Vessela Valiavitcharska

Correct Logos and Truth in Gorgias’

Encomium of Helen

Abstract: This paper argues against the tendency to interpret Gor-

gias’ view of logos as a techne of persuasion which relies on opinion
(doxa) and rests on deception either deliberately or incidentally in
order to function. Rather, Gorgias appears to be making a connec-
tion between truthful speech (alethes logos) and correct speech (orthos
logos). Gorgias’ insistence on correctness of speech surfaces not only
in the Encomium of Helen, but also in the Funeral Oration fragment
and in Agathon’s parody of Gorgianic rhetoric in Plato’s Sympo-
sium. Correct speech goes beyond the effectiveness of language and
into the domain of ethical correctness and responsibility.

mong the two surviving original compositions and the

A few extant fragments of the speeches and opinions of Gor-
gias, the Encomium of Helen has received perhaps the most
attention. His famous account of logos has spurred a number of ques-
tions. How did Gorgias regard the art of speaking? How did he view
the function of language? Does he think of rhetorical discourse as
capable of conveying truth? Scholars have offered a wide range of
opinions: that Gorgias’ view of discourse is best described as “psy-
chological;” that he had a non-representational theory of language;
that his view of rhetorical discourse was deeply influenced by an
existential and relativistic outlook, and others. However, despite the
different interpretations, a common position is that for Gorgias lo-
gos (including his own) is at best incapable of representing any sort
of truth or reality and, at worst, is bound to work in concert with
deception.
In a well-known article entitled “Gorgias and the Psychology
of the Logos,” Charles Segal argues that Gorgias’ main achievement
consists in articulating the art of persuasion as a τèχνη that works
Rhetorica, Vol. XXIV, Issue 2, pp. 147–161, ISSN 0734-8584, electronic ISSN 1533-
8541. ©2006 by The International Society for the History of Rhetoric. All rights re-
served. Please direct all requests for permission to photocopy or reproduce article
content through the University of California Press’s Rights and Permissions website,
at www.ucpress.edu/journals/rights.htm.
147
148 RHETORICA

on the basis of evoking emotional forces, and whose almost physical

power lies in its formal structuring.1 Segal argues that the Encomium is
as much an encomium of Helen as it is an encomium on the power of
logos and thus expresses a view of literature and oratory that touches
closely on Gorgias’ own practice and beliefs. Therefore the speech
“may have served as a kind of formal profession of the aims and
methods of his art, a kind of advertisement” of his skills.2 In other
words, Gorgias sees logos as a τèχνη of persuasion, which works in
an almost physical manner upon the soul, molding the psyche as it
pleases. Logos relies on δìξα (opinion), which is closely connected
with deception, and therefore in order to function, logos must rely
on deception. Thus, “[Gorgias’] art is deliberately opposed to ‘truth’
and produces a logos which is τèχνηù γραφεÐ̋, οÎκ ‚ληθεÐαø λεχθεÐ̋;
but the rhetor uses the deception of τèχνη not because he necessarily
spurns the truth, but because most men (οÉ πλεÐστοι) possess and
communicate only δìξα and would not know truth if they had it.”3
Furthermore, Segal contends that for Gorgias the persuasiveness of
logos derives from its poetic composition, since the µèτρον, the formal
aspect of the logos, “[plays] a significant part in causing the emotive
reactions upon which persuasion rests.”4
Segal’s article set forth what has become an established trend in
the interpretation of the Encomium. Gorgias espouses deception as the
main agent behind the workings of rhetorical speech, and deception
arises from the beautiful language and form of poetry, whose devices
Gorgias himself strives to adopt; it is, therefore, part of his own
rhetorical practice.5 Gorgias’ account of discourse has been described
as “magical”; logos, in other words, affects the mind in a way similar to
magic and clouds its judgment.6 It has also been argued that Gorgias

1
Charles P. Segal, “Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos,” Harvard Studies in
Classical Philology 66 (1962): 99–155.
2
Segal, “Psychology of the Logos,” 102.
3
Segal, “Psychology of the Logos,” 112.
4
Segal, “Psychology of the Logos,” 127.
5
See W. J. Verdenius, “Gorgias’ Doctrine of Deception” in G. B. Kerferd, ed., The
Sophists and Their Legacy: Proceedings of the Fourth International Colloquium on Ancient
Philosophy (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1981), 117–128. On a similar note, W. K. C.
Guthrie, The Sophists (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971) 50, describes
Gorgias’ rhetoric as “sophistic in every sense,” where “sophistic” carries the same
meaning of murky and shifty as it does in Plato’s dialogues. Also on Gorgias’ theory
of logos in relation to deception and tragedy, see Robert Wardy, The Birth of Rhetoric:
Gorgias, Plato, and Their Successors (London: Routledge, 1996), 25–51.
6
Jacqueline de Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, trans. J. Lloyd
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1992). So too George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece
Correct Logos and Truth in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen 149

“saw no moral discrepancy in a methodology of deception,” since

his argumentation was built upon probable knowledge born of a
relativistic outlook.7 Moreover, Gorgias is said to find “language a
miserably elusive and subjective medium in which to order one’s
own world.”8 Even deliberately positive assessments concede that
for Gorgias logos is inseparable from deception.9 I will argue the
opposite view: that in the Encomium Gorgias does not see his own
art as deception, nor does he think that it necessarily rests on opinion
(δìξα), but he sees an intrinsic connection between truthful speech
(‚ληθ˜̋ λìγο̋) and correct speech (æρθä̋ λìγο̋).
The Encomium of Helen is divided into six parts.10 After a short
introduction, Gorgias tells us that his goal is to dispel ignorance,
reveal the truth, and exonerate Helen. The “encomium proper”11
begins with a praise of Helen’s lineage and physical beauty; since
these facts, however, are well-known to everyone, Gorgias quickly
moves on. He gives four different reasons for Helen’s behavior: it
was either physical force; or fortune/necessity/the will of the gods,
which compelled her to act as she did; or she was persuaded by
speeches; or captivated by love. In the first two cases she is clearly
not guilty. In the rest of the speech Gorgias attempts to prove why she

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 61–68, and Classical Rhetoric and Its
Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1999), 34–36, who concentrates on Gorgias’ stylistic innovations
in an effort to demonstrate their effectiveness.
7
Richard Leo Enos, “The Epistemology of Gorgias’ Rhetoric: A Re-Examination,”
The Southern Speech Communication Journal 42 (1976): 35–51 (p. 50).
8
Bruce E. Gronbeck, “Gorgias on Rhetoric and Poetic: A Rehabilitation,” The
Southern Speech Communication Journal 38 (1972): 27–38.
9
See John Poulakos, “Gorgias’ Encomium to Helen and the Defense of Rhetoric,”
Rhetorica 1 (1983): 1–16; “Gorgias’ and Isocrates’ Use of the Encomium,” Southern
Speech Communication Journal 51 (1986): 300–307. Also on the Encomium of Helen as
an implied defense of rhetoric, even though rhetoric can take a license with truth,
see Wardy, cited in n. 5 above, 35–39. Scott Consigny, Gorgias, Sophist and Artist
(Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 2001), lays out an approach he
names “anti-foundationalist” and argues that Gorgias’ account of logos is “parodic”
in that it draws attention to the “rhetoricity” of every text (p. 30) neither confirming,
nor denying truth but incorporating deception as something inevitable.
10
All subsequent references to, quotations from, and translations of the Encomium
of Helen are from D. M. MacDowell, Gorgias: Encomium of Helen (Bristol: Bristol Clas-
sical Press, 1982). All references to Gorgias’ other works are from Hermann Diels and
Walter Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, vol. 2 (Zurich: Weidmann, 1982), section
82.
11
Edward Schiappa, The Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory in Classical Greece. (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1999, has argued for a “pre-disciplinary” reading of the
Encomium, i.e., a reading preceding Aristotle’s division of rhetorical genres.
150 RHETORICA

is not guilty in the latter two cases either. The Encomium ends with
a brief conclusion, in which Gorgias tells us that he has achieved
the purpose he had set for himself at the beginning of the speech.
Thus it happens that a large part of the speech is devoted to the
proof of why Helen is not guilty if she was persuaded by logos,
and this part constitutes the reflection on the nature and function of
logos.
In the beginning of the Encomium Gorgias introduces the subject
of logos by pronouncing that “the grace (κìσµο̋) of a city is excellence
of its men, of a body beauty, of a soul wisdom, of an action virtue and
of a speech truth; and the opposites are a disgrace (‚κοσµÐα).” The
meaning of the word κìσµο̋ in relation to logos and truth has sparked
debate: should it be taken as “adornment,” “ornament” or “good
order,” “decency”? The differences between the meanings of κìσµο̋
would yield different conceptions of what Gorgias understands the
relation of logos and truth to be: in the first case, truth would be a mere
embellishment to speech, in the second, truth would be desirable or
even necessary for speech. However, in this context κìσµο̋ is directly
opposed to ‚κοσµÐα, i.e., the opposite of excellence, beauty, wisdom,
and truth. In the next sentence, Gorgias says that it is an error to
“blame the praiseworthy and praise the blameworthy.” Thus it seems
more likely that here κìσµο̋ is closer in meaning to “good order,”
“decency,” “fittingness” or—as MacDowell translates it—“grace”
(which makes ‚κοσµÐα a “disgrace”). However, the precise meaning
of κìσµο̋ is less important than the fact that a logos, according to
Gorgias, can and should contain the truth, although truth may be
only an external feature of logos. In Gorgias’ view, one who speaks
“correctly” (æρθÀ̋) should reveal the truth and refute those who
blame Helen—which is what he himself sets out to do in this speech,
i.e., “to show the truth and put an end to ignorance.” What kind of
logos is a truthful logos, according to Gorgias?
To answer that question, I turn to Gorgias’ analysis of logos in
Encomium 8–14. To demonstrate the power of logos, Gorgias con-
siders different kinds of speeches: poetry, inspired incantations, the
speeches of the astrologers, false speeches, and speeches at com-
pulsory or philosophical contests. He begins with an appeal to the
power held by poetry in popular opinion: everyone knows how it
can inflict “tearful pity” or bring joy to those who hear it; thus the
mind suffers, through speeches, a “suffering of its own” at others’
fortunes and misfortunes. Gorgias defines poetry as “discourse with
meter” (λìγον êχοντα µèτρον) and declares its power irresistible, but
it is unclear whether poetry works through persuasion or in some
other way, and whether it is truthful and reliable or not (Encomium 9).
Correct Logos and Truth in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen 151

The next kind of logos that he discusses is inspired incantations:

they are “errors of mind and deceptions of belief” (ψυχ¨̋ µαρτ µατα
καÈ δìξη̋ ‚πατ µατα). Incantations achieve their goal by working
with the mind’s opinion (δìξα) and bewitching it through sorcery
(Encomium 10). Just as bad as the incantations are the false speeches:
since most men, says Gorgias, do not possess a perfect knowledge
of the past and a foresight of the future, they make unreliable opin-
ion (δìξα) their mind’s advisor; opinion then allows them to be mis-
guided by persuasion. Persuasion is able to expel good sense, because
it appears to differ from compulsion (Encomium 11–12). Similarly, the
speeches of the astrologers substitute opinion for opinion and make
the incredulous become obvious to the eyes of opinion (Encomium
13). Even at philosophical and compulsory contests, the best speech
is the speech that is quick-witted and skillfully written (γν¸µη̋ τˆχο̋,
τèχνηù γραφεÐ̋); it wins by intercourse with changeable opinion.
What all speeches listed in 10–15 have in common is that they
are based on opinion. In other words, when slippery human opin-
ion becomes attached to logos, the end result is persuasion—which
Gorgias also refers to as “evil persuasion” (οÉ δà πειθοØ τινι κακ¨ù
τ˜ν ψυχ˜ν âφαρµˆκευσαν καÈ âξεγο τευσαν). Persuasion, therefore,
is not a desirable outcome in a speech: its influence is corruptive.
Gorgias openly acknowledges its harm in order to absolve Helen of
blame: it constrains the soul with the form of necessity (Encomium
12), and its agent, the persuader (å πεÐσα̋), does injustice to the
persuaded (™ πεισθεØσα), who, in turn, is accused wrongly. More-
over, when Gorgias makes his famous comparison between logos
and drugs (the effect of logos upon the soul is like the power of drugs
on the body, Encomium 14), he speaks not of logos in general,12 but
uses the word logos in the context of illustrating the negative effects
of persuasion. In order to understand how persuasion can mold the
soul as it wishes, one needs to study the speeches of the astronomers
and philosophers and those recited at speech contests (Encomium 13).
It is those speeches—of which persuasion is an intrinsic part—that
“drug and bewitch the soul with evil persuasion” (οÉ δà πειθοØ τινι
κακ¨ù τ˜ν ψυχ˜ν âφαρµˆκευσαν καÈ âξεγο τευσαν). Furthermore, as
Gagarin observes, outside the Encomium persuasion appears twice,
both times in the Defense of Palamedes, and both times he refers to it as
a negative force and scorns it as ineffective: first, when Palamedes

12
G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press,
1981), argues that the result of Gorgias’ treatment of logos is that its power on the
soul is comparable to the power of drugs on the body.
152 RHETORICA

asks the Greeks how he would have been able to rule them after
becoming a traitor: “By persuasion? By force?” (Palamedes 14); and
second, when he tells his jurors that he cannot hope to persuade them
with the help of friends or entreaties or pity (Palamedes 33).13
To sum up so far: in Helen 8–14 Gorgias distinguishes two kinds
of logos: logos with meter (poetry), which is irresistible, but whether
or not it is persuasive, we do not know; and logos infused with δìξα,
which is intrinsically persuasive, and thus slippery, unreliable, even
evil. There is yet a third kind of logos which makes an appearance
in Gorgias’ speech, and that is his own. At the end of the Encomium
he says, “I have removed by my speech a woman’s infamy and have
kept to the purpose which I set myself at the start of my speech: I
attempted to dispel injustice of blame and ignorance of belief.” This
statement refers back to the beginning of the speech, where Gorgias
tells us that he wishes, “by adding some reasoning (λογισµì̋) to
[his] speech, to free the slandered woman from the accusation and
to demonstrate that those who blame her are lying, to show the
truth, and put a stop to ignorance.” Does he mean then that logos
combined with λογισµì̋ is truthful logos? Not necessarily. Λογισµì̋
appears to be another feature external to logos, and does not always
lead to the truth. Gorgias’ statement at the beginning of the speech
could be taken as a simple description of his method. Besides, the
list of deceptive speeches includes the philosophers’ speeches, which
presumably also contain a certain measure of λογισµì̋.
Gorgias’ method of argumentation in the Encomium has been de-
scribed as “apagogic” and “rationalistic”14 and it has been compared
to the way he reasons in On Not Being and Palamedes, in which the
use of λογισµì̋—if not professed openly—is implied. Although in
Palamedes the aim of rationalistic reasoning is to reveal the truth of
Palamedes’ motives and actions, in On Not Being the same kind of
reasoning is used to achieve an absurd result—that nothing is, and
even if it is, it is inapprehensible, and even if it is apprehensible, it
could not be communicated. Guthrie contends that although the pur-
pose of On Not Being is serious, the conclusions of the composition
cannot be taken seriously to reveal any truth, but are intended as a
sort of reductio ad absurdum of Eleatic, and particularly, Parmenidean

13
Michael Gagarin, “Did the Sophists Aim to Persuade?” Rhetorica 19 (2001): 275–
91 (pp. 288–89). Kerferd, cited in n. 12 above, 80 contends that Gorgias distinguishes
two kinds of persuasion, one good and one bad, but I do not see this kind of argument
anywhere in Gorgias’ extant speeches or fragments.
14
Schiappa, cited in n. 11 above, 121; Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, cited in n. 6
above, 167–68.
Correct Logos and Truth in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen 153

logic. According to Guthrie, Gorgias “would hardly have wished to

deny the existence of everything,” and especially—being a rhetor—to
deny that anything could be communicated. The subversive play on
Parmenides’ arguments “reminds one of Gorgias’ advice to his pupils
to ‘destroy the opponent’s seriousness by laughter, and his laughter
by seriousness.’ ‘’15 According to others, Gorgias’ On Not Being in-
troduces a “radical gulf between logos and the things to which it
refers;” in other words, logos can never succeed in “reflecting” reality
faithfully, because reality is “irretrievably outside [logos].”16 Thus, the
main claim of the essay, as conveyed both in Sextus Empiricus and
the treatise On Melissus, Xenophanes, and Gorgias, is that “there can be
no such thing as knowledge or successful reference” (not that there is
no truth, but that language is incapable if capturing it): an argument
compatible with the basic tenets of skepticism.17 In either case, the
adding of reasoning to speech does not guarantee the demonstration
of truth. As Schiappa notes, outside Gorgias, the word λογισµì̋ is
not a common fifth-century word: an early use is Democritus’ advice
to “drive out by reasoning the unmastered pain of a numbed soul.”
Aristophanes uses the word to ridicule dialectic argumentation in
Euripides (Frogs 973). In Thucydides it always appears in connection
with reflective calculation or logical decision-making.18 In short, the
word λογισµì̋ is not unequivocally connected with truth, although
it may be used to reflect logical reasoning or careful analysis.19 But if a
logos combined with λογισµì̋ is not necessarily a truthful logos—yet
Gorgias explicitly purports to reveal the truth—what kind of logos
is a true logos?
The mention of truth in Gorgias always seems to appear in
connection with correctness of speech. In Encomium 1 he tells us
that “it is an equal error and ignorance to blame the praiseworthy
and praise the blameworthy” and that “the man who says rightly
what ought to be said (λèξαι τε τä δèον æρθÀ̋) should also refute
those who blame Helen . . . and both show what is true and put
a stop to ignorance.” This idea relates to the opening sentence—
“the grace of a city is excellence of its men, . . . of an action virtue,

15
Guthrie, cited in n. 3 above, 193–94. For discussion of the problems connected
with the interpretation and translation of On Not Being, see Schiappa, cited in n. 11
above, 133–52.
16
Kerferd, cited in n. 12 above, 81.
17
Richard Bett, “The Sophists and Relativism,” Phronesis 34 (1989): 139–69 (pp.
150–53).
18
Schiappa, cited in n. 11 above, 122–23.
19
Schiappa, cited in n. 11 above, 123.
154 RHETORICA

and of speech truth”—and further supports the interpretation of

κìσµο̋ as “grace” or “fittingness.” Thus, the entire introductory
paragraph seems to revolve around the notion of correctness or
appropriateness of speech as related to truth. To reveal the truth
would be to show the worth of the praiseworthy—which worth does
not seem to depend on logos, but has a value of its own. In the
Funeral Oration fragment, for example, Gorgias praises the deceased
by saying that they “attained an ‚ρετ  that was divine and a mortality
that was human, often preferring gentle fairness to obstinate justice
and correctness of speech to precision of law, regarding this as the
most divine and universal law (θειìτατον καÈ κοινìτατον νìµον): to
speak, to be silent, and to act as one ought and when one ought (τä
δèον âν τÀú δèοντι καÈ λèγειν καÈ σιγν καÈ ποιεØν).”20 The deceased
are praiseworthy because they spoke and did things correctly, and
it is the task of the orator to reveal it in his speech: “May I be able
to speak what I wish and may I wish to speak what I ought . . . ”
(εÊπεØν δυναеην ‹ βοÔλοµαι, βουλοеην δ' ‹ δεØ).21
Perhaps the strongest argument for the relation of truth and
correctness in Gorgias comes, ironically enough, from Plato. The
speech of Agathon in the Symposium is generally regarded as a
parody of Gorgianic rhetoric. It is an excellent imitation of Gorgias’
distinctive style and draws attention to itself with prominent stylistic
techniques characteristic of Gorgias. The speech is not an authentic
composition by Gorgias, yet being a parody, it picks up on the most
notorious features of Gorgias’ speeches, and could therefore be used
to infer some of the general characteristics of his oratory. Agathon
sets out to correct what he perceives as the “incorrect” encomia of the
other guests by pronouncing a “true” encomium of Eros. He begins
humorously: “I wish indeed to speak first of how I must speak, and
then to speak” (Symposium 194e). Agathon then endeavors to rectify
the misguided notions of the other guests that Eros is to be praised
by praising the fortunes which he brings to humanity; instead, he
says, the correct manner of praise (εÙ̋ δà τρäπο̋ æρθä̋) is to praise
him first for what he is, and then for what he does (Symposium
195a). Although it is intended to mock Gorgias’ style, Agathon’s
prooemium reflects what was, perhaps, an important topos in his
speeches: the association of correctness with truth. Thus, in order

20
Translation from Michael Gagarin and Paul Woodruff, eds. and trans., Early
Greek Political Thought: From Homer to the Sophists (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995), 203.
21
Trans. Gagarin/Woodruff, Early Greek Political Thought, 203.
Correct Logos and Truth in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen 155

to pronounce a true encomium of the god, one must reveal what

ought to be revealed, that is, first the god’s nature, and then the god’s
function.
A similar concern with nature and function is present in the En-
comium of Helen. As Gorgias begins his account of logos, he gives a
definition of poetry “by nature” (“logos with meter”), and then ex-
plains how it functions (“it instills tearful pity and mournful longing,
and makes the mind suffer a suffering of its own at the fortunes and
misfortunes of others,” Encomium 9). Similarly, in the next paragraph
he first attempts to give a definition of the nature of inspired in-
cantations: they are “inducers of pleasure and reducers of sorrow”
(Encomium 10), and then explains how they work: “they affect the
mind through intercourse with the mind’s belief.” In other words,
the truth-correctness topos and the nature-function topos were most
likely prominent features in many of Gorgias’ speeches—which Plato
reflected in his parody in the Symposium. However, what is more
important for present purposes is that both internal and external
evidence suggest that truthful logos (‚ληθ˜̋ λìγο̋) for Gorgias is re-
lated to correct or appropriate logos (æρθä̋ λìγο̋) rather than to logos
combined with reasoning (λογισµì̋). Correct logos seems divorced
from δìξα, since the correctness or appropriateness of speech and
action is both a divine and a human law (θειìτατον καÈ κοινìτατον
νìµον, τä δèον âν τÀú δèοντι καÈ λèγειν καÈ σιγν καÈ ποιεØν, Epitaphios
B6) and independent of persuasion.22 For Gorgias then, correctness of
speech goes beyond the effectiveness of language and is perhaps best
described as a kind of ethical speech.

22
Plato may be deliberately misrepresenting Gorgias’ views of logos in the Gorgias,
when he has him say that the rhetorical art is “to be able to persuade with speeches
judges in the law courts, or statesmen in the Council, or the people in the Assembly
or at any other meeting” and afterwards agree with Socrates’ definition that the “art
of rhetoric is the artisan of persuasion” (πειθοÜ̋ δηµιουργì̋ âστιν ™ ûητορικ , Gorgias
452e-453a). It seems to me unlikely that the same person who, in a public situation
(such as the oral performance of the Encomium of Helen), labels persuasion as “evil”
(Encomium 14), would, in an equally public situation (and presumably more than
once—for Plato to cite it in his dialogue), define his art as the art of persuasion.
It is quite possible that Plato invented the definition of rhetoric himself, just as he
probably invented the word “rhetoric.” The word rhetorike does not appear in any
of the fragments of the sophists; see Edward Schiappa, “Did Plato Coin Rhetorike?”
American Journal of Philology 111 (1990): 457–70, also Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos:
A Study in Greek Philosophy and Rhetoric, 2nd ed. (Columbus: University of South
Carolina Press, 2003), 39–63. Cf. Atheneaus’ comment that, after reading the dialogue
that bears his name, Gorgias is said to have exclaimed, “How well Plato knows how
to satirize!” (Deipnosophistae 11.113.2 (Kaibel) = DK 82.A15a, trans. Sprague).
156 RHETORICA

If truthful logos is correct or appropriate logos and independent of

persuasion, what is the role of pleasure in a speech? Although Gorgias
distances himself from persuasion, he does not renounce pleasure.
Pleasure, like truth or persuasion, is an external component of logos,
and it can be an ally either of persuasion or of truth—but there is
nothing “evil” about pleasure in itself. Thus, poetry—for good or
bad— affects the soul through pleasure; likewise, inspired incanta-
tions work their persuasion into the mind because they are “inducers
of pleasure and reducers of sorrow,” and similarly, speeches at com-
pulsory contests “please and persuade a large crowd” because they
are “written with skill, not spoken with truth.” Gorgias himself sets
pleasure as one of the goals of his logos: he will avoid repeating why,
how, and by whom Helen was abducted, since his audience already
knows that too well, and to tell a well-known fact “carries conviction
but brings no pleasure” (Encomium 5).
Pleasure, therefore, may be a vehicle of persuasion, but it is not
a hindrance to truth—in fact, Gorgias makes every effort to pro-
duce pleasure in his listeners. Although his style was scorned by
later authors as pompous, it must have been impressive for con-
temporaries, since ancient commentators remark on the amazement
it produced in the Athenians.23 Aristotle calls it “poetic,”24 and it is
perhaps this statement which has caused many scholars to look for
specifically poetic vocabulary and rhythmical organization in Gor-
gias. Segal contends that Gorgias’ own employment of persuasion
relies on the emotive power yielded by the formal structuring of
poetry (µèτρον).25 However, Gorgias employs very few strictly poetic
words, and his speeches do not lend themselves to a clear metrical
analysis.26 It is important to note that Aristotle speaks of Gorgias’
style as poetic in the sense of distinct from everyday speech: “Gor-
gias transferred poetic expression to civic discourse because he did
not think it right for the orator to be like private citizens” (trans.
Sprague).

23
Cf. Philostratus, Epistulae et dialexeis 73 = DK 82.A35, Diodorus Siculus 12.53.3
= DK 82.A4.
24
Rhetoric 1.1404a = DK 82.A29.
25
Segal, cited in n. 1 above, p. 127.
26
As Schiappa has demonstrated, certain individual phrases are clearly rhythmic,
yet the speech fails to repeat an overall pattern that could be recognized as metered
poetry (Schiappa, Beginnings of Rhetorical Theory, cited in n. 11 above, p. 111). He
argues that both Gorgias and Thrasymachus draw upon poetic meters but do not
depend on them; “meter is a natural consequence rather than being an end in itself”
(p. 113).
Correct Logos and Truth in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen 157

Further, some commentators emphasize that Gorgias’ greatest

achievement in introducing novel stylistic features was to lend pub-
lic speaking the character of an art (τèχνη, φιλοτεχνÐα).27 Thus, Gor-
gias’ “poeticism” should perhaps be interpreted as the deliberate
and novel aesthetic effect produced by the many prominent stylis-
tic features like alliteration, assonance, rhyme, antithesis, epanalep-
sis, paronomasia, isocolon, etc.28 In addition, his short and balanced
clauses create a unique, rhythmical flow to his speech, which must
have been effective when combined with the appropriate intonation
and body language. Each sentence in the speech is clearly divisible
into declamation units, i.e., units that would have been spoken with-
out a pause, that correspond in terms of length, and that form more or
less independent wholes with respect to meaning. George Kennedy
suggests that Gorgias’ devices are prose analogies to poetic effects
of sound and rhythm.29 Along the same lines, Walker argues that
the presocratic philosophers developed a kind of prose equivalent
to Hesiod’s wisdom-poetry, and the prosodic units of prose became
the phrase and the sentence (κìλον and περÐοδο̋), which correspond
to the metrical line and strophe. Likewise repetition, symmetry, an-
tithesis, and balance were “in essence variations on the primitive,
underlying principle of verse, namely isocolonic and parallelistic
doubling.”30 Thus when Gorgias reportedly made a public appear-
ance in the purple robes worn by professional performers of poetry,31
he was making a statement about the artfulness of his discourse
rather than its association with poetry.32
At the end of the composition Gorgias indicates openly that plea-
sure is one of his goals: “I wanted to write this logos as an encomium
for Helen and for myself an amusement (παÐγνιον).” Although the
word “amusement” has been understood as a retraction of any
truth-claims, thus turning the entire work into a “game,”33 it can
just as well have more to do with pleasure than with a retraction of

27
See Suidas, Lexicon G. 388 = DK 82.A2, Diodorus Siculus 12.53.4 = DK 82.A4.
28
Schiappa, cited in n. 11 above, 85–105, argues that Gorgias’ style, although not
“poetic” in the strict sense of the word, “resembles” poetry in that it is not everyday
language and strikes the listener as strange (p. 94).
29
Kennedy, cited in n. 6 above, pp. 64–66.
30
Jeffrey Walker, Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity (Oxford: Clarendon, 2000), 25.
31
Claudius Aelianus, Varia historia 12.32.4 = DK 82.A9.
32
Schiappa, cited in n. 11 above, 101, describes Gorgias as a “prose rhapsode.”
33
MacDowell, cited in n. 10 above, 16. John Poulakos, cited in n. 9 above, p. 3,
argues that the word παÐγνιον in the last sentence indicates that the composition could
not have been intended as a model speech for students because it would undermine
its own purpose.
158 RHETORICA

truth-claims: “there is plenty of textual material with which to work

without overemphasizing the significance of the last word.’34
In sum, Gorgias’ account of logos distinguishes between three
different kinds of logoi. First, logos with meter, i.e., poetry, which is
powerful and rules over the mind, inflicting joy and sorrow. Gorgias
could thereby be implying that it is deeply persuasive, although he
does not say so explicitly. Second, the logos that employs opinion,
i.e., inspired incantations, philosophical speeches, or speeches at
compulsory contests. This kind of logos is intrinsically persuasive to
no good purpose—since δìξα is slippery and unreliable, the results it
brings are also slippery, unreliable, and even “evil.” The third kind of
logos is, by implication, Gorgias’ own: truthful because it is rightly
spoken (æρθÀ̋), though in this case it has the additional characteristic
of having “reasoning” (λογισµì̋) added to it. The right logos does not
employ persuasion, yet does not shy away from pleasure—pleasure,
as a matter of fact, is a desirable effect in a speech.
What, however, is the precise meaning of æρθä̋ λìγο̋? Does it
mean “saying what one ought,” and does that imply an ethical con-
cern or a concern with justice according to some social standard?
Michael Gagarin notes the ambiguity of the term æρθì̋ in sophistic
usage and its wide range of meaning.35 For example, “correctness of
words” (æν﵈των æρθìτη̋) in the simplest sense was reportedly one
of Prodicus’ concerns: Plato alludes to Prodicus’ preoccupation with
correct verbal usage (Euthydemus 277e, Cratylus 384b) and parodies it
in Protagoras (337a-c), where Prodicus repeatedly draws distinctions
between close synonyms, sometimes as an end in itself. Similarly,
“correct speech” (æρθοèπεια, æρθìτη̋ æν﵈των, Phaedrus 267c, Craty-
lus 391b-e) was of interest to Protagoras, who, in Plato’s dialogue,
discerns “correctly” composed verses from “incorrectly” composed
ones, where by “incorrect” he implies self-contradictory (Protagoras
338e-339a). Gorgias, however, seems to attribute to æρθì̋ a meaning
broader than “linguistic accuracy” or “consistency.”
ÇΟρθì̋ could also mean correctness of argument in the inter-
pretation of guilt and liability. Plutarch, for example, reports that
Pericles spent an entire day with Protagoras, discussing whether a
javelin-thrower who unintentionally struck Epitimus the Pharsalian

34
Schiappa, cited in n. 11 above, 131.
35
Michael Gagarin, “Correct Argument in Sophistic Rhetoric” (delivered at the
fifteenth biennial meeting of the ISHR in Los Angeles in July 2005), and Antiphon
the Athenian: Oratory, Law, and Justice in the Age of the Sophists (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 2002), 26–27.
Correct Logos and Truth in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen 159

and killed him was to blame or whether it was those who organized
the contest, according to the most correct logos (κατ€ τäν æρθìτατον
λìγον) (Pericles 36).36 Schiappa interprets the meaning of æρθì̋ here
as applying not only to speech but to “competing ways of life [ . . .
], choices of war or peace, judgments of just or unjust, etc.,” that
is, to both speech and reality. Protagoras’ concern, therefore, was
with a “correct understanding of actions (πρˆγµατα) as reflected in
discourse.”37
The same issue surfaces in Antiphon’s Second Tetralogy, in which
two pairs of court speeches treat the hypothetical situation of a youth
who threw a javelin and killed a boy who happened to be running
across the practice field. The plaintiff (the dead boy’s father) insists
that the youth committed an unintentional murder and therefore
should be punished as a murderer, while the defendant (the youth’s
father) insists that the boy made a mistake in running through the
field at an inopportune moment and was punished for that mistake
with his own death. The issue here is the representation of reality
and the resulting attribution of blame. The plaintiff maintains that
the actions alone (πρˆγµατα) are self-evident and should suffice in
issuing a verdict; the defendant, however, claims that according to
the truth (‚λ θεια) of what was done, his son should be absolved
since he made no mistake in action—his javelin did not stray from
its course, nor would it have missed the target, had the boy not
prevented it from reaching it. The word æρθì̋ is used by the de-
fendant only once: “For my part, if I have lied about anything, I
agree that whatever I have said correctly (æρθÀ̋) can also be discred-
ited as unfair (Šδικο̋); but if I have spoken the truth (‚λ θεια) but
with subtlety (λεπτˆ) and precision (‚κριβεÐα), then it is only fair that
any hostility that results should be directed not at me the speaker,
but at him [the boy] who acted.”38 But the word is connected with
a representation of the truth through valid reasoning. One aspect
of Gorgias’ own use of æρθì̋ seems very close to this one: if one
is to speak correctly (λèξαι τε τä δèον æρθÀ̋), one should free He-
len from blame; he himself wishes to do that and show the truth
(δεÐξα̋ τ‚ληθè̋) by adding some reasoning (λογιµì̋) to his speech.
The implication is that reasoning could help in providing a “cor-
rect account” and demonstrating the truth of whether or not she
is guilty.

36
Gagarin, Antiphon the Athenian, 27.
37
Schiappa, Protagoras and Logos, cited in n. 22 above, pp. 163–64.
38
Gagarin, Antiphon the Athenian, 125.
160 RHETORICA

The meaning of æρθì̋ as related to truth appears again in An-

tiphon in his discussion of justice in Truth,39 where human law (νìµο̋)
is juxtaposed with the law of nature (φÔσι̋) and shown to be some-
times imposing restrictions on it, sometimes opposed to it. Thus, he
says, “the things from which the laws dissuade us are in no way less
[more?] congenial or akin to nature than the things toward which
they urge us. . . . Thus the things that cause pain do not, according to
a correct account (æρθä̋ λìγο̋), benefit nature more than the things
that cause joy.”40 Again, æρθä̋ λìγο̋ seems to be related to correct
discourse or a correct demonstration of the state of things and, by
implication, to truth.
A similar relation appears also in the Dissoi Logoi, which—
although a work of inferior style and naı̈ve reasoning—seems to
reflect certain intellectual concerns of the fifth century bce. The topic
of Fragment 8 is the relation between public speech, knowledge, and
justice (DK 90.8.1–9). It states that a man who knows the nature of
all things ought to be able to understand the art of speaking and
to speak correctly (æρθÀ̋) on every topic. Conversely, a man who
speaks correctly would have a knowledge of everything and should
also be able to give the city correct instruction in doing good things (τ€
‚γαθ€ æρθÀ̋ διδˆσκεν τ˜ν πìλιν πρˆσσεν) and prevent it from doing
bad ones. And a man who knows how to judge should have a correct
understanding of the just (τä δÐκαιον âπÐστασθαι æρθÀ̋) and the unjust
and how they differ. The author appears to be making the argument
that correct speech and an understanding of reality go together: al-
though things have a twofold appearance in that one and the same
thing could be good for one and bad for another, someone who speaks
correctly knows how to distinguish the truth. (It is not clear from the
context, however, whether under “correct instruction in doing good
things” the author means “ethical things” or “things expedient for
the city.”) Likewise, having a “correct” understanding about the just
and the unjust implies understanding beyond the appearances of-
fered by “incorrect” accounts—a notion in accord with Schiappa’s
interpretation of Protagoras’ view of æρθä̋ λìγο̋ and, in a broader
sense, with Gagarin’s interpretation of æρθì̋ in Antiphon, where the
word is used “to qualify speech, a verdict, a plan, or a law.”41

39
Gagarin, Antiphon the Athenian, 38–63, argues that Antiphon referred to as
“the orator,” Antiphon known as “the sophist” (who wrote Truth and Concord), and
Antiphon the author of the Tetralogies are one and the same person.
40
Trans. Gagarin, Antiphon the Athenian, 67.
41
Schiappa, cited in n. 22 above, 164; Gagarin, “Correct Argument in Sophistic
Rhetoric,” cited in n. 35 above, p. 10.
Correct Logos and Truth in Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen 161

The surviving texts do not give us sufficiently good evidence to

claim that for Gorgias æρθä̋ λìγο̋ also implied just logos, although
Gorgias’ view of correct logos does involve the issue of ethical cor-
rectness and responsibility. For him, logos is a “powerful master”—it
rules over the mind, but is not always to be trusted. It may take
possession of the soul with the beauty of its expression, as in poetry,
and make it suffer a “suffering of its own at the fortunes and mis-
fortunes of others.” Or it may bewitch the soul with evil persuasion
by intercourse with “errors of the soul” and “deceptions of opinion,”
as do the inspired incantations, the philosophers’ disputes, and the
astronomers’ accounts. But it may also reveal the truth, if rightly
spoken, i.e., out of an ethical necessity, distant from persuasion, and
perhaps with a measure of reasoning added to it.
By way of conclusion, I will point out one more passage in Plato
which is relevant to Gorgias’ concern with ethical issues. To Socrates’
question whether Gorgias would agree to teach someone rhetoric
if he did not know what was good or bad, noble or base, just or
unjust, Gorgias answers that the student would have to learn these
things from him as well (Gorgias 459e-460a). Socrates, of course, uses
that answer to corner Gorgias into an apparent discrepancy about
whether or not the rhetorician is capable of using rhetoric unjustly
or doing wrong, at which point Polus jumps into the discussion and
Gorgias has no opportunity to elaborate on his statement. However,
it is clear from the passage that even a hostile and possibly distorting
witness like Plato concedes to Gorgias a concern for issues of right
and wrong. Thus, in his view of æρθä̋ λìγο̋ Gorgias emerges as a
figure different from the opportunistic relativist that Plato portrays.
His attitude towards logos appears close to the high seriousness of
Isocrates (reportedly his student), although his position is perhaps
not as fully and coherently articulated as is Isocrates’ in Antidosis and
Against the Sophists. An example of the affinity between Gorgias and
Isocrates would be the beginning of Isocrates’ Panegyricus, which re-
iterates the beginning of Gorgias’ Olympic Oration; and there is reason
to think that the main theme and tone of the Panegyricus repeat those
of the Olympic Oration.42 Rather than deception, therefore, Gorgias
sees in logos a power and an obligation for ethical use.43

42
Cf. DK 82.B7–8a, Isocrates, Panegyricus 1–3.
43
A shorter version of this paper was presented at the fourteenth biennial
meeting of the ISHR in Madrid in July 2003. I am grateful to the audience, as well as
to Rhetorica’s referees, Rhetorica’s editor, Harvey Yunis, and especially, to my advisors
Professors Michael Gagarin and Jeffrey Walker, for their suggestions and invaluable
help.