#1
by res judicata – defined as one that operates
G.R. No. 192486 November 21, 2012
RUPERTA CANO VDA. DE VIRAY and JESUS
CARLO GERARD VIRAY, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES JOSE USI and AMELITA
USI, Respondents.
VELASCO, JR., J.:
FACTS:
The case involves a piece of land, lot no.
733, registered under the name of Ellen and
Moses Mendoza. The said lot was subdivided
to 6 parts by Engr.Fajardo but was not officially
approved by the LMB. On, April 29, 1986,
Mendoza executed two separate deeds of
absolute sale, the first, transferring Lot 733-F to
Jesus Carlo Gerard Viray (Jesus Viray), and the
second deed conveying Lot 733-A to spouses
AvelinoViray and Margarita Masangcay (Sps.
Viray).
The aforementioned conveyances
notwithstanding, Mendoza, Emerenciana M.
Vda.deMallari (Vda. de Mallari) and respondent
spouses Jose Usi and Amelita T. Usi (Sps. Usi or
the Usis), as purported co-owners of Lot 733,
executed on August 20, 1990 a Subdivision
Agreement, or the 1st subdivision agreement
(1st SA) where lot no. 733 was divided to 3 lots:
Lot 733-A, Lot 733-B and Lot 733-C. Lot 733-C
was further subdivided to 13 lots under a 2nd
subdivision agreement (2nd SA) where herein
respondents appeared as owners of some the
further subdivided lots covering a part of the
lot sold to herein petitioners.
As to be expected, the foregoing
overlapping transactions involving the same
property or portions thereof spawned several
suits and countersuits between petitioner and
respondents herein.
The RTC rendered judgment dismissing
the petition of the Sps. Usi but was reversed by
the CA on appeal, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in ruling that Respondents are the legal
and valid owners of the subject lot?
HELD: The court held that the petition is barred
as bar by prior judgement when there is a final
judgement on merits rendered by a court with
jurisdiction and the first and second action has
identical parties, subject matter or cause of
action.
The better right to possess and right of
ownership cannot be relitigated because of res
judicata.
Res Judicata Applies
Notably, the Sps. Viray and Vda. de Viray, after
peremptorily prevailing in their cases
supportive of their claim of ownership and
possession of Lots 733-A and 733-F (Fajardo
Plan), cannot now be deprived of their rights by
the expediency of the Sps. Usi maintaining, as
here, an accion publiciana and/or accion
reivindicatoria, two of the three kinds of actions
to recover possession of real property. The
third, accion interdictal, comprises two distinct
causes of action, namely forcible entry and
unlawful detainer,44 the issue in both cases
being limited to the right to physical
possession or possession de facto,
independently of any claim of ownership that
either party may set forth in his or her
pleadings,45 albeit the court has the
competence to delve into and resolve the issue
of ownership but only to address the issue of
priority of possession.46 Both actions must be
brought within one year from the date of
actual entry on the land, in case of forcible
entry, and from the date of last demand to
vacate following the expiration of the right to
possess, in case of unlawful detainer.47
When the dispossession or unlawful
deprivation has lasted more than one year, one
may avail himself of accion publiciana to
determine the better right of possession, or
possession de jure, of realty independently of
title. On the other hand, accion reivindicatoria
is an action to recover ownership which
necessarily includes recovery of possession.48
#2
[G.R. No. 207525. June 18, 2014.]
BONIFACIO PIEDAD, represented by MARIA
INSPIRACION PIEDAD-DANAO, petitioner,
vs. SPOUSES VICTORIO GURIEZA and
EMETERIA M. GURIEZA, respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J p:
FACTS:
Bonifacio alleged that he is the absolute owner
of the 1/3 middle portion of a parcel of
residential land which he acquired through
intestate succession from his late father who
inherited the same from the latter's parents,
Alejandro Piedad (Alejandro) and Tomasa
Villaray (Tomasa). He also claimed that his
ownership of the subject lot took place even
before his father's death and was validated
through a Deed of Confirmation of an
Adjudication and Partition (Deed of
Confirmation) executed by Alejandro and
Tomasa's legal heirs. Further, Bonifacio alleged
that before migrating to Hawaii, he built a
bungalow on the subject lot and assigned
numerous caretakers to look after it, the last of
which were Sps. Gurieza.
Sometime in 2005, however, Sps. Gurieza
allegedly took interest of the bungalow and the
subject lot after learning from an employee of
the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) that the lot is public land.
Using such information, Sps. Gurieza had the
subject lot declared under their name for tax
purposes.
When Bonifacio learned of Sps. Gurieza's acts,
he authorized Ofelia Bay-ag to file a protest
before the DENR which deferred further action
on their (Sps. Gurieza's) application before it.
Thereafter, Bonifacio sent his daughter, Maria
Inspiracion Piedad-Danao (Danao), to the
country to personally demand that Sps. Gurieza
vacate the subject lot unconditionally; and for
this purpose, Danao initiated a complaint
before the barangay court. However, during
the mediation proceedings, Sps. Gurieza
refused to heed Danao's demand and even
challenged her to go to higher courts. Thus,
Bonifacio was constrained to file the instant
case as his last resort.
In their defense, Sps. Gurieza denied
Bonifacio's claim and maintained that in 1974,
the subject lot was a vacant and virginal public
land and that the DENR allowed them to
possess and occupy the same in the concept of
an owner. As such, they acquired the same
through acquisitive prescription. They likewise
assailed the authenticity and validity of the
Deed of Confirmation, contending that it was
only signed by a few heirs of Alejandro and
Tomasa.
The MTC Ruling: ruled in Bonifacio's favor, and,
accordingly, ordered Sps. Gurieza to vacate the
subject lot, It found that Bonifacio had a better
right of possession over the subject lot as
evidenced by the house he built thereon as
early as the 1950s when he took possession of
the said lot, as well as the affidavits of
witnesses who are pioneer residents of the
area, attesting that Sps. Gurieza's claim over
such lot is preposterous.
Dissatisfied, Sps. Gurieza appealed to the RTC.
The RTC Ruling. the RTC affirmed the MTC
ruling in toto.
Aggrieved, Sps. Gurieza elevated the case to
the CA by way of petition for review.
The CA Ruling: the CA reversed and set aside
the RTC ruling, and consequently, ordered the
dismissal of Bonifacio's Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer and Damages.
The CA found, upon further scrutiny of the
Deed of Confirmation, that Emeteria M.
Gurieza, whom Bonifacio recognized as one of
the heirs of the subject lot, among others, as
well as the other heirs of Alejandro and
Tomasa, did not sign the Deed of
Confirmation.
Bonifacio moved for reconsideration but was,
however, denied.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: whether or not the CA correctly
reversed the RTC ruling and, consequently,
dismissed Bonifacio's Complaint for Unlawful
Detainer and Damages against Sps. Gurieza.
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
Unlawful detainer is an action to recover
possession of real property from one who
unlawfully withholds possession thereof after
the expiration or termination of his right to
hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. The possession of the defendant in
unlawful detainer is originally legal but became
illegal due to the expiration or termination of
the right to possess. The only issue to be
resolved in an unlawful detainer case is the
physical or material possession of the property
involved, independent of any claim of
ownership by any of the parties. 17
An ejectment case, based on the allegation of
possession by tolerance, falls under the
category of unlawful detainer. Where the
plaintiff allows the defendant to use his/her
property by tolerance without any contract, the
defendant is necessarily bound by an implied
promise that he/she will vacate on demand,
failing which, an action for unlawful detainer
will lie. 18
Thus, under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court, the complaint must be filed "within one
(1) year after such unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession" and must allege
that: (a) the defendant originally had lawful
possession of the property, either by virtue of a
contract or by tolerance of the plaintiff; (b)
eventually, the defendant's possession of the
property became illegal or unlawful upon
notice by the plaintiff to defendant of the
expiration or the termination of the
defendant's right of possession; (c) thereafter,
the defendant remained in possession of the
property and deprived the plaintiff the
enjoyment thereof; and (d) within one (1) year
from the unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession, the plaintiff instituted the
complaint for ejectment. 19
In this light, the Court shall solely resolve the
issue as to who between the parties has the
better right of possession de facto over the
subject lot. Corollary thereto, issues pertaining
to ownership are better threshed out in
another action instituted for such purpose.
After a judicious perusal of the records, the
Court holds that Bonifacio had clearly
established his cause of action for unlawful
detainer.
In view of the foregoing, the Court thus holds
that the CA erred in dismissing Bonifacio's
Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages
against Sps. Gurieza.
#3
SPOUSES ALEJANDRO MANZANILLA and
REMEDIOS VELASCO vs. WATERFIELDS
INDUSTRIES CORPORATION
G.R. No.177484, July 18, 2014
J. Del Castillo
Failure to pay the rent must precede
termination of the contract due to non-
payment of rent. It therefore follows that the
cause of action for unlawful detainer must
necessarily arise before the termination of the
contract and not the other way around.
#4
G.R. No. 160914, March 25, 2015
MARCELA M. DELA
CRUZ, Petitioner, v. ANTONIO Q. HERMANO
AND HIS WIFE REMEDIOS
HERMANO, Respondent.
SERENO, C.J.:
MARCELA M. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, v.
ANTONIO Q. HERMANO AND HIS WIFE
REMEDIOS HERMANO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 160914
March 25, 2015
FACTS: Respondents Antonio Hermano and his
wife RemediosHermano were the registered
and lawful owners of a house and lot in
Tagaytay City.
On September 1, 2001, petitioner Marcela M.
Dela Cruz occupied and possessed the
questioned property pursuant to the alleged
Memorandum of Agreement between her and
a certain Don Mario Enciso Benitez, without the
authority and consent of the Hermanos. On
September 27, 2001, A. Hermano, through a
counsel, sent a formal demand letter to Dela
Cruz to vacate and turn over the possession of
the property and to pay P 20,000 a month as
rent starting September 1, 2001.
Respondent filed an ejectment case against the the initiation of the ejectment suit. As the CA
petitioner at the MTCC; however, the court correctly observed, petitioner failed to
dismissed the case due to lack of jurisdiction. controvert these documents with competent
The court also stated that respondent’s proper evidence. It erred, however, in considering
remedy should be an action for recovery and those documents sufficient to prove
not of a summary proceeding for ejectment, respondents’ prior physical possession.
because there was no showing of forcible entry
or unlawful detainer. Ownership certainly carries the right of
possession, but the possession contemplated is
Respondent appealed the decision at the RTC; not exactly the same as that which is in issue in
the said court, however, affirmed the decision a forcible entry case. Possession in a forcible
of the lower court entoto. The same filed a entry suit refers only to possession de facto, or
petition for review at the CA, of which, granted actual or material possession, and not one
the petition, reversed and set aside the flowing out of ownership. These are different
decision of RTC. Furthermore, the court legal concepts under which the law provides
rendered a decision declaring Hermano as the different remedies for recovery of possession.
lawful possessor of the property and order Thus, in a forcible entry case, a party who can
Dela Cruz to vacate the same. With the CA’s prove prior possession can recover the
decision, petitioner filed a petition for review at possession even against the owner. Whatever
the Supreme Court. may be the character of the possession, the
present occupant of the property has the
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent has security to remain on that property if the
adequately pleaded and proved a case of occupant has the advantage of precedence in
forcible entry. time and until a person with a better right
lawfully causes eviction.
HELD: The burden of sufficiently alleging prior
physical possession carries with it the Similarly, tax declarations and realty tax
concomitant burden of establishing one’s case payments are not conclusive proofs of
by a preponderance of evidence. To be able to possession. They are merely good indicia of
do so, respondents herein must rely on the possession in the concept of owner based on
strength of their own evidence, not on the the presumption that no one in one’s right
weakness of that of petitioner. It is not enough mind would be paying taxes for a property that
that the allegations of a complaint make out a is not in one’s actual or constructive
case for forcible entry. The plaintiff must prove possession.
prior physical possession. It is the basis of the
security accorded by law to a prior occupant of Guided by the foregoing, the Court finds that
a property until a person with a better right the proofs submitted by respondents only
acquires possession thereof. established possession flowing from
ownership. Although respondents have claimed
The Court has scrutinized the parties’ from the inception of the controversy up to
submissions, but found no sufficient evidence now that they are using the property as their
to prove respondents’ allegation of prior vacation house, that claim is not substantiated
physical possession. by any corroborative evidence. On the other
hand, petitioner’s claim that she started
To prove their claim of having a better right to occupying the property in March 2001, and not
possession, respondents submitted their title in September of that year as Antonio alleged in
thereto and the latest Tax Declaration prior to his Complaint, was corroborated by the
Affidavitof petitioner’s caretaker. Respondents
did not present any evidence to controvert that
affidavit.
Therefore, respondents failed to discharge their
burden of proving the element of prior physical
possession. Their uncorroborated claim of that
fact, even if made under oath, is self-serving. It
does not amount to preponderant evidence,
which simply means that which is of greater
weight or is more convincing than evidence
that is offered in opposition.
As noted at the outset, it bears stressing that
the Court is not a trier of facts. However, the
conflicting findings of fact of the MTCC and the
RTC, on the one hand, and the CA on the other,
compelled us to revisit the records of this case
for the proper dispensation of
justice. Moreover, it must be stressed that the
Court’s pronouncements in this case are
without prejudice to the parties’ right to pursue
the appropriate remedy.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on
Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED, and the Decision of
the MTCC dismissing the Complaint against
petitioner is REINSTATED.
#5 NONE
G.R. No. 202354 September 24,
2014
AMADA C. ZACARIAS, Petitioner,
vs.
VICTORIA ANACAY, EDNA ANACAY,
CYNTHIAANACAYGUISIC, ANGELITO
ANACAY, JERMIL ISRAEL, JIMMY ROY
ISRAEL and all other persons claiming
authority under them, Respondents.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
#6
G.R. No. 201286 July 18, 2014
INOCENCIA TAGALOG, Petitioner,
vs.
MARIA LIM VDA. DE GONZALEZ,
GAUDENCIA L. BUAGAS, RANULFO Y. LIM,
DON L. CALVO, SUSAN C. SANTIAGO, DINA
C. ARANAS, and RUFINA C.
RAMIREZ, Respondents.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
The respondents, as co-owners of Lot No.
1595-A, with an assessed value of assessed
value of P57,960 and a market value of
P264,930, filed a complaint for Recovery of
Possession, Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
with a Prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order with Damages and Attorney’s
Fees before the Regional Trial Court of Toledo
City against the petitioner, Inocencia
Tagalog. In their complaint, the respondents
alleged that Inocencia occupied a portion of
the land as lessee and paid rent on a month to
month basis on the basis of a verbal
contract. When Inocencia’s house of light
material was damaged in a typhoon, Inocencia
discontinued paying rent and stopped
inhabiting the house. They then demanded
that she remove the debris, and vacate the land
as they will subdivide and develop it for their
own use. Inocencia however refused to vacate,
instead she constructed a two-storey house
made of concrete. They informed the Office of
the Municipal Engineer of the construction of
the house without their consent and the
required building permit. Despite the warning
given by the municipal official, Inocencia
proceeded with the construction. In her
Answer, Inocencia asserted that the lease
contract was still valid and subsisting, not yet
terminated by the parties, and she had not
abandoned possession of the land. As further
defense, she prayed for the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction on the part of
the RTC, as the case was for ejectment and
unlawful detainer, not cognizable by the RTC.
#7
G.R. No. 182953 October 11, 2010
CORAZON D. SARMIENTA, JOSE DERAMA,
CATES RAMA, JOSIE MIWA, TOTO
NOLASCO, JESUS OLIQUINO, NORBERTO
LOPEZ, RUBEN ESPOSO, BERNARDO
FLORESCA, MARINA DIMATALO, ROBLE
DIMANDAKO, RICARDO PEÑA, EDUARDO
ESPINO, ANTONIO GALLEGOS, VICTOR
SANDOVAL, FELICITAS ABRANTES, MERCY
CRUZ, ROSENDO ORGANO, RICKY BARENO,
ANITA TAKSAGON, JOSIE RAMA and PABLO
DIMANDAKO, Petitioners,
vs.
MANALITE HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION,
INC. (MAHA), Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
FACTS: Respondent Manalite Homeowners
Association, Inc. (MAHA) was the registered
owner of the lot in dispute which was placed
under community mortgage program (CMP).
Through force, intimidation, threat, strategy
and stealth, petitioners entered the premises
and constructed their temporary houses and an
office building. Sometime in 1992, petitioners
sought for the annulment of respondent’s title
but it was dismissed by the RTC. Upon
dismissal, respondent demanded petitioners to
vacate the premises. Petitioners asked for a
one-year extension for them to look for a place
to transfer. However, it was
extended due to respondent’s
Petitioners even propose to become members
of MAHA so that they can be qualified to
acquire portions of the lot but they failed to
comply with the requirements despite repeated
demands. MAHA then sent formal demand
letters to petitioners to vacate
Unheeded, MAHA filed the complaint for
"Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer."
The MTCC dismissed the case for lack of
cause of action for failure by the respondent to
prove prior physical possession which is
required in a complaint for forcible entry. On
appeal, RTC reversed the MTCC decision
stating that MAHA was able to prove by
preponderance of evidence that petitioners’
occupation was by mere tolerance and their
occupation became illegal after MAHA
demanded that they vacate the property. The
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC ruling that
the cause of action was an unlawful detainer
case.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a
superior right of possession over the property
in question.
HELD: No. The evidence proves that after
MAHA acquired the property, MAHA tolerated
petitioners’ stay and gave them the option to
acquire portions of the property by becoming
members of MAHA. But when they failed to
fulfill their obligations, MAHA had the right to
demand for them to vacate the property as
their right of possession had already expired or
had been terminated. Well settled is the rule
that a person who occupies the land of another
at the latter’s tolerance or permission, without
repeatedly
any contract between them, is necessarily
tolerance.
bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which, a summary
action for ejectment is the proper remedy
against him which in the present case is an
unlawful detainer case.
the lot. #8
[G.R. No. 178635, April 11 : 2011]

In their answer, petitioners averred that SERVILLANO E. ABAD, PETITIONER, VS.

they are the owners of the subject lot, having
been in actual physical possession thereof for
more than thirty (30) years before MAHA
intruded into the land. They likewise argued
that the complaint was irregular and defective
because its caption states that it was for
"Forcible Entry/Unlawful Detainer."
OSCAR C. FARRALES AND DAISY C.
FARRALES-VILLAMAYOR, RESPONDENTS.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
This case is about a) the need, when
establishing the jurisdiction of the court over
an action for forcible entry, for plaintiff to
allege in his complaint prior physical
possession of the property and b) the need for
plaintiff to prove as well the fact of such prior
physical possession.
Petitioner Servillano Abad claims he and his
wife, Dr.Estrella E. Gavilan-Abad, bought a
registered property from Teresita, Rommel, and
Dennis Farrales.
• The latter were the wife and sons,
respectively, of the late brother of respondents
Oscar Farrales (Oscar) and Daisy Farrales-
Villamayor (Daisy). Teresita operated a
boarding house on the property.
Because the Abads did not consider running
the boarding house themselves, they agreed to
lease the property back to Teresita so she
could continue with her business.
• But, although the lease had a good start,
Teresita suddenly abandoned the boarding
house, forcing the Abads to take over by
engaging the services of Bencio Duran,
Teresita's helper, to oversee the boarding
house business.
Dr. Abad went to the boarding house to have
certain damage to some toilets repaired.
• While she was attending to the matter, she
also hired house painters to give the boarding
house fresh coat of paint. Oscar and Daisy
came, accompanied by two men, and forcibly
took possession of the boarding house.
• Frightened, the painters called the Abads who
immediately sought police help. The Abads
were later appeased, however, when they
learned that the intruders left the place.
Two days later, the day the Abads left for
abroad, Oscar and Daisy forcibly entered and
took possession of the property once again.
• Because of this, petitioner Servillano Abad
(Abad) filed a complaintfor forcible entry
against the two before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC).
Oscar and Daisy vehemently denied that they
forcibly seized the place. They claimed
ownership of it by inheritance.
• They also claimed that they had been in
possession of the same from the time of their
birth.
• That Oscar had been residing on the property
since 1967 as attested to by a March 31, 2003
certification issued by Barangay Bahay Toro.
While the defendants admitted that Daisy
herself ceased to reside on the property as
early as 1986, they pointed out that she did not
effectively give up her possession.
• Oscar and Daisy further claimed that when
their parents were still alive, the latter
mortgaged the property to a bank to secure a
loan.
• After their mother passed away, they decided
to lease portions of the property to help pay
the loan. Daisy managed the operation of the
boarding house.
• To bolster their claim, Oscar and Daisy
presented copies of rental receipts going back
from 2001 to 2003. They would not have been
able to lease the rooms unless they were in
possession.
Further, Oscar and Daisy asked the MeTC to
dismiss the action on the ground of failure of
Abad to show that he and his wife enjoyed
prior physical possession of the property, an
essential requisite in forcible entry cases.
• Abad's allegation that he and his wife
immediately leased the property after they
bought it was proof that they were never in
possession of it for any length of time.
The MeTC rendered a decision in favor of
Abad, stating that Oscar and Daisy could not
acquire ownership of the property since it was
registered.
• And, as owner, Abad was entitled to
possession.
Disagreeing with the MeTC, Oscar and Daisy
went up to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City.
• The RTC affirmed the decision of the MeTC in
its totality.
• It held that Oscar and Daisy could no longer
impugn the jurisdiction of the MeTC over the
action since they raised the ground of Abad's
failure to allege prior physical possession in his
complaint for the first time on appeal.
• Besides, said the RTC, since the complaint
alleged that Servillano owned the property, it
may be presumed that he also had prior
possession of it.
• No evidence to the contrary having been
presented, the presumption stood.
Undaunted, Oscar and Daisy filed a petition for
review with the Court of Appeals (CA).
• The CA rendered a decision, annulling the
decisions and orders of both the MeTC and the
RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
• The CA pointed out that Abad merely alleged
in his complaint that he leased the property to
Teresita after he and his wife bought the same
and that, thereafter, Oscar and Daisy forcibly
entered the same.
• Since Abad did not make the jurisdictional
averment of prior physical possession, the
MeTC did not acquire jurisdiction over his
action.
• Further, Oscar and Daisy ably proved actual
possession from 1967 through the barangay
certification. Since the MeTC had no
jurisdiction over the case, all the proceedings in
the case were void.
Abad moved for reconsideration but the CA
denied the same, hence, in the present petition
for review.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Abad sufficiently alleged in
his complaint the jurisdictional fact of prior
physical possession of the disputed property to
vest the MeTC with jurisdiction over his action;
and
2. In the affirmative, whether or not Abad
sufficiently proved that he enjoyed prior
physical possession of the property in question.
HELD:
AS TO THE FIRST ISSUE
Yes, Abad sufficiently alleges in his complaint
the jurisdictional fact of prior physical possession
of the disputed property to vest the MeTC with
jurisdiction over his action.
Two allegations are indispensable in actions for
forcible entry to enable first level courts to
acquire jurisdiction over them: first, that the
plaintiff had prior physical possession of the
property; and, second, that the defendant
deprived him of such possession by means of
force, intimidation, threats, strategy, or stealth.
There is no question that Abad made an
allegation in his complaint that Oscar and Daisy
forcibly entered the subject property.
• The only issue is with respect to his
allegation, citing such property as one "of
which they have complete physical and
material possession of the same until deprived
thereof."
• Abad argues that this substantially alleges
plaintiffsprior physical possession of the
property before the dispossession, sufficient to
confer on the MeTC jurisdiction over the action.
The Court agrees.
• The plaintiff in a forcible entry suit is not
required to use in his allegations the exact
terminology employed by the rules.
• It is enough that the facts set up in the
complaint show that dispossession took place
under the required conditions.
It is of course not enough that the allegations
of the complaint make out a case for forcible
entry.
• The plaintiff must also be able to prove his
allegations. He has to prove that he had prior
physical possessionfor this gives him the
security that entitles him to remain in the
property until a person with a better right
lawfully ejects him.
Here, evidently, the Abads did not take physical
possession of the property after buying the
same since they immediately rented it to
Teresita who had already been using the
property as a boarding house.
• Abad claims that their renting it to Teresita
was an act of ownership that amounted to their
acquiring full physical possession of the same.
But the Abad's lease agreement with Teresita
began only in September 2002.
• Oscar and Daisy, on the other hand, have
proved that they had been renting spaces in
the property as early as 2001 as evidenced by
receipts that they issued to their lessees.
• This was long before they supposedly entered
the property, using force, in 2002.
Of course, Abad pointed out that the cited
receipts covered rents in a place called "D's
Condominium" in Sampaloc, Manila, and were
only made to appear through handwritten
notations that they were issued for rooms in
the property subject of the suit.
• But a close examination of the receipts shows
that "D's Condominium" was just the name that
Daisy employed in her business of renting
rooms. The receipts did not necessarily
describe another place.
• Indeed, they provided blank spaces for
describing as the subject of rent the property
subject of this case.
• And, except for Abad's bare claim that
Teresita and his sons had long been in
possession before they sold it to him and his
wife, he offered no evidence to show that this
was in fact the case.
AS THE SECOND ISSUE
Abad failed toprove that he enjoyed prior
physical possession of the property in question.
Finally, Abad argued that with the title to the
property in his name, he has in his favor the
right to the actual, physical, exclusive,
continuous, and peaceful possession of the
same.
• He pointed out that his possession de facto
began from the time of the signing and
notarization of the deed of absolute sale,
becoming de jure once the title was issued in
his name.
It is of course true that a property owner has
the right to exercise the attributes of
ownership, one of which is the right to possess
the property. But Abad is missing the point.
• He is referring to possession flowing from
ownership which is not in issue in this case.
• Possession in forcible entry cases means
nothing more than physical possession or
possession de facto, not legal possession in the
sense contemplated in civil law. Only prior
physical possession, not title, is the issue.
For these reasons, the Court finds that
Servillano utterly failed to prove prior physical
possession in his favor.
• The absence of prior physical possession by
the plaintiff in a forcible entry warrants the
dismissal of the complaint.
#9
G.R. No. 178159 March 2, 2011
SPS. VICENTE DIONISIO AND ANITA
DIONISIO, Petitioner,
vs.
WILFREDO LINSANGAN, Respondent.
ABAD, J.:
FACTS:
Gorgonio M. Cruz (Cruz) owned agricultural
lands inSan Rafael, Bulacan, that his tenant,
Romualdo San Mateo (Romualdo)
cultivated.Upon Romualdos death, his widow,
Emiliana, got Cruzs permission to stay on the
property provided she would vacate it upon
demand.In September 1989, spouses Vicente
and Anita Dionisio (the Dionisios) bought the
property from Cruz. In April 2002, the Dionisios
found out that Emiliana had left the property
and that it was already Wilfredo Linsangan
(Wilfredo) who occupied it under the strength
of a "Kasunduan ng Bilihan ng Karapatan"
dated April 7, 1977.
The Dionisios, on April 22, 2002, demanded
that Wilfredo vacate the land but the latter
declined, prompting the Dionisios to file an
eviction suit against him before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of San Rafael,
Bulacan.Wilfredo filed an answer with
counterclaims in which he declared that he had
been a tenant of the land as early as 1977. At
the pre-trial, the Dionisios orally asked leave to
amend their complaint.The Dionisios filed their
amended complaint on August 5, 2003;
Wilfredo maintained his original answer.
The MTC ruled for the Dionisios and asked
Wilfredo to vacate the property and pay rent
and costs. The RTC affirmed, adding that the
action was one for forcible entry. The CA,
however, reversed. The CA held that, by
amending their complaint, the Dionisios
effectively changed their cause of action from
unlawful detainer to recovery of possession
which fell outside the jurisdiction of the
MTC.Further, since the amendment introduced
a new cause of action, its filing on August 5,
2003 marked the passage of the one year limit
from demand required in ejectment suits.
ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the amended complaint
changed the cause of action
2. Whether or not the action is within the
jurisdiction of the MTC
HELD:
The petition is granted.
REMEDIAL LAW: Effect of amendment of the
complaint; nature of the action.
First issue: To determine if an amendment
introduces a different cause of action, the test
is whether such amendment now requires the
defendant to answer for a liability or obligation
which is completely different from that stated
in the original complaint.
Here, both the original and the amended
complaint have identical allegations, and
required Wilfredo to defend his possession
based on the allegation that he had stayed on
the land after Emiliana left out of the owners
mere tolerance and that the latter had
demanded that he leave.It did not introduce a
new cause of action.
Second issue: Wilfredo points out that the MTC
has no jurisdiction to hear and decide the case
since it involved tenancy relation under the
DARABs jurisdiction. But jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the action is determined by
the allegations of the complaint. The records
show that Wilfredo failed to substantiate his
claim that he was a tenant of the land.
Second, the Court ruled that this is not an
action for forcible entry, since the complaint
contained no allegation that the Dionisios were
in possession of the property before Wilfredo
occupied it either by force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth, an element of that kind of
eviction suit.
The Court ruled that this is an action for
unlawful detainer: (1) the defendant has
possession of property by contract with or by
tolerance of the plaintiff; (2) such possession
became illegal upon plaintiffs notice to
defendant, terminating the latter's right of
possession; (3) the defendant remains in
possession, depriving the plaintiff of the
enjoyment of his property; and (4) within a year
from plaintiff's last demand that defendant
vacate the property, the plaintiff files a
complaint for ejectment. If the defendant had
possession of the land upon mere tolerance of
the owner, such tolerance must be present at
the beginning of defendants possession.
Here, while there was no specific allegation of
"tolerance" in the complaint, the Court
concedes that the rules do not require the
plaintiff in an eviction suit to use the exact
language of such rules.The Dionisios alleged
that Romualdo used to be the lands tenant and
that when he died, the Dionisios allowed his
widow, Emiliana, to stay under a promise that
she would leave upon demand.These
allegations clearly imply the Dionisios
"tolerance" of her (or any of her assignees).
Petition is GRANTED.
The decision of the CA is reversed and that
of the MTC reinstated.
#10
G.R. No. 176341 July 7, 2014
PRO-GUARD SECURITY SERVICES
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
TORMIL REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
DOCTRINE:
The date of unlawful deprivation or
withholding of possession is to be counted
from the date of the demand to vacate.
FACTS:
Manuel Torres, assigned three (3) parcels of
land to Tormil Realty & Development
Corporation located in Pasay City and all
improvements thereon in exchange for shares
of stock in the said corporation. However,
despite the assignment, title to the real
properties remained in the name of Manuel
Torres. Later on Manuel Torres unilaterally
revoked the assignment.
Subsequently, Manuel Torres and Edgardo
Pabalan established Torres-Pabalan Realty
Incorporated. As part of his capital
contribution, Manuel Torres, assigned the three
(3) parcels of land to Torres-Pabalan Realty
Incorporated. Edgardo Palaban was then the
General Manager and Administrator of Tormil
Realty & Development Corporation and he
later on resigned. In 1985, the construction of
the Torres Building on the land was completed
and was rented out.
In March 1987, Tormil filed a case with the SEC
to compel Manuel Torres to fulfil his obligation
by turning over the documents necessary to
effect the registration and transfer of titles in
the name of the properties assigned to it by
Manuel.
Edgardo was the Administrator of Torres-
Pabalan Realty. He then set up a law office
together with Atty. Augustus Cesar Azura on
the 2nd floor of the building. Torres building
was later then declared for tax purposes.
SEC, then made a decision in favour of Tormil
which was later affirmed by SEC EnBanc.
Manuel appealed to the CA. During the
pendency thereof, Pro-Guard entered into a
lease contract with Edgardo for the lease of a
unit at the 3rd floor of the building. In exchange
for the rental payments, Pro-Guard provided
security services to Torres-Pabalan.
Then the CA’s decision was released. CA ruled
in favour or Tormil.
Tormil then sent letters to the law office and
Pro-Guard to settle their accounts with the
previous owner and enter into new lease
contracts with Tormil. Since Tormil’s letters
were ignored, it sent demand letters to vacate
the premises and pay their rentals from the
time they have occupied the said rented units.
Since, their letter was once again unheeded,
Tormil filed an ejectment suit with the MeTC
against Edgardo and Augustus and Pro-Guard.
Tormil averred that the occupancy by
defendants of units in Torres building was out
of tolerance.
Edgardo and Augustus disputed Tormil’s
ownership of the parcels of land where the
building stands and asserted that Torres-
Pabalan was the owner of the same. It was also
the onewho funded the building’s construction.
Unfortunately, its tax declarations over the
building were surreptitiously and unlawfully
cancelled on the sole basis of the SEC Case.
Pro-Guard, for its part, claimed that it was
paying rentals to the owner, Torres-Pabalan, in
the form of security services provided to the
latter. It likewise called attention to the fact
that it was no longer in the premises as Tormil
forcibly ousted it therefrom.
MeTC ruled in favour of Tormil. RTC affirmed
MeTC ruling. CA likewise affirmed the decision.
All the courts have ruled that Tormil have
sufficiently proved its entitlement to possession
of the property. What is left is the
determination of the reckoning point when
Pro-guard and Edgardo and Augustus will pay
the rentals.
ISSUE:
When is the reckoning point of payment of the
rentals, is it from the time of occupation of the
property or at the time of demand?
HELD:
While indeed Tormil, as the victor in the
unlawful detainer suit, is entitled to the fair
rental value for the use and occupation of the
unit in the building, such compensation should
not be reckoned from the time Pro-Guard
began to occupy the same, but from the time
of the demand to vacate.
In unlawful detainer cases, the
defendant is necessarily in prior lawful
possession of the property but his possession
eventually becomes unlawful upon termination
or expiration of his right to possess. In other
words, the entry is legal but the possession
thereafter became illegal. Additionally, the
Rules of Court requires the filing of such action
within a year after the withholding of
possession meaning that “if the dispossession
has not lasted for more than one year, [then]
an ejectment proceeding (in this case unlawful
detainer) is proper.
Here, from the moment Pro-Guard
started to occupy the unit in March 1994 up to
November 15, 1998, the right of Pro-Guard to
possess the premises was not challenged. It
was only after Tormil prevailed over Manuel in
its ownership of the same that it terminated
Pro-Guard’s right to possess the unit it was
occupying through a letter to vacate dated
November 16, 1998. Hence, it is only from that
point that Tormil is considered to have
withdrawn its tolerance of Pro-Guard’s
occupation. Conversely, Pro-Guard’s possession
became unlawful at that same moment. This is
supported by the allegation in the complaint
for ejectment that Tormil initiated the same not
because of non-payment of rentals, but
because of withdrawal of tolerance. Tolerance
or “[t]oleration is defined as ‘the act or practice
of permitting or enduring something not
wholly approved of,” while tolerated acts are
“those which by reason of neighborliness or
familiarity, the owner of the property allows his
neighbor or another person to do on the
property; they are generally those particular
services or benefits which one’s property can
give to another without material injury or
prejudice to the owner, who permits them out
of friendship or courtesy.”
With regard to the effects of withdrawal
of tolerance, it is settled that: A person who
occupies the land of another at the latter’s
tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate upon
demand, failing which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
His status is analogous to that of a lessee or
tenant whose term of lease has expired but
whose occupancy continued by tolerance of
the owner.
In such a case, the date of unlawful deprivation
or withholding of possession is to be counted
from the date of the demand to vacate.
Incidentally, Tormil mentioned that Pro-
Guard is obliged to consign the payment of
rentals. One legal cause for consignation is
when two or more persons claim the same
right to collect. Various claimants to a debtor's
payment must have the appearance of a right
to collect such that the debtor would have a
reasonable doubt, not based on negligence, as
to who is entitled to the payment.
The dispute regarding the validity of
Manuel's assignment to Tonnil of the realties
was pending before the SEC, Tormil did not
claim to Pro-Guard that it is the true owner of
the premises. It neither sought payment of
rentals which it now claims Pro-Guard should
have consigned during the pendency of its suit
against Manuel.
As such, from the viewpoint of Pro-
Guard, the lease contract remained to be then
between it and Torres-Pabalan.
The latter was occupying and running the
building, as evidenced by several tax
declarations in its name which, while not
conclusive proofs of ownership, nevertheless,
are good indicia of possession in the concept
of owner.
Moreover, Edgardo, who claimed to act
on behalf of Torres-Pabalan, administered the
premises. Pro-Guard is not permitted to deny
the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and
tenant between them.
Pro-Guard is ordered to pay reasonable
and fair rentals beginning Nov. 16, 1998 up to
the time that the premises are fully vacated.
#11
G.R. No. 127850 January 26, 1998
MARIA ARCAL, JOSEFINA ARCAL, MARCIANA
ARCAL, and VIRGILIO ARCAL, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DANILO BUCAL, COSTAN
& LETTY RICAFRENTE, RENIE & CENY
RICAFRENTE, SANCHO and LANIE RICAFRENTE,
CORA GONEZ, SOLLY GONEZ, ENIE and
FLORIDA RICAFRENTE, CARMEN TAMBOC, BOY
AGUILAR, NORMING ARCAL, NORA and ALEX
BOCITA, ELVIE TAHIMIC, ANCHANG ARGUSON,
IDRENG and JULIA ARGUSON, LIZA ARGUSON,
ACION ARGUSON, BALENG and FELY
ARGUSON, FIDENG and CILENG MURANIA,
ROSIE and ALDO CALAGO, ENGAY and
SHIRLEY RICAFRENTE, NENITA and NARSING
AGUILAR, ODIE DOZA, NENENG and RAMON
LUNGCAY, TISAY and ABET DONES, YOLLY and
ED PAULINO, ERIC and JENNIFER PAULINO,
CHARLIE PANGANIBAN, DELIA and PATRICIO
BUEZA, ELLEN DUEZA, BERTING and NORMA
BUEZA, ALICE and PILO RICAFRENTE, DELLY
and FREDO NUNEZ, ANDRO and ELLEN
JIMENEZ, CRISELDA and GORIO CLARETE,
NENA VELASCO, DANNY CLARETE, ERLIN and
NONONG IBONG, CHITA and RESTIE REYES,
SONNY and DONG REYES, and WALLY and
DAISY REYES, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer before the MTC of Tanza, Cavite
against private respondents as defendants.
Subject of the complaint was a 21,435 square
meter parcel of land in Sta. Cruz de Malabon
Estate Subdivision, Cavite with title in the
names of Maria, Josefina, Marciana and
Marcelina Arcal. It was alleged that defendants
occupied the subject land thru plaintiffs’
implied tolerance, or permission but without
contract with plaintiffs. From the dates of their
occupancy, plaintiffs did not collect any single
centavo from defendants, nor the latter pay to
plaintiffs any rental for their occupancy therein;
Meanwhile, Lucio Arvisu and substantially all
defendants filed with RTC of Cavite, a civil case
for ‘Annulment of Title, with Reconveyance and
Damages’ against Salud Arcal Arbolante,
Marcelina Arcal (deseased), Maria Arcal,
Josefina Arcal and Marciana Arcal. The said
complaint was ordered to be dismissed by the
trial court for failure to prosecute. An appeal
was made to the Court and said appeal was
considered abandoned and dismissed.
With regard to the ejectment suit filed by
plaintiffs, except Virgilio Arcal, MTC rendered a
favorable judgment in favor of plaintiffs
ordering defendants among others, to vacate
the property in question and remove
residential houses and improvements
introduced therein and return the possession
thereof to plaintiffs.
On appeal with the RTC by defendants, the
foregoing decision was reversed and set aside,
and the said complaint for ejectment was
dismissed without prejudice to the filing of the
proper action after the prejudicial question is
resolved in a fair and adversary proceeding.
Several demands were made by plaintiffs for
defendants to vacate the premises in question,
but they proved futile as they refused and
failed, and still refuse and fail to vacate the
premises, to the damage and prejudice of
plaintiffs.
Private respondents failed to file their answer,
prompting petitioners to file a motion to
render judgment. MTC held that petitioners are
registered owners of the property and as much
they have the right to enjoy possession thereof.
On appeal, RTC affirmed in toto the MTC's
decision.
Private respondents filed a petition for review
with CA. CA, ruled in favor of the private
respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the complaint filed does not
constitute an unlawful detainer suit. (NO)
HELD:
CA made the conclusion that from the
allegations in the complaint, it can be gleaned
that private respondents “did not actually
occupy the subject property upon the tolerance
of petitioners”, as tolerance was withdrawn
when demands to vacate were made on private
respondents prior to the commencement of
the ejectment case; therefore, unlawful detainer
is not the proper remedy. The SC disagreed
with CA.
The rule is that possession by tolerance is
lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful
upon demand to vacate made by the owner
and the possessor by tolerance refuses to
comply with such demand. A person who
occupies the land of another at the latter’s
tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate upon
demand, failing which, a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against him.
The unlawful deprivation or withholding of
possession is to be counted from the date of
the demand to vacate.
The filing of the first ejectments case signified
that petitioners sought the ouster of private
respondents from
possession of the property. Proceeding in the
case were suspended with the filing for
“Annulment of Title with Reconveyance and
Damages” by Lucio Arvisu and several of
private respondents. The first ejectment case
was eventually dismissed and the judgment of
dismissal attained finality. The ejectment case
was later resolved in favor of petitioners, but
on appeal, the case was dismissed without
prejudice to the filing of the proper action after
the prejudicial question in the second case filed
by Lucio Arvisu against petitioners.
Because of the pendency of the cases involving
ownership, the proceedings in the first
ejectment case were suspended. Petitioner
could not but await the outcome of these case
and preserve the status quo.
The rule is that a complaint for unlawful
detainer must be filed within one year from
demand, demand being jurisdictional. This
one-year period is counted from the last
demand. An unlawful detainer suit involves
solely the issue of physical or material
possession over the property or possession de
facto, that is who between the plaintiff and the
defendant has a better right to possess the
property in question. In the case at bar,
petitioners’ complaint for unlawful detainer was
confined to recovery of de facto or physical
possession of the property and was resorted to
after private respondents has indubitably failed
in their suit assailing petitioners’ right to
ownership.
#12 NONE
G.R. No. 164277 October 8, 2014
FE U. QUIJANO, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. DARYLL A. AMANTE, Respondent.
BERSAMIN, J.:
#13 NONE
G.R. No. 204926 December 3, 2014
ANACLETO C. MANGASER, represented by
his Attorney-in-fact EUSTAQUIO
DUGENIA, Petitioner,
vs.
DIONISIO UGAY, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
#14
G.R. No. 203760 December 3, 2014
HOMER C. JAVIER, represented by his
mother and natural guardian, SUSAN G.
CANENCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN LUMONTAD, Respondent.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
The Facts
In his forcible entry complaint, petitioner
Homer C. Javier, represented by his mother and
natural guardian Susan G. Canencia, alleged
that he is one of the sons of the late Vicente T.
Javier (Vicente), who was the owner of a 360-
square meter (sq. m.) parcel of land located at
Corner Malaya and Gonzaga Streets, Barangay
Dolores, Taytay Rizal (subject land). Petitioner’s
family contented that since Javier was born, he
has lived in the residential house erected
thereon. Upon Vicente’s death, petitioner,
together with his mother, continued their
possession over the same. On March 26, 2007,
despite the petitioner’s vigorous objections,
respondent Susan Lumontad gained entry into
the subject land and started to build a two (2)-
storey building (subject building) on a 150 sq.
m. portion thereof. The dispute was submitted
to barangay conciliation but no amicable
settlement was reached between the parties.11
Thus, petitioner was constrained to file against
respondent the instant forcible entry
complaint, averring, in addition to the
foregoing, that reasonable compensation for
the use and occupancy of the above-said
portion may be fixed at 5,000.00 per month.12
In her Answer respondent admitted that during
Vicente’s lifetime, he indeed was the owner and
in physical possession of the subject land.
Nevertheless, she claimed to be the owner of
the portion where the subject building was
being constructed, as evidenced by TD No. 00-
TY-002-1303115 in her name.16 Hence, she
took possession of the said portion not as aan
illegal entrant but as its owner.17
The MTC Ruling
MTC dismissed the complaint for want of cause
of action and lack of jurisdiction.19
It was found that Vicente actually subdivided
the subject land into two (2) lots: the first lot,
with an area of 187.20 sq. m., was given to
petitioner, while the second lot, with an area of
172.80 sq. m. and where the subject building
was erected, was given to one Anthony de la
Paz Javier (Anthony), son of Vicente by a
previous failed marriage, but was eventually
acquired by respondent from the latter through
sale.20 Based on this finding, the MTC
concluded that petitioner had no cause of
action against respondent since she was merely
exercising her rights asthe owner of the 172.80
sq. m. subdivided lot.21
Also, the MTC observed that petitioner’s
complaint failed to aver the required
jurisdictional facts as it merely contained a
general allegation that respondent’s entry into
the disputed portion was made by means of
force and intimidation, without specifically
stating how, when, and where were such means
employed. With such failure, the MTC intimated
that apetitioner’s remedy should either be an
accion publiciana or an accion reivindicatoria
instituted before the proper forum.22
Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to the RTC.
RTC reversed and set aside the MTC ruling, and
ordered respondent to vacate the disputed
portion and surrender possession thereof to
petitioner. Likewise, it ordered respondent to
pay petitioner the amounts of P5,000.00 a
month from March 2007, until she vacates said
portion, as reasonable compensation for its use
and occupation, and P20,000.00 as attorney’s
fees, including costs of suit.24
On the merits, the RTC found that petitioner,
being the owner and possessor of the property
in question, has the right to be respected in his
possession and that respondent forcibly and
unlawfully deprived him of the same.27
Unconvinced, respondent moved for
reconsideration, which was denied. Thus the
petitioner filed an appeal before the CA.
The CA Ruling
Set aside the RTC ruling and remanded the
case to the latter court for trial on the merits.31
It held that the issue of possession of the
subject land is intimately intertwined with the
issue of ownership, such that the former issue
cannot be determined without ruling on who
really owns such land. Thus, it remanded the
case to the RTC for trial on the merits in the
exercise of the latter’s original jurisdiction in an
action for recovery of ownership and
possession pursuant to Section 8 (2), Rule 40 of
the Rules of Court. It further stated that
petitioner was not able to sufficiently establish
that respondent employed force and
intimidation in entering the 172.80 sq. m.
portion of the subject landas he failed to
demonstrate the factual circumstances that
occurred during his dispossession of said
property.39
The Issue Before the Court
Whether or not the CA correctly set aside the
RTC Ruling and ordered the remand of the case
to the latter court for trial on the merits in an
action for recovery of ownership and
possession.
The Court’s Ruling
Although the Court finds that the complaint
was indeed one for forcible entry, petitioner’s
case nonetheless fails to impress on the merits.
A. Nature of the Case: Forcible Entry.
The Court disagrees with the findings of both
the MTC and the CA that the allegations in the
petitioner’s complaint do not make a case for
forcible entry but another action cognizable by
the RTC.42
A plain reading of petitioner’s complaint shows
that the required jurisdictional averments, so as
to demonstrate a cause of action for forcible
entry, have all been complied with. Said
pleading alleges that petitioner, as the original
owner’s, i.e., Vicente’s, successor-in-interest,
was in prior physical possession of the subject
land but was eventually dispossessed of a 150
sq. m. portion thereof on March 26, 2007 by
respondent who, through force and
intimidation, gained entry into the same and,
thereafter, erected a building thereon. Clearly,
with these details, the means by which
petitioner’s dispossession was effected cannot
be said to have been insufficiently alleged as
mistakenly ruled by the MTC and later affirmed
by the CA. The "how" (through unlawful entry
and the construction of the subject building),
"when" (March 26, 2007), and "where" (a 150
sq. m. portion of the subject land) of the
dispossession all appear on the face of the
complaint.
Hence, it was erroneous to conclude that
petitioner only made a general allegation that
respondent’s entry in the premises was made
by means of force and intimidation47 and,
consequently, that a forcible entry case was not
instituted before the MTC. Given that a forcible
entry complaint had been properly filed before
the MTC, the CA thus erred in ordering the
remand of the case to the RTC for trial on the
merits in an action for recovery of possession
and ownership, otherwise known as an accion
reivindicatoria,48 pursuant to Paragraph 2,
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Accordingly, petitioner's forcible entry
complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
#15
G.R. No. 158231 June 19, 2007
BABY ARLENE LARANO,* Petitioner,
vs.
SPS. ALFREDO CALENDACION and RAFAELA
T. CALENDACION,** Respondents.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
FACTS:
 Petitioner owns a parcel of riceland situated
in Barangay Daniw, Municipality of Victoria,
Laguna.
 petitioner and respondents executed a
Contract to Sell whereby the latter agreed
to buy a 50,000-SQM portion of
petitioner's riceland for P5Million,
with P500K as down payment and the
balance payable in nine installments
of P500K each, until September 2001.
 Pending full payment of the purchase price,
possession of the riceland was
transferred to respondents under the
CONDITION that they shall account for
and deliver the harvest from
said riceland to petitioner. However,
RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PAY the
installments and to account for and
deliver the harvest from said riceland.
 Petitioner sent a demand letter to vacate
the riceland within 10 days from receipt
thereof, but the demand went unheeded.
Consequently, she filed on an unlawful
detainer case respondents before the
MTC.
 Respondents allege that: (a) a Contract to
Sell was executed but deny that it contains
all the agreements of the parties; (b)
petitioner has no cause of action because
the 3-year period within which to pay the
purchase price has not yet lapsed; (c) MTC
has no jurisdiction over the case because
the complaint failed to allege that a
demand to pay and to vacate
the riceland was made upon them.
 MTC’S RULING: Vacate the premises and
pay the amount of P365K for the use and
occupation of the property.
 RTC’S RULING: Upon appeal, RTC affirmed
the decision and modified the amount to
P400K.
 CA RULING (PetRev): Set aside RTC’s
Decision and dismissed the complaint for
unlawful detainer. The CA nullified the
proceedings before the MTC for want of
jurisdiction on the ground that the main
issue extend beyond those commonly
involved in unlawful detainer suits, but
one incapable of pecuniary estimation,
placing it under the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the RTC, not the MTC.
o According to CA, the issues in the case
pertain to WON: (a) there was a violation
of the Contract to Sell; (b) such violation
gives the petitioner the right to terminate
the contract and consequently, the right
to recover possession and the value of the
harvest from the Riceland
 PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: CA should
have dismissed outright the petition since it
contains no verification as required by the
Rules; and that the CA, in finding that the
complaint before the MTC was not one for
unlawful detainer but for specific
performance, did not limit itself to the
allegations in the complaint but resorted to
unrestrained references, deductions and/or
conjectures, unduly influenced by the
allegations in the answer.
 RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTION:
Verification is just a formal requirement and
petitioner waived her right to question the
defect when she failed to submit her
comment; that the CA correctly pointed out
that the present case involves one that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation since the
crux of the matter is the rights of the parties
based on the Contract to Sell.
ISSUE: Whether the complaint is one for
unlawful detainer – NO
RULING: The petition is bereft of merit.

Jurisdiction in Ejectment Cases
 Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is
determined by the allegations pleaded in
the complaint. It cannot be made to depend
upon the defenses set up in the answer or
pleadings filed by the defendant and it
cannot be made to depend on the exclusive
characterization of the case by one of the
parties.
 The TEST FOR DETERMINING the
sufficiency of those allegations is whether,
admitting the facts alleged, the court can
render a valid judgment in accordance with
the prayer of the plaintiff. The facts upon
which an action for unlawful detainer can
be brought are specially mentioned
in §1, Rule 70 (see ROC)
 In UNLAWFUL DETAINER, the possession
was originally lawful but became unlawful
by the expiration or termination of the right
to possess. Hence, the issue of rightful
possession is decisive because in such
action, the defendant is in actual possession
and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the
termination of the defendant’s right to
continue in possession.
 In present case, petitioner must comply with
TWO REQUISITES for the purpose of
bringing an ejectment suit: (a) there must
be failure to pay the installment due or
comply with the conditions of the
Contract to Sell; and (b) there must be
demand both to pay or to comply and
vacate within the periods specified in §2
of Rule 70 (15 days in case of land and 5
days in case of buildings).
o FIRST REQUISITE: Refers to the existence
of the cause of action for unlawful
detainer
o SECOND REQUISITE: Refers to the
jurisdiction requirement of demand in
order that said cause of action may be
pursued.
 BOTH DEMANDS – to pay installment due
or adhere to the terms of the Contract to Sell
and to vacate are necessary to make the
vendee deforciant in order that
an ejectment suit may be filed. It is the
vendor's demand for the vendee to
vacate the premises and the vendee's
refusal to do so which makes unlawful
the withholding of the possession. Such
refusal violates the vendor's right of
possession giving rise to an action for
unlawful detainer. However, prior to the
institution of such action, a demand from
the vendor to pay the installment due or
comply with the conditions of the Contract
and to vacate the premises is required
under the rule.
 Thus, mere failure to pay the installment
due or violation of the terms of the
Contract to Sell does not automatically
render a person's possession unlawful. The
giving of such demand MUST be alleged
in the complaint; otherwise, the MTC
cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case.
Complaint failed to Constitute a Case of
Unlawful Detainer
Petitioner’s allegations in the Complaint failed
to constitute a case of
unlawful detainer. Petitioner alleged that
respondents had violated the terms of the
Contract to Sell. However, the Complaint
failed to state that petitioner made
demands upon respondents to comply with
the conditions of the contract. The 10-day
period granted respondents to vacate even fell
short of the 15-day period mandated by
law. When the complaint does not satisfy
the jurisdictional requirements of a valid
cause for unlawful detainer, the MTC does
not have jurisdiction to hear the case.
An allegation of a violation of a contract or
agreement in a detainer suit may be proved by
the presentation of competent evidence, upon
which an MTC judge might make a finding to
that effect, but certainly, that court cannot
declare and hold that the contract is
rescinded. The rescission of contract is a power
vested in the RTC. The rescission of the
contract is the basis of and a condition
precedent for the illegality of a party's
possession of a piece of realty. Without judicial
intervention and determination, even a
stipulation entitling one party to take
possession of the land and building, in case the
other party violates the contract, cannot confer
upon the former the right to take possession
thereof, if that move is objected to.
Clearly, the basic issue raised in the complaint
of petitioner is not of possession but
interpretation, enforcement and/or rescission
of the contract, a matter that is beyond the
jurisdiction of the MTC to hear and determine.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition
is DENIED. The Decision dated May 13, 2003 of
the CA is AFFIRMED
#16
A.M. MTJ-96-1085. October 8, 1998
SALVACION P. ONQUIT, complainant, vs.
JUDGE AURORA BINAMIRA-PARCIA, and
SHERIFF IV DANILO O. MATIAS, Respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
Facts: Respondent Judge was assigned a
forcible entry case which the complainant and
her two brothers were co-defendants.
Complainant raised the issue of jurisdiction
stating that said case falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) because it involves tenancy over
an agricultural land. Respondent Judge denied
all motions raised by defendants ruling that
jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations in the complaint
and not those raised by defendants. Moreover,
according to respondent Judge, the claim
regarding the nature of the case at bar would
not automatically divest the court its
jurisdiction. Subsequently, the complainant
raised to the Supreme Court a complaint
against Respondent Judge, alleging the she
acted with grave abuse of discretion in that the
land subject of the forcible entry case is an
agricultural riceland, thus, it is the
Department of Agrarian Reform which has
original and exclusive jurisdiction, and not
the respondent Judge's court.
Issue: W/N the Respondent Judge’s Court had
jurisdiction over the case
Held: Yes. Well-settled is the principle that the
courts shall not be divested of jurisdiction over
a case merely by what is raised in the answer.
What determines the nature of an action and a
court's jurisdiction over it are the allegations
set up by the plaintiff. Basic is the rule that the
material averments in the complaint, which in
this case is for ejectment, determine the
jurisdiction of the court. And, jurisprudence
dictates that the court does not lose its
jurisdiction over an ejectment case by the
simple expedient of a party raising as a defense
therein the alleged existence of a tenancy
relationship between the parties. It is the duty
of the court to receive evidence to determine
the veracity of allegations of tenancy. In an
Order of respondent Judge dated 09 February
1996, it was ruled that, considering the
evidence presented, the land in question is an
irrigated riceland, but not tenanted. This matter
was even brought up on a petition
for certiorari with prohibition to the Regional
Trial Court of Ligao, Albay, but said petition
was denied. These antecedents are sufficient to
convince us that the respondent Judge did not
act with grave abuse of authority in assuming
jurisdiction over the case filed in her sala.
#17 NONE
[G.R. No. 107741. October 18, 1996.]
FRANCISCO BERNARTE, BENEDICTO
DANAN, BIENVENIDO BELLEZA, ROBERTO
MALLARI, FELICIANO MALLARI, PESCASIO
DIMARUCUT, REYNALDO TIMBANG,
ALFREDO SANTOS, FERERICO SANTOS,
LAMBERTO DANAN, JESUS CASTRO,
VICTORINO TALA, MARIANO SANTOS,
IGNACIO CASTRO DE LA CRUZ, WILFREDO
TAPALLA, REYNALDO OSBUAL, ANTONIO
SANTOS, TEOFILO MUNOZ, MANUEL
NAGUIAT, FELICISIMO MACASPAC, ROMAN
BERNAL, JR., FAUSTINO PANGAN,
FRANCISCO MACASPAC, CARLITO AGUILUZ,
FIDEL CASTRO, SALVADOR TALA, ROMEO
TALA, LUCIANO MANLAPAZ, TOMAS
PAULE, DANNY MANUEL, BENIGNO
PORTALES, CONRADO MALLARI, MARTA
DANAN, REGINA TIMBANG, CONCHITA
VISDA, AMELIA ALFARO, VIOLETA ALFARO,
CONCHITA MALIT, SEVERINA RIVERA,
FLORENCIA PAULE, ROSITA BERNAL,
GLORIA MALLARI, LILIA SERRANO, NORMA
CABUAN-BAUTISTA and ANITA
MANGANTI, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, The Hon. CARLOS BARTOLO,
Municipal Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court of Lubao, Pampanga, THE
PROVINCIAL WARDEN OF THE PROVINCE
OF PAMPANGA, MAJOR JESUS MANINANG
(PNP), SPO3 CARLOS GUINTO (PNP), SPO1
JESUS KABILANG (PNP), SPO4 EDGARDO
LALIC (PNP) & SPO4 DOMINADOR
LACANLALE (PNP) and REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 50, GUAGUA,
PAMPANGA, Respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
#18
G.R. No. 142503 June 20, 2003
ROMUALDO C. PEREZ, petitioner,
vs.
APOLONIO CRUZ, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS:
 Cruz is the owner of Residential Lot No.
5095 declared in his name as per Sworn
Statement Index No. 14-0248-537, as
required by Sec. 6 of P.D. No. 464, as
amended by P.D. No. 1621.
 Cruz averred that he inherited this lot
from his mother, Salvestia
Crisostomo who, in turn, acquired the
same from herein petitioner Romualdo
Perez, through a "Kasulatan ng Bilihang
Patuluyan."
 Cruz claimed that Perez requested his
permission to build his house on a small
portion of said property, as Perez had
nowhere to erect his dwelling on. This
request was granted, as they are close
relatives.6
 Unknown to Cruz, however, Perez filed
an application for issuance of title
covering the subject land with the Land
Management Section, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), Region III, San Fernando City,
Pampanga. When Cruz learned of
Perez's design, he immediately opposed
the application.
 Accordingly, Cruz demanded that Perez
remove his house from the land and
vacate the same. When petitioner failed
to heed the demand, respondent filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against
him.
 Perez denied Cruz's ownership of the
property. He claimed to be owner of the
lot in question, having inherited the
same from his grandmother. He asserted
that he had been in continuous
possession for many years.
 To support his claim, Perez presented
Tax Declaration and official receipts of
tax payments. Perez submitted that the
MTC had no jurisdiction over Civil Case
No. 979, as the issue involved was one
of ownership, not mere possession, of
the land.
 On February 12, 1992, the MTC
dismissed Civil Case No. 979 on the
ground of want of jurisdiction, holding
that the main issue is one of ownership,
not mere possession de facto. Cruz
appealed said decision to the RTC -
Malolos
 Meanwhile, on March 31, 1992, the
Regional Executive Director of the DENR,
Region III, disapproved the survey of Lot
No. 50759, Cad. 304-D, submitted by
Perez, thereby sustaining Cruz's
opposition. Cruz was then directed to
file the appropriate public land
application for the land subject of the
controversy.10
 On June 29, 1992, the RTC of Malolos,
reversing the MTC ruling, and ordering
the remand of the records of Civil Case
No. 979, for trial on the merits.
 On remand, the MTC decided in favour
of Cruz. On appeal by Perez, RTC
reversed MTC’s decision.
 RTC found that question of ownership
was inextricably intertwined with the
issue of possession. Since the issue of
possession could not be resolved
without first addressing the question of
ownership, Civil Case No. 979 should
have been dismissed.
 On appeal by Cruz to the CA, CA ruled in
favour of Cruz (reversed and set aside
RTC decision)
 Hence, this appeal by Perez.
Petitioner’s argument: He contends that the
alleged tolerance given by respondent to him
in occupying the land does not give rise to a
cause of action for unlawful detainer but
rather accion publiciana, which falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTC
Issue: Whether or not MTC has jurisdiction to
hear and decide the case for ejectment.
Ruling: YES
It is hornbook law that jurisdiction is
determined by the averments in the
complaint.
In the complaint for ejectment filed before the
Hagonoy MTC, it was alleged by plaintiff Cruz
that defendant (now petitioner) Perez pleaded
that he be allowed to construct his house as he
had no other parcel of land on which to build a
house. The complaint further alleged that it
was by mere tolerance that Cruz, now
respondent herein, allowed Perez to occupy a
small portion of the lot. Petitioner Perez
constructed his house without paying any rent
for the reasonable use and occupancy of said
portion of Cruz's lot.
Taking the allegations in the complaint as
basis, in our view, there is no doubt that the
case is one for unlawful detainer. The
Hagonoy MTC had the jurisdiction to hear
and decide Civil Case No. 979.
Anent petitioner's claim that the issue is not
one of mere possession but rather of
ownership, Dehesa v. Macalalag25 is instructive.
For in Dehesa, we held that in ejectment cases,
the defendant cannot deprive the court of
jurisdiction by simply claiming ownership of
the property involved.
When the defendant raises the defense of
ownership in his pleadings and the question
of physical possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the
issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.26 Should
the inferior court make any determination
on the issue of ownership, the same shall
not be conclusive and shall be without
prejudice to the right of the parties to
ventilate before the proper court their
claims of ownership over the same land.
#19
G.R. No. 152423 December 15, 2010
SPOUSES MARCOS R. ESMAQUEL and
VICTORIA SORDEVILLA, Petitioners,
vs.
MARIA COPRADA, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
On February 24, 1997, spouses Esmaquel filed
an ejectment case against Coprada before the
2nd MCTC Laguna. Petitioners claimed that
they are the registered owners of a parcel of
land situated in San Miguel, Majayja. In 1945,
Coprada was able to persuade the petitioners
to allow her and her family to use and occupy
the land for their residence, under the
condition that they will vacate the premises
should petitioners need to use the same.
Coprada and her family were allowed to
construct their residential house. Since then,
the petitioners never made an attempt to drive
them away out of pity, knowing that
respondent and her eight children have no
other place to live in. the a few years later the
financial condition of Copradas family, having
acquired her own residential house. This
prompted petitioners to institute an ejectment
case against Coprada. Respondent avers that
she had already acquired ownership over the
contested lot when she orally purchased it. And
further avers that the claim has already
prescribed and thus barred by laches.
MCTC ruled in favor of Coprada, thus the case
was dismissed. On appeal to the RTC, the ruling
of the MCTC was reversed. The CA reversed the
RTCs decision and reinstated the MCTCs ruling.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners have a valid
ground to evict respondent from the subject
property.
HELD:
LAND TITLES
As a registered owner, petitioner has a right to
eject any person illegally occupying his
property. This right is imprescriptible and can
never be barred by laches.
In the present case, Coprada failed to present
evidence to substantiate her allegation that a
portion of the land was sold to her in 1962.
Coprada's submission that there was an oral
sale is a mere afterthought.
On the other hand, it is undisputed that the
subject property is covered by a title, registered
in the name of the petitioners. As against the
respondent's unproven claim that she acquired
a portion of the property from the petitioners
by virtue of an oral sale, the Torrens title of
petitioners must prevail. Petitioners' title over
the subject property is evidence of their
ownership thereof. It is a fundamental principle
in land registration that the certificate of title
serves as evidence of an indefeasible and
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of
the person whose name appears therein.
Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person
who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to
possession thereof.
Further, Coprada's argument that petitioners
are no longer the owners of a portion of the
subject land because of the sale in her favor is
a collateral attack on the title of the petitioners,
which is not allowed. The validity of petitioners'
certificate of title cannot be attacked by
respondent in this case for ejectment. Under
Section 48 of PD No. 1529, a certificate of title
shall not be subject to collateral attack. It
cannot be altered, modified or canceled, except
in a direct proceeding for that purpose in
accordance with law. The issue of the validity of
the title of the petitioners can only be assailed
in an action expressly instituted for that
purpose. Whether or not the respondent has
the right to claim ownership over the property
is beyond the power of the trial court to
determine in an action for unlawful detainer.
#20
G.R. No. 157985 December 2, 2005
ZENAIDA BUGARIN, VIOLETA ABANO, LIZA
ABAYATA, ANTONIO ALEGRE, REMEDIOS
ALEGRE, CHRIS ANASCO, JEFFREY ARQUILLOS,
LOURDES BAGARESE, EUGENIA BARAQUIL,
PRECIOS BASOY, RANNY BASOY, FELY
BERMEJO, CARLOS BO, JUN BO, ALEX BORRES,
ANNA MARIE CORDOVA, ESPERANZE
CORDOVA, EDWIN DEPETILLO, ROMULO
FERRY, LEONISA GABRIEL, MA. FE GABRIEL,
SALOME CORDOVA, ELEN JACOB, JEREMIAS
JACOB, OLIVIA LERIN, CRISELDA MADEJA,
JOMARI MANONG, NESTOR MANONG,
VALENTIN MANONG, EDMUNDO/FELY MINA,
TEDDY PARUAN, SALVACION PASCUA,
ROMMEL POLISTICO, DANIEL/NANCY PRADO,
ARMANDO ROMERO, SANCHO VILLAFUERTE,
and FERNANDO YAMID, Petitioners,
vs.
CECILIA B. PALISOC, MARINA B. MATA and
REYNALDO T. NEPOMUCENO, Respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
FACTS: A complaint for ejectment was filed
before the MeTC by Palisoc et al. (“Palisoc”)
against Bugarin et al. (“Bugarin). The MeTC
declared Palisoc as the rightful possessors and
ordered Bugarin to vacate the premises and
pay Palisoc et al. the rentals.
Bugarin appealed to the RTC while Palisoc
moved for execution pending appeal. The RTC
denied the appeal and affirmed the MeTC
decision. Bugarin filed a MR with Opposition
to the Issuance of a Writ of Execution. The RTC
denied the MR and granted Palisoc’s motion
for execution for failure of Bugarin to post a
supersedeas bond or to pay the back rentals.
This decision was received by Bugarin on
March 12, 2003. A writ of execution pending
appeal was issued.
Bugarin filed a Motion to Defer
Implementation of the Writ of Execution.
Palisoc filed a Motion to Issue a Special Order
of Demolition since Bugarin refused to vacate
the premises. The RTC deferred action on the
motions to allow Bugarin to exhaust legal
remedies available to them. Bugarin filed a
Supplement to the Motion to Defer
Implementation of Writ of Execution and
Opposition to Motion to Issue Special Order of
Demolition, contending that Section 28 of RA
72791 was not complied with.

Palisoc filed a Motion Reiterating the Motion
for Issuance of Special Order of Demolition.
The RTC declared the decision denying
Bugarin’s appeal final and executory, and
remanded the records of the case to the MeTC
without acting on the motions. Bugarin filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
before the CA on April 10, 2003. Bugarin
contended that the RTC committed grave
abuse of discretion in affirming the MeTC
decision and insisted that the MeTC had no
jurisdiction over the complaint.
The MeTC eventually issued the Special Order
of Demolition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MeTC properly
ordered the demolition.
Bugarin’s position:
(1) The MeTC’s orders violated the mandatory
requirements of RA 7279 since there was no
30-day notice prior to the date of eviction or
demolition and there had been no consultation
on the matter of resettlement.
(2) There was neither relocation nor financial
assistance given.
(3) The orders are patently unreasonable,
impossible and in violation of the law.
Palisoc’s position:
(1) RA 7279 is not applicable. There was no
proof that Bugarin et al. are registered as
eligible socialized housing program
beneficiaries.
(2) Even if RA 7279 was applicable, the required
notices under the law had already been
complied with. Bugarin were already notified
on March 7, 2003 of an impending demolition,
when the writ of execution was served.
HELD: YES, the MeTC orders were properly
issued.
A judgment in an ejectment case is
immediately executory to avoid further
injustice to a lawful possessor, and the court’s
duty to order the execution is practically
ministerial. The defendant (Bugarin) may stay it
only by: (1) perfecting an appeal; (2) filing a
supersedeas bond; and (3) making a periodic
deposit of the rental or reasonable
compensation for the use and occupancy of
the property during the pendency of the
appeal.
Once the RTC decides on the appeal, such
decision is immediately executory, without
prejudice to an appeal, via a petition for review,
before the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court.
However, Bugarin failed to file a petition for
review. Bugarin received on March 12, 2003
the RTC decision denying their MR. They had
until March 27, 2003 to file a petition for review
before the CA. Instead, they filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition on April 10,
2003.
DOCTRINE! The remedy to obtain reversal or
modification of the judgment on the merits in
the instant case is appeal. This holds true even
if the error ascribed to the court rendering the
judgment is: (1) its lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter; (2) the exercise of power in
excess thereof; (3) or GADLEJ. The existence
and availability of the right of appeal prohibits
the resort to certiorari because one of the
requirements for the certiorari is that “there
should be no appeal.”
Bugarin’s petition for certiorari before the CA
was filed as a substitute for the lost remedy of
appeal. Certiorari is not and cannot be made
a substitute for an appeal where the latter
remedy is available but was lost through
fault or negligence. Thus, the filing of the
petition for certiorari did not prevent the RTC
decision from becoming final and executory.
The RTC acted correctly when it remanded the
case to the MeTC. The MeTC cannot be faulted
for issuing the order to enforce the RTC
judgment. The orders also did not violate RA
7279. Under the said law, eviction or
demolition may be allowed when there is a
court order for eviction and demolition, as in
the case at bar. Moreover, nothing is shown on
record that Bugarin et al. are underprivileged
and homeless citizens as defined in RA 7279.
The procedure for the execution of the eviction
or demolition order under RA 7279 is not
applicable.
Lastly, the order of demolition had already
been executed. Bugarin had already vacated
the area and Palisoc now possess the
properties free from all occupants, as #24
evidenced by the sheriff’s turn-over of
possession. Thus, the instant case before us has G.R. No. 156995 January 12, 2015
indeed become moot and academic.
RUBEN MANALANG, CARLOS MANALANG,
CONCEPCION GONZALES AND LUIS
MANALANG, Petitioners,
#21 vs.
BIENVENIDO AND MERCEDES
G.R. No. 136274 September 3, 2003 BACANI, Respondents.

SUNFLOWER NEIGHBORHOOD BERSAMIN, J.:

ASSOCIATION, represented by FLORO
ARAGAN, petitioners, Facts: Petitioners were co-owners for lot in
vs. question and caused a relocation and
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ACTING verification survey which showed that
PRESIDING JUDGE LORIFEL LACAP PHIMNA, respondents had encroached on a portion of
MeTC, Branch 77, Parañaque City and ELISA
said lot. When the respondents refused to
MAGLAQUI-CAPARAS, respondents.
vacate the encroached portion and to
CORONA, J.: surrender peaceful possession thereof despite
demands, the petitioners commenced this
In the case SUNFLOWER NEIGHBORHOOD
action for unlawful detainer.
ASSOCIATION vs. CA, et al., GR 136274,
September 3, 2003, “… although an ejectment MTC dismissed on the ground of lack of
suit is an action in personam wherein the jurisdiction. RTC reversed the decision of the
judgment is binding only upon the parties MTC and remanded case on appeal. MTC
properly impleaded and given an opportunity ultimately dismissed case. Another appeal to
to be heard, the judgment becomes binding on RTC was made. RTC ordered the petitioners to
anyone who has not been impleaded if he or conduct a relocation survey to determine their
she is: allegation of encroachment, and also heard the
testimony of the surveyor. The RTC then
#22 NONE
reversed the MTC’s decision.
G.R. No. 173616 June 25, 2014 Issue (1) Can RTC in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction conduct a relocation and
AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE
(ATO), Petitioner, verification survey of lot in question? (2) Was
vs. an action for unlawful detainer proper?
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (NINETEENTH
DIVISION) and BERNIE G. Ruling: The RTC, in an appeal of the judgment
MIAQUE, Respondents. in an ejectment case, shall not conduct a
rehearing or trial de novo. In this connection,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.: Section 18, Rule 70 of the Rules of Courtclearly
provides:
#23 NONE
G.R. No. 196219 July 30, 2014 Sec. 18. Judgment conclusive only on
possession; not conclusive in actions involving
SPOUSES MAURICIO M. TABINO and
LEONILA DELA CRUZ-TABINO, Petitioners, title or ownership.
vs.
xxxx
LAZARO M. TABINO, Respondent.
The judgment or final order shall be appealable
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
to the appropriate Regional Trial Court which
shall decide the same on the basis of the entire
record of the proceedings had in the court of
origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as
may be submitted by the parties or required by
the Regional Trial Court. (7a)
Hence, the RTC violated the foregoing rule by
ordering the conduct of the relocation and
verification survey “in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction” and by hearing the testimony of
the surveyor, for its doing so was tantamount
to its holding of a trial de novo. The violation
was accented by the fact that the RTC
ultimately decided the appeal based on the
survey and the surveyor’s testimony instead of
the record of the proceedings had in the court
of origin.
(2) CA correctly held that a boundary dispute
must be resolved in the context of accion
reivindicatoria, not an ejectment case. The
boundary dispute is not about possession, but
encroachment, that is, whether the property
claimed by the defendant formed part of the
plaintiff’s property. A boundary dispute cannot
be settled summarily under Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court, the proceedings under which
are limited to unlawful detainer and forcible
entry. In unlawful detainer, the defendant
unlawfully withholds the possession of the
premises upon the expiration or termination of
his right to hold such possession under any
contract, express or implied. The defendant’s
possession was lawful at the beginning,
becoming unlawful only because of the
expiration or termination of his right of
possession. In forcible entry, the possession of
the defendant is illegal from the very
beginning, and the issue centers on which
between the plaintiff and the defendant had
the prior possession de facto.
The MTC dismissed the action because it did
not have jurisdiction over the case. The
dismissal was correct. It is fundamental that the
allegations of the complaint and the character
of the relief sought by the complaint determine
the nature of the action and the court that has
jurisdiction over the action. To be clear,
unlawful detainer is an action filed by a lessor,
vendor, vendee, or other person against whom
the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or
termination of the right to hold possession by
virtue of any contract, express or implied.
However, the allegations of the petitioners’
complaint did not show that they had
permitted or tolerated the occupation of the
portion of their property by the respondents;
or how the respondents’ entry had been
effected, or how and when the dispossession
by the respondents had started. All that the
petitioners alleged was the respondents’
“illegal use and occupation” of the property. As
such, the action was not unlawful detainer.
#25 NONE
January 27, 2016
G.R. No. 217694
FAIRLAND KNITCRAFT
CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
ARTURO LOO PO, Respondent.
MENDOZA, J.:
#26
G.R. No. 203075, March 16, 2016
MILAGROS DIAZ, EDUARDO Q. CATACUTAN,
DANTE Q. CATACUTAN, REPRESENTED BY
THEIR COMMON ATTORNEY-IN-FACT,
FERNANDO Q.
CATACUTAN, Petitioners, v. SPOUSES
GAUDENCIO PUNZALAN AND TERESITA
PUNZALAN, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners alleged that their mother,
Rufina Vda. De Catacutan, who died on
November 17, 2005, had acquired a parcel of
land in Mapanique, Candaba, Pampanga,
consisting of 3, 272 square meters. They
contended that respondent spouses Punzalan
constructed their house on a portion of said lot
without their consent and knowledge. But
petitioners allowed them to stay, thinking that
they would vacate once their need for the
property arises. However, when they made a
demand, the Spouses Punzalan refused to
vacate. Thus, on April 9, 2008, petitioners wrote
the spouses a formal demand letter to vacate.
Still they refused to leave the property. On
August 22, 2008, petitioners filed a Complaint
for Unlawful Detainer with the MCTC.
The MCTC then rendered a Decision on
June 22, 2009, in favor of the plaintiffs. The
defendants were ordered to vacate and
surrender its possession to the plaintiffs.
The Spouses Punzalan brought the case
to the RTC. The RTC also then affirmed the
MCTC Decision in toto. Aggrieved, the Spouses
Punzalan forwarded the cases to the Court of
Appeals. On February 17, 2012, the CA reversed
the RTC. The CA dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
The petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration but was denied hence this
petition. The petitioners insist that their
complaint causes an action for unlawful
detainer which therefore gives the MCTC
jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s claim or
cause of action is one for unlawful detainer and
not for forcible entry.
HELD:
The Supreme Court disagrees. A unfortunately availed of the wrong remedy to
complaint for unlawful detainer should have
the following: 1) the defendant’s initial
possession of the property was lawful; 2) that
such possession became illegal; 3) because
they refused to vacate and as a result deprived
the plaintiff of the property; and 4) the plaintiff
instituted the complaint for ejectment within
one (1) year from the last demand to vacate
the property.
Despite the petitioner’s contention, the
Supreme Court finds that the allegations make
up a case for forcible entry and not unlawful
detainer. The evidence clearly reveal that the
spouses’ possession was illegal at the inception
and not merely tolerated. The Spouses
Punzalan started to occupy the lot and built a
house in it without the permission and consent
of petitioners. This is categorized as possession
by stealth which is forcible entry.
In the similar case of Zacarias vs Anacay,
the fact that petitioners actually tolerated the
spouses’ continued occupation after discovery
of their entry into the subject premises will not
and cannot automatically create an action for
unlawful detainer. It must be stressed that the
defendants’ possession in unlawful detainer is
originally legal but simply became illegal due
to the expiration or termination of the right to
possess. The plaintiffs’ supposed acts of
tolerance must have been present right from
the start of possession. Otherwise, if it was
unlawful from the start it is actionable for
forcible entry. Filing for unlawful detainer
would be an improper remedy.
In this instant case, the failure of
petitioners to allege the key jurisdictional facts
constitutive of unlawful detainer is fatal. Since
the jurisdictional requirement of a valid cause
for unlawful detainer was not met, the MCTC
failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case. A
void judgment for lack of jurisdiction is no
judgment at all. Petitioners may be the lawful
possessors of the subject property, but they
recover possession. Nevertheless, they may still
opt to file an accion publicianaor accion
reivindicatoria with the proper RTC.
 This petition is DENIED. The Decision of
the Court of Appeals; dated February 17, 2012,
and Resolution dated July 25, 2012, are
AFFIRMED.

#27 NONE

G.R. No. 191527, August 22, 2016

BALIBAGO FAITH BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. AND

PHILIPPINE BAPTIST S.B.C.,
INC., Petitioners, v. FAITH IN CHRIST JESUS
BAPTIST CHURCH, INC. AND REYNALDO
GALVAN, Respondent.

PERALTA, J.:

#28 NONE

January 18, 2017

G.R. No. 221071

EDDIE E. DIZON and BRYAN R.

DIZON, Petitioners,
vs.
YOLANDA VIDA P. BELTRAN, Respondent.

REYES, J.: