U.S.

Supreme Court

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)

Loving v. Virginia

No. 395

Argued April 10, 1967

Decided June 12, 1967

388 U.S. 1

APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Syllabus

Virginia's statutory scheme to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications held to
violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 388 U. S. 4-12.

206 Va. 924, 147 S.E.2d 78, reversed.

Page 388 U. S. 2

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents a constitutional question never addressed by this Court: whether a statutory scheme adopted by
the State of Virginia to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classifications violates the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. [Footnote 1] For reasons which seem to us
to reflect the central meaning of those constitutional commands, we conclude that these statutes cannot stand
consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment.

In June, 1958, two residents of Virginia, Mildred Jeter, a Negro woman, and Richard Loving, a white man, were
married in the District of Columbia pursuant to its laws. Shortly after their marriage, the Lovings returned to Virginia
and established their marital abode in Caroline County. At the October Term, 1958, of the Circuit Court

Page 388 U. S. 3

of Caroline County, a grand jury issued an indictment charging the Lovings with violating Virginia's ban on interracial
marriages. On January 6, 199, the Lovings pleaded guilty to the charge, and were sentenced to one year in jail;
however, the trial judge suspended the sentence for a period of 25 years on the condition that the Lovings leave the
State and not return to Virginia together for 25 years. He stated in an opinion that:

"Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And,
but for the interference with his arrangement, there would be no cause for such marriage. The fact that he separated
the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix."

After their convictions, the Lovings took up residence in the District of Columbia. On November 6, 1963, they filed a
motion in the state trial court to vacate the judgment and set aside the sentence on the ground that the statutes which
they had violated were repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. The motion not having been decided by October 28,

1
1964, the Lovings instituted a class action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
requesting that a three-judge court be convened to declare the Virginia anti-miscegenation statutes unconstitutional
and to enjoin state officials from enforcing their convictions. On January 22, 1965, the state trial judge denied the
motion to vacate the sentences, and the Lovings perfected an appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. On
February 11, 1965, the three-judge District Court continued the case to allow the Lovings to present their
constitutional claims to the highest state court.

The Supreme Court of Appeals upheld the constitutionality of the anti-miscegenation statutes and, after

Page 388 U. S. 4

modifying the sentence, affirmed the convictions. [Footnote 2] The Lovings appealed this decision, and we noted
probable jurisdiction on December 12, 1966, 385 U.S. 986.

The two statutes under which appellants were convicted and sentenced are part of a comprehensive statutory scheme
aimed at prohibiting and punishing interracial marriages. The Lovings were convicted of violating § 258 of the
Virginia Code:

"Leaving State to evade law. -- If any white person and colored person shall go out of this State, for the purpose of
being married, and with the intention of returning, and be married out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it,
cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be punished as provided in § 20-59, and the marriage shall be governed by the
same law as if it had been solemnized in this State. The fact of their cohabitation here as man and wife shall be
evidence of their marriage."

Section 259, which defines the penalty for miscegenation, provides:

"Punishment for marriage. -- If any white person intermarry with a colored person, or any colored person intermarry
with a white person, he shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for not less
than one nor more than five years."

Other central provisions in the Virginia statutory scheme are § 20-57, which automatically voids all marriages
between "a white person and a colored person" without any judicial proceeding, [Footnote 3] and §§ 20-54 and 1-14
which,

Page 388 U. S. 5

respectively, define "white persons" and "colored persons and Indians" for purposes of the statutory prohibitions.
[Footnote 4] The Lovings have never disputed in the course of this litigation that Mrs. Loving is a "colored person" or
that Mr. Loving is a "white person" within the meanings given those terms by the Virginia statutes.

Page 388 U. S. 6

Virginia is now one of 16 States which prohibit and punish marriages on the basis of racial classifications. [Footnote 5]
Penalties for miscegenation arose as an incident to slavery, and have been common in Virginia since the colonial
period. [Footnote 6] The present statutory scheme dates from the adoption of the Racial Integrity Act of 1924, passed
during the period of extreme nativism which followed the end of the First World War. The central features of this Act,
and current Virginia law, are the absolute prohibition of a "white person" marrying other than another "white
person," [Footnote 7] a prohibition against issuing marriage licenses until the issuing official is satisfied that

Page 388 U. S. 7

2
the applicants' statements as to their race are correct, [Footnote 8] certificates of "racial composition" to be kept by
both local and state registrars, [Footnote 9] and the carrying forward of earlier prohibitions against racial
intermarriage. [Footnote 10]

In upholding the constitutionality of these provisions in the decision below, the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia
referred to its 1965 decision in Naim v. Naim, 197 Va. 80, 87 S.E.2d 749, as stating the reasons supporting the validity
of these laws. In Naim, the state court concluded that the State's legitimate purposes were "to preserve the racial
integrity of its citizens," and to prevent "the corruption of blood," "a mongrel breed of citizens," and "the obliteration
of racial pride," obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White Supremacy. Id. at 90, 87 S.E.2d at 756. The court
also reasoned that marriage has traditionally been subject to state regulation without federal intervention, and,
consequently, the regulation of marriage should be left to exclusive state control by the Tenth Amendment.

While the state court is no doubt correct in asserting that marriage is a social relation subject to the State's police
power, Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 (1888), the State does not contend in its argument before this Court that its
powers to regulate marriage are unlimited notwithstanding the commands of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor could
it do so in light of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923), and Skinner v. Oklahoma,316 U. S. 535 (1942). Instead, the
State argues that the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause, as illuminated by the statements of the Framers, is only
that state penal laws containing an interracial element

Page 388 U. S. 8

as part of the definition of the offense must apply equally to whites and Negroes in the sense that members of each
race are punished to the same degree. Thus, the State contends that, because its miscegenation statutes punish equally
both the white and the Negro participants in an interracial marriage, these statutes, despite their reliance on racial
classifications, do not constitute an invidious discrimination based upon race. The second argument advanced by the
State assumes the validity of its equal application theory. The argument is that, if the Equal Protection Clause does not
outlaw miscegenation statutes because of their reliance on racial classifications, the question of constitutionality
would thus become whether there was any rational basis for a State to treat interracial marriages differently from
other marriages. On this question, the State argues, the scientific evidence is substantially in doubt and, consequently,
this Court should defer to the wisdom of the state legislature in adopting its policy of discouraging interracial
marriages.

Because we reject the notion that the mere "equal application" of a statute containing racial classifications is enough
to remove the classifications from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of all invidious racial discriminations,
we do not accept the State's contention that these statutes should be upheld if there is any possible basis for
concluding that they serve a rational purpose. The mere fact of equal application does not mean that our analysis of
these statutes should follow the approach we have taken in cases involving no racial discrimination where the Equal
Protection Clause has been arrayed against a statute discriminating between the kinds of advertising which may be
displayed on trucks in New York City, Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U. S. 106 (1949), or an exemption
in Ohio's ad valorem tax for merchandise owned by a nonresident in a storage warehouse, Allied Stores of Ohio,

Page 388 U. S. 9

Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 (1959). In these cases, involving distinctions not drawn according to race, the Court has
merely asked whether there is any rational foundation for the discriminations, and has deferred to the wisdom of the
state legislatures. In the case at bar, however, we deal with statutes containing racial classifications, and the fact of
equal application does not immunize the statute from the very heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth
Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according to race.

The State argues that statements in the Thirty-ninth Congress about the time of the passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment indicate that the Framers did not intend the Amendment to make unconstitutional state miscegenation

3
laws. Many of the statements alluded to by the State concern the debates over the Freedmen's Bureau Bill, which
President Johnson vetoed, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, enacted over his veto. While these statements
have some relevance to the intention of Congress in submitting the Fourteenth Amendment, it must be understood
that they pertained to the passage of specific statutes, and not to the broader, organic purpose of a constitutional
amendment. As for the various statements directly concerning the Fourteenth Amendment, we have said in
connection with a related problem that, although these historical sources "cast some light" they are not sufficient to
resolve the problem;

"[a]t best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments undoubtedly intended them
to remove all legal distinctions among 'all persons born or naturalized in the United States.' Their opponents, just as
certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and the spirit of the Amendments, and wished them to have the most
limited effect."

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 347 U. S. 489 (1954). See also Strauder

Page 388 U. S. 10

v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 100 U. S. 310 (1880). We have rejected the proposition that the debates in the Thirty-
ninth Congress or in the state legislatures which ratified the Fourteenth Amendment supported the theory advanced
by the State, that the requirement of equal protection of the laws is satisfied by penal laws defining offenses based on
racial classifications so long as white and Negro participants in the offense were similarly punished. McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U. S. 184 (1964).

The State finds support for its "equal application" theory in the decision of the Court in Pace v. Alabama, 106 U. S.
583 (1883). In that case, the Court upheld a conviction under an Alabama statute forbidding adultery or fornication
between a white person and a Negro which imposed a greater penalty than that of a statute proscribing similar
conduct by members of the same race. The Court reasoned that the statute could not be said to discriminate against
Negroes because the punishment for each participant in the offense was the same. However, as recently as the 1964
Term, in rejecting the reasoning of that case, we stated "Pacerepresents a limited view of the Equal Protection Clause
which has not withstood analysis in the subsequent decisions of this Court." McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, at 379 U. S.
188. As we there demonstrated, the Equal Protection Clause requires the consideration of whether the classifications
drawn by any statute constitute an arbitrary and invidious discrimination. The clear and central purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment was to eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination in the
States. Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 83 U. S. 71 (1873); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303, 100 U. S. 307-
308 (1880); Ex parte Virginia,100 U. S. 339, 100 U. S. 334-335 (1880); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948); Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U. S. 715 (1961).

Page 388 U. S. 11

There can be no question but that Virginia's miscegenation statutes rest solely upon distinctions drawn according to
race. The statutes proscribe generally accepted conduct if engaged in by members of different races. Over the years,
this Court has consistently repudiated "[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry" as being
"odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U. S. 81, 320 U. S. 100 (1943). At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial
classifications, especially suspect in criminal statutes, be subjected to the "most rigid scrutiny," Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U. S. 214, 323 U. S. 216 (1944), and, if they are ever to be upheld, they must be shown to be necessary to
the accomplishment of some permissible state objective, independent of the racial discrimination which it was the
object of the Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate. Indeed, two members of this Court have already stated that they

"cannot conceive of a valid legislative purpose . . . which makes the color of a person's skin the test of whether his
conduct is a criminal offense."

McLaughlin v. Florida, supra, at 379 U. S. 198 (STEWART, J., joined by DOUGLAS, J., concurring).

4
There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial discrimination which justifies this
classification. The fact that Virginia prohibits only interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that
the racial classifications must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.
[Footnote 11] We have consistently denied

Page 388 U. S. 12

the constitutionality of measures which restrict the rights of citizens on account of race. There can be no doubt that
restricting the freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause.

II

These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due process of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.

Marriage is one of the "basic civil rights of man," fundamental to our very existence and survival. Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535, 316 U. S. 541 (1942). See also Maynard v. Hill, 125 U. S. 190 (1888). To deny this fundamental
freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly
subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to deprive all the State's
citizens of liberty without due process of law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of choice to
marry not be restricted by invidious racial discriminations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry, or not
marry, a person of another race resides with the individual, and cannot be infringed by the State.

These convictions must be reversed.

It is so ordered.

5
U.S. Supreme Court

Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978)

Zablocki v. Redhail

No. 76-879

Argued October 4, 1977

Decided January 18, 1978

434 U.S. 374

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

Syllabus

Wisconsin statute providing that any resident of that State "having minor issue not in his custody and which he is
under obligation to support by any court order or judgment" may not marry without a court approval order, which
cannot be granted absent a showing that the support obligation has been met and that children covered by the
support order "are not then and are not likely thereafter to become public charges," held to violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 434 U. S. 383-391.

(a) Since the right to marry is of fundamental importance, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, and the statutory
classification involved here significantly interferes with the exercise of that right, "critical examination" of the state
interests advanced in support of the classification is required. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S.
307, 427 U. S. 312, 314. Pp. 383-387.

(b) The state interests assertedly served by the challenged statute unnecessarily impinge on the right to marry. If the
statute is designed to furnish an opportunity to counsel persons with prior child support obligations before further
such obligations are incurred, it neither expressly requires counseling nor provides for automatic approval after
counseling is completed. The statute cannot be justified as encouraging an applicant to support his children. By the
proceeding, the State, which already possesses numerous other means for exacting compliance with support
obligations, merely prevents the applicant from getting married, without ensuring support of the applicant's prior
children. Though it is suggested that the statute protects the ability of marriage applicants to meet prior support
obligations before new ones are incurred, the statute is both underinclusive (as it does not limit new financial
commitments other than those arising out of the contemplated marriage) and overinclusive (since the new spouse
may better the applicant's financial situation). Pp. 434 U. S. 388-390.

418 F.Supp. 1061, affirmed.

Page 434 U. S. 375

MARSHALL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C.J., and BRENNAN, WHITE, and BLACKMUN, JJ.,
joined. BURGER, C.J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 434 U. S. 391. STEWART, J., post, p.434 U. S. 391 POWELL,
J., post, p. 434 U. S. 396, and STEVENS, J., post, p. 434 U. S. 403, filed opinions concurring in the judgment. REHNQUIST,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, post, p. 434 U. S. 407.

MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL delivered the opinion of the Court.

6
At issue in this ease is the constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute, Wis.Stat. §§ 245.10(1), (4), (5) (1973), which
provides that members of a certain class of Wisconsin residents may not marry, within the State or elsewhere,
without first obtaining a court order granting permission to marry. The class is defined by the statute to include any
"Wisconsin resident having minor issue not in his custody and which he is under obligation to support by any court
order or judgment." The statute specifics that court permission cannot be granted unless the marriage applicant
submits proof of compliance with the support obligation and, in addition, demonstrates that the children covered by
the support order "are not then and are not likely thereafter to become public charges." No marriage license may
lawfully be issued in Wisconsin to a person covered by the statute, except upon court order; any marriage entered
into without compliance with § 245.10 is declared void; and persons acquiring marriage licenses in violation of the
section are subject to criminal penalties. [Footnote 1]

Page 434 U. S. 376

After being denied a marriage license because of his failure to comply with § 245.10, appellee brought this class action
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, challenging the statute as violative

Page 434 U. S. 377

of the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin held the statute
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, and enjoined its enforcement. 418 F.Supp. 1061 (1976). We noted
probable jurisdiction, 429 U.S. 1089 (1977), and we now affirm.

Appellee Redhail is a Wisconsin resident who, under the terms of § 245.10, is unable to enter into a lawful marriage in
Wisconsin or elsewhere so long as he maintains his Wisconsin residency. The facts, according to the stipulation filed
by the parties in the District Court, are as follows. In January, 1972, when appellee was a minor and a high school
student, a paternity action was instituted against him in Milwaukee County Court, alleging that he was the father of a
baby girl

Page 434 U. S. 378

born out of wedlock on July 5, 1971. After he appeared and admitted that he was the child's father, the court entered
an order on May 12, 1972, adjudging appellee the father and ordering him to pay $109 per month as support for the
child until she reached 18 years of age. From May, 1972, until August, 1974, appellee was unemployed and indigent,
and consequently was unable to make any support payments. [Footnote 2]

On September 27, 1974, appellee filed an application for a marriage license with appellant Zablocki, the County Clerk
of Milwaukee County, [Footnote 3] and a few days later the application was denied on the sole ground that appellee
had not obtained a court order granting him permission to marry, as required by § 245.10. Although appellee did not
petition a state court thereafter, it is stipulated that he would not have been able to satisfy either of the statutory
prerequisites for an order granting permission to marry. First, he had not satisfied his support obligations to his
illegitimate child, and, as of December, 1974, there was an arrearage in excess of $3,700. Second, the child had been a
public charge since her birth, receiving benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program. It is
stipulated that the child's benefit payments were such that she would have been a public charge even if appellee had
been current in his support payments.

On December 24, 1974, appellee filed his complaint in the District Court, on behalf of himself and the class of all
Wisconsin residents who had been refused a marriage license pursuant to § 245.10(1) by one of the county clerks in
Wisconsin. Zablocki was named as the defendant, individually

Page 434 U. S. 379

7
and as representative of a class consisting of all county clerks in the State. The complaint alleged, among other things,
that appellee and the woman he desired to marry were expecting a child in March, 1975, and wished to be lawfully
married before that time. The statute was attacked on the grounds that it deprived appellee, and the class he sought to
represent, of equal protection and due process rights secured by the First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution.

A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284. Appellee moved for certification of the plaintiff
and defendant classes named in his complaint, and, by order dated February 20, 1975, the plaintiff class was certified
under Fed.Rule Civ.Proc. 23(b)(2). [Footnote 4] After the parties filed the stipulation of facts, and briefs on the merits,
oral argument was heard in the District Court on June 23, 1975, with a representative from the Wisconsin Attorney
General's office participating in addition to counsel for the parties.

The three-judge court handed down a unanimous decision on August 31, 1976. The court ruled, first, that it was not
required to abstain from decision under the principles set forth in Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U. S. 592 (1975),
and Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971), since there was no pending state court proceeding that could be frustrated
by the declaratory and injunctive relief requested. [Footnote 5] Second, the court held

Page 434 U. S. 380

that the class of all county clerks in Wisconsin was a proper defendant class under Rules 23(a) and (b)(2), and that
neither Rule 23 nor due process required pre-judgment notice to the members of the plaintiff or the defendant class.
[Footnote 6]

Page 434 U. S. 381

On the merits, the three-judge panel analyzed the challenged statute under the Equal Protection Clause and concluded
that "strict scrutiny" was required because the classification created by the statute infringed upon a fundamental
right, the right to marry. [Footnote 7] The court then proceeded to evaluate the interests advanced by the State to
justify the statute, and, finding that the classification was not necessary for the achievement of those interests, the
court held the statute invalid and enjoined the county clerks from enforcing it. [Footnote 8]

Appellant brought this direct appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

Page 434 U. S. 382

§ 1253, claiming that the three-judge court erred in finding §§ 245.10(1), (4), (5) invalid under the Equal Protection
Clause. Appellee defends the lower court's equal protection holding and, in the alternative, urges affirmance of the
District Court's judgment on the ground that the statute does not satisfy the requirements of substantive due process.
We agree with the District Court that the statute violates the Equal Protection Clause. [Footnote 9]

Page 434 U. S. 383

II

In evaluating §§ 245.10(1), (4), (5) under the Equal Protection Clause,

"we must first determine what burden of justification the classification created thereby must meet, by looking to the
nature of the classification and the individual interests affected."

Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U. S. 250, 415 U. S. 253 (1974). Since our past decisions make clear that the
right to marry is of fundamental importance, and since the classification at issue here significantly interferes with the
exercise of that right, we believe that "critical examination" of the state interests advanced in support of the

8
classification is required. Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307, 427 U. S. 312, 314 (1976); see,
e.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 411 U. S. 17 (1973).

The leading decision of this Court on the right to marry is Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1 (1967). In that case, an
interracial couple who had been convicted of violating Virginia's miscegenation laws challenged the statutory scheme
on both equal protection and due process grounds. The Court's opinion could have rested solely on the ground that
the statutes discriminated on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause; id. at 388 U. S. 11-12. But the
Court went on to hold that the laws arbitrarily deprived the couple of a fundamental liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause, the freedom to marry. The Court's language on the latter point bears repeating:

"The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness by free men."

"Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' fundamental to our very existence and survival."

Id. at 388 U. S. 12, quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U. S. 535, 316 U. S. 541 (1942).

Page 434 U. S. 384

Although Loving arose in the context of racial discrimination, prior and subsequent decisions of this Court confirm
that the right to marry is of fundamental importance for all individuals. Long ago, in Maynard v. Hill,125 U. S.
190 (1888), the Court characterized marriage as "the most important relation in life," id. at 125 U. S. 205, and as "the
foundation of the family and of society, without which there would be neither civilization nor progress," id. at 125 U. S.
211. In Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923), the Court recognized that the right "to marry, establish a home and
bring up children" is a central part of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, id. at 262 U. S. 399, and
in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, supra, marriage was described as "fundamental to the very existence and
survival of the race," 316 U.S. at 316 U. S. 541.

More recent decisions have established that the right to marry is part of the fundamental "right of privacy" implicit in
the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. In Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U. S. 479 (1965), the Court observed:

"We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -- older than our political parties, older than our school
system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior
decisions."

Id. at 381 U. S. 486. See also id. at 381 U. S. 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring); id. at 381 U. S. 502-503 (WHITE, J.,
concurring in judgment).

Cases subsequent to Griswold and Loving have routinely categorized the decision to marry as among the personal
decisions protected by the right of privacy. See generally Whalen v. Roe, 429 U. S. 589, 429 U. S. 598-600, and nn. 23-26
(1977). For

Page 434 U. S. 385

example, last Term, in Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U. S. 678 (1977), we declared:

"While the outer limits of [the right of personal privacy] have not been marked by the Court, it is clear that among the
decisions that an individual may make without unjustified government interference are personal decisions 'relating to
marriage, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 388 U. S. 12 (1967); procreation, Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.
S. 535, 316 U. S. 541-542 (1942); contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. at 405 U. S. 453-454; id. at 405 U. S.

9
460, 405 U. S. 463-465 (WHITE, J., concurring in result); family relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S.
158, 321 U. S. 166 (1944); and child rearing and education, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 268 U. S.
535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, [262 U.S. 390, 262 U. S. 399(1923)]."

Id. at 431 U. S. 684-685, quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113, 410 U. S. 152-153 (1973). See also Cleveland Board of
Education v. LaFleur, 414 U. S. 632, 414 U. S. 639-640 (1974) ("This Court has long recognized that freedom of
personal choice in matters of marriage and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment"); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U. S. 816, 431 U. S. 842-844 (1977); Moore v.
East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 431 U. S. 499 (1977); Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 424 U. S. 713 (1976). [Footnote 10]

Page 434 U. S. 386

It is not surprising that the decision to marry has been placed on the same level of importance as decisions relating to
procreation, childbirth, childrearing, and family relationships. As the facts of this case illustrate, it would make little
sense to recognize a right of privacy with respect to other matters of family life and not with respect to the decision to
enter the relationship that is the foundation of the family in our society. The woman whom appellee desired to marry
had a fundamental right to seek an abortion of their expected child, see Roe v. Wade, supra, or to bring the child into
life to suffer the myriad social, if not economic, disabilities that the status of illegitimacy brings, see Trimble v.
Gordon, 430 U. S. 762, 430 U. S. 768-770, and n. 13 (1977); Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U. S. 164, 406 U. S.
175-176 (1972). Surely, a decision to marry and raise the child in a traditional family setting must receive equivalent
protection. And, if appellee's right to procreate means anything at all, it must imply some right to enter the only
relationship in which the State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations legally to take place. [Footnote 11]

By reaffirming the fundamental character of the right to marry, we do not mean to suggest that every state regulation
which relates in any way to the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To
the contrary, reasonable regulations that do not significantly interfere with decisions to enter into the marital
relationship may legitimately be imposed. See Califano v. Jobst, ante p. 434 U. S. 47;

Page 434 U. S. 387

n 12, infra. The statutory classification at issue here, however, clearly does interfere directly and substantially with
the right to marry.

Under the challenged statute, no Wisconsin resident in the affected class may marry in Wisconsin or elsewhere
without a court order, and marriages contracted in violation of the statute are both void and punishable as criminal
offenses. Some of those in the affected class, like appellee, will never be able to obtain the necessary court order,
because they either lack the financial means to meet their support obligations or cannot prove that their children will
not become public charges. These persons are absolutely prevented from getting married. Many others, able in theory
to satisfy the statute's requirements, will be sufficiently burdened by having to do so that they will, in effect be
coerced into forgoing their right to marry. And even those who can be persuaded to meet the statute's requirements
suffer a serious intrusion into their freedom of choice in an area in which we have held such freedom to be
fundamental. [Footnote 12]

Page 434 U. S. 388

III

When a statutory classification significantly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right, it cannot be upheld
unless it is supported by sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. at 431 U. S. 686; Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa
County, 415 U.S. at 415 U. S. 262-263; San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez,411 U.S. at 411 U. S.
117; Bullock v. Carter, 405 U. S. 134, 405 U. S. 144 (1972). Appellant asserts that two interests are served by the
challenged statute: the "permission to marry" proceeding furnishes an opportunity to counsel the applicant as to the

10
necessity of fulfilling his prior support obligations; and the welfare of the "out of custody" children is protected. We
may accept for present purposes that these are legitimate and substantial interests, but, since the means selected by
the State for achieving these interests unnecessarily impinge on the right to marry, the statute cannot be sustained.

There is evidence that the challenged statute, as originally introduced in the Wisconsin Legislature, was intended
merely to establish a mechanism whereby persons with support obligations to children from prior marriages could be
counseled before they entered into new marital relationships and incurred further support obligations. [Footnote 13]
Court permission to marry was to be required, but apparently permission was automatically to be granted after
counseling was completed. [Footnote 14] The statute actually enacted, however, does not expressly require or provide
for any counseling whatsoever, nor for any automatic granting of permission to marry by the court, [Footnote 15] and
thus it can

Page 434 U. S. 389

hardly be justified as a means for ensuring counseling of the persons within its coverage. Even assuming that
counseling does take place -- a fact as to which there is no evidence in the record -- this interest obviously cannot
support the withholding of court permission to marry once counseling is completed.

With regard to safeguarding the welfare of the "out of custody" children, appellant's brief does not make clear the
connection between the State's interest and the statute's requirements. At argument, appellant's counsel suggested
that, since permission to marry cannot be granted unless the applicant shows that he has satisfied his court-
determined support obligations to the prior children and that those children will not become public charges, the
statute provides incentive for the applicant to make support payments to his children. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-20. This
"collection device" rationale cannot justify the statute's broad infringement on the right to marry.

First, with respect to individuals who are unable to meet the statutory requirements, the statute merely prevents the
applicant from getting married, without delivering any money at all into the hands of the applicant's prior children.
More importantly, regardless of the applicant's ability or willingness to meet the statutory requirements, the State
already has numerous other means for exacting compliance with support obligations, means that are at least as
effective as the instant statute's, and yet do not impinge upon the right to marry. Under Wisconsin law, whether the
children are from a prior marriage or were born out of wedlock, court-determined support obligations may be
enforced directly via

Page 434 U. S. 390

wage assignments, civil contempt proceedings, and criminal penalties. [Footnote 16] And, if the State believes that
parents of children out of their custody should be responsible for ensuring that those children do not become public
charges, this interest can be achieved by adjusting the criteria used for determining the amounts to be paid under
their support orders.

There is also some suggestion that § 245.10 protects the ability of marriage applicants to meet support obligations to
prior children by preventing the applicants from incurring new support obligations. But the challenged provisions of §
245.10 are grossly underinclusive with respect to this purpose, since they do not limit in any way new financial
commitments by the applicant other than those arising out of the contemplated marriage. The statutory classification
is substantially overinclusive as well: given the possibility that the new spouse will actually better the applicant's
financial situation, by contributing income from a job or otherwise, the statute in many cases may prevent affected
individuals from improving their ability to satisfy their prior support obligations. And, although it is true that the
applicant will incur support obligations to any children born during the contemplated marriage, preventing the
marriage may only result in the children's being born out of wedlock, as in fact occurred in appellee's case. Since the
support obligation is the same whether the child is born in or out of wedlock, the net result of preventing the marriage
is simply more illegitimate children.

The statutory classification created by §§ 245.10(1), (4),

11
Page 434 U. S. 391

(5) thus cannot be justified by the interests advanced in support of it. The judgment of the District Court is,
accordingly,

Affirmed.

U.S. Supreme Court

Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)

Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson

No. 782

Argued May 6, 1942

Decided June 1, 1942

316 U.S. 535

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF OKLAHOMA

Syllabus

1. A statute of Oklahoma provides for the sterilization, by vasectomy or salpingectomy, of "habitual criminals" -- an
habitual criminal being defined therein as any person who, having been convicted two or more times, in Oklahoma or
in any other State, of "felonies involving moral turpitude," is thereafter convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in
Oklahoma for such a crime. Expressly excepted from the terms of the statute are certain offenses, including
embezzlement. As applied to one who was convicted once of stealing chickens and twice of robbery, held that the
statute violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. P. 316 U. S. 537.

2. The State Supreme Court having sustained the Act, as applied to the petitioner here, without reference to a
severability clause, the question whether that clause would be so applied as to remove the particular constitutional
objection is one which may appropriately be left for adjudication by the state court. P. 316 U. S. 542.

189 Okla. 235, 115 P.2d 123, reversed.

Page 316 U. S. 536

CERTIORARI, 315 U.S. 789, to review the affirmance of a judgment in a proceeding under the Oklahoma Habitual
Criminal Sterilization Act, wherein it was ordered that the defendant (petitioner here) be made sterile.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case touches a sensitive and important area of human rights. Oklahoma deprives certain individuals of a right
which is basic to the perpetuation of a race the right to have offspring. Oklahoma has decreed the enforcement of its
law against petitioner, overruling his claim that it violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Because that decision raised
grave and substantial constitutional questions, we granted the petition for certiorari.

12
The statute involved is Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act. Okla.Stat.Ann. Tit. 57, §§ 171, et seq.;L.1935, pp.
94 et seq. That Act defines an "habitual criminal" as a person who, having been convicted two or more times for crimes
"amounting to felonies involving moral turpitude," either in an Oklahoma court or in a court of any other State, is
thereafter convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in an Oklahoma penal
institution. § 173. Machinery is provided for the institution by the Attorney General of a proceeding against such a
person in the Oklahoma courts for a judgment that such person shall be rendered sexually sterile. §§ 176, 177. Notice,
an opportunity to be heard, and the right to a jury trial are provided. §§ 177-181. The issues triable in such a
proceeding are narrow and confined.

Page 316 U. S. 537

If the court or jury finds that the defendant is an "habitual criminal" and that he "may be rendered sexually sterile
without detriment to his or her general health," then the court "shall render judgment to the effect that said defendant
be rendered sexually sterile" (§ 182) by the operation of vasectomy in case of a male, and of salpingectomy in case of a
female. § 174. Only one other provision of the Act is material here, and that is § 195, which provides that

"offenses arising out of the violation of the prohibitory laws, revenue acts, embezzlement, or political offenses, shall
not come or be considered within the terms of this Act."

Petitioner was convicted in 1926 of the crime of stealing chickens, and was sentenced to the Oklahoma State
Reformatory. In 1929 he was convicted of the crime of robbery with firearms, and was sentenced to the reformatory.
In 1934, he was convicted again of robbery with firearms, and was sentenced to the penitentiary. He was confined
there in 1935 when the Act was passed. In 1936, the Attorney General instituted proceedings against him. Petitioner,
in his answer, challenged the Act as unconstitutional by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment. A jury trial was had.
The court instructed the jury that the crimes of which petitioner had been convicted were felonies involving moral
turpitude, and that the only question for the jury was whether the operation of vasectomy could be performed on
petitioner without detriment to his general health. The jury found that it could be. A judgment directing that the
operation of vasectomy be performed on petitioner was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma by a five-to-four
decision. 189 Okla. 235, 115 P.2d 123.

Several objections to the constitutionality of the Act have been pressed upon us. It is urged that the Act cannot be
sustained as an exercise of the police power, in view

Page 316 U. S. 538

of the state of scientific authorities respecting inheritability of criminal traits. [Footnote 1] It is argued that due
process is lacking because, under this Act, unlike the Act [Footnote 2] upheld in Buck v. Bell, 274 U. S. 200, the
defendant is given no opportunity to be heard on the issue as to whether he is the probable potential parent of socially
undesirable offspring. See Davis v. Berry, 216 F. 413; Williams v. Smith, 190 Ind. 526, 131 N.E. 2. It is also suggested
that the Act is penal in character, and that the sterilization provided for is cruel and unusual punishment and violative
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Davis v. Berry, supra. Cf. State v. Felen, 70 Wash. 65, 126 P. 75; Mickle v.
Henrichs, 262 F. 687. We pass those points without intimating an opinion on them, for there is a feature of the Act
which clearly condemns it. That is its failure to meet the requirements of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

We do not stop to point out all of the inequalities in this Act. A few examples will suffice. In Oklahoma, grand larceny is
a felony. Okla.Stats.Ann. Tit. 21, §§ 1705, 5. Larceny is grand larceny when the property taken exceeds $20 in
value. Id., § 1704. Embezzlement is punishable "in the manner prescribed for feloniously stealing property of the value
of that embezzled." Id., § 1462. Hence, he who embezzles property worth more than $20 is guilty of a felony. A clerk
who appropriates over $20 from his employer's till (id. § 1456) and a stranger who steals the same

Page 316 U. S. 539

13
amount are thus both guilty of felonies. If the latter repeats his act and is convicted three times, he may be sterilized.
But the clerk is not subject to the pains and penalties of the Act no matter how large his embezzlements nor how
frequent his convictions. A person who enters a chicken coop and steals chickens commits a felony (id., § 1719), and
he may be sterilized if he is thrice convicted. If, however, he is a bailee of the property and fraudulently appropriates
it, he is an embezzler. Id., § 1455. Hence, no matter how habitual his proclivities for embezzlement are, and no matter
how often his conviction, he may not be sterilized. Thus, the nature of the two crimes is intrinsically the same, and
they are punishable in the same manner. Furthermore, the line between them follows close distinctions -- distinctions
comparable to those highly technical ones which shaped the common law as to "trespass" or "taking." Bishop,
Criminal Law (9th ed.) Vol. 2, §§ 760, 799, et seq. There may be larceny by fraud, rather than embezzlement even
where the owner of the personal property delivers it to the defendant, if the latter has, at that time, "a fraudulent
intention to make use of the possession as a means of converting such property to his own use, and does so convert
it."Bivens v. State, 6 Okla.Cr. 521, 529, 120 P. 1033, 1036. If the fraudulent intent occurs later, and the defendant
converts the property, he is guilty of embezzlement. Bivens v. State, supra; Flohr v. Territory, 14 Okla. 477, 78 P. 565.
Whether a particular act is larceny by fraud or embezzlement thus turns not on the intrinsic quality of the act, but on
when the felonious intent arose -- a question for the jury under appropriate instructions.Bivens v. State, supra; Riley v.
State, 64 Okla.Cr. 183, 78 P.2d 712.

It was stated in Buck v. Bell, supra, that the claim that state legislation violates the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is "the usual last resort of constitutional arguments." 274 U.S. p. 274 U. S. 208. Under our
constitutional

Page 316 U. S. 540

system, the States, in determining the reach and scope of particular legislation, need not provide "abstract
symmetry." Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 232 U. S. 144. They may mark and set apart the classes and types of
problems according to the needs and as dictated or suggested by experience. See Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63,
and cases cited. It was in that connection that Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court in Bain Peanut Co. v.
Pinson, 282 U. S. 499, 282 U. S. 501, stated, "We must remember that the machinery of government would not work if
it were not allowed a little play in its joints." Only recently, we reaffirmed the view that the equal protection clause
does not prevent the legislature from recognizing "degrees of evil" (Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 239 U. S. 43) by our
ruling in Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 310 U. S. 147, that "the Constitution does not require things which are different,
in fact, or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same." And see Nashville, C. & St.L. Ry. v. Browning, 310
U. S. 362. Thus, if we had here only a question as to a State's classification of crimes, such as embezzlement or larceny,
no substantial federal question would be raised. See Moore v. Missouri, 159 U. S. 673; Hawker v. New York, 170 U. S.
189; Finley v. California, 222 U. S. 28; Patsone v. Pennsylvania, supra. For a State is not constrained in the exercise of its
police power to ignore experience which marks a class of offenders or a family of offenses for special treatment. Nor is
it prevented by the equal protection clause from confining "its restrictions to those classes of cases where the need is
deemed to be clearest." Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 236 U. S. 384. And see McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539. As
stated in Buck v. Bell, supra, p. 274 U. S. 208,

". . . the law does all that is needed when it does all that it can, indicates a policy, applies it to all within the lines, and
seeks to bring within the lines all similarly situated so far and so fast as its means allow. "

Page 316 U. S. 541

But the instant legislation runs afoul of the equal protection clause, though we give Oklahoma that large deference
which the rule of the foregoing cases requires. We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic
civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race. The
power to sterilize, if exercised, may have subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects. In evil or reckless hands, it can
cause races or types which are inimical to the dominant group to wither and disappear. There is no redemption for
the individual whom the law touches. Any experiment which the State conducts is to his irreparable injury. He is
forever deprived of a basic liberty. We mention these matters not to reexamine the scope of the police power of the
States. We advert to them merely in emphasis of our view that strict scrutiny of the classification which a State makes
in a sterilization law is essential, lest unwittingly, or otherwise, invidious discriminations are made against groups or

14
types of individuals in violation of the constitutional guaranty of just and equal laws. The guaranty of "equal
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 118 U. S. 369.
When the law lays an unequal hand on those who have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense and
sterilizes one and not the other, it has made as invidious a discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or
nationality for oppressive treatment. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, supra; Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337. Sterilization of those
who have thrice committed grand larceny, with immunity for those who are embezzlers, is a clear, pointed,
unmistakable discrimination. Oklahoma makes no attempt to say that he who commits larceny by trespass or trick or
fraud has biologically inheritable traits which he who commits embezzlement lacks. Oklahoma's line between larceny
by fraud and embezzlement is determined, as we have noted, "with reference to the time when the

Page 316 U. S. 542

fraudulent intent to convert the property to the taker's own use" arises. Riley v. State, supra, 64 Okla.Cr. at p. 189, 78
P.2d p. 715. We have not the slightest basis for inferring that that line has any significance in eugenics, nor that the
inheritability of criminal traits follows the neat legal distinctions which the law has marked between those two
offenses. In terms of fines and imprisonment, the crimes of larceny and embezzlement rate the same under the
Oklahoma code. Only when it comes to sterilization are the pains and penalties of the law different. The equal
protection clause would indeed be a formula of empty words if such conspicuously artificial lines could be drawn. See
Smith v. Wayne Probate Judge, 231 Mich. 409, 420-421, 204 N.W. 40. In Buck v. Bell, supra, the Virginia statute was
upheld though it applied only to feeble-minded persons in institutions of the State. But it was pointed out that,

"so far as the operations enable those who otherwise must be kept confined to be returned to the world, and thus
open the asylum to others, the equality aimed at will be more nearly reached."

274 U.S. p. 274 U. S. 208. Here there is no such saving feature. Embezzlers are forever free. Those who steal or take in
other ways are not. If such a classification were permitted, the technical common law concept of a "trespass" (Bishop,
Criminal Law, 9th ed., vol. 1, §§ 566, 567) based on distinctions which are "very largely dependent upon history for
explanation" (Holmes, The Common Law, p. 73) could readily become a rule of human genetics.

It is true that the Act has a broad severability clause. [Footnote 3] But we will not endeavor to determine whether its
application

Page 316 U. S. 543

would solve the equal protection difficulty. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma sustained the Act without reference to
the severability clause. We have therefore a situation where the Act, as construed and applied to petitioner, is allowed
to perpetuate the discrimination which we have found to be fatal. Whether the severability clause would be so applied
as to remove this particular constitutional objection is a question which may be more appropriately left for
adjudication by the Oklahoma court. Dorchy v. Kansas, 264 U. S. 286. That is reemphasized here by our uncertainty as
to what excision, if any, would be made as a matter of Oklahoma law. Cf. Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U. S. 553. It is by no
means clear whether, if an excision were made, this particular constitutional difficulty might be solved by enlarging,
on the one hand, or contracting, on the other (cf. Mr. Justice Brandeis dissenting, National Life Ins. Co. v. United
States, 277 U. S. 508, 277 U. S. 534-535) the class of criminals who might be sterilized.

Reversed.

G.R. No. 100150 January 5, 1994

BRIGIDO R. SIMON, JR., CARLOS QUIMPO, CARLITO ABELARDO, AND GENEROSO OCAMPO, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, ROQUE FERMO, AND OTHERS AS JOHN DOES, respondents.

The City Attorney for petitioners.

15
The Solicitor General for public respondent.

VITUG, J.:

The extent of the authority and power of the Commission on Human Rights ("CHR") is again placed into focus in this
petition for prohibition, with prayer for a restraining order and preliminary injunction. The petitioners ask us to
prohibit public respondent CHR from further hearing and investigating CHR Case No. 90-1580, entitled "Fermo, et al.
vs. Quimpo, et al."

The case all started when a "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners)
in his capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under the Office of
the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the officers and members of the North
EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the respondents were given a grace-period of three (3) days
(up to 12 July 1990) within which to vacate the questioned premises of North EDSA.1Prior to their receipt of the
demolition notice, the private respondents were informed by petitioner Quimpo that their stalls should be removed to
give way to the "People's Park".2 On 12 July 1990, the group, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-
complaint (Pinag-samang Sinumpaang Salaysay) with the CHR against the petitioners, asking the late CHR Chairman
Mary Concepcion Bautista for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido Simon, Jr., of Quezon City to stop the
demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores, and carinderia along North EDSA. The complaint was
docketed as CHR Case No. 90-1580.3 On 23 July 1990, the CHR issued an Order, directing the petitioners "to desist
from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the vendors/squatters' complaint
before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to appear before the CHR. 4

On the basis of the sworn statements submitted by the private respondents on 31 July 1990, as well as CHR's own
ocular inspection, and convinced that on 28 July 1990 the petitioners carried out the demolition of private
respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia,5 the CHR, in its resolution of 1 August 1990, ordered the
disbursement of financial assistance of not more than P200,000.00 in favor of the private respondents to purchase
light housing materials and food under the Commission's supervision and again directed the petitioners to "desist
from further demolition, with the warning that violation of said order would lead to a citation for contempt and
arrest."6

A motion to dismiss,7 dated 10 September 1990, questioned CHR's jurisdiction. The motion also averred, among other
things, that:

1. this case came about due to the alleged violation by the (petitioners) of the Inter-Agency
Memorandum of Agreement whereby Metro-Manila Mayors agreed on a moratorium in the
demolition of the dwellings of poor dwellers in Metro-Manila;

xxx xxx xxx

3. . . . , a perusal of the said Agreement (revealed) that the moratorium referred to therein refers to
moratorium in the demolition of the structures of poor dwellers;

4. that the complainants in this case (were) not poor dwellers but independent business
entrepreneurs even this Honorable Office admitted in its resolution of 1 August 1990 that the
complainants are indeed, vendors;

5. that the complainants (were) occupying government land, particularly the sidewalk of EDSA
corner North Avenue, Quezon City; . . . and

16
 6. that the City Mayor of Quezon City (had) the sole and exclusive discretion and authority whether
or not a certain business establishment (should) be allowed to operate within the jurisdiction of
Quezon City, to revoke or cancel a permit, if already issued, upon grounds clearly specified by law
and ordinance.8

During the 12 September 1990 hearing, the petitioners moved for postponement, arguing that the motion to dismiss
set for 21 September 1990 had yet to be resolved. The petitioners likewise manifested that they would bring the case
to the courts.

On 18 September 1990 a supplemental motion to dismiss was filed by the petitioners, stating that the Commission's
authority should be understood as being confined only to the investigation of violations of civil and political rights,
and that "the rights allegedly violated in this case (were) not civil and political rights, (but) their privilege to engage in
business."9

On 21 September 1990, the motion to dismiss was heard and submitted for resolution, along with the contempt
charge that had meantime been filed by the private respondents, albeit vigorously objected to by petitioners (on the
ground that the motion to dismiss was still then unresolved).10

In an Order,11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out the demolition of
the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of
them.

On 1 March 1991,12 the CHR issued an Order, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss and supplemental motion to
dismiss, in this wise:

Clearly, the Commission on Human Rights under its constitutional mandate had jurisdiction over the
complaint filed by the squatters-vendors who complained of the gross violations of their human and
constitutional rights. The motion to dismiss should be and is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. 13

The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the (Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger limited
only to investigating civil and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to
provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines . . . ." It
added:

The right to earn a living is a right essential to one's right to development, to life and to dignity. All
these brazenly and violently ignored and trampled upon by respondents with little regard at the
same time for the basic rights of women and children, and their health, safety and welfare. Their
actions have psychologically scarred and traumatized the children, who were witness and exposed to
such a violent demonstration of Man's inhumanity to man.

In an Order,14 dated 25 April 1991, petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this recourse.

The petition was initially dismissed in our resolution15 of 25 June 1991; it was subsequently reinstated, however, in
our resolution16 of 18 June 1991, in which we also issued a temporary restraining order, directing the CHR to "CEASE
and DESIST from further hearing CHR No. 90-1580."17

The petitioners pose the following:

Whether or not the public respondent has jurisdiction:

17
a) to investigate the alleged violations of the "business rights" of the private respondents whose stalls were
demolished by the petitioners at the instance and authority given by the Mayor of Quezon City;

b) to impose the fine of P500.00 each on the petitioners; and

c) to disburse the amount of P200,000.00 as financial aid to the vendors affected by the demolition.

In the Court's resolution of 10 October 1991, the Solicitor-General was excused from filing his comment for public
respondent CHR. The latter thus filed its own comment,18 through Hon. Samuel Soriano, one of its Commissioners. The
Court also resolved to dispense with the comment of private respondent Roque Fermo, who had since failed to comply
with the resolution, dated 18 July 1991, requiring such comment.

The petition has merit.

The Commission on Human Rights was created by the 1987

Constitution.19 It was formally constituted by then President Corazon Aquino via Executive Order No. 163,20 issued on
5 May 1987, in the exercise of her legislative power at the time. It succeeded, but so superseded as well, the
Presidential Committee on Human Rights.21

The powers and functions22 of the Commission are defined by the 1987 Constitution, thus: to —

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations
involving civil and political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations
thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the
Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for
the primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for
compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human
rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of
documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in any investigation
conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its
functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

18
 (11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

In its Order of 1 March 1991, denying petitioners' motion to dismiss, the CHR theorizes that the intention of the
members of the Constitutional Commission is to make CHR a quasi-judicial body.23 This view, however, has not
heretofore been shared by this Court. In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights,24 the Court, through then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice Andres Narvasa, has observed that it is "only the first of the enumerated powers and
functions that bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment," but that resemblance can in no way be
synonymous to the adjudicatory power itself. The Court explained:

. . . (T)he Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court
or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to
those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

After thus laying down at the outset the above rule, we now proceed to the other kernel of this controversy and, its is,
to determine the extent of CHR's investigative power.

It can hardly be disputed that the phrase "human rights" is so generic a term that any attempt to define it, albeit not a
few have tried, could at best be described as inconclusive. Let us observe. In a symposium on human rights in the
Philippines, sponsored by the University of the Philippines in 1977, one of the questions that has been propounded is
"(w)hat do you understand by "human rights?" The participants, representing different sectors of the society, have
given the following varied answers:

Human rights are the basic rights which inhere in man by virtue of his humanity. They are the same
in all parts of the world, whether the Philippines or England, Kenya or the Soviet Union, the United
States or Japan, Kenya or Indonesia . . . .

Human rights include civil rights, such as the right to life, liberty, and property; freedom of speech, of
the press, of religion, academic freedom, and the rights of the accused to due process of law; political
rights, such as the right to elect public officials, to be elected to public office, and to form political
associations and engage in politics; and social rights, such as the right to an education, employment,
and social services.25

Human rights are the entitlement that inhere in the individual person from the sheer fact of his
humanity. . . . Because they are inherent, human rights are not granted by the State but can only be
recognized and protected by it.26

(Human rights include all) the civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights defined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.27

Human rights are rights that pertain to man simply because he is human. They are part of his natural
birth, right, innate and inalienable.28

19
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as, or more specifically, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, suggests that the scope of human
rights can be understood to include those that relate to an individual's social, economic, cultural, political and civil
relations. It thus seems to closely identify the term to the universally accepted traits and attributes of an individual,
along with what is generally considered to be his inherent and inalienable rights, encompassing almost all aspects of
life.

Have these broad concepts been equally contemplated by the framers of our 1986 Constitutional Commission in
adopting the specific provisions on human rights and in creating an independent commission to safeguard these
rights? It may of value to look back at the country's experience under the martial law regime which may have, in fact,
impelled the inclusions of those provisions in our fundamental law. Many voices have been heard. Among those
voices, aptly represented perhaps of the sentiments expressed by others, comes from Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, a
respected jurist and an advocate of civil liberties, who, in his paper, entitled "Present State of Human Rights in the
Philippines,"29 observes:

But while the Constitution of 1935 and that of 1973 enshrined in their Bill of Rights most of the
human rights expressed in the International Covenant, these rights became unavailable upon the
proclamation of Martial Law on 21 September 1972. Arbitrary action then became the rule.
Individuals by the thousands became subject to arrest upon suspicion, and were detained and held
for indefinite periods, sometimes for years, without charges, until ordered released by the
Commander-in-Chief or this representative. The right to petition for the redress of grievances
became useless, since group actions were forbidden. So were strikes. Press and other mass media
were subjected to censorship and short term licensing. Martial law brought with it the suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus, and judges lost independence and security of tenure, except members of
the Supreme Court. They were required to submit letters of resignation and were dismissed upon the
acceptance thereof. Torture to extort confessions were practiced as declared by international bodies
like Amnesty International and the International Commission of Jurists.

Converging our attention to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we can see the following discussions during
its 26 August 1986 deliberations:

MR. GARCIA . . . , the primacy of its (CHR) task must be made clear in view of the importance of
human rights and also because civil and political rights have been determined by many international
covenants and human rights legislations in the Philippines, as well as the Constitution, specifically
the Bill of Rights and subsequent legislation. Otherwise, if we cover such a wide territory in area, we
might diffuse its impact and the precise nature of its task, hence, its effectivity would also be curtailed.

So, it is important to delienate the parameters of its tasks so that the commission can be most effective.

MR. BENGZON. That is precisely my difficulty because civil and political rights are very broad. The
Article on the Bill of Rights covers civil and political rights. Every single right of an individual
involves his civil right or his political right. So, where do we draw the line?

MR. GARCIA. Actually, these civil and political rights have been made clear in the language of human
rights advocates, as well as in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which addresses a number
of articles on the right to life, the right against torture, the right to fair and public hearing, and so on.
These are very specific rights that are considered enshrined in many international documents and
legal instruments as constituting civil and political rights, and these are precisely what we want to
defend here.

MR. BENGZON. So, would the commissioner say civil and political rights as defined in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights?

20
MR. GARCIA. Yes, and as I have mentioned, the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
distinguished this right against torture.

MR. BENGZON. So as to distinguish this from the other rights that we have?

MR. GARCIA. Yes, because the other rights will encompass social and economic rights, and there are
other violations of rights of citizens which can be addressed to the proper courts and authorities.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. BENGZON. So, we will authorize the commission to define its functions, and, therefore, in doing
that the commission will be authorized to take under its wings cases which perhaps heretofore or at
this moment are under the jurisdiction of the ordinary investigative and prosecutorial agencies of the
government. Am I correct?

MR. GARCIA. No. We have already mentioned earlier that we would like to define the specific
parameters which cover civil and political rights as covered by the international standards governing
the behavior of governments regarding the particular political and civil rights of citizens, especially
of political detainees or prisoners. This particular aspect we have experienced during martial law
which we would now like to safeguard.

MR. BENGZON. Then, I go back to that question that I had. Therefore, what we are really trying to say
is, perhaps, at the proper time we could specify all those rights stated in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and defined as human rights. Those are the rights that we envision here?

MR. GARCIA. Yes. In fact, they are also enshrined in the Bill of Rights of our Constitution. They are
integral parts of that.

MR. BENGZON. Therefore, is the Gentleman saying that all the rights under the Bill of Rights covered by
human rights?

MR. GARCIA. No, only those that pertain to civil and political rights.

xxx xxx xxx

MR. RAMA. In connection with the discussion on the scope of human rights, I would like to state that in
the past regime, everytime we invoke the violation of human rights, the Marcos regime came out with
the defense that, as a matter of fact, they had defended the rights of people to decent living, food, decent
housing and a life consistent with human dignity.

So, I think we should really limit the definition of human rights to political rights. Is that the sense of the
committee, so as not to confuse the issue?

MR. SARMIENTO. Yes, Madam President.

MR. GARCIA. I would like to continue and respond also to repeated points raised by the previous
speaker.

There are actually six areas where this Commission on Human Rights could act effectively: 1) protection
of rights of political detainees; 2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures; 3) fair and
public trials; 4) cases of disappearances; 5) salvagings and hamletting; and 6) other crimes committed
against the religious.

21
 xxx xxx xxx

The PRESIDENT. Commissioner Guingona is recognized.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank You Madam President.

I would like to start by saying that I agree with Commissioner Garcia that we should, in order to make
the proposed Commission more effective, delimit as much as possible, without prejudice to future
expansion. The coverage of the concept and jurisdictional area of the term "human rights". I was
actually disturbed this morning when the reference was made without qualification to the rights
embodied in the universal Declaration of Human Rights, although later on, this was qualified to refer
to civil and political rights contained therein.

If I remember correctly, Madam President, Commissioner Garcia, after mentioning the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, mentioned or linked the concept of human right with other
human rights specified in other convention which I do not remember. Am I correct?

MR. GARCIA. Is Commissioner Guingona referring to the Declaration of Torture of 1985?

MR. GUINGONA. I do not know, but the commissioner mentioned another.

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, the other one is the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights of which we are signatory.

MR. GUINGONA. I see. The only problem is that, although I have a copy of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights here, I do not have a copy of the other covenant mentioned. It is quite possible that
there are rights specified in that other convention which may not be specified here. I was wondering
whether it would be wise to link our concept of human rights to general terms like "convention,"
rather than specify the rights contained in the convention.

As far as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is concerned, the Committee, before the period
of amendments, could specify to us which of these articles in the Declaration will fall within the
concept of civil and political rights, not for the purpose of including these in the proposed
constitutional article, but to give the sense of the Commission as to what human rights would be
included, without prejudice to expansion later on, if the need arises. For example, there was no
definite reply to the question of Commissioner Regalado as to whether the right to marry would be
considered a civil or a social right. It is not a civil right?

MR. GARCIA. Madam President, I have to repeat the various specific civil and political rights that we felt
must be envisioned initially by this provision — freedom from political detention and arrest prevention
of torture, right to fair and public trials, as well as crimes involving disappearance, salvagings,
hamlettings and collective violations. So, it is limited to politically related crimes precisely to protect the
civil and political rights of a specific group of individuals, and therefore, we are not opening it up to all
of the definite areas.

MR. GUINGONA. Correct. Therefore, just for the record, the Gentlemen is no longer linking his
concept or the concept of the Committee on Human Rights with the so-called civil or political rights
as contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

MR. GARCIA. When I mentioned earlier the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I was referring to
an international instrument.

22
 MR. GUINGONA. I know.

MR. GARCIA. But it does not mean that we will refer to each and every specific article therein, but
only to those that pertain to the civil and politically related, as we understand it in this Commission
on Human Rights.

MR. GUINGONA. Madam President, I am not even clear as to the distinction between civil and social
rights.

MR. GARCIA. There are two international covenants: the International Covenant and Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. The second
covenant contains all the different rights-the rights of labor to organize, the right to education,
housing, shelter, et cetera.

MR. GUINGONA. So we are just limiting at the moment the sense of the committee to those that the
Gentlemen has specified.

MR. GARCIA. Yes, to civil and political rights.

MR. GUINGONA. Thank you.

xxx xxx xxx

SR. TAN. Madam President, from the standpoint of the victims of human rights, I cannot stress more
on how much we need a Commission on Human Rights. . . .

. . . human rights victims are usually penniless. They cannot pay and very few lawyers will accept
clients who do not pay. And so, they are the ones more abused and oppressed. Another reason is, the
cases involved are very delicate — torture, salvaging, picking up without any warrant of arrest,
massacre — and the persons who are allegedly guilty are people in power like politicians, men in the
military and big shots. Therefore, this Human Rights Commission must be independent.

I would like very much to emphasize how much we need this commission, especially for the little
Filipino, the little individual who needs this kind of help and cannot get it. And I think we should
concentrate only on civil and political violations because if we open this to land, housing and health, we
will have no place to go again and we will not receive any response. . . .30 (emphasis supplied)

The final outcome, now written as Section 18, Article XIII, of the 1987 Constitution, is a provision empowering the
Commission on Human Rights to "investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights" (Sec. 1).

The term "civil rights,"31 has been defined as referring —

(t)o those (rights) that belong to every citizen of the state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its
inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization or administration of the government. They
include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Or, as
otherwise defined civil rights are rights appertaining to a person by virtue of his citizenship in a state
or community. Such term may also refer, in its general sense, to rights capable of being enforced or
redressed in a civil action.

Also quite often mentioned are the guarantees against involuntary servitude, religious persecution, unreasonable
searches and seizures, and imprisonment for debt.32

23
Political rights,33 on the other hand, are said to refer to the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
establishment or administration of government, the right of suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of
petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.34

Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, aforequoted, it is readily apparent that the delegates
envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases of human rights
violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1) protection of rights of political detainees,
(2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures, (3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5)
salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other crimes committed against the religious." While the enumeration has not
likely been meant to have any preclusive effect, more than just expressing a statement of priority, it is, nonetheless,
significant for the tone it has set. In any event, the delegates did not apparently take comfort in peremptorily making a
conclusive delineation of the CHR's scope of investigatorial jurisdiction. They have thus seen it fit to resolve, instead,
that "Congress may provide for other cases of violations of human rights that should fall within the authority of the
Commission, taking into account its recommendation."35

In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls, sari-sari stores
and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a land which is planned to be
developed into a "People's Park". More than that, the land adjoins the North EDSA of Quezon City which, this Court can
take judicial notice of, is a busy national highway. The consequent danger to life and limb is not thus to be likewise
simply ignored. It is indeed paradoxical that a right which is claimed to have been violated is one that cannot, in the
first place, even be invoked, if it is, in fact, extant. Be that as it may, looking at the standards hereinabove
discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude that the order for
the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private respondents can fall within the compartment
of "human rights violations involving civil and political rights" intended by the Constitution.

On its contempt powers, the CHR is constitutionally authorized to "adopt its operational guidelines and rules of
procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court." Accordingly, the CHR
acted within its authority in providing in its revised rules, its power "to cite or hold any person in direct or indirect
contempt, and to impose the appropriate penalties in accordance with the procedure and sanctions provided for in
the Rules of Court." That power to cite for contempt, however, should be understood to apply only to violations of its
adopted operational guidelines and rules of procedure essential to carry out its investigatorial powers. To exemplify,
the power to cite for contempt could be exercised against persons who refuse to cooperate with the said body, or who
unduly withhold relevant information, or who decline to honor summons, and the like, in pursuing its investigative
work. The "order to desist" (a semantic interplay for a restraining order) in the instance before us, however, is not
investigatorial in character but prescinds from an adjudicative power that it does not possess. In Export Processing
Zone Authority vs. Commission on Human Rights,36 the Court, speaking through Madame Justice Carolina Griño-Aquino,
explained:

The constitutional provision directing the CHR to "provide for preventive measures and legal aid
services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection" may not
be construed to confer jurisdiction on the Commission to issue a restraining order or writ of
injunction for, it that were the intention, the Constitution would have expressly said so. "Jurisdiction
is conferred only by the Constitution or by law". It is never derived by implication.

Evidently, the "preventive measures and legal aid services" mentioned in the Constitution refer to
extrajudicial and judicial remedies (including a writ of preliminary injunction) which the CHR may
seek from proper courts on behalf of the victims of human rights violations. Not being a court of
justice, the CHR itself has no jurisdiction to issue the writ, for a writ of preliminary injunction may
only be issued "by the judge of any court in which the action is pending [within his district], or by a
Justice of the Court of Appeals, or of the Supreme Court. . . . A writ of preliminary injunction is an
ancillary remedy. It is available only in a pending principal action, for the preservation or protection
of the rights and interests of a party thereto, and for no other purpose." (footnotes omitted).

24
The Commission does have legal standing to indorse, for appropriate action, its findings and recommendations to any
appropriate agency of government.37

The challenge on the CHR's disbursement of the amount of P200,000.00 by way of financial aid to the vendors affected
by the demolition is not an appropriate issue in the instant petition. Not only is there lack of locus standi on the part of
the petitioners to question the disbursement but, more importantly, the matter lies with the appropriate
administrative agencies concerned to initially consider.

The public respondent explains that this petition for prohibition filed by the petitioners has become moot and
academic since the case before it (CHR Case No. 90-1580) has already been fully heard, and that the matter is merely
awaiting final resolution. It is true that prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the doing of an act about to be
done, and not intended to provide a remedy for an act already accomplished. 38 Here, however, said Commission
admittedly has yet to promulgate its resolution in CHR Case No. 90-1580. The instant petition has been intended,
among other things, to also prevent CHR from precisely doing that.39

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for in this petition is GRANTED. The Commission on Human Rights is hereby prohibited
from further proceeding with CHR Case No. 90-1580 and from implementing the P500.00 fine for contempt. The
temporary restraining order heretofore issued by this Court is made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason and Puno, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I reiterate my separate opinion in "Carino, et al. vs. The Commission on Human rights, et al.," G.R. No. 96681, 2
December 1991, 204 SCRA 483 in relation to the resolution of 29 January 1991 and my dissenting opinion in "Export
Processing Zone Authority vs. The Commission on Human Rights,
et al.," G.R. No. 101476, 14 April 1992, 208 SCRA 125. I am of the considered view that the CHR can issue a cease and
desist order to maintain a status quo pending its investigation of a case involving an alleged human rights violation;
that such cease and desist order maybe necessary in situations involving a threatened violation of human rights,
which the CHR intents to investigate.

In the case at bench, I would consider the threatened demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderias as well as
the temporary shanties owned by the private respondents as posing prima facie a case of human rights violation
because it involves an impairment of the civil rights of said private respondents, under the definition of civil rights
cited by the majority opinion (pp. 20-21) and which the CHR has unquestioned authority to investigate (Section 18,
Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution).

Human rights demand more than lip service and extend beyond impressive displays of placards at street corners.
Positive action and results are what count. Certainly, the cause of human rights is not enhanced when the very
constitutional agency tasked to protect and vindicate human rights is transformed by us, from the start, into a tiger
without dentures but with maimed legs to boot. I submit the CHR should be given a wide latitude to look into and
investigate situations which may (or may not ultimately) involve human rights violations.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to remand the case to the CHR for further proceedings.

25
G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON REMOTO, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS Respondent.

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The
test of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.

Justice Robert A. Jackson

West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 1

One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that others may make different choices –
choices we would not make for ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend or
anger us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because they are different, and the right to disagree
and debate about important questions of public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our
democracy is built on genuine recognition of, and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.

Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the definitions and demands of morality. In
many cases, where moral convictions are concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an
insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox – philosophical justifications about what is moral are indispensable
and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that practical solutions are
preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric.
This will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at least, civilly.

Factual Background

This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an application for a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 20092 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December 16, 20093 (the Second
Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the
COMELEC’s refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise
known as the Party-List System Act.4

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or
trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with the
COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization had no
substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition5 for registration with the
COMELEC.

Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a marginalized and under-represented sector
that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of
exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their
sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.6 Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of
individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of governance.7

26
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner’s evidence, the COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the
Petition on moral grounds, stating that:

x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and
Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:

x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because of their sexual
orientation and gender identity.

and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:

x x x refers to a person’s capacity for profound emotional, affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual
relations with, individuals of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender."

This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates immorality which offends religious
beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:

For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women did change the natural use into that which
is against nature: And likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one toward
another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in themselves that recompense of their error
which was meet.

In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:

For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a people transgressing beyond bounds."
(7.81) "And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who indulged in
sin and crime!" (7:84) "He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who do mischief" (29:30).

As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2, 2008:

The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in the Petition’s par. 6F: ‘Consensual
partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age’. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the
Petition which waves for the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as
670,000 (Genesis 19 is the history of Sodom and Gomorrah).

Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license, relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to be complied with for
accreditation.

ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines nuisance as ‘Any act, omission, establishment,
business, condition of property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards decency or morality x x x

It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: ‘The contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides that ‘Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy’ are inexistent and void from the beginning.

Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal Code, as amended, penalizes ‘Immoral
doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows’ as follows:

27
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and indecent shows. — The penalty of prision
mayor or a fine ranging from six thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine, shall be
imposed upon:

1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to public morals;

2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in any form; the editors publishing
such literature; and the owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;

(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit indecent or immoral
plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral
plays, scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall
include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other purpose but to
satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet
traffic in and use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good
customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.

3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings, sculpture or literature which are
offensive to morals.

Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating immoral doctrines but likewise for not
being truthful when it said that it "or any of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to
comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections."

Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our youth to an environment that does
not conform to the teachings of our faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one
article that "older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth." As an agency of the government, ours too is the
State’s avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual
degradation.8

When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,9 three commissioners voted to overturn the First Assailed Resolution
(Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted
to deny Ang Ladlad’s Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R.
Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the
First Assailed Resolution, stating that:

I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941

Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system. Even assuming that it has properly
proven its under-representation and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad’s expressed sexual orientations per
se would benefit the nation as a whole.

Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-list system of electing congressional
representatives is to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations
and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and
enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.

If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an organization to represent its constituencies,
then all representative organizations would have found themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the
intention of the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of
misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of
marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nation’s – only that their interests have not been brought to the

28
attention of the nation because of their under representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is able to justify that
having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation
under the party-list system will remain just that.

II. No substantial differentiation

In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine jurisprudence, courts do not recognize
lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special class" of individuals. x x x Significantly, it has also been
held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental right, and that "nothing in the U.S.
Constitution discloses a comparable intent to protect or promote the social or legal equality of homosexual relations,"
as in the case of race or religion or belief.

xxxx

Thus, even if society’s understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBT’s is elevated, there can be no denying that
Ladlad constituencies are still males and females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the same
Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.

xxxx

IV. Public Morals

x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim religious practices. Neither is there any
attempt to any particular religious group’s moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral
parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based, but as a society, the
Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts
espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and these are not publicly accepted moral norms.

V. Legal Provisions

But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal
Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor upon "Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly
contrary to public morals." It penalizes "immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibition and indecent shows."
"Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under these legal provisions. This is clear from its Petition’s paragraph 6F: "Consensual
partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age’ It is further indicated in par. 24 of the
Petition which waves for the record: ‘In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as
670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any act, omission x x x or anything else x x x
which shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality x x x." These are all unlawful. 10

On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the
COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad’s application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a
preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin
printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.

On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to file its Comment on behalf of COMELEC not
later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010.11 Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a Motion for
Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to Comment. 12 Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed
a Comment in support of petitioner’s application.13 Thus, in order to give COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate
its position, we required it to file its own comment.14 The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its Comment
on February 2, 2010.15

29
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary restraining order on January 12, 2010,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist
from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.16

Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus
Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-Intervention.17 The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlad’spetition on
moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the
CHR’s motion to intervene.

On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to Intervene18 which motion was granted on February 2,
2010.19

The Parties’ Arguments

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma,
violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed
Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of
laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.

The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad’s petition and argued that the COMELEC erred in denying petitioner’s application
for registration since there was no basis for COMELEC’s allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their
own special interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate classification.
However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioner’s freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were
concerned, the OSG maintained that there had been no restrictions on these rights.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political
agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first
time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner
made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports
by COMELEC’s field personnel.

Our Ruling

We grant the petition.

Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No. 7941

The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad’s application for registration on the ground that the LGBT sector is neither
enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the
enumeration.

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors
specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections,20 "the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is
not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

30
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged that it had
nationwide existence through its members and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by
its field personnel, it was shown that "save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner does not exist in almost
all provinces in the country."21

This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence" is a
new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that petitioner was "not being truthful when it said that it or any of its
nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations relating to
the elections." Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioner’s accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the
Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioner’s alleged non-existence
were already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this is irregular
procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in respondent’s theory, and a serious violation of petitioner’s
right to procedural due process.

Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal of Ang Ladlad’s initial petition
shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT
community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and
members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group. 22 Ang Ladlad also represented
itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following
LGBT networks:"

§ Abra Gay Association

§ Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) – Aklan

§ Albay Gay Association

§ Arts Center of Cabanatuan City – Nueva Ecija

§ Boys Legion – Metro Manila

§ Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)

§ Can’t Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) – Metro Manila

§ Cebu Pride – Cebu City

§ Circle of Friends

§ Dipolog Gay Association – Zamboanga del Norte

§ Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)

§ Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG) – Metro Manila

§ Gay Men’s Support Group (GMSG) – Metro Manila

§ Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) – Lanao del Norte

§ Iloilo City Gay Association – Iloilo City

31
 § Kabulig Writer’s Group – Camarines Sur

§ Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)

§ LUMINA – Baguio City

§ Marikina Gay Association – Metro Manila

§ Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) – Metro Manila

§ Naga City Gay Association – Naga City

§ ONE BACARDI

§ Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) – Metro Manila

§ PUP LAKAN

§ RADAR PRIDEWEAR

§ Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. – Metro Manila

§ San Jose del Monte Gay Association – Bulacan

§ Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family – Rizal

§ Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) – Metro Manila

§ Soul Jive – Antipolo, Rizal

§ The Link – Davao City

§ Tayabas Gay Association – Quezon

§ Women’s Bisexual Network – Metro Manila

§ Zamboanga Gay Association – Zamboanga City23

Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found
that petitioner had no presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELEC’s findings are to be believed, petitioner
does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlad’s principal place of business.

Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated its compliance with the legal
requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from COMELEC’s moral objection and the belated allegation of non-
existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a
party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The
difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlad’s morality, or lack thereof.

Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration

32
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government
neutrality in religious matters."24 Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this
policy of neutrality."25 We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.

Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether
the COMELEC is able to advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine.
Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular effects. As we
held in Estrada v. Escritor:26

x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice
Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public moral
disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon
religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity
to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to
conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious
freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that
belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy.
As a result, government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those
whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.1avvphi1

In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in criminal law like
concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental
(or dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human society" and not because
the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on
religion might have a compelling influence on those engaged in public deliberations over what actions would be
considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a religion and thus
have religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate
the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put,
a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and
discernible secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x Recognizing the religious
nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion
clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must
pursue its secular goals and interests but at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent
neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state
interests.27

Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad’s Petition for Registration

Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality and homosexual conduct may be
religion-based, it has long been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues:

Petitioner’s accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists of LGBTs but because of the danger
it poses to the people especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a sector which believes that there
is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down
the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of
losing its own existence.28

We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and perhaps homosexuals themselves, have
borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure – religious beliefs,
convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals

33
themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen fit to criminalize
homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly
transplanted into the realm of law.29

The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG
agrees that "there should have been a finding by the COMELEC that the group’s members have committed or are
committing immoral acts."30 The OSG argues:

x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a different gender, or more than one
gender, but mere attraction does not translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and action.
Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its hands full of
disqualification cases against both the "straights" and the gays." Certainly this is not the intendment of the law. 31

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required
for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-
list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest
that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and
we recognize that the government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society.
Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of intentions, situate morality on
one end of an argument or another, without bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In
this, the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not remove an issue
from our scrutiny.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous,
at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as "any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or
anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality," the remedies for which are a prosecution
under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. 32 A
violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to
support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof,
and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a
judicial determination of liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral
grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any
substantial public interest. Respondent’s blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC
targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective
targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.

Equal Protection

Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides "nor shall any person be denied
equal protection of the laws," courts have never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on classification.
"Equality," said Aristotle, "consists in the same treatment of similar persons." 33 The equal protection clause
guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by
other persons or other classes in the same place and in like circumstances. 34

Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we
will uphold the classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate government end.35 In Central
Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 36 we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction, the standard
of analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the ‘rational basis’ test, coupled with a deferential
attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution."37

34
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers homosexual conduct as immoral and
unacceptable, and this constitutes sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the
Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions
or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC
describes it, the asserted state interest here – that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority – is not a legitimate
state interest that is sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause. The COMELEC’s
differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that
would benefit the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a disfavored
group.

From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender have the same interest in
participating in the party-list system on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in
this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.

It bears stressing that our finding that COMELEC’s act of differentiating LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the
party-list system is concerned does not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and
homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG’s position that
homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause.38 We are not prepared to single
out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated treatment. We have not received sufficient
evidence to this effect, and it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely demanded
that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made "an
unwarranted and impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case."

Freedom of Expression and Association

Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and attempt to persuade society of the
validity of its position through normal democratic means.39 It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and
differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor:40

In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled in the public square. Where citizens
are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the public
square where people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of opinion, including opinion
shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these citizens have equal access to the public square. In this
representative democracy, the state is prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments may be
proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and decide.
Majority rule is a necessary principle in this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral
judgments is finally crystallized into law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority, i.e.,
the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits
it specifies – including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small – not only for a
majority, however large – but for each of us" – the majority imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises
not to do what it otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, and this freedom applies
not only to those that are favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in
this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the
COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to
interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.

This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows
that both expressions concerning one’s homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that supports
LGBT individuals are protected as well.

35
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even overwhelming public perception that
homosexual conduct violates public morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.41 European and United
Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality grounds, citing
general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and international texts. 42 To the extent that there is much
to learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly
illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may nevertheless have
persuasive influence on the Court’s analysis.

In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have ruled that existing free speech doctrines
protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of
opinion, public institutions must show that their actions were caused by "something more than a mere desire to avoid
the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint." 43

With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human
rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may
campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and
the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that political ideas that
challenge the existing order and whose realization is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper
opportunity of expression through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking or
unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population.44 A political group should not be hindered solely
because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find solutions capable of satisfying
everyone concerned.45 Only if a political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with
democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.46

We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even
defiant. They are entitled to hold and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all
likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally equivalent to
heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court is
concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from
consideration the values of other members of the community.

Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay rights litigants. It well may be that this
Decision will only serve to highlight the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the
more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a
clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual
perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision.

The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad,
and its members have not been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on
their freedom of expression or association. The OSG argues that:

There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its
authority to review and verify the qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-
list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.

xxxx

A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of the petitioner to freely take part in the
conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a
constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.

36
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that the denial of Ang Ladlad’s petition
has the clear and immediate effect of limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and
equally participate in public life through engagement in the party list elections.

This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a privilege subject to limitations imposed by
law. x x x47

The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its qualifications to participate in the party-list system,
and – as advanced by the OSG itself – the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by
law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC’s action, from publicly
expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process with other equally-
qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner’s fundamental rights.

Non-Discrimination and International Law

In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and promise, international human rights law,
in particular, has grown dynamically in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For
individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human rights
norms are particularly significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so that such norms
may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.

Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect and promote human rights. In
particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral
participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.

The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as follows:

Article 26

All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In
this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national
or social origin, property, birth or other status.

In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general application relating to elections be
applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not specifically
enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has
opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include "sexual orientation." 48Additionally, a
variety of United Nations bodies have declared discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited
under various international agreements.49

The UDHR provides:

Article 21.

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or through freely chosen
representatives.

Likewise, the ICCPR states:

Article 25

37
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and
without unreasonable restrictions:

(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives;

(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and
shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will of the electors;

(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.

As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to electoral participation is elaborated by
the Human Rights Committee in its General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as
follows:

1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen to take part in the conduct of public
affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and the right to have access to public service. Whatever form of constitution
or government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and other measures as may be
necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core
of democratic government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.

xxxx

15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for elective office ensures that persons
entitled to vote have a free choice of candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum
age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election
should not be excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or
by reason of political affiliation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that
person's candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain the legislative provisions which exclude any group or
category of persons from elective office.50

We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the responsibility of giving effect to the
Philippines’ international law obligations, the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social
ills. We refer now to the petitioner’s invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of International Human
Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity), 51 which petitioner declares to reflect binding
principles of international law.

At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles contain norms that are obligatory on the
Philippines. There are declarations and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the current
state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources of international law enumerated under Article
38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice.52 Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous
analysis of these alleged principles of international law to ascertain their true status.

We also hasten to add that not everything that society – or a certain segment of society – wants or demands is
automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at
will. It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today is a much broader context of needs that
identifies many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international law obliges states to sanction these
innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result of the notion that if "wants" are couched
in "rights" language, then they are no longer controversial.1avvphi1

Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by various
international law professors, are – at best – de lege ferenda – and do not constitute binding obligations on the
Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is characterized by the "soft law" nomenclature, i.e.,
international law is full of principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights,

38
most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio
juris.53

As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by this case are emotionally charged,
societal attitudes are in flux, even the psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion. This Court’s role is
not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it can,
uninfluenced by public opinion, and confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to withstand
vigorous debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Commission on Elections dated November 11,
2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on Elections is directed
to GRANT petitioner’s application for party-list accreditation. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO,

PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN
PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.

L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.

Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a legitimate
labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners Nicanor
Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu
and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.

Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969,
in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first shift (from 6 A.M.
to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.,
respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed demonstration.

The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent Court
reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the parties — parties —

3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass demonstration at
Malacañang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police Department to be participated by the
first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well as those working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00
PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning of March 4, 1969;

4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the Company's
canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2) Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3)
and all department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1) Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3)
Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5) Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.

39
 5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass demonstration at
Malacañang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted as spokesman of the union
panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be
cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the
demonstration has nothing to do with the Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with
Management;

6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized,
however, that any demonstration for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation
of the Company. For which reason, the Company, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave
of absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the
demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting
to an illegal strike;

7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked Company represented by
Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod,
Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon meeting of March 3, 1969, Company
reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO representatives that while all workers may join the
Malacañang demonstration, the workers for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be
excused from joining the demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize the workers in
the 2nd and 3rd shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO
LOCKOUT — NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall be dismiss;
De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily liable being the
organizers of the mass demonstration. The union panel countered that it was rather too late to
change their plans inasmuch as the Malacañang demonstration will be held the following morning;
and

8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company which was
received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows: 'REITERATING REQUEST
EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F",
pp. 42-43, rec.)

Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the pleas
of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the demonstration and
that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March
4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969, with the respondent Court, a
charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first shift, charging them with a "violation of
Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15, all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA
providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20, rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint
affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B", pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint
was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan
(Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)

In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because they
gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said mass
demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses of some Pasig
policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was not directed against the
respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)

After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador, in an
order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and herein

40
petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin
Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice
and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the respondent Company (Annex "F",
pp. 42-56, rec.)

Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that they filed
on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for reconsideration of said
order dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and the evidence, as well as asked for ten
(10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended
(Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )

In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company averred that
herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17 (should be September 15), 1969;
that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners had five (5) days
from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for reconsideration; and that
because their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs.
Castillo,1 which held among others, that a motion for extension of the five-day period for the filing of a motion for
reconsideration should be filed before the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).

Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in
support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).

In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of herein
petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its Rules (Annex "J", pp.
74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).

At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on October 24, 1969 and
addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17, as
amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed within five
(5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or order of the C.I.R.,
sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).

On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief from the order dated
October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was due to excusable
negligence and honest mistake committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office clerk of their
counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and "K-2", rec.).

Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, herein petitioners
filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).

There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed by the case at bar.

(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the
central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an individual
must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his person."2

(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and derision of
those who have no patience with general principles." 3

41
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain subjects
from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials, and
to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and property, to free speech,
or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to a vote; they
depend on the outcome of no elections."4 Laski proclaimed that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-being of
the State, was the criterion by which its behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to the
authority it was entitled to exercise."5

(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the immunities
reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we abhor or
hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the minority who want to talk, but
also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen.6 And as Justice Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are
the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not safe unless the liberties of all are protected. 7

(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential
to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the
citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also in
the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is accorded these
rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as
for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.

(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized.8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely precious in our society" and
the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need
breathing space to survive," permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." 9

Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are
extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and
ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of
oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise.

In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are
essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; 10 and such priority "gives these
liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions." 11

The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or rational
relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose — that the law is neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory nor oppressive — would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property rights. 12 On the
other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been
stressed in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the
opinion in Imbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs. Comelec, supra, like Justices
Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs. Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as
well as of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public
officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we shall be
governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the
improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge Learned Hand, viz. — whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by
its improbability, justifies such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17

II

The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of
strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work," herein petitioners are

42
guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective bargaining agreement with private respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles governing a democratic society, such
conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on March 4, 1969 before Malacañang was against
alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstrate
was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and
petition for redress of grievances in particular before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the
police officers of the municipality of Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection
from what they believe were police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to
protect herein petitioner Union and its members fro the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest
herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can
report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective
tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its
employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it also intimidated
by the local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to defend its own
employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers the alleged oppressive police who might have been all
the more emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to further indignities.

In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against alleged
persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their
very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their
basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of
its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their
property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell the difference between the life and death of the
firm or its owners or its management. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment
and persecuted as they believed they were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition
in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their
right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated.
The debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in
monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in anguish
for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.

As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for
redress of grievances — over property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of this basic tenet as a
coveted boon — at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of the human personality, the all-consuming
ideal of our enlightened civilization — becomes Our duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him
who toils so that capital can produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration
against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation
of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstrating
employees, stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting
speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of
peaceful assembly and of petition. 19

The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to the respondent
Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe regular working hours." The strain
construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the workers the right to stage
mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life
the workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom should not be predicated on such a
slender ground.

The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by any court,
such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally appears to be
illegal picketing or strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes that the mass
demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not rooted in any industrial dispute although there is
concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).

43
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the demonstration and that
they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order
that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua non of an effective
demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union members as well as their total
presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the validity of their cause but also
immediately action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with jurisdiction over the issues they
raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of expression. 21 If demonstrators are
reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The
more the participants, the more persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-
third of their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their
position and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union notified the company two days in
advance of their projected demonstration and the company could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent
whatever losses it might sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the
Union requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on March 4, 1969 which
request the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50 in the morning of March 4, 1969, the
day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part
of the firm in rejecting the request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass
demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against the Pasig police, not
against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as it is
unconstitutional.

III

The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the respondent
firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police abuses and the
subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an unconstitutional restraint on the
freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress of grievances, the respondent firm
committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise
known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in
concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an
employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."

We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm on
March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was interference
with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such common action to better shield themselves against
such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the workers for the morning and
regular shift should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a
potent means of inhibiting speech." 22

Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal protection as the concerted action
of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism
an discrimination in the appointment and promotion of ban employees. 23 We further ruled in the Republic Savings
Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come within the protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1)
on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be
contemplated," as long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests. 24

As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court dated September 15,
1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union
guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that matter should not unduly
prejudice the normal operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to
the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company, particularly the officers
present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning (March
4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting
to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining

44
the mass demonstration. However, the issues that the employees raised against the local police, were more important
to them because they had the courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most
that could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the
demonstration. One day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were
willing to forego their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from
police abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free
speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.

Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the workers proof of the truth
of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such abuses should
properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such
complaint may be referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and action with a view to
disciplining the local police officers involved.

On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the demonstration "paralyzed to a
large extent the operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did not make
any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can only mean that the
firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost expected profits for failure to
comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were exacted from it by customers whose orders could not
be filled that day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were cancelled by the customers by reason of its
failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own equipment or materials or products were damaged due to
absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages
for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day. Such savings could have amply
compensated for unrealized profits or damages it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for
only one day.

IV

Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition for
redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding with the
demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise assured by the
fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes upon the State "the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the people," which guarantee is
emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the State shall afford protection
to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the State is under obligation at all times to give
meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor of the working man; for otherwise these
constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act,
the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest
by encouraging and protecting the exercise by employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of
collective bargaining and for the promotion of their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the
case at bar that respondent Court of Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to
implement this policy and failed to keep faith with its avowed mission — its raison d'etre — as ordained and directed
by the Constitution.

It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as a
consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at the
sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after the finality of
the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is convicted by final
judgment through a forced confession, which violated his constitutional right against self-incrimination; 25 or who is
denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due process of law, 26 even
after the accused has already served sentence for twenty-two years. 27

45
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these constitutional immunities of
petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to which the aggrieved
workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these basic human rights of the
laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned orders it issued in the
instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are imperative on all public offices including
the courts 28 as well as private citizens and corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by
mere procedural rule promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative power,
when even a law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights. There is no
time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the
printing of one article or the staging of one demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised
when exigent and expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to be
condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the
period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for time. And in such a contest between an employer and
its laborer, the latter eventually loses because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his
interest with the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for competent
legal services. 28-a

VI

The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its order or writ should filed
within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within ten (10)
days from the date of filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these rules of procedure
were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29

The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on September 22,
1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that they could have filed it on
September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.

Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the petitioning
employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial
Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in labor cases,
promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The answer should be obvious in
the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial Relations over
basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible with the basic tenet of constitutional
government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate rules and regulations, but also does
violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the constitutional right over the aforesaid
Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule
as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but instead
constrict the same to the point of nullifying the enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of
Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and
therefore is beyond the authority granted by the Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to
file a motion for reconsideration is too short, especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready
funds to meet the necessary expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of
fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1,
Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have
been only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the Court of
Industrial are concerned.

It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is based on the ground that
the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced during the hearing,"
and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17
of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec.); although the arguments were actually
filed by the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp. 70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day period required
for the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the filing of the motion for reconsideration. Herein

46
petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for
reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)

It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or where the arguments
in suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for by the Court of Industrial
Relations rules, the order or decision subject of29-a reconsideration becomes final and unappealable. But in all these
cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free assembly and petition were not involved.

It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must be specifically raised in
the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is deemed waived.
However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the
determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis mota of the case without the
resolution of which no final and complete determination of the dispute can be made. 30 It is thus seen that a
procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the
procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional
rights invoked by herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them and
in their defense to the said charge.

In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most compelling
reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human rights. 30-a

It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to except a
particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice Barredo in his
concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-c reiterated this principle and added that

Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without concerning itself about
procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case, without further loss of
time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired. Thus, this
Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa. In other words, when all the material facts are
spread in the records before Us, and all the parties have been duly heard, it matters little that the error
of the court a quo is of judgment or of jurisdiction. We can then and there render the appropriate
judgment. Is within the contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and within the
power of this Court to strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or committed
with grave abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the admit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to
reverse in a certain proceed in any error of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be exactly
categorized as a flaw of jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not entertain, on whether or
not the errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court of Appeals are short of being
jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this Court would still be on firm legal grounds should it choose to
reverse said decision here and now even if such errors can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment
or only as faults in the exercise of jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary return of this case to the
lower court for the sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal. (Emphasis
supplied). 30-d

Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule in this particular case at bar would an
unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the herein laborers, whose basic human
freedoms, including the right to survive, must be according supremacy over the property rights of their employer firm
which has been given a full hearing on this case, especially when, as in the case at bar, no actual material damage has
be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property rights.

If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders more imperative the
suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with the human rights sanctioned and shielded with
resolution concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should be stressed that the application in
the instant case Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon by herein respondent firm is

47
unreasonable and therefore such application becomes unconstitutional as it subverts the human rights of petitioning
labor union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts and circumstances revealed by the record.

The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with reference to the case at
is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the Court of Industrial
Relations to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or
legal forms ..."

On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for the Court,
in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-e thus:

As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for new trial is not
"newly discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of procedure for the ordinary courts, We
hold that such criterion is not binding upon the Court of Industrial Relations. Under Section 20 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial Relations shall adopt its, rules or procedure and
shall have such other powers as generally pertain to a court of justice: Provided, however, That in the
hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any duties
and power under this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of
the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules
of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.' By this
provision the industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of the technicalities applicable to ordinary
courts. Said court is not even restricted to the specific relief demanded by the parties but may issue such
orders as may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or dispelling
any doubts that may give rise to future disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940;
Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe that this
provision is ample enough to have enabled the respondent court to consider whether or not its
previous ruling that petitioners constitute a minority was founded on fact, without regard to the
technical meaning of newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua Kiong v.
Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578). (emphasis supplied.)

To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule in
effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary of human
freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law, simply because their counsel — erroneously believing that he
received a copy of the decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 - filed his motion for
reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day late considering that September 28, 1969 was a
Sunday.

Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be instruments of justice, for the
attainment of which such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr. Justice Fernando,
speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:

As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910]. The
Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84 Phil. 600 [1949];
Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243, June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA
675.), decided as far back as 1910, "technicality. when it deserts its proper-office as an aid to justice
and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy, deserves scant consideration from courts." (Ibid.,
p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has remained committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v.
Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936]) was of a similar mind. For him the interpretation of procedural rule
should never "sacrifice the ends justice." While "procedural laws are no other than technicalities"
view them in their entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends themselves for the compliance with
which courts have organized and function, but as means conducive to the realization the
administration of the law and of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have remained steadfastly opposed, in the
highly rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in altar of
sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred principles of justice." (Potenciano v. Court

48
 of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put by Justice Makalintal, they "should give way
to the realities of the situation." (Urbayan v. Caltex, L-15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In
the latest decision in point promulgated in 1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing McEntee v.
Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961, 3 SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation
of Justice Labrador that rules of procedure "are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense"; but
are intended "to help secure substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g

Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect, the dismissal or
termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence from
work. The respondent Court itself recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the dismissal of
the other 393 employees who are members of the same Union and who participated in the demonstration against the
Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor, the Union members who are not
officers, were not dismissed and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named as
respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by the firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes
"A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm insinuates that not all the 400 or so employee
participated in the demonstration, for which reason only the Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically
named in the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20, respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the
morning and regular shifts reported for work on March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence, the firm continued in
operation that day and did not sustain any damage.

The appropriate penalty — if it deserves any penalty at all — should have been simply to charge said one-day absence
against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a most cruel penalty,
since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as well as that of their
respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same time strengthening the
oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.

Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:

The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek to destroy our
system of Government, but from men of goodwill — good men who allow their proper concerns to
blind them to the fact that what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.

... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember, however, is
thatpreservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the same effect
whether the suppress or be a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against misguided zeal is a
constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of liberty contained in our Constitution. Each
surrender of liberty to the demands of the moment makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle
over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one.

... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.

... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.

... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure because we belong to
a group that is important and respected, we must recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play
for the less fortunate that we in all honor and good conscience must be observe. 31

The case at bar is worse.

Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic
understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local police, It
was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their fight for their
freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer opportunism. Such

49
opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the immunities and welfare of its
employees. It was pure and implement selfishness, if not greed.

Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank dismissed eight (8)
employees for having written and published "a patently libelous letter ... to the Bank president demanding his
resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the
promotion of bank employees." Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:

It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that the latter
acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were nonetheless
protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their right of self
organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection, (Section 3 of the
Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of some members of this Court. For, as has been aptly
stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of employees, if in furtherance of their
interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that
union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416
[1949]).

xxx xxx xxx

Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their grievances.

xxx xxx xxx

The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the respondents' libel
in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of self-organization of employees
is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324 U.S. 793 [1945]), as the right of the employer
to discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. v. Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29,
1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right of the
employer to select his employees or to discharge them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that
right by interfering with the countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB
313 U.S. 177 [1941])...

xxx xxx xxx

In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified as an
interference with the employees' right of self-organization or as a retaliatory action, and/or as a refusal
to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within the meaning and intendment of
section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis supplied.) 33

If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic Savings case,
supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such recognition and
protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more justifiable and more
imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against the company nor any of its officers.

WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:

(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated September 15 and
October 9, 1969; and

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(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their separation
from the service until re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have realized from other
sources during their separation from the service.

With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.

Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Makalintal, C.J, took no part.

51