SECTION 19.
Except in cases of impeachment, The RTC rendered a Decision dated August 20,
or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the
President may grant reprieves, commutations
and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction by final judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty
with the concurrence of a majority of all the
Members of the Congress.
DIEGOvs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Petitioner Grace San Diego had been the
accountant of Obando Fisherman's Multi-
Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (OFMPCI). She also
recorded and reported the cash in bank
transactions and summarized the bank
transactions for the day and was also entrusted
with a set of blank checks pre-signed and was
authorized to fill up the checks, particularly the
date, the amount in words and in figures, and the
payee.
That from November 18, 1996 to January 6,
1997, petitioner acted as cashier when Teresita
Gonzales was on maternity leave and acted as
teller from January 13- 30, 1997 when Flordeliza
Ocampo was on her honeymoon. She then, on
both occasions, had complete access to the cash
vaults and filing cabinets of the cooperative
where its documents were kept.
On March 12, 1997, petitioner stopped reporting
for work. Narciso Correa, the General Manager of
the cooperative, then instructed the bookkeeper,
to prepare bank book balance based on the cash
transactions during the day at the office. They
tried to establish the accountability of San Diego
by comparing the cash position she prepared and
certified as correct against the balances of the
bank.
They discovered the discrepancies in petitioner's
report. The audited figure showed the cash on
hand in bank to be Php3,712,442.80 as of March
11, 1997.However, petitioner reported and
certified the cash on hand of the cooperative with
the total amount of Php9,590,455.17 to be
correct. It was then that they decided to file a
criminal complaint against San Diego.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner
for the crime of qualified theft.
2001, finding petitioner Grace San Diego find her
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified theft. Accordingly, sentences her to
suffer the penalty of reclusion Perpetua for forty
years without pardon before the lapse of 40 years
and with the accessory penalties of death under
Article 40 of the Revised Penal Code, and to
indemnify the Obando Fisherman's Multi-
Purpose Cooperative, Inc., in the amount of
Php6,016,084.26.
Due to the nature of the judgment, petitioner filed
her appeal with this Court. The CA then affirmed
the decision of the RTC, with modification that
she indemnify the Obando Fisherman's Multi-
Purpose Cooperative, Inc. in the amount of
Php2,080,000.00.
Issue:
WON THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE
COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN
THE MATTER OF THE PENALTY IMPOSED?
Ruling:
The CA did not err when it ruled that the proof
adduced by the prosecution is sufficient to prove
petitioner's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The
prosecution presented the testimony of its expert
witness, Alfonso Piscasio, the cooperative's
independent auditor since 1992. He stated that
his audit was based on standard and generally
accepted auditing procedures. The audit report,
duly offered and presented in the trial, was
supported by certifications by several depository
banks of the cooperative indicating its balance on
its account.
Petitioner's own expert witness, Criselda
Sarmiento Oplas, failed to dispute the audit report
presented. She admitted to focusing her review
on bank reconciliation made by Piscasio. It was
only upon cross-examination that she saw the
daily cash flow that petitioner prepared and
certified.
Petitioner also asserts that the People did not
present any witness who categorically testified
that petitioner ran away with the supposed
missing funds. She claimed that the
demonstration that some checks of varying
amounts not recorded in petitioner's books
notwithstanding their return or dishonor, only
proved her incompetence in the performance of
her assigned task and not necessarily criminal
authorship.
This Court does not agree. It was held in People
v. Ragon that resort to circumstantial evidence is
inevitable when there are no eyewitnesses to a
crime. Direct evidence of the commission of a
crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court
may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. The
courts are allowed to rule on the bases of
circumstantial evidence if the following requisites
concur: (1) there is more than one circumstance,
(2) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven, and (3) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The
corollary rule is that the circumstances
established must constitute an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.
The penalty of prison mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed
22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen
exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be
the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten
thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.
In such cases, and in connection with the
accessory penalties which may be imposed and
for the purpose of the other provisions of this
Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor
or reclusion temporal, as the case may be. From
the provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC,
the penalty that is two (2) degrees higher than
prison mayor in its minimum and medium periods
is reclusion temporalin its medium and maximum
periods. In view, however, of the incremental
penalty in simple theft under Article 309 of the
RPC, which is likewise applicable to the crime of
qualified theft, when the value of the thing stolen
is more than ₱22,000.00, the penalty shall be
imposed in its maximum period with an additional
period of one (1) year for every ₱10,000.00 in
excess of ₱22,000.00. In the case at bar, the
value of the property stolen as determined by the
RTC and modified by the CA is ₱2,080,000.00.
Deducting ₱22,000.00 to the amount, the
difference of ₱2,058,000.00 will then be divided
by ₱10,000.00, disregarding any amount less
than ₱10,000.00, we will have two hundred five
(205). Thus, 205 years is the incremental penalty.
Since the imposable penalty for qualified theft is
reclusion temporalin its medium and maximum
periods to be imposed in its maximum period
which is eighteen (18) years, two (2) months, and
twenty-one (21) days to twenty (20) years, if we
add the incremental penalty of two hundred five
(205) years, then the range of the penalty is two
hundred twenty-three (223) years, two (2)
months, and twenty-one (21) days to two hundred
twenty-five (225) years. However, such penalty
cannot be imposed because the maximum
penalty that can be imposed is only up to 40
years, which is the maximum period of reclusion
perpetua.
Unlike in Simple Theft where the maximum
penalty cannot exceed twenty (20) years, in
Qualified Theft such limitation does not
exist.1âwphi1 Nonetheless, inasmuch as the
penalty imposable in the case at bar exceeds
twenty (20) years, logically, the penalty that
should be imposed is reclusion Perpetua, which
is the penalty one degree higher than reclusion
temporal.
There is now a need to modify the penalty
imposed by the lower court and affirmed by the
CA. Verily, the proper penalty imposable is,
thus, the penalty of reclusion Perpetua, but it
was incorrect for the RTC to sentence the
accused to the penalty of reclusion Perpetua
for forty (40) years without pardon because
that would be a limitation on the part of the
power of the Chief Executive. The exercise of
the pardoning power is discretionary in the
President and may not be controlled by the
legislature or reversed by the court, save only
when it contravenes the limitations set forth by
the Constitution. Interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum is likewise imposed from date of
finality of this Decision until full payment pursuant
to Nacar v. Gallery Frames.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
CRISTOBAL, vs.
ALEJO LABRADOR & TEOFILO SANTOS
DOCTRINE:
The President shall have the power to grant
reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures, after conviction, for all
offenses, except in cases of impeachment, upon
such conditions and with such restrictions and
limitations as he may deem proper to impose. He
shall have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of the National Assembly." It should
be observed that there are two limitations upon
the exercise of this constitutional prerogative by
the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the power
be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such
power does not extend to cases of impeachment.
Subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be
restricted of controlled by legislative action. It
must remain where the sovereign authority has
placed it and must be exercised by the highest
authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute
pardon not only blots out the crime committed,
but removes all disabilities resulting from the
conviction.
FACTS:
Santos was convicted of the crime of estafa. He
was given pardon by the president but even prior
to his pardon he was already holding the position
as the municipality president of Malabon
notwithstanding his conviction. Cristobal, on the
other hand, averred that Santos should be
excluded from the list of electors in Malabon
because he was already convicted of final
judgment “for any crime against property”. This is
pursuant to CA 357 of the New Election Code.
The lower court presided by Labrador ruled that
Santos is exempt from the provision of the law by
virtue of the pardon restoring the respondent to
his “full civil and political rights, except that with
respect to the right to hold public office or
employment, he will be eligible for appointment
only to positions which are clerical or manual in
nature and involving no money or property
responsibility.”
Petitioner Cristobal filed a petition for certiorari in
which he impugns the decision of the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pardoning power of the
President applies to legislative prohibitions?
And consequently, whether or not the pardoning
power exercised here would amount to an
unlawful exercise of the President of a legislative
function?
HELD:
It should be observed that there are two
limitations upon the exercise of this constitutional
prerogative of the President: (a) that the power be
exercised after conviction and (b) that such power
does not extend to cases of impeachment.
Subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be
restricted or controlled by legislative action. It
must remain where the sovereign authority has
placed it and must be exercised by the highest
authority to whom it is entrusted.
An absolute pardon not only blots out the
crime committed but removes all disabilities
resulting from the conviction. In this case, the
disability is the result of the conviction without
which there would no basis for disqualification
from voting. Imprisonment is not the only
punishment, which the law imposes upon those
who violates its command. There are accessory
and resultant disabilities, and the pardoning
power likewise extends to such left of the
consequences of conviction. While the pardon
extended to respondent Santos is conditional in
the sense that he will be eligible for appointment
only to positions which are clerical or manual in
nature involving no money or property
responsibility, it is absolute insofar as it restores
the respondent to full civil and political rights.
The suggestion that the disqualification imposed
in the Election Code, does not fall within the
purview of the pardoning power of the Chief
Executive, would lead to the impairment of his
pardoning power not contemplated in the
Constitution and would lead furthermore to the
result that there would be no way of restoring the
political privilege in a case of this nature except
through legislative action.
WILFREDO TORRES vs.
HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES
FACTS
In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of estafa.
In 1979, he was pardoned by the president with
the condition that he shall not violate any penal
laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with
multiple crimes of estafa. In 1986, then Chairman
of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales
petitioned for the cancellation of Torres’ pardon.
Hence, the president cancelled the pardon.
Torres appealed the issue before the Supreme
Court averring that the Executive Department
erred in convicting him for violating the conditions
of his pardon because the estafa charges against
him were not yet final and executory as they were
still on appeal.
ISSUE:
trial and conviction for the offense for which he
was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with
a constitutional vice.
In proceeding against a convict who has been
conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to
have breached the conditions of his pardon, the
Executive Department has two options: (i) to
proceed against him under Section 64 (i) of the
Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed
against him under Article 159 of the RPC which
imposes the penalty of prision correccional,
minimum period, upon a convict who “having
been granted conditional pardon by the Chief
Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of
such pardon.” Here, the President has chosen to
proceed against the petitioner under Section 64
(i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That
choice is an exercise of the President’s executive
prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny

Whether or not conviction of a crime by final

judgment of a court is necessary before Torres
can be validly rearrested and recommitted for
violation of the terms of his conditional pardon
and accordingly to serve the balance of his
original sentence.

RULING:

1. The grant of pardon and the determination of

the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon
are purely executive acts which are not subject to
judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a
breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either a
purely executive act, not subject to judicial
scrutiny under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act
consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of
a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code. Where the President opts
to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement
of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much
less conviction therefor by final judgment of a
court, in order that a convict may be
recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique
(Always and everywhere.) judicial process, and
because the conditionally pardoned convict had
already been accorded judicial due process in his
MONSANTO vs.
FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR.
FACTS:
Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug
City. She was charged for the crime of Estafa
through Falsification of Public Documents. She
was found guilty and was sentenced to jail. She
was however granted pardon by Marcos. She
then wrote a letter to the Minister of Finance for
her to be reinstated to her former position since it
was still vacant. She was also requesting for back
pays. The Minister of Finance referred the issue
to the Office of the President and Factoran denied
Monsanto’s request averring that Monsanto must
first seek appointment and that the pardon does
not reinstate her former position. Also, Monsanto
avers that by reason of the pardon, she should no
longer be compelled to answer for the civil
liabilities brought about by her acts.
ISSUES:
WON Monsanto entitled to back pay?
WON a public officer, who has been granted an
absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, entitled
to reinstatement to her former position without
need of a new appointment?
WON The petitioner be exempt from the payment
of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the
sentence?
RULING:
While a pardon has generally been regarded as
blotting out the existence of guilt so that in the eye
of the law the offender is as innocent as though
he never committed the offense, it does not
operate for all purposes. The very essence of a
pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt.
Pardon implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of
the commission of the crime and the conviction
thereof. It does not wash out the moral stain. It
involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not
retrospective. It makes no amends for the past. It
affords no relief for what has been suffered by the
offender. It does not impose upon the
government any obligation to make reparation for
what has been suffered. “Since the offense has
been established by judicial proceedings, that
which has been done or suffered while they were
in force is presumed to have been rightfully done
and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it can
be required.” This would explain why petitioner,
though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive
backpay for lost earnings and benefits.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in
removing her disqualification from holding public
employment but it cannot go beyond that. To
regain her former post as assistant city treasurer,
she must re-apply and undergo the usual
procedure required for a new appointment.
Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the
Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding
service of sentence, or for any reason the
sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or
commutation of sentence. Petitioner's civil liability
may only be extinguished by the same causes
recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment,
loss of the thing due, remission of the debt,
merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation.