PART II
criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
B. CIVIL ASPECT OF A CRIMINAL CASE
(RULE 111)
1. BUN TIONG v BALBOA
Facts:
Vicente Balboa filed 2 cases against Caroline Siok Ching Teng:
(1) a civil case for Collection of Sum of Money on Feb 24, ’97
based on the post dated checks issued by Caroline with RTC.
The RTC ruled in favor of Balboa affirmed by the CA.
(2) criminal cases for violation of B.P. 22 on July 21, ’97. The
MTC acquitted Tend but held her civilly liable. The RTC on
appeal deleted the award of civil damages.
The Sps Ching Teng now comes to court charging Balboa with
forum shopping.
Issue: W/N it constitutes forum shopping
Held: NO
Forum shopping is the institution of 2 or more actions or
proceedings grounded on the same cause, on the supposition
that one or the other court would render a favorable
disposition. The elements are: (1) identity of parties; (2)
identity of rights and relief prayed for; (3) identity of 2
preceding particulars such that any judgment in the other
action would constitute res judicata or litis pendentia.
In the Hyat case it was pronounced that there is identity of
parties and causes of action between a civil case for recovery
of sum of money and criminal case for BP 22. In the said case
the SC applied SC Circ. No. 57-97 effective Sept 16, 1997,
which provides that “the criminal action for violation of BP 22
shall be deemed to necessarily include the corresponding civil
action and no reservation to file such action separately shall
be allowed or recognized.” This was later adopted in Rule
111(b) of the 2000 Revised Rules of Crim Procedure – “(b) The
criminal action for violation of BP 22 shall be deemed to
include the corresponding civil action. No reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be allowed. x x x”.
The foregoing however is not applicable as the civil and the
criminal actions were filed on Feb 24 and July 21 1997,
respectively, prior to the adoption of the SC Circular. The
applicable rule was still Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules of
Court – “Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. –
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
1
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the
action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. x x x”
Since Balboa instituted the civil case prior to the criminal
case, the civil case may proceed independently of the criminal
case and there is no forum shopping. Even under the
amended rules, a separate proceeding for recovery of civil
liability in cases of violation of BP 22 is allowed when the civil
case is filed of the criminal case. Even then the Rules
encourage consolidation.
2. JOSE v SUAREZ
FACTS:
Sps. Suarez (Respondents) had availed of petitioner Carolina
Jose’s offer to lend money at daily interest of 1% to 2% which
the latter increased to 5% and respondents were forced to
accept due to their financial distress. They sought to nullify
the 5% interest per day fixing claiming that the same were
contrary to morals and done under vitiated consent.
Thereafter, the petitioners filed cases of violation of BP 22
against respondents where the latter filed motions to suspend
hearings based on the existence of a prejudicial question.
Respondents claimed that if the 5% interest rates are nullified
and loans are computed at 1% per month, it would mean that
the checks which are objects of BP 22 cases are not only fully
paid but in fact overpaid.
ISSUE:
W/N a prejudicial questions exists such that the outcome of
the validity of the interest is determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the respondents in the criminal case? No
RULING:
No. Prejudicial questions have two elements: a) The civil
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the
issue raised in the criminal action; b) The resolution of such
issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed. The validity or invalidity of the interest rate is not
determinative of the guilt of the respondents in the criminal
case. The cause or reason for issuance of a check is
immaterial in determining criminal culpability under BP 22.
The law punishes the issuance of the bouncing check, which is
malum prohibitum, and not the purpose it was issued for.

C. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
1. COMMUNITY RURAL BANK v TALAVERA (borrowed)
FACTS:
Community Rural Bank (Bank for short) filed a complaint with
the prosecutor’s office of Cabanatuan charging several
persons (the accused) with Estafa. After preliminary
investigation, 6 informations for estafa were filed, 2 of which
were raffled to the branch where respondent, Judge Talavera,
presided.
The accused appealed the finding of the Fiscal to the DOJ,
which the latter denied, so Judge Talavera issued a warrant of
arrest with no bail against the accused.
Later, the accused filed with Judge Talavera a motion for
reinvestigation and to lift the warrant of arrest. Bank was not
notified of this motion. Judge granted the motion without any
hearing thereon. When the reinvestigation was conducted,
the Bank was still not notified.
The assistant provincial prosecutor who conducted the
reinvestigation reversed the earlier findings of the fiscal. On
the same day, a motion to dismiss was filed with Judge, which
he granted, and he also ordered the release of the accused.
The Bank was never notified of any of these proceedings.
Bank then filed an MR arguing it was deprived of due process.
It also asked that the criminal information be reinstated.
Judge denied this. Now, Bank filed the present case charging
Judge Talavera with serious misconduct and gross inefficiency.
Issue: Did Judge commit gross ignorance? - Yes
Motion for Reinvestigation. Judge should not have
entertained the motion for reinvestigation, since DOJ
Secretary Serafin Cuevas already denied with finality the
appeal of the accused, finding that there was prima facie
evidence against the accused. Under Dept Order No. 223
(Rules Governing Appeals from Resolutions in Preliminary
Investigations or Reinvestigations), a motion for
reinvestigation may be filed on the ground of newly
discovered evidence and this must be filed before the DOJ
Secretary rules on an appeal from the resolution in a
preliminary investigation. Here, the motion for reinvestigation
was filed 3 months after the DOJ Secretary already denied
their appeal with finality. Clearly, therefore, Judge Talavera
was wrong in granting the motion. Also, there was no newly
discovered evidence. Moreover, considering that a prima facie
2
case was found to exist against the accused during the
preliminary investigation, Judge Talavera should have
exercised great restraint in granting a reinvestigation. The
court stressed that a preliminary investigation is essentially
prefatory and inquisitorial. It is not a trial of the case on the
merits and has no purpose except to determine whether a
crime has been committed, and whether there is probable
cause to believe that the accused is guilty of that crime. A
preliminary investigation is not the occasion for a full and
exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence, which needs to
be presented only to engender a well-grounded belief that
an offense has been committed, and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof.
Motion to Dismiss. It was also error for the Judge to grant the
Motion to Dismiss by relying merely on the resolution of the
prosecutor who conducted the reinvestigation. In his Order,
he merely stated that the motion to dismiss is meritorious,
and nothing more. The Order failed to demonstrate an
independent evaluation or assessment of the evidence
against the accused. The Judge acted with undue haste when
he granted the Motion only a day after the reinvestigation
was concluded. This leads to the conclusion that the judge did
not personally evaluate the parties’ evidence before acting on
the Motion. The discretion to grant a Motion to Dismiss rests
solely with the court. However, mere approval of the position
taken by the prosecution is not equivalent to the discretion
required. Once a complaint or an information is filed in court,
the judge -- not the prosecutor -- assumes full control of the
controversy. A grant of the motion to dismiss is equivalent to
a disposition of the case itself, which is a subject clearly
within the court’s exclusive jurisdiction and competence.
When Judge issued the warrants of arrest without bail against
all the accused, it is presumed that he had studied the
Information and the Resolution of the prosecutor and agreed
with the latter’s findings of probable cause. Thus, the grant of
the Motion for Reinvestigation and of the Motion to Dismiss
for alleged insufficiency of evidence posed a serious
contradiction of the earlier finding of probable cause.
Finally, Judge granted both of the Motions despite the
obvious lack of notice to the Bank and lack of hearing. This
lapse effectively deprived it of its day in court.
2. SERAG v CA (borrowed)
Facts:
Atty. Jesus Sibya, Jr. a mayoralty candidate in Iloilo
was shot. His driver Norberto Salamat was also wounded.
Hence, a criminal complaint for murder and attempted
murder was filed against Napao who was an incumbent
mayor at that time and Sebastian Serag. The prosecutor filed
two informations: (1) for Murder with the Use of Unlicensed
Firearms, and (2) Attempted Murder with the Use of
Unlicensed Firearms against Serag and Napao and 7 others.
The wounded driver Salamat and wife of the victim
Ma. Daisy Sibya filed before the provincial prosecutor a
supplemental complaint for murder, frustrated murder and
violation of PD 1866 (Illegal possession of firearms) against
Napag, Serag and 16 others. Provincial Prosecutor issued an
order finding probable cause for murder and attempted
murder with the use of unlicensed firearms. Hence, an
amended information was filed (to include the use of
unlicensed firearms). Napao and the other accused filed a
petition for review to appeal the said resolution before the
DOJ.
The trial court found probable cause for murder and
attempted murder. Warrants of arrest were issued against the
accused who were still at large.
Pending the resolution by the Secretary of Justice of
the said petition for review, the proceedings were suspended.
However, the accused were still set to be arraigned. A day
before the said arraignment, the Secretary of Justice affirmed
with modification the resolution and downgraded the charges
from murder to Homicide. Provincial prosecutor was likewise
ordered to amend the Amended Informations accordingly.
The wife of the victim, Daisy, filed an MR to appeal
the said resolution.
In compliance with the order of the DOJ, provincial
prosecutor filed before the RTC a motion for leave to file a
second amended information for homicide and attempted
homicide. Private prosecutors opposed the motion and
moved for deferment because they said that Daisy had earlier
filed an MR questioning the resolution downgrading the
charges. They said that it would be premature to file a motion
for the admission of the second amended information and for
the court to admit the same. But the RTC still granted the
motion of the provincial prosecutor and admitted the second
amended information for homicide. The attempted homicide
case however was dismissed on the ground that it had no
jurisdiction over the said case. RTC said they had not received
a copy of Daisy’s MR. Hence, the court arraigned the accused
for homicide, who pleaded not guilty.
Taking into account the finding of the DOJ, the court
held that the finding of probable cause for murder against the
accused did not bar it from admitting the Second Amended
Information for Homicide. Likewise, the pendency of Daisy’s
MR of the Resolution of the Secretary of Justice was not a
valid reason for the deferment of the arraignment of the
accused for homicide.
The private complainant (Daisy) forthwith assailed
the orders of the trial court and the arraignment of the
accused via a petition for certiorari in the CA. She insisted
that the admission by the RTC of the Second Amended
Information downgrading the crime charged therein to
Homicide and the arraignment of the accused therein on June
6, 2002 were premature since the Secretary of Justice had not
3
yet resolved her motion for reconsideration of the May 20,
2002 Resolution.
CA issued a TRO enjoining the RTC from proceeding
with the case.
In the meantime, DOJ issued a resolution granting
the MR of private complainant Daisy and set aside the
resolution downgraded the offense to homicide. The
Secretary of Justice opined that the killing of the deceased
was, after all, qualified by treachery. Secretary also said that
he cannot be stopped from taking cognizance of the case and
resolving the MR despite the arraignment of the accused. He
directed the Provincial Prosecutor to withdraw the Second
Amended Information for Homicide and Attempted Homicide
and to file, instead separate Informations for Murder and
Attempted Murder.
The accused-petitioners filed an MR of the said
resolution. They argued that, with their arraignment in the
RTC and the MTC, the Secretary of Justice should have denied
the private complainant’s motion for reconsideration. DOJ
denied said motion.
Juan Napao and the other petitioners in the
Department of Justice filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA assailing the November 18, 2002 Resolution of the
Secretary of Justice, and praying for the reinstatement of
Resolution No. 258 (wherein the charges against them were
downgraded).
The Provincial Prosecutor filed a Motion with the
trial court for the withdrawal of the Second Amended
Information for homicide and for the reinstatement of the
Amended Information for murder. However, in view of the
temporary restraining order issued by the CA, the trial court
suspended the proceedings.
CA eventually issued an order nullifying the order
downgrading the offense. It also issued an order nullifying the
arraignment. Of course, the accused-petitioners questioned
this saying CA acted with GADLEJ when it issued the order
nullifying their arraignment. They insist that the CA should
have dismissed the petition of Daisy for being moot and
academic because they were already arraigned.
ISSUE:
W/N the CA committed GADLEJ? No, petition is
denied.
HELD:
The appellate court’s nullification of the June 6, 2002
and July 26, 2002 Orders of the RTC and the arraignment of
the petitioners on June 6, 2002 are well-founded. Section 13
of DOJ Circular No. 70 reads:
SECTION 13. Motion for reconsideration.— The
aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration
within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from
receipt of the resolution on appeal, furnishing the
adverse party and the Prosecution Office concerned
with copies thereof and submitting proof of such
service. No second or further motion for
reconsideration shall be entertained.
 The private respondent (Daisy) received a copy of
Resolution No. 258 of the Secretary of Justice downgrading
the charges from murder and attempted murder to homicide
and attempted homicide. She had the right to file a motion
for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution on or before
June 6, 2002. it behooved the RTC to suspend the
proceedings until after the Secretary of Justice had resolved
such motion with finality, including the consideration of the
motion of the Provincial Prosecutor for the admission of the
Second Amended Information for homicide, the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 926, and the arraignment of the petitioners
for homicide. It was, in fact, premature for the Provincial
Prosecutor to file such motion for the admission of the
Second Amended Information since the Secretary of Justice
had not yet resolved the said motion; after all, he may still
reconsider Resolution No. 258, which he did, effectively
reversing his previous ruling and thus reverting to the original
charges of murder and attempted murder.
Accordingly, we rule that the trial court in a criminal
case which takes cognizance of an accused’s motion for
review of the resolution of the investigating prosecutor or for
reinvestigation and defers the arraignment until resolution of
the said motion must act on the resolution reversing the
investigating prosecutor’s finding or on a motion to dismiss
based thereon only upon proof that such resolution is already
final in that no appeal was taken therefrom to the
Department of Justice.
In fine, the RTC acted with inordinate and precipitate
haste when it granted the Provincial Prosecutor’s motion for
the admission of the Second Amended Information for
homicide, ordered the withdrawal of Criminal Case No. 926
for attempted homicide based on Resolution No. 258 of the
DOJ Secretary, and arraigned the accused therein for
homicide. Quoting the CA:
“Public respondent also erroneously found that the
pendency of the motion for reconsideration, and the
other reasons given, not compelling for the court to
defer its action on the motion to admit. As earlier
stated, Department Circular No. 70 places the duty
upon the appellant and the trial prosecutor to see to
it that, pending resolution of the appeal, the
proceedings in court are held in abeyance.”
It should be considered that the motion to defer was
even with the conformity of the public prosecutor and the
appearance of the private prosecutors is pursuant to Section
16, Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
Intervention of the offended party in criminal action.
—Where the civil action for recovery of civil liability
is instituted in the criminal action pursuant to Rule
111, the offended party may intervene by counsel in
the prosecution of the offense.
All these facts taken together, there appears to be an
undue haste on the part of the public respondent in admitting
the second amended informations for homicide and
attempted homicide and ordering the arraignment of the
private respondents to the said informations. As a result of
the assailed Orders issued by public respondent, the private
4
respondents were arraigned for homicide and attempted
homicide.
The DOJ cannot be stripped of his authority to act on
and resolve the aforesaid motion of the private complainant
on the Prosecutor’s insistence that the accused be arraigned
on June 6, 2002. Indeed, under Section 7 of DOJ Circular No.
70, the Secretary of Justice may resolve the said motion
despite the arraignment of the petitioners:
SECTION 7. Action on the petition. – The Secretary of
Justice may dismiss the petition outright if he finds
the same to be patently without merit or manifestly
intended for delay, or when the issues raised therein
are too unsubstantial to require consideration.
If an information has been filed in court pursuant to
the appealed resolution, the petition shall not be
given due course if the accused had already been
arraigned. Any arraignment made after the filing of
the petition shall not bar the Secretary of Justice
from exercising his power of review.
3. SORIANO v PEOPLE
Facts: Sometime in 2000, the Office of Special Investigation
(OSI) of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP), sent a letter to
the Chief State Prosecutor of the DOJ. The letter attached five
affidavits, which would serve as bases for filing charges for
Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial Documents and
violation of the DOSRI law against Hilario Soriano.
These five affidavits stated that a certain couple, the spouses
Carlos, appeared to have an outstanding loan of P8 million
with the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM), but
had never applied for nor received such loan and that it was
petitioner, who was then president of RBSM, who had
ordered, facilitated, and received the proceeds of the loan;
and that the P8 million loan had never been authorized by
RBSM's Board and no report thereof had ever been submitted
to the BSP. The letter of the OSI, which was not subscribed
under oath, ended with a request that a preliminary
investigation be conducted and the corresponding criminal
charges be filed against petitioner at his last known address.
Petitioner’s filed a Motion to Quash and argued that the letter
transmitted by the BSP constituted the complaint and hence
was defective for failure to comply with the mandatory
requirements of Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
such as the statement of address of petitioner and oath and
subscription. Moreover, petitioner argued that the officers of
OSI, who were the signatories to the “letter-complaint,” were
not authorized by the BSP Governor, much less by the
Monetary Board, to file the complaint.
The RTC denied it. They ruled that the assailed OSI letter was
not the complaint-affidavit itself; thus, it need not comply
with the requirements under the Rules of Court. It was but a
cover letter, and merely contained a summary of the affidavits
which were attached to it. It did not contain any averment of
personal knowledge of the events and transactions that
constitute the elements of the offenses charged. The RTC held
that the affidavits, which were attached to the OSI letter,
comprised the complaint-affidavit in the case. Since these
affidavits were duly subscribed and sworn to before a notary
public, there was adequate compliance with the Rules. On
certiorari the CA agreed. These complaint-affidavits complied
with the mandatory requirements set out in the Rules of
Court – they were subscribed and sworn to before a notary
public and subsequently certified by State Prosecutor
Fonacier, who personally examined the affiants and was
convinced that the affiants fully understood their sworn
statements.
Issue: Which was the complaint, the letter or the affidavits?
Was there compliance with Rule 112, sec. 3[a] of the Rules of
Court?
Held: 1. The letter was not intended to be the complaint, as
envisioned under the Rules. They did not contain averments
of personal knowledge of the events and transactions
constitutive of any offense. The letters merely transmitted for
preliminary investigation the affidavits of people who had
personal knowledge of the acts of petitioner. We rule that
these affidavits, not the letters transmitting them, initiated
the preliminary investigation. Since these affidavits were
subscribed under oath by the witnesses who executed them
before a notary public, then there was substantial compliance
with Section 3(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
The Court is not unaware of the practice of incorporating all
allegations in one document denominated as “complaint-affidavit.” It
does not pronounce strict adherence to only one approach,
however, for there are cases where the extent of one’s personal
knowledge may not cover the entire gamut of details material to the
alleged offense. The private offended party or relative of the
deceased may not even have witnessed the fatality, in which case
the peace officer or law enforcer has to rely chiefly on affidavits of
witnesses. The Rules do not in fact preclude the attachment of a
referral or transmittal letter.
The rule has been that, unless the offense subject thereof is one that
cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the same may be filed, for
preliminary investigation purposes, by any competent person. The
witnesses who executed the affidavits based on their personal
knowledge of the acts committed by the petitioner fall within the
purview of “any competent person” who may institute the
complaint for a public crime.
A preliminary investigation can thus validly proceed on the basis of
an affidavit of any competent person, without the referral document
having been sworn to by the law enforcer as the nominal
complainant. To require otherwise is a needless exercise. After all,
what is required is to reduce the evidence into affidavits, for while
reports and even raw information may justify the initiation of an
investigation, the preliminary investigation stage can be held only
5
after sufficient evidence has been gathered and evaluated which
may warrant the eventual prosecution of the case in court.
2. Anent the contention that there was no authority from the
BSP Governor or the Monetary Board to file a case against
Soriano, we hold that the NCBA does not apply because the
BSP did not institute the complaint but merely sent the
affidavits of the complainants [the officers] to the DOJ.
3. We further held that since the offenses for which Soriano
was charged were public crimes, authority holds that it can be
initiated by “any competent person” with personal knowledge
of the acts committed by the offender. Thus, the witnesses
who executed the affidavits clearly fell within the purview of
“any competent person” who may institute the complaint for
a public crime.
Appeal denied, Motion to Quash remains denied.
4. SAMUEL LEE v KBC BANK
Facts
Midas Diversified Export Corporation (MDEC) obtained a
$1,400,000 loan from KBC Bank N.V. (KBC Bank). KBC Bank is
a Belgian corporation licensed to do business in the
Philippines. For this loan, Samuel U. Lee (Lee), assistant
treasurer and director of MDEC, executed a promissory note
in favor of KBC Bank and a deed of assignment transferring all
of MDEC’s rights over Confirmed Purchase Order No. MTC-
548 to KBC Bank. Confirmed Purchase Order No. MTC-548
was allegedly issued by Otto Versand, a company based in
Germany, and covered shipments amounting to $1,863,050.
MDEC obtained another loan, amounting to $65,000,
from KBC Bank. For this second loan, Maybelle L. Lim (Lim),
treasurer and assistant secretary of MDEC, executed a
promissory note in favor of KBC Bank and a deed of
assignment transferring all of MDEC’s rights over Confirmed
Purchase Order No. WC-128 to KBC Bank. Confirmed
Purchase Order No. WC-128 was also allegedly issued by Otto
Versand, and covered shipments amounting to $841,500.
MDEC defaulted in the payment of these 2 loans. KBC Bank
sent a letter to Otto Versand verifying the validity of
Confirmed Purchase Order Nos. MTC-548 and WC-
128. However, Otto Versand sent a facsimile message to KBC
Bank stating that (1) it did not issue the purchase orders, (2) it
did not order or receive the items covered by the purchase
orders, and (3) it would not pay MDEC any amount.
Thus, KBC Bank filed a complaint for estafa against Lee and
Lim. State Prosecutor Subia found the existence of probable
cause and recommended that two counts of estafa be filed
against Lee and Lim.
Accordingly, two informations for estafa against Lee and Lim
were filed with the RTC. After finding probable cause, Judge
issued warrants of arrest against Lee and Lim.
Lee and Lim filed a petition. for review with the Department of
Justice (DOJ) challenging the state prosecutor’s resolution.
In his Resolution, DOJ Secretary Perez directed the
withdrawal of the informations filed against Lee and Lim
holding that the facsimile message constituted hearsay
evidence because contents of the said message was not of
personal knowledge of KBC Bank, but of Otto Versand, which
did not present a sworn statement during the trial.
Thereafter, City Prosecutor Sibucao, filed a motion to
withdraw the informations against Lee and Lim, which was
granted by the RTC (through an order). However, on appeal,
the CA set aside this order for the withdrawal of informations.
Hence, this petition.
Issues
1. Whether or not the issue of admissibility of the
facsimile message may be properly ventilated during
the full-blown trial and not during the preliminary
investigation. YES
2. Whether or not Judge Dumayas of the RTC, in
ordering the withdrawal of the informations against
Lee and Lim, ailed to make his own evaluation and
merely relied on Secretary Perez’s recommendation.
YES
Ruling
1.Yes. The issue of admissibility of the facsimile message
should be ventilated during the full-blown trial and not during
the preliminary investigation.
The Court said that whether the facsimile message is
admissible in evidence and whether the element of deceit in
the crime of estafa is present are matters best ventilated in a
full-blown trial, not in the preliminary
investigation. In Andres v. Justice Secretary Cuevas, the Court
held that:
[A preliminary investigation] is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display
of [the prosecution’s] evidence. The
presence or absence of the elements of the
crime is evidentiary in nature and is a
6
matter of defense that may be passed upon
after a full-blown trial on the merits.
In fine, the validity and merits of a party’s defense
or accusation, as well as the admissibility
of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated
during trial proper than at the preliminary
investigation level.
2. Yes, Judge Dumayas of the RTC, in ordering the withdrawal
of the informations against Lee and Lim, failed to make his
own evaluation and merely relied on Secretary Perez’s
recommendation.
Judge Dumayas’ order reads as follows:
This Court, after an in-depth scrutiny of the
arguments raised by the prosecution and
private complainant, finds the contentions
of the prosecution to be sufficient and
meritorious.
Accordingly, the Motion to Withdraw Information
filed by the Prosecution is hereby granted and the
two (2) informations for the crime of Estafa
penalized under par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code
are hereby withdrawn from the docket of this court.
The Court reiterated its rulings on several cases, such as that
found in Co vs. Lim:
Once a case is filed with the court, any
disposition of it rests on the sound
discretion of the court. The trial court is not
bound to adopt the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice, since it is mandated to
independently evaluate or assess the merits
of the case. Reliance on the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice alone would be an
abdication of its duty and jurisdiction to
determine a prima facie case. The trial
court may make an independent
assessment of the merits of the case based
on the affidavits and counter-affidavits,
documents, or evidence appended to the
Information; the records of the public
prosecutor, which the court may order the
latter to produce before the court; or any
evidence already adduced before the court
 by the accused at the time the motion is
filed by the public prosecutor.
XXXX
[T]HE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT POSITIVELY
STATE THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED
AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS WAS
INSUFFICIENT FOR A PRIMA FACIE CASE,
NOR DID THE AFOREQUOTED ORDER
INCLUDE A DISCUSSION OF THE MERITS OF
THE CASE BASED ON AN EVALUATION OR
ASSESSMENT OF THE EVIDENCE ON
RECORD. IN OTHER WORDS, THE DISMISSAL
OF THE CASE WAS BASED UPON
CONSIDERATIONS OTHER THAN THE
JUDGE’S OWN PERSONAL INDIVIDUAL
CONVICTION THAT THERE WAS NO CASE
AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS. THUS, THE
TRIAL JUDGE IMPROPERLY RELINQUISHED
THE DISCRETION THAT HE WAS BOUND TO
EXERCISE, AND THE ORDERS DATED 11
FEBRUARY 2004 AND 29 JUNE 2004 ARE
INVALID FOR HAVING BEEN ISSUED IN
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
In the present case, Judge Dumayas, in his order, did not (1)
positively state that the evidence against Lee and Lim is
insufficient, (2) include a discussion of the merits of the
case, (3) assess whether Secretary Perez’s conclusion is
supported by evidence, (4) look at the basis of Secretary
Perez’s recommendation, (5) embody his assessment in the
order, and (6) state his reasons for granting the motion to
withdraw the informations.
Judge Dumayas’ failure to make his own evaluation of the
merits of the case violates KBC bank’s right to due process
and constitutes grave abuse of discretion. Thus, Judge
Dumayas’ order granting the motion to withdraw the
informations is void.
5. OKABE v GUTIERREZ (borrowed)
FACTS:
Maruyama sued Okabe for estafa. It was alleged in
the complaint that Maruyama entrusted to Okabe a sum of
money for the latter, who was engaged in the business of
door to door delivery, to remit to the Philippines. Okabe failed
to remit such amount.
The complaint for estafa was filed with the 2 nd
assistant city prosecutor for preliminary investigation. During
the preliminary investigation, both Okabe and Marumaya
were given the chance to adduce evidences/affidavits on their
7
behalf. The 2nd assistant city prosecutor found probable cause
and issued a resolution and the corresponding information.
Appended thereto was the Maruyama’s complaint affidavit.
These documents were forwarded to the city prosecutor for
approval.
Then the information was filed with the RTC of Pasay.
A warrant of arrest was issued but Okabe was able to post bail
in the amount of 40,000 thereby allowing her to freely leave
the Philippines for Japan. Upon the instance of the
prosecution, a hold-departure order was issued by the court.
Okabe filed a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause. She claims that the documents attached to
the resolution of the investigating prosecutor were
insufficient to warrant a finding of probable cause. She
contends that it behooved the investigating prosecutor to
submit the following to the trial court to enable it to
determine the presence or absence of probable cause: (a)
copies of the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant;
(b) the counter-affidavit of Okabe and those of her witnesses;
(c) the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the
preliminary investigation; and, (d) other documents
presented during the said investigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court judge should have
required the production of the affidavits of Maruyama’s
witnesses, their documentary evidences, stenographic notes
of the preliminary investigation and Okabe’s counter-affidavit
for the purposes of determining probable cause for the
issuance of the warrant of arrest – YES
Whether or not posting of bail bars the accused from
questioning the legality of the arrest or the conduct of
preliminary investigation - NO
HELD:
The case of Webb v De Leon and Ho v People say
that for the purposes of determining the existence or non-
existence of probable cause for the purpose of issuing a
warrant of arrest, the judge should not rely solely on the said
report. The judge should consider not only the report of the
investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit/affidavits and
the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-
affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as well as the
transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary
investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the
investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information.
This rule is now embodied section 8(a) of Rule 112 (but which
is section 7 (a) in our codal) which mandates that an
information filed in court shall be supported by affidavits and
counter-affidavits of the parties and their witnesses, other
supporting documents and the resolution of the case. The
reason for this rule is because the law aims not only to acquit
the innocent but to like insulate the clearly innocent from
false charges and from the strong arm of the law.
 Section 26 of the Rule 114 says that an application
for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the
warrant issued therefor, or from assailing the regularity or
questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation of the
charge against him, provided that he raises them before
entering his plea. This is a curative rule because modified the
previous rulings of the SC saying that posting of bail is a bar to
challenging the validity of the arrest. Being curative and
procedural in nature, it applies retroactively. It must favor
Okabe. Besides, every waiver of a right to question the
validity of an arrest must be unequivocally established by the
conduct of the accused. In this case, the series of acts by
Okabe point to the conclusion that she was insistent about
the fact that the arrest was ordered with insufficient finding
of probable cause. In fact, she immediately filed a motion for
judicial determination of probable cause.

8

D. ARREST
1. PEOPLE v DE LEON
FACTS
Rodante De Leon was convicted for violation of Secs. 5 (sale)
& 11 (possession), Art. 2 of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Acts (CDDA) of 2002. A confidential informant went to
the office of the Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Task Force
of the Novaliches Police in QC reporting the illegal activities of
De Leon. A buy-bust team was then created with PO2
Magcalayo as poseur-buyer and PO2 Collado, et al. to assist
him. Later at night, the team went to Sta. Monica, Novaliches
where the informant introduced Magcalayo to De Leon as
buyer of shabu. The policeman asked whether De Leon had
shabu, to which he said yes and asked how much he would
buy. Magcalayo gave the money and, in return, De Leon gave
him 1 plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance.
Magcalayo then scratched his head, which was the signal for
the others that the transaction has already been
consummated. Thereafter, De Leon was arrested. The buy-
bust money was recovered. De Leon was handcuffed. Upon
frisking, Collado found another plastic satchet. De Leon was
then brought to the police station for investigation. Collado
placed his initials on the sachet found. The evidence was then
turned over to another police, PO1 Estrelles, who prepared a
request for laboratory examination. Collado, Magcalayo, and
2 other police then brought the sachets to the PNP Crime
Laboratory in Mandaluyong.
De Leon questioned the legality of the buy-bust operation
conducted. He also claimed that the prosecution failed to
prove the chain of custody of the confiscated items.
ISSUEs
(1) Whether the buy-bust operation was valid.
(2) Whether the chain of custody was violated.
RULING
(1) YES. A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment
whereby ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of
trapping and capturing the lawbreakers in the execution of
their criminal plan. In this jurisdiction, the operation is legal
and has been proved to be an effective method of
apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to
constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.
9
Here, the evidence clearly shows that the buy-bust
operation conducted by the police officers, who made use of
entrapment to capture appellant in the act of selling a
dangerous drug, was valid and legal. The defense has failed
to show any evidence of ill motive on the part of the police
officers. Even appellant himself declared that it was the first
time he met the police officers during his cross-examination.
There was, therefore, no motive for the police officers to
frame up appellant. The identity of appellant as the person
who sold the dangerous drugs to PO2 Magcalayo and the one
in possession of the shabu cannot be doubted anymore. Such
positive identification prevails over appellant's defenses of
denial and alibi. These defenses have been invariably viewed
by the Court with disfavor, for they can easily be concocted
but difficult to prove, and they are common and standard
defense ploys in most prosecutions arising from violations of
the CDDA of 2002.
Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse appellant of such
a grave offense, the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty and the findings of the trial court
with respect to the credibility of witnesses shall prevail over
appellant's bare allegation.
(2) NO. The IRR of the CDDA of 2002 provide:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized
and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody
of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition
in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items
were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof; Provided, that the physical inventory and
photograph shall be conducted at the place where
the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures;
 Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items ...
A close examination of the law reveals that it admits of
certain exceptions. Thus, contrary to the assertions of
appellant, Sec. 21 of the foregoing law need not be followed
as an exact science. Non-compliance with Sec. 21 does not
render an accused's arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is essential is
"the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of
the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused."
Here, there was substantial compliance with the law and the
integrity of the drugs seized from appellant was preserved.
The chain of custody of the drugs subject matter of the case
was shown not to have been broken. The factual milieu of the
case reveals that after PO2 Magcalayo seized and confiscated
the dangerous drugs, as well as the marked money, appellant
was immediately arrested and brought to the police station
for investigation, where the sachet of suspected shabu was
marked with "NM." Immediately thereafter, the confiscated
substance, with a letter of request for examination, was
submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination to
determine the presence of any dangerous drug. Per Chemistry
Report No. D-1240-2003 dated November 9, 2003, the
specimen submitted contained methylamphetamine
hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. The examination was
conducted by one Engr. Jabonillo, a Forensic Chemical Officer
of the PNP Crime Laboratory, whose stipulated testimony
clearly established the chain of custody of the specimens he
received. Thus, it is without a doubt that there was an
unbroken chain of custody of the illicit drug purchased from
appellant.
2. PEOPLE v LAGUIO
Facts:
Lawrence Wang was charged on three separate informations
for 1) violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, 2) Illegal
Possession of Firearms and 3) Violation of the Comelec Gun
Ban. Police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction
Against Crime of the Department of Interior and Local
Government arrested SPO2 Vergel de Dios, Rogelio Anoble
and a certain Arellano, for unlawful possession of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug popularly
10
known as shabu. Redentor Teck, alias Frank, and Joseph Junio
were identified as the source of the drug. . In a separate
operation that same date, Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio
were arrested while they were about to hand over another
bag of shabu to SPO2 De Dios and company. Questioned,
Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio informed the police
operatives that they were working as talent manager and
gymnast instructor, respectively, of Glamour Modeling Agency
owned by Lawrence Wang. Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio
did not disclose their source of shabu but admitted that they
were working for Wang. They also disclosed that they knew of
a scheduled delivery of shabu and that their employer (Wang)
could be found at the Maria Orosa Apartment in Malate,
Manila. The police operatives decided to look for Wang to
shed light on the illegal drug activities of Redentor Teck and
Joseph Junio.
Wang, who was described to the operatives by Teck, came out
of an apartment and walked towards a parked BMW car.
Police officers approached Wang, introduced themselves to
him as police officers, asked his name and, upon hearing that
he was Lawrence Wang, immediately frisked him and asked
him to open the back compartment of the BMW car. When
frisked, there was found inside the front right pocket of Wang
and confiscated from him an unlicensed AMT Cal. 380 9mm
automatic Back-up Pistol loaded with ammunitions. At the
same time, the other members of the operatives searched the
BMW car and found inside it were the following items: (a) 32
transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline
substance with a total weight of 29.2941 kilograms, which
substance was later analyzed as positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug locally
known as shabu; (b) cash in the amount of P650,000.00; (c)
one electronic and one mechanical scales; and (d) an
unlicensed Daewoo 9mm Pistol with magazine. Then and
there, Wang resisted the warrantless arrest and search.
Wang filed his undated Demurrer to Evidence, praying for his
acquittal and the dismissal of the three (3) cases against him
for lack of a valid arrest and search warrants and the
inadmissibility of the prosecution’s evidence against him. Due
to the demurrer, Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr., issued the
assailed Resolution granting Wang’s Demurrer to Evidence
and acquitting him of all charges for lack of evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not Wang’s warrantless arrest was valid?
Ruling:
No. The pertinent provisions of Rule 113 of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure on warrantless arrest provide:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A
peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested
has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has just been committed, and he
has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who
has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
Section 5, above, provides three (3) instances when
warrantless arrest may be lawfully effected: (a) arrest of a
suspect in flagrante delicto; (b) arrest of a suspect where,
based on personal knowledge of the arresting officer, there is
probable cause that said suspect was the author of a crime
which had just been committed; (c) arrest of a prisoner who
has escaped from custody serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending.
For a warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante
delicto under paragraph (a) of Section 5 to be valid, two
requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view
of the arresting officer.
The facts and circumstances surrounding the present case did
not manifest any suspicious behavior on the part of private
respondent Lawrence Wang that would reasonably invite the
attention of the police. He was merely walking from the Maria
Orosa Apartment and was about to enter the parked BMW
car when the police operatives arrested him, frisked and
searched his person and commanded him to open the
compartment of the car, which was later on found to be
owned by his friend, David Lee. He was not committing any
visible offense then. Therefore, there can be no valid
warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto under paragraph (a) of
Section 5. It is settled that "reliable information" alone,
11
absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in the
presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not
sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in
flagrante delicto arrest.
Neither may the warrantless arrest be justified under
paragraph (b) of Section 5. What is clearly established from
the testimonies of the arresting officers is that Wang was
arrested mainly on the information that he was the employer
of Redentor Teck and Joseph Junio who were previously
arrested and charged for illegal transport of shabu. Teck and
Junio did not even categorically identify Wang to be their
source of the shabu they were caught with in flagrante
delicto. Upon the duo’s declaration that there will be a
delivery of shabu on the early morning of the following day,
May 17, which is only a few hours thereafter, and that Wang
may be found in Maria Orosa Apartment along Maria Orosa
Street, the arresting officers conducted "surveillance"
operation in front of said apartment, hoping to find a person
which will match the description of one Lawrence Wang, the
employer of Teck and Junio. These circumstances do not
sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause based on
personal knowledge as required in paragraph (b) of Section 5.
3. VALDEZ v PEOPLE (borrowed)
FACTS: In 2003, Valdez had in his possession and custody
dried marijuana leaves wrapped in cellophane and newspaper
page, without first securing the necessary permit or
prescription from the proper gov’t agency. He was then
charged with violation of Sec. 11 of RA 9165. On arraignment,
Valdez pleaded not guilty. During trial, the prosecution
presented the testimony of the 3 barangay tanods (Bautista,
Aratas and Ordoño) who arrested Valdez. While the three
were conducting the routine patrol during the night of the
incident, they noticed Valdez, lugging a bag, alight from a
mini-bus. They then observed that Valdez, who appeared
suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for something.
Thus, they approached Valdez but he purportedly attempted
to run away. The tanods chased Valdez, arrested and brought
him to the house of Brgy. Capt. Mercado. Bautista testified
that it was Mercado who instructed him to open Valdez’ bag,
where the mariajuana leaves were found. Aratas and Ordoño
corroborated Bautista’s testimony on most material points.
On cross-examination, however, Aratas admitted that he
himself brought out the contents of Valdez’ bag before the
latter was taken to Mercado’s house. Nonetheless, he claimed
that at Mercado’s house, it was Valdez’ himself who brought
out the contents of his bag upon orders from Mercado. For
his part, Ordoño testified that it was he who was ordered by
Mercado to open Valdez’ bag and that it was then that they
saw its contents. Valdez denied the charges. He basically
alleged that while he was walking after alighting from the bus,
witness Ordoño allegedly approached him and asked where
he was going. Ordoño then purportedly requested to see the
contents of his bag and Valdez acceded. It was at this point
that Bautista and Aratas joined them. After inspecting all the
contents of his bag, Valdez testified that he was restrained by
the tanod and taken to the house of Mercado. It was Aratas
who carried the bag until they reached their destination. At
Mercado’s house, his bag was opened by the tanod and
Mercado himself. They took out an item wrapped in
newspaper, which later turned out to be marijuana leaves.
Valdez denied ownership of the marijuana. The RTC found
Valdez guilty. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
ISSUE: W/N the drugs were seized pursuant to a lawful
warrantless arrest that would make the drugs admissible as
evidence? (NOTE: Valdez never raised the irregularity of his
arrest before arraignment, but to determine the admissibility
of the seized drugs in evidence, it is indispensable to ascertain
whether or not the search which yielded the alleged
contraband was lawful.)
HELD/RATIO: NO. Thus, the seized marijuana is inadmissible
as evidence.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides the only occasions on which a person may be
arrested without a warrant.1 It is obvious that based on the
testimonies of the arresting barangay tanod, not one of these
circumstances was present at the time Valdez was arrested.
By their own admission, Valdez was not committing an
offense at the time he alighted from the bus, nor did he
appear to be then committing an offense. The tanods did not
have probable cause either to justify Valdez’ warrantless
arrest. For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to
operate, this SC ruled that two (2) elements must be
present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the
arresting officer. Here, Valdez’ act of looking around after
getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding his way
to his destination. The allegation that he attempted to run
away as the tanod approached him is irrelevant and cannot by
itself be construed as adequate to charge the tanod with
personal knowledge that Valdez had just engaged in, was
actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal
activity. More importantly, Valdez testified that he did not run
away but in fact spoke with the barangay tanod when they
approached him.
1
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place
where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one confinement to another.
12
Even taking the prosecution’s version generally as the truth,
the conclusion will not be any different. It is not unreasonable
to expect that Valdez, walking the street at night, after being
closely observed and then later tailed by three unknown
persons, would attempt to flee at their approach. Flight per se
is not synonymous with guilt and must not always be
attributed to one’s consciousness of guilt. Alone, and under
the circumstances of this case, Valdez’ flight lends itself just as
easily to an innocent explanation as it does to a nefarious
one. The supposed acts of Valdez, even assuming that they
appeared dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite
suspicion of criminal activity enough to validate his
warrantless arrest. If at all, the search most permissible for
the tanod to conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the
case was a stop-and-frisk to allay any suspicion they have
been harboring based on Valdez’ behavior. However, a stop-
and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio, must precede a
warrantless arrest, be limited to the person’s outer clothing,
and should be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of
the police officer’s experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him.
Accordingly, Valdez’ waiver of his right to question his arrest
notwithstanding, the marijuana leaves allegedly taken during
the search cannot be admitted in evidence against him as
they were seized during a warrantless search which was not
lawful. As in People vs. Bacla-an, the SC ruled “A waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless
arrest. The following searches and seizures are deemed
permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search of moving vehicles
(2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches (4) waiver or
consent searches (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry Search)
and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes
a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally
valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of
arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless
arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests
effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of escaped
prisoners.” Thus, when Valdez was arrested without a
warrant, he was neither caught in flagrante delicto
committing a crime nor was the arrest effected in hot pursuit.
Verily, it cannot therefore be reasonably argued that the
warrantless search conducted on Valdez was incidental to a
lawful arrest. Even granting that Valdez admitted to opening
his bag when Ordoño asked to see its contents, his implied
acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere
passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating
circumstances and hence, is considered no consent at all
within the contemplation of the constitutional guarantee. As
a result, Valdez’ lack of objection to the search and seizure is
not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a
voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure.
 4. ROLITO GO v CA (borrowed)
FACTS: On July 2, 1991, Eldon Maguan and Rolito Go had a
near-collision incident in San Juan. After that, Go alighted
from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside his car. Go
then left the scene but a security guard at a nearby restaurant
was able to get his license plate.
On July 8, 1991, Go , with 2 lawyers, presented himself before
San Juan Police Station to very news reports that he was
being hunted by the police. He was detained. An eyewitness
to the shooting was able to positively identify him as the
gunman. That same day, a complaint for frustrated homicide
was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal.
He was informed, in the presence of his lawyers, that he could
avail himself of his right to preliminary investigation but that
he must first sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of
the RPC. Go refused to sign the waiver.
Initially, he was released on bail but CA issued an Order
wherein the bail grant was recalled so Go had to surrender
himself. He was detained again.
Secondly, the warrantless "arrest" does not fall within the
terms of Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. Go's "arrest" took place 6 days after the shooting.
The "arresting" officers obviously were not present at the
time petitioner allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the
"arrest" effected 6 days after be reasonably regarded as
effected "when the shooting had in fact just been
committed". Plus, none of the "arresting" officers had any
"personal knowledge" of facts indicating that Go was the
gunman. The police merely relied on the statements of an
alleged eyewitness.
**On Preliminary Investagion: WON Go had effectively
waived his right to preliminary investigation.-- NO
From the very start Go demanded that a preliminary
investigation be conducted. It wasn’t waived when he
incorrectly filed an omnibus motion for release and
preliminary investigation with the Prosecutor (should be filed
with the RTC). Plus, the Prosecutor himself filed the same
with the RTC days after filing the information for murder.

CA said that Go's warrantless arrest was valid because the

offense for which he was arrested and charged had been
"freshly committed." When he showed up at the police
station, was already an existing manhunt for him; he was
positively identified by an eyewitness.

Solicitor General argues Go was validly arrested without

warrant because his identity as the gunman had been
sufficiently established, was validly arrested six (6) days later
at the San Juan Police Station. The Solicitor General relies In
the Mater of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Roberto Umil,
etc., v. Ramos, et al. where the SC upheld a warrantless
arrest as valid although made 14 days after the killing.

Go argues that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant

because he went to the police station 6 days after the
shooting. Thus the crime had not been "just committed" at
the time that he was arrested. Since there had been no lawful
warrantless arrest. Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court
which establishes the only exception to the right to
preliminary investigation, is not applicable.

ISSUE: WON there was a lawful warrantless arrest—NO

First, the reliance of both petitioner and the Solicitor General

upon Umil v. Ramos is, in the circumstances of this case,
misplaced. In Umil v. Ramos there was a valid warrantless
arrest because the offense (subversion) constituted
"continuing crimes." Here, the offense was murder, not a
continuing crime.

13

E. BAIL
1. MABUTAS v PERELLO
FACTS
Subject matters of the present administrative cases are two
complaints against respondent Judge Perello.
Admin. Matter No. RTJ-03-1817 (1st administrative case)
Mabutas of PDEA complained of certain irregularities
committed by respondent Judge in the grant of bail to
accused Omadan. Omadan was charged with Violation of RA
9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for
the possession, custody and control of 57.78 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), with no bail
recommended. Respondent judge explained that the bail was
granted because the prosecution’s evidence of Omadan’s guilt
was not strong.
Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820 (2nd administrative case)
Prosecutor Togononon charged respondent Judge of
partiality, serious misconduct in office and gross ignorance of
the law, concerning the latter’s grant of bail in four criminal
cases for Violations of R.A. No. 9165 pending before her.
Respondent judge issued an order granting motion for bail
without hearing. Asst. City Prosecutor Francisco filed MR,
arguing that since the crime charged is a capital offense, bail
is not allowed as a matter of right, and a hearing is
indispensable. Respondent Judge denied the motion.
Respondent Judge explains that she did not conduct any
hearings on the motions/petitions for bail because the crimes
charged are not capital offenses as the quantity of shabu
involved therein was minimal. They all involve selling of less
than 5 grams of shabu. Respondent Judge believes that
under R.A. No. 9165, shabu is not a dangerous drug but
merely a controlled precursor, in which the selling of less than
5 grams is punishable only with imprisonment of 12 years to
20 years. Such being the case, respondent Judge maintains
that bail is a matter of right and a hearing is not required.
ISSUE: w/n respondent Judge may be administratively held
liable for the grant of bail.
HELD:
1. Admin. Matter No. RTJ-03-1817 (1 st case)- NO, judge not
liable.
Under RA 9165, possession of 50 grams or more of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is punishable by
life imprisonment to death; hence, a capital offense. As such,
bail becomes a matter of discretion. In this regard, Rule 114,
Sec. 7 of the Rules of Court states:
14
No person charged with the capital offense,
or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
admitted to bail when the evidence of guilt
is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.
The matter of determining whether or not the evidence is
strong is a matter of judicial discretion that remains with the
judge. Under the present rules, a hearing on an application
for bail is mandatory. Whether bail is a matter of right or of
discretion, the prosecutor should be given reasonable notice
of hearing, or at least his recommendation on the matter
must be sought. In case an application for bail is filed, the
judge is entrusted to observe the following duties:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or
discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation;
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing
of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion;
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based
on the summary of evidence of the prosecution; and
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the
accused upon the approval of the bail bond. Otherwise the
bail should be denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after
the hearing, the court’s order granting or refusing bail must
contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. Based
on the summary of evidence, the judge formulates his own
conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to
indicate the guilt of the accused.
In this case, respondent Judge complied with the foregoing
duties. A hearing was held on the petition; the prosecution
was given the opportunity to present its evidence;
respondent Judge based her findings on the prosecution’s
evidence; respondent Judge’s Order granting the accused’s
petition for bail contained a summary of the prosecution’s
evidence; and since it was her conclusion that the evidence of
accused Omadan’s guilt is not strong, the petition for bail was
granted.
2. Admin. Matter No. RTJ-04-1820 (2nd case)-YES, judge liable.
To justify her granting bail in the three criminal cases,
respondent Judge insists that she did so because of her belief
that methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is merely a
precursor and therefore the sale thereof is not a capital
offense. This opinion is blatantly erroneous.
Respondent Judge need not “exhaustively” study R.A. No.
9165 to determine the nature of methamphetamine
hydrochloride. A plain reading of the law would immediately
show that methamphetamine hydrochloride is a dangerous
drug and not a controlled precursor. Methamphetamine
hydrochloride is listed in the 1971 UN Single Convention on
Psychotropic Substances, which are considered dangerous
drugs. This is further strongly manifest in Section 11 of R.A.
No. 9165, wherein it is specifically provided that the
possession of dangerous drugs, such as methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu, is punishable with life imprisonment
to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10M, if the
quantity thereof is 50 grams or more. Furthermore, had
respondent judge kept herself abreast of jurisprudence and
decisions of the Court, she would have been apprised that in
all the hundreds and hundreds of cases decided by the Court,
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu had always been
considered as a dangerous drug.
Given that methamphetamine hydrochloride is a dangerous
drug, regardless of quantity, the sale, trade, administration,
dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of
shabu is punishable by life imprisonment to death. Being a
capital offense, it is incumbent upon respondent Judge to
hold a hearing on the petitions/motions for bail filed by the
accused therein to determine whether evidence of guilt is
strong. To grant an application for bail and fix the amount
thereof without a hearing duly called for the purpose of
determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong
constitutes gross ignorance or incompetence whose grossness
cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or excusable
negligence.
2. LEVISTE v CA
FACTS:
Leviste was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision
mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion
temporal as maximum. He then appealed to the CA. Pending
appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail
pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition,
and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on
his part.
The CA denied his application for bail. It said that in the
matter of bail pending appeal, the discretion to extend bail
during the course of appeal should be exercised with grave
caution and only for strong reasons. It ruled that bail is not a
sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing
medical care outside the prison facility. According to it, Leviste
failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity
that his continued confinement during trial will permanently
impair his health or put his life in danger.
15
The CA also considered the fact of petitioner’s conviction. It
made a preliminary evaluation of petitioner’s case and made
a prima facie determination that there was no reason
substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioner’s
guilt.
Petitioner then filed a MR and now questions as grave abuse
of discretion (Rule 65) the denial of his application for bail,
considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of
bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court was present. Basically, Leviste claims that in
the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
an application for bail by an appellant sentenced by the
Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than six years’
imprisonment should automatically be granted.
ISSUE:
In a bail application pending appeal of a conviction with a
sentence of more than six years, does the discretionary
nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail
should automatically be granted absent any of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
HELD:
No. Thus, it cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued
the assailed resolution without or in excess of its jurisdiction.
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of
right when the offense charged is not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand,
upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
bail becomes a matter of discretion. Similarly, if the court
imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years
then bail is a matter of discretion, except [that] when any of
the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section
5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied.
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial
discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is
present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or
deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be
denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent.
In other words, the appellate court’s denial of bail pending
appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not,
by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion. On the other
hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a
more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain
whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If
it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or
revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court
grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will
thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application
for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the
perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion
stage, where the appellate court must determine whether
any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the
appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent
discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal
and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the
appellant’s case falls within the first scenario allowing the
exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider
all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands
of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow
or disallow bail.
Thus, a finding that none of the circumstances in Section 5,
Rule 114 is present will not automatically result in the grant of
bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the
less stringent sound discretion approach. Moreover,
historically, the development over time of the Rules On
Criminal Procedure reveals an orientation towards a more
restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a
faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that is, bail
pending appeal should be allowed not with leniency but with
grave caution and only for strong reasons. After conviction by
the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. 46 From then
on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the risk
of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with
grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that
the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance
of bail pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-
standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong
support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and
the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
3. DOMINGO v PAGAYATAN (borrowed)
FACTS:
The Bureau of Immigration (BOI) Board of
Commissioners (BOC) issued Summary Deportation Order
(SDO) No. ADD-2001-057 against Ernesto M. Peñaflorida, a
U.S. citizen, after finding that he was an overstaying and
undocumented alien, in violation of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940. Peñaflorida was also a fugitive from
justice since he stood indicted in the United States for health
care fraud which resulted in more than $1,376,000.00 losses
to the U.S. Federal Government. No appeal was filed with the
Office of the President. The SDO became final and executor.
Respondent Judge Pagayatan issued a Notice of
Arraignment requiring the production of Peñaflorida. On the
scheduled hearing, Judge Pagayatan denied the P40,000 bail
16
recommended by the Provincial Prosecutor for the provisional
release of the accused on the ground that the crime
Peñaflorida was charged with involved large scale estafa, a
non-bailable offense. Judge Pagayatan ordered the
commitment of Peñaflorida to the Provincial Jail in Magbay,
San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. However, later on that same
day, the BOI received information that respondent judge had
allowed the release from detention of Peñaflorida without
the interdepartmental courtesy of affording prior notice to
the BOI of such action. Commissioner Domingo was appalled
not only by the respondent’s employment of legal
subterfuges in ordering the release of Peñaflorida whose
Summary Deportation Order had already become final and
executory, but also by the respondent’s bad faith in deceiving
them into surrendering the custody of an undesirable alien
federal fugitive to the Provincial Jail at Magbay, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro.
As a result, Commissioner Domingo filed a letter-
complaint with the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
charging Pagayatan with gross ignorance of the law.
In his Comment, Judge Pagayatan explained that the
prosecution and the defense jointly manifested that it would
be fair and just if the court would fix the bail bond for the
provisional release of the accused Peñaflorida at P250,000.00
and that he granted the motion to fix bail; and that at the
time he issued the order fixing the bail bond, he was not
aware that a deportation order has already been issued by
the BOI.
In its Evaluation Report, the OCA recommends to the
Court that respondent be fined P5,000 for Gross Ignorance of
the Law.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Pagayatan was guilty of gross
ignorance of the law in granting the bail of the accused
without conducting a hearing – YES
HELD:
Under the rules on bail, a hearing is mandatory in
granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion. A
hearing is indispensable for the court to ask searching
questions from which it may infer the strength of the
evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused, in
cases where the offense is punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. After hearing, the court’s
order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution and based thereon, the judge
should then formulate his own conclusion as to whether the
evidence so presented is strong enough as to indicate the
guilt of the accused. Otherwise, the order granting or denying
the application for bail may be invalidated because the
summary of evidence for the prosecution which contains the
judge’s evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an
aspect of procedural due process for both the prosecution
and the defense.
The herein respondent granted bail to the accused
Peñaflorida without conducting a hearing despite his earlier
pronouncement in the Order denying bail as he considered
the crime the accused Peñaflorida was charged with to be a
non-bailable offense. The manifestation of the prosecutor
that he is not ready to present any witness to prove that the
prosecution’s evidence against the accused is strong, is never
a basis for the outright grant of bail without a preliminary
hearing on the matter. A hearing is required even when the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose
an objection to the motion for bail.
The joint manifestation of the prosecution and the
defense that it would be fair and just if the court would fix the
bail bond for the provisional release of the accused at
P250,000 does not justify the granting of bail without a
hearing in a case involving a non-bailable offense. A hearing is
necessary for the court to take into consideration the
guidelines in fixing the amount of bail set forth in Section 9,
Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Respondent judge should have ascertained
personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong and
endeavored to determine the propriety of the amount of bail
recommended. To do away with the requisite bail hearing “is
to dispense with this time-tested safeguard against
arbitrariness.”
Although the Domingo failed to prove that Judge
Pagayatan had prior knowledge of the existence of the
deportation order or was informed by the BOI of such order,
respondent judge cannot escape administrative liability by
invoking unawareness of the deportation order. Absent
evidence of malice, respondent’s lack of knowledge of the
deportation order will only free him from administrative
liability for gross misconduct but not for gross ignorance of
the law for disregarding the rules on bail.
4. LACHICA v TORMIS
FACTS
Defendant Domugho was apprehended and was brought to
the police station for booking and custody. A few days later
Complainant was flabbergasted to learn that she was released
from confinement. Complainant inquired from the police
station if an Order of Release was issued by the court.
Complainant learned that accused was released because the
respondent judge called the police station and told the desk
officer that the accused had posted a cash bail bond and may
already be released.
Upon investigation by complainant, the police blotter showed
no entry that an order of release was received by the police.
Only a notation that the accused had put up a cash bail bond
was entered therein.
Complainant also asserted that it was improper for the
respondent judge to receive the cash bail bond as the
17
function belongs exclusively to the Office of the Clerk of
Court. She claimed that respondent judge committed an act
of impropriety when she called the police station to verbally
order the release of the accused. It is vexing further that no
copy of the release order was found on the day of release.
Respondent judge denied the charges of complainant. She
maintained that she issued the Order of Release after the
accused posted a cash bond. She claimed that the accused
was released by virtue of the Order of Release and not on the
basis of her alleged telephone call to the police station..
The Office of the Court administrator fined and suspended
the judge after finding several inconsistencies in her alibi.
Even the arresting officer denied receiving a court order for
release
ISSUE: W/n the judge is administratively liable.
HELD:Yes.
Respondent judge personally received the cash bail bond for
the accused. For this act alone, respondent is already
administratively liable. Section 14, Rule 114 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure specifies the persons with whom
a cash bail bond may be deposited, namely: the collector of
internal revenue or the provincial, city or municipal treasurer.
A judge is not authorized to receive the deposit of cash as bail
nor should such cash be kept in his office.
The respondent judge is guilty of gross misconduct for having
abused her judicial authority when she personally accepted
the cash bail bond of the accused and for deliberately making
untruthful statements in her comment and during the
investigation of the instant administrative case with intent to
mislead this Court.
By corruption, the judge undermined and adversely reflect on
the honesty and integrity of the system as an officer of the
court; she also betrayed a character flaw which speaks ill of
her person. Making false representations is a vice which no
judge should imbibe. As the judge is the visible
representation of the law, and more importantly justice, he
must therefore, be the first to abide by the law and weave an
example for the others to follow
5. SERAPIO v SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:

An administrative case was filed against MTCC Judge Tormis.

After investigation, Executive Judge Dumdum of the RTC of
Cebu City recommended that she be fined P20K or suspended
for 3 months. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
concurred but recommended that Judge Tormis be suspended
for three months. The SC found Judge Tormis guilty of gross
misconduct, suspended him from office for 6 months without
salary and other benefits and sternly warned that a repetition
of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.

However, before Judge Tormis received a copy of the

judgment, the same had been downloaded from the web site
of the Court and disseminated to the local media. She was
apprised by her staff that her 6-month suspension was
published in 2 local newspapers and called for her ouster
from the judiciary.

Thus, Judge Tormis requested for a certified true copy of the

judgment but she received a copy of the Resolution requiring
the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit
the case for resolution based on the pleadings filed. This led
her to conclude that the case had not yet been resolved and
the judgment promulgated, thus, she filed a Manifestation on
the same date praying for a reinvestigation and to be allowed
to present additional evidence.

ISSUE: W/N the request for reinvestigation and to be allowed

to present additional evidence should be granted?

RULING: YES. Remanded to the Office of the Executive Judge

of the RTC of Cebu City for further proceedings

RATIO:

Any administrative complaint leveled against a judge must be

examined with a discriminating eye for its consequential
effects are by nature penal in character, such that the
respondent judge stands to face the sanction of dismissal,
disbarment, or suspension. In cases where the charges
involved are misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption
or incompetency, the general rules as to admissibility of
evidence in criminal trials apply and the culpability of the
respondent should be established beyond reasonable doubt.

Thus, as in criminal cases where the dictates of due process is

observed with utmost stringence, the respondent judge in
this administrative complaint should likewise be given full
opportunity upon reasonable notice to defend herself and to
adduce evidence in support thereof for the Court will not
allow itself to be an instrument that would destroy the
reputation of any member of the bench by pronouncing guilt
on the basis of incomplete evidence or mere speculation.

18
F. RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
1. CRISOSTOMO v SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
Crisostomo, a member of the Philippine National Police, and
others were charged with the murder of Renato, a detention
prisoner at the Solano Municipal Jail. Crisostomo pleaded not
guilty. Trial ensued.
The presentation of evidence for Crisostomo’s defense was
deemed waived for his failure to appear at the scheduled
hearings despite notice. Crisostomo and 1 co-accused were
found guilty by the Sandiganbayan, while the others were still
at large.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the person
of Crisostomo?
2. W/N the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion when they found him guilty despite their own
admission that there was no direct evidence showing his
participation in Renato’s death?
HELD:
1. YES. Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.
Since the crime was committed on 14 February 1989, the
applicable provision of law is Section 4 of PD 1606, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861 (“PD 1861”),
which took effect on 23 March 1983. The amended
provision provides that the Sandiganbayan has exclusive
jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officers
and employees in relation to their office where the
penalty is higher than prision correccional. Since the the
penalty for murder is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death, jurisdiction was properly exercised by
the Sandiganbayan.
2. YES. Sandiganbayan committed GADALEJ. Crisostomo’s
guilt was actually not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
No direct evidence linked Crisostomo to the killing of
Renato. The prosecution relied on circumstantial
evidence to prove that there was a conspiracy to kill
Renato and Crisostomo participated in carrying out the
conspiracy. Circumstantial evidence consists of proof of
collateral facts and circumstances from which the
existence of the main fact may be inferred according to
reason and common experience.
19
In sum, the Sandiganbayan believed that Crisostomo took
part in the conspiracy to kill Renato because of these
three circumstances: 1) Crisostomo as the jail guard on
duty at the time of Renato’s killing had in his possession
the keys to the main door and the cells; (2) Crisostomo
was in such a position that he could have seen or heard
the killing of Renato; and (3) there are discrepancies
between the list of detainees/prisoners and the police
blotter. According to the Sandiganbayan, there is a prima
facie case against Crisostomo.
Clearly, the Sandiganbayan had no basis to convict
Crisostomo because the prosecution failed to produce
the evidence necessary to overturn the presumption of
innocence.
The “deafening silence” of all of the accused does not
necessarily point to a conspiracy. In the first place, not all
of the accused remained silent. Calingayan put himself
on the witness stand. Calingayan further claimed that
the Solano police investigated him and his handwritten
statements were taken the morning following Renato’s
death. Secondly, an accused has the constitutional right
to remain silent and to be exempt from being compelled
to be a witness against himself.
A judgment of conviction must be predicated on the
strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not on
the weakness of the evidence for the defense. The
circumstantial evidence in this case is not sufficient to
create a prima facie case to shift the burden of evidence
to Crisostomo. The supposed waiver of presentation of
evidence did not work against Crisostomo because the
prosecution failed to prove Crisostomo’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Crisostomo’s non-appearance during the 22 June 1995
trial was merely a waiver of his right to be present for
trial on such date only and not for the succeeding trial
dates.
Crisostomo’s absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing
should not have been deemed as a waiver of his right to
present evidence. While constitutional rights may be
waived, such waiver must be clear and must be coupled
with an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Crisostomo did not voluntarily waive in person or even
through his counsel the right to present evidence. The
Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the
 agreement of the prosecution, Calingayan, and
Calingayan’s counsel.
If no waiver of the right to present evidence could be
presumed from Crisostomo’s failure to attend the 22 June
1995 hearing, with more reason that flight could not be
logically inferred from Crisostomo’s absence at that
hearing. Crisostomo’s absence did not even justify the
forfeiture of his bail bond. A bail bond may be forfeited
only in instances where the presence of the accused is
specifically required by the court or the Rules of Court
and, despite due notice to the bondsmen to produce him
before the court on a given date, the accused fails to
appear in person as so required. Crisostomo was not
specifically required by the Sandiganbayan or the Rules of
Court to appear on the 22 June 1995 hearing. Thus,
there was no basis for the Sandiganbayan to order the
confiscation of Crisostomo’s surety bond and assume that
Crisostomo had jumped bail.
2. ANDRADO v PEOPLE (borrowed)
Facts:
An Information was filed with the City Prosecutor of Baguio
City charging Andrada with frustrated murder. During the
hearing, evidence for the prosecution showed that a group of
policemen dropped by a restaurant for a snack. While one of
the policemen was talking to a woman who passed by their
table, Andrada approached him and scolded him. Andrada
was advised to go home because he was drunk. When
Adrada left, one of the policemen heard his companion (the
one who spoke to the woman) moaning in pain and found
him sprawled on the floor while Andrada was hacking him on
the head with a bolo. Andrada ran away but was arrested in a
waiting shed. They brought him back to the restaurant where
they recovered the bolo. Witnesses were interviewed and
they pointed to Andrada as the culprit.
Andrada interposed self-defense and invoked the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. His version was that
while they were drinking beer with a hospitality girl inside the
restaurant, three military men occupied the table next to
them. Without any warning or provocation, two of them
approached him, slapped his face several times and pointed
their guns to his head because he was “so boastful.” Fearing
that he might be killed while being dragged outside, Andrada
pulled out his bolo (wrapped in newspaper) and swung it at
the two men and ran away.
20
The RTC found him guilty. The CA found him to be entitled to
the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, as he was
only 17 years old at the time of the incident. On a petition for
review on certiorari before the SC, Andrada claimed that his
right to due process was violated because of the gross
negligence/incompetence of his counsel who: 1) Failed to
present all the witnesses who could have testified that he is
innocent; 2) Failed to present the medical certificate showing
the injuries inflicted upon him by the victim; 3) Did not notify
him to attend the hearing when one of the policemen was
cross-examined, and 4) Failed to submit a memorandum.
The OSG counters that there was no violation of his right to
due process since he was represented by counsel of his own
choosing. If the counsel’s performance and competence fell
short of Andrada’s expectation, then he should not blame
either the trial court or the CA.
Issue: Whether Andrada was denied due process due to his
counsel’s gross negligence/incompetence – NO
Ratio:
In criminal cases, the negligence or incompetence of counsel
to be deemed gross must have prejudiced the constitutional
right of an accused to be heard. In this case, however,
records show that counsel actively participated in the cross-
examination of the witnesses to test their credibility. The fact
that he did not choose to present other witnesses did not
affect any of Andrada’s substantial rights. Counsel might have
valid reasons for choosing not to.
Andrada was present during the hearing. If he believed that
his counsel de parte was not competent, he could have
secured the services of a new counsel. Having decided to
retain the services of his counsel during the entire
proceedings, he must be deemed bound by any mistake
committed by him. The long-standing rule in this jurisdiction
is that a client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer.
Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the
sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence, the
proper defense or the burden of proof, failure to introduce
evidence, to summon witnesses, and to argue the case, unless
they prejudice the client and prevent him from properly
resting his case, do not constituted gross incompetence or
negligence. The SC found that the counsel was not so inept or
motivated by bad faith or so careless and negligence of his
duties so as to seriously prejudice the substantial rights of
Andrada.
 3. OLIVARES v CA
Facts:
Isidro Olivares was charged with violation of RA 7610 (Anti-
Child Abuse) for touching the breast and kissing the lips of
Cristina Elitiong, a 16-year old high school student employed
by the former in making sampaguita garlands during
weekends. The trial court found him guilty; was affirmed by
the CA. Petitioner now alleges that his right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him was
violated for failure to allege in the information the age of the
private offended party and the essential elements of the
offense for which he is being charged.
Issue:
Whether Olivares can be charged with violation of RA 7610
considering the alleged violation of the right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him?
Held:
Yes. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused is entitled to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. A complaint is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute;
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
date of the commission of the offense; and the place where
the offense was committed.
Thus, while it is necessary to allege the essential elements of
the crime in the information, the failure to do so is not an
irremediable vice. When the complaint or the resolution by
the public prosecutor which contain the missing averments is
attached to the information and form part of the records, the
defect in the latter is effectively cured, and the accused
cannot successfully invoke the defense that his right to be
informed is violated.
As to the contention that the minority of Cristina was not
properly alleged in the information, the SC ruled that:
Petitioner was furnished a copy of the Complaint which was
mentioned in the information, hence he was adequately
informed of the age of the complainant.
True, the information herein may not refer to specific
section/s of R.A. 7610 alleged to have been violated by the
petitioner, but it is all to evident that the body of the
information contains an averment of the acts alleged to have
been performed by petitioner which unmistakably refers to
acts punishable under Section 5 of R.A. 7610. As to which
section of R.A. 7610 is being violated by petitioner is
inconsequential. What is determinative of the offense is the
21
recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the
complaint or information.
4. LIBUIT v PEOPLE (borrowed)
FACTS: Accused Libuit is charged with Estafa with with abuse
of confidence. Complainant Domingo del Mundo delivered
and brought his car to the motor shop and owned and/or
operated by Joel Libuit and Julius Libuit for repair of its
damaged parts, which car was received by Jose Bautista, then
mechanic in the said motor shop.
However, it was alleged that accused Joel Libuit,
once in possession of the said car, with intent to defraud and
with abuse of confidence, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriated instead of complying with his obligation or
duty to return or deliver the repaired car to Domingo del
Mundo.
Accused (Libuit) testified on direct examination.
However, his defense counsel, Atty. Mendoza, withdrew from
the case after his initial cross-examination. On motion of the
accused, the continuation of his cross-examination was reset
to give him time to engage the services of another counsel.
The petitioner eventually secured the services of Atty.
Dimayuga.
At the subsequent hearings, Atty. Dimayuga failed to
appear despite notices. On motion of the prosecution, the
trial court issued an Order striking from the records the
petitioner’s direct testimony and declaring the case submitted
for decision on the basis of the evidence already on record.
In the CA, accused claims that he had been deprived
his right to counsel. However, the CA held that the RTC never
deprived the petitioner of his right to counsel as he was
represented by a counsel de parte, Atty. Mendoza. When said
counsel withdrew, the RTC allowed the resetting of the
petitioner’s cross-examination to give him time to engage the
services of another counsel. It ordered the striking of his
testimony from the records only after his new counsel failed
to appear at the subsequent hearings.
ISSUE: Was petitioner deprived of his right to counsel? (NO)
HELD: Petitioner contends that the trial court should have
appointed a counsel de oficio when his counsel consistently
failed to appear for his cross-examination.
The duty of the court to appoint a counsel de oficio for
the accused who has no counsel of choice and desires to
employ the services of one is mandatory only at the time of
arraignment. No such duty exists where the accused has
proceeded to arraignment and then trial with a counsel of his
own choice. Worth noting, when the time for the
presentation of evidence for the defense arrived, and the
defendant appeared by himself alone, the absence of his
counsel was inexcusable.
In the present case, since the petitioner was represented
by counsel de parte at the arraignment and trial, the trial
court could not be deemed duty-bound to appoint a
counsel de oficio for the continuation of his cross-
examination. Indeed, after his initial cross-examination, the
trial court granted the petitioner’s motion to postpone, giving
him sufficient time to engage the services of another counsel.
The failure of Atty. Dimayuga, his newly hired lawyer, to
appear at the subsequent hearings without reason was
sufficient legal basis for the trial court to order the striking
from the records of his direct testimony, and thereafter
render judgment upon the evidence already presented. In
fact, the repeated failure to appear of defendant’s counsel at
the trial may even be taken as a deliberate attempt to delay
the court’s proceedings.
At the most, the appointment of a counsel de oficio in a
situation like the present case would be discretionary with the
trial court, which discretion will not be interfered with in the
absence of grave abuse. This Court is convinced that the trial
court had been liberal in granting postponements asked by
the petitioner himself. We think that such liberality removes
any doubt that its order was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
5. MAGTOLIS v SALUD (borrowed)
(Actually, hindi ko alam kung ano yung related sa Rights of the
Accused sa case na ‘to. More on Evidence siya.)
FACTS: In a criminal case, Lagua was found guilty by the RTC
of homicide. On appeal, Lagua filed a Very Urgent Petition for
Bail, which the CA granted upon posting the required bond.
Lagua’s bond was approved in a Resolution which was
brought to the Office of the Division Clerk of Court, Atty.
Madarang, for promulgation. Around that time, respondent
Salud’s unusual interest on the case became noticeable and
he started making inquiries about the case. When Atty.
Madarang finally directed the typing of the Order of Release
Upon Bond, Salud went to the former’s office and assisted in
arranging and stapling of the papers for release. It was he
who ultimately serve the resolution and order of release in
the Lagua case to the National Penitentiary.
In the meantime, Atty. Madarang received a telephone call
from a certain Melchor, who introduced herself as Lagua’s
relative, asking her how much more would they have to give
to facilitate Lagua’s release. The caller also informed her that
they had sought the help of a certain Valdez of the RTC where
the criminal case originated, but were told that they still had a
balance to be paid to Justice Magtolis and Atty. Madarang
through Salud.
22
Then, Atty. Madarang called the RTC, pretending to be Lagua’s
relative, and asked for Valdez, who turned out to be the
Process Server of the RTC. She was informed that Valdez was
not there at the time and reminded her about the her
outstanding balance. After making the call, she coordinated
with the Acting Chief of the Mailing Section, Ms. Secarro. She
got Salud’s number from Secarro and started texting him
about the same time Sacarro did. Again, she represented
herself as a relative of Lagua. Most of Salud’s text messages
were stored in Atty. Madarang’s cellphone. After discovering
the corrupt acts of Salud, Atty. Madarang accompanied him to
Justice Magtolis, where out of the confrontation, it was
discovered that Salud did not properly serve the copies of the
Resolution and Order of Release upon Lagua and his counsel.
An administrative complaint for inefficiency and gross
misconduct was thus filed by Justice Magtolis against Salud.
During the hearings, witnesses narrated their experiences
with the respondent wherein the latter also tried to “help”
them with their cases after paying a certain amount.
ISSUE: W/N Salud should be guilty of inefficiency and gross
misconduct. – YES.
HELD/RATIO: The complainant in administrative proceedings
has the burden of proving the allegations in the complaint by
substantial evidence. If a court employee is to be disciplined
for a grave offense, the evidence against him must be
competent and derived from direct knowledge; as such,
charges based on mere suspicion and speculation cannot be
given credence. Thus, if the complainant fails to substantiate
a claim of corruption and bribery, relying on mere conjectures
and suppositions, the administrative complaint must be
dismissed for lack of merit. However, in administrative
proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish
malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but
substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence
that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion, is required. The findings of investigating
magistrates on the credibility of witnesses are given great
weight by reason of their unmatched opportunity to see the
manner of the witnesses as they testified.
To determine the credibility and probative weight of the
testimony of a witness, such testimony must be considered in
its entirety and not in truncated parts. To determine which
contradicting statements of a witness is to prevail as to the
truth, the other evidence received must be considered such
as the actuations of the respondent contrary to a normal
person’s reactions.
The respondent's claim that the admission of the text
messages as evidence against him constitutes a violation of
his right to privacy is unavailing. Text messages have been
classified as ephemeral electronic communication under
Section 1(k), Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence, and
'shall be proven by the testimony of a person who was a party
to the same or has personal knowledge thereof. Any question
as to the admissibility of such messages is now moot and
academic, as the respondent himself, as well as his counsel,
already admitted that he was the sender of the first three
messages on Atty. Madarang's cell phone.
As ratiocinated in Nuez v. Cruz-Apao, Ephemeral electronic
communications shall be proven by the testimony of a person
who was a party to the same or who has personal knowledge
thereof ' . In this case, complainant who was the recipient of
the said messages and therefore had personal knowledge
thereof testified on their contents and import. Respondent
herself admitted that the cellphone number reflected in
complainant's cellphone from which the messages originated
was hers. Moreover, any doubt respondent may have had as
to the admissibility of the text messages had been laid to rest
when she and her counsel signed and attested to the veracity
of the text messages between her and complainant.
6. HERRERA v ALBA
Facts:
Alba, represented by his mother, Armi Alba, filed before the
RTC a petition for compulsory recognition, support and
damages against petitioner. The latter denied that he is the
biological father and that he had any physical contact with
respondent’s mother. Alba filed a motion to direct the taking
of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. Petitioner opposed DNA paternity testing and
contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner
further argued that DNA paternity testing violates his right
against self-incrimination.
RTC granted the motion to conduct the DNA paternity test on
petitioner Alba’s mother. Petitioner filed an MR asserting that
“under the present circumstances, the DNA test would be
inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the
requisite specimen unconstitutional.” MR denied. The case
reached the SC via Petition for Review.
Issue/Ruling: W/N DNA Paternity testing is violative of the
rights of an accused against self-incrimination - NO
Ratio:
23
Section 17, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution provides that
“no person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.” Petitioner asserts that obtaining samples from him
for DNA testing violates his right against self-incrimination.
Petitioner ignores our earlier pronouncements that the
privilege is applicable only to testimonial evidence. As held
by the RTC’s Order with Approval, obtaining DNA samples
from an accused in a criminal case or from the respondent in
a paternity case will not violate the right against self-
incrimination. This privilege applies only to evidence that is
“communicative” in essence taken under duress. The right
against self-incrimination is just a prohibition on the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communication
(testimonial evidence) from a defendant, not an exclusion of
evidence taken from his body when it may be material. As
such, a defendant can be required to submit to a test to
extract virus from his body; to submit substance emitting
from the body; to put on clothes for size; to submit for
pregnancy test, since the gist of the privilege is the restriction
on “testimonial compulsion.
7. YULO v PEOPLE
FACTS:
Sometime in August 1992, Petitioner Yulo and Josefina
Dimalanta went to the house of Private Complainant Roque in
Caloocan City. Their visit was for Josefina to endorse
Petitioner Yulo as a good payor so that the latter’s checks can
be encashed. In view of this endorsement, Private
Complainant Roque enashed the following checks: (a)
Equitable Bank (EB) Check No. 237936 for
P40,000.00, postdated September 30, 1992; (b) EB Check No.
237941 for P16,200.00; and (c) Bank of the Philippine Islands
(BPI) Check No. 656602 for P40,000.00, postdated November
18, 1992.
When Private Complainant Roque presented the checks for
payment to the drawee banks, they were dishonored. The EB
checks were "Drawn Against Insufficient Funds," while the BPI
check was stamped "Account Closed.” Since Private
Complainant did not know the address of Petitioner Yulo, she
immediately informed Josefina about the dishonored checks.
The latter repeatedly assured Private Complainant Roque that
that she will relay the fact of dishonor to Petitioner Yulo.
When there was still no payment, Private Complainant Roque
lodged a complaint against Petitioner Yulo and on August 23,
1993, three (3) Informations were filed by the Caloocan City
Prosecutor with the RTC Br. 130 for violation of BP 22.
When arraigned, Petitioner Yulo pleaded not guilty to the
charge. During trial, Petitioner Yulo admitted having issued
the checks in question but claimed that she merely lent them
to Josefina. In turn, Josefina delivered the checks to her friend
who showed them to a jeweler as "show money." It was filed on March 4, 1997. However, the case was assigned
understood that the checks were not to be deposited. to the Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole only on
Petitioner Yulo vehemently denied having any transaction February 28, 2000 and brought to her attention on March
with Private Complainant Roque. Furthermore, Petitioner Yulo 2, 2000. We note that it took Justice Gozo-Dadole only
claimed that when she issued the checks, she knew she had two (2) weeks from notice to resolve the motion. Clearly,
no funds in the banks; and that she was aware that the checks she did not incur any delay. We, therefore, rule that there
would be dishonored if presented for payment. has been no violation of the petitioner's right to a speedy
trial.
The RTC found Petitioner Yulo guilty. On appeal, the CA
affirmed the decision of the RTC. 2. The elements of the offense penalized by Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 are: (1) the making, drawing, and
ISSUE: issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;
On appeal to the SC, Petitioner Yulo raised the following (2) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at
issues: the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or
1. Whether or not the CA violated her right to speedy trial credit with the drawee bank for the payment of the check
(RELEVANT ISSUE)  NO in full upon its presentment; and (3) the subsequent
2. Whether or not her guilt was proven beyond reasonable dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficient
doubt  YES funds or credit or dishonor for the same reason had not
the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to
HELD: stop payment.
1. Petitioner contends that the CA resolved her motion for
reconsideration only after three (3) years from its filing. The prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the
Such inaction violates her right to a speedy disposition of case. Petitioner Yulo admitted having issued the three
her case. dishonored checks for value. Her purpose was to encash
them. She also admitted that at the time she issued the
checks, she was aware that she had only P1,000.00 in her
account with the Equitable Bank and that her BPI account
was already closed. Significantly, what BP 22 penalizes is
Under Art. III Sec. 162 of the 1987 Constitution, any party the issuance of a bouncing check. It is not the non-
to a case has the right to demand on all officials tasked payment of an obligation which the law punishes, but the
with the administration of justice to expedite its act of making and issuing a check that is dishonored upon
disposition. However, the concept of speedy disposition presentment for payment. The purpose for which the
is a relative term and must necessarily be a flexible check was issued and the terms and conditions relating
concept. In applying the Constitutional guarantee, to its issuance are immaterial. What is primordial is that
particular regard must be taken of the facts and the issued checks were worthless and the fact of
circumstances of each case. worthlessness was known to the petitioner at the time of
their issuance, as in this case. This is because under Batas
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right Pambansa Blg. 22, the mere act of issuing a worthless
to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the check is malum prohibitum.
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays, or when unjustified postponements of 8. PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF
the trial are asked for and secured, or when without THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST
cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR AMPATUAN (borrowed)
allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried.
To determine whether the right has been violated, the FACTS:
following factors may be considered: (1) the length of the
delay; (2) the reasons for such delay; (3) the assertion or On November 23, 2009, 57 people, including 32 journalists
failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the and media practitioners, were killed while on their way to
prejudice caused by the delay.
Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. This tragic incident, which
In this case, the delay was sufficiently explained by the came to be known as “Maguindanao Massacre”, spawned
CA: The orginal ponente of the decision of Petitioner charges for 57 counts of murder and an additional charge of
Yulo’s case (Associate Justice Jainal D. Rasul) retired rebellion against 197 accused. Note that there was a transfer
during the pendency of the motion for reconsideration of venue. The cases are being tried by Presiding Judge Jocelyn
Solis-Reyes of RTC Quezon City.
2
All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial,
or administrative bodies.

24
On November 19, 2010, the National Union of Journalists of
the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation,
GMA Network, Inc., relatives of the victims, individual
journalists from various entities, and members of the
academe filed a petition before the SC praying that live
television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal
cases be allowed, recording devices (still cameras, tape
recorders) be permitted inside the courtroom to assist the
working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated
to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices.
In a related move, the National Press Club of the Philippines
(NPC) and Alyansa ng Filipinong Mamamahayag (AFIMA) filed
a petition praying that the SC constitute RTC Quezon City as a
special court (to focus only on the Maguindanao Massacre
Trial), and allow the installation inside the courtroom of a
sufficient number of video cameras that shall beam the audio
and video signals to the television monitors outside the court.
ISSUE:
WON the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage
of court proceedings should be lifted? YES, but subject to the
guidelines to be issued by the SC.
RULING:
In the case of Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing
of President Corazon Aquino’s Libel Case, the SC concluded
that live radio and television coverage of court proceedings
shall not be allowed considering the prejudice it poses to the
defendant’s right to due process as well as to the fair and
orderly administration of justice, and considering further that
the freedom of the press and the right of the people to
information may be served and satisfied by less distracting,
degrading, and prejudicial means.
The SC had another unique opportunity in the case of Re:
Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan
of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President Joseph
Estrada to revisit the question of live radio and television
coverage of court proceedings in a a criminal case. It held that
the propriety of granting or denying the instant petition
involves the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press and the right to public information, on
the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on
the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court
to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial.
The petition was denied. However, in resolving the MR, it
provided a glimmer of hope when it ordered the audio-visual
recording of the trial for documentary purposes subject to the
conditions set by the SC.
25
Note: The indication of “serious risks” posed by live media
coverage to the accused’s right to due process was left
unexplained and unexplored in Aquino and Estrada. So the SC
thought that compliance with regulations, not curtailment of
a right, provides a workable solution to such concern while
maintaining the underlying principles held in Aquino and
Estrada.
One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao
Massacre cases apart from these earlier cases is the
impossibility of accommodating even the parties to the cases
(private complainants/families of the victims and other
witnesses) inside the courtroom. In the Estrada case, the SC
held that a courtroom should have enough facilities for a
reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings,
not too small as to render the openness negligible, and not
too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper
functions.
Even before considering what is a “reasonable number of the
public” who may observe the proceedings, the peculiarity of
the subject criminal cases is that the proceedings already
necessarily entail the presence of hundreds of families. It
cannot be gainsaid that the families of the 57 victims and of
the 197 accused have as much interest, beyond mere
curiosity, to attend or monitor the proceedings as those of the
impleaded parties or trial participants. It bears noting at this
juncture that the prosecution and the defense have listed
more than 200 witnesses each.
The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a
courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties,
whether private complainants or accused, is unfortunate
enough. What more if the right itself commands that a
reasonable number of the general public be allowed to
witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the
courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to
break the inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the
imperative of a transparent, open and public trial.
In so allowing pro hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and
television of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, the SC lays
down the following guidelines toward addressing the
concerns mentioned in Aquino and Estrada:
(a) An audio-visual recording of the
Maguindanao massacre cases may be made
both for documentary purposes and for
transmittal to live radio and television
broadcasting.
(b) Media entities must file with the trial
court a letter of application, manifesting that
they intend to broadcast the audio-visual
recording of the proceedings and that they
have the necessary technological equipment
and technical plan to carry out the same,
with an undertaking that they will faithfully
comply with the guidelines and regulations
and cover the entire remaining proceedings
until promulgation of judgment.
No selective or partial coverage shall be
allowed. No media entity shall be allowed to
broadcast the proceedings without an
application duly approved by the trial
court.
(c) A single fixed compact camera shall be
installed inconspicuously inside the
courtroom to provide a single wide-angle
full-view of the sala of the trial court. No
panning and zooming shall be allowed to
avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying
incidents in the proceedings. The camera
and the necessary equipment shall be
operated and controlled only by a duly
designated official or employee of the
Supreme Court. The camera equipment
should not produce or beam any distracting
sound or light rays. Signal lights or signs
showing the equipment is operating should
not be visible. A limited number of
microphones and the least installation of
wiring, if not wireless technology, must be
unobtrusively located in places indicated by
the trial court.
The Public Information Office and the Office
of the Court Administrator shall coordinate
and assist the trial court on the physical set-
up of the camera and equipment.
(d) The transmittal of the audio-visual
recording from inside the courtroom to the
media entities shall be conducted in such a
way that the least physical disturbance shall
be ensured in keeping with the dignity and
solemnity of the proceedings and the
exclusivity of the access to the media
entities.
The hardware for establishing an
interconnection or link with the camera
equipment monitoring the proceedings shall
be for the account of the media entities,
which should employ technology that can (i)
avoid the cumbersome snaking cables inside
26
the courtroom, (ii) minimize the unnecessary
ingress or egress of technicians, and (iii)
preclude undue commotion in case of
technical glitches.
If the premises outside the courtroom lack
space for the set-up of the media entities’
facilities, the media entities shall access the
audio-visual recording either via wireless
technology accessible even from outside the
court premises or from one common web
broadcasting platform from which streaming
can be accessed or derived to feed the
images and sounds.
At all times, exclusive access by the media
entities to the real-time audio-visual
recording should be protected or encrypted.
(e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a
particular day must be continuous and in its
entirety, excepting such portions thereof
where Sec. 21 of Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court[27] applies, and where the trial court
excludes, upon motion, prospective
witnesses from the courtroom, in instances
where,inter alia, there are unresolved
identification issues or there are issues which
involve the security of the witnesses and the
integrity of their testimony (e.g., the
dovetailing of corroborative testimonies is
material, minority of the witness).
The trial court may, with the consent of the
parties, order only the pixelization of the
image of the witness or mute the audio
output, or both.
(f) To provide a faithful and complete
broadcast of the proceedings, no commercial
break or any other gap shall be allowed until
the day’s proceedings are adjourned, except
during the period of recess called by the trial
court and during portions of the proceedings
wherein the public is ordered excluded.
(g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the
audio output from the on-going proceedings,
the proceedings shall be broadcast without
any voice-overs, except brief annotations of
scenes depicted therein as may be necessary
to explain them at the start or at the end of
the scene. Any commentary shall observe
the sub judice rule and be subject to the
contempt power of the court;
 (h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual
recording shall be allowed until after the
finality of judgment, except brief footages
and still images derived from or cartographic
sketches of scenes based on the recording,
only for news purposes, which shall likewise
observe the sub judice rule and be subject to
the contempt power of the court;
(i) The original audio-recording shall be
deposited in the National Museum and the
Records Management and Archives Office for
preservation and exhibition in accordance
with law.

(j) The audio-visual recording of the

proceedings shall be made under the
supervision and control of the trial court
which may issue supplementary directives,
as the exigency requires, including the
suspension or revocation of the grant of
application by the media entities.

(k) The Court shall create a special

committee which shall forthwith study,
design and recommend appropriate
arrangements, implementing regulations,
and administrative matters referred to it by
the Court concerning the live broadcast of
the proceedings pro hac vice, in accordance
with the above-outlined guidelines. The
Special Committee shall also report and
recommend on the feasibility, availability and
affordability of the latest technology that
would meet the herein requirements. It may
conduct consultations with resource persons
and experts in the field of information and
communication technology.

(l) All other present directives in the conduct

of the proceedings of the trial court (i.e.,
prohibition on recording devices such as still
cameras, tape recorders; and allowable
number of media practitioners inside the
courtroom) shall be observed in addition to
these guidelines.

Indeed, the SC cannot gloss over what advances

technology has to offer in distilling the abstract
discussion of key constitutional precepts into the
workable context. Technology per se has always been
neutral. It is the use and regulation thereof that need
fine-tuning. Law and technology can work to the
advantage and furtherance of the various rights
herein involved, within the contours of defined
guidelines.

27