Please

 direct  questions  to  Terry  Francke,  CalAware  General  Counsel:  terry@calaware.org  

Californians  Aware  
Proposals  for  Open  Government  Reform  in  2017
Public  Information  and  the  California  Public  Records  Act  (CPRA)  
The  Deliberative  Process  Privilege  Needs  Definition  

The  Problem:
This  common  law  privilege—one  not  recognized  in  the  Evidence  Code  or  
defined  as  an  exemption  from  disclosure  under  any  other  statute—was  cited  by  the  
California  Supreme  Court  as  a  justification  for  denying  public  access  to  five  years’  worth  
of  the  appointment  calendars  of  Governor  George  Deukmejian,  sought  by  the  Los  
Angeles  Times  under  the  CPRA.  

The  1991  decision  in  Times  Mirror  Co.  v.  Superior  Court,  53  Cal.3d  1325  concluded  that  if  
the  public  knew  who  was  meeting  with  the  Governor  that  would  disclose  the  Governor’s  
thinking  and  degrade  the  quality  of  his/her  deliberative  process,  since  people  would  be  
reluctant  to  participate  in  such  meetings  if  their  doing  so  became  widely  known.  Not  
what  was  said,  but  merely  the  fact  that  the  meeting  took  place.  

Since  then  the  Governor’s  special  need  for  such  discretionary  confidentiality—also  
known  as  the  executive  privilege—has  been  recognized  in  two  appellate  decisions  
dealing  with  the  power  to  appoint  persons  to  mid-­‐term  vacancies  on  boards  of  
supervisors.  But  another  appellate  case  extended  the  privilege  to  protect  the  
deliberations  of  members  of  a  city  council,  and  since  then  the  privilege  claim  is  too  often  
used  the  keep  secret  the  development  of  policy  by  legislative  bodies.  This  is  utterly  
contrary  to  the  principle  underlying  the  Brown  Act  that  such  policy  development  and  
deliberation  are  to  be  open  to  public  examination  and  to  some  extent  even  public  
participation.  Some  local  bodies  have  even  tried  to  extend  the  privilege  to  
communications  among  staff  members  during  the  policy  development  process.  

The  Correction:
Amend  the  CPRA  to  codify  the  Times  Mirror  Co.  principle,  but  narrowly.  
Add  an  express  exemption  from  disclosure  for  records  revealing  the  advice  given  to  the  
Governor,  or  his  or  her  mental  processes,  concerning  and  preliminary  to  a  specified  and  
disclosed  decision.  To  qualify,  such  advice  must  come  from  and  originate  with  executive  
branch  advisors,  not  consultants,  lobbyists  or  others,  who  are  either  professionals  paid  
to  take  the  heat  of  the  kitchen  or  those  outside  the  government  whom  it  is  vital  to  be  
able  to  link  with  campaign  contribution  disclosures  and  other  indicia  of  potential  
improper  influence.  This  exemption  would  parallel  and  complement  the  existing  
exemption  for  the  Governor’s  correspondence.  But  it  would  also  expressly  exclude  
availability  of  the  exemption  for  legislative  bodies  subject  to  the  Brown  Act  and  the  
Bagley-­‐Keene  Open  Meeting  Act,  their  members  and  their  advisors.  
Please  direct  questions  to  Terry  Francke,  CalAware  General  Counsel:  terry@calaware.org  

Overcharging  for  Digital  Copies  of  Records  Needs  to  be  Ended  

The  Problem:
The  CPRA  language  providing  access  to  government’s  electronic  records  
dates  from  the  1990s  and  badly  needs  updating  to  reflect  a  completely  transformed  
digital  environment.  In  particular,  the  rates  charged  for  copies  of  electronic  records  bear  
little  relation  to  the  legal  standard  for  recoverable  “direct  costs  of  duplication,”  as  
understood  in  the  paper  domain.  The  California  State  University  System,  for  example,  
charges  the  same  amount  for  copies  of  a  pdf  document  as  for  the  paper  document:  20  
cents  per  page.  Also,  many  agencies  charge  a  substantial  fee  for  extracting  data  from  an  
existing  database  whether  or  not  any  new  programming  has  to  be  done  to  permit  the  
extraction.  

The  Correction:
Amend  the  CPRA  to  prohibit  charges  for  copies  of  pdfs,  or  for  data  
extracted  from  a  database  if  no  new  programing  is  required  to  permit  the  extraction.  
Use  the  clarification  already  found  in  the  California  Rules  of  Court:  "For  purposes  of  this  
rule,  selecting  data  from  extractable  fields  in  a  single  database  using  software  already  
owned  or  licensed  by  the  judicial  branch  entity  does  not  constitute  creating  a  record  or  
compiling  or  assembling  data."  

Agencies  Need  to  Accept  Digital  Payment  for  Smaller  Records  Orders  

The  Problem:
California  State  University  refuses  to  accept  credit  card  or  other  digital  
payment  for  copies  of  public  records.  Its  headquarters  in  Long  Beach  has  even  been  
known  to  insist  on  a  mailed  check  for  less  than  a  dollar  before  emailing  a  requester  in  
the  north  state  a  one-­‐  or  two-­‐page  document.  

The  Correction:
Require  public  agencies  to  accept  credit  card  or  other  digital  forms  of  
payment  for  copies  of  public  records  involving  fewer  than  20  pages.  

Officials  Need  to  Use  Official  Email  to  Conduct  Official  Business  

The  Problem:
Increasingly,  public  officials  appear  to  be  communicating  on  matters  of  
official  business  using  their  personal  owned  email  accounts,  with  their  agencies  then  
arguing  that  these  messages  are  private  and  beyond  the  reach  of  the  CPRA.  This  is  not  
necessary  to  protect  officials’  privacy,  however,  since  the  CPRA  already  permits  
withholding  of  records  to  preserve  personal  privacy.  If  an  agency  is  so  small  or  strapped  
for  resources  that  it  has  not  been  able  to  support  email  accounts  for  its  officials,  that  is  
one  problem.  But  if  it  does  provide  email  service  for  its  officials,  then  they  should  not  
“go  private”  with  their  agency  business  communications  just  to  avoid  CPRA  disclosure.  

The  Correction:
Prohibit  the  use  of  personal  email  accounts  by  public  employees  or  
officials  to  communicate  on  agency  business  if  the  agency  provides  them  with  an  official  
email  account.  Prohibit  agencies  that  provide  their  employees  and  officials  with  such  
Please  direct  questions  to  Terry  Francke,  CalAware  General  Counsel:  terry@calaware.org  

accounts  as  of  the  effective  date  of  the  bill  from  withdrawing  them  to  avoid  its  
application.  

Attorney  General  Needs  to  Weigh  in  on  Access  Denials  

The  Problem:
If  a  public  agency  denies  access  to  a  requested  record  the  requester  very  
often—perhaps  even  typically—has  no  sense  of  how  legally  well-­‐founded  that  denial  is,  
or  what  the  prospects  of  success  for  suing  to  get  access  might  be.  Even  experienced  
requesters’  attorneys  who  consult  case  law  may  sometimes  be  unsure  of  the  strength  of  
their  case  for  access.  In  such  instances  it  may  be  necessary  to  sue  to  find  out—or  to  
simply  accept  the  denial  and  walk  away.  Some  mechanism  to  provide  a  reality  check  to  
both  requesters  and  denying  agencies  is  badly  needed  to  reduce  the  necessity  of  
litigation.  

The  Correction: AB 2927 of  2006  by  then  Assembly  Member  Leno  would  have  required  
the  Attorney  General,  upon  request,  to  provide  a  relatively  prompt  and  brief  public  
opinion  on  the  validity  of  a  public  agency’s  denial  of  access  sought  under  the  CPRA.  The  
opinion  would  have  no  binding  effect  but  would  provide  either  the  requester  or  the  
denying  agency,  as  the  case  might  be,  with  support  for  its  position  sufficient  to  avoid  
litigation.  AB  2927  was  vetoed  because  of  both  its  anticipated  high  cost  and  the  interest  
conflict  created  when  a  public  agency  advised  by  the  Attorney  General  had  its  access  
denial  referred  for  AG  review.  The  basic  provisions  of  AB  2927  should  be  revised  with  
two  changes.  Requesters  should  be  required  to  pay  a  review  fee  based  on  one  hour’s  
time  of  a  deputy  attorney  general  until  actual  costs  of  the  program  are  known,  with  a  
one-­‐year  experience  report  to  the  Legislature.  And  any  denial  by  an  agency  advised  by  
the  Attorney  General  in  any  matter  should  be  exempt  from  AG  review  of  CPRA  denials.  

Public  Agencies  Need  to  Base  Their  Access  Denials  on  the  Public  Interest  

The  Problem:
The  CPRA  recognizes  three  different  species  of  exemption  from  
disclosure.  One  is  where  a  privilege  or  other  law  outside  the  CPRA  flatly  overrides  or  
even  prohibits  public  access,  for  example  in  the  case  of  attorney-­‐client  communications,  
personal  medical  history  or  tax  return  information.  The  second  is  where  the  government  
is  given  the  discretion  to  deny  access,  while  not  mandated  to.  The  third  is  where,  
despite  any  express  authority  to  deny  access,  the  public  agency  can  do  so  if  it  can  show  
that  on  the  facts  of  the  particular  case  there  is  a  greater  public  interest  in  withholding  
than  in  disclosing  the  information.  The  latter  “balancing  test”  or  “catchall  exemption”  
acts  as  a  wild  card  for  justifying  secrecy.  The  result  is  a  fundamental  structural  
imbalance  in  the  CPRA—a  tilt  favoring  secrecy  based  on  ad  hoc  considerations  of  
overriding  public  interest.  Consequently,  agencies  with  discretion  to  withhold  public  
records  (the  second  category),  with  no  obligation  to  justify  or  explain  the  need  to  do  so,  
treat  their  discretion  as  a  virtual  mandate  to  withhold  records.  Using  their  discretion  to  
release  information  is  essentially  never  considered,  much  less  exercised.  
Please  direct  questions  to  Terry  Francke,  CalAware  General  Counsel:  terry@calaware.org  

The  Correction:
To  provide  policy  parity,  amend  the  CPRA  to  allow  access  to  records  
normally  subject  to  discretionary  exemption  based  on  a  demonstration  that,  under  the  
given  circumstances,  the  public  interest  in  disclosure  outweighs  the  public  interest  in  
denial  of  access.  The  result:  just  as  the  government  has  the  power  to  make  a  persuasive  
argument  for  at  least  temporary  or  one-­‐time  withholding  of  information  to  serve  a  
defined  public  interest,  a  requester  is  able  to  do  likewise  on  behalf  of  a  temporary  or  
one-­‐time  override  of  the  normally  imposed  secrecy.  This  leveling  of  the  field  would  not  
affect  first-­‐category  rules  that  flatly  prohibit  public  disclosure,  only  situations  where  an  
agency  is  given  discretion  to  permit  access—but  now  simply  never  does  so.  

Dismissals  of  Unworthy  Peace  Officers  Need  to  be  Publicly  Discoverable  

The  Problem:
Case  law  interpretation  of  the  confidential  treatment  given  to  the  
contents  of  peace  officer  personnel  files  holds  that,  unlike  the  case  with  all  other  public  
employees,  no  information  may  be  disclosed  as  to  even  confirmed  misconduct  leading  
to  the  termination  of  these  officers  for  dishonesty,  brutality  or  other  abuses  of  power  
and  authority.  Citizens  have  no  way  of  determining  whether  a  newly  hired  officer  in  the  
local  police  or  sheriff’s  department  was  fired  from  his  or  her  last  job  for  such  offenses.  

The  Correction:
Require  the  Commission  on  Peace  Officer  Standards  and  Training  to  
disclose  not  only  the  beginning  and  end  dates  of  an  officer’s  employment  with  a  
particular  department—data  which  are  now  matters  of  public  record—but  also  if  the  
officer’s  separation  was  a  termination  for  cause.  Require  law  enforcement  employers  in  
such  cases  to  disclose  on  request  under  the  CPRA  the  complaint(s)  and  investigative  
finding(s)  that  resulted  in  such  terminations.  

Agencies  Need  to  Preserve  Emails  As  They  Do  Other  Public  Records  

The  Problem:
All  state  and  local  public  agencies  are  subject  to  one  or  another  statutes  
or  regulations  requiring  the  preservation  of  various  records  for  various  periods  of  time.  
Some  must  be  maintained  in  some  form  in  perpetuity,  while  most  can  be  destroyed  if  
unneeded  after  a  relatively  brief  period—typically  one  to  three  years.  Nevertheless  too  
many  public  agencies  either  purge  their  networks  and  archives  of  emails  after  one  to  
three  months,  or  archive  them  in  fragmentary  form  requiring  a  costly  process  to  
reassemble,  arguing  that  while  the  CPRA  defines  email  as  a  medium  whose  content  is  
presumed  open  to  the  public,  these  messages  are  not  really  “records”  requiring  
preservation  under  the  applicable  statutes.  The  result  is  a  loss  of  institutional  memory  
and  accountability  in  short  order,  before  the  potential  public  significance  of  these  
communications  can  be  properly  assessed.  

The  Correction:
Amend  the  CPRA  and  the  preservation  statutes  to  provide  that  for  
purposes  of  those  laws,  email  is  a  record  subject  to  the  presumption  of  disclosure  and  is  
subject  to  the  same  preservation  standards  and  schedules  as  paper  or  other  media.  
Please  direct  questions  to  Terry  Francke,  CalAware  General  Counsel:  terry@calaware.org  

Open  Meetings  and  the  Ralph  M.  Brown  Act  

Commitment  of  Public  Funds  or  Assets  Must  Have  Timely  Transparency  

The  Problem:
The  Brown  Act  not  only  permits  local  government  bodies  to  consider  and  
instruct  bargaining  agents  or  attorneys  on  matters  being  negotiated  with  other  
parties—employee  unions,  real  property  dealmakers,  litigation  adversaries  involved  in  
settlement  talks—it  allows  these  officials  to  use  closed  sessions  to  approve  binding  
agreements,  with  the  public  informed  of  the  agreement  only  afterward.  The  result  can  
be  costly  and  irreversible  commitments  of  public  funds  and  assets  with  no  public  
awareness,  much  less  opportunity  to  comment  prior  to  locking  these  decisions  in.  This  
need  not  be  the  case.  For  example,  the  Education  Code  has  a  considerably  more  
transparent  process  for  school  boards  to  engage  in  negotiations  with  employee  unions,  
while  cities,  who  handle  bargaining  under  the  Brown  Act,  are  vulnerable  to  seeking  
bankruptcy  because  of  imprudent  employee  union  commitments  entered  into  with  no  
public  awareness.  

The  Correction:
Amend  the  Brown  Act  to  require  the  text  of  all  local  governing  body  
agreements  of  any  kind  bargained  in  closed  session  involving  the  commitment  of  public  
funds  or  assets  to  be  announced  and  attached  to  the  agenda  of  any  meeting  at  which  
approval  is  ought,  and  confine  such  approvals  to  regular  meetings.  Submit  employee  
unit  bargaining  in  cities,  counties  and  special  districts  to  the  same  transparency  
procedures  as  the  Education  Code  requires  for  school  districts.  

Special  Meetings  Need  to  Be  Reserved  for  Special  Purposes  

The  Problem:
The  Brown  Act  permits  a  local  government  body  to  hold  a  meeting  off  the  
regular  schedule  or  at  a  different  place  (or  both)  for  any  purpose  it  chooses,  and  after  
only  24  hours  notice,  not  the  72  hours  required  for  regular  meetings.  Many  if  not  most  
local  agencies  have  special  meetings  only  infrequently,  for  fairly  predictable  purposes.  
But  some  hold  special  meetings  on  the  same  day  as  regular  meetings,  which  allows  
them  in  effect  to  collapse  the  72  hour  notice  period  to  only  24  hours  for  any  subject  
normally  destined  for  a  regular  meeting  for  which  they  would  prefer  to  arouse  less  
advanced  public  attention.  At  least  one  local  body  even  schedules  special  meetings  for  
certain  topics  during  regular  meetings,  adjourning  and  then  reconvening  the  latter  as  
bookends.  These  maneuvers  are  nothing  but  gaming  the  rules  to  minimize  public  
awareness  and  participation.  

The  Correction:
Amend  the  Brown  Act  to  prohibit  holding  special  meetings  on  the  same  
day  as  regular  meetings,  and  limit  special  meeting  purposes  to:  

1.  take  action  on  an  urgent  matter  that  must  be  addressed  sooner  than  the  next  regular  
meeting,  such  as  action  required  to  avoid  a  specified  substantial  and  irremediable  
Please  direct  questions  to  Terry  Francke,  CalAware  General  Counsel:  terry@calaware.org  

adverse  impact  that  would  occur  if  the  action  were  delayed;  

2.  comply  with  a  deadline  imposed  by  a  court,  by  law  or  by  legally  binding  agreement  or  
one  determining  eligibility  for  a  grant,  gift  or  other  valuable  benefit;  

3.  take  a  purely  ceremonial  or  commendatory  action  of  no  known  or  reasonably  
foreseeable  controversy,  scheduled  by  another  person  or  organization,  on  a  date  over  
which  the  city  had  no  control;  

4.  address  a  matter  of  sufficient  complexity,  controversy  or  both  that  considering  it  at  a  
regular  meeting  would  leave  insufficient  time  to  address  more  conventional  business  on  
the  agenda;  or  

5.  meet  at  a  location  outside  the  city  for  purposes  permitted  by  the  Brown  Act,  or  at  a  
location  within  the  city  of  sufficient  capacity  to  accommodate  an  anticipated  public  
attendance  significantly  larger  than  experienced  at  ordinary  regular  meetings.  

Brown  Act  Enforcement  Needs  Relevant,  Probative  Evidence  

The  Problem:
In  a  1999  case  the  Court  of  Appeal  held  that  members  of  local  
government  bodies  could  not  be  questioned  about  things  discussed  in  closed  session,  as  
part  of  litigation  discovery  to  determine  whether  the  Brown  Act  had  been  violated.  This  
creation  of  a  virtual  privilege  outside  the  Evidence  Code  means  that  absent  an  actual  
voluntary  admission  by  a  member  of  the  body—which  can  then  be  denied  by  others  
present—there  is  no  way  to  acquire  evidence  confirming  whether  matters  have  been  
discussed  in  closed  session  with  unlawful  secrecy.  

The  Correction:
Allow  members  of  local  bodies  to  be  subjected  to  normal  processes  of  
discovery  as  to  particular  discussions  in  closed  session,  in  an  action  to  enforce  the  
Brown  Act,  after  appropriate  foundation  suggesting  a  possible  violation,  and  subject  to  a  
protective  order  forbidding  the  plaintiff’s  counsel  from  disclosing  the  information  
learned  to  any  person,  including  the  plaintiff,  until  it  is  accepted  by  the  court  as  
admissible  evidence  of  a  violation.