the Solicitor General was required to file a comment on Ching's petition for admission to the Philippine
Bar.
In his report:
1. Ching, under the 1935 Constitution, was a Chinese citizen and continue to be so, unless upon reaching the age of
majority he elected Philippine citizenship, under the compliance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 265
"an act providing for the manner in which the option to elect Philippine citizenship shall be declared by a person
whose mother is a Filipino citizen"
2. He pointed out the Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship, and if ever he does, it would already be
beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by the present jurisprudence.

Issue:

Whether or not he has elected Philippine citizenship within "a reasonable time".

Rulings:

No. Ching, despite the special circumstances, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within a reasonable time. The
reasonable time means that the election should be made within 3 years from "upon reaching the age of majority",
which is 21 years old. Instead, he elected Philippine citizenship 14 years after reaching the age of majority which the
court considered not within the reasonable time. Ching offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine
citizenship, as procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is
required is an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and file the same with the nearest civil registry.

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v. In Re Petition of Ramon Quisumbing, Bar Matter No. 419

Facts:

Ramon Quisumbing, a citizen and resident of the Philippines who obtained his degree in law from Georgetown
University Law Center, Washington, D.C. who took and passed the bar examinations of the District of Columbia
and State of Virginia and has been admitted to the practice of law in various jurisdictions in the United States
including the Federal Supreme Court, applies for admission to the practice of law without need of taking the
bar examinations. The petition made on his behalf replied on the following grounds:

1. Section 4, Rule 138, of the Rules of court;

2. Comity or reciprocity, with the state of NY; and
3. The case of In Re Shoop, 41 Phil. 213

Issue:

WON, from the foregoing averments, petitioner may be admitted to the Philippine bar without having to take
the bar examinations.

Held:

The requirements under Section 4, Rule 138, are not met.

The provision reads:

Sec 4. Requirements for applicants from other jurisdictions – applicants for admission who, being
Filipino citizens, are enrolled attorneys in good standing in the SC of U.S. or in any Circuit Court of
Appeals or District Court therein, or in the highest court of any State or territory of the U.S., and who
can show by satisfactory certificates that they have practiced at least 5 years in any courts, and that such
practice began before July 4,1946, and that they have never been suspended or disbarred, may, in the
discretion of the Court, be admitted without examination.

In his petition, the applicant admits that he does not satisfy the requirement that practice in the foreign
jurisdiction must have commenced prior to July 4,1946. However, he insists that given his qualifications and
experience, he should nevertheless, “in the discretion of the Court, be admitted without examination.”

The correct application of the aforecited Rule is that discretion to admit one to the bar may be exercised only
after it is shown that the applicant has complied with all the requirements thereunder.

Moreover, there is at present no Philippine rule authorizing the admission to the Philippine bar because of
reciprocity or comity.

Reciprocity or comity does not operate in the abstract. A local law governs and regulates the extent by which
recipcrocity may be invoked as the source of a right or privilege. The Rules of Court promulgated by the SC
which under the 1987 Constitution as the sole power to promulgate rules concerning admission to the practice
of law in the Philippines, makes no provision for admission to the bar on the basis of reciprocity. The Court

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notes that Rule 520.9 of the Rules of the New Your Court of Appeals does not impose reciprocity as a condition
for admission of foreign trained lawyers who may be admitted to the NY bar without examination.

The limited application of comity as a ground for admission to the Philippine bar is embodied in Rule 138, Sec.
4. Sine the conditions therein were not met by the applicant, then he cannot claim the benefits under the rule.

Applicant himself admits that In Re Shoop “may no longer be binding precedent.” Said case was decided under
the old rules of examination of candidates for admission to the practice of law, which became effective on July
1, 1920, but which had been long superseded by the 1964 Rules of Court.

The court acting on earlier similar applications for admission to law practice by Filipino citizens who obtained
their law degree abroad denied them and required their taking of the bar examinations for admission to the
Philippine bar.

In view of the above considerations, the Court denied the petition of the applicant to the practice of
law without taking and passing the bar examinations.

vi. In Re Application of Adriano M. Hernandez, 225 SCAR

The Law Degree as a prerequisite to practicing law

Wikipedia describes a “law degree” as “an academic degree conferred for studies in law. Such degrees are
generally preparation for legal careers; but while their curricula may be reviewed by legal authority, they do not
themselves confer a license.” In the Philippines, a law degree may be a Bachelor of Laws (LLB), or a Juris Doctor
(JD).

Graduation from a Philippine law school constitutes the primary eligibility requirement for the Philippine Bar
Examination. But this is the general rule which, throughout the years, has been the subject of various exceptions.

Non-law graduates have been allowed to take the Bar Examinations. In fact the 1944 Bar Examinations was
topped by two persons – Jovito Salonga and Jose Diokno – neither of whom had a law degree at the time they
took the Bar. Salonga earned his from the University of the Philippines College of Law in 1946 or after he topped
the Bar; Diokno never returned to his studies at the University of Santo Tomas Faculty of Civil Law.

Non-graduates of Philippine law schools have also been allowed to take the Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of
the Supreme Court En Banc dated July 27, 1993 (Re: Application of Adriano M. Hernandez to take the 1993 Bar
Examinations), the Court allowed the applicant, a Filipino citizen who obtained a Juris Doctor from Columbia
University, New York and who has taken fourth year review courses and other bar subjects at the Ateneo Law
School, to take the 1993 Bar Examinations, considering the fact that in the past, it had allowed Filipinos “who have
studied law in foreign law schools from the strict requirements of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138 and allowed them
to take the bar examinations…”, but with the caveat that:

“beginning next year, the Court WILL NOT ALLOW GRADUATES OF FOREIGN LAW SCHOOLS TO TAKE THE
BAR EXAMINATIONS. An applicant who desires to take the bar examinations must not only have studied law in
a local law school but has to present the certifications required under Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138 in order to take
the bar examination. Since graduates of foreign law schools cannot submit said certifications, they shall henceforth
not be allowed to take the bar examinations” (emphasis supplied).

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Was Adriano M. Hernandez the last Filipino to graduate from a foreign law school who was allowed to take the
Bar Examinations?

No.

In Bar Matter No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in the Bar Examinations
through Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, March 9, 2010) the Supreme Court once again allowed
Filipino graduates of foreign law schools to take the Philippine Bar, subject to certain conditions, and amended
Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

Section 5 of the Rule now provides that before being admitted to the examination, all applicants for admission to
the bar shall satisfactorily show that they have successfully completed all the prescribed courses for the degree
of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree in a law school or university officially recognized by the Philippine
Government or by the proper authority in the foreign jurisdiction where the degree has been granted.

Section 5 now also provides that a Filipino citizen “who graduated from a foreign law school shall be admitted to
the bar examination only upon submission to the Supreme Court of certifications showing: (a) completion of all
courses leading to the degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree; (b) recognition or accreditation of the
law school by the proper authority; and (c) completion of all fourth year subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic
program in a law school duly recognized by the Philippine Government.”

A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her degree in Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent in a foreign
law school must also present proof of completion of a separate bachelor’s degree.

Since the law course is designed to acquaint the law student with (hopefully) the whole spectrum of Philippine law,
those who obtain their law degrees from non-Philippine law schools have to work doubly hard in preparing for the
Bar Examinations, since they studied a different set of laws in law school. But if they are up to the challenge, the
Supreme Court, pursuant to Bar Matter No. 1153, is very much willing to accommodate them.

And so what happened to Adriano M. Hernandez?

He passed the 1993 Bar Examinations and was admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1994, but passed away in 2011 at
the young age of 44.

Facts: Adriano Hernandez, a Filipino citizen, a degree holder of Juris Doctor from Columbia Law School in
New York and a bar passer in NY in year 1990 took bar subjects in Ateneo Law School and 5-month bar
review course there. He sought the Supreme Court and prayed to allow him to take the bar exam in the
Philippines

Issue; Whether or not Hernandez should be allowed to take the bar examination even if he is umable to
present requirements under Sec. 5 and 6 of Rule 138

Held: The Supreme Court ruled to allow the applicant to take the 1993 Bar Examinations with high regard of
Filipinos with same case in which the court allowed to take the bar examination. Non-graduates of Philippine
law schools have also been allowed to take the bar examination. However, the court held in this resolution
that in the following year, all applicants for the bar must comply with the requirements stipulated in Sec. 5
and 6 of Rule 138 including the completion to studying law in any of the Philippine law schools.

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vii. Tan v Sabandal, Bar Matter No. 44, 24 February 1992

Tan vs. Sabandal, 206 SCRA 473 (1992)

DOCTRINES:

The practice of law is not a matter of right.

No moral qualification for bar membership is more important than truthfulness or candor.

FACTS:

Respondent Sabandal passed the 1978 Bar Examinations but was denied to take his oath in view of the finding of the
Court that he was guilty of unauthorized practice of law. Since then, he had filed numerous petitions for him to be
allowed to take his lawyer's oath.

Acting to his 1989 petition, the Court directed the executive judge of the province where Sabandal is domiciled to
submit a comment on respondent's moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. In compliance therewith, the executive
judge stated in his comment that he is not aware of any acts committed by the respondent as would disqualify him
to from admission to the Bar. However, he added that respondent has a pending civil case before his court for
cancellation/reversion proceedings, in which respondent, then working as Land Investigator of the Bureau of Lands,
is alleged to have secured a free patent and later a certificate of title to a parcel of land which, upon investigation,
turned out to be a swampland and not susceptible of acquisition under a free patent, and which he later mortgaged
to the bank. The mortgage was later foreclosed and the land subsequently sold at public auction and respondent has
not redeemed the land since then.

The case was however been settled through amicable settlement. The said amicable settlement canceled the OCT
under Free Patent in the name of Sabandal and his mortgage in the bank; provided for the surrender of the
certificate of title to the RD for proper annotation; reverted to the mass of public domain the land covered by the
aforesaid certificate of title with respondent refraining from exercising acts of possession or ownership over the said
land. Respondent also paid the bank a certain sum for the loan and interest.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent may be admitted to the practice of law considering that he already submitted three
(3) testimonials regarding his good moral character, and his pending civil case has been terminated.

HELD:
His petition must be denied.

Time and again, it has been held that practice of law is not a matter of right. It is a privilege bestowed upon
individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral character.

It should be recalled that respondent worked as Land Investigator at the Bureau of Lands. Said employment
facilitated his procurement of the free patent title over the property which he could not but have known was a
public land. This was manipulative on his part and does not speak well of his moral character. It is a manifestation of
gross dishonesty while in the public service, which cannot be erased by the termination of the case and where no

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determination of guilt or innocence was made because the suit has been compromised. This is a sad reflection of his
sense of honor and fair dealings.

Moreover, his failure to reveal to the Court the pendency of the civil case for Reversion filed against him during the
period that he was submitting several petitions and motions for reconsiderations reveal his lack of candor and
truthfulness.

Although, the term "good moral character" admits of broad dimensions, it has been defined as "including at least
common dishonesty." It has also been held that no moral qualification for membership is more important than
truthfulness or candor.

C. ADMISSION TO THE BAR

i. In Re Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534

IN RE CUNANAN [94 Phil 534; Resolution; 18 Mar 1954]

Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes

Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Congress passed Republic Act Number 972, commonly known as the “Bar Flunkers’ Act of 1953.” In
accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had
obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent.

After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its
provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the
aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the
reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual
petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether or not they had
invoked Republic Act No. 972.

Issue: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and valid.

Held: RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from
insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation.

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement
of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function
and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission,
suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.

On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments
of the government.

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It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this
Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say,
merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.

REPUBLIC ACT 6735,

INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ACT

R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution.
The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill No. 17. The former was prepared by the committee
on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill
No. 497, which dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the
Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988, which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497, as well as with
initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17 solely, dealt with
initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The Bicameral Conference
Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a draft bill, which was subsequently
approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate and by the House of Representatives. This approved bill is now R.A. No.
6735.

FACTS:

Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The title of the law was, “An
Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to and including 1955.”

Section 1 provided the following passing marks:

1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%

Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.

Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any subject shall be deemed to
have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be included in the computation of the general average
in subsequent bar examinations.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.

RULING:

Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the title of the Act. As per
its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a
permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take
account of the fact that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.

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As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in
force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under the following reasons:

The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had inadequate
preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;

The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said candidates;

The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be admitted to practice of
law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid
down by Congress under this power are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court
on who can practice law; and

The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.

As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to declare it void. Moreover,
the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions
denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to
alter, supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.

ii. In Re Lanuevo, 29 August 1975

In Re: Lanuevo 66 SCRA 254 August 29, 1975

FACTS: This is an administrative proceeding against Victorio Lanueva who was the Bar Confidant during the 1971 Bar
Examination emanating from the revelation of one Oscar Landicho, a bar examinee of the same bar exam, in his
confidential letter that the result of the bar exam of one of the bar examinee later identified as Ramon Galang was
raised before the result was released to make him pass the bar. Acting upon said letter, the court called the 5 bar
examiners and the Bar Confident Lanuevo to submit their sworn statements on the matter. It appears that each of
the 5 bar examiners were approached by Lanuevo with the examination booklet asking them to re-evaluate the
grades of the bar examiner explaining that it is a practice policy in bar exams that he will review the grades obtained
in all subjects by an examinee and when he finds a candidate to have extraordinary high grades in other subjects and
low grade in one subject he can bring it to the examiner for reconsideration to help the candidate pass. In good faith
of trust and confidence to the authority of Lanuevo, the examiners re-evaluated the exam of the candidate and
reconsider the grade they give for each subject matter. Further investigation also revealed that Ramon Galang was
charged with crime of slight physical injuries in the Mla. MTC but did not revealed the information in his application
to take the bar examination.

ISSUE: WON Lanuevo has the authority to ask bar examiners to re-evaluate and re-correct the examination result of
a bar candidate.

RULING: The court ruled that it is evident that Lanuevo has deceptively staged a plot to convince each examiner
individually to re-evaluate the grades of Galang in order to help him pass the bar without prior authorization of the
Court. His duty as a Bar Confident is limited only as a custodian of the examination notebooks after they are
corrected by the examiners where he is tasked to tally the general average of the bar candidate. All requests for re-
evaluation of grades from the bar exam shall be made by the candidate themselves. With the facts fully established

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that Lanuevo initiated the re-evaluation of the exam answers of Galang without the authority of the Court, he has
breached the trust and confidence given to him by the court and was disbarred with his name stricken out from the
rolls of attorneys. Galang was likewise disbarred for fraudulently concealing the criminal charges against him in his
application for the bar exam while under oath constituting perjury. The court believed that the 5 bar examiners
acted in good faith and thereby absolved from the case but reminded to perform their duties with due care.

D. APPEARANCE OF NON-LAWYERS

When may a non-lawyer litigate in court?

Reiterating a previous article that I had posted on the same subject matter, in the case of FERDINAND A. CRUZ vs.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F. GUERRERO and HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007,the
Philippine Supreme Court interpreted, clarified and implemented:

(a) Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,

(b) Bar Matter No. 730, Circular No. 19 governing law student practice, and
(c) Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule).

The basic question was “whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or
friend of a party litigant.”

The courts a quo held that the Law Student Practice Rule as encapsulated in Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court,
prohibits the petitioner, as a law student, from entering his appearance in behalf of his father, the private
complainant in the criminal case without the supervision of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.

Section 1 of Rule 138-A provides that a law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the regular four-
year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education program approved
by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative case before any trial
court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the law school.

Section 2 of the said Rule provides that the appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the
direct supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law
school. Any and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the
supervising attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

However, in Resolution6 dated June 10, 1997 in Bar Matter No. 730, the Court En Banc clarified that the said Rule,
however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure are
relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of a
lawyer.

Section 34, Rule 138 provides that in the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in person,
with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other
court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

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Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a
member of the bar.

The phrase "in the court of a justice of the peace" in Bar Matter No. 730 is subsequently changed to "In the court of
a municipality" as it now appears in Section 34 of Rule 138.

In Section 34 of Rule 138, the appearance of a non-lawyer, as an agent or friend of a party litigant, is expressly
allowed, while Rule 138-A provides for conditions when a law student, not as an agent or a friend of a party litigant,
may appear before the courts.

Section 34, Rule 138 is clear that appearance before the inferior courts by a non-lawyer is allowed, irrespective of
whether or not he is a law student.

As succinctly clarified in Bar Matter No. 730, by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may appear, as an agent
or a friend of a party litigant, without the supervision of a lawyer before inferior courts.

Representation By A Non-Lawyer

CAN A NON-LAWYER REPRESENT THE ACCUSED DURING ARRAIGNMENT?

> No, during the arraignment, it is the obligation of the court to ensure that the accused is represented by a
lawyer because it is the first time when the accused is informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.

> This is a task which only a lawyer can do.

> But during trial, there is no such duty. The accused must ask for
a lawyer, or else, the right is deemed waived. He can even defend himself personally.

MAY AN ACCUSED BE VALIDLY REPRESENTED BY A NON-LAWYER AT THE TRIAL?

> If the accused knowingly engaged the service of the non-lawyer, he is bound by the non-lawyer’s actions
> But if he didn’t know that he was represented by a non-laywer, the judgment is void because of the
misrepresentation

N.B: In MTCs, one can defend himself or by a non-lawyer.

WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES IF REPRESENTED BY A NON-LAWYER?

1. He is bound by the rules

2. He cannot raise right to counsel

SUPPOSE X DEFENDS HIMSELF. IS THIS CONSIDERED A PRACTICE OF LAW UNDER THE DOCTRINE IN CAYETANO V.
MONSOD?

> No, this is an exercise of a constitutional right.

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1. Law student practice (Rule 138-A)

RULE 138-A
Law Student Practice Rule

Section 1. Conditions for student practice. — A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the
regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative
case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the
law school.

Section 2. Appearance. — The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct
supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any
and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising
attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

Section 3. Privileged communications. — The Rules safeguarding privileged communications between attorney and
client shall apply to similar communications made to or received by the law student, acting for the legal clinic.

Section 4. Standards of conduct and supervision. — The law student shall comply with the standards of professional
conduct governing members of the Bar. Failure of an attorney to provide adequate supervision of student practice
may be a ground for disciplinary action. (Circular No. 19, dated December 19, 1986).

> Cruz v Mina, 522 SCRA 387 (2007)

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007 ]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, PETITIONER,
VS.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F GUERRERO AND HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, RESPONDENTS

Facts:

Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, where his father,
Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the
bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge
Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The
petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a
written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private
prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A
of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in
Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.

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Issue:

whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant

Ruling:

The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure
are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of
a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a
member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)

2. Non-lawyers in courts

Pro se representation vs. law student practice rule

In the case of FERDINAND A. CRUZ vs. JUDGE PRISCILLA MIJARES, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 108,
Pasay City, Metro Manila, G.R. No. 154464, September 11, 2008, the Supreme Court of the Philippines upheld a
litigant’s right to pro se representation under Sec. 34, Rule 138, Rules of Court and clarified its distinction in relation
to the Law Student Practice Ruleunder Rule 138-A, Rules of Court.

On March 5, 2002, Ferdinand A. Cruz (petitioner) sought permission to enter his appearance for and on his behalf,
before the RTC, Branch 108, Pasay City, as the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 01-0410, for Abatement of Nuisance.
Petitioner, a fourth year law student, anchors his claim on Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court [3] that a non-
lawyer may appear before any court and conduct his litigation personally.

During the pre-trial, Judge Priscilla Mijares required the petitioner to secure a written permission from the Court
Administrator before he could be allowed to appear as counsel for himself, a party-litigant. Atty. Stanley Cabrera,
counsel for Benjamin Mina, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss instead of a pre-trial brief to which petitioner Cruz
vehemently objected alleging that a Motion to Dismiss is not allowed after the Answer had been filed. Judge Mijares
then remarked, “Hay naku, masama ‘yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?” and proceeded to hear the pending Motion
to Dismiss and calendared the next hearing on May 2, 2002.

On March 6, 2002, petitioner Cruz filed a Manifestation and Motion to Inhibit, [4] praying for the voluntary inhibition
of Judge Mijares. The Motion alleged that expected partiality on the part of the respondent judge in the conduct of
the trial could be inferred from the contumacious remarks of Judge Mijares during the pre-trial. It asserts that the
judge, in uttering an uncalled for remark, reflects a negative frame of mind, which engenders the belief that justice
will not be served. [5]

In an Order [6] dated April 19, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion for inhibition stating that throwing tenuous
allegations of partiality based on the said remark is not enough to warrant her voluntary inhibition, considering that
it was said even prior to the start of pre-trial. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration [7] of the said order.

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On May 10, 2002, Judge Mijares denied the motion with finality. [8] In the same Order, the trial court held that for
the failure of petitioner Cruz to submit the promised document and jurisprudence, and for his failure to satisfy the
requirements or conditions under Rule 138-A of the Rules of Court, his appearance was denied.

In a motion for reconsideration, [9] petitioner reiterated that the basis of his appearance was not Rule 138-A, but
Section 34 of Rule 138. He contended that the two Rules were distinct and are applicable to different circumstances,
but the respondent judge denied the same, still invoking Rule 138-A, in an Order [10] dated July 31, 2002.

On August 16, 2002, the petitioner directly filed with this Court, the instant petition.

The core issue raised before the Court was whether the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied the appearance of the petitioner as party litigant and
when the judge refused to inhibit herself from trying the case.

Rule 138-A, or the Law Student Practice Rule, provides:

RULE 138-A

LAW STUDENT PRACTICE RULE

Section 1. Conditions for Student Practice. – A law student who has successfully completed his 3rd year of the
regular four-year prescribed law curriculum and is enrolled in a recognized law school's clinical legal education
program approved by the Supreme Court, may appear without compensation in any civil, criminal or administrative
case before any trial court, tribunal, board or officer, to represent indigent clients accepted by the legal clinic of the
law school.

Sec. 2. Appearance. – The appearance of the law student authorized by this rule, shall be under the direct
supervision and control of a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines duly accredited by the law school. Any
and all pleadings, motions, briefs, memoranda or other papers to be filed, must be signed by the supervising
attorney for and in behalf of the legal clinic.

The respondent court held that the petitioner could not appear for himself and on his behalf because of his failure to
comply with Rule 138-A. In denying petitioner’s appearance, the court a quo tersely finds refuge in the fact that, on
December 18, 1986, this Court issued Circular No. 19, which eventually became Rule 138-A, and the failure of Cruz to
prove on record that he is enrolled in a recognized school’s clinical legal education program and is under supervision
of an attorney duly accredited by the law school.

However, the petitioner insisted that the basis of his appearance was Section 34 of Rule 138, which provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

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and is a rule distinct from Rule 138-A.

From the clear language of this provision of the Rules, it will have to be conceded that the contention of the
petitioner has merit. It recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any case to which he is a party.
The Rules state that a party may conduct his litigation personally or with the aid of an attorney, and that his
appearance must either be personal or by a duly authorized member of the Bar. The individual litigant may
personally do everything in the course of proceedings from commencement to the termination of the litigation. [14]
Considering that a party personally conducting his litigation is restricted to the same rules of evidence and procedure
as those qualified to practice law, [15] petitioner, not being a lawyer himself, runs the risk of falling into the snares
and hazards of his own ignorance. Therefore, Cruz as plaintiff, at his own instance, can personally conduct the
litigation of Civil Case No. 01-0410. He would then be acting not as a counsel or lawyer, but as a party exercising his
right to represent himself.

The trial court must have been misled by the fact that the petitioner is a law student and must, therefore, be subject
to the conditions of the Law Student Practice Rule. It erred in applying Rule 138-A, when the basis of the petitioner’s
claim is Section 34 of Rule 138. The former rule provides for conditions when a law student may appear in courts,
while the latter rule allows the appearance of a non-lawyer as a party representing himself.

The conclusion of the trial court that Rule 138-A superseded Rule 138 by virtue of Circular No. 19 is misplaced. The
Court never intended to repeal Rule 138 when it released the guidelines for limited law student practice. In fact, it
was intended as an addendum to the instances when a non-lawyer may appear in courts and was incorporated to
the Rules of Court through Rule 138-A.

It may be relevant to recall that, in respect to the constitutional right of an accused to be heard by himself and
counsel, [16] this Court has held that during the trial, the right to counsel cannot be waived. [17] The rationale for
this ruling was articulated in People v. Holgado, [18] where we declared that “even the most intelligent or educated
man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.”

The case at bar involves a civil case, with the petitioner as plaintiff therein. The solicitous concern that the
Constitution accords the accused in a criminal prosecution obviously does not obtain in a civil case. Thus, a party
litigant in a civil case, who insists that he can, without a lawyer’s assistance, effectively undertake the successful
pursuit of his claim, may be given the chance to do so. In this case, petitioner alleges that he is a law student and
impliedly asserts that he has the competence to litigate the case himself. Evidently, he is aware of the perils incident
to this decision.

In addition, it was subsequently clarified in Bar Matter 730, that by virtue of Section 34, Rule 138, a law student may
appear as an agent or a friend of a party litigant, without need of the supervision of a lawyer, before inferior courts.
Here, we have a law student who, as party litigant, wishes to represent himself in court. We should grant his wish.

Additionally, however, petitioner contends that the respondent judge committed manifest bias and partiality by
ruling that there is no valid ground for her voluntary inhibition despite her alleged negative demeanor during the
pre-trial when she said: “Hay naku, masama ‘yung marunong pa sa Huwes. Ok?” Petitioner avers that by denying his
motion, the respondent judge already manifested conduct indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice, causing
petitioner’s and his co-plaintiff’s loss of faith and confidence in the respondent’s impartiality.

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We do not agree.

It must be noted that because of this incident, the petitioner filed an administrative case [19] against the respondent
for violation of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which we dismissed for lack of merit on September 15, 2002. We now
adopt the Court’s findings of fact in the administrative case and rule that there was no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of Judge Mijares when she did not inhibit herself from the trial of the case.

In a Motion for Inhibition, the movant must prove the ground for bias and prejudice by clear and convincing
evidence to disqualify a judge from participating in a particular trial, [20] as voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter
of conscience and addressed to the sound discretion of the judge. The decision on whether she should inhibit herself
must be based on her rational and logical assessment of the circumstances prevailing in the case before her. [21]
Absent clear and convincing proof of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge, this Court will rule in favor of
the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

In fine, the Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition, modified the assailed Resolution and Order of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 108, Pasay City, and directed it to ADMIT the Entry of Appearance of petitioner in Civil Case No. 01-
0410 as a party litigant.

> RULES OF COURT: Rule 138, Section 34

Section 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation
in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for the purpose, or with the aid an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

> Cantimbuhan v. Hon Cruz, 211 Phil. 373 (1983)

EN BANC
[ GR No. L-51813-14, Nov 29, 1983 ]
ROMULO CANTIMBUHAN v. NICANOR J. CRUZ +
DECISION

211 Phil. 373

RELOVA, J.:

Appeal from the Order, dated August 16, 1979, of respondent Judge Nicanor J. Cruz, Jr., of the then Municipal Court
of Parañaque, Metro Manila, disallowing the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as
private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550, both for less serious physical injuries, filed against
Pat. Danilo San Antonio and Pat. Rodolfo Diaz, respectively, as well as the Order, dated September 4, 1979, denying
the motion for reconsideration holding, among others, that "the fiscal's claim that appearances of friends of party-
litigants should be allowed only in places where there is a scarcity of legal practitioner, to be well founded. For, if we
are to allow non-members of the bar to appear in court and prosecute cases or defend litigants in the guise of being

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friends of the litigants, then the requirement of membership in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
additional requirement of paying professional taxes for a lawyer to appear in court, would be put to naught." (p.
25, Rollo)

Records show that on April 6, 1979, petitioner Romulo Cantimbuhan filed separate criminal complaints against
Patrolmen Danilo San Antonio and Rodolfo Diaz for less serious physical injuries, respectively, and were docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 in the then Municipal Court of Paranaque, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila, in 1979, were senior law students of the U. P. College of Law
where, as part of the curriculum of the university they were required to render legal assistance to the needy clients
in the Office of the Legal Aid. Thus, in August 1979, petitioners Malana and Lucila filed their separate appearances,
as friends of complainant-petitioner Cantimbuhan. Herein respondent Fiscal Leodegario C. Quilatan opposed the
appearances of said petitioners, and respondent judge, in an Order dated August 16, 1979, sustained the respondent
fiscal and disallowed the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila, as private prosecutors in said criminal
cases. Likewise, on September 4, 1979, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration.

Hence, this petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with prayers, among others, that the Orders of
respondent judge, datedAugust 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979, be set aside as they are in plain violation of Section
34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and/or were issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Upon motion, the Court, on November 8, 1979, issued a temporary restraining order "enjoining
respondent judge and all persons acting for and in his behalf from conducting any proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos.
58549 (People of the Philippines vs. Danilo San Antonio) and 58559 (People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo Diaz) of the
Municipal Court of Paranaque Metro Manila on November 15, 1979 as scheduled or on any such dates as may be
fixed by said respondent judge."

Basis of this petition is Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which states:

"SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. - In the court of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation
in person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar."

Thus, a non-member of the Philippine Bar - a party to an action is authorized to appear in court and conduct his own
case; and, in the inferior courts, the litigant may be aided by a friend or agent or by an attorney. However, in the
Courts of First Instance, now Regional Trial Courts, he can be aided only by an attorney.

On the other hand, it is the submission of the respondents that pursuant to Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules
of Court, it is the fiscal who is empowered to determine who shall be the private prosecutor as was done by
respondent fiscal when he objected to the appearances of petitioners Malana and Lucila. Sections 4 and 15, Rule
110 of the Rules of Court provide:

"SEC. 4. Who must prosecute criminal actions. - All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal.

"x x x xxx xxx

"SEC. 15. Intervention of the offended party in criminal action. - Unless the offended party has waived the civil
action or expressly reserved the right to institute it separately from the criminal action, and subject to the provisions
of section 4 hereof, he may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense."

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And, they contend that the exercise by the offended party to intervene is subject to the direction and control of the
fiscal and that his appearance, no less than his active conduct of the case later on, requires the prior approval of the
fiscal.

We find merit in the petition. Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, clearly provides that in the municipal court
a party may conduct his litigation in person with the aid of an agent appointed by him for the purpose. Thus, in the
case of Laput vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, a law student was allowed to represent the accused in a case pending before
the then Municipal Court, the City Court of Manila, who was charged for damages to property through reckless
imprudence. "It is accordingly our view that error was committed in the municipal court in not
allowing Crispiniano V. Laput to act as an agent or friend of Catalino Salas to aid the latter in conducting his
defense." The permission of the fiscal is not necessary for one to enter his appearance as private prosecutor. In the
first place, the law does not impose this condition. What the fiscal can do, if he wants to handle the case personally
is to disallow the private prosecutor's participation, whether he be a lawyer or not, in the trial of the case. On the
other hand, if the fiscal desires the active participation of the private prosecutor, he can just manifest to the court
that the private prosecutor, with its approval, will conduct the prosecution of the case under his supervision and
control. Further, We may add that if a non-lawyer can appear as defense counsel or as friend of the accused in a
case before the municipal trial court, with more reason should he be allowed to appear as private prosecutor under
the supervision and control of the trial fiscal.

In the two criminal cases filed before the Municipal Court of Parañaque, petitioner Cantimbuhan, as the offended
party, did not expressly waive the civil action nor reserve his right to institute it separately and, therefore, the civil
action is deemed impliedly instituted in said criminal cases. Thus, said complainant Romulo Cantimbuhan has
personal interest in the success of the civil action and, in the prosecution of the same, he cannot be deprived of his
right to be assisted by a friend who is not a lawyer.

WHEREFORE, the Orders issued by respondent judge dated August 16, 1979 and September 4, 1979 which
disallowed the appearances of petitioners Nelson B. Malana and Robert V. Lucila as friends of party-litigant peti-
tioner Romulo Cantimbuhan, are hereby SET ASIDE and respondent judge is hereby ordered to ALLOW the
appearance and intervention of petitioners Malana and Lucila as friends of RomuloCantimbuhan. Accordingly,
the temporary restraining order issued on November 8, 1979 is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
Teehankee and De Castro, JJ., joined J. Melencio-Herrera in her dissenting opinion.
Aquino, J., I dissent. Senior Law students should study their lessons and prepare for the bar. They have no business
appearing in court.
Melencio-Herrera,J., dissents in a separate opinion.

6 pt 6 pt 0 3 style-->

DISSENTING OPINION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

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LEGAL PROFESSION
Section 34, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court specifically provides that it is "a party" who may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose in the Court of a Justice of the Peace
Romulo Cantimbuhan, as the complaining witness in Criminal Cases Nos. 58549 and 58550 of the then Municipal
Court of Paranaque, Metro Manila, is not a "party" within the meaning of the said Rule. The parties in a criminal case
are the accused and the People. A complaining witness or an offended party only intervenes in a criminal action in
respect of the civil liability. The case of Laput and Salas vs. Bernabe, 55 Phil. 621, is authority only in respect of the
accused, as a "party", in a criminal case.

Sections 4 and 15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, being the more specific provisions in respect of criminal cases,
should take precedence over Section 34, Rule 138 and should be controlling (Bagatsing vs. Hon. Ramirez, 74 SCRA
306 [1976]). Section 4 provides that allcriminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the
Fiscal, while Section 15 specifically provides that the offendedparty may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the
prosecution of the offense.

I vote, therefore, to uphold the Order of respondent Municipal Judge, dated August 16, 1979, disallowing the
appearances of petitioners as private prosecutors in the above-mentioned criminal cases.

> Cruz v Mina, G.R. No. 154207, 27 April 2007

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 154207, April 27, 2007 ]
FERDINAND A. CRUZ, PETITIONER,
VS.
ALBERTO MINA, HON. ELEUTERIO F GUERRERO AND HON. ZENAIDA LAGUILLES, RESPONDENTS

Facts:

Ferdinand A. Cruz filed before the MeTC a formal Entry of Appearance, as private prosecutor, where his father,
Mariano Cruz, is the complaining witness.

The petitioner, describing himself as a third year law student, justifies his appearance as private prosecutor on the
bases of Section 34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the ruling of the Court En Banc in Cantimbuhan v. Judge
Cruz, Jr. that a non-lawyer may appear before the inferior courts as an agent or friend of a party litigant. The
petitioner furthermore avers that his appearance was with the prior conformity of the public prosecutor and a
written authority of Mariano Cruz appointing him to be his agent in the prosecution of the said criminal case.

However, in an Order dated February 1, 2002, the MeTC denied permission for petitioner to appear as private
prosecutor on the ground that Circular No. 19 governing limited law student practice in conjunction with Rule 138-A
of the Rules of Court (Law Student Practice Rule) should take precedence over the ruling of the Court laid down in
Cantimbuhan; and set the case for continuation of trial.

Issue:

whether the petitioner, a law student, may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party litigant

Ruling:

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The rule, however, is different if the law student appears before an inferior court, where the issues and procedure
are relatively simple. In inferior courts, a law student may appear in his personal capacity without the supervision of
a lawyer. Section 34, Rule 138 provides:

Sec. 34. By whom litigation is conducted. — In the court of a justice of the peace, a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any
other court, a party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must be either
personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

Thus, a law student may appear before an inferior court as an agent or friend of a party without the supervision of a
member of the bar. (Emphasis supplied)

> In PAFLU v Binalagbagan Isabela Sugar Company, G.R. No. L-23959, 29

November 1971

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU) LUZANO, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCISCO L. ESTRELLA,
Acting Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and/or Chief of Labor Appeals Review Staff, and ASSOCIATED
LABOR UNIONS (ALU), respondents., G.R. No.

FELICIANO, J.:

The present Petition for Certiorari, filed with this Court on 4 January 1977, is directed at the Resolution dated 16
December 1976 of the Bureau of Labor Relations, in BLR Case No. 0314. That case originated from a Petition
for Certification Election (docketed as Case No. 333-MC-CEBU) filed with the former Court of Industrial
Relations, Cebu Branch, by petitioner Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions-Luzano ("PAFLU").

The facts are stated in the Resolution sought to be nullified:

"On March 26, 1968, the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) filed with the Court of Industrial
Relations a petition for certification election at Visayan Glass Factory, Inc. The Cebu Central Union of the
Philippine (CCUP) moved to intervene. On the other hand, ALU moved to dismiss on the ground that it had then
a collective agreement with the company which would expire on May 31, 1968. The latter motion was denied.

The case, however, dragged on, and on May 20, 1968, ALU renewed the contract, this time expiring on May 31,
1971. ALU again moved to dismiss the petition. Even so, the case remained unresolved and on November 25,
1971, a new contract expiring on May 31, 1974 was again concluded.

On January 16, 1975, the unresolved case was transferred to this Office pursuant to the provisions of the Labor
Code. On March 3, 1975, the Med-Arbiter called a certification election.

On March 14, 1975, ALU appealed to this Office alleging that its contract of November 25, 1971 still subsisted
because of its automatic renewal clause. On April 26, 1975, it filed a motion to dismiss alleging that it had

62
Alexandra S. Roxas
LEGAL PROFESSION
negotiated a new contract on April 15, 1975 which the National Labor Relations Commission approved on April
11; the contract would expire on April 4, 1979.

Nonetheless, on July 22, 1975, the Bureau affirmed the Med-Arbiter's order, ruling that the alleged contract
could not bar the election because at the time it was approved, a representative question was pending
resolution. Pre-election conference was then ordered.

On October 22, 1975, ALU filed a motion for clarification praying that PAFLU be excluded from the list of unions
to be voted on. On December 3, 1975, the Bureau passed upon the motion and announced that no further
motion shall entertained. On December 23, 1975, ALU appealed to the Secretary of Labor. Directed to treat the
same as a motion to reconsider, the Bureau dismissed the appeal on February 27, 1976.

Pursuant to the order, a certification election was held on June 30, 1976 yielding the following results:

PAFLU ----214 votes

ALU ----75 votes
CCUP ----3 votes
NO UNION ----3 votes

On July 14, 1976, ALU filed an election protest contending that the election was void because its contract (i.e.,
the collective bargaining agreement with the company) was allegedly ratified by the employees and approved by
the National Labor Relations Commission on April 11, 1975, and therefore barred the election held long after.

On October 7, 1976, this Bureau dismissed the protest, standing firm on its previous orders. It therefore certified
PAFLU-Luzano as the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees.

On November 9, 1976, ALU repaired to the Secretary of Labor who, in turn, directed this Office to consider the
same as a motion for reconsideration."

On 16 December 1976, however, public respondent Francisco L. Estrella, then Acting Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations ("BLR"), issued the assailed Resolution, 1 the dispositive portion of which read:

"WHEREFORE, the election protest is hereby sustained, and all previous orders of this Bureau in this case are
hereby set aside.

SO ORDERED."

The above conclusion was rationalized in the following terms:

"After thorough consideration of the raised and the arguments adduced, this Office [is] convinced that it should
regard the protest with a more sympathetic mind. Indeed, the contract which ALU executed with the company
was approved by the National Labor Relations Commission way back on April 11, 1975. That approval already
amounts to a certification by this Bureau itself. It therefore bars a certification election as would a certification by

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Alexandra S. Roxas
LEGAL PROFESSION
this Bureau of a collective agreement in accordance with Article 230 of the Labor Code. For certainly, it would be
unwise for this Bureau to annul an official act of the Commission. Yet, that would precisely be the result if the
Bureau certify PAFLU and throw open once more the bargaining negotiations which were already put to rest by
the Commission when it approved the contract concluded by ALU with the company, from which the employees
have since drawn untold benefits without complaints. That an election was held notwithstanding is quite
unfortunate because it was clearly a nullity from the start. The Bureau should not compound its error by
attaching undeserved weight to the results."

The Resolution dated 16 December 1976 of the public respondent Acting Director of the BLR must be set
aside.

1. The Med-Arbiter was not in error in issuing an order calling for a certification election at the Visayan Glass
Factory, Inc. Neither was the BLR in error when, on 22 July 1975, it affirmed such order of the Med-Arbiter. In
this respect, Article 257 of the Labor Code (as it then stood) provides:

"Art. 257. Requisites for certification election. Any petition for certification election filed by any legitimate labor
organization shall be supported by the written consent of at least thirty percent (30%) of all the employees in the
bargaining unit. Upon receipt and verification of such petition, it shall be mandatory for the Bureau to conduct a
certification election for the purpose of determining the representative of the employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit and certify the winner as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of all the employees
in the unit." mphasis supplied)

It does not appear from the record of this case that the Petition for Certification Election filed by petitioner
PAFLU on 26 March 1968, did not satisfy the requirements stated in the above provision. On the contrary, the
Med-Arbiter found as a matter of fact that said petition was supported by at least 30% of all company
employees. Consequently, it was mandatory upon the BLR to grant the petition and, thereafter, to conduct
certification elections at the Visayan Glass Factory, Inc. 2

Private respondent ALU would, however, invoke the "contract bar rule" and argue that the renegotiation on 5
April 1975 of a collective bargaining agreement between private respondent ALU and the company management
rendered the certification election held at the Visayan Glass Factory, Inc. on 30 June 1976 a nullity. The
argument is not persuasive. First of all, it is the rule in this jurisdiction that only a certified collective bargaining
agreement ---- i.e. an agreement duly certified by the BLR may serve as a bar to certification elections. 3 It is
noteworthy that the BLR did not certify the 5 April 1975 collective bargaining agreement here in question.
Second, even assuming (though merely arguendo) that approval of said agreement by the NLRC on 11 April
1975 had the same effect as certification by the BLR, nevertheless, such approval did not quash, as it were,
petitioner PAFLU's Petition for Certification Election which had then remained pending with the BLR for more
then seven (7) years, such petition having been filed as early as March of 1968. To hold otherwise would be to
create an incentive for labor unions or employers to block the expeditious disposition of petitions for certification
elections which are, after all, the mechanisms through which the choice of the workers of their own
representatives is ascertained.

2. It does not follow as a matter of course that reversal of the BLR's Resolution of 16 December 1976
necessarily results in nullification of an "official act" of the NLRC: the collective bargaining agreement executed
between private respondent ALU and the company management in April of 1975 need not be disturbed,
especially considering that the substantive terms and conditions thereof had not once been assailed, whether by
labor or management, and that the employees of the company had in fact availed of the benefits offered
thereunder. In other words, the fairness of the agreement had not here been put in issue. What must be
resolved, however, is which union ---- petitioner PAFLU or private respondent ALU ---- has the exclusive right to
represent the workers of the Visayan Glass Factory, Inc. for the purpose of collective bargaining with company
management. In this respect, the record clearly shows that the workers of the company, in the certification
election held on 30 June 1976, had chosen petitioner PAFLU to be their bargaining representative. The will of

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LEGAL PROFESSION
the workers having been unequivocally and freely expressed, it is the duty of this Court, as well as of all other
agencies concerned, to give life and meaning to rather than subject that will.

It remains only to note that what the Court is here saying is that petitioner PAFLU was entitled to be certified as
the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees at the Visayan Glass Factory, Inc. as of December
1976. The Court is not informed of developments concerning the representation of those employees after 12
August 1977, the date of the last pleading filed with the Court by the parties in this case. This Resolution must
therefore be regarded as subject to such subsequent developments, e.g., a subsequent election resulting in the
certification of some other union as exclusive bargaining representative of Visayan Glass employees.

ACCORDINGLY, the Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED. The Resolution dated 16 December 1976 of the Acting
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations in BLR Case No. 00314, is hereby SET ASIDE. This Resolution is
immediately executory. No pronouncement as to costs.

Fernan, (C.J.), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortés, JJ., concur.

----------------
Footnotes

1. Id., pp. 72-73.

2. Article 257, Labor Code (1976 ed., supra). National Organization of the Trade Unions (NORTU) v. Secretary
of Labor 90 SCRA 463 (1979; and Federacion Obrera de la Industria Tabaquera y Otros Trabajadores de
Filipinas (FOITAF-Associated Anglo American Chapter) v. Noriel, 72 SCRA 24 (1976).
3. Chrysler Philippines Labor Union (CPLU) v. Estrella, 86 SCRA 338 (1978); Firestone Tire & Rubber
Company Employees Union v. Estrella, 81 SCRA 49 (1978); and Foamtex Labor Union-Tupas v. Noriel, 72
SCRA 371 (1976). See Article 230 of the Labor Code (1976 Ed.). See also Book V, Rule IX, Sec. 3 of the Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code (1976 ed.).

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU) LUZANO, petitioner, vs. HON. FRANCISCO
L. ESTRELLA, Acting Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and/or Chief of Labor Appeals Review Staff,
and ASSOCIATED LABOR UNIONS (ALU), respondents., G.R. No. 45323, 1989 Feb 20, 3rd Division

3. Non-lawyers in administrative tribunals

> 2011 NLRC RULES OF PROCEDURE, Rule III (Pleadings), Section 6(B)

SECTION 6. Appearances. — Attorney appearing for a party is presumed to be properly authorized for that purpose.

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Alexandra S. Roxas
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A non-lawyer may appear before the Commission or any Labor Arbiter only if:

(a) he represents himself as party to the case;

(b) he represents an organization or its members, provided that he shall be made to present written proof that he is
properly authorized or;

(c) he is a duly-accredited member of any legal aid office duly recognized by the Department of Justice or the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines in cases referred thereto by the latter.

Appearances may be made orally or in writing. In both cases, the complete name and office address of both parties
shall be made of record and the adverse party or his counsel/representative properly advised.

Any change in the address of counsel/representative should be filed with the records of the case and furnished the
adverse party or counsel.

Any change or withdrawal of counsel/representative shall be made in accordance with the Rules of Court.

SECTION 7. Authority to bind party. — Attorneys and other representatives of parties shall have authority to bind
their clients in all matters of procedure; but they cannot, without a special power of attorney or express consent,
enter into a compromise agreement with the opposing party in full or partial discharge of a client's claim.

4. Proceedings where lawyers are prohibited from appearing

PROCEEDINGS WHERE LAWYERS ARE PROHIBITED FROM APPEARING

Small Claims Cases

Rules of Procedure for Small Claims Cases, AM No.08-8-7,

Sec. 17. Appearance of Attorneys Not Allowed. — No attorney shall appear in behalf of or represent a party at the
hearing, unless the attorney is the plaintiff or defendant. Katarungang Pambarangay RA 7160, Sec. 415. In all
katarungang pambarangay proceedings the parties must appear in person without the assistance of counsel or
representative except for minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.

SANCTIONS FOR PRACTICE OR APPEARANCE WITHOUT AUTHORITY (1) Lawyers without authority (2) Persons not
lawyers Shari’a Bar passers are not full-fledged Philippine Bar members so they may only practice before Shari’a
courts. Both are counselors, but only the latter is an “attorney.” [Alawi v. Alauya, (1997)] REMEDIES AGAINST

UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE (1) Petition for Injunction (2) Declaratory Relief (3) Contempt of Court (4) Disqualification
and complaints for disbarment (5) Criminal complaint for estafa against the person who falsely represented himself
as a lawyer to the damage of another

F. PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND PRACTICE OF LAW

> 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. VI (Legislative Department, Section 14)

Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel
before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative
bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any

66
Alexandra S. Roxas
LEGAL PROFESSION
franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of
office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit
or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.

> 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII (Judicial Department, Section 15)

Section 15.

1. All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower
courts.
2. A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
3. Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief
Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of
the case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or
resolution has not been rendered or issued within said period.
4. Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such
responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case
or matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.

> 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. IX-A (Constitutional Commission), Sec 2;

Section 2. No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office or
employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active management or
control of any business which, in any way, may be affected by the functions of his office, nor shall he be
financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by
the Government, any of its subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.

> 1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. IX, Sec. 8(2)

Section 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be
represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other
similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.

> R.A. 7160, Section 90-91

Section 90. Practice of Profession. -

(a) All governors, city and municipal mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in
any occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.

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Alexandra S. Roxas
LEGAL PROFESSION
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools
except during session hours: Provided, That sanggunian members who are also members of the Bar shall
not:

(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a local government unit or any
office, agency, or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party;

(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or employee of the national or local
government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office.

(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative proceedings involving the local government
unit of which he is an official; and

(4) Use property and personnel of the government except when the sanggunian member concerned
is defending the interest of the government.

(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official hours of work only on occasions of
emergency: Provided, That the officials concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.

Section 91. Statement of Assets and Liabilities. - (a) Officials and employees of local government units shall file sworn
statements of assets, liabilities and net worth, lists of relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or
affinity in government service, financial and business interests, and personnel data sheets as required by law.

> RULES OF COURT, Rule 148, Sec. 35

Section 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. — No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of
the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional advice
to clients.

> People v Villanueva, G.R. No. L-19450, 27 May 1965

In 1959, Villanueva was charged with Malicious Mischief in the municipality of Alaminos in Laguna. In said case,
the private offended party asked his lawyer friend, Ariston Fule to prosecute said case. Apparently, Fule was the
fiscal in San Pablo, Laguna. Villanueva the opposed the appearance of Fule as counsel for the offended party as
he said that according to the Rules of Court when an attorney had been appointed to the position of Assistant
Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private law
practice.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ariston Fule is engaged in private law practice.
HELD: No. Private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the active and continued
practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the public for a compensation,
as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services. In the case at bar, Fule is not being
compensated but rather he’s doing it for free for his friend who happened to be the offended party. Practice is
more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the
same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise. Further, the fact that the Secretary of Justice approved
Fule’s appearance for his friend should be given credence.

> R.A. 910, Sec. 1

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 910

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Alexandra S. Roxas
LEGAL PROFESSION

AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE RETIREMENT OF JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OF THE COURT OF APPEALS,
FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE PROVISIONS HEREOF BY THE GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, AND TO
REPEAL COMMONWEALTH ACT NUMBERED FIVE HUNDRED AND THIRTY-SIX

Section 1. When a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals who has rendered at least twenty years'
service either in the judiciary or in any other branch of the Government, or in both, (a) retires for having attained the
age of seventy years, or (b) resigns by reason of his incapacity to discharge the duties of his office, he shall receive
during the residue of his natural life, in the manner hereinafter provided, the salary which he was receiving at the
time of his retirement or resignation. And when a Justice of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals has
attained the age of fifty-seven years and has rendered at least twenty-years' service in the Government, ten or more
of which have been continuously rendered as such Justice or as judge of a court of record, he shall be likewise
entitled to retire and receive during the residue of his natural life, in the manner also hereinafter prescribed, the
salary which he was then receiving. It is a condition of the pension provided for herein that no retiring Justice during
the time that he is receiving said pension shall appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party, or in any criminal case wherein and
officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office, or collect any fee
for his appearance in any administrative proceedings to maintain an interest adverse to the Government, insular,
provincial or municipal, or to any of its legally constituted officers.

F. LAWYERS AUTHORIZED TO REPRESENT THE GOVERNMENT

> Orbos v Civil Service Commission, 189 SCRA 459

DOTC SEC. ORBOS vs CSC and MADARANG

FACTS:
•Reorganization of DOTC-- Magnayon and Agon were appointed as Head Telecommunications Engineer.
•Madarang, appointed as Supervising Telecommunications Engineer questioned the appointment.
•Reorganization Appeals Board of DOTC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit.
•Madarang appealed with the CSC.
•CSC decided in favor of Madarang--revoked appointment of Magnayon and Agon, and appointed Madarang for the
questioned position.
•Asst. Sec. Sibal sought for reconsideration, but was denied. He sent a manifestation that the Selection and
Promotions Board of the DOTC will convene to deliberate on the appointment for the contested position.
•Madarang sent a letter to CSC requesting got the implementation of its resolution. CSC directed his appointment as
Head Telecommunications Engineer.
•Solicitor General, on behalf of DOTC Sec. Orbos, filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction.

ISSUE:
•Whether or not the CSC acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the appointment of Nerio .

HELD:
•Yes. CSC has the power to approve or disapprove appointments but not the power to make the appointment (Par.
H, Sec. 9, PD No. 807).

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Alexandra S. Roxas
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ADDITIONAL:

•Madarang filed a motion to disqualify the Solicitor General from appearing on behalf of petitioner.
•Solicitor General is the lawyer of the government.
•Part of his task is to represent the government, its agencies and instrumentalities, its officials and agents in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation matter requiring the services of a lawyer (Sec. 1, PD No. 478).
•His duty is to present to the court what he considers would legally uphold the best interest of the government.

> Gonzales v Chavez 205, SCAR 815

GONZALES vs HON. CHAVEZ, SOLICITOR GENERAL, PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and
COMMISSION ON AUDIT

FACTS:
•SG filed a pleading stating that he withdraws as counsel for PCGG, with the reservation to submit his comment on
incidents pending if called by circumstances in the interest of the government, or if required by the court.
•Ramon Gonzales, a tax payer, questions the SG's withdrawal as counsel of the PCGG.
•SG's withdrawal caused PCGG to hire 40 private lawyers
•Gonzales filed, as a class suit, a petition for mandamus and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a TRO
against the OSG, PCGG and COA.
•The Court required respondents' comments
•COA: it has not allowed the disbursement of funds to pay the PCGGhired lawyers
•PCGG: -It contended that its power to file and prosecute all cases investigated by it includes the grant of discretion
to the Commission in determining the manner of filing and prosecuting its cases, including the matter of who, in
particular, will control and supervise the prosecution (Sec. 1, EO No. 14) -It concluded that the reasonableness of the
compensation for its hired lawyers can be hardly questioned considering the expertise of said lawyers and the
complexity of the cases they would be handling for the PCGG
•OSG: -PCGG failed to cooperate with them in regard to the 39 cases and the suits and countersuits that stemmed
out of them. The PCGG has disposed of their services, as the Commission has announced through TV and print. -
Petition should be dismissed for the Court allowed the SG's withdrawal making the petition moot and academic. -
Petitioner had no "court standing" nor "litigable interest."
•Petitioner: -A question of public right is involved which gives him the court standing. -The petition may be moot and
academic as it is settled between the SG and PCGG, but between him, the OSG and the PCGG, a real controversy still
existed. -A judgement of prohibition and mandamus would have practical legal effect and can be enforced

ISSUE:
•Whether or not the Solicitor General neglected his public duty by withdrawing as counsel for the Republic of the
Philippines and the PCGG.
•Whether or not the PCGG acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in hiring private lawyers as a result of such
withdrawal of appearance.

HELD:
•Yes. The Court was firmly convinced that there can be no other logical interpretation of Sec. 35 of the
Administrative Code than that it is indeed mandatory upon the OSG ti represent the Government of the Philippines.
•Yes. The PCGG under the law of its creation and it complementary Rules, ineluctably lead to no other conclusion
but that the law office of the PCGG and the rest of the Government is the OSG.
•The writ of prohibition was not granted, but a writ of mandamus was, and directed the SG to immediately re-enter
his appearance in the cases wherein he had filed a motion to withdraw appearance.

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G. LAWYER’S OATH

Lawyer's Oath
I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, I will support the Constitution and
obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give
aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to
the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself these voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.

III. THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

> RULES OF COURT, Rule 139

RULE 139-A

Integrated Bar of the Philippines

Section 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an official national body to be known as the
"Integrated Bar of the Philippines," composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter be
included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

Section 2. Purposes. — The fundamental purposes of the Integrated Bar shall be to elevate the standards of
the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility more effectively.

Section 3. Regions. — The Philippines is hereby divided into nine Regions of the Integrated Bar, to wit:

(a) Northern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Abra, Batanes, Benguet, Cagayan, Ifugao, Ilocos
Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Kalinga-Apayao, La Union, Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya, and
Quirino.

(b) Central Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Bataan, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Pampanga,
Pangasinan, Tarlac, and Zambales;

(c) Greater Manila, consisting of the City of Manila and Quezon City;

(d) Southern Luzon, consisting of the provinces of Batangas, Cavite, Laguna, Marinduque,
Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro, Quezon, and Rizal;

(e) Bicolandia, consisting of the provinces of Albay, Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Catanduanes,
Masbate, and Sorsogon;

(f) Eastern Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Bohol, Cebu, Eastern Samar, Leyte, Northern
Samar, Samar, and Southern Leyte;

(g) Western Visayas, consisting of the provinces of Aklan, Antique, Capiz, Iloilo, Negros Occidental,
Negros Oriental, Palawan, Romblon, and Siquijor.

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(h) Eastern Mindanao, consisting of the provinces of Agusan del Norte, Agusan Del Sur, Bukidnon,
Camiguin, Davao del Norte, Davao del Sur, Davao Oriental, Misamis Oriental, Surigao del Norte,
and Surigao del Sur; and

(i) Western Mindanao, consisting of the cities of Basilan and Zamboanga, and the provinces of
Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Misamis Occidental, South Cotabato, Sulu, Zamboanga
del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur.

In the event of the creation of any new province, the Board of Governors shall, with the approval of the
Supreme Court, determine the Region to which the said province shall belong.

Section 4. Chapters. — A Chapter of the Integrated Bar shall be organized in every province. Except as
hereinbelow provided, every city shall be considered part of the province within which it is geographically
situated.

A separate Chapter shall be organized in each of the following political subdivisions or areas;

(a) The sub-province of Aurora;

(b) Each congressional district of the City of Manila;

(c) Quezon City;

(d) Caloocan City, Malabon and Navotas;

(e) Pasay City, Makati, Mandaluyong and San Juan del Monte;

(f) Cebu City; and

(g) Zamboanga City and Basilan City.

Unless he otherwise registers his preference for a particular Chapter, a lawyer shall be considered a member
of the Chapter of the province, city, political subdivision or area where his office, or, in the absence thereof,
his residence is located. In no case shall any lawyer be a member of more than one Chapter.

Each Chapter shall have its own local government as provided for by uniform rules to be prescribed by the
Board of Governors and approved by the Supreme Court, the provisions of Section 19 of this Rule
notwithstanding.

Chapters belonging to the same Region may hold regional conventions on matters and problems of common
concern.

Section 5. House of Delegates. — The Integrated Bar shall have a House of Delegates of not more than one
hundred twenty members who shall be apportioned among all the Chapters as nearly as may be according to
the number of their respective members, but each Chapter shall have at least one Delegate. On or before
December 31, 1974, and every four years thereafter, the Board of Governors shall make an apportionment of
Delegates.

The term of the office of Delegate shall begin on the date of the opening of the annual convention of the
House and shall end on the day immediately preceding the date of the opening of the next succeeding annual
convention. No person may be a Delegate for more than two terms.

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The House shall hold an annual convention at the call of the Board of Governors at any time during the
month of April of each year for the election of Governor, the reading and discussion of reports including the
annual report of the Board of Governors, the transaction of such other business as may be referred to it by
the Board, and the consideration of such additional matters as may be requested in writing by at least twenty
Delegates. Special conventions of the House may be called by the Board of Governors to consider only such
matters as the Board shall indicate. A majority of the Delegates who have registered for a convention,
whether annual or special, shall constitute a quorum to do business.

Section 6. Board of Governors. — The Integrated Bar shall be governed by a Board of Governors. Nine
Governors shall be elected by the House of Delegates from the nine Regions on the representation basis of
one Governor from each Region. Each Governor shall be chosen from a list of nominees submitted by the
Delegates from the Region, provided that not more than one nominee shall come from any Chapter. The
President and the Executive Vice President, if chosen by the Governors from outside of themselves as
provided in Section 7 of this Rule, shall ipso facto become members of the Board.

The members of the Board shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of their election and until
their successors shall have been duly elected and qualified. No person may be a Governor for more than two
terms.

The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such date and such time and place as it shall
designate. A majority of all the members of the Board shall constitute a quorum to do business. Special
meetings may be called by the President or by five members of the Board.

Subject to the approval of the Supreme Court, the Board shall adopt By-Laws and promulgate Canons of
Professional Responsibility for all members of the Integrated Bar. The By-Laws and the Canons may be
amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors.

The Board shall prescribe such other rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out the
purposes of the Integrated Bar as well as the provisions of this Rule.

Section 7. Officers. — The Integrated Bar shall have a President and an Executive Vice President who shall
be chosen by the Governors immediately after the latter's election, either from among themselves or from
other members of the Integrated Bar, by the vote of at least five Governors. Each of the regional members of
the Board shall be ex officio Vice President for the Region which he represents.

The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of one year from the date of their
election and until their successors shall have duly qualified. The Executive Vice President shall
automatically become the President for the next succeeding full term. The Presidency shall rotate from year
to year among all the nine Regions in such order or rotation as the Board of Governors shall prescribe. No
person shall be President or Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar for more than one term.

The Integrated Bar shall have a Secretary, a Treasurer, and such other officers and employees as may be
required by the Board of Governors, to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board, and to
hold office at the pleasure of the Board or for such terms as it may fix. Said officers and employees need not
be members of the Integrated Bar.

Section 8. Vacancies. — In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his duties shall be performed
by the Executive Vice President; and in the event of the death, resignation, or removal of the President, the
Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President during the remainder of the term of the office thus
vacated. In the event of the death, resignation, removal, or disability of both the President and the Executive
Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to hold office until the next
succeeding election or during the period of disability.

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The filling of vacancies in the House of Delegates, Board of Governors, and all other positions of Officers of
the Integrated Bar shall be as provided in the By-Laws. Whenever the term of an office or position is for a
fixed period, the person chosen to fill a vacancy therein shall serve only for the unexpired term.

Section 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the
Board of Governors shall determine with the approval of the Supreme Court. A fixed sum equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of the collection from each Chapter shall be set aside as a Welfare Fund for disabled members
of the Chapter and the compulsory heirs of deceased members thereof.

Section 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in
the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent
member from the Roll of Attorneys.

Section 11. Voluntary termination of membership; re-instatement. — A member may terminate his
membership by filing a written notice to that effect with the Secretary of the Integrated Bar, who shall
immediately bring the matter to the attention of the Supreme Court. Forthwith he shall cease to be a member
and his name shall be stricken by the Court from the Roll of Attorneys. Reinstatement may be made by the
Court in accordance with rules and regulations prescribed by the Board of Governors and approved by the
Court.

Section 12. Grievance procedures. — The Board of Governors shall provide in the By-Laws for grievance
procedures for the enforcement and maintenance of discipline among all the members of the Integrated Bar,
but no action involving the suspension or disbarment of a member or the removal of his name from the Roll
of Attorneys shall be effective without the final approval of the Supreme Court.

Section 13. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar shall be strictly non-political, and every activity
tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No lawyer
holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political
subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election of appointment to any position in the
Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his position as of the
moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any elective public office or accepts appointment to any
judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof.

Section 14. Positions honorary. — Except as may be specifically authorized or allowed by the Supreme
Court, no Delegate or Governor and no national or local Officer or committee member shall receive any
compensation, allowance or emolument from the funds of the Integrated Bar for any service rendered therein
or be entitled to reimbursement for any expense incurred in the discharge of his functions.

Section 15. Fiscal matters. — The Board of Governors shall administer the funds of the Integrated Bar and
shall have the power to make appropriations and disbursements therefrom. It shall cause proper Books of
Accounts to be kept and Financial Statements to be rendered and shall see to it that the proper audit is made
of all accounts of the Integrated Bar and all the Chapters thereof.

Section 16. Journal. — The Board of Governors shall cause to be published a quarterly Journal of the
Integrated Bar, free copies of which shall be distributed to every member of the Integrated Bar.

Section 17. Voluntary Bar associations. — All voluntary Bar associations now existing or which may
hereafter be formed may co-exist with the Integrated Bar but shall not operate at cross-purposes therewith.

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Section 18. Amendments. — This Rule may be amended by the Supreme Court motu propio or upon the
recommendation of the Board of Governors or any Chapter of the Integrated Bar.

Section 19. Organizational period. — The Commission on Bar Integration shall organize the local Chapters
and toward this end shall secure the assistance of the Department of Justice and of all Judges throughout the
Philippines. All Chapter organizational meetings shall be held on Saturday, February 17, 1973. In every
case, the Commission shall cause proper notice of the date, time and place of the meeting called to organize
a Chapter shall constitute a quorum for the purpose, including the election of a President, a Vice President, a
Secretary, a Treasurer, and five Directors.

The Commission shall initially fix the number of Delegates and apportion the same among all the Chapters
as nearly as may be in proportion to the number of their respective members, but each Chapter shall have at
least one Delegate. The President of each Chapter shall concurrently be its Delegate to the House of
Delegates. The Vice President shall be his alternate, except where the Chapter is entitled to have more than
one Delegate, in which case the Vice President shall also be a Delegate.

The Board of Directors of the Chapter shall in proper cases elect additional as well as alternate Delegates.

The House of Delegates shall convene in the City of Manila on Saturday, March 17, 1973 for the Purpose of
electing a Board of Governors. The Governors shall immediately assume office and forthwith meet to elect
the Officers of the Integrated Bar. The Officers so chosen shall immediately assume their respective
positions.

Section 20. Effectivity. — This Rule shall take effect on January 16, 1973.

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> In Re Integration of the Philippine Bar, 49 SCRA 22 (1973)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
January 9, 1973

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTEGRATION OF THE BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

On December 1, 1972, the Commission on Bar Integration1 submitted its Report dated November 30, 1972, with
the "earnest recommendation" — on the basis of the said Report and the proceedings had in Administrative
Case No. 5262 of the Court, and "consistently with the views and counsel received from its [the Commission's]
Board of Consultants, as well as the overwhelming nationwide sentiment of the Philippine Bench and Bar" —
that "this Honorable Court ordain the integration of the Philippine Bar as soon as possible through the adoption
and promulgation of an appropriate Court Rule."

The petition in Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar, after
due hearing, giving recognition as far as possible and practicable to existing provincial and other local Bar
associations. On August 16, 1962, arguments in favor of as well as in opposition to the petition were orally
expounded before the Court. Written oppositions were admitted,3 and all parties were thereafter granted leave to
file written memoranda.4

Since then, the Court has closely observed and followed significant developments relative to the matter of the
integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction.

In 1970, convinced from preliminary surveys that there had grown a strong nationwide sentiment in favor of Bar
integration, the Court created the Commission on Bar Integration for the purpose of ascertaining the advisability
of unifying the Philippine Bar.

In September, 1971, Congress passed House Bill No. 3277 entitled "An Act Providing for the Integration of the
Philippine Bar, and Appropriating Funds Therefor." The measure was signed by President Ferdinand E. Marcos
on September 17, 1971 and took effect on the same day as Rep. Act 6397. This law provides as follows:

SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules
of court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in
order to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.

SEC. 2. The sum of five hundred thousand pesos is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the
National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this Act. Thereafter,
such sums as may be necessary for the same purpose shall be included in the annual
appropriations for the Supreme Court.

SEC. 3. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.

The Report of the Commission abounds with argument on the constitutionality of Bar integration and contains all
necessary factual data bearing on the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar integration. Also embodied
therein are the views, opinions, sentiments, comments and observations of the rank and file of the Philippine
lawyer population relative to Bar integration, as well as a proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the
Commission and presented to them by that body in a national Bar plebiscite. There is thus sufficient basis as

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well as ample material upon which the Court may decide whether or not to integrate the Philippine Bar at this
time.

The following are the pertinent issues:

(1) Does the Court have the power to integrate the Philippine Bar?

(2) Would the integration of the Bar be constitutional?

(3) Should the Court ordain the integration of the Bar at this time?

A resolution of these issues requires, at the outset, a statement of the meaning of Bar integration. It will suffice,
for this purpose, to adopt the concept given by the Commission on Bar Integration on pages 3 to 5 of its Report,
thus:

Integration of the Philippine Bar means the official unification of the entire lawyer population of
the Philippines. This requires membership and financial support (in reasonable amount) of every
attorney as conditions sine qua non to the practice of law and the retention of his name in the
Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.

The term "Bar" refers to the collectivity of all persons whose names appear in the Roll of
Attorneys. An Integrated Bar (or Unified Bar) perforce must include all lawyers.

Complete unification is not possible unless it is decreed by an entity with power to do so: the
State. Bar integration, therefore, signifies the setting up by Government authority of a national
organization of the legal profession based on the recognition of the lawyer as an officer of the
court.

Designed to improve the position of the Bar as an instrumentality of justice and the Rule of Law,
integration fosters cohesion among lawyers, and ensures, through their own organized action
and participation, the promotion of the objectives of the legal profession, pursuant to the principle
of maximum Bar autonomy with minimum supervision and regulation by the Supreme Court.

The purposes of an integrated Bar, in general, are:

(1) Assist in the administration of justice;

(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning, professional
competence, public service and conduct;

(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;

(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;

(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading, practice and
procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public, and publish information
relating thereto;

(6) Encourage and foster legal education;

(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law, and make
reports and recommendations thereon; and

(8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.

Integration of the Bar will, among other things, make it possible for the legal profession to:

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(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;

(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and prosecuting officers;

(3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal of
incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;

(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own forum, from
the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to maintain its integrity,
impartiality and independence;

(5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;

(6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local practice
maintained through influence or position;

(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;

(8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer reference
services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent legal service;

(9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in many of our
provinces;

(10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising attorneys in order
to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country;

(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;

(12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;

(13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations, on the
importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the Filipino lawyer; and

(14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of the lawyer
population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the nation.

Anent the first issue, the Court is of the view that it may integrate the Philippine Bar in the exercise of its power,
under Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law." Indeed, the power to integrate is an inherent part of the
Court's constitutional authority over the Bar. In providing that "the Supreme Court may adopt rules of court to
effect the integration of the Philippine Bar," Republic Act 6397 neither confers a new power nor restricts the
Court's inherent power, but is a mere legislative declaration that the integration of the Bar will promote public
interest or, more specifically, will "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."

Resolution of the second issue — whether the unification of the Bar would be constitutional — hinges on the
effects of Bar integration on the lawyer's constitutional rights of freedom of association and freedom of speech,
and on the nature of the dues exacted from him.

The Court approvingly quotes the following pertinent discussion made by the Commission on Bar Integration
pages 44 to 49 of its Report:

Constitutionality of Bar Integration

Judicial Pronouncements.

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In all cases where the validity of Bar integration measures has been put in issue, the Courts have
upheld their constitutionality.

The judicial pronouncements support this reasoning:

— Courts have inherent power to supervise and regulate the practice of law.

— The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege; a privilege, moreover, clothed with
public interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the
profession, to the courts, and to the nation; and takes part in one of the most important functions
of the State, the administration of justice, as an officer of the court.

— Because the practice of law is privilege clothed with public interest, it is far and just that the
exercise of that privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.

— These public responsibilities can best be discharged through collective action; but there can
be no collective action without an organized body; no organized body can operate effectively
without incurring expenses; therefore, it is fair and just that all attorneys be required to contribute
to the support of such organized body; and, given existing Bar conditions, the most efficient
means of doing so is by integrating the Bar through a rule of court that requires all lawyers to pay
annual dues to the Integrated Bar.

1. Freedom of Association.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of an integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional

freedom to associate (or the corollary right not to associate).

Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is not already a member.
He became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All that integration
actually does is to provide an official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized
and incohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member.

Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not
attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he
chooses. The body compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues.

Otherwise stated, membership in the Unified Bar imposes only the duty to pay dues in
reasonable amount. The issue therefore, is a question of compelled financial support of group
activities, not involuntary membership in any other aspect.

The greater part of Unified Bar activities serves the function of elevating the educational and
ethical standards of the Bar to the end of improving the quality of the legal service available to
the people. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevating the
quality of professional services, may require that the cost of improving the profession in this
fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.

Assuming that Bar integration does compel a lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such
compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the State. The legal profession has
long been regarded as a proper subject of legislative regulation and control. Moreover, the
inherent power of the Supreme Court to regulate the Bar includes the authority to integrate the
Bar.

2. Regulatory Fee.

For the Court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court levies a
tax.

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A membership fee in the Integrated Bar is an exaction for regulation, while the purpose of a tax is
revenue. If the Court has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows that as an incident to
regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It would not be possible to push
through an Integrated Bar program without means to defray the concomitant expenses. The
doctrine of implied powers necessarily includes the power to impose such an exaction.

The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the Bar is that the regulation does not
impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by the integration of the Bar far
outweighs the inconsequential inconvenience to a member that might result from his required
payment of annual dues.

3. Freedom of Speech.

A lawyer is free, as he has always been, to voice his views on any subject in any manner he
wishes, even though such views be opposed to positions taken by the Unified Bar.

For the Integrated Bar to use a member's due to promote measures to which said member is
opposed, would not nullify or adversely affect his freedom of speech.

Since a State may constitutionally condition the right to practice law upon membership in the
Integrated Bar, it is difficult to understand why it should become unconstitutional for the Bar to
use the member's dues to fulfill the very purposes for which it was established.

The objection would make every Governmental exaction the material of a "free speech" issue.
Even the income tax would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths that have never
been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties were to be thus extended, might
refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any other end condemned by his conscience
as irreligious or immoral. The right of private judgment has never yet been exalted above the
powers and the compulsion of the agencies of Government.

4. Fair to All Lawyers.

Bar integration is not unfair to lawyers already practising because although the requirement to
pay annual dues is a new regulation, it will give the members of the Bar a new system which they
hitherto have not had and through which, by proper work, they will receive benefits they have not
heretofore enjoyed, and discharge their public responsibilities in a more effective manner than
they have been able to do in the past. Because the requirement to pay dues is a valid exercise of
regulatory power by the Court, because it will apply equally to all lawyers, young and old, at the
time Bar integration takes effect, and because it is a new regulation in exchange for new
benefits, it is not retroactive, it is not unequal, it is not unfair.

To resolve the third and final issue — whether the Court should ordain the integration of the Bar at this time —
requires a careful overview of the practicability and necessity as well as the advantages and disadvantages of
Bar integration.

In many other jurisdictions, notably in England, Canada and the United States, Bar integration has yielded the
following benefits: (1) improved discipline among the members of the Bar; (2) greater influence and ascendancy
of the Bar; (3) better and more meaningful participation of the individual lawyer in the activities of the Integrated
Bar; (4) greater Bar facilities and services; (5) elimination of unauthorized practice; (6) avoidance of costly
membership campaigns; (7) establishment of an official status for the Bar; (8) more cohesive profession; and (9)
better and more effective discharge by the Bar of its obligations and responsibilities to its members, to the
courts, and to the public. No less than these salutary consequences are envisioned and in fact expected from
the unification of the Philippine Bar.

Upon the other hand, it has been variously argued that in the event of integration, Government authority will
dominate the Bar; local Bar associations will be weakened; cliquism will be the inevitable result; effective
lobbying will not be possible; the Bar will become an impersonal Bar; and politics will intrude into its affairs.

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LEGAL PROFESSION
It is noteworthy, however, that these and other evils prophesied by opponents of Bar integration have failed to
materialize in over fifty years of Bar integration experience in England, Canada and the United States. In all the
jurisdictions where the Integrated Bar has been tried, none of the abuses or evils feared has arisen; on the other
hand, it has restored public confidence in the Bar, enlarged professional consciousness, energized the Bar's
responsibilities to the public, and vastly improved the administration of justice.

How do the Filipino lawyers themselves regard Bar integration? The official statistics compiled by the
Commission on Bar integration show that in the national poll recently conducted by the Commission in the
matter of the integration of the Philippine Bar, of a total of 15,090 lawyers from all over the archipelago who have
turned in their individual responses, 14,555 (or 96.45 per cent) voted in favor of Bar integration, while only 378
(or 2.51 per cent) voted against it, and 157 (or 1.04 per cent) are non-commital. In addition, a total of eighty (80)
local Bar association and lawyers' groups all over the Philippines have submitted resolutions and other
expressions of unqualified endorsement and/or support for Bar integration, while not a single local Bar
association or lawyers' group has expressed opposed position thereto. Finally, of the 13,802 individual lawyers
who cast their plebiscite ballots on the proposed integration Court Rule drafted by the Commission, 12,855 (or
93.14 per cent) voted in favor thereof, 662 (or 4.80 per cent) vote against it, and 285 (or 2.06 per cent) are non-
committal.5 All these clearly indicate an overwhelming nationwide demand for Bar integration at this time.

The Court is fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments adduced in Adm.
Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of
the Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is "perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable," within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has become an
imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and
enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court, by virtue of the power vested in it by Section 13 of Article VIII of the Constitution,
hereby ordains the integration of the Bar of the Philippines in accordance with the attached COURT RULE,
effective on January 16, 1973.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castillo, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Created by Supreme Court Resolution of October 5, 1970 "for the purpose of ascertaining the
advisability of the integration of the Bar in this jurisdiction," the Commission is composed of
Supreme Court Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro (Chairman), Senator Jose J. Roy, retired
Supreme Court Associate Justice Conrado V. Sanchez, Supreme Court Associate Justice (then
Court of Appeals Presiding Justice) Salvador V. Esguerra, U. P. Law Center Director Crisolito
Pascual, Ex-Senator Tecla San Andres Ziga, and San Beda Law Dean and Constitutional
Convention Delegate Feliciano Jover Ledesma (Members).

2 Filed on July 11, 1962 (by a Committee composed of Jose W. Diokno, Roman Ozaeta, Jose P.
Carag, Eugenio Villanueva, Jr. and Leo A. Panuncialman), the petition represented the
unanimous consensus of 53 Bar Associations (from all over the Philippines) reached in
convention at the Far Eastern University Auditorium in Manila on June 23, 1962.

3 Written oppositions were submitted by Attys. Cesar Fajardo and Vicente L. Arcega, the
Camarines Norte Lawyers League, Atty. Fructuoso S. Villarin, the Camarines Sur Bar
Association and the Manila Bar Association.

4 The Petitioners and the Negros Occidental Bar Association submitted memoranda in favor of
Bar integration, while the Manila Bar Association submitted a memoranda opposing Bar
integration.

5 All figures are as of January 8, 1973.

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LEGAL PROFESSION
> In re IBP Elections, 178 SCRA 815

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 491 October 6, 1989

IN THE MATTER OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE 1989 ELECTIONS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES.

PER CURIAM:

In the election of the national officers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (hereafter "IBP") held on June 3,
1989 at the Philippine International Convention Center (or PICC), the following were elected by the House of
Delegates (composed of 120 chapter presidents or their alternates) and proclaimed as officers:

NAME POSITION

Atty. Violeta Drilon President

Atty. Bella Tiro Executive Vice-President

Atty. Salvador Lao Chairman, House of Delegates

Atty. Renato F. Ronquillo Secretary, House of Delegates

Atty. Teodoro Quicoy Treasurer, House of Delegates

Atty. Oscar Badelles Sergeant at Arms, House of Delegates

Atty. Justiniano Cortes Governor & Vice-President for Northern Luzon

Atty. Ciriaco Atienza Governor & Vice-President for Central Luzon

Atty. Mario Jalandoni Governor & Vice-President for Metro Manila

Atty. Jose Aguilar Grapilon Governor & Vice-President for Southern Luzon

Atty. Teodoro Almine Governor & Vice-President for Bicolandia

Atty. Porfirio Siyangco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Visayas

Atty. Ricardo Teruel Governor & Vice-President for Western Visayas

Atty. Gladys Tiongco Governor & Vice-President for Eastern Mindanao

Atty. Simeon Datumanong Governor & Vice-President for Western Mindanao

The newly-elected officers were set to take the their oath of office on July 4,1989, before the Supreme Court en
banc. However,disturbed by the widespread reports received by some members of the Court from lawyers who
had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the adverse comments published in the columns of some
newspapers about the intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main
protagonists for the office of president of the association, namely, Attorneys Nereo Paculdo, Ramon Nisce, and
Violeta C. Drilon, the alleged use of government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to
influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which prohibit such activities. The

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LEGAL PROFESSION
Supreme Court en banc, exercising its power of supervision over the Integrated Bar, resolved to suspend the
oath-taking of the IBP officers-elect and to inquire into the veracity of the reports.

It should be stated at the outset that the election process itself (i.e. the voting and the canvassing of votes on
June 3, 1989) which was conducted by the "IBP Comelec," headed by Justice Reynato Puno of the Court of
Appeals, was unanimously adjudged by the participants and observers to be above board. For Justice Puno took
it upon himself to device safeguards to prevent tampering with, and marking of, the ballots.

What the Court viewed with considerable concern was the reported electioneering and extravagance that
characterized the campaign conducted by the three candidates for president of the IBP.

I. MEDIA ACCOUNT OF THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN.

Emil Jurado, in his column "IBP Group Questions Drilon Election" (Manila Standard, Sunday, June 17, 1989),
Luis Mauricio, in two successive columns: "The Invertebrated Bar" (Malaya, June 10, 1989) and "The
Disintegrating Bar" (Malaya, June 20, 1989), and Teodoro Locsin Jr. in an article, entitled "Pam-Pam" (The
Philippines Free Press, July 8,1989), and the editorial, entitled 'Wrong Forum" of the Daily Globe (June 8, 1989),
were unanimously critical of the "vote-buying and pressure tactics" allegedly employed in the campaign by the
three principal candidates: Attys. Violeta C. Drilon, Nereo Paculdo and Ramon Nisce who reportedly "poured
heart, soul, money and influence to win over the 120 IBP delegates."

Mr. Jurado mentioned the resentment of Atty. Drilon's rivals who felt at a disadvantage because Atty. Drilon
allegedly used PNB helicopters to visit far-flung IBP chapters on the pretext of distributing Bigay Puso donations,
and she had the added advantage of having regional directors and labor arbiters of the Department of Labor and
Employment (who had been granted leaves of absence by her husband, the Labor Secretary) campaigning for
her. Jurado's informants alleged that there was rampant vote-buying by some members of the U.P. Sigma Rho
Fraternity (Secretary Drilon's fraternity), as well as by some lawyers of ACCRA (Angara, Concepcion, Cruz,
Regala and Abello Law Office) where Mrs. Drilon is employed, and that government positions were promised to
others by the office of the Labor Secretary.

Mr. Mauricio in his column wrote about the same matters and, in addition, mentioned "talk of personnel of the
Department of Labor, especially conciliators and employers, notably Chinese Filipinos, giving aid and comfort to
her (Atty. Drilon's) candidacy," the billeting of out-of-town delegates in plush hotels where they were reportedly
"wined and dined continuously, womened and subjected to endless haggling over the price of their votes x x x"
which allegedly "ranged from Pl5,000 to P20,000, and, on the day of the election, some twelve to twenty votes
which were believed crucial, appreciated to P50,000."

In his second column, Mr. Mauricio mentioned "how a top official of the judiciary allegedly involved himself in IBP
politics on election day by closeting himself with campaigners as they plotted their election strategy in a room of
the PICC (the Philippine International Convention Center where the convention/election were held) during a
recess x x x."

Mr. Locsin in his column and editorial substantially re-echoed Mauricio's reports with some embellishments.

II. THE COURT'S DECISION TO INVESTIGATE.

Responding to the critical reports, the Court, in its en banc resolution dated June 15, 1989, directed the outgoing
and incoming members of the IBP Board of Governors, the principal officers and Chairman of the House of
Delegates to appear before it on Tuesday, June 20, 1989, at 2:00 o'clock p.m., and there to inform the Court on
the veracity of the aforementioned reports and to recommend, for the consideration of the Court, appropriate
approaches to the problem of confirming and strengthening adherence to the fundamental principles of the IBP.

In that resolution the Court "call[ed] to mind that a basic postulate of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
heavily stressed at the time of its organization and commencement of existence, is that the IBP shall be non-
political in character and that there shall be no lobbying nor campaigning in the choice of members of the Board
of Governors and of the House of Delegates, and of the IBP officers, national, or regional, or chapter. The
fundamental assumption was that officers, delegates and governors would be chosen on the basis of
professional merit and willingness and ability to serve."

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Alexandra S. Roxas
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The resolution went on to say that the "Court is deeply disturbed to note that in connection with the election of
members of the Board of Governors and of the House of Delegates, there is a widespread belief, based on
reports carried by media and transmitted as well by word of mouth, that there was extensive and intensive
campaigning by candidates for IBP positions as well as expenditure of considerable sums of money by
candidates, including vote-buying, direct or indirect."

The venerable retired Supreme Court Justice and IBP President Emeritus, Jose B.L. Reyes, attended the
dialogue, upon invitation of the Court, to give counsel and advice. The meeting between the Court en banc on
the one hand, and the outgoing and in coming IBP officers on the other, was an informal one. Thereafter, the
Court resolved to conduct a formal inquiry to determine whether the prohibited acts and activities enumerated in
the IBP By-Laws were committed before and during the 1989 elections of IBP's national officers.

The Court en banc formed a committee and designated Senior Associate Justice Andres R. Narvasa, as
Chairman, and Associate Justices Teodoro R. Padilla, Emilio A. Gancayco, Abraham F. Sarmiento, and Carolina
C. Griño-Aquino, as members, to conduct the inquiry. The Clerk of Court, Atty. Daniel Martinez, acted as the
committee's Recording Secretary.

A total of forty-nine (49) witnesses appeared and testified in response to subpoenas issued by the Court to shed
light on the conduct of the elections. The managers of three five-star hotels the Philippine Plaza, the Hyatt, and
the Holiday Inn where the three protagonists (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) allegedly set up their respective
headquarters and where they billeted their supporters were summoned. The officer of the Philippine National
Bank and the Air Transport Office were called to enlighten the Court on the charge that an IBP presidential
candidate and the members of her slate used PNB planes to ferry them to distant places in their campaign to win
the votes of delegates. The Philippine Airlines officials were called to testify on the charge that some candidates
gave free air fares to delegates to the convention. Officials of the Labor Department were also called to enable
the Court to ascertain the truth of the reports that labor officials openly campaigned or worked for the election of
Atty. Drilon.

The newspaper columnists, Messrs. Luis Mauricio, Jesus Bigornia and Emil Jurado were subpoenaed to
determine the nature of their sources of information relative to the IBP elections. Their stories were based, they
said, on letters, phone calls and personal interviews with persons who claimed to have knowledge of the facts,
but whom they, invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to identify.

The Committee has since submitted its Report after receiving, and analyzing and assessing evidence given by
such persons as were perceived to have direct and personal knowledge of the relevant facts; and the Court,
after deliberating thereon, has Resolved to accept and adopt the same.

III. PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES UNDER IBP BY-LAWS.

Article I, Section 4 of the IBP By-Laws emphasizes the "strictly non-political" character of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, thus:

"SEC. 4. Non-political Bar. — The Integrated Bar is strictly non-political, and every activity
tending to impair this basic feature is strictly prohibited and shall be penalized accordingly. No
lawyer holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government or any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof shall be eligible for election or appointment to any
position in the Integrated Bar or any Chapter thereof. A Delegate, Governor, officer or employee
of the Integrated Bar, or an officer or employee of any Chapter thereof shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his position as of the moment he files his certificate of candidacy for any
elective public office or accepts appointment to any judicial, quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in
the Government or any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof. "'

Section 14 of the same By-Laws enumerates the prohibited acts relative to IBP elections:

SEC. 14. Prohibited acts and practices relative to elections. — The following acts and practices
relative to election are prohibited, whether committed by a candidate for any elective office in the
Integrated Bar or by any other member, directly or indirectly, in any form or manner, by himself or
through another person:

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Alexandra S. Roxas
LEGAL PROFESSION
(a) Distribution, except on election day, of election campaign material;

(b) Distribution, on election day, of election campaign material other than a statement of the
biodata of a candidate on not more than one page of a legal-size sheet of paper; or causing
distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer
presiding at the elections;

(c) Campaigning for or against any candidate, while holding an elective, judicial, quasi-judicial or
prosecutory office in the Government or any political subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof;

(d) Formation of tickets, single slates, or combinations of candidates, as well as the

advertisement thereof;

(e) For the purpose of inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or
against a candidate, (1) payment of the dues or other indebtedness of any member; (2) giving of
food, drink, entertainment, transportation or any article of value, or any similar consideration to
any person; or (3) making a promise or causing an expenditure to be made, offered or promised
to any person."

Section 12(d) of the By-Laws prescribes sanctions for violations of the above rules:

(d) Any violation of the rules governing elections or commission of any of the prohibited acts and
practices defined in Section 14 prohibited Acts and Practices relative to elections) of the by-laws
of the Integrated Bar shall be a ground for the disqualification of a candidate or his removal from
office if elected, without prejudice to the imposition of sanctions upon any erring member
pursuant to the By-laws of the Integrated Bar.

At the formal investigation which was conducted by the investigating committee, the following violations were
established:

(1) Prohibited campaigning and solicitation of votes by the candidates for president, executive vice-president, the
officers of candidate the House of Delegates and Board of Governors.

The three candidates for IBP President Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo began travelling around the country to solicit
the votes of delegates as early as April 1989. Upon the invitation of IBP President, Leon Garcia, Jr. (t.s.n., July
13,1989, p. 4), they attended the Bench and Bar dialogues held in Cotabato in April 1989 (t.s.n., June 29, 1989,
p. 123), in Tagaytay City, Pampanga, and in Baguio City (during the conference of chapter presidents of
Northern Luzon (t.s.n., July 3,1989, p. 113; t.s.n., July 10, p. 41; t.s.n., July 13, p. 47) where they announced
their candidacies and met the chapter presidents.

Atty. Nisce admitted that he went around the country seeking the help of IBP chapter officers, soliciting their
votes, and securing their written endorsements. He personally hand-carried nomination forms and requested the
chapter presidents and delegates to fill up and sign the forms to formalize their commitment to his nomination for
IBP President. He started campaigning and distributing the nomination forms in March 1989 after the chapter
elections which determined the membership of the House of Delegates composed of the 120 chapter presidents
(t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-86). He obtained forty (40) commitments. He submitted photocopies of his
nomination forms which read:

"Nomination Form

I Join in Nominating

RAMON M. NISCE

as

85
Alexandra S. Roxas
LEGAL PROFESSION
National President of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines

______________ _______________

Chapter Signature"

Among those who signed the nomination forms were: Onofre P. Tejada, Candido P. Balbin, Jr., Conizado V.
Posadas, Quirico L. Quirico Ernesto S. Salun-at, Gloria C. Agunos, Oscar B. Bernardo, Feliciano F. Wycoco,
Amor L. Ibarra, Jose M. Atienza, Jose N. Contreras, Romeo T. Mendoza, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Paulino G.
Clarin, Julius Z. Neil, Roem J. Arbolado Democrito M. Perez, Abelardo Fermin, Diosdado B. Villarin, Jr., Daniel
C. Macaraeg, Confesor R. Sansano Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., Emesto A. Amores, Romeo V. Pefianco, Augurio C.
Pamintuan, Atlee T. Viray, Ceferino C. Cabanas, Jose S. Buban, Diosdado Z. Reloj, Jr., Cesar C. Viola, Oscar
C. Fernandez, Ricardo B. Teruel Rodrigo R. Flores, Sixto Marella, Jr., Arsenio C. Villalon, Renato F. Ronquillo,
Antonio G. Nalapo Romualdo A. Din Jr., Jose P. Icaonapo Jr., and Manuel S. Person.

Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms at the Hyatt Hotel based on the commitments he had obtained
(t.s.n., June 29, 1989, pp. 82-85). Unfortunately, despite those formal commitments, he obtained only 14 votes in
the election (t.s.n., June 29, 1 989, p. 86). The reason, he said, is that. some of those who had committed their
votes to him were "manipulated, intimidated, pressured, or remunerated" (t.s.n., June 29,1989, pp. 8695; Exhibit
"M-4-Nisce," t.s.n., July 4, 1989, pp. 100-1 04).

(2) Use of PNB plane in the campaign.

The records of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit C-1-Crudo and Exhibit C-2-Crudo) show that Secretary
Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. of the Department of Environment & Natural Resources (DENR) borrowed a plane
from the Philippine National Bank for his Bicol CORD (Cabinet Officers for Regional Development) Assistant,
Undersecretary Antonio Tria. The plane manifest (Exh. C-2-Crudo) listed Atty. Violeta Drilon, Arturo Tusi (Tiu),
Assistant Secretary for Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Tony Tria, Atty. Gladys Tiongco, and Amy
Wong. Except for Tony Tria, the rest of the passengers were IBP candidates.

Atty. Drilon admitted that she "hitched" a ride on a PNB plane. She said that she was informed by Atty. Tiu about
the availability of a PNB plane (t.s.n., July 3,1989, pp. 116-118).

Atty. Tiu, who ran for the position of IBP executive vice-president in the Drilon ticket, testified that sometime in
May 1989 he failed to obtain booking from the Philippine Airlines for the projected trip of his group to Bicol. He
went to the DENR allegedly to follow up some papers for a client. While at the DENR, he learned that Assistant
Secretary Tria was going on an official business in Bicol for Secretary Fulgencio Factoran and that he would be
taking a PNB plane. As Assistant Secretary Tria is his fraternity brother, he asked if he, together with the Drilon
group, could hitch a ride on the plane to Bicol. His request was granted. Their purpose in going to Bicol was to
assess their chances in the IBP elections. The Drilon company talked with the IBP chapter presidents in Daet,
Naga, and Legaspi, and asked for their support (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 549).

Assistant Secretary Antonio S. Tria confirmed the use of a PNB plane by Atty. Drilon and her group. He recalled
that on May 23,1989, DENR Secretary Factoran instructed him to go to Bicol to monitor certain regional
development projects there and to survey the effect of the typhoon that hit the region in the middle of May. On
the same day, Atty. Tiu, a fraternity brother (meaning that Tiu belongs to the Sigma Rho fraternity) went to the
DENR office and requested the Secretary (Factoran) if he (Tiu) could be allowed to hitch a ride on the plane.
Assistant Secretary Tria, together with the Drilon group which included Attorneys Drilon, Grapilon, Amy Wong,
Gladys Tiongco, and Tiu, took off at the Domestic Airport bound for Naga, Daet and Legaspi. In Legaspi the
Drilon group had lunch with Atty. Vicente Real, Jr., an IBP chapter president (t.s.n., July 10, 1989, pp. 54-69).

(3) Formation of tickets and single slates.

The three candidates, Paculdo, Nisce and Drilon, admitted having formed their own slates for the election of IBP
national officers on June 3, 1989.

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LEGAL PROFESSION
Atty. Paculdo's slate consisted of — himself for President; Bella D. Tiro, for Executive Vice-President; and for
Governors: Justiniano P. Cortez (Northern Luzon), Oscar C. Fernandez (Central Luzon), Mario C.V. Jalandoni
(Greater Manila), Petronilo A. de la Cruz (Southern Luzon), Teodorico C. Almine, Jr. (Bicolandia), Ricardo B.
Teruel (Western Visayas), Porfirio P. Siyangco (Eastern Visayas), Jesus S. Anonat (Western Mindanao),
Guerrero A. Adaza, Jr. (Eastern Mindanao) (Exhibit M-Nisce).

The Drilon ticket consisted of. Violeta C. Drilon for President, Arturo Tiu for Executive Vice President, Salvador
Lao for Chairman of the House of Delegates, and, for Governors: Basil Rupisan (Northern 'Luzon), Acong
Atienza (Central Luzon), Amy Wong (Metro Manila), Jose Grapilon (Southern Tagalog), Teodoro Almine
(Bicolandia), Baldomero Estenzo (Eastern Visayas), Joelito Barrera (Western Visayas), Gladys Tiongco (Eastern
Mindanao), Simeon Datumanong (Western Mindanao) (Exhibit M-1-Nisce).

Atty. Ramon N. Nisce's line-up listed himself and Confessor B. Sansano Benjamin B. Bernardino, Antonio L.
Nalapo Renato F. Ronquillo, Gloria C. Agunos, Mario Valderrama, Candido P. Balbin Jr., Oscar C. Fernandez,
Cesar G. Viola, Leo C. Medialdea, Jr., Vicente P. Tordilla, Jr., Jose S. Buban, Joel A. Llosa, Jesus T. Albacite
and Oscar V. Badelles.

(4) Giving free transportation to out-of-town delegates and alternates.

Atty. Nisce admitted having bought plane tickets for some delegates to the convention. He mentioned Oscar
Badelles to whom he gave four round-trip tickets (worth about P10,000) from Iligan City to Manila and back.
Badelles was a voting delegate. Nisce, however, failed to get a written commitment from him because Atty.
Medialdea assured him (Nisce) "sigurado na 'yan, h'wag mo nang papirmahin." Badelles won as sergeant-at-
arms, not in Nisce's ticket, but in that of Drilon.

Badelles admitted that Nisce sent him three airplane tickets, but he Badelles said that he did not use them,
because if he did, he would be committed to Nisce, and he Badelles did not want to be committed (t.s.n., July
4,1989, pp. 77-79, 95-96).

Nisce also sent a plane ticket to Atty. Atilano, who was his candidate, and another ticket to Mrs. Linda Lim of
Zamboanga. Records of the Philippine Airlines showed that Atty. Nisce paid for the plane tickets of Vicente Real,
Jr. (Exh. D-1-Calica), Romeo Fortes (Exh. D-1-Calica), Cesar Batica (Exh. D-2-Calica), Jose Buban of Leyte
(Exh. D-2-Calica), Delsanto Resuello (Exh. D-3- Calica), and Ceferino Cabanas (Exh. D-3-Calica).

In spite of his efforts and expense, only one of Nisce's candidates won: Renato Ronquillo of Manila 4, as
Secretary of the House of Delegates (t.s.n. July 3, p. 161).

(5) Giving free hotel accommodations, food, drinks, entertainment to delegates.

(a) ATTY. NEREO PACULDO

Atty. Paculdo alleged that he booked 24 regular rooms and three suites at the Holiday Inn, which served as his
headquarters. The 24 rooms were to be occupied by his staff (mostly ladies) and the IBP delegates. The three
suites were to be occupied by himself, the officers of the Capitol Bar Association, and Atty. Mario Jalandoni. He
paid P150,000 for the hotel bills of his delegates at the Holiday Inn, where a room cost P990 per day with
breakfast.

Those listed as guests of Atty. Paculdo at the Holiday Inn were: Emesto C. Perez, Tolomeo Ligutan Judge
Alfonso Combong, Ricardo Caliwag, Antonio Bisnar, Benedicto Balajadia, Jesus Castro, Restituto Villanueva,
Serapio Cribe Juanita Subia, Teodorico J. Almine, Rudy Gumban, Roem Arbolado, Ricardo Teruel, Shirley
Moises, Ramon Roco, Alberto Trinidad, Teodoro Quicoy Manito Lucero, Fred Cledera Vicente Tordilla, Julian
Ocampo, Francisco Felizmenio Marvel Clavecilla, Amador Capiral, Eufronio Maristela, Porfirio Siyangco, William
Llanes, Jr., Marciano Neri, Guerrero Adaza, Diosdado Peralta, Luis C. Formilleza, Jr., Democrito Perez, Bruno
Flores, Dennis Rendon, Judge Ceferino Chan, Mario Jalandoni, Kenneth Siruelo Bella Tiro, Antonio Santos,
Tiburcio Edano James Tan, Cesilo A. Adaza, Francisco Roxas, Angelita Gacutan, Jesse Pimentel, Judge Jaime
Hamoy, Jesus Anonat, Carlos Egay, Judge Carlito Eisma, Judge Jesus Carbon, Joven Zach, and Benjamin
Padon.

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Alexandra S. Roxas
LEGAL PROFESSION
Noel de Guzman, Holiday Inn's credit manager, testified that Atty. Paculdo booked 52 (not 24) rooms, including
the presidential suite, which was used as the Secretariat. The group bookings were made by Atty. Gloria
Paculdo, the wife of Nereo Paculdo (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 63-68). The total sum of P227,114.89 was paid to
Holiday Inn for the use of the rooms.

(b) ATTY. VIOLETA C. DRILON

The delegates and supporters of Atty. Drilon were billeted at the Philippine Plaza Hotel where her campaign
manager, Atty. Renato Callanta, booked 40 rooms, 5 of which were suites. According to Ms. Villanueva,
Philippine Plaza banquet and conventions manager, the contract that Atty. Callanta signed with the Philippine
Plaza was made in the name of the "IBP c/o Atty. Callanta."

Mrs. Lourdes Juco, a sales manager of the Philippine Plaza, recalled that it was Mr. Mariano Benedicto who first
came to book rooms for the IBP delegates. She suggested that he obtain a group (or discounted) rate. He gave
her the name of Atty. Callanta who would make the arrangements with her. Mr. Benedicto turned out to be the
Assistant Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).

The total sum of P316,411.53 was paid by Atty. Callanta for the rooms, food, and beverages consumed by the
Drilon group, with an unpaid balance of P302,197.30. Per Attorney Daniel Martinez's last telephone conversation
with Ms. Villanueva, Atty. Callanta still has an outstanding account of P232,782.65 at Philippine Plaza.

Atty. Callanta admitted that he signed the contract for 40 rooms at the Philippine Plaza. He made a
downpayment of P123,000. His "working sheet' showed that the following persons contributed for that down
payment:

(a) Nilo Pena (Quasha Law Office) P 25,000

(b) Antonio Carpio 20,000

(c) Toto Ferrer (Carpio Law Office) 10,000

(d) Jay Castro 10,000

(e) Danny Deen 20,000

(f) Angangco Tan (Angara Law Office) 10,000

(g) Alfonso Reyno 20,000

(h) Cosme Rossel 15,300

(t.s.n. July 4, 1 989, pp. 3-4)

Atty. Callanta explained that the above listed persons have been contributing money every time the IBP embarks
on a project. This time, they contributed so that their partners or associates could attend the legal aid seminar
and the IBP convention too.

Atty. Drilon alleged that she did not know that Atty. Callanta had billeted her delegates at the Philippine Plaza.
She allegedly did not also know in whose name the room she occupied was registered. But she did ask for a
room where she could rest during the convention. She admitted, however, that she paid for her hotel room and
meals to Atty. Callanta, through Atty. Loanzon (t.s.n. July 3,1989).

The following were listed as having occupied the rooms reserved by Atty. Callanta at the Philippine Plaza:
Violeta Drilon, Victoria A. Verciles, Victoria C. Loanzon, Leopoldo A. Consulto Ador Lao, Victoria Borra, Aimee
Wong, Callanta, Pena, Tiu, Gallardo, Acong Atienza, D. Bernardo, Amores, Silao Caingat, Manuel Yuson,
Simeon Datumanong, Manuel Pecson, Sixto Marella, Joselito Barrera, Radon Macalalag, Oscar Badelles,
Antonio Acyatan, Ildefonso C. Puerto, Nestor Atienza, Gil Batula Array Corot, Dimakuta Corot Romeo Fortes
Irving Petilla, Teodoro Palma, Gil Palma, Danilo Deen, Delsanto, Resuello, Araneta, Vicente Real, Sylvio
Casuncad Espina, Guerrero, Julius Neri, Linda Lim, Ben Lim, C. Batica, Luis Formilleza, Felix Macalag Mariano
Benedicto, Atilano, Araneta, Renato Callanta.

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Atty. Nilo Pena admitted that the Quasha Law Office of which he is a senior partner, gave P25,000 to Callanta
for rooms at the Philippine Plaza so that some members of his law firm could campaign for the Drilon group
(t.s.n. July 5,1989, pp. 7678) during the legal aid seminar and the IBP convention. Most of the members of his
law firm are fraternity brothers of Secretary Drilon (meaning, members of the Sigma Rho Fraternity). He admitted
being sympathetic to the candidacy of Atty. Drilon and the members of her slate, two of whom Jose Grapilon and
Simeon Datumanong — are Sigma Rhoans. They consider Atty. Drilon as a "sigma rho sister," her husband
being a sigma rhoan.

Atty. Antonio Carpio, also a Sigma Rhoan, reserved a room for the members of his own firm who attended the
legal aid seminar and the convention. He made the reservation through Atty. Callanta to whom he paid P20,000
(t.s.n. July 6,1989, pp. 30-34).

Atty. Carpio assisted Atty. Drilon in her campaign during the convention, by soliciting the votes of delegates he
knew, like Atty. Albacite his former teacher (but the latter was already committed to Nisce), and Atty. Romy
Fortes, a classmate of his in the U.P. College of Law (t. t.s.n. July 6, 1989, pp. 22, 29, 39).

(c) ATTY. RAMON NISCE.

Atty. Nisce, through his brother-in-law, Ricardo Paras, entered into a contract with the Hyatt Hotel for a total of
29 rooms plus one (1) seventh-floor room. He made a downpayment of P20,000 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 58) on
April 20, 1989, and P37,632.45 on May 10, or a total of P57,632.45.

Ms. Cecile Flores, Ms. Milagros Ocampo, and Mr. Ramon Jacinto, the sales department manager, credit
manager, and reservation manager, respectively of the Hyatt, testified that Atty. Nisce's bill amounted to
P216,127.74 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 57-58; Exhibits E-Flores, F-Jacinto G-Ocampo).

As earlier mentioned, Atty. Nisce admitted that he reserved rooms for those who committed themselves to his
candidacy.

The hotel guests of Atty. Nisce were: Gloria Agunos Dennis Habanel B. Batula, John E. Asuncion, Reynaldo
Cortes, Lourdes Santos, Elmer Datuin, Romualdo Din, Antonio Nalapo, Israel Damasco, Candido Balbin,
Serrano Balot, Ibarra, Joel Llosa, Eltanal, Ruperto, Asuncion, Q. Pilotin Reymundo P. Guzman, Zoilo Aguinaldo,
Clarin, R. Ronquillo, Dominador Carillo, Filomeno Balinas, Ernesto Sabulan, Yusop Pangadapun, A. Viray,
Icampo, Abelardo Fermin, C. Quiaoit, Augurio Pamintuan, Daniel Macaraeg, Onofre Tejada.

(6) Campaigning by labor officials for Atty. Violeta Drilon

In violation of the prohibition against "campaigning for or against a candidate while holding an elective, judicial,
quasi-judicial, or prosecutory office in the Government' (Sec. 14[c], Art. I, IBP By-Laws), Mariano E. Benedicto II,
Assistant Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, testified that he took a leave of absence from his
office to attend the IBP convention. He stayed at the Philippine Plaza with the Drilon group admittedly to give
"some moral assistance" to Atty. Violeta Drilon. He did so because he is a member of the Sigma Rho Fraternity.
When asked about the significance of Sigma Rho, Secretary Benedicto explained: "More than the husband of
Mrs. Drilon being my boss, the significance there is that the husband is my brother in the Sigma Rho."

He cheered up Mrs., Drilon when her spirits were low. He talked to her immediate circle which included Art Tiu,
Tony Carpio, Nilo Pena, Amy Wong, Atty. Grapilon, Victor Lazatin, and Boy Reyno. They assessed the progress
of the campaign, and measured the strengths and weaknesses of the other groups The group had sessions as
early as the later part of May.

Room 114, the suite listed in the name of Assistant Secretary Benedicto toted up a bill of P23,110 during the 2-
day IBP convention/election. A total of 113 phone calls (amounting to Pl,356) were recorded as emanating from
his room.

Opposite Room 114, was Room 112, also a suite, listed in the names of Mrs. Drilon, Gladys Tiongco (candidate
for Governor, Eastern Mindanao) and Amy Wong (candidate for Governor, Metro Manila). These two rooms
served as the "action center' or "war room" where campaign strategies were discussed before and during the

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convention. It was in these rooms where the supporters of the Drilon group, like Attys. Carpio, Callanta,
Benedicto, the Quasha and the ACCRA lawyers met to plot their moves.

(7) Paying the dues or other indebtedness of any number (Sec. 14[e], IBP BY-Laws).

Atty. Teresita C. Sison, IBP Treasurer, testified that she has heard of candidates paying the IBP dues of lawyers
who promised to vote for or support them, but she has no way of ascertaining whether it was a candidate who
paid the delinquent dues of another, because the receipts are issued in the name of the member for whom
payment is made (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, pp. 24-28).

She has noticed, though, that there is an upsurge of payments in March, April, May during any election year.
This year, the collections increased by P100,000 over that of last year (a non-election year from Pl,413,425 to
Pl,524,875 (t.s.n. June 28, 1989, p. 25).

(8) Distribution of materials other than bio-data of not more than one page of legal size sheet of paper (Sec.
14[a], IBP By-Laws).

On the convention floor on the day of the election, Atty. Paculdo caused to be distributed his bio-data and copies
of a leaflet entitled "My Quest," as wen as, the lists of his slate. Attys. Drilon and Nisce similarly distributed their
tickets and bio-data.

The campaign materials of Atty. Paculdo cost from P15,000 to P20,000. They were printed by his own printing
shop.

(9) Causing distribution of such statement to be done by persons other than those authorized by the officer
presiding at the election (Sec. 14[b], IBP By-Laws).

Atty. Paculdo employed uniformed girls to distribute his campaign materials on the convention floor. Atty. Carpio
noted that there were more campaign materials distributed at the convention site this year than in previous
years. The election was more heated and expensive (t.s.n. July 6,1989, p. 39).

Atty. Benjamin Bernardino, the incumbent President of the IBP Rizal Chapter, and a candidate for chairman of
the House of Delegates on Nisce's ticket, testified that campaign materials were distributed during the
convention by girls and by lawyers. He saw members of the ACCRA law firm campaigning for Atty. Drilon (t.s.n.
July 3,1989, pp. 142-145).

(10) Inducing or influencing a member to withhold his vote, or to vote for or against a candidate (Sec. 14[e], IBP
BY-Laws).

Atty. Bernardino disclosed that his cousin, Atty. Romeo Capulong, urged him to withdraw his candidacy for
chairman of the House of Delegates and to run as vice-chairman in Violy Drilon's slate, but he declined (t.s.n.
July 3,1989, pp. 137, 149).

Atty. Gloria Agunos personnel director of the Hyatt Terraces Hotel in Baguio and president of the Baguio-
Benguet IBP Chapter, recalled that in the third week of May 1989, after the Tripartite meet of the Department of
Labor & Employment at the Green Valley Country Club in Baguio City, she met Atty. Drilon, together with two
labor officers of Region 1, Attys. Filomeno Balbin and Atty. Mansala Atty. Drilon solicited her (Atty. Agunos') vote
and invited her to stay at the Philippine Plaza where a room would be available for her. Atty. Paculdo also tried
to enlist her support during the chapter presidents' meeting to choose their nominee for governor for the
Northern Luzon region (t.s.n. July 13,1989, pp. 43-54).

Atty. Nisce testified that a Manila Chapter 4 delegate, Marcial Magsino, who had earlier committed his vote to
Nisce changed his mind when he was offered a judgeship (This statement, however, is admittedly hearsay).
When Nisce confronted Magsino about the alleged offer, the latter denied that there was such an offer. Nisce's
informant was Antonio G. Nalapo an IBP candidate who also withdrew.

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Another Nisce candidate, Cesar Viola, withdrew from the race and refused to be nominated (t.s.n. June 29,
1989, p. 104). Vicente P. Tordilla who was Nisce's candidate for Governor became Paculdo's candidate instead
(t.s.n. June 29, 1989, p. 104).

Nisce recalled that during the Bench and Bar Dialogue in Cotabato City, Court Administrator Tiro went around
saying, "I am not campaigning, but my wife is a candidate." Nisce said that the presidents of several IBP
chapters informed him that labor officials were campaigning for Mrs. Drilon (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 109-110).
He mentioned Ciony de la Cerna, who allegedly campaigned in La Union (t.s.n. June 29,1989,p.111)

Atty. Joel A. Llosa, Nisce's supporter and candidate for governor of the Western Visayas, expressed his
disappointment over the IBP elections because some delegates flip-flopped from one camp to another. He
testified that when he arrived at the Manila Domestic Airport he was met by an assistant regional director of the
DOLE who offered to bring him to the Philippine Plaza, but he declined the offer. During the legal aid seminar,
Atty. Drilon invited him to transfer to the Philippine Plaza where a room had been reserved for him. He declined
the invitation (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 102-106).

Atty. Llosa said that while he was still in Dumaguete City, he already knew that the three candidates had their
headquarters in separate hotels: Paculdo, at the Holiday Inn; Drilon, at the Philippine Plaza; and Nisce, at the
Hyatt. He knew about this because a week before the elections, representatives of Atty. Drilon went to
Dumaguete City to campaign. He mentioned Atty. Rodil Montebon of the ACCRA Law Office, accompanied by
Atty. Julve the Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Labor in Dumaguete City. These two, he said,
offered to give him two PAL tickets and accommodations at the Philippine Plaza (t.s.n. July 4,1989, pp. 101-
104). But he declined the offer because he was already committed to Atty. Nisce.

Atty. Llosa also revealed that before he left for Manila on May 31, 1989, a businessman, Henry Dy, approached
him to convince him to vote for Atty. Paculdo. But Llosa told Dy that he was already committed to Nisce.

He did not receive any plane tickets from Atty. Nisce because he and his two companions (Atty. Eltanal and Atty.
Ruperto) had earlier bought their own tickets for Manila (t.s.n. July 4, 1989, p. 101).

SUMMARY OF CAMPAIGN EXPENSES INCURRED

BY THE CANDIDATES

Atty. Paculdo admitted having spent some P250,000 during his three weeks of campaigning. Of this amount, the
Capitol Bar Association (of which he was the chapter president) contributed about P150,000. The Capitol Bar
Association is a voluntary bar association composed of Quezon City lawyers.

He spent about P100,000 to defray the expenses of his trips to the provinces (Bicol provinces, Pampanga, Abra,
Mountain Province and Bulacan) (t.s.n. June 29,1989, pp. 9-14).

Atty. Nisce's hotel bills at the Hyatt amounted to P216,127.74. This does not include the expenses for his
campaign which began several months before the June 3rd election, and his purchases of airplane tickets for
some delegates.

The records of the Philippine Plaza Hotel, headquarters of Atty. Drilon's camp, showed that her campaign rang
up over P600,000 in hotel bills. Atty. Callanta paid P316,411.53 for the rooms, food, and beverage consumed by
Atty. Drilon's supporters, but still left an unpaid bill of P302,197.30 at convention's end.

FINDINGS.

From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal candidates for the national positions in
the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of
the IBP By-Laws and made a travesty of the idea of a "strictly non-political" Integrated Bar enshrined in Section
4 of the By-Laws.

The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, Nisce and Paculdo) in five-
star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the

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delegates billeted therein; the island hopping to solicit the votes of the chapter presidents who comprise the 120-
member House of Delegates that elects the national officers and regional governors; the formation of tickets,
slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo
or Nisce; the procurement of written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be filled up by the
delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, at the expense of the presidential
candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and some members of her ticket to enable them to "assess their
chances" among the chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and bio-
data of the candidates which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some P15,000 to P20,000; the
employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by Drilon) to distribute their campaign materials on the
convention floor on the day of the election; the giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon
and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort them to the Philippine Plaza
Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel accommodations to delegates (and some families who
accompanied them) in exchange for their support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing them to "hop" or
"flipflop" from one ticket to another for some rumored consideration; all these practices made a political circus of
the proceedings and tainted the whole election process.

The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the By-Laws of the IBP but also the
ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold
the constitution and the laws, the duty to "promote respect for law and legal processes" and to abstain from
'activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system" (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code
of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed
to be millions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the IBP
formulated for their observance.

The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the association detracted from the
dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another,
certainly did not uphold the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the public's esteem.

The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and outright prevarications that
tainted the statements of the witnesses, including tome of the candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by
it before its fact-finding committee was created. The subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee has
revealed that those parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem to have conspired among
themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital information from it to conceal the irregularities committed during
the campaign.

CONCLUSIONS.

It has been mentioned with no little insistence that the provision in the 1987 Constitution (See. 8, Art. VIII)
providing for a Judicial and Bar Council composed of seven (7) members among whom is "a representative of
the Integrated Bar," tasked to participate in the selection of nominees for appointment to vacant positions in the
judiciary, may be the reason why the position of IBP president has attracted so much interest among the
lawyers. The much coveted "power" erroneously perceived to be inherent in that office might have caused the
corruption of the IBP elections. To impress upon the participants in that electoral exercise the seriousness of the
misconduct which attended it and the stern disapproval with which it is viewed by this Court, and to restore the
non-political character of the IBP and reduce, if not entirely eliminate, expensive electioneering for the top
positions in the organization which, as the recently concluded elections revealed, spawned unethical practices
which seriously diminished the stature of the IBP as an association of the practitioners of a noble and honored
profession, the Court hereby ORDERS:

1. The IBP elections held on June3,1989 should be as they are hereby annulled.

2. The provisions of the IBP By-Laws for the direct election by the House of Delegates (approved by this Court in
its resolution of July 9, 1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) of the following national officers:

(a) the officers of the House of Delegates;

(b) the IBP president; and

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(c) the executive vice-president,

be repealed, this Court being empowered to amend, modify or repeal the By-Laws of the IBP under Section 77,
Art. XI of said By-Laws.

3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of
Governors (composed of the governors of the nine [91 IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in
Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by the Executive
Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's
resolution dated July 9,1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.

4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the
office of president. The incoming board of governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among
themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the nine (9) IBP regions. One who
has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after
the rotation of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation
shall begin anew.

5. Section 47 of Article VII is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 47. National Officers. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and
Executive Vice-President to be chosen by the Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional
governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. The governors shall be ex oficio Vice-
President for their respective regions. There shall also be a Secretary and Treasurer of the Board
of Governors to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Board.

6. Section 33(b), Art. V, IBP By-Laws, is hereby amended as follows:

(b) The President and Executive Vice President of the IBP shall be the Chairman and Vice-
Chairman, respectively, of the House of Delegates. The Secretary, Treasurer, and Sergeant-at-
Arms shall be appointed by the President with the consent of the House of Delegates.'

7. Section 33(g) of Article V providing for the positions of Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary-Treasurer and
Sergeant-at- Arms of the House of Delegates is hereby repealed

8. Section 37, Article VI is hereby amended to read as follows:

Section 37. Composition of the Board. — The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall be governed
by a Board of Governors consisting of nine (9) Governors from the nine (9) regions as delineated
in Section 3 of the Integration Rule, on the representation basis of one (1) Governor for each
region to be elected by the members of the House of Delegates from that region only. The
position of Governor should be rotated among the different Chapters in the region.

9. Section 39, Article V is hereby amended as follows:

Section 39. Nomination and election of the Governors at least one (1) month before the national
convention the delegates from each region shall elect the governor for their region, the choice of
which shall as much as possible be rotated among the chapters in the region.

10. Section33(a), Article V hereby is amended by addingthe following provision as part of the first paragraph:

No convention of the House of Delegates nor of the general membership shall be held prior to
any election in an election year.

11. Section 39, (a), (b), (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), and (7) of Article VI should be as they are hereby deleted.

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All other provisions of the By-Laws including its amendment by the Resolution en banc of this Court of July 9,
1985 (Bar Matter No. 287) that are inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed or modified.

12. Special elections for the Board of Governors shall be held in the nine (9) IBP regions within three (3) months,
after the promulgation of the Court's resolution in this case. Within thirty (30) days thereafter, the Board of
Governors shall meet at the IBP Central Office in Manila to elect from among themselves the IBP national
president and executive vice-president. In these special elections, the candidates in the election of the national
officers held on June 3,1989, particularly identified in Sub-Head 3 of this Resolution entitled "Formation of
Tickets and Single Slates," as well as those identified in this Resolution as connected with any of the
irregularities attendant upon that election, are ineligible and may not present themselves as candidate for any
position.

13. Pending such special elections, a caretaker board shall be appointed by the Court to administer the affairs of
the IBP. The Court makes clear that the dispositions here made are without prejudice to its adoption in due time
of such further and other measures as are warranted in the premises.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla. Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Griño-Aquino
and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J. and Medialdea, J., took no part.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

IV. SUSPENSION, DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF LAWYERS (RULE 139-

B, RULES OF COURT)

1. Nature and characteristics of disciplinary actions against lawyer

a. Sui generis

SUI GENERIS. Latin term meaning “of its own kind” and used to describe an item that is unique or different
than the normal. ... It is commonly used in case law: A “sui generis case” or a “sui generis authority” means
that the decision in the case may not be precedent setting and limited to the specific facts of the case.

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b. Prescription

> Valencia v Cabanting, 196 SCRA 302 (1991)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 April 26, 1991

PAULINO VALENCIA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARSENIO FER CABANTING, respondent.

CONSTANCIA L. VALENCIA, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, ATTY. EDUARDO U. JOVELLANOS and ATTY. ARSENIO FER.
CABANTING,respondents.

LYDIA BERNAL, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. DIONISIO C. ANTINIW, respondent.

PER CURIAM:

These consolidated administrative cases seek to disbar respondents Dionisio Antiniw, Arsenio Fer. Cabanting
and Eduardo Jovellanos (the last named, now an MCTC Judge) for grave malpractice and misconduct in the
exercise of their legal profession committed in the following manner:

1. Administrative Cases No. 1302 and 1391.

In 1933, complainant Paulino Valencia (Paulino in short) and his wife Romana allegedly bought a parcel of land,
where they built their residential house, from a certain Serapia Raymundo, an heir of Pedro Raymundo the
original owner. However, they failed to register the sale or secure a transfer certificate of title in their names.

Sometime in December, 1968, a conference was held in the house of Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos to settle the land
dispute between Serapia Raymundo (Serapia in short) another heir of Pedro Raymundo, and the Valencia
spouses since both were relatives and distant kin of Atty. Jovellanos. Serapia was willing to relinquish ownership
if the Valencias could show documents evidencing ownership. Paulino exhibited a deed of sale written in the
Ilocano dialect. However, Serapia claimed that the deed covered a different property. Paulino and Serapia were
not able to settle their differences. (Report of Investigating Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr., pp. 21-22).

On December 15, 1969 Serapia, assisted by Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, filed a complaint against Paulino for
the recovery of possession with damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. V-2170, entitled "Serapia
Raymundo, Plaintiff, versus Paulino Valencia, Defendant." (Report, p. 11).

Summoned to plead in Civil Case No. V-2170, the Valencias engaged the services of Atty. Dionisio Antiniw. Atty.
Antiniw advised them to present a notarized deed of sale in lieu of the private document written in Ilocano. For

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this purpose, Paulino gave Atty. Antiniw an amount of P200.00 to pay the person who would falsify the signature
of the alleged vendor (Complaint, p. 2; Rollo, p. 7). A "Compraventa Definitiva" (Exh. B) was executed purporting
to be a sale of the questioned lot.

On January 22, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch V, rendered a decision in favor of
plaintiff, Serapia Raymundo. The lower court expressed the belief that the said document is not authentic.
(Report, p. 14)

Paulino, thereafter, filed a Petition for Certiorari, under Rule 65, with Preliminary Injunction before the Court of
Appeals alleging that the trial court failed to provide a workable solution concerning his house. While the petition
was pending, the trial court, on March 9, 1973, issued an order of execution stating that "the decision in this case
has already become final and executory" (Exhibits 3 and 3-A). On March 14, 1973, a writ of execution was
issued.

On March 20, 1973, Serapia sold 40 square meters of the litigated lot to Atty. Jovellanos and the remaining
portion she sold to her counsel, Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting, on April 25, 1973. (Annex "A" of Administrative
Case No. 1302).

On March 4, 1974, Paulino filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No. 1302) against
Atty. Cabanting on the ground that said counsel allegedly violated Article 1491 of the New Civil Code as well as
Article II of the Canons of Professional Ethics, prohibiting the purchase of property under litigation by a counsel.

On March 21, 1974 the appellate court dismissed the petition of Paulino.

On October 14, 1974, Constancia Valencia, daughter of Paulino, filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as
Administrative Case No. 1391) against Atty. Dionisio Antiniw for his participation in the forgery of "Compraventa
Definitiva" and its subsequent introduction as evidence for his client; and also, against Attys. Eduardo Jovellanos
and Arsenio Cabanting for purchasing a litigated property allegedly in violation of Article 1491 of the New Civil
Code; and against the three lawyers, for allegedly rigging Civil Case No. V-2170 against her parents. On August
17, 1975, Constancia Valencia filed additional charges against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos as follows:

1. AGAINST ATTY. DIONISIO ANTINIW:

In the year 1973 Atty. Dionisio Antiniw fraudulently and in confabulation with one Lydia Bernal had a
deed of sale, fabricated, executed and ratified before him as Notary Public by one Santiago Bernal in
favor of Lydia Bernal when as a matter of fact said Santiago Bernal had died already about eight years
before in the year 1965.

2. AGAINST ATTY. EDUARDO JOVELLANOS:

In the year 1954 Atty. Eduardo Jovellanos, fraudulently and in bad faith, in confabulation with Rosa de
los Santos as vendee had, as Notary Public, executed and ratified before him, two (2) deeds of sale in
favor of said Rosa de los Santos when as a matter of fact the said deeds were not in fact executed by
the supposed vendor Rufino Rincoraya and so Rufino Rincoraya had filed a Civil Case in Court to annul
and declare void the said sales (p. 7, Report)

2. Administrative Case No. 1543.

A deed of donation propter nuptias involving the transfer of a piece of land by the grandparents of Lydia Bernal
(complainant,) in favor of her parents, was lost during the last world war. For this reason, her grandmother (the
living donor) executed a deed of confirmation of the donation propter nuptias with renunciation of her rights over
the property. (Complaint, p. 1). Notwithstanding the deed, her grandmother still offered to sell the same property
in favor of the complainant, ostensibly to strengthen the deed of donation (to prevent others from claim-ing the
property).

On consultation, Atty., Antiniw advised them to execute a deed of sale. Atty. Antiniw allegedly prepared and
notarized the deed of sale in the name of her grandfather (deceased at the time of signing) with her
grandmother's approval.

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Felicidad Bernal-Duzon, her aunt who had a claim over the property filed a complaint against her (Lydia Bernal)
and her counsel, Atty. Antiniw for falsification of a public document. (Complaint, pp. 1-2) The fiscal exonerated
the counsel for lack of evidence, while a case was filed in court against Lydia Bernal.

On October 3, 1975, Lydia Bernal filed a disbarment proceeding (docketed as Administrative Case No.1543)
against Atty. Antiniw for illegal acts and bad advice.

Pursuant to the resolution of the First Division of this Court dated December 9, 1974, the resolution of the
Second Division dated March 3, 1975 and the two resolutions of the Second Division both dated December 3,
1975, Administrative Cases Nos. 1302, 1391 and 1543 were referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation.

Upon formal request of Constancia L. Valencia and Lydia Bernal dated March 3, 1976, all of these cases were
ordered consolidated by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza per his handwritten directive of March 9, 1976.

On April 12, 1988, We referred the investigation of these cases to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. When1âwphi 1

Atty. Jovellanos was appointed as Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge of Alcala-Bautista, Pangasinan, We
referred the investigation of these cases to Acting Presiding Judge Cesar Mindaro, Regional Trial Court, Branch
50, Villasis, Pangasinan, for further investigation.

In view of the seriousness of the charge against the respondents and the alleged threats against the person of
complainant Constancia L. Valencia, We directed the transfer of investigation to the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.

The three administrative cases were raffled to Branch XVII of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, under the sala
of Judge Catalino Castaneda, Jr.

After investigation, Judge Catalino Castañeda, Jr., recommended the dismissal of cases against Atty. Jovellanos
and Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting; dismissal of Administrative Case No. 1543 and the additional charges in
Administrative Case No. 1391 against Antiniw and Judge Jovellanos; however, he recommended the
suspension of Atty. Antiniw from the practice of law for six months finding him guilty of malpractice in falsifying
the "Compraventa Definitiva."

The simplified issues of these consolidated cases are:

I. Whether or not Atty. Cabanting purchased the subject property in violation of Art. 1491 of the New Civil
Code.

II. Whether or not Attys. Antiniw and Jovellanos are guilty of malpractice in falsifying notarial documents.

III. Whether or not the three lawyers connived in rigging Civil Case No. V-2170.

Under Article 1491 of the New Civil Code:

The following persons cannot acquire by purchase, even at a public of judicial auction, either in person
or through the mediation of another:

xxx xxx xxx

(5) . . . this prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be the object of any litigation in which they make take part
by virtue of their profession.

Public policy prohibits the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship involved. It is intended to curtail any
undue influence of the lawyer upon his client. Greed may get the better of the sentiments of loyalty and

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Alexandra S. Roxas
LEGAL PROFESSION
disinterestedness. Any violation of this prohibition would constitute malpractice (In re: Attorney Melchor Ruste,
40 O.G. p. 78) and is a ground for suspension. (Beltran vs. Fernandez, 70 Phil. 248).

Art. 1491, prohibiting the sale to the counsel concerned, applies only while the litigation is pending. (Director of
Lands vs. Adaba, 88 SCRA 513; Hernandez vs. Villanueva, 40 Phil. 775).

In the case at bar, while it is true that Atty. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting purchased the lot after finality of judgment,
there was still a pending certiorari proceeding. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest
or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge.
(Gan Tingco vs. Pabinguit, 35 Phil. 81). Logic indicates, in certiorari proceedings, that the appellate court may
either grant or dismiss the petition. Hence, it is not safe to conclude, for purposes under Art. 1491 that the
litigation has terminated when the judgment of the trial court become final while a certiorari connected therewith
is still in progress. Thus, purchase of the property by Atty. Cabanting in this case constitutes malpractice in
violation of Art. 1491 and the Canons of Professional Ethics. Clearly, this malpractice is a ground for suspension.

The sale in favor of Atty. Jovellanos does not constitute malpractice. There was no attorney-client relationship
between Serapia and Atty. Jovellanos, considering that the latter did not take part as counsel in Civil Case No.
V-2170. The transaction is not covered by Art. 1491 nor by the Canons adverted to.

II

It is asserted by Paulino that Atty. Antiniw asked for and received the sum of P200.00 in consideration of his
executing the document "Compraventa Definitiva" which would show that Paulino bought the property. This
charge, Atty. Antiniw simply denied. It is settled jurisprudence that affirmative testimony is given greater weight
than negative testimony (Bayasen vs. CA, L-25785, Feb. 26, 1981; Vda. de Ramos vs. CA, et al., L40804, Jan.
31, 1978). When an individual's integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he deny the charges
against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the evidence for the relator and show proofs that he still
maintains the highest degree of morality and integrity which at all time is expected of him. (De los Reyes vs.
Aznar, Adm. Case No. 1334, Nov. 28, 1989).

Although Paulino was a common farmer who finished only Grade IV, his testimony, even if not corroborated by
another witness, deserves credence and can be relied upon. His declaration dwelt on a subject which was so
delicate and confidential that it would be difficult to believe the he fabricated his evidence.

There is a clear preponderant evidence that Atty. Antiniw committed falsification of a deed of sale, and its
subsequent introduction in court prejudices his prime duty in the administration of justice as an officer of the
court.

A lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of his client (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622), but not at the
expense of truth. (Cosmos Foundry Shopworkers Union vs. La Bu, 63 SCRA 313). The first duty of a lawyer is
not to his client but to the administration of justice. (Lubiano vs. Gordalla, 115 SCRA 459) To that end, his
client's success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law
and ethics. While a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost earnestness and with the maximum skill
he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to illegal means for his client's interest. It is the duty of an attorney to
employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means as are consistent with truth and
honor. (Pangan vs. Ramos, 93 SCRA 87).

Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. By far, the most important of them is mindfulness
that a lawyer is an officer of the court. (In re: Ivan T. Publico, 102 SCRA 722). This Court may suspend or disbar
a lawyer whose acts show his unfitness to continue as a member of the Bar. (Halili vs. CIR, 136 SCRA 112).
Disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood but is rather
intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this function should be
competent, honorable and reliable in order that courts and the public may rightly repose confidence in them.
(Noriega vs. Sison, 125 SCRA 293). Atty. Antiniw failed to live up to the high standards of the law profession.

The other charges of malpractice against Atty. Antiniw and Atty. Jovellanos should be dismissed for lack of
evidence.

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Alexandra S. Roxas
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During the proceedings in Administrative Case No. 1543, Lydia Bernal testified in full on direct examination, but
she never submitted herself for cross-examination. Several subpoenas for cross-examination were unheeded.
She eventually requested the withdrawal of her complaint.

Procedural due process demands that respondent lawyer should be given an opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses against him. He enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him until the
1âwphi1

contrary is proved. (Santos vs. Dichoso, 84 SCRA 622). The case must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof. (Camus vs. Diaz, Adm. Case No. 1616, February 9, 1989), Since Atty. Antiniw was not
accorded this procedural due process, it is but proper that the direct testimony of Lydia Bernal be stricken out.

In view also of the affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant, Administrative Case No. 1543 should be
dismissed. Although the filing of an affidavit of desistance by complainant for lack of interest does not ipso
factoresult in the termination of a case for suspension or disbarment of an erring lawyer (Munar vs. Flores, 122
SCRA 448), We are constrained in the case at bar, to dismiss the same because there was no evidence to
substantiate the charges.

The additional charge against Atty. Antiniw in Administrative Case No. 1391 is predicated on the information
furnished by Lydia Bernal. It was not based on the personal knowledge of Constancia L. Valencia: hence,
hearsay. "Any evidence, whether oral or documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the
personal knowledge of the witness but on the knowledge of some other person not on the witness stand."
(Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 6th ed., vol. 2, 1989, p. 486). Being hearsay, the evidence presented is
inadmissible.

The additional charge filed by Constancia L. Valencia against Atty. Jovellanos in Administrative Case No. 1391
was not proved at all. Complainant failed to prove her additional charges.

III

There is no evidence on record that the three lawyers involved in these administrative cases conspired in
executing the falsified "Compraventa Definitiva" and rigged the Civil Case No. V-2170.

Atty. Jovellanos is a distant kin of the Raymundos and Valencias. In fact, he and the Valencias are neighbors
and only two meters separate their houses. It would not be believable that Atty. Jovellanos, a practicing lawyer,
would hold a meeting with the heirs of Pedro Raymundo in his house with the intention of inducing them to sue
the Valencias. Atty. Jovellanos even tried to settle the differences between the parties in a meeting held in his
house. He appeared in Civil Case No. V-2170 as an involuntary witness to attest to the holding of the
conference.

Besides, the camaraderie among lawyers is not proof of conspiracy, but a sign of brotherhood among them. One
of the fourfold duties of a lawyer is his duty to the Bar. A lawyer should treat the opposing counsel, and his
brethren in the law profession, with courtesy, dignity and civility. They may "do as adversaries do in law: strive
mightily but (they) eat and drink as friends." This friendship does not connote conspiracy.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring: 1. Dionisio Antiniw DISBARRED from the practice of
law, and his name is ordered stricken off from the roll of attorneys; 2. Arsenio Fer. Cabanting SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for six months from finality of this judgment; and 3. Administrative Case No. 1391 against
Attorney Eduardo Jovellanos and additional charges therein, and Administrative Case No. 1543 DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.

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> In re Almacen

31 SCRA 562 – Legal Ethics – A Lawyer’s Right to Criticize the Courts

Atty. Almacen was the counsel of one Virginia Yaptinchay in a civil case. They lost in said civil
case but Almacen filed a Motion for Reconsideration. He notified the opposing party of said
motion but he failed to indicate the time and place of hearing of said motion. Hence, his motion
was denied. He then appealed but the Court of Appeals denied his appeal as it agreed with
the trial court with regard to the motion for reconsideration. Eventually, Almacen filed an
appeal on certiorari before the Supreme Court which outrightly denied his appeal in a minute
resolution.
This earned the ire of Almacen who called such minute resolutions as unconstitutional. He
then filed before the Supreme Court a petition to surrender his lawyer’s certificate of title as
he claimed that it is useless to continue practicing his profession when members of the high
court are men who are calloused to pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity. He
further alleged that due to the minute resolution, his client was made to pay P120k without
knowing the reasons why and that he became “one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of
hypocrisy.” He also stated “that justice as administered by the present members of the
Supreme Court is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.”
The Supreme Court did not immediately act on Almacen’s petition as the Court wanted to wait
for Almacen to ctually surrender his certificate. Almacen did not surrender his lawyer’s
certificate though as he now argues that he chose not to. Almacen then asked that he may be
permitted “to give reasons and cause why no disciplinary action should be taken against him
. . . in an open and public hearing.” He said he preferred this considering that the Supreme
Court is “the complainant, prosecutor and Judge.” Almacen was however unapologetic.
ISSUE: Whether or not Almacen should be disciplined.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court first clarified that minute resolutions are needed because the
Supreme Court cannot accept every case or write full opinion for every petition they reject
otherwise the High Court would be unable to effectively carry out its constitutional duties. The
proper role of the Supreme Court is to decide “only those cases which present questions
whose resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties
involved.” It should be remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of
Appeals is not a matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully
explain the court’s denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the
Court of Appeals’ opinion.
On Almacen’s attack against the Supreme Court, the High Court regarded said criticisms as
uncalled for; that such is insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory. It is
true that a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, has the right to criticize in
properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. His
right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the
independence of the bar, as well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the
courts. But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall
not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts.
In the case at bar, Almacen’s criticism is misplaced. As a veteran lawyer, he should have
known that a motion for reconsideration which failed to notify the opposing party of the time
and place of trial is a mere scrap of paper and will not be entertained by the court. He has only
himself to blame and he is the reason why his client lost. Almacen was suspended indefinitely.

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> Rayos-Ombac v. Rayos, 90 SCAD 742, 285 SCRA 93 (1998).

[A.C. No. 2884. January 28, 1998]

IRENE RAYOS-OMBAC, complainant, vs. ATTY. ORLANDO A. RAYOS, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This case stemmed from a petition for disbarment filed with this Court by Mrs. Irene
Rayos-Ombac against her nephew, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, a legal practitioner in Metro
Manila, for "his failure to adhere to the standards of mental and moral fitness set up for
members of the bar."[1]
The records show that in January 1985, respondent induced complainant who was then
85 years old to withdraw all her bank deposits and entrust them to him for
safekeeping.Respondent told her that if she withdraws all her money in the bank, they will be
excluded from the estate of her deceased husband and his other heirs will be precluded from
inheriting part of it.
Acting on respondent's suggestion, complainant preterminated all her time deposits with
the Philippine National Bank on January 18, 1985. She withdrew P588,000.00.
Respondent then advised complainant to deposit the money with Union Bank where he
was working. He also urged her to deposit the money in his name to prevent the other heirs
of her husband from tracing the same.
Complainant heeded the advice of respondent. On January 22, 1985, respondent
deposited the amount of P588,000.00 with Union Bank under the name of his wife in trust for
seven beneficiaries, including his son. The maturity date of the time deposit was May 22,
1985.
On May 21, 1985, complainant made a demand on respondent to return the P588,000.00
plus interest. Respondent told her that he has renewed the deposit for another month and
promised to return the whole amount including interest on June 25, 1985. Respondent,
however, failed to return the money on June 25, 1985.
On August 16, 1985, respondent informed complainant that he could only
return P400,000.00 to be paid on installment. Complainant acceded to respondent's proposal
as she was already old and was in dire need of money.
On the same date, respondent and complainant executed a memorandum of agreement
stating:

"WHEREAS, on January 22, 1985, (complainant) entrusted for safekeeping to (respondent)

the sum of FIVE HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P588,000.00) which sum
of money was withdrawn by the parties from the Philippine National Bank on said date.

WHEREAS, the said amount was deposited by (respondent) with the consent of
(complainant) with the UNION BANK, J.P. Rizal Branch, Makati, Metro Manila.

WHEREAS, upon mutual agreement of the parties, they have agreed as they hereby agree
on the following terms for the purpose of disposing of the above sum, to wit:

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Alexandra S. Roxas
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1. Of the sum of P588,000.00 received in trust, (respondent) shall return only the sum
of P400,000.00 to (complainant) in the following manner:

a) P100,000.00 upon execution of this agreement;

b) P200,000.00 on or before October 19, 1985, to be covered by postdated check;

c) P100,000.00 on or before November 19, 1985, to be covered by a postdated check.

2. (Respondent) hereby undertakes and guarantees that at the time the aforesaid postdated
checks fall due, the same should be backed up with sufficient funds on a best efforts basis.

3. That the remaining balance of P188,000.00, (respondent) hereby acknowledges the same
as his indebtedness to (complainant) to be paid by the former when able or at his
option.(Complainant) however assures (respondent) that she will not institute any collection
suit against (respondent) (sic), neither will she transmit the same by way of testamentary
succession to her heirs, neither are (respondent's) heirs liable.

4. That the parties have executed this agreement with the view of restoring their previous
cordial filial relationship."[2]
In accordance with the memorandum of agreement, respondent issued to complainant
the following checks:

1. UCPB Check No. 487974 dated August 19, 1985 in the amount of P100,000.00;

2. UCPB Check No. 487975 dated October 19, 1985 in the amount of P200,000;

3. UCPB Check No. 487976 dated November 19, 1985 in the amount of P100,000.00.
Complainant was not able to encash UCPB Check No. 487974 as it was dishonored due
to insufficient funds.
Respondent, nonetheless, asserted that he was not duty-bound to fund the check
because under paragraph 2 of the memorandum of agreement, he only guaranteed that the
checks shall be "backed up with sufficient funds on a best efforts basis." This prompted the
other relatives of respondent and complainant to intervene in the brewing dispute between
the two. They begged respondent to pay his obligation to complainant. Heeding their plea,
respondent replaced UCPB Check No. 487974 with two new checks, one for P64,800.00 and
another for P35,200.00. Complainant was able to encash the first check but not the second
because it was dishonored by the drawee bank. The remaining checks, UCPB Check No.
487975 and UCPB Check No. 487976, were likewise dishonored by the drawee bank for lack
of funds.
On November 15, 1985, complainant filed a complaint for estafa against respondent and
a corresponding information was filed against him by the provincial fiscal.
Respondent thereafter made a proposal to complainant for an amicable settlement. To
pay his debt, respondent offered to complainant two second hand cars and cash amounting
to P40,000.00. Complainant refused the offer because she needed cash to provide for her
daily needs.
The records also show that respondent filed several suits against complainant.
First, in February 1985, respondent filed a criminal case for estafa against complainant. It
appears that respondent has previously told the tenants of a parcel of land owned by

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Alexandra S. Roxas
LEGAL PROFESSION
complainant that she had promised to sell them the land and that she had authorized him to
negotiate with them. He obtained from the tenants advance payment for the lots they were
occupying. Respondent then prepared a special power of attorney[3] authorizing him to sell
the land and asked complainant to sign it. Complainant, however, refused to sign because
she did not intend to make respondent her attorney-in-fact. Hence, the tenants sued
respondent for estafa. Respondent, in turn, sued complainant for estafa for allegedly
reneging on her promise to sell the land.
Then, on April 5, 1986, respondent filed a pleading entitled "Motion to Review Acts of
Administratrix as a Prelude for Formal Motion to (sic) her Discharge" in Special Proceedings
No. 5544 for the settlement of the estate of complainant's husband, pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan.[4] Respondent filed the pleading although he
was not a party to the case.
Finally, on May 19, 1986, respondent indicted complainant for "falsification by private
individuals and use of falsified documents under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code" for
allegedly making untruthful statements in her petition for appointment as administratrix of the
estate of her deceased husband.[5]
Thus, in June 1986, complainant filed with this Court a complaint to disbar respondent
on two grounds: (1) that respondent employed clever scheme to defraud complainant, and
(2) that respondent filed frivolous cases against complainant to harass her.
Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for disbarment against complainant's
counsel, Atty. Abelardo Viray. The complaint cited four causes of action: (1) assisting client
to commit tax fraud; (2) use of unorthodox collection method; (3) ignorance of the law; and
(4) subornation of perjury.[6]
Both disbarment cases were consolidated and referred to the Office of the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.
The cases were transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation
and disposition pursuant to Section 20 Rule 139-B which took effect on June 1, 1988.
After investigation, the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP recommended the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for two years. It also recommended the
dismissal of the complaint to disbar Atty. Viray for lack of merit.[7]
On January 27, 1996, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed Resolution No. XII-96-
22 stating:

"RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the

Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above entitled
case, hereinmade part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation therein to be supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Orlando A. Rayos is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for two (2) years and the complaint against Atty. Abelardo V. Viray is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit."[8]
On June 6, 1996, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with regard to
Administrative Case No. 2884.[9] The Board of Governors of the IBP, however, denied the
motion in Resolution No. XII-96-193.[10]
On September 15, 1997, respondent filed with this Court a Motion to Lift Suspension for
Two Years, alleging that complainant has executed an affidavit withdrawing the complaint for
disbarment.[11]
We deny the motion of respondent.

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Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states:

"A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Rule 1.03 of the same Code, on the other hand, provides:

"A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding
or delay any man's cause."
Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as his oath as an
attorney when he deceived his 85-year old aunt into entrusting to him all her money, and later
refused to return the same despite demand. Respondent's wicked deed was aggravated by
the series of unfounded suits he filed against complainant to compel her to withdraw the
disbarment case she filed against him. Indeed, respondent's deceitful conduct makes him
unworthy of membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office of a lawyer requires
that he shall be of good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent
to admission to the legal profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain
one's good standing in the profession.[12]
Considering the depravity of respondent's offense, we find the penalty recommended by
the IBP to be too mild. Such offense calls for the severance of respondent's privilege to
practice law not only for two years, but for life.
The affidavit of withdrawal of the disbarment case allegedly executed by complainant
does not, in any way, exonerate the respondent. A case of suspension or disbarment may
proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What matters is whether,
on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct has been duly proven.[13] This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary
proceedings. A proceeding for suspension or disbarment is not in any sense a civil action
where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary
proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose
of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in
them. The attorney is called to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the
court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to the attorney's
alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome
except as all good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.[14] Hence, if the
evidence on record warrants, the respondent may be suspended or disbarred despite the
desistance of complainant or his withdrawal of the charges. In the instant case, it has been
sufficiently proved that respondent has engaged in deceitful conduct, in violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent is hereby DISBARRED. Let a copy of this decision be
attached to respondent's record in the Bar Confidant's Office and furnished the IBP and all
our courts.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco, Panganiban, and Martinez, JJ, concur.

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2. GROUNDS

a. Deceit

> Cham v Atty Ediberto D. Pizarro, A.C. No. 5499, August 16, 2005

WILSON PO CHAM v. ATTY. EDILBERTO PIZARRO

A.C. No. 5499, 16 August 2005

The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, which

shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor
to thus render him unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer
upon him, may be sanctioned with disbarment or suspension.

Upon Atty. Edilberto Pizarro’s representations to complainant Wilson Po Cham (Po

Cham) that a certain parcel of land being offered for sale to him was alienable and
disposable, Po Cham gave Atty. Pizarro two checks representing the purchase price of
the said property. Po Cham subsequently took possession of the property and installed
a barbed wire fence at its front portion. Soon after, however, a forest guard approached
him and informed him that the property could not be fenced for the reason that it was
part of the Bataan National Park. Upon investigation, Po Cham discovered that the
property is not an alienable or disposable land susceptible of private ownership.

Po Cham demanded the return of the purchase price but Atty. Pizarro did not heed to
the demand. Po Cham thereafter charged Atty. Pizarro of violation of his oath as a
member of the Bar.

The Supreme Court (SC) referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation or decision. The IBP, in its Report
and Recommendation, found Atty. Pizarro to have violated his oath as a member of
the Bar. It recommended his suspension from the practice of law for 3 months, subject
to the approval of the members of the Board of Governors. The case was forwarded to
the SC for final action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Atty. Pizarro violated his solemn oath as a lawyer

HELD:

The misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, which

shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor to
thus render him unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon
him, may be sanctioned with disbarment or suspension.

Atty. Pizarro has utterly failed to substantiate his documented claim of having
irrevocable rights and interests over the property which he could have conveyed to Po
Cham. Atty. Pizarro must thus be faulted for fraudulently inducing Po Cham to
purchase non-existent ―irrevocable rights, interest and participation‖ over an
inalienable property.

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LEGAL PROFESSION

> Co v Bernardino, 285 SCRA 102 (1998)

FIRST DIVISION
[A C. No. 3919. January 28, 1998]
SOCORRO T. CO, complainant, vs. ATTY. GODOFREDO N. BERNARDINO, respondent.

DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by complainant Socorro T. Co, a businesswoman,
against Atty. Godofredo N. Bernardino charging him with unprofessional and unethical conduct indicating
moral deficiency and unfitness to stay in the profession of law.
Socorro T. Co alleged that in October 1989, as she was following up the documents for her shipment at
the Bureau of Customs, she was approached by respondent, Atty. Godofredo N. Bernardino, introducing
himself as someone holding various positions in the Bureau of Customs such as Executive Assistant at the
NAIA, Hearing Officer at the Law Division, and OIC ofthe Security Warehouse. Respondent offered to help
complainant and promised to give her some business at the Bureau. In no time, they became friends and a
month after, or in November of the same year, respondent succeeded in borrowing from
complainant P120,000.00 with the promise to pay the amount in full the following month, broadly hinting that
he could use his influence at the Bureau of Customs to assist her. To ensure payment of his obligation,
respondent issued to complainant several postdated Boston Bank checks: No. 092601 dated 1 December
1989 for P21,950.00, No. 092602 dated 4 December 1989 for P6,750.00, No. 092615 dated 15 January 1990
for P65,000.00 and No. 092622 dated 15 January 1990 for P10,000.00 (Exhs. "A-3," "B," "C," "D,"
respectively). Respondent also issued a postdated Urban Development Bank check No. 051946 dated 9
January 1990 for P5,500.00 (Exh. "E").However, the checks covering the total amount of P109,200.00 were
dishonored for insufficiency of funds and closure of account.
Pressed to make good his obligation, respondent told complainant that he would be able to pay her if
she would lend him an additional amount of P75,000.00 to be paid a month after to be secured by a chattel
mortgage on his Datsun car.[1] As complainant agreed respondent handed her three (3) copies of a deed of
chattel mortgage which he himself drafted and six (6) copies of the deed of sale of his car with the assurance
that he would turn over its registration certificate and official receipt. The agreement was not consummated
as respondent later sold the same car to another.
Despite several chances given him to settle his obligation respondent chose to evade complainant
altogether so that she was constrained to write him a final demand letter dated 22September
1992[2] preceding the filing of several criminal complaints against him for violation of BP Blg.
22.[3] Complainant also filed a letter-complaint dated 5 October 1992 with the Office of the Ombudsman.[4]
It may be worth mentioning that a certain Emelinda Ortiz also filed several criminal and civil cases against
respondent similarly involving money transactions.[5] Ms. Ortiz claimed that respondent had volunteered to
sell to her a 20-footer container van filled with imported cotton fabric shirting raw materials from the Bureau
of Customs warehouse for P600,000.00 in time for the holidays. However, despite her successive payments
to respondent totalling P410,000.00, the latter failed to deliver the goods as promised. Worse, respondent's
personal check for P410,000.00 representing reimbursement of the amount he received from Ms. Ortiz was
returned dishonored for insufficiency of funds.
By way of defense, respondent averred that he gave the checks to complainant Co by way of
rediscounting and that these were fully paid when he delivered five cellular phones to her.He brushed aside
the allegations of complainant and Ms. Ortiz as ill-motivated, vague, confusing, misleading and full of biases
and prejudices. Although he is married he insinuated a special relationship with the two (2) women which
caused him to be careless in his dealings with them.
On 3 March 1993 the Court referred this administrative case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation.

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On 17 May 1997 the IBP issued a resolution recommending the suspension of respondent from the
practice of law for six (6) months based on the following findings -

1. No receipt has been produced by respondent showing that the face value of the subject checks has been
paid or that the alleged five (5) units of cellular phones have been delivered to the complainant;

2. The Decision in the criminal cases that were filed vis-a-vis the subject bouncing checks and wherein he
was acquitted clearly shows that his acquittal was not due to payment of the obligation but rather that
'private complainant knew at the time the accused issued the checks that the latter did not have sufficient
funds in the bank to cover the same. No violation of BP Blg. 22 is committed where complainant was told
by the drawer that he does not have sufficient funds in the bank; and

3. Respondent subsequently paid the complainant as shown by a receipt dated 26 August 1995 x x x and
the release of real estate mortgage x x x x If it is true that he had already paid his obligation with five (5)
cellular phones, why pay again?

The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily
assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity (In Re
Pelaez, 44 Phil. 5569 [1923]). Where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional
dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege
which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him
from the office of attorney (In Re Sotto, 38 Phil. 569 [1923]).

The evidence on record clearly shows respondent's propensity to issue bad checks. This gross misconduct
on his part, though not related to his professional duties as a member of the bar, puts his moral character in
serious doubt. The Commission, however, does not find him a hopeless case in the light of the fact that he
eventually paid his obligation to the complainant, albeit very much delayed.[6]
While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between complainant and respondent as the
transaction between them did not require the professional legal services of respondent, nevertheless
respondent's abject conduct merits condemnation from this Court. Thus we held in Lizaso v. Amante[7] where
Atty. Amante enticed complainant to invest in the casino business with the proposition that her investment
would yield her an interest of 10% profit daily, and Atty. Amante not only failed to deliver the promised return
on the investment but also the principal thereof (P5,000.00) despite complainant's repeated demands -

As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez [44 Phil.567 (1923)] the principle
that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes which do not involve the relationship of an
attorney and client x x x x In disciplining the respondent, Mr. Justice Malcolm said: x x x x As a general rule,
a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been
committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule with many exceptions x x x x The nature of the
office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney,
and the statutory rules prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney shall be
a person ofgood moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to
enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the
practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer upon him x x x x[8]
Ten years later, in Piatt v. Abordo[9] where the erring lawyer was suspended for one year from the practice
of law for attempting to engage in an opium deal, Justice Malcolm reiterated that an attorney may be removed
not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not related to his
professional duties which show him to be an unfit and unworthy lawyer. "The courts are not curators of the
morals of the bar. At the same time the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their
character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good character is an essential qualification for
admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show that
he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to discipline

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him x x x x Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the law x x x and to
that doctrine we give our unqualified support."[10]
Finally, reference is made to Rule 1.01, Chapter 1, entitled The Lawyer and Society of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." "Conduct," as used in this Rule, is not limited to conduct exhibited in connection with the
performance of professional duties.
In the case at bar, it is glaringly clear that the procurement of personal loans through insinuations of his
power as an influence peddler in the Bureau of Customs, the issuance of a series of bad checks and the
taking undue advantage of his position in the aforesaid government office constitute conduct in gross violation
of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The recommended suspension of respondent for six (6) months is less than what he justly deserves. His
propinquity for employing deceit and misrepresentations as well as his cavalier attitude towards incurring
debts without the least intention of repaying them is reprehensible. This disturbing behavior cannot be
tolerated most especially in a lawyer who is an officer of the court.
WHEREFORE, respondent ATTY. GODOFREDO N. BERNARDINO is SUSPENDED FOR ONE (1)
YEAR from the practice of law with warning that repetition of the same or similar acts will merit a more severe
penalty. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts in the land, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
the Office of the Bar Confidant and spread in respondent's personal records.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

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> Lao v Medel, 405 SCRA 227 (2003)

EN BANC
[A.C. No. 5916. July 1, 2003]
SELWYN F. LAO, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERT W. MEDEL, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross
misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice of law.

The Case and the Facts

This administrative case stems from a Complaint-Affidavit[1] filed with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) by Selwyn F. Lao. Atty. Robert W. Medel was charged
therein with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming an attorney.
The material averments of the Complaint are summarized by the IBP-CBD in this wise:

The Complaint arose from the [respondents] persistent refusal to make good on four (4) RCBC checks
totaling [t]wenty [t]wo [t]housand (P22,000.00) [p]esos. These dishonored checks were issued by defendant
in replacement for previous checks issued to the complainant. Based on the exchange of letters between
the parties, it appears that [respondent], in a letter dated June 19, 2001, had committed to forthwith effect
immediate settlement of my outstanding obligation of P22,000.00 with Engr. Lao, at the earliest possible
time, preferably, on or before the end of June 2000. Again, in a letter dated July 3, 2000, the [respondent]
made a request for a final extension of only ten (10) days from June 30, 2000 (or not later than July 10,
2000), within which to effect payment of P22,000.00 to Engr. Lao. Needless to say, the initiation of this
present complaint proves that contrary to his written promises, Atty. Medel never made good on his
dishonored checks. Neither has he paid his indebtedness.[2]
In his Answer[3] dated July 30, 2001, Atty. Medel reasons that because all of his proposals to settle his
obligation were rejected, he was unable to comply with his promise to pay complainant. Respondent
maintains that the Complaint did not constitute a valid ground for disciplinary action because of the following:

(a). Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules, a member of the Bar, may be disbarred or suspended from his
office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wil[l]ful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wil[l]fully appearing as an attorney
for a party to case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice;

(a.1). Applying the afore-cited legal provision to the facts obtaining in the present case, it is clear that the
offense with which the respondent is being charged by the complainant, is merely a violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22, for brevity), which is a special law, and is not punishable under the Revised
Penal Code (RPC, for brevity). It is self-evident therefore, that the offense is not in the same category as a
violation of Article 315, paragraph 2, (d), RPC, which is issuing a post-dated check or a check in payment
of an obligation, with insufficient funds in the drawee bank, through false pretenses or fraudulent acts,
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud, which is a crime involving moral
turpitude;

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(b). If the respondent is to be disciplined by the Supreme Court, under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules, for
the issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P. 22, for payment of a pre-existing obligation to the
complainant, then, verily, the said Rule 138, Sec. 27, would be a cruel and an unjust law, which the
Honorable Supreme Court would not countenance;

(c). A careful examination of the specific grounds enumerated, for disbarment or suspension of a member
of the Bar, under Sec. 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules, clearly shows beyond a shadow of doubt that the
alleged issuance of a worthless check, in violation of B.P. 22, is NOT one of the grounds for disciplinary
action against a member of the Bar, to warrant his disbarment or suspension from his office as attorney, by
the Supreme Court; and

(d). The issuance of a worthless check by a member of the Bar, in violation of B.P. 22, does NOT constitute
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, under Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. This is because, the door to the law profession swings on reluctant hinges. Stated
otherwise, unless there is a clear, palpable and unmitigated immoral or deceitful conduct, of a member of
the Bar, in violation of his oath as an attorney, by the mere issuance of a worthless check, in violation of
B.P. 22, the Supreme Court is inclined to give the said attorney, the benefit of the doubt.[4]
On August 22, 2001, complainant submitted his Reply.[5] Thereafter, IBP-CBD Commissioner Renato G.
Cunanan, to whom the case was assigned by the IBP for investigation and report, scheduled the case for
hearing on October 4, 2001. After several cancellations, the parties finally met on May 29, 2002. In that
hearing, respondent acknowledged his obligation and committed himself to pay a total of P42,000 (P22,000
for his principal debt and P20,000 for attorneys fees). Complainant agreed to give him until July 4, 2002 to
settle the principal debt and to discuss the plan of payment for attorneys fees in the next hearing.
On July 4, 2002, both parties appeared before the IBP-CBD for their scheduled hearing. But, while
waiting for the case to be called, respondent suddenly insisted on leaving, supposedly to attend to a family
emergency. Complainants counsel objected and Commissioner Cunanan, who was still conducting a hearing
in another case, ordered him to wait. He, however, retorted in a loud voice, Its up to you, this is only
disbarment, my family is more important.[6] And, despite the objection and the warning, he arrogantly left. He
made no effort to comply with his undertaking to settle his indebtedness before leaving.

Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In his September 19, 2002 Report,[7] Commissioner Cunanan found respondent guilty of violating the
attorneys oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The former explained that, contrary to the latters
claim, violation of BP 22 was a crime that involved moral turpitude. Further, he observed that [w]hile no
criminal case may have been instituted against [respondent], it is beyond cavil that indeed, [the latter]
committed not one (1) but four counts of violation of BP 22.[8] The refusal [by respondent] to pay his
indebtedness, his broken promises, his arrogant attitude towards complainants counsel and the [commission
sufficiently] warrant the imposition of sanctions against him.[9] Thus, the investigating commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law.
In Resolution No. XV-2002-598,[10] the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted the Report and
Recommendation of Commissioner Cunanan and resolved to suspend respondent from the practice of law
for two years. The Resolution, together with the records of the case, was transmitted to this Court for final
action, pursuant to Rule 139-B Sec. 12(b).

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors, but reduce the period
of suspension to one year.

Administrative Liability of Respondent

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Lawyers are instruments for the administration of justice. As vanguards of our legal system, they are
expected to maintain not only legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing.[11] In so doing, the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.
In the present case, respondent has been brought to this Court for failure to pay his debts and for issuing
worthless checks as payment for his loan from complainant. While acknowledging the fact that he issued
several worthless checks, he contends that such act constitutes neither a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; nor dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
The defense proffered by respondent is untenable. It is evident from the records that he made several
promises to pay his debt promptly. However, he reneged on his obligation despite sufficient time afforded
him. Worse, he refused to recognize any wrongdoing and transferred the blame to complainant, on the
contorted reasoning that the latter had refused to accept the formers plan of payment. It must be pointed out
that complainant had no obligation to accept it, considering respondents previous failure to comply with earlier
payment plans for the same debt.
Moreover, before the IBP-CBD, respondent had voluntarily committed himself to the payment of his
debts, yet failed again to fulfill his promise. That he had no real intention to settle them is evident from his
unremitting failed commitments. His cavalier attitude in incurring debts without any intention of paying for
them puts his moral character in serious doubt.
Verily, lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to
their clients. As part of those duties, they must promptly pay their financial obligations. Their conduct must
always reflect the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional or
private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor --
or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the Court.[12]
It is equally disturbing that respondent remorselessly issued a series of worthless checks, unmindful of
the deleterious effects of such act to public interest and public order.[13]
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates all members of the bar to obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law. Rule 1.01 of the Code specifically provides that [a] lawyer shall not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. In Co v. Bernardino,[14] the Court considered the
issuance of worthless checks as a violation of this Rule and an act constituting gross misconduct. It explained
thus:

The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily
assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity (In Re
Pelaez, 44 Phil. 5569 [1923]). Where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer's professional
dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and unworthy of the privilege
which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified in suspending or removing him
from the office of attorney (In Re Sotto, 38 Phil. 569 [1923]).

The evidence on record clearly shows respondent's propensity to issue bad checks. This gross misconduct
on his part, though not related to his professional duties as a member of the bar, puts his moral character in
serious doubt. The Commission, however, does not find him a hopeless case in the light of the fact that he
eventually paid his obligation to the complainant, albeit very much delayed.

While it is true that there was no attorney-client relationship between complainant and respondent as the
transaction between them did not require the professional legal services of respondent, nevertheless
respondent's abject conduct merits condemnation from this Court.

As early as 1923, however, the Court laid down in In Re Vicente Pelaez [44 Phil.567 (1923)] the principle
that it can exercise its power to discipline lawyers for causes which do not involve the relationship of an
attorney and client x x x In disciplining the respondent, Mr. Justice Malcolm said: x x x As a general rule, a
court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been
committed in his private capacity. But this is a general rule with many exceptions x x x. The nature of the
office, the trust relation which exists between attorney and client, as well as between court and attorney,

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and the statutory rules prescribing the qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that an attorney shall be
a person of good moral character. If that qualification is a condition precedent to a license or privilege to
enter upon the practice of the law, it would seem to be equally essential during the continuance of the
practice and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which shows him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his
license and the law confer upon him x x x.

Ten years later, in Piatt v. Abordo where the erring lawyer was suspended for one year from the practice of
law for attempting to engage in an opium deal, Justice Malcolm reiterated that an attorney may be removed
not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross misconduct not related to his
professional duties which show him to be an unfit and unworthy lawyer. The courts are not curators of the
morals of the bar. At the same time the profession is not compelled to harbor all persons whatever their
character, who are fortunate enough to keep out of prison. As good character is an essential qualification
for admission of an attorney to practice, when the attorney's character is bad in such respects as to show
that he is unsafe and unfit to be entrusted with the powers of an attorney, the courts retain the power to
discipline him x x x Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the law x x
x and to that doctrine we give our unqualified support."
We likewise take notice of the high-handed manner in which respondent dealt with Commissioner
Cunanan during the July 4, 2002 hearing, when the former was expected to settle his obligation with
complainant. We cannot countenance the discourtesy of respondent. He should be reminded that the IBP
has disciplinary authority over him by virtue of his membership therein.[15]
Thus, it was imperative for him to respect the authority of the officer assigned to investigate his
case. Assuming that he had a very important personal matter to attend to, he could have politely explained
his predicament to the investigating commissioner and asked permission to leave immediately. Unfortunately,
the former showed dismal behavior by raising his voice and leaving without the consent of complainant and
the investigating commissioner.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege.[16] It demands a high degree of good
moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the
practice of law.[17] In this case, respondent fell short of the exacting standards expected of him as a guardian
of law and justice.[18]
Accordingly, administrative sanction is warranted by his gross misconduct. The IBP Board of Governors
recommended that he be suspended from the practice of law for two years.However, in line
with Co v. Bernardino,[19] Ducat Jr. v. Villalon Jr.[20] and Saburnido v. Madroo[21] -- which also involved gross
misconduct of lawyers -- we find the suspension of one year sufficient in this case.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Robert W. Medel is found guilty of gross misconduct and is
hereby SUSPENDED for one year from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of this Decision.He is
warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the IBP, as well as on
the court administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

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b. Malpractice

> Nakpil v Atty. Carlos J. Valdes, March 4, 1998

SECOND DIVISION [A.C. No. 2040. March 4, 1998]

IMELDA A. NAKPIL, complainant, vs. ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

The friendship of JOSE NAKPIL and respondent CARLOS J. VALDES dates back to the 50s during their
schooldays in De La Salle and the Philippine Law School. Their closeness extended to their families and respondent
became the business consultant, lawyer and accountant of the Nakpils.
In 1965, Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran Street, Baguio City.[1] For lack
of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran property for him. They agreed that respondent would keep
the property in thrust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained
two (2) loans from a bank (in the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00) which he used to purchase and renovate the
property. Title was then issued in respondents name.
It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When Jose Nakpil died on July 8, 1973, respondent
acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow, complainant IMELDA NAKPIL. On March 9, 1976, respondents
law firm, Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, handled the proceeding for the settlement of Joses estate. Complainant was
appointed as administratix of the estate.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings. It appears that respondent
excluded the Moran property from the inventory of Joses estate. On February 13, 1978, respondent transferred his title
to the Moran property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation.
On March 29, 1979, complainant sought to recover the Moran property by filing with the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Baguio City an action for reconveyance with damages against respondent and his corporation. In defense,
respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and denied that a trust was created over it.
During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, complainant filed this administrative case to disbar the
respondent. She charged that respondent violated professional ethics when he:
I. Assigned to his family corporation the Moran property (Pulong Maulap) which belonged to the
estate he was settling as its lawyer and auditor.
II. Excluded the Moran property from the inventory of real estate properties he prepared for a
client-estate and, at the same time, charged the loan secured to purchase the said
excluded property as a liability of the estate, all for the purpose of transferring the title to
the said property to his family corporation.
III. Prepared and defended monetary claims against the estate that retained him as its counsel
and auditor.[2]
On the first charge, complainant alleged that she accepted respondents offer to serve as lawyer and auditor to
settle her husbands estate. Respondents law firm then filed a petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Nakpil
but did not include the Moran property in the estates inventory. Instead, respondent transferred the property to his
corporation, Caval Realty Corporation, and title was issued in its name. Complainant accused respondent of maliciously
appropriating the property in trust knowing that it did not belong to him. She claimed that respondent has expressly
acknowledged that the said property belonged to the late Nakpil in his correspondences [3] with the Baguio City Treasurer
and the complainant.
On the second charge, complainant alleged that respondents auditing firm (C. J. Valdes and Co., CPAs) excluded
the Moran property from the inventory of her husbands estate, yet included in the claims against the estate the amounts
of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00, which respondent represented as her husbands loans applied probably for the purchase
of a house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City.
As to the third charge, complainant alleged that respondents law firm (Carlos J. Valdes and Associates) filed the
petition for the settlement of her husbands estate in court, while respondents auditing firm (C. J. Valdes & Co., CPAs)
acted as accountant of both the estate and two of its creditors. She claimed that respondent represented conflicting

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interests when his accounting firm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against her
husbands estate which was represented by respondents law firm. Complainant averred that there is no distinction
between respondents law and auditing firms as respondent is the senior and controlling partner of both firms which are
housed in the same building.
We required respondent to answer the charges against him. In hisANSWER,[4] respondent initially asserted that the
resolution of the first and second charges against him depended on the result of the pending action in the CFI for
reconveyance which involved the issue of ownership of the Moran property.
On the merit of the first charge, respondent reiterated his defense in the reconveyance case that he did not hold
the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils as he is its absolute owner. Respondent explained that the Nakpils never
bought back the Moran property from him, hence, the property remained to be his and was rightly excluded from the
inventory of Nakpils estate.
As to the second charge, respondent denied preparing the list of claims against the estate which included his loans
of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 for the purchase and renovation of the Moran property. In charging his loans against the
estate, he stressed that the list drawn up by his accounting firm merely stated that the loans in respondents name were
applied probably for the purchase of the house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City. Respondent insisted that this was
not an admission that the Nakpils owned the property as the phrase probably for the purchase did not imply a
consummated transaction but a projected acquisition.
Respondent also disclaimed knowledge or privity in the preparation of a letter (Exhibit H) of his accounting firm to
the Baguio City treasurer remitting the real estate taxes for the Moran property on behalf of the Nakpils. He contended
that the letter could be a mere error or oversight.
Respondent averred that it was complainant who acknowledged that they did not own the Moran property for: (1)
complainants February 1979 Statement of Assets and Liabilities did not include the said property, and; (2) complainant,
as administratrix, signed the Balance Sheet of the Estate where the Moran property was not mentioned.
Respondent admitted that complainant retained the services of his law and accounting firms in the settlement of
her husbands estate.[5] However, he pointed out that he has resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as
1974. He alleged that it was Atty. Percival Cendaa (from the law firm Carlos Valdes & Associates) who filed the inestate
proceedings in court in 1976.
As to the third charge, respondent denied there was a conflict of interest when his law firm represented the estate
in the inestate proceedings while his accounting firm (C. J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) served as accountant of the estate and
prepared the claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against the estate. He proffered the following reasons for
his thesis: First, the two claimants were closely related to the late Nakpil. Claimant ENORN, Inc. is a family corporation
of the Nakpils of which the late Nakpil was the President. Claimant Angel Nakpil is a brother of the late Nakpil who, upon
the latters death, became the President of ENORN, Inc. These two claimants had been clients of his law and accounting
firms even during the lifetime of Jose Nakpil. Second, his alleged representation of conflicting interests was with the
knowledge and consent of complainant as administratrix. Third, there was no conflict of interests between the estate
and the claimants for they had forged a modus vivendi, i.e., that the subject claims would be satisfied only after full
payment of the principal bank creditors. Complainant, as administratrix, did not controvert the claims of Angel Nakpil
and ENORN, Inc. Complainant has started paying off the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. after satisfying the
banks claims. Complainant did not assert that their claims caused prejudice to the estate. Fourth, the work of Carlos J.
Valdes and Co. as common auditor redounded to the benefit of the estate for the firm prepared a true and accurate
amount of the claim. Fifth, respondent resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as August 15, 1974.[6] He
rejoined his accounting firm several years later. He submitted as proof the SECs certification of the filing of his
accounting firm of an Amended Articles of Partnership. Thus, it was not he but Atty. Percival Cendaa, from the firm
Carlos J. Valdes and Associates, who filed the intestate proceedings in court. On the other hand, the claimants were
represented by their own counsel Atty. Enrique O. Chan. Sixth, respondent alleged that in the remote possibility that he
committed a breach of professional ethics, he committed such misconduct not as a lawyer but as an accountant who
acted as common auditor of the estate and its creditors. Hence, he should be held accountable in another forum.
On November 12, 1979, complainant submitted her REPLY.[7] She maintained that the pendency of the
reconveyance case is not prejudicial to the investigation of her disbarment complaint against respondent for the issue
in the latter is not the ownership of the Moran property but the ethics and morality of respondents conduct as a CPA-
lawyer.
Complainant alleged that respondents Annexes to his Reply (such as the Statement of Assets & Liability of the
Nakpils and the Balance Sheet of the Estate) which showed that complainant did not claim ownership of the Moran
property were all prepared by C. J. Valdes and Co. as accountant of the estate of Jose Nakpil and filed with the intestate
court by C. J. Valdes and Associates as counsel for the estate. She averred that these Annexes were not proofs that
respondent owned the Moran property but were part of respondents scheme to remove the property from the estate and
transfer it to his family corporation. Complainant alleged that she signed the documents because of the professional

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counsel of respondent and his firm that her signature thereon was required. Complainant charged respondent with greed
for coveting the Moran property on the basis of defects in the documents he himself prepared.
Complainant urged that respondent cannot disown unfavorable documents (the list of claims against the estate
and the letter regarding Nakpils payments of realty tax on the Moran property) which were prepared by his law and
accounting firms and invoke other documents prepared by the same firms which are favorable to him. She averred that
respondent must accept responsibility not just for some, but for all the representations and communications of his firms.
Complainant refuted respondents claim that he resigned from his firms from March 9, 1976 to several years later.
She alleged that none of the documents submitted as evidence referred to his resignation from his law firm. The
documents merely substantiated his resignation from his accounting firm.
In his REJOINDER,[8] respondent insisted that complainant cannot hold him liable for representing the interests of
both the estate and the claimants without showing that his action prejudiced the estate. He urged that it is not per
se anomalous for respondents accounting firm to act as accountant for the estate and its creditors. He reiterated that
he is not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for he acted not as lawyer, but as accountant for both the estate and its
claimants.
He alleged that his accounting firm merely prepared the list of claims of the creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN,
Inc. Their claims were not defended by his accounting or law firm but by Atty. Enrique Chan. He averred that his law
firm did not oppose these claims as they were legitimate and not because they were prepared by his accounting firm.
He emphasized that there was no allegation that the claims were fraudulent or excessive and that the failure of
respondents law firm to object to these claims damaged the estate.
In our January 21, 1980 Resolution,[9] we deferred further action on the disbarment case until after resolution of the
action for reconveyance between the parties involving the issue of ownership by the then CFI of Baguio. Complainant
moved for reconsideration on the ground that the issue of ownership pending with the CFI was not prejudicial to her
complaint which involved an entirely different issue, i.e., the unethical acts of respondent as a CPA-lawyer. We granted
her motion and referred the administrative case to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[10]
In 1983, the CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for reconveyance. The trial court ruled that respondent held the
Moran property in trust for the Nakpils but found that complainant waived her right over it.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The appellate court held that respondent was the absolute
owner of the Moran property. The Decision was elevated to this Court.
On February 18, 1986, during the pendency of complainants appeal to this Court, the OSG submitted its
Report[11] on the disbarment complaint. The OSG relied heavily on the decision of the Court of Appeals then pending
review by this Court. The OSG found that respondent was not put on notice of complainants claim over the property. It
opined that there was no trust agreement created over the property and that respondent was the absolute owner thereof.
Thus, it upheld respondents right to transfer title to his family corporation. It also found no conflict of interests as the
claimants were related to the late Jose Nakpil. The OSG recommended the dismissal of the administrative case.
Prefatorily, we note that the case at bar presents a novel situation as it involves the disbarment of a CPA-lawyer
for his demeanor in his accounting profession and law practice in connection with the property of his client.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be characterized
with utmost honesty and good faith.[12] The measure of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings
with his client is a much higher standard than is required in business dealings where the parties trade at arms
length.[13] Business transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the
law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client.
This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of
the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered
in an attorneys favor. [14]
In the case at bar, we cannot subscribe to the findings of the OSG in its Report. These findings were based mainly
on the decision of the Court of Appeals in the action for reconveyance which was reversed by this Court in 1993. [15]
As to the first two charges, we are bound by the factual findings of this Court in the aforementioned reconveyance
case.[16] It is well-established that respondent offered to the complainant the services of his law and accounting firms by
reason of their close relationship dating as far back as the 50s. She reposed her complete trust in respondent who was
the lawyer, accountant and business consultant of her late husband. Respondent and the late Nakpil agreed that the
former would purchase the Moran property and keep it in trust for the latter. In violation of the trust agreement,
respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and refused to sell the property to complainant after the death
of Jose Nakpil. To place the property beyond the reach of complainant and the intestate court, respondent later
transferred it to his corporation.

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Contrary to the findings of the OSG, respondent initially acknowledged and respected the trust nature of the Moran
property. Respondents bad faith in transferring the property to his family corporation is well discussed in this Courts
Decision,[17] thus:
x x x Valdes (herein respondent) never repudiated the trust during the lifetime of the late
Jose Nakpil. On the contrary, he expressly recognized it. x x x (H)e repudiated the trust when
(he) excluded Pulong Maulap from the list of properties of the late Jose Nakpil submitted to the
intestate court in 1973. x x x
xxx
The fact that there was no transfer of ownership intended by the parties x x x can be bolstered by
Exh. I-2, an annex to the claim filed against the estate proceedings of the late Jose Nakpil by his
brother, Angel Nakpil, which was prepared by Carlos J. Valdes & Co., the accounting firm of herein
respondent. Exhibit I-2, which is a list of the application of the proceeds
of various FUB loans contracted as of 31 December 1973 by the late Jose Nakpil, x x x contains
the two (2) loans contracted in the name of respondent. If ownership of Pulong Maulap was
already transferred or ceded to Valdes, these loans should not have been included in the
list.
Indeed, as we view it, what the parties merely agreed to under the arrangement outlined in Exh.
J was that respondent Valdes would x x x take over the total loan of P140,000.00 and pay all
of the interests due on the notes while the heirs of the late Jose Nakpil would continue to
live in the disputed property for five (5) years without remuneration save for regular
maintenance expenses. This does not mean, however, that if at the end of the five-year
period petitioner (Nakpil) failed to reimburse Valdes for his advances, x x x Valdes could
already automatically assume ownership of Pulong Maulap. Instead, the remedy of
respondents Carlos J. Valdes and Caval Realty Corporation was to proceed against the
estate of the late Jose M. Nakpil and/or the property itself. (emphasis supplied)
In the said reconveyance case, we further ruled that complainants documentary evidence (Exhibits H, J and L),
which she also adduced in this administrative case, should estop respondent from claiming that he bought the Moran
property for himself, and not merely in trust for Jose Nakpil.[18]
It ought to follow that respondents act of excluding Moran property from the estate which his law firm was
representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his client. If respondent truly believed that the said property
belonged to him, he should have at least informed complainant of his adverse claim. If they could not agree on its
ownership, respondent should have formally presented his claim in the intestate proceedings instead of transferring the
property to his own corporation and concealing it from complainant and the judge in the estate proceedings.
Respondents misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran property is clearly unethical.
To make matters worse, respondent, through his accounting firm, charged the two loans of P65,000.00
and P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after said loans were obtained by respondent for the purchase and renovation
of the property which he claimed for himself. Respondent seeks to exculpate himself from this charge by disclaiming
knowledge or privity in the preparation of the list of the estates liabilities. He theorizes that the inclusion of the loans
must have been a mere error or oversight of his accounting firm. It is clear that the information as to how these two
loans should be treated could have only come from respondent himself as the said loans were in his name. Hence, the
supposed error of the accounting firm in charging respondents loans against the estate could not have been committed
without respondents participation. Respondent wanted to have his cake and eat it too and subordinated the interest of
his client to his own pecuniary gain. Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his clients cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
on him.
As regards the third charge, we hold that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. It is generally
the rule, based on sound public policy, that an attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is highly improper to
represent both sides of an issue.[19] The proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds application where
the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter [20] and is applicable however slight such adverse
interest may be. It applies although the attorneys intentions and motives were honest and he acted in good
faith.[21] However, representation of conflicting interests may be allowed where the parties consent to the representation,
after full disclosure of facts. Disclosure alone is not enough for the clients must give their informed consent to such
representation. The lawyer must explain to his clients the nature and extent of conflict and the possible adverse effect
must be thoroughly understood by his clients.[22]

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In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of it creditors are adverse to each
other. Respondents accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time,
computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which
stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate. In fact, at one instance, respondents
law firm questioned the claims of creditor Angel Nakpil against the estate.
To exculpate himself, respondent denies that he represented complainant in the intestate proceedings. He points
out that it was one Atty. Percival Cendaa, from his law firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, who filed the intestate case
in court. However, the fact that he did not personally file the case and appear in court is beside the point. As established
in the records of this case and in the reconveyance case, [23] respondent acted as counsel and accountant of complainant
after the death of Jose Nakpil. Respondents defense that he resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as
1974 (or two years before the filing of the intestate case) is unworthy of merit. Respondents claim of resignation from
his law firm is not supported by any documentary proof. The documents on record [24] only show respondents resignation
from his accounting firm in 1972 and 1974. Even these documents reveal that respondent returned to his accounting
firm on July 1, 1976 and as of 1978, the intestate proceedings for the settlement of Joses estate had not yet been
terminated. It does not escape us that when respondent transferred the Moran property to his corporation on February
13, 1978, the intestate proceedings was still pending in court. Thus, the succession of events shows that respondent
could not have been totally ignorant of the proceedings in the intestate case.
Respondent claims that complainant knew that his law firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates was the legal counsel of
the estate[25] and his accounting firm, C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs, was the auditor of both the estate and the two claimants
against it.[26] The fact, however, that complainant, as administratrix, did not object to the set-up cannot be taken against
her as there is nothing in the records to show that respondent or his law firm explained the legal situation and its
consequences to complainant. Thus, her silence regarding the arrangement does not amount to an acquiescence based
on an informed consent.
We also hold that the relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil does not negate the conflict of interest. When
a creditor files a claim against an estate, his interest is per se adverse to the estate. As correctly pointed out by
complainant, if she had a claim against her husbands estate, her claim is still adverse and must be filed in the intestate
proceedings.
Prescinding from these premises, respondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position where his loyalty to his
client could be doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty of respondents law firm was to contest the claims of these
two creditors but which claims were prepared by respondents accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid and did not
prejudice the estate, the set-up is still undesirable. The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the
representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was respondents duty to inhibit either of his firms from said
proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest.
Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was conflict of interest, he could not be charged before
this Court as his alleged misconduct pertains to his accounting practice.
We do not agree. Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both professions. He is the senior partner
of his law and accounting firms which carry his name. In the case at bar, complainant is not charging respondent with
breach of ethics for being the common accountant of the estate and the two creditors. He is charged for allowing his
accounting firm to represent two creditors of the estate and, at the same time, allowing his law firm to represent the
estate in the proceedings where these claims were presented. The act is a breach of professional ethics and undesirable
as it placed respondents and his law firms loyalty under a cloud of doubt. Even granting that respondents misconduct
refers to his accountancy practice, it would not prevent this Court from disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule
is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities,
as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. [27] Possession of good
moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of
law.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of
the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession. Members of the bar are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature
and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. [28] In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty
to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his clients. [29]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES guilty of misconduct. He is
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective from receipt of this Decision, with a warning
that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely in the future.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Bar Confidant. SO ORDERED.

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> Buted v Hernando, 203 SCRA 1

FACTS:
Atty. Hernando was counsel for Luciana Abadilla and Angela Buted for a partition case of the late
Teofilo Buted’s lot. He successfully defended the case. When Luciana died, Hernando withdrew
appearance. Luciana once sold the property to Benito Bolisay but it appears that the TCT was issued to
the Sy couple. Upon filing specific performance, Bolisay got Atty. Hernando to represent him (free of
charge). They succeeded in ejecting the couple. Atty. Hernando claims to have terminated relationship
with Bolisay. In February 1974, Atty. Hernando filed a petition, in behalf of Luciana’s heirs without
their consent, to cancel TCT of Bolisay couple over the lot. The couple filed disapproval. The case was
dismissed for prescription. In August of 1974, Bolisay couple filed an administrative complaint against
Atty. Hernando for having abused personal secrets obtained by him as their counsel

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent Hernando had a conflict of interests

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that Atty. Hernando had a conflict of interest. In the action for specific
performance, Atty Hernando defended the Bolisay couple’s right to ownership but assailed the very
same right in the cadastral proceeding in favor of Luciana’s heirs. The Canons of Professional Ethics
prohibits conflicting interests for lawyers. “It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except
by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this
canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to contend
for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose. The obligation to represent the client with
undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidence forbids also the subsequent acceptance
of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client with
respect to which confidence has been reposed.”And despite Atty Hernando’s claim that he had never
seen nor taken hold of the Transfer Certificate of Title or that he divulged any confidential information
belonging to the Bolisay couple, that the mere fact that respondent had acted as counsel for Benito
Bolisay in the action for specific performance should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for
the other side in in the cancellation of the Transfer Certificate of Title of the spouses. There is no
necessity for proving the actual transmission of confidential information to an attorney in the course of
his employment by his first client in order that he may be precluded from accepting employment by
the second or subsequent client where there are conflicting interests between the first and the
subsequent clients. The prohibition on conflict of interest was designed not only to prevent the
dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from
unfounded suspicion of unprofessional practice. Although the relation of attorney and client has
terminated, and the new employment is in a different case; nor can the attorney use against his
former client any knowledge or information gained through their former connection.

SUSPENDED for 5 months.

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> Maturan v Gonzales, March 12, 1998
FACTS:
Maturan was instituted as an attorney in fact through an SPA by his mother and father (Casquejo
couple) in law to file ejectment cases and criminal cases against illegal settles occupying a certain lot.
Atty. Gonzales prepared and notarized the SPA. Maturan engaged Gonzles as counsel for the ejectment
cases. While said lot was registered in the name of Celestino Yokingco, Antonio Casquejo had,
however, instituted a case for reconveyance of property and declaration of nullity against the former.
Gonzales filed Forcible Entry and Damages against several individuals and judgment was rendered in
their favor. A writ of execution was issued. On the case filed by Casquejo, they entered into a
judicially-approved compromise agreement. While the writ of execution was pending and without
withdrawing as counsel for Matura, Atty. Gonzales filed in behalf of Yokingco, an action to annul the
judgment rendered in the previous case due to lack of authority on the part of Maturan to represent
Antonio and Gloria Casquejo. Maturan then filed an administrative complaint against the Gonzales for
immoral, unethical, and anomalous acts and asked for his disbarment. Gonzales denied the allegations
and contended he was of the belief that filing a motion for issuance of a writ of execution was the last
and final act in the lawyer-client relationship between himself and Maturan, and that his formal
withdrawal as counsel for the Casquejos was unnecessary in order to sever the lawyer-client
relationship between them. Furthermore, he alleged that his acceptance of employment from Yokingco
was for him, an opportunity to honestly earn a little more for his children’s sustenance. IBP
recommended suspension of 1 year.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Gonzales is guilty of representing conflicting interests

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court found Gonzales guilty of representing conflicting interests. It is improper for a
lawyer to appear as counsel for one party against the adverse party who is his client in a related suit,
as a lawyer is prohibited from representing conflicting interests or discharging inconsistent duties. The
representation of conflicting interest is in good faith and with honest intention on the part of the lawyer
does not make the prohibition inoperative. What Gonzales did was violative of Canon 6 of the Canons
of Professional Ethics which provide in part: “It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests,
except by express consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning
of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.”

A lawyer-client relationship is not terminated by the filing of a motion for a writ of execution. His
acceptance of a case implies that he will prosecute the case to its conclusion. He may not be
permitted to unilaterally terminate the same to the prejudice of his client.

SUSPENDED for 2 years (modified IBP recommendation)

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Conflict of Interest

> Pormento v Pontevedra, March 31, 2005

SECOND DIVISION [A.C. No. 5128. March 31, 2005]
ELESIO[1] C. PORMENTO, SR., complainant, vs. ATTY. ALIAS A. PONTEVEDRA, respondent.

RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

In a verified Complaint[2] dated August 7, 1999, Elesio C. Pormento, Sr. charged Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra
with malpractice and misconduct, praying that on the basis of the facts alleged therein, respondent be
disbarred.
Complainant alleges that between 1964 and 1994, respondent is his familys legal counsel having
represented him and members of his family in all legal proceedings in which they are involved. Complainant
also claims that his familys relationship with respondent extends beyond mere lawyer-client relations as they
gave respondent moral, spiritual, physical and financial support in his different endeavors. [3]
Based on the allegations in the complaint, the rift between complainant and respondent began when
complainants counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1648 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City was
dismissed. Complainant claims that respondent, who was his lawyer in the said case, deliberately failed to
inform him of the dismissal of his counterclaim despite receipt of the order of dismissal by the trial court, as
a result of which, complainant was deprived of his right to appeal said order. Complainant asserts that he
only came to know of the existence of the trial courts order when the adverse party in the said case
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage executed over the parcel of land which is the subject matter of the
suit. In order to recover his ownership over the said parcel of land, complainant was constrained to hire a
new lawyer as Atty. Pontevedra refused to institute an action for the recovery of the subject property. [4]
Complainant also claims that in order to further protect his rights and interests over the said parcel of
land, he was forced to initiate a criminal case for qualified theft against the relatives of the alleged new owner
of the said land. Respondent is the counsel of the accused in said case. Complainant claims that as part of
his defense in said criminal case, respondent utilized pieces of confidential information he obtained from
complainant while the latter is still his client.[5]
In a separate incident, complainant claims that in 1967, he bought a parcel of land located at Escalante,
Negros Occidental. The Deed of Declaration of Heirship and Sale of said land was prepared and notarized
by respondent. Since there was another person who claims ownership of the property, complainant alleges
that he heeded respondents advice to build a small house on the property and to allow his (complainants)
nephew and his family to occupy the house in order for complainant to establish his possession of the said
property. Subsequently, complainants nephew refused to vacate the property prompting the former to file an
ejectment case with the Municipal Trial Court of Escalante, Negros Occidental, docketed as Civil Case No.
528. Respondent acted as the counsel of complainants nephew.[6]
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of malpractice and misconduct by representing clients
with conflicting interests and should be disbarred by reason thereof.[7]
In his Comment,[8] respondent contends that he was never a direct recipient of any monetary support
coming from the complainant. Respondent denies complainants allegation that he (respondent) did not inform
complainant of the trial courts order dismissing the latters counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1648. Respondent
claims that within two days upon his receipt of the trial courts order of dismissal, he delivered to complainant
a copy of the said order, apprising him of its contents. As to his representation of the persons against whom
complainant filed criminal cases for theft,[9] respondent argues that he honestly believes that there exists no
conflict between his present and former clients interests as the cases he handled for these clients are
separate and distinct from each other. He further contends that he took up the cause of the accused in the
criminal cases filed by complainant for humanitarian considerations since said accused are poor and needy
and because there is a dearth of lawyers in their community. With respect to the case for ejectment filed by
complainant against his nephew, respondent admits that it was he who notarized the deed of sale of the

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parcel of land sold to complainant. However, he contends that what is being contested in the said case is not
the ownership of the subject land but the ownership of the house built on the said land.[10]
On December 21, 1999, complainant filed a Reply to respondents Comment.[11]
On January 19, 2000, the Court referred the instant case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
for investigation, report and recommendation.[12]
On February 18, 2002, respondent filed a Rejoinder to complainants Reply adding that the instant
complaint was orchestrated by complainants son who wanted political vengeance because he lost the vice-
mayoralty post to respondent during the 1988 local elections.[13]
On February 20, 2002, complainant filed a Sur-Rejoinder to respondents Rejoinder.[14]
Thereafter, the parties filed their respective Position Papers, [15] after which the case was deemed
submitted for resolution.
In his Report and Recommendation dated February 20, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Agustinus V.
Gonzaga found respondent guilty of violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He recommended that respondent be meted the penalty of suspension for one month.
In a minute Resolution passed on July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to annul and set
aside the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner and instead approved the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit, to wit:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2004-387
Adm. Case No. 5128
Elesio C. Pormento, Sr., vs. Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra

RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDED [sic], as it is hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE, the Recommendation
of the Investigating Commission, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit of
the complaint.
We do not agree with the dismissal of the complaint.
At the outset, we reiterate the settled rule that in complaints for disbarment, a formal investigation is a
mandatory requirement which may not be dispensed with except for valid and compelling reasons.[16] Formal
investigations entail notice and hearing. However, the requirements of notice and hearing in administrative
cases do not necessarily connote full adversarial proceedings, as actual adversarial proceedings become
necessary only for clarification or when there is a need to propound searching questions to witnesses who
give vague testimonies.[17] Due process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to be
heard and to submit evidence in support of their arguments.[18]
From the records extant in the present case, it appears that the Investigating Commissioner conducted
a hearing on January 16, 2002 where it was agreed that the complainant and the respondent shall file their
respective position papers, after which the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution. [19] No further
hearings were conducted.
It is also disturbing to note that the abovementioned Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, annulling
and setting aside the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, is bereft of any findings of facts or
explanation as to how and why it resolved to set aside the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner
and instead dismissed the complaint against respondent.
Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.

(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of Governors upon the record
and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with his report. The decision of the Board upon
such review shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on
which it is based. It shall be promulgated within a period not exceeding thirty (30) days from the next
meeting of the Board following the submittal of the Investigators report. (Emphasis supplied)

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In Cruz vs. Cabrera,[20] we reiterated the importance of the requirement that the decision of the IBP Board
of Governors must state the facts and the reasons on which such decision is based, which is akin to what is
required of the decisions of courts of record. We held therein that:

[A]side from informing the parties the reason for the decision to enable them to point out to the appellate court the
findings with which they are not in agreement, in case any of them decides to appeal the decision, it is also an
assurance that the judge, or the Board of Governors in this case, reached his judgment through the process of legal
reasoning.
Noncompliance with this requirement would normally result in the remand of the case.[21]
Moreover, while we may consider the act of the IBP Board of Governors in simply adopting the report of
the Investigating Commissioner as substantial compliance with said Rule, in this case, we cannot
countenance the act of the IBP Board of Governors in merely stating that it is annulling the Commissioners
recommendation and then dismiss the complaint without stating the facts and the reasons for said dismissal.
However, considering that the present controversy has been pending resolution for quite some time, that
no further factual determination is required, and the issues being raised may be determined on the basis of
the numerous pleadings filed together with the annexes attached thereto, we resolve to proceed and decide
the case on the basis of the extensive pleadings on record, in the interest of justice and speedy disposition
of the case.[22]
Coming to the main issue in the present case, respondent is being accused of malpractice and
misconduct on three grounds: first, for representing interests which conflict with those of his former client,
herein complainant; second, for taking advantage of the information and knowledge that he obtained from
complainant; and, third, for not notifying complainant of the dismissal of his counterclaim in Civil Case No.
1648.
We shall concurrently discuss the first and second grounds as they are interrelated.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.
Corollary to this, Canon 21 of the same Code enjoins a lawyer to preserve the confidences and secrets of
his clients even after the attorney-client relation is terminated. Rule 21.02, Canon 21 specifically requires
that:

A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information acquired in the course of employment, nor shall
he use the same to his own advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the
circumstances consents thereto.
In addition, Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics states:

It is the duty of a lawyer at the time of retainer to disclose to the client all the circumstances of his relations to the
parties and any interest in or connection with the controversy, which might influence the client in the selection of
counsel.

It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of
one client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.

The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets or confidences forbids also
the subsequent acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the
client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.
Jurisprudence instructs that there is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new
retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which
he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against his first client

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any knowledge acquired through their connection.[23] Another test to determine if there is a representation of
conflicting interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge
of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing
in the performance thereof.[24]
A lawyer is forbidden from representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject
matter of the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigation
in which he appeared for the former client.[25] Conversely, he may properly act as counsel for a new client,
with full disclosure to the latter, against a former client in a matter wholly unrelated to that of the previous
employment, there being in that instance no conflict of interests.[26] Where, however, the subject matter of the
present suit between the lawyers new client and his former client is in some way connected with that of the
former clients action, the lawyer may have to contend for his new client that which he previously opposed as
counsel for the former client or to use against the latter information confided to him as his counsel. [27] As we
have held in Maturan vs. Gonzales:[28]

The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is one of trust and confidence of
the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his clients case. He learns from his
client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded
with care. No opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the clients secrets. A lawyer must have the fullest
confidence of his client. For if the confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof.[29]
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting
interests arise with respect to the same general matter and is applicable however slight such adverse interest
may be.[30] In essence, what a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the clients confidence or
to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously represented
him.[31]
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent represented herein complainants
nephew and other members of his family in the ejectment case, docketed as Civil Case No. 528, and in the
criminal complaint, denominated as I.S. Case No. 99-188, filed by herein complainant against them. The only
established participation respondent had with respect to the parcel of land purchased by complainant, is that
he was the one who notarized the deed of sale of the said land. On that basis alone, it does not necessarily
follow that respondent obtained any information from herein complainant that can be used to the detriment
of the latter in the ejectment case he filed.
While complainant alleges that it was respondent who advised him to allow his nephew to temporarily
occupy the property in order to establish complainants possession of said property as against another
claimant, no corroborating evidence was presented to prove this allegation. Defendant, in his answer to the
complaint for ejectment, raised the issue as to the right of the vendor to sell the said land in favor of
complainant.[32] However, we find this immaterial because what is actually in issue in the ejectment case is
not the ownership of the subject lot but the ownership of the house built on the said lot. Furthermore, the
subject matter of I.S. Case No. 99-188 filed by complainant against his nephew and other members of his
family involves several parts of trucks owned by herein complainant.[33] This case is not in any way connected
with the controversy involving said parcel of land. In fine, with respect to Civil Case No. 528 and I.S. Case
No. 99-188, complainant failed to present substantial evidence to hold respondent liable for violating the
prohibition against representation of conflicting interests.
However, we find conflict of interests in respondents representation of herein complainant in Civil Case
No. 1648 and his subsequent employment as counsel of the accused in Criminal Case No. 3159.
The subject matter in Civil Case No. 1648 is Lot 609 located at Escalante, Negros Occidental, the same
parcel of land involved in Criminal Case No. 3159 filed by herein complainant against several persons,
accusing them of theft for allegedly cutting and stealing coconut trees within the premises of the said lot.
Complainant contends that it is in this criminal case that respondent used confidential information which the
latter obtained from the former in Civil Case No. 1648.
To prove his contention, complainant submitted in evidence portions of the transcript of stenographic
notes taken during his cross-examination in Criminal Case No. 3159. However, after a reading of the said
transcript, we find no direct evidence to prove that respondent took advantage of any information that he may
have been acquired from complainant and used the same in the defense of his clients in Criminal Case No.

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3159. The matter discussed by respondent when he cross-examined complainant is the ownership of Lot 609
in its entirety, only a portion of which was purportedly sold to complainant. Part of the defense raised by his
clients is that herein complainant does not have the personality to file the criminal complaint as he is not the
owner of the lot where the supposed theft occurred. It is possible that the information as to the ownership of
the disputed lot used by respondent in bringing up this issue may have been obtained while he still acted as
counsel for complainant. It is also probable that such information may have been taken from other sources,
like the Registry of Deeds, the Land Registration Authority or the respondents clients themselves.
Nonetheless, be that as it may, it cannot be denied that when respondent was the counsel of complainant
in Civil Case No. 1648, he became privy to the documents and information that complainant possessed with
respect to the said parcel of land. Hence, whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent utilized
against complainant any information given to him in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous
relationship should have precluded him from appearing as counsel for the opposing side. As we have
previously held:

The relations of attorney and client is [are] founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. The question is not
necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard.
With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesars wife, not only to keep inviolate the clients
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to
entrust their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. [34]
Moreover, we have held in Hilado vs. David[35] that:

Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a complicated affair, consisting of
entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of
dealings between an attorney and client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in advance of the
trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice the complainants cause.[36]
Thus, respondent should have declined employment in Criminal Case No. 3159 so as to avoid suspicion that
he used in the criminal action any information he may have acquired in Civil Case No. 1648.
Moreover, nothing on record would show that respondent fully apprised complainant and his new clients
and secured or at least tried to secure their consent when he took the defense of the accused in Criminal
Case No. 3159.
Respondent contends that he handled the defense of the accused in the subject criminal case for
humanitarian reasons and with the honest belief that there exists no conflict of interests. However, the rule is
settled that the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies although the attorneys
intentions and motives were honest and he acted in good faith.[37] Moreover, the fact that the conflict of
interests is remote or merely probable does not make the prohibition inoperative.[38]
Respondent also asserts that when he accepted employment in Criminal Case No. 3159, the attorney-
client relations between him and complainant in Civil Case No. 1648 had already been terminated. This
defense does not hold water because the termination of the relation of attorney and client provides no
justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. [39]
Thus, we find respondent guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests.
As to the third ground, we find that complainant failed to present substantial evidence to prove that
respondent did not inform him of the dismissal of his counterclaim in Civil Case No. 1648. On the contrary,
we find sufficient evidence to prove that complainant has been properly notified of the trial courts order of
dismissal. The only proof presented by complainant to support his claim is the affidavit of his daughter
confirming complainants contention that respondent indeed failed to inform him of the dismissal of his
counterclaim.[40] However, in the same affidavit, complainants daughter admits that it was on December 4,
1989 that respondent received the order of the trial court dismissing complainants counterclaim. Respondent,
presented a certification dated December 11, 1989, or one week after his receipt of the trial courts order,
where complainants daughter acknowledged receipt of the entire records of Civil Case No. 1648 from
complainant.[41] The same certification relieved respondent of his obligation as counsel of complainant. From
the foregoing, it can be inferred that respondent duly notified complainant of the dismissal of his counterclaim.
Otherwise, complainant could not have ordered his daughter to withdraw the records of his case from

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respondent at the same time relieving the latter of responsibility arising from his obligation as complainants
counsel in that particular case.
As to the penalty to be imposed, considering respondents honest belief that there is no conflict of
interests in handling Civil Case No. 1648 and Criminal Case No. 3159, and it appearing that this is
respondents first infraction of this nature, we find the penalty of suspension to be disproportionate to the
offense committed.[42] Moreover, we take into account respondents undisputed claim that there are only three
lawyers who are actually engaged in private practice in Escalante, Negros Occidental, where both
complainant and respondent reside. One of the lawyers is already handling complainants case, while the
other lawyer is believed by respondents clients to be a relative of complainant. Hence, respondents clients
believed that they had no choice but go to him for help. We do not find this situation as an excuse for
respondent to accept employment because he could have referred his clients to the resident lawyer of the
Public Attorneys Office or to other lawyers in the neighboring towns. Nonetheless, in view of respondents
belief that he simply adhered to his sworn duty to defend the poor and the needy, we consider such situation
as a circumstance that mitigates his liability. Considering the foregoing facts and circumstances, we find it
proper to impose a fine on respondent. In Sibulo vs. Cabrera,[43] the respondent is fined for having been found
guilty of unethical conduct in representing two conflicting interests.
Respondent is further reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional employments, to refrain
from all appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to
behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing
candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his clients.[44]
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Elias A. Pontevedra is found GUILTY of representing conflicting
interests and is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos. He is WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is DIRECTED to be heedful of the
requirements provided for in Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court as discussed in the text of herein
decision.
SO ORDERED.

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> NAKPIL V VALDES, 286 SCRA 758

SECOND DIVISION [A.C. No. 2040. March 4, 1998]

IMELDA A. NAKPIL, complainant, vs. ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:

The friendship of JOSE NAKPIL and respondent CARLOS J. VALDES dates back to the 50s during their
schooldays in De La Salle and the Philippine Law School. Their closeness extended to their families and respondent
became the business consultant, lawyer and accountant of the Nakpils.
In 1965, Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran Street, Baguio City. [1] For lack
of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the Moran property for him. They agreed that respondent would keep
the property in thrust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement, respondent obtained
two (2) loans from a bank (in the amounts of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00) which he used to purchase and renovate the
property. Title was then issued in respondents name.
It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When Jose Nakpil died on July 8, 1973, respondent
acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow, complainant IMELDA NAKPIL. On March 9, 1976, respondents
law firm, Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, handled the proceeding for the settlement of Joses estate. Complainant was
appointed as administratix of the estate.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings. It appears that respondent
excluded the Moran property from the inventory of Joses estate. On February 13, 1978, respondent transferred his title
to the Moran property to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation.
On March 29, 1979, complainant sought to recover the Moran property by filing with the then Court of First Instance
(CFI) of Baguio City an action for reconveyance with damages against respondent and his corporation. In defense,
respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and denied that a trust was created over it.
During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, complainant filed this administrative case to disbar the
respondent. She charged that respondent violated professional ethics when he:
I. Assigned to his family corporation the Moran property (Pulong Maulap) which belonged to the
estate he was settling as its lawyer and auditor.
II. Excluded the Moran property from the inventory of real estate properties he prepared for a
client-estate and, at the same time, charged the loan secured to purchase the said
excluded property as a liability of the estate, all for the purpose of transferring the title to
the said property to his family corporation.
III. Prepared and defended monetary claims against the estate that retained him as its counsel
and auditor.[2]
On the first charge, complainant alleged that she accepted respondents offer to serve as lawyer and auditor to
settle her husbands estate. Respondents law firm then filed a petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Nakpil
but did not include the Moran property in the estates inventory. Instead, respondent transferred the property to his
corporation, Caval Realty Corporation, and title was issued in its name. Complainant accused respondent of maliciously
appropriating the property in trust knowing that it did not belong to him. She claimed that respondent has expressly
acknowledged that the said property belonged to the late Nakpil in his correspondences [3] with the Baguio City Treasurer
and the complainant.
On the second charge, complainant alleged that respondents auditing firm (C. J. Valdes and Co., CPAs) excluded
the Moran property from the inventory of her husbands estate, yet included in the claims against the estate the amounts
of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00, which respondent represented as her husbands loans applied probably for the purchase
of a house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City.
As to the third charge, complainant alleged that respondents law firm (Carlos J. Valdes and Associates) filed the
petition for the settlement of her husbands estate in court, while respondents auditing firm (C. J. Valdes & Co., CPAs)
acted as accountant of both the estate and two of its creditors. She claimed that respondent represented conflicting
interests when his accounting firm prepared the list of claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against her
husbands estate which was represented by respondents law firm. Complainant averred that there is no distinction

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between respondents law and auditing firms as respondent is the senior and controlling partner of both firms which are
housed in the same building.
We required respondent to answer the charges against him. In hisANSWER, [4] respondent initially asserted that the
resolution of the first and second charges against him depended on the result of the pending action in the CFI for
reconveyance which involved the issue of ownership of the Moran property.
On the merit of the first charge, respondent reiterated his defense in the reconveyance case that he did not hold
the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils as he is its absolute owner. Respondent explained that the Nakpils never
bought back the Moran property from him, hence, the property remained to be his and was rightly excluded from the
inventory of Nakpils estate.
As to the second charge, respondent denied preparing the list of claims against the estate which included his loans
of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 for the purchase and renovation of the Moran property. In charging his loans against the
estate, he stressed that the list drawn up by his accounting firm merely stated that the loans in respondents name were
applied probably for the purchase of the house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City. Respondent insisted that this was
not an admission that the Nakpils owned the property as the phrase probably for the purchase did not imply a
consummated transaction but a projected acquisition.
Respondent also disclaimed knowledge or privity in the preparation of a letter (Exhibit H) of his accounting firm to
the Baguio City treasurer remitting the real estate taxes for the Moran property on behalf of the Nakpils. He contended
that the letter could be a mere error or oversight.
Respondent averred that it was complainant who acknowledged that they did not own the Moran property for: (1)
complainants February 1979 Statement of Assets and Liabilities did not include the said property, and; (2) complainant,
as administratrix, signed the Balance Sheet of the Estate where the Moran property was not mentioned.
Respondent admitted that complainant retained the services of his law and accounting firms in the settlement of
her husbands estate.[5] However, he pointed out that he has resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as
1974. He alleged that it was Atty. Percival Cendaa (from the law firm Carlos Valdes & Associates) who filed the inestate
proceedings in court in 1976.
As to the third charge, respondent denied there was a conflict of interest when his law firm represented the estate
in the inestate proceedings while his accounting firm (C. J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) served as accountant of the estate and
prepared the claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against the estate. He proffered the following reasons for
his thesis: First, the two claimants were closely related to the late Nakpil. Claimant ENORN, Inc. is a family corporation
of the Nakpils of which the late Nakpil was the President. Claimant Angel Nakpil is a brother of the late Nakpil who, upon
the latters death, became the President of ENORN, Inc. These two claimants had been clients of his law and accounting
firms even during the lifetime of Jose Nakpil. Second, his alleged representation of conflicting interests was with the
knowledge and consent of complainant as administratrix. Third, there was no conflict of interests between the estate
and the claimants for they had forged a modus vivendi, i.e., that the subject claims would be satisfied only after full
payment of the principal bank creditors. Complainant, as administratrix, did not controvert the claims of Angel Nakpil
and ENORN, Inc. Complainant has started paying off the claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. after satisfying the
banks claims. Complainant did not assert that their claims caused prejudice to the estate. Fourth, the work of Carlos J.
Valdes and Co. as common auditor redounded to the benefit of the estate for the firm prepared a true and accurate
amount of the claim. Fifth, respondent resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as August 15, 1974. [6] He
rejoined his accounting firm several years later. He submitted as proof the SECs certification of the filing of his
accounting firm of an Amended Articles of Partnership. Thus, it was not he but Atty. Percival Cendaa, from the firm
Carlos J. Valdes and Associates, who filed the intestate proceedings in court. On the other hand, the claimants were
represented by their own counsel Atty. Enrique O. Chan. Sixth, respondent alleged that in the remote possibility that he
committed a breach of professional ethics, he committed such misconduct not as a lawyer but as an accountant who
acted as common auditor of the estate and its creditors. Hence, he should be held accountable in another forum.
On November 12, 1979, complainant submitted her REPLY.[7] She maintained that the pendency of the
reconveyance case is not prejudicial to the investigation of her disbarment complaint against respondent for the issue
in the latter is not the ownership of the Moran property but the ethics and morality of respondents conduct as a CPA-
lawyer.
Complainant alleged that respondents Annexes to his Reply (such as the Statement of Assets & Liability of the
Nakpils and the Balance Sheet of the Estate) which showed that complainant did not claim ownership of the Moran
property were all prepared by C. J. Valdes and Co. as accountant of the estate of Jose Nakpil and filed with the intestate
court by C. J. Valdes and Associates as counsel for the estate. She averred that these Annexes were not proofs that
respondent owned the Moran property but were part of respondents scheme to remove the property from the estate and
transfer it to his family corporation. Complainant alleged that she signed the documents because of the professional
counsel of respondent and his firm that her signature thereon was required. Complainant charged respondent with greed
for coveting the Moran property on the basis of defects in the documents he himself prepared.

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Complainant urged that respondent cannot disown unfavorable documents (the list of claims against the estate
and the letter regarding Nakpils payments of realty tax on the Moran property) which were prepared by his law and
accounting firms and invoke other documents prepared by the same firms which are favorable to him. She averred that
respondent must accept responsibility not just for some, but for all the representations and communications of his firms.
Complainant refuted respondents claim that he resigned from his firms from March 9, 1976 to several years later.
She alleged that none of the documents submitted as evidence referred to his resignation from his law firm. The
documents merely substantiated his resignation from his accounting firm.
In his REJOINDER,[8] respondent insisted that complainant cannot hold him liable for representing the interests of
both the estate and the claimants without showing that his action prejudiced the estate. He urged that it is not per
se anomalous for respondents accounting firm to act as accountant for the estate and its creditors. He reiterated that
he is not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for he acted not as lawyer, but as accountant for both the estate and its
claimants.
He alleged that his accounting firm merely prepared the list of claims of the creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN,
Inc. Their claims were not defended by his accounting or law firm but by Atty. Enrique Chan. He averred that his law
firm did not oppose these claims as they were legitimate and not because they were prepared by his accounting firm.
He emphasized that there was no allegation that the claims were fraudulent or excessive and that the failure of
respondents law firm to object to these claims damaged the estate.
In our January 21, 1980 Resolution,[9] we deferred further action on the disbarment case until after resolution of the
action for reconveyance between the parties involving the issue of ownership by the then CFI of Baguio. Complainant
moved for reconsideration on the ground that the issue of ownership pending with the CFI was not prejudicial to her
complaint which involved an entirely different issue, i.e., the unethical acts of respondent as a CPA-lawyer. We granted
her motion and referred the administrative case to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, report and
recommendation.[10]
In 1983, the CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for reconveyance. The trial court ruled that respondent held the
Moran property in trust for the Nakpils but found that complainant waived her right over it.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The appellate court held that respondent was the absolute
owner of the Moran property. The Decision was elevated to this Court.
On February 18, 1986, during the pendency of complainants appeal to this Court, the OSG submitted its
Report[11] on the disbarment complaint. The OSG relied heavily on the decision of the Court of Appeals then pending
review by this Court. The OSG found that respondent was not put on notice of complainants claim over the property. It
opined that there was no trust agreement created over the property and that respondent was the absolute owner thereof.
Thus, it upheld respondents right to transfer title to his family corporation. It also found no conflict of interests as the
claimants were related to the late Jose Nakpil. The OSG recommended the dismissal of the administrative case.
Prefatorily, we note that the case at bar presents a novel situation as it involves the disbarment of a CPA-lawyer
for his demeanor in his accounting profession and law practice in connection with the property of his client.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business transaction must be characterized
with utmost honesty and good faith.[12] The measure of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings
with his client is a much higher standard than is required in business dealings where the parties trade at arms
length.[13] Business transactions between an attorney and his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the
law. Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his client.
This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of
the credulity and ignorance of his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is considered
in an attorneys favor. [14]
In the case at bar, we cannot subscribe to the findings of the OSG in its Report. These findings were based mainly
on the decision of the Court of Appeals in the action for reconveyance which was reversed by this Court in 1993. [15]
As to the first two charges, we are bound by the factual findings of this Court in the aforementioned reconveyance
case.[16] It is well-established that respondent offered to the complainant the services of his law and accounting firms by
reason of their close relationship dating as far back as the 50s. She reposed her complete trust in respondent who was
the lawyer, accountant and business consultant of her late husband. Respondent and the late Nakpil agreed that the
former would purchase the Moran property and keep it in trust for the latter. In violation of the trust agreement,
respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and refused to sell the property to complainant after the death
of Jose Nakpil. To place the property beyond the reach of complainant and the intestate court, respondent later
transferred it to his corporation.

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Contrary to the findings of the OSG, respondent initially acknowledged and respected the trust nature of the Moran
property. Respondents bad faith in transferring the property to his family corporation is well discussed in this Courts
Decision,[17] thus:
x x x Valdes (herein respondent) never repudiated the trust during the lifetime of the late
Jose Nakpil. On the contrary, he expressly recognized it. x x x (H)e repudiated the trust when
(he) excluded Pulong Maulap from the list of properties of the late Jose Nakpil submitted to the
intestate court in 1973. x x x
xxx
The fact that there was no transfer of ownership intended by the parties x x x can be bolstered by
Exh. I-2, an annex to the claim filed against the estate proceedings of the late Jose Nakpil by his
brother, Angel Nakpil, which was prepared by Carlos J. Valdes & Co., the accounting firm of herein
respondent. Exhibit I-2, which is a list of the application of the proceeds
of various FUB loans contracted as of 31 December 1973 by the late Jose Nakpil, x x x contains
the two (2) loans contracted in the name of respondent. If ownership of Pulong Maulap was
already transferred or ceded to Valdes, these loans should not have been included in the
list.
Indeed, as we view it, what the parties merely agreed to under the arrangement outlined in Exh.
J was that respondent Valdes would x x x take over the total loan of P140,000.00 and pay all
of the interests due on the notes while the heirs of the late Jose Nakpil would continue to
live in the disputed property for five (5) years without remuneration save for regular
maintenance expenses. This does not mean, however, that if at the end of the five-year
period petitioner (Nakpil) failed to reimburse Valdes for his advances, x x x Valdes could
already automatically assume ownership of Pulong Maulap. Instead, the remedy of
respondents Carlos J. Valdes and Caval Realty Corporation was to proceed against the
estate of the late Jose M. Nakpil and/or the property itself. (emphasis supplied)
In the said reconveyance case, we further ruled that complainants documentary evidence (Exhibits H, J and L),
which she also adduced in this administrative case, should estop respondent from claiming that he bought the Moran
property for himself, and not merely in trust for Jose Nakpil.[18]
It ought to follow that respondents act of excluding Moran property from the estate which his law firm was
representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of his client. If respondent truly believed that the said property
belonged to him, he should have at least informed complainant of his adverse claim. If they could not agree on its
ownership, respondent should have formally presented his claim in the intestate proceedings instead of transferring the
property to his own corporation and concealing it from complainant and the judge in the estate proceedings.
Respondents misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran property is clearly unethical.
To make matters worse, respondent, through his accounting firm, charged the two loans of P65,000.00
and P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after said loans were obtained by respondent for the purchase and renovation
of the property which he claimed for himself. Respondent seeks to exculpate himself from this charge by disclaiming
knowledge or privity in the preparation of the list of the estates liabilities. He theorizes that the inclusion of the loans
must have been a mere error or oversight of his accounting firm. It is clear that the information as to how these two
loans should be treated could have only come from respondent himself as the said loans were in his name. Hence, the
supposed error of the accounting firm in charging respondents loans against the estate could not have been committed
without respondents participation. Respondent wanted to have his cake and eat it too and subordinated the interest of
his client to his own pecuniary gain. Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his clients cause and enjoins him to be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed
on him.
As regards the third charge, we hold that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. It is generally
the rule, based on sound public policy, that an attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is highly improper to
represent both sides of an issue.[19] The proscription against representation of conflicting interests finds application where
the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same general matter [20] and is applicable however slight such adverse
interest may be. It applies although the attorneys intentions and motives were honest and he acted in good
faith.[21] However, representation of conflicting interests may be allowed where the parties consent to the representation,
after full disclosure of facts. Disclosure alone is not enough for the clients must give their informed consent to such
representation. The lawyer must explain to his clients the nature and extent of conflict and the possible adverse effect
must be thoroughly understood by his clients.[22]

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In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of it creditors are adverse to each
other. Respondents accounting firm prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time,
computed the claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the estate which
stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate. In fact, at one instance, respondents
law firm questioned the claims of creditor Angel Nakpil against the estate.
To exculpate himself, respondent denies that he represented complainant in the intestate proceedings. He points
out that it was one Atty. Percival Cendaa, from his law firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, who filed the intestate case
in court. However, the fact that he did not personally file the case and appear in court is beside the point. As established
in the records of this case and in the reconveyance case, [23] respondent acted as counsel and accountant of complainant
after the death of Jose Nakpil. Respondents defense that he resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as
1974 (or two years before the filing of the intestate case) is unworthy of merit. Respondents claim of resignation from
his law firm is not supported by any documentary proof. The documents on record [24] only show respondents resignation
from his accounting firm in 1972 and 1974. Even these documents reveal that respondent returned to his accounting
firm on July 1, 1976 and as of 1978, the intestate proceedings for the settlement of Joses estate had not yet been
terminated. It does not escape us that when respondent transferred the Moran property to his corporation on February
13, 1978, the intestate proceedings was still pending in court. Thus, the succession of events shows that respondent
could not have been totally ignorant of the proceedings in the intestate case.
Respondent claims that complainant knew that his law firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates was the legal counsel of
the estate[25] and his accounting firm, C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs, was the auditor of both the estate and the two claimants
against it.[26] The fact, however, that complainant, as administratrix, did not object to the set-up cannot be taken against
her as there is nothing in the records to show that respondent or his law firm explained the legal situation and its
consequences to complainant. Thus, her silence regarding the arrangement does not amount to an acquiescence based
on an informed consent.
We also hold that the relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil does not negate the conflict of interest. When
a creditor files a claim against an estate, his interest is per se adverse to the estate. As correctly pointed out by
complainant, if she had a claim against her husbands estate, her claim is still adverse and must be filed in the intestate
proceedings.
Prescinding from these premises, respondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position where his loyalty to his
client could be doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty of respondents law firm was to contest the claims of these
two creditors but which claims were prepared by respondents accounting firm. Even if the claims were valid and did not
prejudice the estate, the set-up is still undesirable. The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the
representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was respondents duty to inhibit either of his firms from said
proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest.
Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was conflict of interest, he could not be charged before
this Court as his alleged misconduct pertains to his accounting practice.
We do not agree. Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both professions. He is the senior partner
of his law and accounting firms which carry his name. In the case at bar, complainant is not charging respondent with
breach of ethics for being the common accountant of the estate and the two creditors. He is charged for allowing his
accounting firm to represent two creditors of the estate and, at the same time, allowing his law firm to represent the
estate in the proceedings where these claims were presented. The act is a breach of professional ethics and undesirable
as it placed respondents and his law firms loyalty under a cloud of doubt. Even granting that respondents misconduct
refers to his accountancy practice, it would not prevent this Court from disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The rule
is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities,
as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. [27] Possession of good
moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a continuing requirement to the practice of
law.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of
the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public confidence in the
integrity of the legal profession. Members of the bar are expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature
and demands utmost fidelity and good faith. [28] In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty
to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his clients. [29]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES guilty of misconduct. He is
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year effective from receipt of this Decision, with a warning
that a similar infraction shall be dealt with more severely in the future.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Bar Confidant.SO ORDERED.

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C. GROSSLY IMMORAL CONDUCT

> EMMA DANTES V ATTY. CRISPIN DANTES, A.C. NO. 6488, SEPTEMBER 22, 2004
> Barrientos v Daarol, 218 SCRA 30

> Joselano Guevarra v Jose Emmanuel Eala, A.C. No. 7136, August 1, 2007

> Toledo v Toledo, 7 SCRA 757

> Obusan v Obusan, 128 SCRA 485

> Terre v Terre, July 3, 1992

> Santos v Tan, 196 SCRA 16

> St. Louis Univc. LaboratoryHigh School Faculty & Staff v Atty. Dela Cruz, A.C. No. 6010, August 28, 2006.

> Cojuangco v Palma, 438 SCRA 306; 462 SCRA 310 (2005)

> Zaguirre v Castillo, 398 SCRA 658 (2003)

d. Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude

> In the Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v Narciso Jaranillo, 101 Phil 323

> In Re: Dalmacio delos Angeles, G.R. No. L-10969, March 31, 1958

> In Re: Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo, 203 Phil. 79

> In Re: Atty. Isidro Vinzons, 126 Phil. 96

> Barrios v Atty. Francisco Martinez, A. C. No. 4885, November 12, 2004

e. Violation of the Lawyer’s Oath

> Pormento v Dalusog, 62 SCRA 540

> Judge Ubaldino Larucon v Atty. Ellis Jacoba, A. C. No. 5921, March 10, 2006

> Almendrez v Atty. Minervo Langit, A. C. No. 7057, July 25, 2006

> In Re: Suspension from the Practice of Law in the territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G. Maquera, 435 SCRA 417, July
30, 2004.

f. Willful disobedience to any lawful order of a superior court

> People v Dalusog, 62 SCRA 540

> Luzon Mahogany Timber Ind. Inc. v Castro, 69 SCRA 384

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> People v Medina, 62 SCRA 253

> Geeslin v Navarro, 185 SCRA 230

g. Willfully appearing as attorney for any party without authority

> Sec. 27, Rule 138, RULES OF COURT

> Atty. Edilberto D. Pizarro, A.C. No. 5499, August 16, 2005

> Porac Trucking Corp. v CA, 202 SCRA 674; Garrido v Quisumbing, 28 SCRA 614

> Mercado v Ulay, 187 SCRA 720

3. PROCEEDINGS

4. Discipline of Filipino lawyers practicing abroad

> In Re: Suspension from the Practice of Law in the territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G. Maquerra, 435 SCRA 417, July
30, 2004

> Velez v De Vera, A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006

_________

V. READMISSION TO THE BAR

5. Lawyers who have been suspended

6. Lawyers who have been disbarred

7. Lawyers who have been repatriated

__________

VI. MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION

8. Bar Matter 2012, Rule on Mandatory Legal Aid Service

9. Purpose

10. Requirements

11. Compliance

12. Exemptions

13. Sanctions

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LEGAL PROFESSION

Atty. Jose Victornino L. Salud

Guidelines

1. The professor will not be taking attendance but if a student is called for recitation and is absent, that student will
automatically get a 50 as a recitation score for that session if present, the minimum grade that may be obtained is
65.

2. The only absences that will be excused are: 1. Death of a family member to the 4th degree of consanguinity, 2.
Illness – as certified by a board licensed medical doctor, 3. The student’s wedding. 4. Other analogous causes, upon
the discretion of the professor

3. Grading will as follows:

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a. Class participation (1/3) – active class participation is expected and everyone is encouraged to contribute to a
lively class discussion; there will also be a debate towards the end of the semester where all students will get to
experience arguing for or against a particular topic.

b. Midterm Requirement (1/3) – each student will be required to submit a 1500 word essay on the topic “The
Greatest Threats to the Legal Profession in the Philippines” a week before the finals.

c. Finals (1/3) – to be administered during the Finals week

4. Reference: Agpalo, Legal Ethics (Rex Bookstore)

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