Gender:

Art. 2259. The capacity of a married woman to execute acts and contracts
is governed by this Code, even if her marriage was celebrated under the
former laws. (n)

(ROC) Rule 3.Section 4. Spouses as parties. — Husband and wife shall sue or
be sued jointly, except as provided by law. (4a)

Silverio VS Republic
Facts:

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio is a male transsexual. He’s a biological male

who feels trapped in a male body. Being that, he sought gender re-assignment in
Bangkok, Thailand. The procedure was successful – he (she) now has a female
body. Thereafter, in 2002, he filed a petition for the change of his first name (from
Rommel to Mely) and his sex (male to female) in his birth certificate. He filed the
petition before the Manila RTC. He wanted to make these changes, among
others, so that he can marry his American fiancé.
The RTC granted Silverio’s petition. The RTC ruled that it should be granted
based on equity; that Silverio’s misfortune to be trapped in a man’s body is not
his own doing and should not be in any way taken against him; that there was no
opposition to his petition (even the OSG did not make any basis for opposition at
this point); that no harm, injury or prejudice will be caused to anybody or the
community in granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would
bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of Silverio and [her] fiancé and the
realization of their dreams.
Later, a petition for certiorari was filed by the OSG before the CA. The CA
reversed the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the entries pertaining to sex and first name in the birth
certificate may be changed on the ground of gender re-assignment.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that the change of such entries finds no
support in existing legislation.
No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases
where the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or
write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The
petitioner’s basis of the change of his name is that he intends his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery. The
Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the
change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex
reassignment. The Court denied the petition.
 Republic VS Cagandahan
Facts:

Jennifer Cagandahan was registered as a female in her Certificate of Live

Birth. During her childhood years, she suffered from clitoral hypertrophy and was
later on diagnosed that her ovarian structures had minimized. She likewise has
no breast nor menstruation. Subsequently, she was diagnosed of having
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH), a condition where those afflicted possess
secondary male characteristics because of too much secretion of male
hormones, androgen. According to her, for all interests and appearances as well
as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. She filed a petition at
RTC Laguna for Correction of Entries in her Birth Certificate such that her gender
or sex be changed to male and her first name be changed to Jeff.

Issue: Whether or not Cagandahan’s sex and name as appearing in her birth
certificate be changed.

Held: The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the RTC, granting the
respondent’s change of name and gender. The Supreme Court gave respect to
(1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has
handed out. In other words, the court respected respondents’ congenital
condition and his mature decision to be a male considering the unique
circumstances in the case.

III. Marriage

Art. 1. Family Code - Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union

between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by law
and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage settlements
may fix the property relations during the marriage within the
limits provided by this Code. (52a)

1987 Constitution Article XV Sec. 1 – 3

Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the
nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and
shall be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious
convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other
conditions
prejudicial to their development;
(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in the planning and
implementation of policies and programs that affect them.

2. Breach of Promise to Marry

Art. 19 – 21, 2176 NCC
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith.
Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes
damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same.
Article 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in manner that
is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.

Wassmer Vs Velez
Facts:
In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They
decided to schedule it on September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer made
preparations such as: making and sending wedding invitations, bought her
wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2 days
before the scheduled day of wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer advising
her that he will not be able to attend the wedding because his mom was opposed
to said wedding. And one day before the wedding, he sent another message to
Wassmer advising her that nothing has changed and that he will be returning
soon. However, he never returned.
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an
answer and eventually judgment was made in favor of Wassmer. The court
awarded exemplary and moral damages in favor of Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was
because of fortuitous events. He further argued that he cannot be held civilly
liable for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there is no law upon
which such an action may be grounded. He also contested the award of
exemplary and moral damages against him.

Issue: Whether or not the award of damages is proper for a breach of promise to
marry.

Held:
Yes. It is true that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable
wrong. However, in this case, it was not a simple breach of promise to marry
because of such promise, Wassmer made preparations for the wedding. Velez’s
unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy. Wassmer’s cause of action is supported under Article 21 of the
Civil Code which provides in part “any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy
shall compensate the latter for the damage.” The appellant was made to pay for
the actual, moral, and exemplary damages.

Tanjanco VS CA
Facts:
About December 1957, Apolonio courted Arceli both of adult age. That Apolonio
expressed his undying love and affection to Araceli also in due time reciprocated
the tender feelings, in consideration of Apolonio promise of marriage Araceli
consented and acceded to Apolonio’s pleas for carnal knowledge. U
ntilDecember 1959, through his protestations of love and promises of marriage, defendant
succeeded inhaving carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter
conceived a child. Araceli informedAplolonio and pleaded with him to make good
his promises of marriage but instead of honoring his promises and righting his
wrong, Apolonio stopped and refrained from seeing Araceli since about July1959
has not visited her and to all intents and purposes has broken their engagement and his
promises.
Issue:
Whether or Not Consent and Voluntariness on the part of the offended party is an essential
element in Art. 21 of the Civil Code.

Held: Yes. The court held in the present case that, the appellant was not deceived by the
respondent for if there was deceit, the sexual relationship should not have lasted for a year.
clearly, there was voluntariness and mutual passion between the appellant and the
respondent. Therefore, claiming damages under Art.21 of the Civil code is not applicable on
the present case.
 De Jesus VS Sequia
FACTS: Antonia Loanco de Jesus, 20 years old, and Cesar Syquia, 23 met in a
barber shop where de Jesus worked as cashier. They had a relationship and
Antonia got pregnant with a baby boy. During her pregnancy, Syquia often visited
her. He even wrote a letter to a reverend father saying that he wanted his name
to be given to the child. When he went to Japan and China, he was writing
letters to Antonia reminding her to keep herself in good condition so that their
junior would be strong. When she gave birth, Syquia took her and the child to live
in a house in Manila where they lived as a family for a year. She became
pregnant again but Syquia left her to marry another woman. During the
christening of the child which Syquia arranged, he decided to give the child the
name of Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia Jr.

ISSUE: W/N there would be damages for breach to marry and W/N Syquia is
compelled to recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child

HELD: The letter written by Syquia to the Rev Fr serves as an admission of

paternity and the other letters are sufficient to connect the admission with the
child carried by Antonia. P50.00 to ismael Loanco. The SC held that they agree
with the trial court in refusing to provide damages for breach of promise to marry
since this has no standing in court.

3. On Private Contracts

In Re Santiago, 70 Phil 66
Facts:
Ernesto Baniquit, who was living then separately from his wife Soledad Colares
for 9 years, sought the legal advice of the respondent for a possible second
marriage. Respondent, who is a lawyer prepared the waiver which was signed by
both spouses. Relysing on the document, Ernesto contracted a second marriage.
The respondent then realized his mistake and made the spouses signed a
cancelletaion deed.

Issue: Wheter or Not Signing a Waiver is valid to contract subsequent

marriages.

Held: No. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between the

husband and wife. A waiver to remarry without annulment of the previous
marriage is prohibited by law because it is against public interest and it devoid
the sanctity and purity of marriage.
 SELANOVA VS. MENDOZA
Facts:
On November 21, 1972, respondent judge Alejandro Mendoza prepared and
ratified a document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal partnership of
complainant Saturnino Selanova and his wife, Avelina Ceniza. The contract,
signed by the spouses and two witnesses before the culpable judge, divided the
two pieces of conjugal assets of the spouses between them, and licensed either
spouse to commit any act of infidelity; and withdraw the complaint fro adultery or
concubinage which each had filed against the other.

Issue: Whether or not an extrajudicial agreement between spouses to dissolve

their marriage is valid.

Held: The agreement in question is void because it contravenes the provision

under Art. 221 of the Civil Code, which state that the following shall be void and
of no effect: (1) any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
(2) every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between
husband and wife.

Even before the approval of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court held
that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial
approval was void. An agreement between husband and wife which permits the
husband to take a concubine and for the wife to live in adulterous relationship
with another man, is void. While adultery and concubinage are private crimes,
they still remain crimes, and a contract legalizing their commission is contrary to
law, morals and public orders, and as a consequence not judicially
recognizable.

B. Requisites of Marriage

Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential

requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male
and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the solemnizing
officer. (53a)

Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in
Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance
of the contracting parties before the solemnizing officer and their
personal declaration that they take each other as husband and
wife in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.

RPC Art. 350. Marriage contracted against provisions of laws. — The

penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall
be imposed upon any person who, without being included in the provisions
of the next proceeding article, shall have not been complied with or that the
marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment.chanrobles virtual law library
If either of the contracting parties shall obtain the consent of the other by
means of violence, intimidation or fraud, he shall be punished by the
maximum period of the penalty provided in the next preceding
paragraph.chanrobles virtual law li
brary

1. Essential Requisites
a. legal capacity of male and female
Vermount Act 91 – Making the state of Vermount the first state to have civil
unions with same sex couples in July 1, 2000.
Netherlands Act of 21 December 2000 - The Netherlands was the first country in
the world to legalize same-sex marriage.

Jones Vs Halahan
FACTS:

On November 21, 1972, respondent judge Alejandro Mendoza

prepared and ratified a document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal
partnership of complainant Saturnino Selanova and his wife, Avelina
Ceniza. The contract, signed by the spouses and two witnesses before the
culpable judge, divided the two pieces of conjugal assets of the spouses between
them, and licensed either spouse to commit any act of infidelity; and withdraw the
complaint fro adultery or concubinage which each had filed against the other.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not an extrajudicial agreement between spouses to
dissolve their marriage is valid.

HELD:

The agreement in question is void because it contravenes the provision

under Art. 221 of the Civil Code, which state that the following shall be void and
of no effect: (1) any contract for personal separation between husband and wife;
(2) every extrajudicial agreement, during marriage, for the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains or of the absolute community of property between
husband and wife.

Even before the approval of the Civil Code, the Supreme Court held
that the extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership without judicial
approval was void. An agreement between husband and wife which permits the
husband to take a concubine and for the wife to live in adulterous relationship
with another man, is void. While adultery and concubinage are private crimes,
they still remain crimes, and a contract legalizing their commission is contrary to
law, morals and public orders, and as a consequence not judicially
recognizable.

The judge having become a lawyer in 1948, who was in good faith and
with honest intent to terminate the marital conflict, since he was not aware of Art.
221 of the Civil Code, was merely reprimanded.

Summary of Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health
Facts: In April of 2001, advocates for GLAD (Gay and Lesbian Advocates and
Defenders) filed suit against the Massachusetts Department of Health in Superior
Court on behalf of seven same-sex Massachusetts couples. All of the named
couples had been denied same-sex marriage licenses in March and April of
2001. The plaintiffs were all in long-term, monogamous relationships; some
couples had children. The Department was responsible for setting policies
regarding the issue of marriage licenses, among other things. The Superior Court
judge ruled in favor of the Department, affirming its right to deny the plaintiffs
marriage licenses. The plaintiffs appealed the ruling to the Supreme Judicial
Court. In the appeal, Massachusetts Attorney General Tom Reilly argued that the
issue of “the broader public interest” should prevail. If the Court were to do so,
they would realize that because “same-sex couples cannot procreate on their
own and therefore cannot accomplish the ‘main object’…of marriage as
historically understood," they were not legally deserving of the right to get
married.

Issue: The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that Department of

Health had erred by not issuing marriage licenses to the same-sex couples who
had applied for them.
Holding: The Court indicated that the State may not “deny the protections,
benefits and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the same
sex who wish to marry.”
Majority Opinion Reasoning: The Court reasoned that pursuant to the state’s
constitution, “the dignity and equality of all individuals" “forbids the creation of
second-class citizens," which would most assuredly be created by the systematic
denial of marriage licenses to same-sex couples. The Court also reasoned that
the State had no rational interest to deny constitutionally protected state rights on
higher, federal due process and equal protection concepts.

Baker v. State of Vermont

Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiffs, three same-sex couples who have lived in
committed relationships for significant periods, brought suit seeking judgment
that a statute disallowing same sex marriage was unconstitutional under state
law and the state constitution.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A law that prohibited same-sex couples from

receiving the same benefits and protections that married opposite-sex couples
received violated the Vermont Constitution.

Facts. Plaintiffs, three same-sex couples who have lived in committed

relationships for significant periods, brought suit seeking judgment that a statute
disallowing same sex marriage was unconstitutional under state law and the
state constitution. Two of the same-sex couples had raised children together.

Issue. May the State of Vermont exclude same-sex couples from the benefits
and protections that its laws provide to married couples under the Vermont
Constitution?
Held. The State is constitutionally required to extend to same-sex couples the
same benefits and protections that flow from marriage under Vermont law.
The State claims that under statutory construction, marriage means the union of
a man and a woman as husband and wife. Further evidence of the intent of State
law flow from consanguinity statutes, annulment statutes, and other statutes
related to marriage. Plaintiffs claim that the underlying purpose of marriage is to
protect and encourage the union of committed couples. However, it is not clear
that limiting marriages to opposite-sex couples violates the intent and spirit of the
Legislature.

B. Consent Freely Given

PEOPLE VS. SANTIAGONo.

27972October 31, 1927
FACTS:
On November 23, 1926, herein appellant Felipe Santiago raped Felicita
Masilang, his wife’s niece, in an uninhabited place
across a river in Gapan, Nueva Ecija. After the deed, he took her to the house of
his brother, Agaton Satiago, who in turnfetched a protestant minister who there
and then officiated the ceremony of their marriage. After having given money
byFelipe, Felicita proceeded home to her father and told what had just occurred.

ISSUE:Whether or not the marriage executed by the protestant minister is of

legal effect.

HELD:The marriage ceremony was a mere ruse by which the appellant hoped to
escape from the criminal consequence of his act.It shows that he had no bona
fide intention of making her his wife and the ceremony cannot be considered
binding on
her because of duress. The marriage was therefore void for lack of essential con
sent, and it supplies no impediment to the prosecution of the wrongdoer.

Eigenmann vs. guerra digest

EduardoEigenmannmariedMarydenGueraon1957
Two years later eigenmann filed action to annul his marriage with Guerra on the
ground that he was between 16-18 years old at the time and his mother did not
consent the marriage
Issue: Whether or not there was parental consent, the absence of which could
render the marriage void.

Held: Consent may be given in any form, whether it be written, oral or even
implication. Eigenmanns mother was present at the time of the celebration of
marriage and did not object thereto such that consent can be gleaned from such
act.

Republic Vs Albios
Facts:
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married
before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59,
Mandaluyong City (MeTC)
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of
nullity[4] of her marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their
marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they
never really had any... intention of entering into a married state or complying with
any of their essential marital obligations. She described their marriage as one
made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.
S... ummons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September
13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial
brief.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared.
Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule.
the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience
only
. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer
to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in
consideration thereof, she agreed... to pay him the sum of $2,000.00... she did
not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for...
citizenship.
the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of
consent was lacking.
Issues:
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship
in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
Held:
The marriage is valid. Based on the above, consent was not lacking between
Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it was not vitiated nor
rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and
intelligent as they understood the nature and the... beneficial and inconvenient
consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so. That
their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of
acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that
they... willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage.