VOL.
63 , MARCH 12, 1975 97
Perido vs. Perido
No. L-28248. March 12, 1975.*
LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband MANUEL PIROTE, INOCENCIA PERIDO,
ALBENIO PERIDO, PAULINO PERIDO, LETIA PERIDO, joined by husband
BIENVENIDO BALYAO, LETICIA PERIDO, joined by husband FELIX VILLARUZ,
EUFEMIA PERIDO, CONSOLACION PERIDO, ALFREDO PERIDO, GEORGE
PERIDO, AMPARO PERIDO, WILFREDO PERIDO, MARGARITA PERIDO,
ROLANDO
_______________
*
FIRST DIVISION.
98
98 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Perido vs. Perido
SALDE and EDUARDO SALDE, petitioners, vs . MARIA PERIDO, SOFRONIO
PERIDO, JUAN A. PERIDO, GONZALO PERIDO, PACITA PERIDO, MAGDALENA
PERIDO, ALICIA PERIDO, JOSEFINA PERIDO, FE PERIDO, TERESA PERIDO and
LUZ PERIDO, respondents.
Evidence; Presumption of marriage and legitimacy of
children;Presumption may be overcome only by cogent proof on the part of
those who allege illegitimacy.—The statement of the civil status of a person
in a certificate of title issued to him is not conclusive to show that he is not
actually married to another. It is weak and insufficient to rebut the
presumption that persons living together as husband and wife are married to
each other. This presumption, especially where the legitimacy of the issue is
involved, may be overcome only by cogent proof on the part of those who
allege the illegitimacy .
Same; Same; Reason for presumption of marriage.—The basis of human
society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage is not only
a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of
which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the
law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-
presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason
is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what
they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
violation of decency and law.
Appeals; Findings of appellate court on matters involving appreciation
of evidence binding on Supreme Court; Reason.—The issue raised also
involves appreciation of the evidence and, consequently , the finding of the
appellate court on the matter is binding on the Court. Indeed, a review of that
finding would require an examination of all the evidence introduced before
the trial court, a consideration of the credibility of witnesses and of the
circumstances surrounding the case, their relevancy or relation to one
another and to the whole, as well as an appraisal of the probabilities of the
entire situation. It would thus abolish the distinction between an ordinary
appeal on the one hand and review on certiorari on the other, and thus defeat
the purpose for which the latter procedure has been established.
APPEAL by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Januario L. Jison, Jr. for petitioners.
Antonio T. de Jesus for respondents.
99
VOL. 63, MARCH 12, 1975 99
Perido vs. Perido
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in
its CA-G.R. No. 37034-R, affirming the decision of the Co urt of First Instan ce
of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 6529.
Lucio Perido of Hima maylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his
lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3 )
children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married
Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria,
Sofronia, and Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in 1942, while his second wife died
in 1943.
Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita
Perido is still living. Her deceased brother, Felix Perido, is survived by his
childre n Inocencia, Leonora, Albinio, Paulino, Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all
surnamed Perido. Nicanora Perido, another daughter of Felix, is also
deceased, but is survived by two (2) sons, Rolando and Eduardo Salde.
Margarita’s other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by his
children, namely: Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and Amparo. Susano
1
Perido, another son of Ismael, is dead, but survived by his own son George
Perido.
Of Lucio Perido’s five (5) children by his second wife, two are already dead,
namely: Eusebio and Juan. Eusebio is survived by his children Magdalena
Perido, Pacita Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido,
and Luz Perido, while Juan is surviv ed by his only ch ild, Juan A. Perido.
On August 15 , 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second
marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document denominated as “Declaration
of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition,” whereby they partitioned among
themselves Lots Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B, 807, and 808, all of the
Cadastral Survey of Hima maylan , Occidental Negros.
Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido had
second thoughts about the partition. On March 8, 1962 they filed a comp laint
in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, which comp laint was later
amended on February 22, 1963, against the children of the second marriage,
praying for th e annulment of the so-called “Declaration of Heirship and Extra-
judicial Partition” and
100
100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Perido vs. Perido
for another partition of the lots mentioned therein among the plaintiffs
alone. They alleged, among other th ings, that they had been induced by the
defendants to execute the document in question through misrepresen tation,
false promises and fraudulent means; that the lo ts which were partitioned in
said document belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Lucio
Perido and Benita Talo rong; and that the five children of Lucio Perido with
Marcelina Baliguat were all ille gitimate and therefore had no successional
righ ts to the estate of Lucio Perido, who died in 1942. The defendants denied
the foregoing allegations.
After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31, 1965,
annulling the “Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition.” However,
it did not order the partition of the lots involved among the plaintiffs
exclusively in view of its findings that the fiv e children of Lucio Perido with
his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were legitimate; that all the lots, except
Lot No. 458, were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido; and that 11/12 of
Lot No . 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership of Lucio Perido and his
second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The dispositive portion of the decision reads
as follows:
“IN VIE W OF ALL THE FOREGOI NG, the Court renders judgment as follows:
declaring the following as the legitimate children and grandchildren and heirs
of Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong: Felix Perido, deceased; grandchildren:
Inocencia Perido, Leonora Perido, Albinio Perido, Paulino Perido, Letia Perido,
Leticia Perido, Eufemia Perido; Nicanora Perido, deceased; great
grandchildren: Rolando Salde and Eduardo Salde; Ismael Perido, deceased;
grandchildren: Consolacion Perido, Alfredo Perido, Susano Perido, deceased;
great grandson: George Perido; Amparo Perido and Wilfredo Perido; and,
Margarita Perido; (2) declaring the following as the legitimate children and
grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat: Eusebio
Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Pacita Perido, Magdalena Perido, Alicia
Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido; Juan B.
Perido, deceased; grandson, Juan A. Perido; Maria Perido; Sofronia Perido;
and Gonzalo Perido; (3) declaring all lots (471, 506, 511, 509, 513-part, 807,
and 808) except Lot No. 458 as exclusive properties of Lucio Perido so that
each of them should be divided into eight (8) equal parts: 1/8 belongs to Felix
Perido, but because of his death leaving eight (8) children, the same should
be divided and alloted as follows: 1/64 to Inocencia Perido of age, widow;
1/64 to Leonora Perido, of age, married to Manuel
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VOL. 63 , MARCH 12, 1975 101
Perido vs. Perido
Pirote; 1/64 to Albinio Perido, of age, married to Honorata Villasana; 1/64 to
Paulino Perido, of age, married to Norma Villalba; 1/64 to Letia Perido, of age,
married to Bienvenido Balyac; 1/64 to Leticia Perido, of age, married to Felix
Villaruz; 1/64 to Eufemia Perido, of age, single; 1/64 to Nicanora Perido, but
because she is now dead the same should be divided and alloted as follows:
1/128 to Rolando Salde, of age, single; and 1/128 to Eduardo Salde, of age,
single; 1/8 belongs to Ismael Perido, but because he is already dead leaving
five children, the same should b e divided and alloted as follows: 1/40 to
Consolacion Perido, of age, widow; 1/40 to Alfredo Perido, of age, married to
Trinidad Tamargo; 1/40 to Susano Perido, but he is already dead with one
son, the same goes to George Perido, of age, single; 1/40 to Wilfredo Perido,
of age, single; 1/8 belongs t o Margarita Perido, of age, widow; 1/8 belongs
to Eusebio Perido, but because he is already dead with seven children, the
same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/56 goes to Pacita Perido, of
age, single; 1/56 goes to Magdalena Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Alicia
Perido, of age, married to Isaias Ruiz; 1/56 goes to Josefina Perido, of age,
2
married to Leopoldo Doloroso; 1/56 goes to Fe Perido, of age, single; 1/56
goes to Teresa Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Luz Perido, of age, married
to Fidel de la Cruz; 1/8 belongs to Juan B. Perido, but because he is already
dead with one child, the same 1/8 goes to Juan A. Perido, of age, ma rried to
Salud Salgado; 1/8 goes to Maria Perido, of age, married to Julio Pirote; 1/8
goes to Sofronia Perido, of age, widow; and, 1/8 goes to Gonzalo Perido, of
age, married to Lacomemoracion Estiller; (4) declaring the 11/12 shares in Lot
No. 458 as conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina
Baliguat, which should be divided and alloted as follows: 11/24 goes to Lucio
Perido to be divided into eight (8) equal shares and 11/24 goes to Marcelina
Baliguat to be divided into five (5) equal shares or 11/120 for each of the
children and again to be divided by the children of each child now deceased;
(6) declaring Fidel Perido owner of 1 /12 share in Lot 458 to be divided among
his heirs to be determined accordingly later; and (6) declaring null and void
Exhibit “J” of the plaintiffs which is Exhibit “10” for the defendants, without
costs and without adjudication with respect to the counterclaim and
damages, they being members of the same family, fore quity and justice .”
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court
erred: (1) in declaring that Eusebio Perido, Juan Perido, Maria Perido, Sofron
ia Perido and Gonzalo Perido, were the legitimate children of Lucio Perido
and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat; (2) in declaring that Lucio Perido was
the exclusive owner of Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511 , 509, 513-Part, 807, and 808
of Cadastral Survey of Hima maylan, Negros
102
102 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Perido vs. Perido
Occidental, and in not declaring that said lots were the conjugal partnership
property of Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong; and (3) in holding
that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lu cio Perido
and Marcelina Baliguat.
Finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court, the Court of
Appeals affirmed it in toto. The appellants moved to reconsider but were
turned down . There upon they instituted the instant petition for review
reiterating in effect the assignments of error and the arguments in the brief
they submitted to the appellate court.
The first issue pertains to the legitima cy of th e five children of Lucio
Perido with Marcelina Baliguat. The petitioners insist that said children were
illegitimate on th e theory that the first three were born out of wedlock even
before the death of Lucio Perido’s first wife, while the last two were also born
out of wedlock and were not recognized by their parents before or after their
marriage. In support of their contention they allege that Benita Talorong died
in 1905, after the first th ree children were born, as testified to by petitioner
Margarita Perido and corroborated by petitioner Leonora Perido; that as late
as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower, as shown on the face of the
certificates of title issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido married his
second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly established
through the testi mony of petitioner Leonora Perido.
The petition cannot be sustained . The Court of Appeals found that there
was evidence to show that Lucio Perido’s wife, Benita Talo rong, died during
the Spanish regime. This finding is conclusive upon us and beyond our power
of review. Under the circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to
marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first child in 1900.
W ith respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates
of title issued to him in 1923, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the
statement was not conclusiv e to show that he was not actually married to
Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore, it is weak and in sufficient to rebut the
presumption that persons living together as husband and wife are married to
each other. This presumption, especially where the legiti macy of th e issue is
in volved, as in this case, may be overcome only by cogent proof on the part
of those who allege
103
VOL. 63, MARCH 12, 1975 103
Perido vs. Perido
the illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee,1 this Court
explained the rationale behind this presumption, thus: “The basis of human
society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this
jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution
in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently,
every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons
dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of
any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact
married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the
parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as bein g, they would
be living in th e constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption
established by our Code of Civil Procedure is ‘that a man and woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
3
contract of marriage.’ (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio—Always presume marriage.”
While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might tend to rebut
the presumption of marriage arising from previous cohabitation, it is to be
noted that both the trial court and the appellate court did not even pass upon
the uncorroborated testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido on the matter.
The reason is obvious. Said witness, when asked why she knew that Marcelina
Baliguat was married to Lucio Perido only in 1925, merely replied th at she
knew it because “during the celebration of the marriage by the Aglipayan
priest (they) got flowers from (their) garden and placed in the altar.” Ev id en
tly, she was n o t ev en an eyewitness to the ceremony.
In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that
the five children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat were born during th
eir marriage and, th erefore, legitimate.
The second assignment of error refers to the determination of whether or
not Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-Part, 807 and 808 were the exclusive
properties of Lucio Perido. In disposing of the contention of the petitioners
th at said lo ts belonged to the conjugal partnership of spouses Lucio Perido
and Benita Talorong, the Court of Appeals said:
_______________
1
43 Phil. 43, 56.
104
104 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Perido vs. Perido
“x x x. We cannot agree again with them on this point. It is to be noted that
the lands covered by the certificates of title (Exhs. B to G) were all declared
in the name of Lucio Perido. Then there is evidence showing that the lands
were inherited by Lucio Perido from hi s grandmother (t.s.n., p. 21, Feb. 20,
1964). In other words, they were the exclusive properties of the late Lucio
Perido which he brought into the first and second marriages. By fiat of law
said properties should be divided accordingly among his legal heirs.”
The petitioners take exception to the finding of the appellate court that the
aforementioned lots were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother
and contend that they were able to establish through the testi monies of th
eir witnesses that the sp ou ses Lu cio Perido an d Ben ita Talo ro ng acqu ired
th em during their lifetime. Again, the petitioners cannot be sustained. The
question involves appreciation of the evidence, which is within the domain of
the Court of Appeals, the factual findings of which are not reviewable by this
Court.
The third assignment of error is with regard to the ruling of the Court of
Appeals sustaining the finding of the trial court that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the
conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina
Baliguat. Said the appellate court:
“With respect to Lot No. 458 which is now covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 21769 issued in 1925 the same should be considered conjugally
owned by Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The finding
of the lower court on this point need not be disturbed. It is expressly stated
in the certificate of title (Exh. L) that Lucio Perido, the registered owner, was
married to Marcelina Baliguat unlike in the previous land titles. If the law
presumes a property registered in the name of only one of the spouses to be
conjugal (Guinguing vs. Abutin, 48 Phil. 144; Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil.
288, Escutin vs. Escutin, 60 Phil. 922), the presumption becomes stronger
when the document recites that the spouse in whose name the land is
registered is married to somebody else, like in the case at bar. It appearing
that the legal presumption that Lot No. 458 belonged to the conjugal
partnership had not been overcome by clear proofs to the contrary , we are
constrained to rule, that the same is the conjugal property of the deceased
spouses Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.”
In impugning the foregoing ruling, the petitioners ma intain that they were
able to prove that 6/12 of said Lot 458 was the
105
VOL. 63, MARCH 12, 1975 105
Perido vs. Perido
conjugal property of spouses Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong,
and that the purchase price of the additional 5/12 of said lot came from the
proceeds of sale of a lot allegedly belonging to Lucio Perido and his three
children of the first marriage. As in the seco nd assignment of error, the issue
raised here also involves ap preciation of the evidence and, consequently, the
finding of the appellate court on the matter is binding on this Court. Indeed,
a review of that finding would require an examination of all the evidence
introduced before the trial court, a consideration of the credibility of
witnesses and of the circumstances surrounding the case, their relevancy or
relation to one another and to the whole, as well as an appraisal of the
probabilities of the entire situation. It would thus abolish the distinction
between an ordinary appeal on the one hand and review on certiorari on the
4
other, and thus defeat the purpose for which th e latter procedure has been
established.2
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with
costs against the petitioners.
Castro, Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur. Muñoz
Palma, J., is on leave abroad.
Decision affirmed.
Notes. a) Presumption of marriage and legitimacy.—Two of the strongest
presumptions in law are that a man and woman living together as husband
and wife are lawfully married, and that a child born of that union is presumed
to be legitimate. These presumptions can be repelled only by strong,
convincing and conclusive evidence to the contrary ( Arriola-Uy Company vs.
Director of Forestry, CA-GR No. 21 899-R, June 16, 1959).
b) Appeal and certiorari as modes of review.—Appeal, and not certiorari,
is the proper remedy if review of the judgment on the merits is sought
( Casilan vs. Ybañez, L-199 68-69 , October 31, 1962). Mistake of fact or of law
is not within the reach of certiorari, but the proper reme dy is by appeal
(Lopez vs. Alvendia, L-20697, December 24, 1964). Change of procedure does
not affect the nature of the proceedings as an appeal by way of certiorari
(Gamalog vs. Court of Appeals, L-28643, November 28, 1969).
_______________
2
Tamayo vs. Callejo, No. L-25563, July 28, 1972, (46 SCRA 27).
106
994 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals
No. L-18630. December 17, 1966.
APOLONIO TANJANCO, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ARACELI
SANTOS, respondents.
Damages; Seduction falling under Article 21 of the New Civil Code.—The
case under Article 21, cited as an example by the Code Commission, ref ers
to a tort upon a minor who has been seduced. The essential feature is
seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of
promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement,
superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer, to which
the woman has yielded. Where for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959,
plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained intimate sexual relations
with the defendant, with repeated acts of intercourse, such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly, there is here voluntariness
and mutual passion, for had the plaintiff been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant,
she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year,
without exacting early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage,' and
she would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that the defendant
did not intend to fulfill his promises. Hence, no case is made under Article 21
of the Civil Code and, no other cause of action being alleged, no error was
committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. Of
course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever
actions may correspond to the child of the plaintiff against defendant-
appellant, if any.
995
VOL. 18, DECEMBER 17, 1966 995
Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals
PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
P. Carreon and G.O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner,
Antonio V. Bonoan for respondents.
5
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R)
revoking an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-
4797) dismissing appellant's action for support and damages.
The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from
December, 1957, the defendant (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco,
courted the plaintiff, Araceli Santos, both being of adult age; that "defendant
expressed and professed his undying love and affection for plaintiff who also
in due time reciprocated the tender feelings"; that in consideration of
defendant’s promise of marriage plaintiff consented and acceded to
defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly until December 1959,
through his protestations of e and promises of marriage, defendant
succeeded in having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter
conceived a child; that due to her pregnant condition, to avoid
embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff had to resign her job as
secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving P230.00 a month;
that thereby plaintiff became unable to support herself and her baby; that
due to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered
mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and
social humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to
recognize the unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than
P430.00 a month for her support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in
moral and exemplary damages, plus P1 0,000.00 attorney's fees.
Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the court of first instance dismissed
the complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
996
996 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals
Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter
ultimately decided the case, holding with the lower court that no cause of
action was shown to compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for 'its,
support, but decreed that.the complaint did state a cause of action for
damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
prescribing as follows:
"ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage."
The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal
and directing the court of origin to proceed with the case.
Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for
breach of a promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction, and
invoking the rulings of this Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, L-14733, September
30, 1960; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628, January 29, 1962; and
De Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.
We find this appeal meritorious.
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under
Article 21 above mentioned, the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted
from the memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature
in 1949 to support the original draft of the Civil Code. Referring to Article 23
of the draft (now Article 21 of the Code), the Commission stated; '
"But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs
defined or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless
gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless,
even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the
Commission has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate
in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
'ART. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs of public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.'
"An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: 'A' seduces
the nineteen-year old daughter of 'X'. ' A promise of marriage either has not
been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the
present laws,
997
VOL. 18, DECEMBER 17, 1966 997
Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals
there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can any
civil action for breach of promise of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the
grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family
have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring
any action for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents
would have such a right of action."
The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in
the Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has
been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than
6
mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes
essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of
confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S.
vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 8, Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that—
"To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise
or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or other
inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is
from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig tit. Seduction, par.
56). She must be induced 'to depart from the path of virtue by the use of
some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to -have and
do have that effect, and which result in her ultimately submitting her person
to the sexual embraces of her seducer" (27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
"On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion
or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual
desire or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the
needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized
that to allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of
the female sex, and would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of
adventuresses would be swift to profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)
Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material
allegations there are as follows:
1. "I.That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing
998
998 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals
1. at 56 South E. Diliman, Quezon City, while defendant is also of legal
age. single and residing at 525 Padre Faura, Manila. where he may
be served with summons;
2. II.That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each
other sometime in December, 1957 and soon thereafter, the
defendant started visiting and courting the plaintiff;
3. III.That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due
time the defendant expressed and professed his undying love and
affection for the plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the
tender feelings;
4. IV.That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the
defendant as are wont of young people in love had frequent outings
and dates, became very close and intimate to each other and
sometime in July, 1958, in consideration of the defendant's
promises of marriage, the plaintiff consented and acceded to the
former's earnest and repeated pleas to have carnal knowledge with
him;
5. V.That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except
for a short period in December, 1958 when the defendant was out
of the country, the defendant through his protestations of love and
promises of marriage succeeded in having carnal knowledge with
the plaintiff;
6. VI.That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started
conceiving which was confirmed by a doctor sometime in July, 1959;
7. VII.That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff
informed the defendant and pleaded with him to make good his
promises of marriage, but instead of honoring his promises and
righting his wrong, the defendant stopped and refrained from
seeing the plaintiff, since about July, 1959 has not visited the
plaintiff and to all intents and purposes has broken their
engagement and his promises."
Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one
whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age,
maintained intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of
intercourse. Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly
there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for had the appellant 'been
deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful
persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to
his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early fulfillment of the
alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations
upon finding that defendant did not intend to fulfill his promises.
999
VOL. 18, DECEMBER 17, 1966 999
7
Soriano vs. Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas
Hence, we conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code,
and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed by the
Court of First Instance in dismissing- the complaint.
Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to
whatever actions may correspond to the child of the plaintiff against the
defendant-appellant, if any. On that point, this Court makes no
pronouncement, since the child's own rights. are not here involved.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal.Bengzon,
J.P.,. Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Decision reversed.
348 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Palaroan vs. Anaya
No. L-19193. November 29, 1965.
FERNANDO O. PALAROAN, plaintiff-appellant, vs. AURORA A. ANAYA, ET AL.,
defendants-appellees.
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court; Annulment of decision on the
ground of fraud.—Appellant filed an action for the
349
VOL. 15, NOVEMBER 29, 1965 349
Palaroan vs. Anaya
annulment of his marriage to appellee, claiming that his consent
thereto was obtained through force and intimidation- The Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court, after due trial, dismissed the complaint and
ordered appellant to pay support to appellee. No appeal having been taken
from said decision appellee filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
execution, which the lower court granted. lnstead of appealing from the
order granting the motion for execution, appellant filed a complaint with the
Court of First Instance to annul the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court. Held: Appellant had no cause of action for the annulment of
the aforesaid decision. He could and should have appealed therefrom or from
the order granting the writ of execution and denying his motion for
reconsideration, Moreover, the fraud relied upon by appellant as ground for
the annulment of the decision is not the fraud—extrinsic—that would
constitute a ground for the annulment of the proceedings had before the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, but the fraud that, if proven, would
be a ground for the annulment of the marriage contracted between him and
appellee. If his consent to the marriage contract was not given voluntarily, he
should have appealed from the decision dismissing his complaint.
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court,
R. P. Sarandi for plaintiff-appellant.
8
 Isabelo V. Castro for defendants-appellees.
DlZON, J.:
On January 7, 1954, appellant Fernando O. Palaroan filed an action in the
Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No. 21589) for the annulment of
his marriage to appellee Aurora A. Anayacelebrated on December 4, 1953
before the Hon. Natividad Almeda-Lopez, then Judge of the Municipal Court
of Manila, claiming that his consent thereto was obtained thru force and
intimidation employed by said appellee, her two brothers and other relatives.
While the case was pending trial, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
was created and the case was remanded to it being one falling within its
jurisdiction. After due trial, the said court, on September 23, 1959, rendered
judgment dismissing the complaint and ordering Palaroan to pay Anaya, by
way of support, the sum of P100.00 a month;
350
350 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Palaroan vs. Anaya
the sum of P6,795.32 as support in arrears, plus attorney's fees and costs, in
accordance with appellee's counterclaim.
No appeal having been taken from the above-mentioned decision,
appellee Anaya, on January 4, 1961, filed a motion for the issuance of a writ
of execution. This was granted by the lower court over Palaroan's opposition
who claimed that the decision has not yet become f inal and executory for
lack of due notice to him.
Thereafter, Palaroan moved for a reconsideration of the above order to
prevent garnishment f rom being levied upon his salary due from the San
Miguel Brewery, Manila alleging further under oath, that he needed the to
support his three minor children and his aged and bedridden mother. The
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, however, denied the motion.
Instead of appealing from the order of the lower court granting the
motion for execution, or contesting it by certiorari, appellant filed a complaint
against appellee Aurora A. Anaya and the Sheriff of Manila with the Court of
First Instance of Manila (Civil Case No, 27396) to annuI the aforesaid decision
of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, claiming that the same was
contrary to Iaw. The Complaint also prayed that, pending determination
thereof, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain defendants
therein from enforcing the writ of execution issued by the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court, but the lower court (Court of First Instance of
Manila) in its order of July 16, 1961, refused to grant the writ on the ground
that to do so "would amount to annulling the actuations of a coordinate
branch x x x." Palaroan moved for a reconsideration of this order,
Meanwhile, appellee Anaya filed her answer to the complaint denying the
material averments thereof, at the same time praying for the dismissal of the
action on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over its subject
matter, and for damages.
After the motion for reconsideration and the motion to dismiss had been
jointly heard, the court issued its order of September 16, 1961 (a) denying the
motion for re-
351
VOL. 15, NOVEMBER 29, 1965 351
Palaroan vs. Anaya
consideration and (b) dismissing the complaint. From this
order, Palaroan took the present appeal.
Appellant's main contention in his first and second assignments of error is
that the aforementioned decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of September 28, 1959 is void, being contrary to law, and, as a
consequence, the lower court erred in ruling that it cannot be annulled In this
connection he contends that support may be granted only upon proof that
the claimant needs the same forhis or her maintenance; that appellee, at the
time of the filing of the action, was earning a sufficient amount for this
purpose, while, on the other hand, he was earning a mere monthly salary of
P575.00 to support himself, three minor children and the mother of said
children; that the decision aforesaid is void because it was obtained thru
fraud "as demonstrated by the affidavit of the defendant that the consent of
the plaintiff to the said marriage was not voluntary."
These contentions deserve but scant consideration now, because the
same should have been raised by appellant in the appeal that he could and
should have taken from the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of September 23, 1959—which decision, as stated heretofore, has long
ago become final and executory—or from the order granting the writ of
execution and denying his motion for reconsideration mentioned heretofore.
Appellant also claims that said decision of the Domestic Relations court
had not yet become executory because the notice of judgment was served on
Atty. Pedro Valdez Liongson, who had already ceased to be his attorney. This
is likewise untenable, it appearing that the same point was raised in said court
in connection with appellee's motion for execution and appellant's motion
9
for reconsideration, and the court ruled that, as far as the record of the case
could show, said attorney was still one of appellant's attorneys of record and
that the notice of judgment on him served was therefore proper and valid.
Again, appellant failed to appeal from said order and to contest its validity
and that of the decision on the merits, either by certiorari or other
appropriate remedy.
352
352 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
People vs. Ortiz
Moreover, the fraud that appellant speaks of in his brief as ground for the
nullity of the decision rendered by the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
is not the kind of fraud—extrinsic—that would constitute a ground for the
annulment of the proceedings had before said court, but the fraud that, if
proven, would be ground for the annulment of the marriage contracted
between him and appellee. If his consent to the marriage contract was not
given voluntarily. he should have appealed from the decision of September
28, 1959 dismissing this complaint The lower court, therefore, was right in
virtually ruling that appellant had no cause of action for the annulment of the
aforesaid decision and other orders complained of.
In view of the conclusions We have arrived at in connection with the first
and second assignments of error, we deem it unnecessary to consider the
last.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order is affirmed, with costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon. J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.
Order affirmed.
Note.—See the annotation entitled "Annulment of Marriage", 22 SCRA
525.
G.R. No. 187462. June 1, 2016.*
RAQUEL G. KHO, petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and VERONICA
B. KHO, respondents.
Civil Law; Marriages; Marriage License; Article 58 of the Civil Code makes
explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being
issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting
party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional character
authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.—Article 58 of the
Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a
license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality where
either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75. Under
the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2,
Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79. These marriages are: (1) marriages
in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war; (2) marriages
in remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4) ratification of marital
cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or
pagan marriages; and (7) mixed marriages. Petitioner’s and respondent’s
marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.
Same; Same; Same; The rationale for the compulsory character of a
marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the
State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has
inquired into their capacity to contract marriage.—Article 80(3) of the Civil
Code also makes it clear that a marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing more than the
legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence
of the marriage contract. The rationale for the compulsory character of a
marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is the authority granted by the
10
State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has
inquired into their capacity to contract marriage. Stated differently, the
requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the State’s demon-
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
605
VOL. 791, JUNE 1, 2016 605
Kho vs. Republic
stration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested.
Same; Same; Same; To be considered void on the ground of absence of
a marriage license, the law requires that the absence or such marriage license
must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported by
a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was
issued to the parties.—To be considered void on the ground of absence of a
marriage license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license
must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the very least, supported
by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license
was issued to the parties. Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show
that a wedding ceremony was conducted and a marriage contract was signed
does not operate to cure the absence of a valid marriage license. As cited
above, Article 80(3) of the Civil Code clearly provides that a marriage
solemnized without a license is void from the beginning, except marriages of
exceptional character under Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code. As earlier
stated, petitioner’s and respondent’s marriage cannot be characterized as
among the exceptions.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals, Cebu City.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Cenesio Gavan for petitioner.
PERALTA, J.:
Challenged in the present petition for review on certiorari are the
Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., with Associate
Justices Arsenio J. Magpale and Vicente L. Yap, concurring; Annex “A” to
Petition, Rollo, pp. 28-40.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Francisco P. Acosta, with Associate Justices
Amy C. Lazaro-Javier and Rodil V. Zalameda, concurring; Annex “B” to
Petition, id., at pp. 41-43.
606
606 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Kho vs. Republic
Cebu City dated March 30, 2006 and January 14, 2009, respectively, in C.A.-
G.R. CV No. 69218. The assailed CA Decision reversed and set aside the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Borongan, Eastern Samar,
Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 464, which ruled in petitioner’s favor in an action
he filed for declaration of nullity of his marriage with private respondent,
while the CA Resolution denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration.
The present petition arose from a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage filed by herein petitioner with the RTC of Oras, Eastern Samar.
Pertinent portions of the Petition allege as follows:
xxxx
3. Sometime in the afternoon of May 31, 1972, petitioner’s
parents summoned one Eusebio Colongon, now deceased, then clerk
in the office of the municipal treasurer, instructing said clerk to arrange
and prepare whatever necessary papers were required for the
intended marriage between petitioner and respondent supposedly to
take place at around midnight of June 1, 1972 so as to exclude the
public from witnessing the marriage ceremony;
4. Petitioner and Respondent thereafter exchanged marital vows
in a marriage ceremony which actually took place at around 3:00
o’clock before dawn of June 1, 1972, on account that there was a
public dance held in the town plaza which is just situated adjacent to
the church whereas the venue of the wedding, and the dance only
finished at around 2:00 o’clock of same early morning of June 1, 1972;
5. Petitioner has never gone to the office of the Local Civil
Registrar to apply for marriage license and had not seen much less
11
 signed any papers or documents in connection with the procurement
of a marriage license;
_______________
3 Annex “C” to Petition, id., at pp. 44-59.
607
VOL. 791, JUNE 1, 2016 607
Kho vs. Republic
6. Considering the shortness of period from the time the
aforenamed clerk of the treasurer’s office was told to obtain the
pertinent papers in the afternoon of May 31, 1972 so required for the
purpose of the forthcoming marriage up to the moment the actual
marriage was celebrated before dawn of June 1, 1972, no marriage
license therefore could have been validly issued, thereby rendering the
marriage solemnized on even date null and void for want of the most
essential requisite;
7. For all intents and purposes, thus, Petitioner’s and
Respondent’s marriage aforestated was solemnized sans the required
marriage license, hence, null and void from the beginning and neither
was it performed under circumstances exempting the requirement of
such marriage license;
xxxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully prayed of
this Honorable Court that after due notice and hearing, judgment be
rendered:
1. Declaring the contract of marriage between petitioner and
respondent held on June 1, 1972, at Arteche, Eastern Samar, null and
void ab initio and of no legal effect.
xxxx4
Among the pieces of evidence presented by petitioner is a
Certification5 issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern
Samar which attested to the fact that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
has neither record nor copy of a marriage license issued to petitioner and
respondent with respect to their marriage celebrated on June 1, 1972.
Respondent filed her Answer6 praying that the petition be outrightly
dismissed for lack of cause of action because there
4 Id., at pp. 60-61.
5 See RTC Decision, id., at p. 56.
6 Id., at p. 64.
608
608 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Kho vs. Republic
is no evidence to prove petitioner’s allegation that their marriage was
celebrated without the requisite marriage license and that, on the contrary,
both petitioner and respondent personally appeared before the local civil
registrar and secured a marriage license which they presented before their
marriage was solemnized.
Upon petitioner’s request, the venue of the action was subsequently
transferred to the RTC of Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, where the
parties submitted their respective pleadings as well as affidavits of witnesses.
On September 25, 2000, the RTC rendered its Decision granting the
petition. The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby declares
the marriage contracted between Raquel G. Kho and Veronica Borata
on June 1, 1972 null and void ab initio, pursuant to Article 80 of the
Civil Code and Articles 4 and 5 of the Family Code. The foregoing is
without prejudice to the application of Articles 50 and 51 of the Family
Code.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Municipal Civil Registrar
of Arteche, Eastern Samar for proper registration of this decree of
nullity of marriage.
SO ORDERED.7
The RTC found that petitioner’s evidence sufficiently established the
absence of the requisite marriage license when the marriage between
petitioner and respondent was celebrated. As such, the RTC ruled that based
on Articles 53(4), 58 and 80(3) of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the absence
of the said marriage license rendered the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void ab initio.
_______________
7 Id., at p. 59.
12

609
VOL. 791, JUNE 1, 2016 609
Kho vs. Republic
Respondent then filed an appeal with the CA in Cebu City. On March 30,
2006, the CA promulgated its assailed Decision, disposing thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated 25
September 2000 of Branch 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Borongan,
Eastern Samar, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The marriage between
the petitioner-appellee Raquel Kho and Veronica Kho is declared valid
and subsisting for all intents and purposes.
SO ORDERED.8
The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact, solemnized between the
contending parties, there is a presumption that a marriage license was issued
for that purpose and that petitioner failed to overcome such presumption.
The CA also ruled that the absence of any indication in the marriage
certificate that a marriage license was issued is a mere defect in the formal
requisites of the law which does not invalidate the parties’ marriage.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 but the CA denied it in its
Resolution dated January 14, 2009.
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN ASCRIBING A SO-CALLED “ETHICAL DIMENSION” TO
PETITIONER’S CAUSE, ALLUDING TO AN ALLEGED LIAISON WITH
ANOTHER WOMAN AS A FACTOR IN REVERSING THE JUDGMENT OF
THE LOWER COURT WHICH VOIDED HIS MARRIAGE IN QUESTION WITH
RESPONDENT;
_______________
8 Id., at p. 39.
9 Id., at p. 72.
610
610 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Kho vs. Republic
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN APPRECIATING AGAINST PETITIONER THE FACT THAT
DESPITE THE LAPSE OF 25 YEARS HE DID NOTHING TO ATTACK, EVEN
COLLATERALLY, HIS APPARENTLY VOID MARRIAGE WITH
RESPONDENT;
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN ALTOGETHER DISREGARDING PETITIONER’S OBVIOUSLY
OVERWHELMING DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCES OF LACK OF MARRIAGE
LICENSE AND GIVING WEIGHT INSTEAD TO UNSUPPORTED
PRESUMPTIONS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT, IN ITS ASSAILED
DECISION; and
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN SETTING ASIDE OR REVERSING THE LOWER COURT’S
JUDGMENT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE BETWEEN PETITIONER AND
RESPONDENT A NULLITY FOR ABSENCE OF THE REQUISITE MARRIAGE
LICENSE.10
Petitioner’s basic contention in the present petition centers on the alleged
failure of the CA to give due credence to petitioner’s evidence which
established the absence or lack of marriage license at the time that petitioner
and respondent’s marriage was solemnized. Petitioner argues that the CA
erred in deciding the case not on the basis of law and evidence but rather on
the ground of what the appellate court calls as ethical considerations as well
as on the perceived motive of petitioner in seeking the declaration of nullity
of his marriage with respondent.
The Court finds for the petitioner.
At the outset, the State, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
raises a procedural question by arguing that the issues presented by
petitioner in the present petition are
_______________
10 Id., at p. 15.
611
VOL. 791, JUNE 1, 2016 611
13
Kho vs. Republic
factual in nature and it is not proper for this Court to delve into these
issues in a petition for review on certiorari.
The Court does not agree.
The issues in the instant petition involve a determination and application
of existing law and prevailing jurisprudence. However, intertwined with these
issues is the question of the existence of the subject marriage license, which
is a question of fact and one which is not appropriate for a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This rule, nonetheless, is not
without exceptions, viz.:
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises and conjectures;
(2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or
impossible;
(3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting;
(6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) When the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of
specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners’ main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents;
and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record.11
_______________
11 Geronimo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 105540, July 5, 1993, 224 SCRA
494, 498-499. (Emphasis supplied)
612
612 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Kho vs. Republic
In the present case, the findings of the RTC and the CA, on whether or not
there was indeed a marriage license obtained by petitioner and respondent,
are conflicting. Hence, it is but proper for this Court to review these findings.
The marriage of petitioner and respondent was celebrated on June 1,
1972, prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.12 Hence, the Civil Code
governs their union. Accordingly, Article 53 of the Civil Code spells out the
essential requisites of marriage as a contract, to wit:
ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these
requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of
exceptional character.13
Article 58 of the Civil Code makes explicit that no marriage shall be
solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of
the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save
marriages of an exceptional character authorized by the Civil Code, but not
those under Article 75.14 Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional
character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72 to 79.
These marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death
during peace or war; (2) mar-
_______________
12 The Family Code of the Philippines took effect on August 3, 1988.
13 Emphasis supplied.
14 Art. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be
solemnized by consuls and vice consuls of the Republic of the Philippines. The
duties of the local civil registrar and of a judge or justice of the peace or mayor
with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by such consuls
and vice consuls.
613
VOL. 791, JUNE 1, 2016 613
14
Kho vs. Republic
riages in remote places; (3) consular marriages; (4) ratification of marital
cohabitation; (5) religious ratification of a civil marriage; (6) Mohammedan or
pagan marriages; and (7) mixed marriages. Petitioner’s and respondent’s
marriage does not fall under any of these exceptions.
Article 80(3) of the Civil Code also makes it clear that a marriage
performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being
nothing more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the
license is the essence of the marriage contract.15 The rationale for the
compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is
the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper
government official has inquired into their capacity to contract
marriage.16 Stated differently, the requirement and issuance of a marriage
license is the State’s demonstration of its involvement and participation in
every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested.17
In the instant case, respondent claims that she and petitioner were able
to secure a marriage license which they presented to the solemnizing officer
before the marriage was performed.
The OSG, on its part, contends that the presumption is always in favor of
the validity of marriage and that any doubt should be resolved to sustain such
validity. Indeed, this Court is mindful of this principle as well as of the
Constitutional policy which protects and strengthens the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family.
_______________
15 Republic v. Dayot, 573 Phil. 553, 568-569; 550 SCRA 435, 453 (2008).
16 Id., at p. 569; p. 453.
17 Alcantara v. Alcantara, 558 Phil. 192, 202; 531 SCRA 446, 454 (2007).
614
614 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Kho vs. Republic
On the other hand, petitioner insists that the Certification issued by the
Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with the testimony of the
former Civil Registrar, is sufficient evidence to prove the absence of the
subject marriage license.
The Court agrees with petitioner and finds no doubt to be resolved as the
evidence is clearly in his favor.
Apropos is the case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee Cariño.18 There, it was held
that the certification of the Local Civil Registrar, that their office had no record
of a marriage license, was adequate to prove the non-issuance of said
license.19 It was further held that the presumed validity of the marriage of the
parties had been overcome, and that it became the burden of the party
alleging a valid marriage to prove that the marriage was valid, and that the
required marriage license had been secured.20
As stated above, petitioner was able to present a Certification issued by
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting that the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar “has no record nor copy of any marriage
license ever issued in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M.
Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated on June 1,
1972.”21 Thus, on the basis of such Certification, the presumed validity of the
marriage of petitioner and respondent has been overcome and it becomes
the burden of respondent to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who
alleges such validity. As found by the RTC, respondent was not able to
discharge that burden.
It is telling that respondent failed to present their alleged marriage license
or a copy thereof to the court. In addition,
_______________
18 403 Phil. 861; 351 SCRA 127 (2001).
19 Id., at p. 869; p. 133.
20 Id., at p. 870; id.
21 See RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 56.
615
VOL. 791, JUNE 1, 2016 615
Kho vs. Republic
the Certificate of Marriage22 issued by the officiating priest does not
contain any entry regarding the said marriage license. Respondent could have
obtained a copy of their marriage contract from the National Archives and
Records Section, where information regarding the marriage license, i.e., date
of issuance and license number, could be obtained. However, she also failed
to do so. The Court also notes, with approval, the RTC’s agreement with
petitioner’s observation that the statements of the witnesses for respondent,
15
as well as respondent herself, all attest to the fact that a marriage ceremony
was conducted but neither one of them testified that a marriage license was
issued in favor of petitioner and respondent. Indeed, despite respondent’s
categorical claim that she and petitioner were able to obtain a marriage
license, she failed to present evidence to prove such allegation. It is a settled
rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.23
Based on the Certification issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Arteche, Eastern Samar, coupled with respondent’s failure to produce a copy
of the alleged marriage license or of any evidence to show that such license
was ever issued, the only conclusion that can be reached is that no valid
marriage license was, in fact, issued. Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot
be said that there was a simple defect, not a total absence, in the
requirements of the law which would not affect the validity of the marriage.
The fact remains that respondent failed to prove that the subject marriage
license was issued and the law is clear that a marriage which is performed
without the corresponding marriage license is null and void.
As to the sufficiency of petitioner’s evidence, the OSG further argues that,
on the basis of this Court’s ruling in Sevilla
_______________
22 Id., at p. 133.
23 Amor-Catalan v. Court of Appeals, 543 Phil. 568, 575; 514 SCRA 607,
612 (2007).
24 529 Phil. 419, 429; 497 SCRA 428, 438 (2006).
616
616 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Kho vs. Republic
v. Cardenas,24 the certification issued by the local civil registrar, which
attests to the absence in its records of a marriage license, must categorically
state that the document does not exist in the said office despite diligent
search.
However, in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,25this Court
considered the certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar as a
certification of due search and inability to find the record or entry sought by
the parties despite the absence of a categorical statement that “such
document does not exist in their records despite diligent search.” The Court,
citing Section 28,26 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, held that the certification
of due search and inability to find a record or entry as to the purported
marriage license, issued by the civil registrar, enjoys probative value, he being
the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held that
there is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage void ab
initio.
Moreover, as discussed in the above stated case of Nicdao Cariño v. Yee
Cariño,27 this Court considered the marriage of the petitioner and her
deceased husband as void ab initio as the records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number
and, as certified by the local civil registrar, their office has no record of such
marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil
registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their
marriage having been
_______________
25 G.R. No. 103047, September 2, 1994, 236 SCRA 257, 262.
26 Sec. 28. Proof of lack of record.—A written statement signed by an
officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after
diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the
records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is
admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record
or entry.
27 Cariño v. Cariño, supra note 18.
617
VOL. 791, JUNE 1, 2016 617
Kho vs. Republic
solemnized without the necessary marriage license and not being one of
the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the marriage
of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio. This ruling
was reiterated in the more recent case of Go-Bangayan v. Bangayan, Jr.28
Furthermore, in the fairly recent case of Abbas v. Abbas,29 this Court
echoed the ruling in Republic v. CA,30 that, in sustaining the finding of the
lower court that a marriage license was lacking, this Court relied on the
Certification issued by the local civil registrar, which stated that the alleged
marriage license could not be located as the same did not appear in their
16
records. Contrary to petitioner’s asseveration, nowhere in the Certification
was it categorically stated that the officer involved conducted a diligent
search. In this respect, this Court held that Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules
of Court does not require a categorical statement to this effect. Moreover, in
the said case, this Court ruled that:
Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is a disputable
presumption that an official duty has been regularly performed,
absent contradiction or other evidence to the contrary. We held, “The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.” No
such affirmative evidence was shown that the Municipal Civil Registrar
was lax in performing her duty of checking the records of their office,
thus the presumption must stand. x x x31
In all the above mentioned cases, there was clear and unequivocal finding
of the absence of the subject marriage license which rendered the marriage
void.
_______________
28 G.R. No. 201061, July 3, 2013, 700 SCRA 702.
29 Abbas v. Abbas, 702 Phil. 578, 590-592; 689 SCRA 646, 660-661 (2013).
30 Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 25.
31 Abbas v. Abbas, supra at p. 592; p. 661.
618
618 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Kho vs. Republic
From these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the
ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires that the absence of
such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at the
very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no
such marriage license was issued to the parties.32
Indeed, all the evidence cited by the CA to show that a wedding ceremony
was conducted and a marriage contract was signed does not operate to cure
the absence of a valid marriage license.33 As cited above, Article 80(3) of the
Civil Code clearly provides that a marriage solemnized without a license is
void from the beginning, except marriages of exceptional character under
Articles 72 to 79 of the same Code. As earlier stated, petitioner’s and
respondent’s marriage cannot be characterized as among the exceptions.
As to the motive of petitioner in seeking to annul his marriage to
respondent, it may well be that his motives are less than pure — that he seeks
a way out of his marriage to legitimize his alleged illicit affair with another
woman. Be that as it may, the same does not make up for the failure of the
respondent to prove that they had a valid marriage license, given the weight
of evidence presented by petitioner. The law must be applied. As the
marriage license, an essential requisite under the Civil Code, is clearly absent,
the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City, dated March 30, 2006 and
January 14, 2009, respectively, in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 69218,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch 2, dated September 25, 2000, in Civil Case
No. 464 is REINSTATED.
_______________
32 Supra note 17 at pp. 203-204; p. 455.
33 Supra note 29 at p. 594; p. 663.
619
VOL. 791, JUNE 1, 2016 619
Kho vs. Republic
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Perez and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Brion,** J., On Leave.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.
Notes.—Before performing the marriage ceremony, the judge must
personally examine the marriage license presented. (Tupal vs. Rojo, 717
SCRA 236 [2014])
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15 as a condition for the
issuance of a marriage license, the Supreme Court finds the same to be a
reasonable exercise of police power by the government; All the law requires
is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. (Imbong vs. Ochoa, Jr., 721 SCRA 146
[2014])
17
 Claro M. Recto and Jose Nava for petitioner and appellant.
Josefina R. Phodaca and Naomi P. Salvador for respondent and
——o0o——
appellant.
_______________

** Designated additional member, in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. SYLLABUS

Jardeleza, per Raffle dated May 23, 2016.
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
1. APPEALS; APPELLATE JURISDICTION WHERE BOTH PARTIES
APPEAL AND ONE OF THE APPEALS RAISES ONLY QUESTIONS OF LAW. —
Where the petitioner raises in his brief only questions of law and the
respondent, who is also an appellant, raises both questions of law and
fact, and the appeals of both parties are indivisible in that they pertain to
only one case, the Supreme Court, under sections 17 and 31 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948, may take cognizance of both appeals.
2. ELECTION CONTESTS; MUNICIPAL OFFICE; ECCLESIASTIC
INELIGIBLE TO HOLD MUNICIPAL OFFICE; WHO ARE ECCLESIASTICS. — An
ecclesiastic is ineligible to hold a municipal office under section 2175 of
the Revised Administrative Code. An Ordained minister of the United
Church of Christ in the Philippines registered as such in the Bureau of
Public Libraries with authority to solemnize marriages, is an ecclesiastic
and ineligible to hold the office of the Municipal Mayor. Resignation as
such minister and acceptance thereof by the cabinet of his church, are
but self-serving evidence if the resignation and its acceptance are not
registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries. If a candidate to a
municipal office is a minister of a church with license to solemnize
marriages, it is his duty (and not of his church) to secure from the Bureau
of Public Libraries the cancellation of his resignation as minister and to
attach to his certificate of candidacy a copy of such resignation.
EN BANC 3. ID.; IMPORTANCE AND PURPOSE OF REGISTRATION WITH THE
BUREAU OF PUBLIC LIBRARIES. — The importance of registration cannot
be underestimated. The purpose of registration is two-fold: to inform the
[G.R. No. L-8014. March 14, 1955.]
public not only of the authority of the minister to discharge religious
functions but equally to keep it informed of any change in his religious
PEDRO V. VILAR, petitioner- status. This information is necessary for the protection of the public. This
appellant, vs. GAUDENCIO V. PARAISO, respondent- is especially so with regard to the authority to solemnize marriages, the
appellant. registration of which is made by the law mandatory (Articles 92-96, New
Civil Code).

18
 4. ID.; ELECTION FOR MUNICIPAL MAYOR; IF PERSON ELECTED IS
INELIGIBLE, CANDIDATE OCCUPYING SECOND PLACE CANNOT BE
DECLARED BY COURT ELECTED. — When the person elected is ineligible,
the court cannot declare that the candidate occupying the second place
has been elected, even if he were eligible. (Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil., 645;
Llamoso vs. Ferrer, 47 Off. Gaz., No. 2, p. 727.)
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J p:
In the general elections held on November 13, 1951, Pedro V.
Vilar and Gaudencio V. Paraiso were among the candidates registered
and voted for the office of mayor of Rizal, Nueva Ecija. After the canvass
was made, Vilar obtained 1,467 votes while Paraiso garnered 1,509, and
as a result the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed the latter as the
mayor duly elected with a plurality of 41 votes. However, contending
thatParaiso was ineligible to hold office as mayor because he was then a
minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines and such was
disqualified to be a candidate under section 2175 of the Revised
Administrative Code, Vilar instituted the present quo
warranto proceedings praying that Paraiso be declared ineligible to
assume office and that his proclamation as mayor-elect be declared null
and void. He also prayed that he be declared duly elected mayor of Rizal,
Nueva Ecija, in lieu of respondent Paraiso.
Respondent in his answer denied his ineligibility and claimed that
he resigned as minister of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines
on August 21, 1951, that his resignation was accepted by the cabinet of
his church at a special meeting held in Polo, Bulacan on August 27, 1951,
and that even if respondent was not eligible to the office, petitioner could
not be declared elected to take his place.
After due trial, the court found respondent to be ineligible for the
office of mayor, being an ecclesiastic, and, consequently, it declared his
proclamation as mayor null and void, but refrained from declaring
petitioner as mayor-elect for lack of sufficient legal grounds to do so.
From this decision both parties have appealed, respondent from that
portion finding him ineligible, and petitioner from that portion holding he
cannot be declared elected as mayor for lack of sufficient legal grounds
to do so.
The case was originally taken to the Court of Appeals. However,
as the latter court found that while petitioner raises in his brief only
questions of law respondent raises both questions of law and fact, and
both appeals are indivisible in that they pertain to only one case, that
court resolved to certify it to this Court pursuant to the provisions of
sections 17 and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, upon the theory that one
of the appeals is exclusively cognizable by the Supreme Court.
The only issue before us is whether respondent, being an
ecclesiastic, is ineligible to hold office under section 2175 of the Revised
Administrative Code, or whether he actually resigned as minister before
the date of the elections, and his resignation duly accepted, as claimed,
thereby removing his disability. As may be noted, this is a question of fact
the determination of which much depends upon the credibility and
weight of the evidence of both parties.
The evidence for petitioner tends to show that respondent was
ordained as minister of the Evangelical Church of the Philippines in 1944
and as such was given license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of
Public Libraries; that since 1944 up to 1950 he acted as minister in the
town of Rizal, Nueva Ecija, continuously and without interruption and has
been renewing his license to solemnize marriages as prescribed by the
regulations of the Bureau of Public Libraries; that on April 19, 1950,
respondent transferred to the United Church of Christ in the Philippines,
having been assigned to work in the same place and chapel during the
years 1944-1950; that on April 7, 1951, respondent applied for, and was
issued, a license to solemnize marriages by the Bureau of Public Libraries
as minister of the new church up to the end of April, 1952; that said
license has never been cancelled, as neither the head of the united
church nor respondent has requested for its cancellation; and that
respondent has been publicly known as minister of the United Church of
Christ, but he has not attached to his certificate of candidacy a copy of his
alleged resignation as minister.
The evidence for the respondent, on the other hand, tends to
show that while he was formerly a minister of the United Church of Christ
19
in the Philippines, he, however, filed his resignation as such minister on
August 21, 1951, because of his desire to engage in politics; that said
resignation was accepted by the cabinet of his church at a special meeting
held in Polo, Bulacan on August 27, 1951; that respondent turned over
his chapel and his office to the elder members of his religious order on
August 21, 1951, and since then he considered himself separated from
his order and in fact he has refrained ever since from conducting any
religious services pertaining to that order.
Which of these versions is correct?
After carefully examining the evidence of record, and after
weighing its credibility and probative value, we have not found any
reason for deviating from the finding of the trial court that respondent
never ceased as minister of the order to which he belonged and that the
resignation he claims to have filed months before the date of the
elections is but a mere scheme to circumvent the prohibition of the law
regarding ecclesiastics who desire to run for a municipal office. Indeed, if
respondent really and sincerely intended to resign as minister of the
religious organization to which he belonged for the purpose of launching
his candidacy why did he not resign in due form and have the acceptance
of his resignation registered with the Bureau of Public Libraries. 1 The
importance of resignation cannot be underestimated. The purpose of
registration is two-fold: to inform the public not only of the authority of
the minister to discharge religious functions, but equally to keep it
informed of any change in his religious status. This information is
necessary for the protection of the public. This is especially so with regard
to the authority to solemnized marriages, the registration of which is
made by the law mandatory (Articles 92-96, new Civil Code). It is no
argument to say that the duty to secure the cancellation of the requisite
resignation devolves, not upon respondent, but upon the head of his
organization or upon the official in charge of such registration, upon
proper showing of the reason for such cancellation, because the law
likewise imposes upon the interested party the duty of effecting such
cancellation, who in the instant case is the respondent himself. This he
failed to do. And what is more, he failed to attach to his certificate of
candidacy, a copy of his alleged resignation as minister knowing full well
that a minister is disqualified by law to run for a municipal office.
It is true that respondent attempted to substantiate his claim by
submitting as evidence certain documents purporting to show the alleged
resignation and its acceptance by the cabinet of his church at a meeting
held on August 27, 1951, but, considering said documents in the light of
the shortcomings we have pointed out above, one cannot help but brand
them as self-serving or as documents merely prepared to serve the
political designs of respondent in an attempt to obviate his
disqualification under the law. And this feeling appears strengthened if
we examine the so-called minute book wherein, according to witness
Jose Agpalo, are entered the minutes of all the meetings of the church,
because upon an examination thereof one would at once get the
impression that it was prepared haphazardly and not with such
seriousness and solemnity that should characterize the religious activities
of a well established religious order. As the trial court aptly remarked "All
these lead the court to believe with the petitioner, that the supposed
resignation and acceptance were made at a later date to cure the
ineligibility of the respondent." We are therefore constrained to hold that
respondent is disqualified to hold the office of mayor as found by the trial
court.
As to the question whether, respondent being ineligible,
petitioner can be declared elected, having obtained second place in the
elections, our answer is simple: this Court has already declared that this
cannot be done in the absence of an express provision authorizing such
declaration. Our law not only does not contain any such provision but
apparently seems to prohibit it. This is what we said in at least two cases
where we laid down a ruling which is decisive of the present case.
". . . In the first case when the person elected is
ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate
occupying the second place has been elected, even if he
were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration of
election in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality
of votes, and has presented his certificate of candidacy."
(Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil., 645.)
"Section 173 of Republic Act No. 180 known as
the Revised Election Code, does not provide that if the
contestee is declared ineligible the contestant will be
proclaimed. Indeed it may be gathered that the law
contemplates no such result, because it permits the filing
20
 of the contest by any registered candidate irrespective of
whether the latter occupied the next highest place or the
lowest in the election returns." (Llamoso vs. Ferrer, et al.,
84 Phil., 489, 47 Off. Gaz., [No. 2] p. 727.)
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Paras C. J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo,
Labrador, Concepcion and Reyes, J. B. L., JJ., concur.
||| (Vilar v. Paraiso, G.R. No. L-8014, [March 14, 1955], 96 PHIL 659-665)

21