G.R. No.

185758 March 9, 2011 Considering that all the respondents are now also permanent residents of the USA, summons was served
upon them by publication per RTC Order4 dated May 17, 2007. Meanwhile, the respondents executed two
LINDA M. CHAN KENT, represented by ROSITA MANALANG, Petitioner, special powers of attorney5 both dated August 3, 2007 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in
vs. Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., authorizing their counsel, Atty. Richard C. Miguel (Atty. Miguel), to file their
DIONESIO C. MICAREZ, SPOUSES ALVARO E. MICAREZ & PAZ MICAREZ, and THE REGISTRY OF DEEDS, answer in Civil Case No. 13-2007 and to represent them during the pre-trial conference and all subsequent
DAVAO DEL NORTE, Respondents. hearings with power to enter into a compromise agreement. By virtue thereof, Atty. Miguel timely filed his
principals’ answer denying the material allegations in the complaint.
DECISION
After the parties had filed their respective pre-trial briefs, and the issues in the case had been joined, the
RTC explored the possibility of an amicable settlement among the parties by ordering the referral of the
MENDOZA, J.:
case to the Philippine Mediation Center (PMC). On March 1, 2008, Mediator Esmeraldo O. Padao,
Sr. (Padao) issued a Mediator’s Report6 and returned Civil Case No. 13-2007 to the RTC allegedly due to the
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the July 17, 2008 Order 1 of the non-appearance of the respondents on the scheduled conferences before him. Acting on said Report, the
Regional Trial Court of Panabo City, Branch 34 (RTC), dismissing the complaint for recovery of property RTC issued an order on May 29, 2009 allowing petitioner to present her evidence ex parte.7
filed by petitioner Linda M. Chan Kent (petitioner), docketed as Civil Case No. 13-2007, and its November
21, 2008, Order2 denying her motion for reconsideration.
Later, Padao clarified, through a Manifestation,8 dated July 15, 2008, that it was petitioner, represented by
Atty. Benjamin Utulle (Atty. Utulle), who did not attend the mediation proceedings set on March 1, 2008,
The Facts and not Atty. Miguel, counsel for the respondents and their authorized representative. Padao explained
that Atty. Miguel inadvertently affixed his signature for attendance purposes on the column provided for
This petition draws its origin from a complaint for recovery of real property and annulment of title filed by the plaintiff’s counsel in the mediator’s report. In light of this development, the RTC issued the assailed
petitioner, through her younger sister and authorized representative, Rosita Micarez- Order9 dated July 17, 2008 dismissing Civil Case No. 13-2007. The pertinent portion of said order reads:
Manalang (Manalang), before the RTC. Petitioner is of Filipino descent who became a naturalized
American citizen after marrying an American national in 1981. She is now a permanent resident of the Being so, the Order dated May 29, 2008 is hereby corrected. For plaintiff’s and her counsel’s failure to
United States of America (USA). appear during the mediation proceeding, this instant case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.

In her complaint, petitioner claimed that the residential lot in Panabo City, which she purchased in 1982, SO ORDERED.
was clandestinely and fraudulently conveyed and transferred by her parents, respondent spouses Alvaro
and Paz Micarez (Spouses Micarez), in favor of her youngest brother, respondent Dionesio
Petitioner, through her counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration10 to set aside the order of dismissal,
Micarez (Dionesio), to her prejudice and detriment. She alleged that sometime in 1982, she asked her
invoking the relaxation of the rule on non-appearance in the mediation proceedings in the interest of
parents to look for a residential lot somewhere in Poblacion Panabo where the Spouses Micarez would
justice and equity. Petitioner urged the trial court not to dismiss the case based merely on technicalities
build their new home. Aware that there would be difficulty in registering a real property in her name, she
contending that litigations should as much as possible be decided on the merits. Resolving the motion in its
being married to an American citizen, she arranged to pay for the purchase price of the residential lot and
second assailed Order11 dated November 21, 2008, the RTC ruled that it was not proper for the petitioner
register it, in the meantime, in the names of Spouses Micarez under an implied trust. The title thereto shall
to invoke liberality inasmuch as the dismissal of the civil action was due to her own fault. The dispositive
be transferred in her name in due time.
portion of said order reads:

Thus, on October 20, 1982, a deed of absolute sale was executed between Spouses Micarez and the
WHEREFORE, there being no cogent reason to depart from our earlier Order, this instant motion for
owner, Abundio Panganiban, for the 328 square meter residential lot covered by Transfer Certificate of
reconsideration is hereby ordered DENIED.
Title (TCT) No. T-25833. Petitioner sent the money which was used for the payment of the lot. TCT No. T-
25833 was cancelled upon the registration of the deed of sale before the Registry of Deeds of Davao del
Norte. In lieu thereof, TCT No. T-38635 was issued in the names of Spouses Micarez on January 31, 1983. SO ORDERED.12

Sometime in 2005, she learned from Manalang that Spouses Micarez sold the subject lot to Dionesio on The denial prompted the petitioner to file this petition directly with this Court claiming that the dismissal
November 22, 2001 and that consequently, TCT T-172286 was issued in her brother’s name on January 21, of the case was not in accordance with applicable law and jurisprudence.
2002.
ISSUES
At the end, petitioner prayed that she be declared as the true and real owner of the subject lot; that TCT
No. T-172286 be cancelled; and that a new one be issued in her name.3
 1. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE CASE SIMPLY ON THE REASON THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO APPEAR DURING THE
MEDIATION PROCEEDING, ALTHOUGH PRESENT FOR TWO (2) TIMES.
2. IS THE EXCUSABLE AND EXPLAINED FAILURE TO ATTEND THE MEDIATION PROCEEDING FOR
TWO (2) TIMES OR SETTINGS, OUT OF THE FOUR (4) SCHEDULED SETTINGS, BY THE PLAINTIFF A
GROUND TO DISMISS THE CASE UNDER THE SUPREME COURT’S ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR
NO. 20-2002?
The pivotal issue in this case is whether the RTC erred in dismissing Civil Case No. 13-2007 due to the
failure of petitioner’s duly authorized representative, Manalang, and her counsel to attend the mediation
proceedings under the provisions of A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA and 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure.
Petitioner claims that the dismissal of the case was unjust because her representative, Manalang, and her
counsel, Atty. Etulle, did not deliberately snub the mediation proceedings. In fact, Manalang and Atty.
Etulle twice attended the mediation conferences on January 19, 2008 and on February 9, 2008. On both
occasions, Manalang was present but was not made to sign the attendance sheet and was merely at the
lobby waiting to be called by Atty. Etulle upon arrival of Atty. Miguel. Manalang and Atty. Etulle only left
PMC at 11:00 o’clock in the morning when Atty. Miguel had not yet arrived.13
Petitioner, however, admits that her representative and counsel indeed failed to attend the last scheduled
conference on March 1, 2008, when they had to attend some urgent matters caused by the sudden
increase in prices of commodities.14
In the interest of justice, the Court grants the petition.
A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA dated October 16, 2001, otherwise known as the Second Revised Guidelines
for the Implementation of Mediation Proceedings, was issued pursuant to par. (5), Section 5, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution mandating this Court to promulgate rules providing for a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases. Also, Section 2(a), Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, requires the courts to consider the possibility of an amicable settlement or of
submission to alternative modes of resolution for the early settlement of disputes so as to put an end to
litigations. The provisions of A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA pertinent to the case at bench are as follows:
9. Personal appearance/Proper authorizations
Individual parties are encouraged to personally appear for mediation. In the event they cannot attend,
their representatives must be fully authorized to appear, negotiate and enter into a compromise by a
Special Power of Attorney. A corporation shall, by board resolution, fully authorize its representative to
appear, negotiate and enter into a compromise agreement.
12. Sanctions
Since mediation is part of Pre-Trial, the trial court shall impose the appropriate sanction including but not
limited tocensure, reprimand, contempt and such other sanctions as are provided under the Rules of Court
for failure to appear for pre-trial, in case any or both of the parties absent himself/themselves, or for
abusive conduct during mediation proceedings. [Underscoring supplied]
To reiterate, A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA regards mediation as part of pre-trial where parties are
encouraged to personally attend the proceedings. The personal non-appearance, however, of a party may
be excused only when the representative, who appears in his behalf, has been duly authorized to enter
into possible amicable settlement or to submit to alternative modes of dispute resolution. To ensure the
attendance of the parties, A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA specifically enumerates the sanctions that the court
can impose upon a party who fails to appear in the proceedings which includes censure, reprimand,
contempt, and even dismissal of the action in relation to Section 5, Rule 18 of the Rules of Court. 15 The
respective lawyers of the parties may attend the proceedings and, if they do so, they are enjoined to
cooperate with the mediator for the successful amicable settlement of disputes 16 so as to effectively
reduce docket congestion.
Although the RTC has legal basis to order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 13-2007, the Court finds this
sanction too severe to be imposed on the petitioner where the records of the case is devoid of evidence of
willful or flagrant disregard of the rules on mediation proceedings. There is no clear demonstration that
the absence of petitioner’s representative during mediation proceedings on March 1, 2008 was intended
to perpetuate delay in the litigation of the case. Neither is it indicative of lack of interest on the part of
petitioner to enter into a possible amicable settlement of the case.
The Court notes that Manalang was not entirely at fault for the cancellation and resettings of the
conferences. Let it be underscored that respondents’ representative and counsel, Atty. Miguel, came
late during the January 19 and February 9, 2008 conferences which resulted in their cancellation and the
final resetting of the mediation proceedings to March 1, 2008. Considering the circumstances, it would
be most unfair to penalize petitioner for the neglect of her lawyer.1avvphi1
Assuming arguendo that the trial court correctly construed the absence of Manalang on March 1, 2008
as a deliberate refusal to comply with its Order or to be dilatory, it cannot be said that the court was
powerless and virtually without recourse. Indeed, there are other available remedies to the court a
quo under A.M. No. 01-10-5-SC-PHILJA, apart from immediately ordering the dismissal of the case. If
Manalang’s absence upset the intention of the court a quo to promptly dispose the case, a mere censure
or reprimand would have been sufficient for petitioner’s representative and her counsel so as to be
informed of the court’s intolerance of tardiness and laxity in the observation of its order. By failing to do
so and refusing to resuscitate the case, the RTC impetuously deprived petitioner of the opportunity to
recover the land which she allegedly paid for.
Unless the conduct of the party is so negligent, irresponsible, contumacious, or dilatory as for non-
appearance to provide substantial grounds for dismissal, the courts should consider lesser sanctions
which would still achieve the desired end. The Court has written "inconsiderate dismissals, even if
without prejudice, do not constitute a panacea nor a solution to the congestion of court dockets, while
they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to records of the individual judges, they merely postpone the
ultimate reckoning between the parties. In the absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay,
justice is better served by a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of the cases
before the court.17
It bears emphasis that the subject matter of the complaint is a valuable parcel of land measuring 328
square meters and that petitioner had allegedly spent a lot of money not only for the payment of the
docket and other filing fees but also for the extra-territorial service of the summons to the respondents
who are now permanent residents of the U.S.A. Certainly, petitioner stands to lose heavily on account of
technicality. Even if the dismissal is without prejudice, the refiling of the case would still be injurious to
petitioner because she would have to pay again all the litigation expenses which she previously paid for.
The Court should afford party-litigants the amplest opportunity to enable them to have their cases justly
determined, free from constraints of technicalities.18Technicalities should take a backseat against
substantive rights and should give way to the realities of the situation. Besides, the petitioner has
manifested her interest to pursue the case through the present petition. At any rate, it has not been
shown that a remand of the case for trial would cause undue prejudice to respondents.
In the light of the foregoing, the Court finds it just and proper that petitioner be allowed to present her
cause of action during trial on the merits to obviate jeopardizing substantive justice. Verily, the better and
more prudent course of action in a judicial proceeding is to hear both sides and decide the case on the
merits instead of disposing the case by technicalities. What should guide judicial action is the principle that
a party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his complaint or defense
rather than for him to lose life, liberty or property on technicalities. 19 The ends of justice and fairness
would best be served if the issues involved in the case are threshed out in a full-blown trial. Trial courts are
reminded to exert efforts to resolve the matters before them on the merits and to adjudge them
accordingly to the satisfaction of the parties, lest in hastening the proceedings, they further delay the
resolution of the cases.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Civil Case No. 13-2007 is hereby REINSTATED and REMANDED to
the Regional Trial Court of Panobo City, Branch 34 for referral back to the Philippine Mediation Center for
possible amicable settlement or for other proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193225 February 9, 2015
BBB,* Petitioner, vs. AAA,* Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Petitioner BBB is now before this Court with a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Civil Procedure to assail the Decision2 dated November 6, 2009 and Resolution3 dated August 3, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89581, which affirmed with modification the issuance against
him on August 14, 2007 of a Permanent Protection Order (PPO)4 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, Branch 162, in favor of his wife, herein respondent AAA.
Antecedent Facts
The CA aptly summarized as follows the facts of the case until the RTC’s issuance of the PPO against BBB:
Both [BBB] and [AAA] allege that they first met in 1991 but started to date seriously only in 1996. [AAA]
was then a medical student and was raising her first child borne from a previous relationship, a boy named
[CCC], with the help of her parents.
During the relationship with [BBB], [AAA] bore two more children namely, [DDD] (born on December 11,
1997) and [EEE] (born on October 19, 2000).
To legalize their relationship, [BBB] and [AAA] married in civil rights on October 10, 2002 and thereafter,
the birth certificates of the children, including [CCC’s], was amended to change their civil status to
legitimated by virtue of the said marriage.
The relationship, both admit, was far from ideal and has had its share of happy moments and heated
arguments. The two however have contradicting statements as to the cause of their present situation.
[BBB] alleges that [AAA’s] irrational jealousy has caused their frequent arguments. According to [BBB],
[AAA] has been suspicious of [BBB] and his relationship with his female co-workers, which [BBB] alleges,
contrary to [AAA’s] suspicion, are purely professional. According to [BBB], because of their repeated fights,
he was forced to leave the family home to prevent the brewing animosity between him and his wife. Soon
after [BBB] left, [AAA] herself decided to leave the family home and brought the children with her, which
made it difficult for [BBB] to see their kids regularly. This has also caused the family expense to double,
making it even more difficult for [BBB] to fulfill his financial obligations.
[AAA], on the other hand, alleges that their heated arguments were often due to [BBB’s] incessant
womanizing. When confronted about it, [BBB], instead of denying the same, would even curse [AAA].
The breaking point for [AAA] came when, [BBB’s] alleged mistress, a woman by the name of [FFF], insulted
and humiliated [AAA] in public, in the presence of [BBB] himself, who, according to [AAA], did nothing to
stop the same. Extremely hurt, [AAA] decided to leave the conjugal home with the children and lived
temporarily at a friend’s house. She however went back to the conjugal home with [DDD] and [EEE] after
some time, leaving her son [CCC] at her friend’s house.
What made matters worse, according to [AAA], was the apparent biases of [BBB] in favor of [DDD] and
[EEE]. That despite his promise to treat [CCC] as his own, [BBB] would still treat the latter differently from
the two kids, putting [CCC] at a disadvantage. [AAA], cites as example the instances when, [BBB] would buy
food and toys for [DDD] and [EEE] only, buying nothing for [CCC].
While living separately from [BBB], [AAA] discovered that [BBB] was not paying the rentals due on the
condominium unit they were occupying, forcing [AAA] to move out. [AAA] was likewise compelled to find
work to support the family, after [BBB] has started to be remiss in his financial obligations to the family.
According to [AAA], the amounts given by [BBB] were not sufficient to cover the family expenses, forcing
her to request for loans from friends.
[AAA] likewise feels threatened after discovering [that BBB] was stalking her and/or their children. [AAA]
alleges that she found out that [BBB] has sought the help of one [GGG], a friend of [BBB] who lives within
the same compound where [AAA] lives, to go through the guard’s logbook to monitor their every move,
i.e., who visits them, what time [AAA] leaves and returns back home, etc.
Citing the foregoing as constituting economic and psychological abuse, [AAA] filed an application for the
issuance of a Temporary Protection Order with a request to make the same permanent after due hearing,
before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
Finding good ground in [AAA’s] application, the court a quo issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO).
The TPO was thereafter, made permanent by virtue of a Decision of the RTC dated August [14, 2007], the
dispositive portion of which orders:
"x x x x
a. Prohibiting [BBB], directly and indirectly, from stalking, harassing, annoying, or otherwise verbally
abusing [AAA], directly or indirectly, to refrain from insulting her, cursing her and shouting invectives at her;
b. Prohibiting [BBB] from committing or threatening to commit any act that may cause mental and
emotional anguish to [AAA], i.e. publicly displaying her extramarital relations with his mistress [FFF] and
anyone else for that matter;
c. Prohibiting [BBB] from exposing the minor children to immoral and illicit environment, specifically
prohibiting him to allow her (sic) mistress[FFF] and anyone else to be with them in instances where he
would be allowed by this Court to see their children;
d. Allowing [BBB] ALONE to see and visit his children once a month (for a total of 12 visits per year) at the
latter’s residence for a maximum period of 2 years [sic]each visit, subject to further orders from this Court.
For this purpose, [BBB’s every visit] shall be accompanied by the Court Sheriff, who shall coordinate with
[AAA] as to the availability of time and date of children for such visit, at the expense of [BBB]. For every
visit, the Court Sheriff is directed to submit his report within 5 days from the date [BBB] visited the children;
e. Directing [BBB] to allow [AAA] to continue to have lawful use and possession of the motor vehicle more
particularly described as follows:
One (1) Hyundai Starex Van
1997 Model
Plate Number: WJP 902
Chassis Number:
Serial Number KMJWH7HPXU158443
f. Granting [AAA] permanent sole custody over their common children until further orders from this Court;
g. Ordering [BBB] to provide support in the amount of Php 62,918.97 per month (not Php 81,650.00 being
prayed by [AAA]) to [AAA] as monthly support, inclusive of educational expenses, groceries, medicines,
medical bills, and insurance premiums, starting from the month of January 2007 to be given within the first
five (5) days of the month through the Court Sheriff, who shall coordinate with [AAA] in receiving such
support;
h. Requiring [BBB] to stay away from the offended party and any designated family or household member
at a distance of 100 meters;
i. Requiring [BBB] to stay away from the residence, school, place of employment or any specified place
frequented regularly by the offended party and children and any designated family or household member;
j. Ordering [BBB] to post bond of Php 300,000.00 to keep peace pursuant to Section 23 of RA 9262 with the
undertaking that [BBB] will not commit the violence sought to be prevented and that in case such violence
is committed[,] he will pay the amount determined by the Court in its judgment;
k. Ordering [BBB] to pay the sum of Php 100,000.00 (not Php 200,000.00 being prayed by [AAA])
representing both reasonable attorney’s fees and cost of litigation, including cost of suit.
x x x x."5
Ruling of the CA
BBB filed before the CA an appeal6 to challenge the RTC Decision dated August 14, 2007.1âwphi1 BBB
alleged that the RTC’s (a) issuance of the PPO against him, (b) award to AAA of the sole custody over their
children, (c) directives for him to pay attorney’s fees and costs of litigation and to post an excessive
amount of bond, and (d) declaration that he had an abusive character lack factual bases.
On November 6, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision affirming the factual findings and dispositions
of the RTC, but ordering the remand of the case for the latter to determine in the proper proceedings who
shall be awarded custody of the children. Like the RTC, the CA found that under the provisions of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9262,7 BBB had subjected AAA and their children to psychological, emotional and economic
abuses. BBB displayed acts of marital infidelity which exposed AAA to public ridicule causing her emotional
and psychological distress. While BBB alleged that FFF was only a professional colleague, he continued to
have public appearances with her which did not help to dispel AAA’s accusation that the two had an extra-
marital relation. Further, BBB verbally abused AAA either in person or through text messages. The CA
likewise did not favorably consider BBB’s claim that he cannot provide financial support to AAA and the
children in the amount required by the RTC as his income merely depended on contractual hosting and
events management assignments. The CA emphasized that AAA was in the position to know the sources of
BBB’s income. Citing Section 288 of R.A. No. 9262 and Article 2139of the Family Code, the CA, however,
ordered the RTC to determine who shall be entitled to exercise custody over the children, who at that time
were already older than seven years of age.
The CA denied BBB’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration10 by way of the Resolution11 dated August 3, 2010
which is likewise assailed in the instant petition.
Issues
Undaunted, BBB now comes before this Court raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA]COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE RTC’S DECISION TO MAKE THE
[TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TPO)] PERMANENT.
 II
WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA]COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE RTC’S AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES
AND COST OF LITIGATION IN FAVOR OF [AAA].
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA]COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE RTC’S ORDER REQUIRING [BBB] TO
POST AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNTOF BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE.12
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA AND THE RTC CORRECTLY ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCETHE UNAUTHENTICATED
TEXT MESSAGES ADDUCED BY AAA.13
V
WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF SUPPORT SHOULD BE DELETED AS THE SPOUSES’ COMMON
BIOLOGICAL CHILDREN, DDD AND EEE, ARE ALREADY UNDER BBB’S ACTUAL CARE AND CUSTODY SINCE
AUGUST 2010 WHEN AAA LEFT TO WORK AS A NURSE IN THE UNITED STATES. 14
In support of the instant petition, BBB merely reiterates his factual claims in the proceedings below relative
to his financial position and AAA’s supposedly baseless accusations and demands from him. In addition, he
posits that the text messages offered by AAA as evidence were unauthenticated; hence, doubt exists as to
their admissibility. Further, he points out that due to the current whereabouts and circumstances of the
parties, the PPO issued against him is rendered moot. He now has actual care and custody of DDD and EEE,
while CCC, who is not his biological son, resides in a college dormitory. BBB and AAA barely get in touch
with each other except when the latter initiates the same.
In her Comment15 to the petition, AAA counters that BBB erroneously raises factual issues which are
subjects beyond the contemplation of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Further, BBB continuously violates the PPO, which under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262, is supposed to be
immediately executory upon its issuance by the RTC. AAA claims that BBB still verbally abuses her. BBB has
not posted the 300,000.00 bond required from him. He likewise has not paid the attorney’s fees and costs
of litigation awarded to AAA. He does not provide support for CCC, who, in the eyes of the law, is also
among his legitimated children. AAA further alleges that in2010, she left DDD and EEE under the care of
BBB only because the circumstances then obtaining forced her to do so. Three years had then lapsed from
the time she filed an application for a protection order and still, no execution of the PPO ensued. She could
not depend for financial support from BBB. She was thus left with no choice but to yield custody over DDD
and EEE even if the set-up exposed the children to BBB’s illicit affairs. AAA points out that since their
children are all older than seven years of age, they are already capable of choosing for themselves whom
they want to exercise custody over them.
Pending the Court’s deliberation of the instant case, BBB filed a Manifestation and Motion to Render
Judgment Based on a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).16 BBB alleges that on July 29, 2013, he and AAA
had entered into a compromise anent the custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of DDD
and EEE.17
AAA’s counsel, Atty. Shielah Elbinias-Uyboco (Atty. Uyboco), filed a Comment to the MOA18 pointing out
that AAA signed the MOA while emotionally distressed and sans the former’s advice and guidance. Atty.
Uyboco likewise emphasizes that BBB’s illicit relationship with FFF continues in violation of the PPO issued
by the RTC.
In BBB’s Reply,19 he counters that AAA should be presumed to have acted with due care and full knowledge
of the contents of the MOA which she signed. Further, BBB’s alleged involvement with FFF is an issue
which need not be resolved in a judgment based on compromise.
Disquisition of the Court
The instant petition is not a proper subject of a compromise agreement.
The Court cannot take the simplest course of finally writing finis to the instant petition by rendering a
judgment merely based on compromise as prayed for by BBB due to reasons discussed below.
Alleging psychological violence and economic abuse, AAA anchored her application for the issuance of a
TPO and a PPO on the basis of the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. In the instant petition, what is essentially
being assailed is the PPO issued by the RTC and which was affirmed by the CA. The rules, however, intend
that cases filed under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 be not subjects of compromise agreements.
It bears stressing that Section 23(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC20 explicitly prohibits compromise on any act
constituting the crime of violence against women. Thus, in Garcia v. Drilon,21 the Court declared that:
Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue
of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. x x x.22 (Emphasis deleted) AM No. 10-4-16-SC,23 on
the other hand, directs the referral to mediation of all issues under the Family Code and other laws in
relation to support, custody, visitation, property relations and guardianship of minor children, excepting
therefrom those covered by R.A. No. 9262.
While AAA filed her application for a TPO and a PPO as an independent action and not as an incidental
relief prayed for in a criminal suit, the instant petition cannot be taken outside the ambit of cases falling
under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. Perforce, the prohibition against subjecting the instant petition to
compromise applies.
The courts a quo committed no error in issuing a PPO against BBB.
Anent the main issues raised in the instant petition, the Court finds no error in the CA’s ruling that the RTC
properly issued a PPO against BBB and that a remanding of the case to the trial court is necessary to
determine who shall exercise custody over CCC, DDD and EEE. However, the choices of the children as with
whom they would prefer to stay would alter the effects of the PPO. Hence, this Court affirms the herein
assailed PPO except items (d), (f), (g), (h) and (i)24 thereof relative to who shall be granted custody over the
three children, how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and the amount and manner of providing
financial support, which are matters the RTC is now directed to determine with dispatch.
The Court notes BBB’s manifestation that he and AAA had arrived at an amicable settlement as regards the
issues of custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of DDD and EEE. While these matters
can be lawful subjects of compromise, AAA’s vacillation, as expressed by her counsel, compels the Court to
exercise prudence by directing the RTC to resolve with finality the aforesaid issues. The parties are,
however, not precluded from entering into a compromise as regards the aforesaid issues, but the Court
now requires the RTC’s direct supervision lest the parties muddle the issues anew and fail to put an end to
their bickering.
No grounds exist which compel this Court to resolve the first three issues raised by BBB since they are
merely factual in character.
In Padalhin v. Laviña,25 the Court declared that:
Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition filed shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the
truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it
is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.
x x x [T]he substantive issue of whether or not the petitioners are entitled to moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney’s fees is a factual issue which is beyond the province of a petition for review
on certiorari. x x x
In the case at bar, the petitioner spouses present to us issues with an intent to subject to review the
uniform factual findings of the RTC and the CA. Specifically, the instant petition challenges the existence of
clear and substantial evidence warranting the award of damages and attorney’s fees in Laviña’s favor.
Further, the instant petition prays for the grant of the Spouses Padalhin’s counterclaims on the supposed
showing that the complaint filed by Laviña before the RTC was groundless. It bears stressing that we are
not a trier of facts. Undoubtedly, the questions now raised before us are factual and not legal in character,
hence, beyond the contemplation of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.26 (Italics
in the original and emphasis ours)
In BBB’s case, he avers that the RTC and the CA’s (a) issuance of the PPO, (b) award of attorney’s fees and
costs of litigation in AAA’s favor, and (c) directive for him to post a bond in the amount of 300,000.00 all
lack factual bases. The first three issues presented unmistakably call for a re-calibration of evidence. While
the general rule that only legal issues can be resolved in a petition filed under Rule 45 recognizes
exceptions,27 BBB’s case does not fall in the latter category. The RTC and the CA are in accord with each
other as to their factual findings, which are supported by substantial evidence, thus, binding upon this
Court.
The doubt raised by BBB anent the admissibility of the text messages as evidence is not genuinely a legal
issue.
In the case of Justice Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud,28 it is stated that any question as to the admissibility of
text messages as evidence is rendered moot and academic if the party raising such issue admits authorship
of the subject messages.29
BBB argues that the RTC and the CA erred in admitting as evidence the text messages which were sent by
him and FFF to AAA since they were unauthenticated. However, BBB himself effectively admitted in the
pleadings filed with this Court and the CA that he indeed sent the text messages attributed to him by AAA.
The Appellant’s Brief30filed before the CA stated in part that:
[AAA] conveniently chose to leave out the initiatory messages to which [BBB] replied to. It is totally
obvious that the alleged messages from [BBB] are only messages that are in response to an ongoing verbal
or virtual tussle and the adamant refusal of [AAA] to bring the children home despite the entreaties of
[BBB]. Be it noted that [BBB], for the past several months leading up to their separation, and up to the time
that the instant case has been filed, continuously endured the extreme mood swings, malicious
accusations, haranguing, curses, insults, and even violence from [AAA].31 (Emphasis and underscoring in
the original and italics ours)
Further, in the instant petition, BBB repleads that:
[I]t is utterly apparent that the alleged messages from [BBB] are only messages that are in response to an
ongoing verbal or virtual tussle between the parties. 32
In the above-quoted portions of the pleadings, BBB attempted to justify why he sent the messages to AAA.
However, in doing so, he, in effect, admitted authorship of the messages which AAA adduced as evidence.
It is likewise noted that BBB did not deny ownership of the cellphone number from which the text
messages were sent.
Hence, while at first glance, it would seem that the issue of admissibility of the text messages requires an
interpretation of the rules of evidence, this Court does not find the same to be necessary. While BBB had
admitted authorship of the text messages, he pleads for this Court to consider those messages as
inadmissible for allegedly being unauthenticated. BBB’s arguments are unbearably self-contradictory and
he cannot be allowed to take refuge under technical rules of procedure to assail what is already apparent.
The deletion from the PPO of the directive of the RTC and the CA relative to the award of support is not
warranted. While CCC is not BBB’s biological son, he was legitimated under the latter’s name. Like DDD and
EEE, CCC is entitled to receive support from BBB.
BBB claims that DDD and EEE are now under his sole care and custody, which allegedly renders moot the
provision in the PPO relative to support. BBB points out that CCC is not his biological son. Impliedly then,
BBB justifies why CCC is not entitled to receive support from him. This Court is not persuaded.
Article 177 of the Family Code provides that "[o]nly children conceived and born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to
marry each other may be legitimated." Article 178 states that "[l]egitimation shall take place by a
subsequent valid marriage between parents."
In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is not CCC’s biological father. Such being the
case, it was improper to have CCC legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAA’s marriage. Clearly
then, the legal process of legitimation was trifled with. BBB voluntarily but falsely acknowledged CCC as his
son. Article 1431 of the New Civil Code pertinently provides:
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person
making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
At least for the purpose of resolving the instant petition, the principle of estoppel finds application and it
now bars BBB from making an assertion contrary to his previous representations. He should not be allowed
to evade a responsibility arising from his own misrepresentations. He is bound by the effects of the
legitimation process. CCC remains to be BBB’s son, and pursuant to Article 179 of the Family Code, the
former is entitled to the same rights as those of a legitimate child, including the receipt of his father’s
support.
Notwithstanding the above, there is no absolute preclusion for BBB from raising before the proper court
the issue of CCC’s status and filiation. However, BBB cannot do the same in the instant petition before this
Court now. In Tison v. CA,33 the Court held that "the civil status [of a child] cannot be attacked collaterally."
The child’s legitimacy "cannot be contested by way of defense or as a collateral issue in another action for
a different purpose."34 The instant petition sprang out of AAA’s application for a PPO before the RTC.
Hence, BBB’s claim that CCC is not his biological son is a collateral issue, which this Court has no authority
to resolve now.
Section 16 of R.A. No. 9262, on the other hand, provides that "[a] PPO shall be effective until revoked by a
court upon application of the person in whose favor the order was issued." Pending the resolution of the
instant petition, BBB claims that he and AAA had executed a MOA, upon which basis a judgment by
compromise is sought to be rendered. Atty. Uyboco, on her part, pointed out AAA’s vacillation anent the
MOA’s execution. With the foregoing circumstances, the parties, wittingly or unwittingly, have imposed
upon this Court the undue burden of speculating whether or not AAA’s half-hearted acquiescence to the
MOA is tantamount to an application for the revocation of the PPO. The Court, however, refuses to indulge
the whims of either parties. The questions raised in the instant petition for the Court to dispose of revolve
around the propriety of the PPO’s issuance. The Court resolves that principal query in the affirmative. The
PPO thus stands unless AAA, categorically and without any equivocation, files an application for its
revocation.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 6, 2009 and Resolution
dated August 3, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89581 are AFFIRMED. The Permanent
Protection Order, dated August 14, 2007, issued against BBB by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 162STANDS except items (d), (f), (g), (h) and (i)36 thereof. The case is hereby remanded to the trial
court for it to accordingly modify the aforecited items after determining with dispatch the following:

All told, the Court finds no merit in BBB’s petition, but there exists a necessity to remand the case for the (1) who between BBB and AAA shall exercise custody over the three children;
RTC to resolve matters relative to who shall be granted custody over the three children, how the spouses
shall exercise visitation rights, and the amount and manner of providing financial support. (2) how the parties shall exercise their respective visitation rights; and

The RTC and the CA found substantial evidence and did not commit reversible errors when they issued the (3) the amount and manner of providing financial support.
PPO against BBB. Events, which took place after the issuance of the PPO, do not erase the fact that
psychological, emotional and economic abuses were committed by BBB against AAA. Hence, BBB’s claim The Reply and Manifestation dated November 10, 2014 and December 4, 2014, respectively, are NOTED.
that he now has actual sole care of DDD and EEE does not necessarily call for this Court’s revocation of the
PPO and the award to him of custody over the children.
SO ORDERED.

This Court, thus, affirms the CA’s order to remand the case for the RTC to resolve the question of custody.
Since the children are now all older than seven years of age, they can choose for themselves whom they
want to stay with. If all the three children would manifest to the RTC their choice to stay with AAA, then
the PPO issued by RTC shall continue to be executed in its entirety. However, if any of the three children
would choose to be under BBB’s care, necessarily, the PPO issued against BBB relative to them is to be
modified. The PPO, in its entirety, would remain effective only as to AAA and any of the children who opt
to stay with her. Consequently, the RTC may accordingly alter the manner and amount of financial support
BBB should give depending on who shall finally be awarded custody over the children. Pursuant to Articles
201 and 202 of the Family Code, BBB’s resources and means and the necessities of AAA and the children
are the essential factors in determining the amount of support, and the same can be reduced or increased
proportionately. The RTC is reminded to be circumspect in resolving the matter of support, which is a
mutual responsibility of the spouses. The parties do not dispute that AAA is now employed as well, thus,
the RTC should consider the same with the end in mind of promoting the best interests of the children.

A final note on the effectivity and violation of a PPO

The Court reminds the parties that the application for the issuance of a PPO is not a process to be trifled
with. It is only granted after notice and hearing. Once issued, violation of its provisions shall be punishable
with a fine ranging from Five Thousand Pesos (5,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and/or
imprisonment of six (6) months.35

[A.M. No. P-01-1518. November 14, 2001]
ANTONIO A. ARROYO, complainant, vs. SANCHO L. ALCANTARA, Clerk of Court II, Municipal
This is an administrative complaint against Sancho L. Alcantara, Clerk of Court II of the Municipal Trial
Court of Guinobatan, Albay, for oppression, misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, and violations of 5(a) & (d) of R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees)and 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).
The allegations in the complaint[if !supportFootnotes][1][endif] are as follows:
On August 4, 1999, respondent issued a subpoena to Joaquin Opiana, Sr., complainants father-in-law
and a resident of Barangay Tandarora, Guinobatan, Albay, requiring him to appear before the Municipal
Trial Court of Guinobatan, Albay. Ruben Olayres, Barangay Captain of Barangay Tandarora, Guinobatan,
Albay, served the subpoena on Joaquin Opiana, Sr. It appears that complainant had an altercation with
Olayres as the latter presented the subpoena in an arrogant manner. Joaquin Opiana, Sr. at the time had a
serious illness such that service of the subpoena upon him distressed him, causing him to experience
difficulty in breathing.
On August 13, 1999, complainant wrote a letter by registered mail to the office of respondent,
requesting him for a copy of the alleged subpoena and a certification as to the facts surrounding the
issuance of the same. Although respondent received the said letter on August 16, 1999, per Registry
Receipt No. 476,[if !supportFootnotes][2][endif] he failed to act on it.
On September 14, 1999, complainant wrote to respondent to follow up the request in his first
letter.[if !supportFootnotes][3][endif] However, respondent twice refused to receive the follow-up
letter.[if !supportFootnotes][4][endif] Complainants subsequent request to examine the records of the
Municipal Trial Court of Guinobatan, Albay also proved futile.
Complainant argues that the issuance of a subpoena on Joaquin Opiana, Sr., who was not a party in
any case before the Municipal Trial Court of Guinobatan, Albay, hastened the latters death on August 27,
1999. Complainant also alleges that respondent, by issuing the supposed subpoena, conferred undue
benefit in favor of Olayres and caused the latter to file a criminal case for assault against complainant and
his wife. Complainant seeks the preventive suspension of respondent pending investigation of the charges
against him.
In his answer,[if !supportFootnotes][5][endif] respondent claims that the document mistaken by
complainant to be a subpoena was in reality just a letter, typed on an ordinary bond paper and addressed
to Joaquin Opiana, Sr., requesting him to attend a meeting at the office of the Municipal Trial Court of
Guinobatan, Albay. Respondent explains that he made such request in his personal capacity upon the
insistence of Ruben Olayres, who thought that respondents position as a clerk of court could be used to
amicably settle the dispute among the heirs of Isaac Opiana, one whom was Joaquin Opiana, Sr.,
concerning a certain real property. Respondent attached to his answer the letter of Olayres, dated August
3, 1999, requesting him to mediate in the dispute.[if !supportFootnotes][6][endif] Respondent also
contends that the mistake as to the nature of the document which he prepared could be attributed to the
one who thought that what he caused to be served was a subpoena. Respondent claims that he was aware
of the proper procedure regarding the issuance of a subpoena and he could not have allowed the barangay
chairman to serve the same as the latter was not authorized by the rules to do so. According to
respondent, complainant could not produce a copy of the supposed subpoena because there was none,
the document involved being a letter written only in one copy intended to be given to the addressee
thereof.
During the pendency of this case, respondent applied for retirement effective June 30, 2000. On
December 8, 2000,[if !supportFootnotes][7][endif] he wrote a letter to the Office of the Court
Administrator, praying that his retirement benefits, less such amount as would be determined by the Court
Administrator, be released to him considering that he had rendered judicial service for more than 36 years
and that he was the sole breadwinner of his family.
Upon the recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator, who found that this case
involved factual matters which must be resolved after hearing, this Court referred the matter to Executive
Judge Antonio C. Alfane, Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Legazpi City for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
Anent the respondents request for partial release of his retirement benefits, the Court adopted the
recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator to release the same minus the amount of
P100,000.00 pending the final resolution of this case.[if !supportFootnotes][8][endif]
In his report, dated May 29, 2001, Executive Judge Antonio C. Alfane stated that respondent should
be held liable for violation of R.A. No. 6713, 5 (a) and (d) but absolved from the other charges of
oppression, misconduct, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violation of R.A. No.
3019, 3 (e) on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. As penalty, Judge Alfane recommended that
respondent be ordered to pay a fine equivalent to his salary for three months.
We find the recommendations of Executive Judge Alfane to be substantially well taken.
First. To prove his charge against respondent for violation of R.A. No. 3019, 3 (e), complainant presented as
his witness Joaquin Opiana, Jr., who testified that respondent asked P5,000.00 from him during the
meeting held at the behest of the latter. Joaquin Opiana, Jr. said that he was not able to pay the said
amount because his family could not afford it.[if !supportFootnotes][9][endif] Respondent, on the other
hand, claimed that he merely advised Joaquin Opiana, Jr. to raise the money in order to pay the fees of the
geodetic engineer, who would conduct the survey on the disputed land of the Opianas. Respondent denied
that he ever asked for money for himself as his fee for mediating the dispute.[if
!supportFootnotes][10][endif]
Executive Judge Alfane found that the evidence presented by complainant was insufficient to hold
respondent liable for the charge.[if !supportFootnotes][11][endif] We agree. To hold a person liable for
violation of R.A. No. 3019, 3 (e), the concurrence of the following must be established: (1) the respondent
is a public officer or a private person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) the said public officer
committed the prohibited acts in the performance of his official duties or in relation to his or her public
positions; (3) he caused undue injury to any party, whether the government or a private party; and (4) the
public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.[if
!supportFootnotes][12][endif]
In this case, the element of undue injury, which has been consistently interpreted as actual
damage,[if !supportFootnotes][13][endif] has not been shown as complainant failed to prove that
respondent indeed asked for and received money during the meeting. Complainant likewise failed to
substantiate his charge of alleged unwarranted benefit bestowed upon respondent Olayres through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The mere fact that Olayres filed a
case against complainant and his wife for direct assault as a consequence of the fight that occurred during
the service of the alleged subpoena does not prove that respondent indeed accorded unwarranted benefit
in favor of Olayres. Furthermore, the fact that respondent tried to help Olayres reach an amicable
settlement with the Opianas is insufficient basis for concluding that he exhibited manifest partiality and
evident bad faith, much less inexcusable negligence.
Second. The pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6713, for violation of which respondent was charged, read as
follows:
SEC. 5. Duties of Public Officials and Employees. In the performance of their duties, all public officials and
employees are under obligation to:
(a) Act promptly on letters and requests. All public officials and employees shall, within fifteen (15) working
days from receipt thereof, respond to letters, telegrams or other means of communications sent by the
public. The reply must contain the action taken on the request.
....
(d) Act immediately on the publics personal transactions. All public officials and employees must attend to
anyone who wants to avail himself of the services of their offices and must, at all times, act promptly and
expeditiously.
It appears that respondent violated the abovesaid provisions when he, after receipt of complainants
first letter requesting for a copy of the alleged subpoena, deliberately failed to act on the said request and
even refused to receive complainants follow-up letter on the pretext that the contents of the second letter
were the same as that of the first one. The law enjoins public officials, such as respondent, to extend
prompt, courteous, and adequate service to the public, and, at all times, to respect the rights of others and
refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public order, public policy, public
safety, and public interest.[if !supportFootnotes][14][endif] In the performance of this duty, respondent
had indeed been remiss.
Third. Executive Judge Alfane recommended that respondent be absolved from the charge of oppression,
misconduct, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service because of reasonable doubt as to
whether respondent indeed issued and caused to be served a subpoena to complainants father-in-law.
According to him, complainant failed to produce in evidence the alleged subpoena and to comply with the
requirements of the Rules of Court regarding the proffer of secondary evidence in lieu of the Original
document. Further, Executive Judge Alfane opined that if the document subject of the controversy was
really a subpoena issued by respondent without authority, Joaquin Opiana, Jr. would then not have
voluntarily attended on behalf of his father the meeting held the day following the incident.[if
!supportFootnotes][15][endif]
We disagree. While it is true that complainant failed to produce the alleged subpoena in court, the
evidence on record shows that respondent issued a document purportedly from the Municipal Trial Court
of Guinobatan, Albay. Respondent admitted in his answer that Barangay Chairman Olayres requested him
to mediate among the heirs of the late Isaac Opiana because his position as a clerk of court might convince
the parties to settle their differences regarding the land left by their deceased father. To this request,
respondent acceded, with the alleged intention of helping Olayres.
In the first place, a clerk of court had no authority to mediate among the constituents of Olayres.
Respondent even admitted that he was aware of this fact. Although he claims that his act was done in his
personal capacity and not as a clerk of court, this is belied by the fact that complainant was given the
impression that the intended meeting involving his father-in-law was court-related. Complainant testified
that he read the words Municipal Trial Court in the alleged subpoena.[if !supportFootnotes][16][endif]
Furthermore, the meeting was held at the office of respondent on August 5, 1999, a Thursday, and during
working hours.[if !supportFootnotes][17][endif]
It is apparent that respondent had exceeded his authority as a clerk of court. He had, wittingly or
unwittingly, allowed his position to be used to exercise his moral ascendancy over the members of the
Opiana family, whom he summoned to his office for mediation. He gave the impression that such meeting
was part of the proceedings of the court, for which reason Joaquin Opiana, Jr. felt compelled to attend the
same to represent his sick father.
Moreover, respondents deliberate setting aside of complainants request for a copy of the supposed
subpoena and his refusal to receive complainants follow-up letter in violation of 5 (a) and (d) of R.A. No.
6713 cannot be viewed in isolation as it appears that he intentionally violated these rules to cover up his
reprehensible act of issuing a document purportedly from the court in excess of his authority. Respondent
refused to give any written explanation concerning the nature of the document he issued to summon
Joaquin Opiana, Sr. Neither did he explain why he was not able to produce in court the supposed letter of
invitation he executed after complaint presented evidence to prove that he has done all within his means
to get a copy of the subpoena. It cannot be denied that such document was well within the control of
respondent, who was the one who prepared it, signed it, and caused it to be served on Joaquin Opiana, Sr.
Thus, his failure to present in evidence the purported letter raises the presumption against him that
evidence willfully suppressed will be adverse if produced.[if !supportFootnotes][18][endif]
Indeed, respondent failed in his duty to conduct himself at all times with propriety and decorum and,
above all else, to be above reproach.[if !supportFootnotes][19][endif] It bears stressing that everyone
connected with the dispensation of justice bears a heavy burden of responsibility of so conducting himself
that reflects credit to his office. By acting in excess of his authority, albeit with good intentions, respondent
committed simple misconduct.
By way of penalty, Executive Judge Alfane recommended that respondent be fined in the amount
equivalent to his salary for three months for violation of Republic Act No. 6713, 5 (a) and (d). We hold that
the appropriate penalty for this lapse is a reprimand, the violation being a light offense.[if
!supportFootnotes][20][endif] In addition, the proper penalty to be imposed on respondent for having
committed simple misconduct should be suspension without pay for a period of one month and one day to
six months.[if !supportFootnotes][21][endif] However, considering that respondent has retired from the
service, this Court will impose on him, in lieu of suspension, a fine approximately equal to his former salary
for three months. Since at the time of his retirement, respondents monthly salary was P17,069.00, a fine of
P50,000.00 would thus be appropriate.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sancho L. Alcantara guilty of simple misconduct and violation of
R.A. Act No. 6713, 5 (a) and (d) and accordingly imposes on him as penalty a fine in the amount of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00) and a reprimand, respectively. The Court also orders the release of the
balance of the P100,000.00 retained from his monetary benefits after deducting the fine. With respect to
the charge against respondent for violation of 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, the same is dismissed for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.