Republic of the Philippines Thereafter, respondent presented three witnesses to prove her allegations.
She, then, filed
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 176022
February 2, 2015
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
CECILIA GRACE L. ROASA, married to GREG AMBROSE ROASA, as herein
represented by her Attorneys-in-Fact, BERNARDO M. NICOLAS, JR. and ALVIN B.
ACAYEN, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the annulment of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated December 13, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No.
85515 which reversed and set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Land Registration Case No. TG-930.
The facts of the case are as follows:
The instant petition arose from an application for registration of title over a parcel of land
filed by herein respondent, represented by her attorneys-in-fact, Bernardo M. Nicolas, Jr.
and Alvin B. Acayen. The application was filed on December 15, 2000 with the RTC of
Tagaytay City. The subject lot was denominated as Lot 2 of the consolidation/subdivision
plan, Ccs-04-000501-D, being a portion of Lots 13592 and 2681, Cad-452-D, Silang
Cadastre.
In her application, respondent alleged, among others, that she is the owner in fee simple
of the subject lot, having acquired the same by purchase as evidenced by a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated December 2, 1994; that the said property is an agricultural land
planted with corn, palay, bananas, coconut and coffee by respondent's predecessors-in-
interest; that respondent and her predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous,
exclusive and uninterrupted possession and occupation of the land under bona fideclaim
of ownership since the 1930's and that they have declared the land for taxation purposes.
The application, likewise, stated the names and addresses of the adjoining owners.
Subsequently, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed the application contending that the muniments of title, such as tax
declarations and tax payment receipts, did not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land applied for nor of the alleged open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by respondent and her predecessors-in-
interest as owners for the period required by law. The OSG also argued that the subject
lot is a portion of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines which is
not subject to private appropriation.
her formal offer of evidence. The Republic, on the other hand, did not present any evidence
to support its opposition to respondent's application for registration.
On June 21, 2004, the RTC admitted all the exhibits of respondent and considered the
case submitted for decision.
On December 8, 2004, the RTC rendered its Decision denying respondent's application.
The trial court held:
xxxx
Perusal of the records show that the subject land x x x is not classified as forest land prior
to March 15, 1982; x x x.
It bears stressing at this point in time that before one can register his title over a parcel
ofland, the applicant must show that he, by himself or by his predecessors-in-interest, had
been in notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a "bona fide" claim
of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier; and further, the land subject of application is
alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. x x x
The evidence adduced by the applicant [herein respondent] particularly Exhibit "U" shows
that the subject land applied for registration was declared as not part of the forest land of
the government before March 15, 1982, or short of moreor less seven (7) years of the
required adverse possession of thirty (30) years.
x x x x.2
Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, herein respondent filed an appeal with the CA.
On December 13, 2006, the CA rendered its assailed Decision disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the December 8, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Tagaytay City, Branch 18, in Land Registration Case No. TG-930, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one issued, GRANTING the application for
confirmation of imperfect title. The Register of Deeds of Tagaytay City is hereby
DIRECTED to issue Title in the name of applicant for Lot 2 of Consolidated Subdivision
Plan CCs-04-000501-D, being a portion of Lot 13592 and 2681, Cad-452-D, Silang
Cadastre, consisting of 1.5 hectares.
SO ORDERED.3
The CA held that:
xxxx
Applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the following: (a) that
the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain;
and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same under a bona fideclaim of ownership either since time immemorial
or since June 12, 1945. There are two parts to the requirements of the law. As to the first
part, there is no doubt that the subject property, irregardless of the date, was already made
alienable and disposable agricultural land.
As to the second requirement, there is a specific cut-off date of possession: June 12, 1945.
The cut-off date of possession of June 12, 1945 only applies to the requirement of
possession. It does not have any bearing as to when the land became alienable and
disposable.
When the property was classified as alienable and disposable, specifically on March 15,
1982, does not have any bearing with the second requirement of possession so that
despitethe fact that the property became alienable and disposable only in 1982, the
possession requirement since June 12, 1945 stands so that, as in this case at bench,
when the possession was since 1930, which is before June 12, 1945, the requirement of
possession has been met.
x x x x4
Hence, the instant petition anchored on the sole ground, to wit:
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIRED 30-YEAR ADVERSE POSSESSION
SINCE THE SUBJECT LAND WAS DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE LAND
OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN ONLY ON MARCH 15, 1982 PER CENRO CERTIFICATION,
AND THE APPLICATION WAS FILED ONLY ON DECEMBER 12, 2000. ANY PERIOD
OF POSSESSION PRIOR TO THE DATE WHEN THE SUBJECT LAND WAS
CLASSIFIED AS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS INCONSEQUENTIAL AND
SHOULD BE EXCLUDED FROM THE COMPUTATION OF THE 30-YEAR PERIOD OF
POSSESSION.5
Section 14(1), Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides as follows:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessorsin-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier. In the same manner, Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
otherwise known as The Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073,
states:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain orclaiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province
where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-ininterest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fideclaim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12,
1945, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except
when prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate oftitle under the provisions of this chapter.
Based on the above provisions, an applicant for original registration of title based on a
claim of exclusive and continuous possession or occupation must show the existence of
the following:
1. Open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, of land;
2. The land possessed or occupied must have been declared alienable and
disposable agricultural land of public domain;
3. The possession or occupation was under a bona fideclaim of ownership;
4. Possession dates back to June 12, 1945 or earlier.6
In the instant case, petitioner's solecontention is that the possession of the subject lot by
respondent and her predecessors-in-interest before the establishment of alienability of the
said land, should be excluded in the computation of the period of possession for purposes
of registration. Petitioner argues that respondent's possession of the disputed parcel of
land, prior to its re-classification as alienable and disposable, cannot be credited as part
of the required period of possession because the same cannot be considered adverse.
The Court does not agree.
The Court's disquisition in the recent case of AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits
System (AFP-RSBS) v. Republic of the Philippines,7 as it retraces the various rulings of
this Court on the issue as to when an applicant's possession should be reckoned and the
resulting prevailing doctrine, is instructive, to wit:
xxxx
Republic v. Naguit [409 Phil. 405] involves the similar question. In that case, this court
clarified that Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree should be interpreted to
include possession before the declaration of the land’s alienability as long as at the time
of the application for registration, the land has already been declared part of the alienable
and disposable agricultural public lands. This court also emphasized in that case the
absurdity that would result in interpreting Section 14(1) as requiring that the alienability
ofpublic land should have already been established by June 12, 1945. Thus, this court
said in Naguit:
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioner’s position.
Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSG’s view, that all lands
of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12,
1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged
possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14
virtually inoperative and even precludes the government from giving it effect even as it
decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The
unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June
12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the
application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made,
has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the
presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence,
the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse
possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as
alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part
of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
However, in the later case of Republic v. Herbieto [498 Phil. 227] that was cited by
respondent, this court ruled that the period of possession before the declaration that land
is alienable and disposable cannot be included in the computation of the period of
possession. This court said: Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession
of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became
alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to the date
when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and
should be excluded from the computation of the period of possession; such possession
can never ripen into ownership and unless the land had been classified as alienable and
disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title shall not apply thereto. It is very
apparent then that respondents could not have complied with the period of possession
required by Section 48(b) of the Public LandAct, as amended, to acquire imperfect or
incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed or legalized. This Court
clarified the role of the date, June 12, 1945, in computing the period of possession for
purposes of registration in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philippines [605
Phil. 244].In that case, this court declared that Naguit and not Herbieto should be followed.
Herbieto "has [no] precedential value with respect to Section 14(1)." This court said:
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was
adopted in Naguit.1âwphi1 The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in
Naguit, absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it
would only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945,
even if the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of
ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be
feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant, especially considering our
forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Thus, neither Herbietonor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any precedental
value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded in
Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had been in
exclusive possession under a bona fideclaim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The
Court’s interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive to the resolution of the case.
Any doubt as to which between Naguitor Herbietoprovides the final word of the Court on
Section 14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
Moreover, in the resolution of the motions for reconsideration of this court’s 2009 decision
in Heirs of Malabanan, this Court explained that there was no other legislative intent that
could be associated with the date, June 12, 1945, as written in our registration laws except
that it qualifies the requisite period of possession and occupation. The law imposes no
requirement that land should have been declared alienable and disposable agricultural
land as early as June 12, 1945.
Therefore, what is important in computing the period of possession is that the land has
already been declared alienable and disposable at the time of the application for
registration. Upon satisfaction of this requirement, the computation of the period may
include the period of adverse possession prior to the declaration that land is alienable and
disposable.8 (Emphasis supplied)
Although adverse, open,continuous, and notorious possession in the concept of an owner
is a conclusion of law to be determined by courts, it has more to do with a person’s belief
in good faith that he or she has just title to the property that he or she is occupying. 9 It is
unrelated to the declaration that land is alienable or disposable. 10 A possessor or occupant
of property may, therefore, be a possessor in the concept of an owner prior to the
determination that the property is alienable and disposable agricultural land.11
Respondent’s right to the original registration of title over the subject property is, therefore,
dependent on the existence of (a) a declaration that the land is alienable and disposable
at the time of the application for registration and (b) open and continuous possession in
the concept of an owner through itself or through its predecessors-in-interest since June
12, 1945 or earlier.12
In the present case, there is no dispute that the subject lot has been declared alienable
and disposable on March 15, 1982. This is more than eighteen (18) years before
respondent's application for registration, which was filed on December 15, 2000.
Moreover, the unchallenged testimonies of two of respondent's witnesses established that
the latter and her predecessors-in-interest had been inadverse, open, continuous, and
notorious possession in the concept ofan owner even before June 12, 1945. 13
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated
December 13, 2006, in CA-G.R. CV No. 85515 is AFFIRMED.
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, G.R. No. 179987 provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality on the ground.
Petitioner, The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of informal
Present: settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Yet our
PUNO, C.J., current laws are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon.
QUISUMBING, Still, the duty on our part is primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the
YNARES-SANTIAGO, Constitution and the legal principles that have developed our public land law, though our
CARPIO social obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the endemic problems.
- versus –
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA, I.
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering
CHICO-NAZARIO, a parcel of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,[2] situated in
VELASCO, JR., Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite, and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan
NACHURA, claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, [3] and that he and his
LEONARDO DE CASTRO, predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and
BRION, peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PERALTA, and
Respondent. BERSAMIN, JJ. The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City,
Branch 18. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant
DECISION Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite, Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State. [4] Apart
from presenting documentary evidence, Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged
from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and registered. This to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had
is a generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And it has many four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being Aristedess
consequences. grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among
themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all
Xxx the properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of
Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco.
in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru, have wanted to title these people and have not It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan. [5]
been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none of the state systems
in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes
have means of proving property ownership to each other which are not the same Velazco. He further manifested that he also [knew] the property and I affirm the truth of
means developed by the Spanish legal system. The informals have their own the testimony given by Mr. Velazco.[6] The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not
papers, their own forms of agreements, and their own systems of registration, all present any evidence to controvert the application.
of which are very clearly stated in the maps which they use for their own informal
business transactions. Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you walk June 2001, issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office,
by field after field--in each field a different dog is going to bark at you. Even dogs Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that
know what private property is all about. The only one who does not know it is the the subject property was verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land per Land
government. The issue is that there exists a "common law" and an "informal law" Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such
which the Latin American formal legal system does not know how to recognize. under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.[7]

- Hernando De Soto[1]
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of persons and
entities other than the Philippine government. The petition, while unremarkable as to the
facts, was accepted by the Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity to the
applicability and scope of original registration proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court confronts not only the relevant
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and
thus places under the operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise
known as Property Registration Law, the lands described in Plan Csd-04-
0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand Three
Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs
adduced in the name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino,
widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of
registration shall forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had
failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the
property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of
imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision [8] reversing the RTC and
dismissing the application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of
the lots as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from
the computation of the period of possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since
the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that the property was declared
alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos possession prior to that
date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This
interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
was based on the Courts ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.[9]
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals; [10] hence, it was
his heirs who appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court,
rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit,[11] which was handed down just four months prior
to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of
Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had
directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction in the first place since the
requisite notice of hearing was published only after the hearing had already begun. Naguit,
petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the property in
question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession
prior to the declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in
reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and the
Property Registration Decree.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc,[12] and on 11 November 2008, the case
was heard on oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for the oral
arguments, to wit:
1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be
registered under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known
as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified as alienable
and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur
at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is
established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945 or earlier?
2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel
of land classified as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and
therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with the Civil
Code?
3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of
its use or because its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the provisions of
the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names
under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or
both?[13]
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.
With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court
in Naguit is the correct interpretation of the provision. The seemingly contradictory
pronouncement in Herbieto, it is submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, since the
land registration proceedings therein was void ab initio due to lack of publication of the
notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out that in Republic v.
Bibonia,[14] promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the same
observation that the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently
absurd. For its part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land
should have been classified as alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart
from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent rulings in Buenaventura v.
Republic,[15] Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic [16] and Republic v. Imperial Credit
Corporation,[17] as well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals.[18]
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 years ipso
jure converts the land into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section
14(2). According to them, it would not matter whether the land sought to be registered was
previously classified as agricultural land of the public domain so long as, at the time of the
application, the property had already been converted into private property through
prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively from our 2008 ruling
in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.[19]
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive.
The OSG notes that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of
properties of the State refers to patrimonial property, while Section 14(2) speaks of private
lands. It observes that the Court has yet to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as
a ground for application for registration, and that the 30-year possession period refers to
the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, and not the concept
of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that the 30-
year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from
the time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual
circumstances surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof.
II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full
understanding of the provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its enactment,
governed the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is
authorized, from time to time, to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and
disposable, timber, or mineral lands.[20] Alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain are further classified according to their uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential,
commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c) educational, charitable, or
other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and quasi-public
uses.[21]
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges
that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles through judicial legalization. [22] Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants
that right, subject to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim
of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be
entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law was
amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No.
1073. First, the term agricultural lands was changed to alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain. The OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands
that may be registered.[23] This is not actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land
Act, agricultural lands are a mere subset of lands of the public domain alienable or open
to disposition. Evidently, alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are a larger
class than only agricultural lands.
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for thirty
(30) years immediately preceding the filing of the application to possession since June 12,
1945 or earlier. The Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession
deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the
public domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was
amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership
must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged
the reckoning date at June 12, 1945.
xxx
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the
same as Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified
the various laws relative to the registration of property, including lands of the
public domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the registration of such
lands of the public domain. The provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court
of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally
or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945, or earlier.
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of
Section 14(1) therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly
refer to persons or their predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
That circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the other is a redundancy,
or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted. That
is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree warrant comparison.
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest
therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and
the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The following persons may
file in the proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land,
whether personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
Xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the
right enjoyed by the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which
seems to presume the pre-existence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for
the first time. It is proper to assert that it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No.
1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily established the right of a Filipino citizen
who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, since June 12, 1945 to perfect or complete his title by applying with the
proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the
corresponding certificate of title.
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public
Land Act, which provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be
disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion that both
provisions declare that it is indeed the Public Land Act that primarily establishes the
substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in possession of the property since
12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration Decree recognizes the
substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well provides the
corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect
or incomplete title.
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the Public
Land Act limits the period within which one may exercise the right to seek registration under
Section 48. The provision has been amended several times, most recently by Rep. Act No.
9176 in 2002. It currently reads thus:
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time,
not to extend beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this
Chapter: Provided, That this period shall apply only where the area applied for does not
exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided, further, That the several periods of time designated
by the President in accordance with Section Forty-Five of this Act shall apply also to the
lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section shall not be construed
as prohibiting any said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior to the
period fixed by the President.[24]
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under Section
48(b) may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and Section
14(a) of the Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that for one
to acquire the right to seek registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, it is not enough that the applicant and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12 June 1945; the alienable and
disposable character of the property must have been declared also as of 12 June 1945.
Following the OSGs approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12 June
1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
or Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication
was discussed in Naguit.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the
land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne
out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since June 12, 1945, as used in the provision,
qualifies its antecedent phrase under a bonafide claim of ownership. Generally speaking,
qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately
associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. [25] Ad proximum antecedents fiat
relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners
position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs
view, that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or
disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration,
no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such
interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even
precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify
public agricultural lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of
the situation would even be aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945,
the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the
property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time
the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application
is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to
utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State
irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if
the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in
this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its
exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was
adopted in Naguit. The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit,
absurdly limits the application of the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would
only cover lands actually declared alienable and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if
the current possessor is able to establish open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of
ownership to avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be
feasible under Herbieto. This balancing fact is significant, especially considering our
forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages
from Herbieto are obiter dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab
initio in the first place due to lack of the requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing.
There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as it suffices that the Courts
acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein concerning Section
14(1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,[26] the Court, citing Herbieto,
again stated that [a]ny period of possession prior to the date when the [s]ubject [property
was] classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded
from the computation of the period of possession That statement, in the context of Section
14(1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless, the passage as cited in Buenaventura should
again be considered as obiter. The application therein was ultimately granted, citing
Section 14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish any mode
of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the application of Section
14(1). It is not even apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed
entitlement to original registration following Section 14(1), their position being that they
had been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50)
years, but not before 12 June 1945.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any
precedental value with respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is
embedded in Section 14(1), since it precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had
been in exclusive possession under a bona fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945.
The Courts interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was decisive to the resolution of the
case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the final word of the
Court on Section 14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of
Appeals[27] since in the latter, the application for registration had been filed before the land
was declared alienable or disposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the
better rule between the two. Yet two years after Bracewell, its ponente, the
esteemed Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling in Republic v.
Ceniza,[28] which involved a claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over a public
domain land that was declared alienable and disposable only
1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted extensively from it, and following the mindset of the
dissent, the attempt at registration in Cenizashould have failed. Not so.
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994,
issued by Eduardo M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer
in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that
the lots involved were "found to be within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land
Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4-I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is
sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject of private respondents
application. Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the absence of
contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation
of the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the application
of appellees on the ground that the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is
there any showing that the lots in question are forestal land....
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for
the period required by law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it
did not err in ruling in favor of private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act is concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of
proving the alienability of the land subject of their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to
prove their open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject
land even before the year 1927. As a rule, we are bound by the factual findings
of the Court of Appeals. Although there are exceptions, petitioner did not show
that this is one of them.[29]
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored Bracewell,
sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of public domain lands declared alienable or
disposable thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference
is that in Ceniza, the application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land
had been declared alienable or disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed
nine (9) years before the land was declared alienable or disposable. That crucial
difference was also stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it from Bracewell, a difference
which the dissent seeks to belittle.
III.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14(2). The
provision reads:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court
in of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally
or through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by
prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2), which we
did even then recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it
as material for further discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073
preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession
over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of those
who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.[[30]]
There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable
public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous
and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[ [31]] With such conversion,
such property may now fall within the contemplation of private lands under Section
14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership
through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land
commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been
open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register
the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where
petitioners have based their registration bid primarily on that provision, and where the
evidence definitively establishes their claim of possession only as far back as 1948. It is
in this case that we can properly appreciate the nuances of the provision.
A.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis
for application for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113
which provides legal foundation for the application. It reads:
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription,
unless otherwise provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in
character, they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the
public domain lands that are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands
and mineral lands. The Constitution itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral
lands.
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of real
property through prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired by ordinary
prescription of ten (10) years,[32] or through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30)
years.[33] Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith, [34]as well as
just title.[35]
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that persons
who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws, it unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of
lands. The Civil Code is the only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by
prescription of private lands, including patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus,
the critical question that needs affirmation is whether Section 14(2) does encompass
original registration proceedings over patrimonial property of the State, which a private
person has acquired through prescription.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding that
properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by
reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. [36] Yet if
we ascertain the source of the thirty-year period, additional complexities relating to Section
14(2) and to how exactly it operates would emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins
of the thirty (30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act by granting the right to seek original registration of alienable public
lands through possession in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance
of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied) [37]
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the
date 12 June 1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications for
registration filed prior to 1977 could have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act
No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it applies
the rules on prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article
1137. Note that there are two kinds of prescription under the Civil Codeordinary acquisitive
prescription and extraordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is
completed through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years, without need of title
or of good faith.
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became
unavailable after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the
law on prescription under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14(2). However, there
is a material difference between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No.
1942 and how it did under the Civil Code.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to
or call into application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a
requisite thirty-year possession period immediately preceding the application for
confirmation of title, without any qualification as to whether the property should be declared
alienable at the beginning of, and continue as such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years.
There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had
mandated such a requirement,[38] similar to our earlier finding with respect to the present
language of Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basis for
original registration became Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which
entitled those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws to apply for original registration. Again, the thirty-year period is
derived from the rule on extraordinary prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At
the same time, Section 14(2) puts into operation the entire regime of prescription under
the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to Section 14(1).

B.
Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription under
existing laws. Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription,
as set forth in the Civil Code, in our interpretation of Section 14(2). There is no similar
demand on our part in the case of Section 14(1).
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: [p]roperty of the State
or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
The identification what consists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421,
which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports
and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in
the preceding article, is patrimonial property
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to
the State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of
man.[39] Lands of the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are
property of public dominion and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or
any duly authorized government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the
public domain. Would such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted,
under the Civil Code, from property of the public dominion into patrimonial property? After
all, by connotative definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the object of the
commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are
susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that patrimonial
property of the State may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that [p]roperty of public dominion, when
no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State. It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may
be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all,
Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property which belong to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the
State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the
public dominion if when it is intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth
or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration,
the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It
is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to
be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that
the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the
form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of
lands already declared alienable and disposable to the detriment of the bona
fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this interpretation is in accord
with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands owned by the
State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used
only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to apply the
Constitution and the laws in accordance with their language and intent. The remedy is to
change the law, which is the province of the legislative branch. Congress can very well be
entreated to amend Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree and pertinent
provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the requirements for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual example.
Republic Act No. 7227, entitled An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military
Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, etc., is more commonly known as the BCDA
law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain military reservations and portions
of military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and Villamor Air Base. For
purposes of effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the President to
transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development Authority
(BCDA)[40] which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or administer them. [41] The
President is authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in
part.[42] Accordingly, the BCDA law itself declares that the military lands subject thereof
are alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing laws and regulations
governing sales of government properties.[43]
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have become
alienable and disposable. However, said lands did not become patrimonial, as the BCDA
law itself expressly makes the reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to raise
funds for the conversion of the former American bases at Clark and Subic.[44]Such
purpose can be tied to either public service or the development of national wealth under
Article 420(2). Thus, at that time, the lands remained property of the public dominion under
Article 420(2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable. It is upon their
sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that such lands
become private property and cease to be property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a
duly enacted law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth, would the period of
possession prior to the conversion of such public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned
in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of
possession before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the
purpose of completing the prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property
before it becomes patrimonial cannot be the object of prescription according to the Civil
Code. As the application for registration under Section 14(2) falls wholly within the
framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that possession during the
time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted to meet
the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)?
There is no inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis
of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration on the basis
of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of
the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section
14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under Section 48(b)
of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period
available through Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to Article
1137 of the Civil Code. The period under the former speaks of a thirty-year period of
possession, while the period under the latter concerns a thirty-year period of extraordinary
prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended by Rep.
Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without regard to the Civil Code,
while the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is founded
on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not apply
as well to Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it ultimately
is just one of numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other statutes such as the
Property Registration Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the
framework set forth by the Civil Code when it enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2)
manifests a clear intent to interrelate the registration allowed under that provision with the
Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect to Section 14(1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how our land
registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which, under the Civil Code,
is one of the modes for acquiring ownership over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
private persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states
that [a]ll things which are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription, and
that [p]roperty of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not
be the object of prescription.
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under
the Civil Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117,
requires possession in good faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed
through possession of ten (10) years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person
from acquiring patrimonial property of the State through ordinary acquisitive prescription,
nor is there any apparent reason to impose such a rule. At the same time, there are
indispensable requisitesgood faith and just title. The ascertainment of good faith involves
the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil
Code,[45] provisions that more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under Article 1129,
there is just title for the purposes of prescription when the adverse claimant came into
possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition
of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit
any right. Dr. Tolentino explains:
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and which
would have actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or
defect is the one cured by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation,
succession, and dacion in payment.[46]
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the applicability
of ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major premise for the
argument is that the State, as the owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership to the
possessor before the completion of the required period of possession.[47] It is evident that
the OSG erred when it assumed that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State.
The grantor is the one from whom the person invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription
derived the title, whether by sale, exchange, donation, succession or any other mode of
the acquisition of ownership or other real rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary
prescription, the period of possession preceding the classification of public dominion lands
as patrimonial cannot be counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But after the
property has been become patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of
the possessor. Once the requisite period has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1)
the patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into private land; and (2) the person in
possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires ownership of the
property by operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted
patrimonial property, the ideal next step is the registration of the property under
the Torrens system. It should be remembered that registration of property is not a mode
of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode of confirmation of ownership. [48]
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property Registration
Decree in 1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did not fully accommodate
the acquisition of ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil Code. What the system
accommodated was the confirmation of imperfect title brought about by the completion of
a period of possession ordained under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep.
Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945 following P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act[49] was noticeably silent on the requisites for alienable public
lands acquired through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though it arguably did
not preclude such registration.[50] Still, the gap was lamentable, considering that the Civil
Code, by itself, establishes ownership over the patrimonial property of persons who have
completed the prescriptive periods ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the
adoption of the Property Registration Decree in 1977, with Section 14(2) thereof expressly
authorizing original registration in favor of persons who have acquired ownership over
private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, that is, the Civil Code
as of now.
V.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through
their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their
possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period
of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto
as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by
Section 47 of the Public Land Act.[51]
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that
under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not
only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an
express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the
Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period
for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure
registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired,
one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person
acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10)
years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a
persons uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30)
years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act.
There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own
evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particularis to the year 1948. Thus, they
cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the
subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent
evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the
subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change
its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code.Thus, it
is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
VI.
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines
established in this decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of todays
ruling cannot be discounted. For, every untitled property that is occupied in the country
will be affected by this ruling. The social implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the
Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to the Filipino people if we simply levied
the law without comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a
phenomenon tied to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common
among the so-called Third World countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the
disconnect between a legal system and the reality on the ground. The law so far has been
unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of these
public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have proven unattractive
due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said
properties.[52] Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not
the most attractive means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this decision, has
considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held
residential lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many more have tilled
and made productive idle lands of the State with their hands. They have been regarded
for generation by their families and their communities as common law owners. There is
much to be said about the virtues of according them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are
not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law itself considered such lands as
property of the public dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set forth a new phase
of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement of such lands which in
legal theory are lands of the public domain before the problem becomes insoluble. This
could be accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the standards for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for
the conversion of public dominion property into patrimonial.
Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not only of
that individual, but also to the persons family. Once that sense of security is deprived, life
and livelihood are put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcome closure to
the long pestering problem.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23
February 2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 199537
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ANDREA TAN, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the Republic of the
Philippines (Republic) from the May 29, 2009 decision1 and October 18, 2011
resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 00702. The CA denied
the Republic's appeal from LRC Case No. N-1443 wherein the Municipal Trial Court in
Consolacion, Cebu, granted respondent Andrea Tan's application for land title registration.
Antecedents
On October 2, 2002, Tan applied for the original registration of title of Lot No. 4080, Cad.
545-D (new) situated in Casili, Consolacion, Cebu (the subject lot). She alleged that she
is the absolute owner in fee simple of the said 7,807 square-meter parcel of residential
land she purchased from a certain Julian Gonzaga on September 17, 1992. Her
application was docketed as LRC Case No. N-144.
After complying with the jurisdictional requirements, the land registration court issued an
order of general default, excepting the State which was duly represented by the Solicitor
General.
During the trial, Tan proved the following facts:
1. The subject lot is within Block 1, Project No. 28, per LC Map No. 2545 of
Consolacion, Cebu;
2. The subject lot was declared alienable and disposable on September 1, 1965,
pursuant to Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063;
3. Luciano Gonzaga who was issued Tax Declaration Nos. 01465 in 1965 and
02983 in 1972 initially possessed the subject lot.
4. After Luciano’s death, Julian Gonzaga inherited the subject lot;
5. Andrea Tan purchased the subject lot from Julian Gonzaga on September 17,
1992;
6. She, through her predecessors, had been in peaceful, open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner
for over thirty (30) years.
On 28 April 2004, the land registration court granted Tan’s application. The court
confirmed her title over the subject lot and ordered its registration.
The Republic appealed the case to the CA, arguing that Tan failed to prove that she is a
Filipino citizen who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject lot, in the concept of an owner, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of her application. The appeal was docketed
as CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 00702.
On May 29, 2009, the CA denied the appeal. The CA observed that under the Public Land
Act, there are two kinds of applicants for original registration: (1) those who had possessed
the land since June 12, 1945; and (2) those who already acquired the property through
prescription. The respondent’s application fell under the second category.
The CA noted that before land of the public domain can be acquired by prescription, it
must have been declared alienable and disposable agricultural land. The CA pointed to
the certification issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) as evidence that the subject was classified as alienable and disposable on
September 1, 1965, pursuant to Land Classification Project No. 28. The CA concluded
that Tan had already acquired the subject lot by prescription.
On July 2, 2009, the Republic moved for reconsideration. Citing Republic v. Herbieto,4 it
argued that an applicant for judicial confirmation of title must have been in possession and
occupation of the subject land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, and that the subject land
has been likewise already declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.5
On October 18, 2011, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration citing the then recent
case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Rep. of the Philippines 6 which abandoned the ruling
in Herbieto. Malabanan declared that our law does not require that the property should
have been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945, as long as the
declaration was made before the application for registration is filed. 7
On January 5, 2012, the Republic filed the present petition for review on certiorari.
The Petition
The Republic argues: (1) that the CA misapplied the doctrine in Malabanan; and (2) that
the CENRO certification and tax declarations presented were insufficient to prove that the
subject lot was no longer intended for public use.
Meanwhile, the respondent insists that she has already proven her title over the subject
lot. She maintains that the classification of the subject lot as alienable and disposable
public land by the DENR on September 1, 1965, per Land Classification Project No. 28,
converted it into patrimonial property of the State.
From the submissions, the lone issue is whether a declaration that Government-owned
land has become alienable and disposable sufficiently converts it into patrimonial property
of the State, making it susceptible to acquisitive prescription.
Our Ruling
We find the petition meritorious.
All lands of the public domain belong to the State. It is the fountain from which springs any
asserted right of ownership over land. Accordingly, the State owns all lands that are not
clearly within private ownership. This is the Regalian Doctrine which has been
incorporated in all of our Constitutions and repeatedly embraced in jurisprudence.8 Under
the present Constitution, lands of the public domain are not alienable except
for agricultural lands.9
The Public Land Act10 (PLA) governs the classification, grant, and disposition of alienable
and disposable lands of the public domain. It is the primary substantive law on this matter.
Section 11 thereof recognizes judicial confirmation of imperfect titles as a mode of
disposition of alienable public lands.11 Relative thereto, Section 48(b) of the PLA identifies
who are entitled to judicial confirmation of their title:
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership,
since June 12, 1945, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation
of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and shall
be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (As amended by PD
1073.)
The Property Registration Decree12 (PRD) complements the PLA by prescribing how
registrable lands, including alienable public lands, are brought within the coverage of the
Torrens system. Section 14 of the PRD enumerates the qualified applicants for original
registration of title:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a
bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier;
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription
under the provision of existing laws;
(3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river beds
by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws;
(4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided for
by law.13
The PRD also recognizes prescription as a mode of acquiring ownership under the Civil
Code.14 Nevertheless, prescription under Section 14(2) must not be confused with judicial
confirmation of title under Section 14(1). Judicial confirmation of title requires:
1. That the applicant is a Filipino citizen;15
2. That the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-ininterest, has been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
property since June 12, 1945;16
3. That the property had been declared alienable and disposable as of the filing
of the application.17
Only private property can be acquired by prescription. Property of public dominion is
outside the commerce of man.18 It cannot be the object of prescription 19 because
prescription does not run against the State in its sovereign capacity. 20 However, when
property of public dominion is no longer intended for public use or for public service, it
becomes part of the patrimonial property of the State. 21 When this happens, the property
is withdrawn from public dominion and becomes property of private ownership, albeit still
owned by the State. The property is now brought within the commerce of man and
becomes susceptible to the concepts of legal possession and prescription.1avvphi1
In the present case, respondent Tan’s application is not anchored on judicial confirmation
of an imperfect title because she does not claim to have possessed the subject lot since
June 12, 1945. Her application is based on acquisitive prescription on the claim that: (1)
the property was declared alienable and disposable on September 1, 1965; and (2) she
had been in open continuous, public, and notorious possession of the subject lot in the
concept of an owner for over thirty (30) years.
In our 2009 decision and 2013 resolution23 in Malabanan, we already held en banc that a
declaration that property of the public dominion is alienable and disposable does not ipso
facto convert it into patrimonial property. We said:
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth
or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express
declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of
acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to
run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law. 24
While a prior declaration that the property has become alienable and disposable is
sufficient in an application for judicial confirmation of title under Section 14(1) of the PRD, it
does not suffice for the purpose of prescription under the Civil Code. 25 Before prescription
can even begin to run against the State, the following conditions must concur to convert
the subject into patrimonial property:

1. The subject lot must have been classified as agricultural land in compliance
with Sections 2 and 3 of Article XII of the Constitution;

2. The land must have been classified as alienable and disposable; 26 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
3. There must be a declaration from a competent authority that the subject lot is THIRD DIVISION
no longer intended for public use, thereby converting it to patrimonial property. G.R. No. 185092
June 4, 2014
Only when these conditions are met can applicants begin their public and peaceful REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
possession of the subject lot in the concept of an owner. vs.
CORAZON C. SESE and FE C. SESE, Respondents.
In the present case, the third condition is absent. Even though it has been declared
alienable and disposable, the property has not been withdrawn from public use or public DECISION
service. Without this, prescription cannot begin to run because the property has not yet
been converted into patrimonial property of the State. It remains outside the commerce of MENDOZA, J.:
man and the respondent’s physical possession and occupation thereof do not produce
any legal effect. In the eyes of the law, the respondent has never acquired legal
possession of the property and her physical possession thereof, no matter how long, can This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by
never ripen into ownership. petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSGJ, assailing the November 21, 2007 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 81439, which dismissed its appeal and affirmed the October 3, 2003
WHEREFORE, we hereby GRANT the petition. The May 29, 2009 decision and October Decision2 of the Municipal Trial Court of Pulilan, Bulacan (MTC), in LRC Case No. 026.
18, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA- G.R. CEB-CV No.
00702 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The respondent's application for Land
Registration is DENIED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs. Factual and Procedural Antecedents:

SO ORDERED. Records show that on September 17, 2002, Corazon C. Sese and Fe C. Sese
(respondents) filed with the MTC an application for original registration of land over a
parcel of land with an area of 10, 792 square meters, situated in Barangay Sto. Cristo,
Municipality of Pulilan, Province of Bulacan, and more particularly described as Lot 11247,
Cad. 345, Pulilan Cadastre, under Plan No. AP-03-004226.

Respondents alleged that on July 22, 1972, they acquired, through a donation inter vivos
from their mother, Resurreccion L. Castro (Resurreccion), the subject agricultural land;
that they, through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in possession of the subject
property; and that the property was not within a reservation.

In support of their application, respondents submitted the following documents, namely:

(1) Tax Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 "in the name of Corazon Sese and Fe Sese,
minor, representing their mother Resurreccion Castro, as her Natural Guardian"; (2)
Certificate of Technical Description which was approved on December 10, 1998 by the
Land Management Service, Region III, of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR); (3) Certification in lieu of lost Surveyor’s Certificate issued by the
same authority; (4) Official Receipt of payment of real property tax over the subject
property; (5) Certification from the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Pulilan, stating that
the registered owners of a property under Tax Declaration No. 99-19-015-01557 were
Corazon Sese and others; and (6) Survey plan of Lot 11247, CAD 345,Pulilan Cadastre,
approved by the Regional Technical Director of the Land Management Service, Region
III, of the DENR, stating that the land subject of the survey was alienable and disposable
land, and as certified to by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927, was outside of any
civil or military reservation. On the lower portion of the plan, there was a note stating that
a deed of absolute sale over the subject property was executed by a certain Luis Santos
and Fermina Santos (the Santoses) in favor of Resurreccion on October 4, 1950.
On the lower portion of the survey plan, a note stated, among others, that: "This survey is
inside the alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 20 LC Map No. 637 certified
by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is outside any civil or military reservation."
The said plan was approved by the DENR, Land Management Services, Regional Office
III, San Fernando, Pampanga, on December 3, 1998.
Finding the application sufficient in form and substance, the MTC issued the Order, dated
October 10, 2002, setting the case for hearing with the corresponding publication. After
compliance with all the requirements of the law regarding publication, mailing and posting,
hearing on the merits of the application followed.
During the trial on June 4, 2003, respondent Corazon C. Sese (Corazon) testified on their
claim over the subject lot. Thereafter, respondents submitted their formal offer of evidence,
after which the evidence offered were admitted by the MTC in the Order, dated July 10,
2003, without objection from the public prosecutor.
The OSG did not present any evidence to oppose the application.
On October 3, 2003, the MTC rendered its Decision, 3 ordering the registration of the
subject property in the name of respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the instant application to be sufficient in form and substance and
the applicants having established their right of ownership over the subject parcel of land
and are therefore entitled to registration thereof, the Court thereby grants the petition.
Accordingly, the Court hereby orders the registration of the parcel of land subject matter
of this petition which is more particularly described in Plan Ap-03-004226 Pulilan Cadastre
and in their corresponding technical descriptions in the name of Resureccion Castro.
Upon this decision becoming final, let an Order for the decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.
The MTC reasoned out that there was evidence to show that the subject lots had been in
open, continuous, adverse, and public possession, either by the applicants themselves or
their predecessor-in-interest. Such possession since time immemorial conferred an
effective title on the applicants, whereby the land ceased to be public and became private
property. It had been the accepted norm that open, adverse and continuous possession
for at least 30 years was sufficient. The MTC noted that evidence showed that the parcel
of land involved was not covered by land patent or a public land application as certified to
by the Community Environment and Natural Resources of Tabang, Guiguinto, Bulacan.
Moreover, it added that the technical descriptions of Lot 11247 were prepared and secured
from the Land Management Sector, DENR, Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga, and
were verified and found to be correct by Eriberto Almazan, In-Charge of the Regional
Survey Division.
On December 19, 2003, the OSG interposed an appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-GR.
CV No. 81439. In its brief,4 the OSG presented the following assignment of errors: a) only
alienable lands of the public domain occupied and possessed in concept of owner for a
period of at least thirty (30) years is entitled to confirmation of title; and b) respondents
failed to prove specific acts of possession.
The OSG argued that there was no proof that the subject property was already segregated
from inalienable lands of the public domain. Verily, it was only from the date of declaration
of such lands as alienable and disposable that the period for counting the statutory
requirement of possession would start.
Also, there was absolutely no proof of respondents’ supposed possession of the subject
property. Save for the testimony of Corazon that "at present, the worker of (her) mother is
occupying the subject property," there was no evidence that respondents were actually
occupying the subject tract of land or that they had introduced improvement thereon.
On November 21, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision5 affirming the judgment of the MTC
ordering the registration of the subject property in the name of respondents. The decretal
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed decision dated October 3, 2003
of the MTC of Pulilan, Bulacan, in LRC Case No. 026 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
The CA reasoned out, among others, that the approved survey plan of the subject property
with an annotation, stating that the subject property was alienable and disposable land,
was a public document, having been issued by the DENR, a competent authority. Its
contents were prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Thus, the evidence was
sufficient to establish that the subject property was indeed alienable and disposable.
With respect to the second issue, the CA was of the view that the doctrine of constructive
possession was applicable. Respondents acquired the subject property through a
donation inter vivos executed on July 22, 1972 from their mother. The latter acquired the
said property from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of a deed of absolute sale.
Further, respondent Corazon testified that a small hut was built on the said land, which
was occupied by the worker of her mother. Moreover, neither the public prosecutor nor
any private individual appeared to oppose the application for registration of the subject
property.
The CA also stated that respondents’ claim of possession over the subject property was
buttressed by the Tax Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 "in the name of Corazon Sese and
Fe Sese, minor, representing their mother Resurreccion Castro, as her Natural Guardian";
the official receipt of payment of real property tax over the subject property; and the
certificate from the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Pulilan, stating that the registered
owner of a property under Tax Declaration No. 99-19015-01557 were respondents.
The CA added that although tax declaration or realty tax payments of property were not
conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they were good indicia of possession in
the concept of owner.
Hence, the OSG filed this petition.
ISSUES
I property is indeed alienable and disposable.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN RULING THAT THE
APPROVED SURVEY PLAN IDENTIFIED BY ONE OF THE RESPONDENTS IS PROOF
THAT THE SUBJECT LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE
APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION.
The OSG argues that unless a piece of land is shown to have been classified as alienable
and disposable, it remains part of the inalienable land of the public domain. In the present
case, the CA relied on the approved survey indicating that the survey was inside alienable
and disposable land. It is well-settled, however, that such notation does not suffice to prove
that the land sought to be registered is alienable and disposable. What respondents should
have done was to show that the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and
released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land
subject of the application for registration fell within the approved area per verification
through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, they should have adduced a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy
by the legal custodian of the official records.
To bolster its argument, the OSG cites the case of Republic of the Philippine v. T.A.N.
Properties, Inc.,6 where the Court stated that the trial court should not have accepted the
contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications
are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in
establishing that the land is alienable and disposable. Such government certifications do
not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. As such, the certifications are
prima facie evidence of their due execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute
prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
With respect to the second assignment of error, the OSG argues that respondents failed
to present specific acts of ownership to prove open, continuous, exclusive, notorious, and
adverse possession in the concept of an owner. Facts constituting possession must be
duly established by competent evidence. As to the tax declaration adduced by
respondents, it cannot be said that it clearly manifested their adverse claim on the
property. If respondents genuinely and consistently believed their claim of ownership, they
should have regularly complied with their real estate obligations from the start of their
supposed occupation.
Position of Respondents
On the other hand, respondents assert that the CA correctly found that the subject land
was alienable and disposable. The approved survey plan of the subject property with an
annotation, stating that the subject property is alienable and disposable land, is a public
document, having been issued by the DENR, a competent authority. Its contents are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein and are sufficient to establish that the subject
Respondents cite the case of Republic v. Serrano, 7 where the Court stated that a DENR
Regional Technical Director’s certification, which was annotated on the subdivision plan
submitted in evidence, constituted substantial compliance with the legal requirement. The
DENR certification enjoyed the presumption of regularity absent any evidence to the
contrary.
Anent the second assignment of error, respondents contend that the CA correctly applied
the doctrine of constructive possession because they acquired the subject land from their
mother, Resurreccion, through a donation inter vivos, dated July 22, 1972.Their mother,
in turn, acquired the subject land from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of an
absolute sale. They claim that a small hut was built in the said land and was occupied by
a worker of her mother. They countered that although tax declarations or realty tax
payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are
good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property which is not in his actual or constructive custody.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The vital issue to be resolved by the Court is whether respondents are entitled to the
registration of land title under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (P.D.)No. 1529, or
pursuant to Section 14(2) of the same statute. Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 in relation
to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141,8 as amended by Section 4 of P.D. No.
1073,9 provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through
their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June
12, 1945, or earlier.
xxxx
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act,
to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of
the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Based on the above-quoted provisions, applicants for registration of land title must
establish and prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable
lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.10 Compliance with the foregoing requirements is indispensable for an application
for registration of land title, under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, to validly prosper. The
absence of any one requisite renders the application for registration substantially
defective.
Anent the first requisite, respondents presented evidence to establish the disposable and
alienable character of the subject land through a survey plan, where on its lower portion,
a note stated, among others, as follows: "This survey is inside the alienable and disposable
area as per Project No. 20 LC Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau of Forestry on March
1, 1927. It is outside any civil or military reservation." The said plan was approved by the
DENR, Land Management Services, Regional Office III, San Fernando, Pampanga on
December 3, 1998. The annotation in the survey plan, however, fell short of the
requirement of the law in proving its disposable and alienable character.
In Republic v. Espinosa,11 citing Republic v. Sarmiento12 and Menguito v. Republic,13 the
Court reiterated the rule that that a notation made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer that
the property surveyed was alienable and disposable was not the positive government act
that would remove the property from the inalienable domain and neither was it the
evidence accepted as sufficient to controvert the presumption that the property was
inalienable. Thus:
To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print Copy of the conversion and
subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which bears the notation of the surveyor-
geodetic engineer that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No.
27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such annotation to prove that the
lot is alienable is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome
the presumption that it remains part of the inalienable public domain.
"To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: ‘This survey plan is
inside Alienable and Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623,
certified by the Bureau of Forestry on January 3, 1968,’ appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey
Plan No. Swo-13-000227).
This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All
lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State..."
For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome
the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by
the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in
the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered
as a title." To overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by
the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.
In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit "E"
indicating that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does
not constitute a positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in
question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain.
By relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven
that the land in question has been declared alienable." (Citations omitted and emphases
supplied)
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the
public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must
prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this
presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. The applicant must establish the existence
of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; or
a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification from the
government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of
years is alienable and disposable.14
Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.15 declared that a CENRO certification was insufficient
to prove the alienable and disposable character of the land sought to be registered. The
applicant must also show sufficient proof that the DENR Secretary approved the land
classification and released the land in question as alienable and disposable.
Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied
by (1) a CENRO or PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification
approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the
official records.16
Here, the only evidence presented by respondents to prove the disposable and alienable
character of the subject land was an annotation by a geodetic engineer in a survey plan.
Although this was certified by the DENR, it clearly falls short of the requirements for original
registration.
With regard to the third requisite, it must be shown that the possession and occupation of
a parcel of land by the applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, started
on June 12, 1945 or earlier.17 A mere showing of possession and occupation for 30 years
or more, by itself, is not sufficient.18
In this regard, respondents likewise failed. As the records and pleadings of this case will
reveal, the earliest that respondents and their predecessor-in-interest can trace back
possession and occupation of the subject land was only in the year 1950,when their
mother, Resurreccion, acquired the subject land from the Santoses on October 4, 1950
by virtue of an absolute sale. Evidently, their possession of the subject property
commenced roughly five (5) years beyond June 12, 1945, the reckoning date expressly
provided under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. Thus, their application for registration of
land title was legally infirm.
The respondents cannot invoke Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 which provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. – The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:
xxxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.1avvphi1 The case of Malabanan v. Republic19 gives a
definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration proceedings under
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In the said case, the Court laid down
the following rules:
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:
xxxx
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that
under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not
only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an
express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the
Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period
for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person
acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code
is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse
possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of
good faith or just title, ripens into ownership. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth
or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration,
the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and, thus, incapable of acquisition by prescription. It
is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to
be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that
the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the
form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.20
Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to commence and
operate against the State, the classification of land as alienable and disposable alone is
not sufficient. The applicant must be able to show that the State, in addition to the said
classification, expressly declared through either a law enacted by Congress or a
proclamation issued by the President that the subject land is no longer retained for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted
into patrimonial. Consequently, without an express declaration by the State, the land
remains to be a property of public dominion and, hence, not susceptible to acquisition by
virtue of prescription.21 The classification of the subject property as alienable and
disposable land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public
dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. It is still insusceptible to acquisition by
prescription.22
For the above reasons, the respondents cannot avail of either Section 14 (1) or 14 (2) of
P.O. No. 1529. Under Section 14 (1), respondents failed to prove (a) that the property is
alienable and disposable; and (b) that their possession of the property dated back to June
12, 1945 or earlier. Failing to prove the alienable and disposable nature of the subject
land, respondents all the more cannot apply for registration by way of prescription pursuant
to Section 14 (2) which requires possession for 30 years to acquire or take. Not only did
respondents need to prove the classification of the subject land as alienable and
disposable, but also to show that it has been converted into patrimonial. As to whether
respondents were able to prove that their possession and occupation were of the character
prescribed by law, the resolution of this issue has been rendered unnecessary by the
foregoing considerations.

In fine, the Court holds that the ruling of the CA lacks sufficient factual or legal
justification.1âwphi1 Hence, the Court is constrained to reverse the assailed CA decision
and resolution and deny the application for registration of land title of respondents.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 21, 2007 Decision and the
October 8, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV No. 81439, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Application for Registration of Title of
Respondents Corazon C. Sese and Fe C. Sese in Land Registration Case No. 026 is
DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC.,
ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela,
which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of
land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and
Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed
judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is
a corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario
can acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of
Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph
(9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally
acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from
Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such
are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as
the sale took place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines
was discovered by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and
occupied the land from generation to generation until the same came into the
possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is
continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the
possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said
land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time
immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of
the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands,
whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than
Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said
improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land
sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the
applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of
Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the Board
of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the
land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon
Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by
the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special
session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the
applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts
that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long
after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law;
and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from
holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000 hectares
(a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme
purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree
registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
 ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through
their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for
at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial
court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer
controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme
purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural
minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors, possessed and occupied
those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the required 30-year period and were,
by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section 48 of the Public Land
Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme, as the
successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said
lands under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV
already referred to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels
had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings
instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind
the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the public domain
except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of
institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public
domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already
private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations
or associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-
Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric
Company, a domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-
owned, had purchased in 1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots
had been possessed by the vendors and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest,
Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941. On December 1,
1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for
confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land,
dismissed the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified
to apply for registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only
Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to
public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court upheld the dismissal. It was
held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the
issuance of the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section
48(b). Because it is still public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is
disqualified to apply for its registration under section 48(b), Meralco's application
cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction
between (on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no
occupant has an imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the
public domain as to which an occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial
confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any
distinction or qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to
which a Torrens title may be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under
section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of
Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning
with Carino in 1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed,
affirmed and reaffirmed the doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the
land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or
other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property. That said dissent
expressed what is the better — and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a
consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations
of June 25, 1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals
in the Philippine Islands. It was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may
prove' possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument
that this means may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English
conveyancer would have recommended an application under the foregoing
decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief
the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every
word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other
provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation.
There are indications that registration was expected from all but none sufficient
to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of
the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical
language, in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de
jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act
 No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were
complied with, for he has been in actual and physical possession, personally and
through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly,
continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So
that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had
already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction,
Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had
already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at
least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of
Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the
Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or
control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did
not thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of
Lands, 7 Mesina vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of
Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have
firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
11
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the
respondent Court held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's
proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself
and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested on petitioner
so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no
longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing
provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by
operation of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of
a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public
domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of. The
application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect
the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the
Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession
of public land which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent
of an express grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the
possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title .... " No proof
being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings would,
in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the
possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The
proceedings would not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only
confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment the
required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here
are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for
want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made,
was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not
by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels
had a legally sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it
from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such
acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter,
in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations from
acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite
immemorial possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was
actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no
serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time it did, there also being
nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations from
purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired
that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was
that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of
1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were
brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning
lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into
effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already
held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application
to the sales application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already
acquired a vested right to the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution
took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new
Constitution. Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private
corporations to purchase public agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand
and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is barred by the doctrine
of vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may
not impair vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the
subsequent repeal of a municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of
the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
 xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973
Constitution the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had
become fixed and established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of
a patent had the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The
corporation's right to obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be
deprived of that right without due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil.
919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own
name must be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect
hardly more than procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right
of ownership sought to be confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's
entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the
Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had title in themselves
confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny the
same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no
constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling
in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The
correct rule, as enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public
land held by a possessor, personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly,
continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public
Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion
of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the
land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from
the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no
prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that,
as a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under
section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds
its answer in the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the
technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who
are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical
and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was
a technical error not having filed the application for registration in the name of the
Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there
is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither
is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect
in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with
the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable
acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption
therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the
rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and
adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years
dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the
applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed
in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to
apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive
presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to
the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to
hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title
to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the
latter from themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the
certificate/s of title in their names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be
merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the same result is more efficaciously and
speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal application of the rule on
amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in
a real sense, it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were,
doctrines the soundness of which has passed the test of searching examination and
inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting that the majority opinion, as well as
the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad Santos,
in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person,
was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article
XIV, Section 11, was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and
may, in that context, be considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no
constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June,
1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is the
better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909
case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein
to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an open,
continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period
provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894
in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a
private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said
possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private
property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake. But since we are
reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and discarding
the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristocases which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel
constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government
grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the
Act, the rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not
necessary that certificate of title should be issued an order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a legal
fiction, Valentin Susi had acquiredthe land in question by a grant of the State, it had
already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his
authority to sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
for the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have
been deprived of ancestral family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration)
which reversed the dismissal of the registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court)
and adopted the liberal view that under the decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The
words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the other provisions, might be
taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership
actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer
title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases
subsequent thereto which failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating
back to 1909 and was consistently applied up to June 29, 1982 (when
the Meralco decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the established doctrine that such
acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of
law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso
jure ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property, which may be
lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation.
(As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack
of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona
fide claim of acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly
stated therein. By virtue of such conversion into private property, qualified corporations
may lawfully acquire them and there is no "alteration or defeating" of the 1973
Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring title to lands of the
public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no public
lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on
October 16, 1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition
against corporations holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later
1973 Constitution which imposed an absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous
assumption that the land remained public land despite the Infiels' open possession thereof
as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful purchase from them of
the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the welfare and
progress of the community, particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it
donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired
by the prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the
Infiels had been ipso jure converted into private land and they had a legally sufficient and
transferable title conferred by the conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which
needed only to be established in confirmation of title proceedings for formalization and
issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly transferred to respondent
corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such
applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and
disposable public lands expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State
to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered lands,"
i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated
under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been converted into
private property and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish and record such
fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have originally
expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31, 1941,
then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further extended to
December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation
of title is in effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco,
mutatis mutandis, is properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served,
therefore, by considering the applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the
evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons who as natural persons are duly
qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had acquired by conclusive
presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein
corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private
lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired
and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise
dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar
as the opinion of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant
was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the
particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought.
I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed
by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of being
deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the
exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide
the matter as if the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who
I assume suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while
concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority
ruling on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which are sought
to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were
acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of
acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the
confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private corporation
or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens
who may prove their undisputed and open possession of public lands for the required
statutory thirty-year period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that
only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations, can
actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the required statutory 30-year
period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the natural
persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them
a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law
that they file the applications for confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully
transferred their title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat
the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are
already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the corporation's
predecessors and the realistic solution would be to consider the application for
confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the
evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and
lawfully transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity of
the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It should not be necessary to
go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign its rights to the private land to
natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia
ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having
natural persons file the application for confirmation of title to the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed are the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of
the public domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area;
nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares
....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a
corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates of
Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114
SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119
SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion
that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land
involved in the case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly
apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal"
requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards
transfer the title to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila
Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality
that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural
persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just
give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error
in not having filed the application for registration in the name of the Piguing
spouses as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the
applicant Meralco
 and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with
retroactive effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural
persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their
indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive
presumption therein provided in their favor.

It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all
such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the
Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now." (Paragraphing supplied)

The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens
(natural persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits
corporations from acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That interpretation or
construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A construction adopted should
not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State
Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v.
Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).

It has also been said that:

In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the
legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be
presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a
general principle that the courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret
the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient operation
and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under
which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise
expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or
rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly
susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give effect to the act, while the
other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred. One part of a statute may
not be construed so as to render another part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover,
notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of extension of a statute
by construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise
words used in the law, and words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where
this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the provision
of a statute is general everything which is necessary to make such provision
effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III
2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)

The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The
proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus laid
down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy.

In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-
Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164408
March 24, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ZURBARAN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An application for original registration of land of the public domain under Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529 must show not only that the land has previously been
declared alienable and disposable, but also that the land has been declared patrimonial
property of the State at the onset of the 30-year or 10-year period of possession and
occupation required under the law on acquisitive prescription. Once again, the Court
applies this rule-as clarified in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic 1 – in reviewing the
decision promulgated on June 10, 2004,2whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) granted the
petitioner's application for registration of land.
Antecedents
On May 28, 1993, respondent Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in San Pedro, Laguna an application for original registration
covering a 1,520 square meter parcel of land situated in Barrio Banlic, Municipality of
Cabuyao, Province of Laguna, denominated as Lot 8017-A of Subdivision Plan CSD-04-
006985-D, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre,3 alleging that it had purchased the land on
March 9, 1992 from Jane de Castro Abalos, married to Jose Abalos, for ₱300,000.00; that
the land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of its predecessor-in-interest
under Tax Declaration No. 22711; that there was no mortgage or encumbrance of any
kind affecting the land, nor was there any other person or entity having any interest
thereon, legal or equitable, adverse to that of the applicant; and that the applicant and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and
occupation of the land in the concept of an owner.
Attached to the application were several documents, namely: (1) tracing cloth plan as
approved by the Land Management Division of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR); (2) blue print copies of the tracing cloth plan; (3) copies of the
technical description; (4) copies of Tax Declaration No. 2711; and (5) copies of the Deed
of Sale dated March 9, 1992.
The Republic, represented by the Director of Lands, opposed the application, arguing that
the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest had not been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945; that the
muniments of title and tax declaration presented did not constitute competent and
sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land; and that the land was a portion
of the public domain, and, therefore, was not subject to private appropriation.4
The RTC directed the Land Management Bureau, Manila; the Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of Los Baños, Laguna; and the Land
Management Sector and Forest Management Bureau, Manila, to submit a status report
on the land, particularly, on whether the land was covered by a land patent, whether it was
subject of a previously approved isolated survey, and whether it was within a forest zone.5
In his memorandum to the DENR, Region IV (Lands Forestry Sector), and the Provincial
Prosecutor of Laguna, a copy of which was furnished the trial court, CENRO Officer
Arnulfo Hernandez stated that the land had been "verified to be within the Alienable and
Disposable land under Land Classification Project No. 23-A of Cabuyao, Laguna, certified
and declared as such pursuant to the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 705, as
amended, under Forestry Administrative Order No. A-1627 dated September 28, 1981 per
BFD Map LC-3004." Attached to the memorandum was the inspection report declaring
that "the area is surrounded with concrete fence, three (3) buildings for employees’
residence;" that the land was acquired through sale before the filing of the application; that
the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest had been in "continuous, open and peaceful
occupation" of the land, and that "no forestry interest is adversely affected."6
CENRO Land Management Inspector/Investigator Rodolfo S. Gonzales reported that: (1)
the land was covered by a survey plan approved by the Regional Land Director/Land
Registration Authority on May 25, 1988 pursuant to PD No. 239 dated July 9, 1975; (2) it
consisted of 22,773 square meters and was located in Barangay Banlic, Cabuyao,
Laguna; (3) the area was entirely within the alienable and disposable area; (4) it had never
been forfeited in favor of the government for non-payment of taxes, and had not been
confiscated in connection with any civil or criminal cases; (5) it was not within a previously
patented property as certified to by the Register of Deeds, Calamba, Laguna; and (6) there
was no public land application filed for it by the applicant or any other persons as per
verification from the records unit of his office. The report further stated that a verification
at the Office of the Municipal Assessor showed that: (1) the land was declared for the first
time in 1960 under Tax Declaration No. 6712 in the name of Enrique Hemedez with an
area of 23,073 square meters; (2) it was now covered by Tax Declaration No. 2253 issued
in the name of the respondent; (3) the real property taxes had been paid since 1968; and
(4) it had not been earmarked for public or quasi-public purposes per information from the
District Engineer.
After inspection, it was also found that (1) the land was residential; (2) the respondent was
in the actual occupation and possession of the land; and (3) the land did not encroach
upon an established watershed, riverbank/bed protection, creek, right-of-way or park site
or any area devoted to general use or devoted to public service.7
A certification was issued by the Records Management Division of the Land Management
Bureau stating that it had no record of any kind of public land applications/land patents
covering the parcel of land subject of the application.8
The respondent presented Gloria P. Noel, its Vice President and Treasurer, who testified
that the respondent had purchased the land from Jane de Castro Abalos on March 9, 1992
for ₱300,000.00; that the land had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of
Abalos under Tax Declaration No. 22711; that after the sale, a new Tax Declaration had
been issued in the name of the respondent, who had meanwhile taken possession of the
land by building a fence around it and introducing improvements thereon; that the
respondent had paid the real property taxes thereon since its acquisition; that the
respondent’s possession had been continuous, open and public; and that the land was
free from any lien or encumbrance; and that there was no adverse claimant to the land. 9
Engr. Edilberto Tamis attested that he was familiar with the land because it was a portion
of Lot No. 8017 of Subdivision Plan Cad-455-D of the Cabuyao Cadastre, owned by
Corazon Tapalla who had acquired it from the Hemedez family; that Tapalla had sold a
portion of Lot No. 8017 to Abalos and the remaining portion to him; and that he had
witnessed the sale of the land to the respondent.10
The respondent’s final witness was Armando Espela who declared that he was a retired
land overseer residing in Barangay Banlic from birth; that he was familiar with the land
which was part of a bigger parcel of land owned by the Hemedez family; that his father,
Toribio Espela, with his assistance, and one Francisco Capacio worked on the land since
1960; that the entire landholding had originally been sugarland, but was later on
subdivided, sold, and resold until it ceased to be agricultural land; that, in 1982, the land
was sold to Corazon Tapalla who hired him as the overseer; that as the overseer, he
fenced and cleared the area; that he was allowed to use the grassy portion for grazing
purposes; that in 1987, Tapalla sold part of the land to Abalos and the remaining portion
to Engr. Tamis; that he continued to oversee the land for the new owners; that Abalos then
sold her portion to the respondent in 1992; that since then, the respondent took possession
of the land, and he then ceased to be the overseer; that the possession by the Hemedez
family and its successors-in-interest was open, continuous, public and under claim of
ownership; and that he did not know any person who claimed ownership of the land other
than those he and his father served as overseers.11
Decision of the RTC
On May 12, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision, holding that the respondent and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and
adverse possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership even
prior to 1960 and, accordingly, granted the application for registration, viz:
WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the evidence submitted by the applicant, this
Court hereby orders the confirmation and registration of title of the land described as Lot
8017-A of subdivision plan Csd-04-006985-D, being a portion of Lot 8017 of subdivision
plan Cad-455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre situated at Barangay Banlic, Cabuyao, Laguna with
an area of 1,520 square meters to be entered under the name of the applicant Zurbaran
Realty and Development Corporation, a corporation organized and existing under the laws
of the Philippines with office address at 33 M. Viola St., San Francisco del Monte, Quezon
City by the Land Registration Authority. After the decision shall become final, let an order
for the issuance of a decree of title be issued in favor of said applicant.
SO ORDERED.12
Judgment of the CA
The Republic appealed, arguing that the issue of whether the applicant and its
predecessors-in-interest had possessed the land within the required length of time could
not be determined because there was no evidence as to when the land had been declared
alienable and disposable.
On June 10, 2004, the CA promulgated its judgment affirming the RTC, and concluded
that the reports made by the concerned government agencies and the testimonies of those
familiar with the land in question had buttressed the court a quo’s conclusion that the
respondent and its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, public, peaceful,
continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and occupation of the land under a bona
fide claim of ownership even prior to 1960.13
Issue
Hence, the Republic appeals the adverse judgment of the CA upon the following ground:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT
AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT’S GRANT OF THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL
REGISTRATION DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE THAT RESPONDENT AND
ITS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAVE COMPLIED WITH THE PERIOD OF
POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION REQUIRED BY LAW.14
The Republic contends that the respondent did not establish the time when the land
covered by the application for registration became alienable and disposable; 15 that such
detail was crucial because the possession of the respondent and its predecessors-in-
interest, for the purpose of determining whether it acquired the property by prescription,
should be reckoned from the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable;
and that prior to the declaration of the land of the public domain as alienable and
disposable, it was not susceptible to private ownership, and any possession or occupation
at such time could not be counted as part of the period of possession required under the
law on prescription.16
The respondent counters that whether it established when the property was declared
alienable and disposable and whether it complied with the 30-year required period of
possession should not be entertained anymore by the Court because: (a) these issues
had not been raised in the trial court and were being raised for the first time on appeal;
and (b) factual findings of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the CA, were binding
and conclusive on this Court. At any rate, the respondent insists that it had been in open,
public, peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession of the property for the prescribed
period of 30 years as evidenced by the fact that the property had been declared for taxation
purposes in 1960 in the name of its predecessors-in-interest, and that such possession
had the effect of converting the land into private property and vesting ownership upon the
respondent.17
In reply, the Republic asserts that it duly opposed the respondent’s application for
registration; that it was only able to ascertain the errors committed by the trial court after
the latter rendered its decision; and that the burden of proof in land registration cases
rested on the applicant who must prove its ownership of the property being registered.
The Republic maintains that the Court had the authority to review and reverse the factual
findings of the lower courts when the conclusion reached was not supported by the
evidence on record, as in this case.18
Ruling
The petition for review is meritorious.
Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates those who may file an application for registration
of land based on possession and occupation of a land of the public domain, thus:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provision of existing laws.
xxxx
An application for registration under Section14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 must establish the
following requisites, namely: (a) the land is alienable and disposable property of the public
domain; (b) the applicant and its predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of
ownership; and (c) the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed and
occupied the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The Court has clarified in
Malabanan19 that under Section14(1), it is not necessary that the land must have been
declared alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945, or earlier, because the law simply
requires the property sought to be registered to be alienable and disposable at the time
the application for registration of title is filed. The Court has explained that a contrary
interpretation would absurdly limit the application of the provision "to the point of virtual
inutility."
The foregoing interpretation highlights the distinction between a registration proceeding
filed under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 and one filed under Section 14(2) of P.D. No.
1529. According to Malabanan:
Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2)
entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is
extended under the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act
while registration under Section 14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration
Decree and the Civil Code.20
In other words, registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 is based on possession
and occupation of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain since June 12,
1945 or earlier, without regard to whether the land was susceptible to private ownership
at that time. The applicant needs only to show that the land had already been declared
alienable and disposable at any time prior to the filing of the application for registration.
On the other hand, an application under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 is based on
acquisitive prescription and must comply with the law on prescription as provided by the
Civil Code. In that regard, only the patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
prescription pursuant to the Civil Code.21 For acquisitive prescription to set in, therefore,
the land being possessed and occupied must already be classified or declared as
patrimonial property of the State. Otherwise, no length of possession would vest any right
in the possessor if the property has remained land of the public dominion. Malabanan
stresses that even if the land is later converted to patrimonial property of the State,
possession of it prior to such conversion will not be counted to meet the requisites of
acquisitive prescription.22 Thus, registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 requires
that the land had already been converted to patrimonial property of the State at the onset
of the period of possession required by the law on prescription.
An application for registration based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 must, therefore,
establish the following requisites, to wit: (a) the land is an alienable and disposable, and
patrimonial property of the public domain; (b) the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest
have been in possession of the land for at least 10 years, in good faith and with just title,
or for at least 30 years, regardless of good faith or just title; and (c) the land had already
been converted to or declared as patrimonial property of the State at the beginning of the
said 10-year or 30-year period of possession.
To properly appreciate the respondent’s case, we must ascertain under what provision its
application for registration was filed. If the application was filed under Section 14(1) of P.D.
No. 1529, the determination of the particular date when the property was declared
alienable and disposable would be unnecessary, inasmuch as proof showing that the land
had already been classified as such at the time the application was filed would be enough.
If the application was filed under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the determination of the
issue would not be crucial for, as earlier clarified, it was not the declaration of the land as
alienable and disposable that would make it susceptible to private ownership by acquisitive
prescription. Malabanan expounds thereon, thus …Would such lands so declared
alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the public
dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and
disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that
all things within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same
provision further provides that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by
prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when
no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial
property of the State." It is this provision that controls how public dominion property may
be converted into patrimonial property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all,
Article 420 (2) makes clear that those property "which belong to the State, without being
for public use, and are intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the property belongs to the
State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property of the respondent's application for original registration of Lot 8017-A of Subdivision Plan CSD-
public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of 04-006985-D, Cad. 455-D, of the Cabuyao Cadastre.
the national wealth."
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion
property is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth SO ORDERED.
or that the property has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration,
the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public
dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1529
is only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to
be no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth that AMENDING AND CODIFYING THE LAWS RELATIVE TO REGISTRATION OF
the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall be in the PROPERTY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.23 CHAPTER III
ORIGINAL REGISTRATION
The respondent’s application does not enlighten as to whether it was filed under Section
14(1) or Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The application alleged that the respondent and I
its predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and ORDINARY REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS
occupation of the property in the concept of an owner, but did not state when possession
and occupation commenced and the duration of such possession. At any rate, the
evidence presented by the respondent and its averments in the other pleadings reveal that A. APPLICATIONS
the application for registration was filed based on Section 14(2), not Section 14(1) of P.D.
No. 1529. The respondent did not make any allegation in its application that it had been Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
in possession of the property since June 12, 1945, or earlier, nor did it present any Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their
evidence to establish such fact.1âwphi1 duly authorized representatives:

With the application of the respondent having been filed under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. (1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
1529, the crucial query is whether the land subject of the application had already been been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
converted to patrimonial property of the State. In short, has the land been declared by law of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim
as no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth? of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

The respondent may perhaps object to a determination of this issue by the Court for the (2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
same reason that it objects to the determination of whether it established when the land the provision of existing laws.
was declared alienable and disposable, that is, the issue was not raised in and resolved
and by the trial court. But the objection would be futile because the issue was actually
raised in the trial court, as borne out by the Republic's allegation in its opposition to the (3) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands or abandoned river
application to the effect "that the land is a portion of the public domain not subject to beds by right of accession or accretion under the existing laws.
prescription." In any case, the interest of justice dictates the consideration and resolution
of an issue that is relevant to another that was specifically raised. The rule that only (4) Those who have acquired ownership of land in any other manner provided
theories raised in the initial proceedings may be taken up by a party on appeal refers only for by law.
to independent, not concomitant, matters to support or oppose the cause of action. 24
Where the land is owned in common, all the co-owners shall file the application jointly.
Here, there is no evidence showing that the land in question was within an area expressly
declared by law either to be the patrimonial property of the State, or to be no longer
Where the land has been sold under pacto de retro, the vendor a retro may file an
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth. The Court is left with
application for the original registration of the land, provided, however, that should the
no alternative but to deny the respondent's application for registration.
period for redemption expire during the pendency of the registration proceedings and
ownership to the property consolidated in the vendee a retro, the latter shall be
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and substituted for the applicant and may continue the proceedings.
SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on June 10, 2004; and DISMISSES the
A trustee on behalf of his principal may apply for original registration of any land held in
trust by him, unless prohibited by the instrument creating the trust.