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Danilo Reggiani
A short introduction to Control Theory
(doi: 10.1418/34542)

Lingue e linguaggio (ISSN 1720-9331)


Fascicolo 1, gennaio-giugno 2011

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A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO CONTROL THEORY

A SHORT INTRODUCTION
TO CONTROL THEORY
DANILO REGGIANI

ABSTRACT: This article is an introduction to control theory. Control theory


has changed consistently in the last fifteen years thanks to new ideas and
cross-linguistic evidence. Far from being exhaustive, this article aims
at surveying the last fifteen years of control theory reviewing the most
influential proposals and those problems that still have to be fully addressed.
KEYWORDS: syntax, Control Theory.

1. INTRODUCTION1
Control theory was born decades ago2 to explain some interface phenomena
between syntax and semantics. Control theory tried to generate a
mechanism able to explain how infinitives are assigned a subject that is not
phonologically present. Two main interpretations of the infinitive clauses
and their subject gap were recognized, an antecedent-referring interpretation
(1a) and a generic interpretation (1b).
(1) a. The fox told the crow [Δ to sing].
b. [Δ Singing for the fox] can be dangerous.
The antecedent-referring interpretation can be split in two different
categories: a local antecedent interpretation and a non-local (long distance,
henceforth LD) antecedent interpretation. The local antecedent is necessarily
placed in the higher clause that selects the infinitive clause as an argument
(2a). The LD antecedent can be higher (2b) or lower (2c) than the infinite,
but it can never be an argument of the verb that selects the infinitive clause
as a complement (Manzini, 1983; Landau, 1999). The subject of the infinite
can also be inferred by the context (2d) (Bresnan, 1982).
(2) a. The old mani said that the foxj told the crow [Δ*i/j to sing].
b. The crowi doesn’t know that [Δi singing hisi song] can be dangerous.
c. [Δi Singing a song with a piece of cheese in hisi mouth] convinced every
reader that the crowi must be very stupid.
1
I gratefully acknowledge two anonymous reviewers of Lingue e Linguaggio for insightful
remarks and comments. List of abbreviations: ACC: accusative; COMP: complementizer; DAT:
dative; DFLT: default; HAB: habitual; IRR: irrealis; NOM: nominative; PL: plural; SG: singular.
2
The term “control” however did not appear until the late Seventies. Rosenbaum (1965b)
used the term “Identity Erasure Transformation”.

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DANILO REGGIANI

d. The foxj knows what she wants. [Δj Challenging the crow] was a smart move.
It is clear that LD control and generic control are characterized by a
common property: they do not need a local antecedent. The definition of
local antecedent for control has been disputed (Landau, 1999, 2001). It is
traditionally assumed that a local antecedent is a c-commanding argument
of the verb that selects the infinitive (controlled) clause (Williams, 1980).
Locality and interpretation are thus matching into two types of control
predicates: obligatory control (OC) and non obligatory control (NOC). OC is
local and is not able to license arbitrary control or LD control. Sentences like
(2a) show also that OC contexts tend to block the emergence of NOC. OC is
also characterized by the impossibility of strict reading, while NOC allows
such a reading. OC (3a) allows only sloppy reading under VP-ellipsis, while
NOC (3b) allows both sloppy reading and strict reading under VP-ellipsis.
(3) a. The hare wants [Δ to run faster], and the tortoise does too.
b. The dove thinks that [Δ helping her friend] was a good idea, and the ant
does too.
Finally, OC allows only the DE SE reading, while NOC allows both DE
RE and DE SE reading.
(4) a. The crow Δi said that [Δi singing that song] was very stupid.
b. The crow Δi remembered [Δi being stupid].
In a DE SE reading the crow has the property of being a stupid animal
and being fully aware of that. In a DE RE reading the crow has the property
of being a stupid animal while not being aware of that.

1.1 Split control and partial control


Sometimes an obligatorily controlled verb has not simply one antecedent.
The control by two different split antecedents is of course possible in NOC,
as we can see from (5a), but it is also possible in OC, in the complement
position of some verbs (5b).
(5) a. Johni told Maryj that [Δi+j living together] would be fun.
b. Johni persuaded Maryj [to Δi+j live together].
I will call the example in (5b) a case of “split control”. Split control has
been rarely discussed in the literature on control. As a result of this, we do
not know much about it: we do not really know how it is licensed or if it
can be divided into subtypes, etc. We know much more about a somehow
similar phenomenon called “partial control” (Landau, 1999).
(6) a. The guys thought that Johni wanted Δi+ to meet at six.
b. *The guys thought that John managed Δi to meet at six.

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c. The board met at six.


d. John’s friends met at six.
e. *John met at six.

The verb meet is a collective predicate, a verb that requires a plural subject
(6d) or at least a semantically plural3 subject like board (6c). Every DP that is
not at least semantically plural cannot be the subject of a collective predicate
(6e). What happens then in (6a) and (6b)? A verb like want allows the
controlled argument to be semantically plural, even if the controlling antecedent
is purely singular. A case like (6a) is “perfectly natural when the speaker has
some salient group in mind” (Landau, 2004: 833), like the guys in (6a).
A verb like manage, on the contrary, does not allow the controlled
argument to be semantically plural, given a purely singular antecedent.
Landau (1999) recognizes two major properties of partial control.
(7) a. Partial control is an instance of OC.
b. Only some matrix verbs allow partial control in their complement clauses.

Partial control shares the properties reported in section 1 with the


OC complements. Partial control verbs like want and prefer do not allow
arbitrary control (8a) or LD antecedents (8b). Partial control is also unable
to yield a strict reading in (8c) and a DE RE reading in (8d). If (8d) is true,
then the crow decided that he himself would meet at six with the fox.
(8) a. Johni wanted [Δi/*arb to be quiet].
b. Mary knew that John wanted [Δ to perjure himself/*herself].
c. The board was scheduling the meetings. John preferred [Δ to meet at
six], but Peter didn’t.
d. The fox was ready for a date. The crow decided [Δ to meet at six].

The second important property of partial control is that only some verbs
in the matrix clause allow partial control of the complement clause. The
whole class of complement controlling verbs (i.e. roughly the verbs that
select an infinitive clause as a complement in English) can be divided,
according to Landau (1999), in two distinct categories: partial control (PC)
verbs (matrix verbs able to yield partial control) and exhaustive control
(EC) verbs (matrix verbs unable to yield partial control).
(9) Exhaustive Control verbs
a. *John told Mary that hei forgot Δ*i+ to meet at six.
b. *The chairi dared Δ*i+ to convene during the strike.
c. *John told Mary that hei had Δ*i+ to separate before it was too late.

3
Landau (2004) calls “mereology” the feature that characterizes semantically plural nouns
like board: board is [+Mer] whereas John is [-Mer].

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DANILO REGGIANI

(10) Partial Control verbs


a. John told Mary that hei preferred Δi+ to meet at six.
b. The chairi decided Δi+ to convene during the strike.
c. John told Mary that hei intended Δi+ to separate before it was too late.

Partial control verbs and exhaustive control verbs belong to different


semantic classes. The relationship between certain semantic classes of
control verbs and the subtypes of control is captured (Landau, 1999) by the
generalization in (11).
(11) PC complements are tensed; EC complements are untensed.

A tensed complement creates a tense domain different from the domain


of the matrix clause: tensed complements (12a) are thus able to create a
mismatch with the tense of the matrix clause; untensed complement cannot
create such a mismatch, yielding the agrammaticality in (12b).
(12) a. Yesterday, John decided to solve the problem tomorrow.
b. *Yesterday, John managed to solve the problem tomorrow.

PC complements thus tolerate a tense mismatch. EC complements are


unable to tolerate such a mismatch. Partial control and split control are
deeply different phenomena. The subject of a partially controlled clause is
only semantically plural and hence unable to license the reciprocal each
(14b) (exactly like the semantically and syntactically singular pronoun he
in (14a)). On the other hand, split control is able to license a reciprocal in
the controlled clause (14c) (like the plural DP John and Mary in (14d)).
(13) a. TENSED COMPLEMENT (PC)
i. tense mismatch is tolerated
ii. partial control is possible
b. UNTENSED COMPLEMENT (EC)
i. tense mismatch is NOT tolerated
ii. partial control is IMpossible

According to Landau (1999), split control looks like a weird exception,


whereas partial control is not. The phenomenon of partial control allows in
fact, as we saw, to split the category of OC into two distinct categories: EC
and PC (see Table 1, next page).

1.2 Cross-linguistic oddities of control


Cross-linguistic data, especially in the last decade, have enriched the
phenomenology of control, introducing new problems for control theories,
which were mainly based on English phenomena.

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A SHORT INTRODUCTION TO CONTROL THEORY

OC NOC
EC PC
Is subject to locality constraints ∨ ∨ ×
Allows LD control × × ∨
Allows arbitrary control × × ∨
Allows DE RE reading × × ∨
Allows strict reading × × ∨
Allows PC reading × ∨ ∨
TABLE 1. EC, PC AND NOC

1.2.1 Control in non-infinitive clauses


Balkan languages do not have infinitives or gerunds but they have control: they
have subjunctives in control predicates. In old theories of control (Chomsky,
1981; Manzini, 1983), controlled arguments were licensed in the subject position
of infinitives and gerunds. Landau (1999, 2004) modified the original theory
proposing a cross-linguistic generalization that accounts for the distribution of
control phenomena across languages (at least Balkan Languages and Hebrew).
Landau observes that tense and agreement seem to be related to the
presence of control especially in languages like English and in Balkan
Languages. In English, for example, controlled clauses are characterized by
sentences that do not display agreement with the subject and that can have
anaphoric or dependent tense. In Balkan languages, the same behaviour
characterizes subjunctive complement clauses, which display subject-verb
agreement and are characterized by anaphoric tense. Landau calls these
subjunctives C-subjunctives. On the other hand, subjunctives with dependent
tense can have a DP or pro as their subject and hence they do not seem to
exhibit control. These subjunctive are called F-subjunctive. Greek examples of
C-subjunctive and F-subjunctive are (15) and (16). As you can see, the untensed
complement (15) must have a local OC interpretation. On the other hand, the
tensed complement (16) can host an empty pronoun pro or a full DP (17).
(15) I Mariai prospathise Δi/*j na divasi.
‘Maria tried to read’ (Terzi, 1997)
(16) O Yanisi elpizi Δi/j na figi.
‘Yanisi hopes that hei/j will leave’ (Varlokosta, 1993)
(17) O Yanisi elpizi na figi i Maria.
‘Yanisi hopes that Maria will leave’ (Landau, 2004)

1.2.2 Backward control and copy control

Backward control is a case in which the controlled argument apparently


c-commands its antecedent. Backward control then seems clearly to turn

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upside down the c-command requirements for control reported in section


1. The backward control constructions, though not very familiar to English
speakers, are neither marginal nor rare cross-linguistically. Cases of backward
control have been identified in different languages: Korean (Monahan, 2003),
Balkan languages like Greek and Romanian (Alexiadou et al., 2010), some
Caucasian languages (Polinsky & Potsdam, 2006) and many others.
Few languages exhibit the phenomenon of copy control. In case of copy
control, the controlled argument is a full copy of the controlling argument,
as in Zapotec, spoken in San Lucas Quiavinì (Lee, 2003).
(18) a. Chelswu-ka Yenghii-lul [Δi hakkyo-lul ttena-tolok] seltukhayssta
Chelswu-NOM Yenghii-ACC [Δi school-ACC quit-COMP] persuaded
b. Chelswu-ka Δi [Yenghii-ka hakkyo-lul ttena-tolok] seltukhayssta
Chelswu-NOM Δi [Yenghii-NOM school-ACC quit-COMP] persuaded
‘Chelswu persuaded Yenghi to quit school’ (Polinsky & Potsdam, 2006)
(19) r-cààa’z Gye’eihlly [g-auh (Gye’eihlly) bxaady]
HAB-want Mike [IRR-eat Mike grasshopper]
‘Mike wants to eat grasshopper’ (Polinsky & Potsdam, 2006)

2. ON THE EXISTENCE OF PRO


In the last years the debate about the syntax of control has grown around this
very basic problem. How to account for the distribution and the interpretation
of control structures? Is the subject of controlled verbs a syntactic category?
If the subject of controlled verbs is syntactically categorized, how many
categories do we need to account for the different interpretations? Different
answers to these questions gave rise to different theories of control.
Some linguists thought that it is useless to syntactically categorize the subject
of controlled verbs: the control verb has no syntactical subject but only a
semantic subject, assigned after syntax, at the semantic level (Chierchia, 1984).
Chomsky (1981) thought that one syntactic category (PRO) could
represent the controlled argument and its properties. Locality constraints
distinguish between types of control (OC vs. NOC), different types of
control yield different interpretations. One category can be licensed easily
in all kinds of infinitive clauses and can be adequate, via some assumptions,
for the different interpretations.
Hornstein (1999, 2001) thought that a category like PRO is too
much to explain control phenomena, it is redundant. PRO requires a
theoretical module to be interpreted and the interpretations of PRO are
already available in Universal Grammar: a trace t can account for a local
interpretation in OC and pro can account for non-local interpretation in
NOC. A problem for this solution is of course the need for a theoretical
mechanism that explains the distribution of t and pro.

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2.1 Movement theory of control


The “movement theory of control” (MTC) proposes that OC is simply
movement and, hence, that the subject of obligatorily controlled
complement clauses is a trace. The subject of non-obligatorily controlled
clauses, instead, is an empty pronoun like pro.
Hornstein (1999, 2001) started formulating his movement theory of
control by noticing that traces of A-movement (20) and PRO in obligatory
control share the same basic properties examined here in section 1. A-traces
found in raising predicates (20) in fact do not allow arbitrary reading, LD
antecedents, strict reading and DE RE reading.
(20) a. Johni seemed [ti/*arb to be quiet].
b. Mary saw that John seemed [ti to perjure himself/*herself].
c. Johni seemed [ti to be happy], but Peter didn’t.
i. It seemed that John was happy, but it didn’t seem that Peter was happy.
ii. *It seemed that John was happy, but it didn’t seem that John was happy.
If control is reduced to movement, then also the distinction between raising
and control is reduced. The origin of the distinction between raising and control
goes back to minimal pairs like (21)-(22), introduced by Rosenbaum (1965b).
(21) a. John seems to have examined Bill.
b. Bill seems to have been examined by John.
(22) a. John tried to examine Bill.
b. Bill tried to be examined by John.
The sentences in (21) are synonymous but the sentences in (22) are not
synonymous. Both in (21a) and (21b), John is the agent that performs the
examination. This is true also for (22a) and (22b); the difference between the
two sentences in (22) rests in the agentive thematic role assigned by the matrix
verb: in (22a) John is the agent of the verb tried, whereas in (22b) it is Bill.
These facts seem to suggest that, beside thematic properties, between
raising and control there is no syntactic difference. In the case of control,
one element (the element that is moved according to the MTC) seems to take
two thematic roles: one assigned by the matrix verb, one assigned by the
controlled verb. This is of course a clear violation of the “Theta Criterion”
(Chomsky, 1981). But Hornstein treats thematic roles in a different way: theta
roles are grammatical features and are able to trigger movement.
From this point of view, subject control structures are reduced to raising-
to-subject contructions and object control structures are reduced to raising-to-
object constructions. Reducing control to movement also entails that control
is subject to a principle like the Minimal Link Condition (MLC).
Such a principle, once applied to control, entails an old generalization called
Principle of Minimal Distance (PMD), roughly stating that, in case of control

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into complement clause, the argument of the matrix verb that is syntactically
nearest to the controlled argument is the controller (Rosenbaum, 1965a).
To account for cases of OC in adjunct control, Hornstein (2001, 2003)
argues that the MTC can be extended to control into adjuncts headed by
after, before, while, etc. (i.e. to control into OC adjuncts). In those adjuncts
the controlled argument is c-commanded and controlled by the subject of the
matrix verb. The problem with this generalization is that objects seem to be
able to bind and thus c-command into adjuncts (23b).
(23) a. Johni will drink no winej [before Δi/*j eating some food]
b. John will drink no winej [before itj is ready for drinking]
A theory of OC adjunct control based on direct A-movement across
object would violate the MLC. To solve this problem, Hornstein (2001,
2003) proposes that OC adjuncts contain a trace in subject position and
that this trace is part of a “sideward movement” chain. Sideward movement
moves a constituent from one subtree to another and allows consequently the
extraction of an argument out of an adjunct. Sideward movement extracts the
highest (i.e. closest to the edge) argument of an adjunct and copies it into an
argument position into the matrix clause. Hornstein (2001), following Nunes
(1995), argues that sideward movement is involved also in parasitic gaps.
(24) a. Johni read a book before ti eating a pineapple.
b. Which booki did you read ti before Fred reviewed ti?
Sideward movement allows John (which is, being the subject, the
leftmost/highest argument) in (24a) to move out of the adjunct in the
subject position of the matrix clause. In (24b) the same sideward movement
allows the object of the adjunct clause to move from the adjunct clause
subtree to the matrix clause subtree, in the position of the object.
Hornstein claims that the best feature of the MTC is the elimination of the
“control module”. The control module is basically that theoretical mechanism
that, given the distribution of PRO, provides the interpretation of PRO in different
environments (OC vs. NOC). The control module was in fact assumed by early
theories of control (Chomsky, 1981): “very little is known about the control
module. Its powers are generally invoked when there is no principled or insightful
alternative at hand” (Boeckx & Hornstein, 2004: 433, footnote 2). The MTC
provides a principled account of the old theory of the double nature of PRO,
pronominal and anaphoric, by adopting t instead of PRO in OC and pro instead
of PRO in NOC. However, PRO was in fact a good way of accounting for the
distribution of control phenomena, allowing the same infinitival complement
in English to receive a different interpretation in a different environment.
How is it possible to license control phenomena and avoid wrong interpretations
in the MTC? How is it possible, in other words, to let A-movement stick to OC
environments and let pro stick to NOC environments?

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(25) a. Johni hopes [ti to be still alive].


b. [pro singing] can be dangerous.
c. *[t singing] can be dangerous.
d. *[Mary singing] can be dangerous.
e. *John hopes [pro to be still alive].
f. *John hopes [Peter to be still alive].
Deviant results like (25c), (25d) and (25f) pose no problems: they cannot
be generated under the MTC. In (25c) the trace has simply no chain and
then a structure like (25c) cannot be formally licensed. In (25d) and (25f) the
derivation crashes because Mary and Peter, according to Hornstein, cannot
receive case. The problem is (25e): this structure is not grammatical in
English but it can be generated by the MTC.
Boeckx & Hornstein (2007) hypothesize that an answer to this problem can
be found by looking at a universal property of the parser. The basic idea is that
(25e) is not ungrammatical but simply not parsable. We do not find sentences
like (25e) in English because they are somehow invisible to the parser.
The parser parses the sentence from left to right and projects the structure
rapidly and deterministically. This means, according to Boeckx & Hornstein
(2007), that the parser obeys two basic principles when facing empty
categories. Hornstein (2006) states the following basic principles:
(26) a. Parsers are transparent with respect to grammars. So, if grammars
encode a condition, the parsers respect it.
b. Parsers move from left to right and project structure rapidly and
deterministically on the basis of local information. (Hornstein, 2006)

Hornstein (2006) assumes that grammars prefer movement to


pronominalization and that, by (26a), the parser will prefer the insertion of
a trace to the insertion of a pro. Then, by (26b), Hornstein assumes that the
parser must be sensitive to earlier information. The two basic principles can
be rephrased as:
(27) When a syntactic gap must be filled:
a. prefer the insertion of a trace instead of the insertion of an empty pronoun
b. prefer the insertion of an element that, at that point of the parsing
operations, has a proper left antecedent.
(28) The insertion (of a trace or an empty pronoun) must not violate grammar.

The parser, facing an empty category, is puzzled between two solutions:


inserting a pro or inserting a trace. The parser is guided by the principles in
(27) and cannot absolutely violate the condition (28). The parser chooses the
solution that violates fewer principles in (27). If both the solutions violate
the same number of principles, then they are both possible for the parser.
The principles in (27) do not forbid a derivation like (25c). Without (28),

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the unacceptable derivation in (25c) would be possible: (25c) (i.e. the


insertion of a trace) would violate only (27b) and (25b) (i.e. the insertion of
pro) would violate both (27a) and (27b). So, as far as principle (28) allows
only one solution, (27) is irrelevant.
The principle (27a) forbids (25e) that, being a grammatical derivation
(because according to the MTC pro can be spelled out as a subject of a
non-finite clause), is not blocked by (28). The principle (27a) blocks the
insertion of pro in (25e), making such a sentence unavailable for the
grammar and the parser.
The principle (27b) comes into play when we consider a sentence like:
(29) Johni believes that [tj / proi washing herself j /himselfi] would delight Maryj.

According to Hornstein, in (29) the controlled argument is a trace (as a


result of sideward movement), and thus an instance of OC, if the antecedent
is Mary; the controlled argument is pro, instead, if the antecedent is John, an
instance of NOC. Inserting a trace in the controlled argument position violates
principle (27b), but not principle (27a). Inserting a pro in the controlled
argument position violates principle (27a), but not (27b). The two solutions
are thus equally possible because they violate the same number of principles.
In a sentence like (30), on the contrary, neither a trace nor an empty
pronoun can have a proper left antecedent: any insertion would violate the
principle (27b).
(30) Δi/*j Having to wash behind the ears made Maryi angry at Billj.

Only the insertion of a trace, by the way, would satisfy the principle (27a).
Hence only a trace can be in the subject position of the infinitive clause in (30).

2.1.1 The virtues of the MTC


Boeckx & Hornstein (2006b) note that the MTC is theoretically
parsimonious and light, it does not need a theoretical deus ex machina like
the control module and it does not assume the existence of a category like
PRO. From this point of view, they argue, the MTC is really a minimalist
theory of control, strictly obeying Occam’s razor.
MTC also offers the possibility of making sense of the phenomenon of
backward control. The phenomenology of control across languages, which
includes forward, backward and copy control, suggests that the syntactic
positions involved in control participate in a copy-deletion relationship
rather than an asymmetric binding relationship. Boeckx & Hornstein (2006b)
note that the cases of backward control can be accounted for as cases of
pronunciation of a lower copy and deletion of the higher copy. Similarly,
cases of copy control can be seen as cases of copy without deletion.

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2.1.2 Some problems related to the MTC


NULL OBJECT. A main problem for the MTC is the implicit control/binding
asymmetry reported by Rizzi (1986). It is known that, in languages like
Italian, object control verbs can have an object or a dative argument which is
phonologically unrealized and which yields a generic interpretation of the
controlled argument. Rizzi argues that the implicit argument of such verbs, being
(at least) able to control, must be realized as a syntactic empty category ec.
(31) Gianni ordina ec di lavorare sodo.
‘Gianni orders ec to work hard’
The implicit object is able to control and bind in Italian, whereas in
English this is impossible. In English implicit internal arguments are generally
unable to bind and/or control. Few English verbs are, by the way, able to
control from ec (32) but still unable to bind (33b), as noted by Landau (2007).
???
(32) John shouted/said to arrest Bill.
(33) We all heard the amazing story about [Bill and Kevin]i.
a. John said to themi at each otheri’s parties to take off their clothes.
b. *John said eci at each otheri’s parties to take off their clothes. (Landau, 2007)
Boeckx & Hornstein (2004) observe that ec can be theoretically
described as pro. The basic problem of this account is that pro is a
pronoun and is thus able to bind: we would not then expect (33b) to be
ungrammatical. Boeckx & Hornstein then propose an assumption: anaphors
cannot be lexicalized if the antecedent is not. In other words, there cannot
be binding from a phonologically unrealized DP, with the exception of the
“Italian-style pro” (Boeckx & Hornstein, 2004), which is able to bind, being
“lexically realized as the inflection of the verb”.
The assumption introduced by Boeckx & Hornstein of course would not
hold in Italian cases of binding from null object ec. Landau (2007) notices
that in NOC, the controlled argument, even in the case of arbitrary control,
can bind an anaphor (34). Remember that, in the MTC, the controlled
argument in NOC is realized as pro.
(34) Praising oneself/myself wouldn’t be polite.
Notice that Rizzi (1986) observes that Italian subject pro and null object
ec have radically different properties. Null object/dative ec is marked as
[+human], [+generic] and [+plural]; pro has not such restrictions and can
be [-human], [-generic] and [-plural]. These data suggest that pro and null
object/dative ec4 may be considered different categories. MTC would then

4
Henceforth I will call simply ec the empty category that syntactically represents null object
and null dative.

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employ ec to describe null objects and null datives instead of pro.


Notice that ec does not seem to pose threats to the theory of distribution of
trace and pro inside the MTC. Recall the principles in (27). According to the
MTC, ec would be merged in the subject position of the complement clause and
then move to the object position in the matrix clause. Adopting such a solution,
it would be necessary to assume that ec cannot be spelled out as a subject, but
only as an internal argument of the verb, receiving accusative or dative case.
SUBJECT CONTROL ACROSS OBJECT. Assuming the MTC, cases of subject control
across object (SCaO), for example with the verb promise, would turn out
to be violations of the MLC. The violation of the MLC is also, of course, a
violation of the PMD. Hornstein (2003) considers the SCaO class a “marked
exception” to the MLC. A marked exception is something that is not easily
acquired by children. The literature on the acquisition of control has in fact
reported, since Chomsky (1969), a strong delay in the acquisition of subject
control: six-year-old children are able to master object control but are still
unable to comprehend subject control sentences (they interpret subject control
verbs as object control verbs in more than half of the cases). Hornstein
proposes two different theories to explain the markedness of the SCaO verbs.
The first hypothesis is that chidren would need significant evidence in
order to understand that the MLC can in fact be violated by a restricted
group of verb constructions. The second hypothesis is that the SCaO
verbs take in fact an indirect object with a preposition that becomes null
during the derivation. Analogous constructions are raising verbs like seem
and strike. In these apparent violations of the MLC the apparent internal
argument is in a position that can bind but cannot control (35b). Sentences
in (35) show how the internal argument of promise and the experiencer of
a raising verb like seem share the ability to bind (35a, 35b) and thus the
possibility to violate principle C (35c, 35d).
(35) a. John seemed to every girli to like heri.
b. John promised every girli heri candy.
c. *John seemed to themi to like the meni.
d. *John promised themi to like the meni.
English is “somewhat exceptional” in allowing movement across the
indirect object in raising constructions. This indirect object occupies a
position to which it is impossible to move: according to the MTC, we can
in fact assume that control is impossible from position α iff it is impossible
to move a DP to α. By the way it is also true that it is possible to bind from
position α to position β only if position α c-commands position β. The verb
promise is even more exceptional because of the supposed null preposition
that, according to Hornstein, licenses the internal DP and that should be
erased during the derivation. Hornstein assumes that the null preposition

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is what makes the verb promise so hard to acquire: “the prepositional


complement structure of promise would be opaque to the child and its late
acquisition would be expected” (Hornstein, 2003: 35).5
PARTIAL CONTROL. Assuming that control is copy and deletion of a DP implies
that the controlling argument is semantically and syntactically identical to
the controlled argument: the controlling argument must be an exact copy
of the controlled argument. In the case of partial control, the controlled
argument may differ in semantic number from the controller. Hornstein,
assuming that the movement account can be combined to other mechanisms,
proposes to solve the problem with a meaning postulate “licensed by certain
matrix verbs when taking control complements” (Hornstein, 2003: 42).
(36) If “DP Vs [IP to VP]” then “DP Vs [IP DP and some contextually specified
others to VP]”
Adopting a meaning postulate like (36) in order to account for the
semantics of PC is not very elegant, as noticed by Hornstein himself
(Hornstein, 2003: 42). The meaning postulate in (36) is a ploy to include
PC into the MTC at the cost of the assumption that movement can be
integrated with meaning postulates. However the meaning postulate (36)
does not formulate any hypothesis for the distribution of PC, i.e. it does not
try to explain why PC occurs and which is the cause of PC.
Another problem for Hornstein’s approach to partial control is reported
in Costantini (2008). Observe the sentences in (37). A negatively quantified
DP (nessun ministro) can control a clause with an exhaustive floating
quantifier (tutti) scoping over VP, as shown in (37a). However, the same
negatively quantified DP cannot be the subject of a clause containing the
same exhaustive floating quantifier (37b).
(37) a. I viceministrii hanno detto che nessun ministroj si ricorda PRO di essersi
tuttii+j riuniti a Bruxelles.
‘The vice-ministersi said that no ministerj remembers that theyi+j have
alli+j gathered in Bruxelles’
b. *Nessun ministroj e i viceministrii si sono tuttii+j riuniti ieri sera.
‘*No ministerj and the vice-ministersi have alli+j gathered yesterday evening’
Costantini shows that the meaning postulate (36) does not account for
minimal couples like those in (37). The PRO in (37a) cannot be interpreted
as the trace of the negatively quantified DP (nessun ministro) “and some
contextually specified others”, as predicted by the meaning postulate (36).
5
In my Ph.D. thesis (Reggiani, 2010) I showed how children struggle to acquire Italian verbs
which exhibit subject control across dative. Since dative in Italian is introduced by an overt
preposition (a) it is possible to reject Hornstein’s claim. It is not the “opacity” (i.e. the absence of
a full preposition that licenses the internal DP) that makes a verb like promise particularly difficult.

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This interpretation is in fact ungrammatical (37b).


Rodrigues (2007) proposes an alternative theory of partial control
compatible with the MTC. The main idea, taken from Torrego (1996), is that the
moved DP is in fact stranded from some sort of complex DP. If the subject of
the partially controlled infinitive is the controller plus somebody or something
else, then it could be assumed that such subject has the structure shown in (38),
in which a null pronoun adjoins to a DP that will soon move leftwards.
(38) DP
3
ec DP
Rodrigues assumes that the structure in (38) floats in the controlled
clause (presumably in the SpecVP) whereas the lower DP gets copied to
the matrix clause.
(39) Johni wanted to [VP [DP ec [DP ti ]] meet at six]
This interesting theory however has the same drawbacks of Hornstein’s
(2003) approach. The stranded DP approach (38) and the meaning postulate
(36) are equally unable to explain the correlation between partial control
and tensed complements.
The stranded DP approach suffers also from the problem exemplified
in (37). The idea that the subject of partialliy controlled predicates is some
DP plus ec is based on the same understatement from which originates the
meaning postulate (36): that a partially controlled DP is the same DP “and
some contextually specified others”.

2.2 PRO and the calculus of control


2.2.1 The origins of PRO
The category PRO, as we already saw, was assumed by Chomsky (1981)
in order to account for the distribution and the interpretation of the subject
of the infinitives. The subject of infinitives receives an interpretation from
a local antecedent (like anaphors) or from an arbitrary/non-local contextual
referent (like pronouns). Two binary features could then completely
describe the whole range of NPs in syntax.
(40) -anaphor -pronominal → R-expressions and wh-traces
-anaphor +pronominal → pronouns
+anaphor -pronominal → reflexives, reciprocals and NP traces
+anaphor +pronominal → PRO
The problem with PRO was its ambiguous nature, considering that,
according to Chomsky (1981):

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(41) a. An anaphor must be bound in its governing category.


b. A pronoun must be bound in its governing category.
If PRO is simultaneously a pronoun and an anaphor, then it must be
bound and free in its governing category. To avoid this contradiction,
Chomsky (1981) assumed that PRO, i.e. the subject of non-finite verbs, is
not governed. This series of assumptions was called the “PRO theorem”.
The PRO theorem did (and still does) not seem to be free from heavy
assumptions. The first thing that can be noticed is that PRO is never
simultaneously interpreted as a pronoun (free) and as an anaphor (bound).
The double nature of PRO (i.e. the possibility to interpret PRO in OC
and NOC) has to be found in at least two different instances of PRO. It
could be assumed, as Hornstein (2001) notices, that those two different
interpretations of PRO are in fact two different categories with (roughly) the
same distribution. Theorizing control with two different categories would
be free from the assumption of the ungoverned position. In fact nothing
prohibits pronouns and anaphors from appearing in the same positions.
(42) a. The men saw their mothers.
b. The men saw each other’s mothers. (Hornstein, 2001)
Another problem for PRO theorem is that PRO has a thematic role but
no case. This violates the “Case Filter” formulated in Chomsky (1981) and
rephrased as (43) by Chomsky & Lasnik (1993).
(43) A chain is visible for theta-marking if it contains Case position.
Anyway, as soon as the concept of government was disposed of in
favour of a minimalist system (Chomsky, 1993), the PRO theorem had little
theoretical reason to exist and a new theory of control had to be forged.
Chomsky & Lasnik (1993) assume that the distribution of PRO depends on
case theory, solving also the problem of the violation of the Case Filter in
(43). PRO (and only PRO) is marked by “null case”; on the other hand,
null case cannot be assigned to any other NP. The “null case theory” blocks
the cases exemplified in (44); it also blocks cases like (45b) by prohibiting
PRO from getting the accusative case. Last but not least, this theory
prevents non-finite clauses from having subjects that are simply not PRO
(anaphors, pronouns, R-expressions).
(44) a. *Sarah saw PRO
b. *Sarah saw pictures of PRO
(45) a. Naomi tried PRO to solve the problem.
b. *Naomi belives PRO to solve the problem.
(46) a. *Naomi asked Peter Joe to solve the problem.
b. Naomi asked Peter PRO to solve the problem.

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The null case theory, however, has some problems. If non-finite I


checks null case and A-movement from case positions is blocked, then null
case theory seems to predict that no DP can be inserted as a subject of a
non-finite clause and that no DP can consequently raise from the non-finite
clause to the matrix clause; it becomes also possible the licensing of PRO
as the subject of raising infinitives. Null case theory thus predicts (47a) to
be acceptable and (47b) to be unacceptable.
(47) a. *It seems to Naomi PRO to have solved the problem.
b. Naomi believes her to have solved the problem.
Another problem of null case theory is noticed by Boeckx & Hornstein
(2006a: 595). The assignment of null case to PRO in Icelandic (48) would
represent a violation of minimality.
(48) Jòn vonast til að koma *einan/einn.
John.NOM hopes to to come alone.*ACC/NOM
‘John hopes to come alone’
(49) … controller NP[str.case] … [PRO[null case] … SP[str.case] …]

Cases of case transmission across control like (48), supposing that


PRO has null case, would be quite difficult to explain. In any case, the
transmission of case from the secondary predicate to the controller would
constitute a violation of the MLC.

2.2.2 The calculus of control


As we saw in section 2.1, the control module accounts for the interpretation
of PRO. Landau (1999, 2004) explores the syntax and semantics of control
and proposes a theory of control enriched by generalizations and cross-
linguistic theoretical issues. We could summarize Landau’s theory (Landau,
1999) in few points:
(50) a. Agree is the mechanism of OC
b. NOC PRO is logophoric
c. PRO has structural case: case assignment is not relevant to the licensing of PRO
d. OC can be achieved through two different ways of agreement
AGREE AND CONTROL. In Landau’s (1999, 2004) theory of control the interpretation
of control is achieved via agreement between the controlling DP, PRO and
some functional head.6 Three features are involved in the series of agreement
relations that constitute the mechanism of control: [±Agr], [±T], and [±R].
6
The idea of exploring the possibility of (anaphoric) agreement as the basic mechanism for
control comes from Borer (1989).

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These features are the key to understand the distinction between EC and
PC. These features are also necessary to understand the distribution of PRO
and controlled predicates cross-linguistically. The feature [±Agr] marks the
presence of overt phi-agreement on the head I: English infinitives and gerunds
are characterized by the feature [-Agr] whereas Balkan subjunctives (that are
able to license control) are characterized by the feature [+Agr]. The feature
[±T], on the heads C and I, distinguishes tensed [+T] and untensed [-T]
complements: tensed complements allow tense mismatch and partial control;
untensed complements, on the contrary, disallow both partial control and
tense mismatch. The feature [±R], as assumed by Reinhart & Reuland (1993),
distinguishes DPs that are referential expressions [+R] (and thus can be used
to directly select an entity in the discourse) and elements like anaphors and
logophors that are referentially defective [-R] and need to have a linguistic
antecedent in the sentence. PRO, being [-R], needs a sentential antecedent
in order to be interpreted in OC contexts. Landau assumes that PRO “freely
picks phi-features before entering the derivation. In the case of PRO those
features are anaphoric, but valued (like the phi-features of himself)” (Landau,
1999: 17). The feature [±R] on PRO, also, enters the derivation as valued.
Recall now Landau’s generalization on PC and EC, reported in section
1.1. Landau assumes that PC and EC are characterized also by different
syntactic mechanisms that yield the possibility of semantic number
mismatch between controller and controllee (PC) or the impossibility of
such a semantic number mismatch (EC).
(51) Exhaustive control
[CP … F DP … [ CP C[-T] [IP PRO[-R] [ I’ I[-T, -Agr, -R] [VP t[PRO] …]]]]]

The rightmost operation is an operation of agreement between the head


I and PRO, which enters the derivation, as I already said, with valued phi-
features. The phi-features in I are valued and PRO moves to SpecIP in order
to check EPP. The second operation is the feature [-T] agreement between
the heads I and C. The third operation checks the phi-features of DP on F.
The last agreement operation is between F and PRO. F is a functional head:
in case of subject control it is I, in case of object control is light v. By this
agreement operation PRO inherits the phi-features of the controlling DP. At
the end of these operations the controlling DP and PRO share the same phi-
features and PRO is interpreted as a copy of the controlling DP (that has
previously agreed with F).
Adler (2006) notices that Landau’s theory relies on two important
assumptions.
(52) a. Some probes (namely F) can enter into two Agree relations.
b. The operation Agree is sometimes able to cross a phase boundary.

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The assumption (52a) can be derived from another assumption: that


uninterpretable features in F are still visible to syntactic operations despite
being checked off by a first Agree operation. Thanks to this assumption the
head F is able to agree with DP (the controller) and then with PRO.
The assumption (52b) is derived from the assumption that interpretable
features remain accessible to probes. The phase impenetrability condition
then constrains only uninterpretable features. Landau (1999) claims that this
is an innocuous modification of the phase theory. This assumption allows F
to agree with PRO, which is inside CP.
In order to account for the PC generalization (11), Landau (1999) has to
make two more basic assumptions.
(53) a. PRO enters the derivation with valued phi-features, but without semantic
number, i.e. with the feature [Mer] unvalued.
b. I-to-C head movement (following Pesetsky & Torrego, 2001) applies in
tensed (PC) complements but not in untensed (EC) complements.
The assumption (53a) is necessary to account for the mismatch in
semantic number between the controller and PRO in PC complements. PRO
behaves ambiguously, depending on the tense of the complement clause and
ultimately on the semantics of the matrix verb. PRO’s semantic number can
be matched to one of the controlling DP but there can also be a mismatch
between the two semantic numbers.
The assumption (53b) is needed to block the agreement between the
controlling DP and PRO. This assumption thus allows for the second way
of agreement (50d).
(54) Partial control
[CP … F DP …[ CP
C[+T] [IP PRO[-R] [ I’
t[I] [VP t[PRO] …]]]]

The head movement from I to C is the main difference between


EC and PC. In the rightmost movement PRO has valued the features
in I. The head I then moves to C and the head C inherits the valued
features of I. The head F then agrees with DP (the controller) and
then with C. F agrees with C and not with PRO: C has inherited PRO’s
phi-features from I and then has the features that are necessary to
agree with F. According to the MLC, F must agree with the nearest
goal: C is in the head of its phase and PRO, being in the domain of
C, is more distant from the probe F than C. Hence F agrees with C.
During the derivation, the head I agreed first with PRO and then, after the
head movement to C, it agreed with F. As a consequence, “by transitivity of
agreement, PRO gets to match the controller in all phi-features” (Landau,
1999: 82). The only feature that PRO does not inherit is the semantic
number [Mer], because [Mer], being unvalued, was not originally involved

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in the first agreement between I and PRO: PRO entered the derivation with
an unvalued feature [Mer], according to the assumption (53a).
The mismatch in semantic number between the controlling DP and PRO is
then possible: PRO, having no value for feature [Mer], can be the subject of
a collective predicate without committing feature clash. On the contrary, PRO
that has inherited from F the feature [-Mer] (or a simple singular DP marked
with the feature [-Mer]) cannot be the subject of a collective predicate.
The double route of agreement and the relation between tense and licensing
of partial control is roughly summarized in (55).
(55) a. TENSED COMPLEMENT (PC)
i. tense mismatch is tolerated
ii. I-to-C movement blocks direct agreement between F and PRO
the unvalued feature [Mer] remains unvalued
iii. partial control is possible
b. UNTENSED COMPLEMENT (EC)
i. tense mismatch is NOT tolerated
ii. direct agreement between F and PRO
the unvalued feature [Mer] is valued by F
iii. partial control is IMpossible
THE DISTRIBUTION OF CONTROL PHENOMENA. Landau (2004) deals with the
distribution of the category PRO crosslinguistically. PRO is licensed in
clauses, headed by a C head, that are characterized by abstract agreement
and/or anaphoric tense (the one which characterizes untensed complements).
Landau (2004) stipulates that the presence of PRO is regulated by an
“R-assignment Rule”. The R-assignment Rule is a “honest stipulation”
(Landau, 2004) that allows or blocks the presence of the feature [±R] (and
hence the capability of agreeing with PRO) on the heads C and I of every
clause. The aim of the R-assignment Rule is to relate the licensing of PRO
to the features (the type of agreement and tense) of the controlled clauses.
(56) R-assignment Rule
a. tense mismatch is tolerated
b. Each head (C, I) bears the feature [-R] iff it is marked [-Agr, +T],
[+Agr, -T] or [-Agr, -T]
A direct consequence of the R-assignment Rule is that if a head lacks
[±Agr] or [±T] then no feature [±R] is assigned.7
The features [Agr] and [T] are specified on the head I. The head I bears
the feature [+Agr] if there is overt subject-verb agreement and the feature
[-Agr] if there is abstract (i.e. covert) subject-verb agreement. Speaking of
7
The R-assignment rule is the core of the mechanism that licenses control phenomena and is
what Landau also calls “the calculus of control”.

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the head C, Landau assumes that it bears the same type of [T] features that
is present on the head I, unless the clause is characterized by independent
tense: in that case the head C has no feature [T].
(57) Specifying [T] on embedded I/C
Anaphoric tense → [-T] on I and C
Dependent tense → [+T] on I and C
Independent tense → [+T] on I and Ø on C
He further stipulates that the feature [Agr] on C is usually not present
on C, since “agreement is rarely espressed on C” (Landau, 2004: 871). If
[Agr] is present on C, then it must be [+Agr]. [-Agr] is unavailable on C.
Recall that data from English and Balkan languages provide us two
case studies. The first case study is the case of control into infinitival
complements that can be found in English or Italian. English infinitives do
not license a DP/pro (i.e. an R-expression or a pronoun) in subject position.
(58) EC-infinitive
*[CP … F DP …[ CP
C[-T] [IP [I’ I[-T, -Agr, *-R] [VP DP / pro[+R] …]]]]]

The first operation in (58) is the movement of the DP/pro to SpecIP:


EPP must be checked and also the features [-Agr, -R]. The feature [-R],
however, cannot be checked. A PRO, which is marked [-R], could have
checked it but a pronoun or an R-expression was inserted into the lower VP.
The DP/pro is characterized by the feature [+R], which cannot check the
feature [-R] on I. There is no element that could check the feature [-R] on
I and the derivation crashes. The problem observed in (58) is shared by all
types of infinitive clauses in English and Italian, either PC infinitive clauses
or EC infinitive clauses.
The second case study is the case of control into subjunctive clauses that
can be found in Balkan languages. Balkan C-subjunctives license PRO and
not R-expressions or pronouns. They are untensed (C and I are marked [-T])
and are characterized by overt subject-verb agreement (I is marked [+Agr], C
is marked Ø). The R-assignment Rule assigns the feature [-R] to the head I.
(59) C-subjunctive
*[CP … F DP …[ CP
C[-T] [IP [I’ I[-T, +Agr, *-R] [VP DP / pro[+R] …]]]]]

[CP … F DP …[ CP
C[-T] [IP PRO[-R] [ I’
I[-T, +Agr, -R] [VP t[PRO] …]]]]]

The examples in (59) show that Balkan C-subjunctives work almost as


English infinitives. The insertion of a DP/pro causes the feature [-R] on I to
remain unvalued.
Landau’s theory is able to account, as we have seen, for very different

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licensing environments. The cross-linguistic difference between English and


Balkan is reduced to the features that mark their heads I and C. Saying that
English lacks C-subjunctives equates saying that English lacks complement
clauses characterized by the features [-T, +Agr] on the head I and the
features [-T] on the head C.
(60) English subjunctive
*[CP … F DP …[ CP C[+T] [IP PRO[-R] [ I’
I[+T, +Agr, *+R] [VP t[PRO] …]]]]]

In (60) the uninterpretable feature [+R] on I cannot be checked by any


other agreeing head, causing the derivation to crash. It cannot be checked
by PRO, which bears a [-R] feature, and it cannot be checked by C, which
does not have a feature [±R] at all because of the R-assignment Rule (56) (no
feature [±R] is assigned to a head that lacks a feature [±Agr]). In other words,
the absence of the feature [+Agr] on C (in a subjunctive clause) eventually
blocks the insertion of PRO. It is now clear how the presence/absence of
the feature [+Agr] on C is the parameter that allows to switch between a
controlled subjunctive and an obviative subjunctive.
The presence of a feature [+Agr] on a head C can be almost arbitrarily
stipulated since “any kind of agreement on C, visible or not, is represented
by [+Agr]” (Landau, 2004: 840). It is impossible to prove the absence of an
invisible agreement and hence it is impossible to argue on the presence or the
absence of the feature [+Agr] on C. For this reason it is clear that the nature
of the feature [Agr] on the head C is the stipulative part of Landau’s theory.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF OC AND NOC. Let us now turn to the distribution
of OC and NOC. Landau (1999) assumes that when the controlled clause
cannot be reached by the operation Agree from a controlling sentence, i.e.
when there is no I or light v head that can enter in an Agree relation with
PRO, we have NOC. Following Bresnan (1982) and contrary to Hornstein
(1999), Landau assumes that NOC, in the case of LD control, is a logophor.8
Logophors “are licensed by discourse factors such as focus, perspective and
center of consciousness or communication” (Landau, 1999: 138). Landau
follows Reinhart & Reuland (1993): all those reflexives that are licensed by
principle A are anaphors, the other reflexives are logophors. The presence/
absence of syntactic relation (principle A) licenses a different semantic
interpretation of a reflexive (anaphoricity/logophoricity). The same principle
applies in Landau: the presence/absence of the operation Agree on PRO
licenses a different intepretation of PRO itself, OC or NOC.
Logophors are subject to more strict constraints compared to pronouns. A
logophor can only refer to “antecedents that are sources or targets of mental/
8
Landau (1999) assumes that the arbitrary interpretation in NOC is achieved via binding from
a null operator (presumably in C) adopting a solution already proposed by Lebeaux (1984).

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DANILO REGGIANI

communicative reports” (Landau, 1999: 139). Landau reports some minimal


couples to show that, contrary to Hornstein (1999), NOC PRO is a logophor
and not an anaphor.
(61) a. John said to Mary that there was a picture of herself with a Mafia figure
in the newspaper.
b. *John said about Mary that there was a picture of herself with a Mafia
figure in the newspaper. (Kuno, 1975)
(62) a. John said to Maryi that it would be easy PROi to prepare herself for the exam.
b. *John said about Maryi that it would be easy PROi to prepare herself for
the exam. (Adler, 2006)
Considering that in (61a) and (61b) the reflexive herself and the related
DP Mary are not in the same minimal CP, it is clear that their relationship
cannot be syntactic, i.e. that herself is not licensed by principle A. So
herself is a logophor. A logophor can only refer to an antecedent that is
source or target of mental/communicative reports. That is why (61b) is
unacceptable. In (61b) herself cannot be an anaphor (principle A does not
hold) and not even a logophor, because there is no possible antecedent for a
feminine logophoric. The assumption of a logophoric nature of NOC PRO
can explain the unacceptability of (62b); the assumption that NOC PRO is
a pronoun, on the contrary, would predict the acceptability of (62b).

2.2.3 Some problems for Landau’s theory


BACKWARD CONTROL. Landau’s theory still has two problems to solve. The
first problem is backward control (see section 1.2.2). In backward control
the controlled argument, in OC, is not c-commanded by the controller: the
controlled argument is located in the matrix clause. The examples (18a) and
(18b) clearly exemplify the problem: the same verb and the same tense allow
both forward and backward control.
In Landau’s theory, OC is carried out through the operation Agree: the
operation Agree requires that PRO is c-commanded by a functional head in the
matrix clause. In backward control the mechanism that allows the interpretation
of PRO is completely scrambled. Backward control also inverts the position
of the controller and the controllee, strongly violating the R-assignment Rule:
the R-assignment Rule assumes that certain features regulate the distribution
of PRO and other DPs. Switching the positions of the controller and the
controllee scrambles the predictions of the R-assignment rule.

3. CASE TRANSMISSION
Landau (2003) argues that the change of case in Icelandic between the
controlling argument and the controlled argument (the case is marked on a

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secondary predicate or on a floating quantifier) constitutes a problem for the


MTC. Sentences characterized by this pattern are (63c), (63d) and (63e). In these
sentences (from Boeckx & Hornstein, 2006a) a quirky case (a dative) marks
part of the chain whereas the other part of the chain receives structural case.
(63) a. Jòn vonast til að koma *einan/einn.
John.NOM hopes to to come alone.*ACC/NOM
‘Jon hopes to come alone’ NOM … [NOM …]
b. Jòn bað Bjarna að koma einan/ einn. ??

John.NOM asked Bjarni to come alone.ACC/ ??NOM


‘Jon asked Bjarni to come alone’ ACC … [ACC …]
c. Jòn vonast til að leiðast ekki einum/*einan/*einn.
John.NOM hopes to be_bored not alone.DAT/*ACC/*NOM
‘Jon hopes not to be bored alone’ NOM … [QRK …]
d. Jòn bað Bjarna að leiðast ekki einum/*einan/*einn.
John.NOM asked Bjarni to be_bored not alone.DAT/*ACC/*NOM
‘Jon asked Bjarni not to be bored alone’ ACC … [QRK …]
e. Bjarna leiddist að hlaupa einum/*einan/*einn.
Bjarn.-DAT was_bored to run alone.*DAT/NOM
‘Bjarni was bored to be running alone’ QRK … [NOM …]
Landau (2003) argues that only one case may be assigned to a chain
(Boeckx & Hornstein, 2006a call this “chain uniformity argument”). Two
DPs with different case should belong to two different chains.
Boeckx & Hornstein (2006a) argue that Icelandic quirky cases in
complement clauses are not problematic for the MTC. Quirky case is a kind
of inherent case that is tightly related to a thematic role. In Icelandic, quirky
case marks the subject of some particular predicates. During the derivation the
quirky case is inherently assigned to the controlled DP. Boeckx & Hornstein
(2006a) simply assume that quirky case can be overwritten by a structural
case: the quirky DP moves from the complement clause to the matrix clause
and then it receives a structural case; the controlling argument surfaces
in the matrix clause as a nominative or accusative DP. This assumption is
able to account for cases like (63c) and (63d), characterized by a structural
case in the matrix clause and a quirky case in the complement clause.
Cases like (63a) and (63b) are common examples of case transmission. The
head that assigns case to the moved element assigns case to the entire chain
via multiple Agree: in the absence of a quirky case, the highest case in the
A-chain is transmitted to all the copies. In (63e) the matrix verb assigns
quirky case to the moved DP: Boeckx & Hornstein (2006a) argue that quirky
case, being an inherent case, cannot be assigned from long-distance. The
secondary predicate, being unable to receive case from agreement with a
c-commanding head, is then assigned a default nominative case.
Bobaljik & Landau (2009) report some examples of A-movement in

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Icelandic that are problematic for the hypothesis presented by Boeckx &
Hornstein (2006a). Quirky case preservation is persistent in A-movement
but is impossible in control.
(64) ECM constructions
a. Ég tel strákana (hafa verið) kitlaða.
I believe the.boy.PL.ACC to.have been tickled.ACC
‘I believe the boys to have been tickled’
b. Ég tel strákunum (hafa verið) bjargað.
I believe the.boy.PL.ACC to.have been rescued.DFLT
‘I believe the boys to have been rescued’ (Bobaljik & Landau, 2009)
(65) Passivized ECM constructions
a. Strákarnir eru taldir (hafa verið) kitlaðir.
the.boy.PL.NOM are believed.PL to.have been tickled.NOM
‘The boys are believed to have been tickled’
b. Strákunum er talið (hafa verið) bjargað.
the.boy.PL.DAT are believed.DFLT to.have been rescued.DFLT
‘The boys are believed to have been rescued’ (Bobaljik & Landau, 2009)
Examples (64) and (65) show that A-moved quirky case remains quirky and
is not overwritten by a structural case. This clearly rules out the overwriting
hypothesis by Boeckx & Hornstein, i.e. the hypothesis that the subject of a
quirky case assigning verb changes its case after undergoing A-movement.
Bobaljik & Landau then observe that if, according to the MTC, control
is (almost) reduced to raising, it is impossible to explain the difference
between (66a) and (66b).
(66) a. Ég tel Maríu hafa verið tekna/*tekin af lögreglunni.
I believed Maria.ACC to.have been taken.ACC/*NOM by the.police
‘I believed Maria to have been taken by the police’
b. Ég bað Maríu að vera *tekna/tekin af lögreglunni.
I asked Maria.ACC to be taken.*ACC/NOM by the.police
‘I asked Maria to be taken by the police’ (Thrainsson, 1979)
The hypothesis by Boeckx & Hornstein is unable to explain why there is
a nominative in the lower clause in (66b), where an accusative is expected.
According to Bobaljik & Landau (2009), there is no case transmission
between the complement clause and the matrix clause. Each clause hosts an
independent case assignment. That is how the controlled argument in (66b)
receives nominative case. Boeckx, Hornstein & Nunes (2010) argue that a
little assumption can solve the problem discovered by Bobaljik & Landau
(2009). They propose that the assignment of an additional theta-role to a
DP removes its quirky case. This proposal solves the problem exemplified
in (64) and (65): not every A-moved DP changes its quirky case, but only
those DPs that have received a new thematic role, i.e. only DPs involved

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in a control relation. In (64) and (65) the quirky DPs conserve their quirky
case when they undergo passivization and raising because passivization and
raising do not involve the assignment of new thematic roles.
The proposal by Boeckx, Hornstein & Nunes (2010) then solves the
problem exemplified in (64) and (65), but what about (66)? Boeckx,
Hornstein & Nunes observe that, according to the literature, the accusative
case transmission in control structures varies strongly across the speakers
(Sigurðsson, 2008). In other words, the acceptability judgments in (66b) are
not correct since some speakers allow case transmission across such control
constructions. (67) shows more correct acceptability judgments.
(67) Hún bað Ólaf að fara bara einn/einan í veisluna.
she.NOM asked Olaf.ACC to go just alone.ACC/NOM to the.party
‘She asked Olaf to just go alone to the party’ (Sigurðsson, 2008)
Boeckx, Hornstein & Nunes propose that both case transmission and case
independence in (67) can be accounted for by the MTC. Since, according to
the MTC, non-finite I does not assign nominative case, the controller (Olaf
in (67)) receives case only after moving into the matrix clause. Which case
then surfaces on the lower copy of the control chain? Boeckx, Hornstein &
Nunes predict two possible outcomes: the structural case assigned to the
controller in the matrix clause or a default case (nominative in Icelandic)
which is applied to those traces that do not bear a case feature. The answer
given by Boeckx, Hornstein & Nunes, summed up in (68), tentatively
accounts for cases of case transmission and case independence in Icelandic.
(68) a. Quirky case is erased (and requires rewriting) when the DP is assigned a
new theta-role.
b. Caseless copies:
i. can inherit the case received by a higher copy.
ii. can receive default nominative case only if the higher copy that
receives case has a different set of theta-roles.
This answer given by Boeckx, Hornstein & Nunes is of course
incomplete since it does not offer a detailed explanation for the behaviour
of caseless copies. The theory proposed by the authors does not precisely
predict when caseless copies inherit case from the A-chain or receive default
case. However no theory, at the time being, seems to be able to make such a
prediction, since case transmission in Icelandic is still quite a murky subject.
The summary given in (68) is a kind of case transmission filter. It is
a set of generalizations that describes how case transmission works in
Icelandic. These generalizations, despite being able to address the issue
of case transmission, still show some problems. First of all, the filter
exemplified in (68) lacks elegance. Take for example (68b-ii). It is not clear
what should be the link between the surfacing of the default case and the

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difference set of theta-roles. In other words, it is not clear which theoretical


mechanism should trigger the case independence, as described in (68b-ii),
exclusively in case of copies with different sets of thematic roles.
The second problem is that (68) works only for Icelandic (and
analogous cases). What about other languages? A review of the relevant
literature by Landau (2008) shows that there is a considerable variation
in case transmission patterns across languages. Languages like Czech,
Slovak, Slovenian and Latin consistently manifest case transmission.
Languages like Russian, Polish and Ancient Greek follow a different
pattern, alternating case transmission and case independence. Landau
reckons that the pattern of complete obligatory case independence (i.e.
total absence of case transmission) is probably attested in German.
How could Boeckx, Hornstein & Nunes account for such a cross-linguistic
variety? The only possibility is apparently to formulate a different filter for each
case transmission pattern. Each language would then be characterized by its case
transmission filter. The idea of a different filter for each language is far from
the requirement of formal elegance and minimality proposed by the Minimalist
Program. Chomsky states clearly that, in a minimalist syntax, “beyond PF
options and lexical arbitrariness, variation is limited to non-substantive parts of
the lexicon and general properties of lexical items” (Chomsky, 1993: 170).
Landau (2008) seems to follow more closely the path marked by
Chomsky (1993). He argues that the cross-linguistic variation in case
transmission can be accounted for by appointing different case features to the
functional heads C or I inside the controlled clause. For example, in languages
with obligatory case independence, the head I in the controlled clause always
has a case feature that assigns case to PRO. In languages with obligatory case
transmission, neither C nor I in the controlled clause bear case features; PRO
receives its case by agreeing with the functional head that triggers control
in the matrix clause. In languages with an optional case transmission (like
Icelandic) the feature may be either present or missing in the same head I.
The possibility to set case feature on heads C and/or I seems to be the key
for accounting for all different patterns of case transmission in control. The
MTC is still unable to provide such a principled and elegant account.

4. CONCLUSIONS
This article has shown the main changes in control theory in the last
fifteen years. We have seen how different theories have provided different
interpretations for different infinitival complements. The challenge between
the theories will be won by the theory that is less assumptive and that is able
to explain most phenomena. The MTC (section 2.1) and the so-called calculus
of control (section 2.2) are the main contenders. They are however far from

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reaching a satisfying and peaceful answer to the problems of control. They


both face hard problems and they both lack explanations for many phenomena.
This article, of course, is not exhaustive. Its main purpose is just
to provide an introduction to control structures and to their theoretical
mechanisms and problems. In other words, this article is an introduction to an
interesting and rich topic that received growing attention in the last decade.
An interesting and rich topic for which the big answers are still far distant.

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Danilo Reggiani
Università degli Studi di Verona
Facoltà di Medicina e Chirurgia
P.le Scuro 10, 37134 Verona
Italy
e-mail: danilo.reggiani@gmail.com

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