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PRE-WEEK BAR REVIEW Version 2007 sirdondee@gmail.com

Personal Collection
of

Supreme Court
(COURT NEWS)

2006-2007
Highlighted Cases

By sirdondee@gmail.com
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PRE-WEEK BAR REVIEW Version 2007 sirdondee@gmail.com

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Labor; Mapua’s Change in Ranking of College Faculty Voided (2007).......................................................................................................................11
Labor; Reinstatement for Employee Dismissed on AWOL Due to Flood (2007)..........................................................................................................12
Labor; Retired Lieutenant’s Pension Terminated upon Loss of Filipino Citizenship (2007).........................................................................................12
Labor; School Guilty of Illegal Dismissal (2007)...........................................................................................................................................................13
Legal Ethics; SC Bans Coterminous Employment of Justices’ Spouses........................................................................................................................14
Legal Ethics; SC Disbars PBA Commissioner for Extra-Marital Affair (2007).............................................................................................................14
Remedial Law; Declaratory Relief; No suspension of telecom stocks public offering (2007).......................................................................................29
Remedial Law; Evidence; Conditions for Discharge of State Witness (2007)...............................................................................................................30
Remedial Law; FPA’s jurisdiction only over agri pesticides (2007)..............................................................................................................................30
Remedial Law; Jurisdiction; SC Upholds Textbook Supply Deal (2007)......................................................................................................................30
Remedial Law; PAO Clients Now Exempt from Court Fees (2007)..............................................................................................................................31
Remedial Law; SC Clarifies Rules on Indigent Litigants (2006)...................................................................................................................................31
Remedial Law; SC Decisions to Withhold Names of Women and Child Victims (2006).............................................................................................32
Remedial Law; SC Denies Habeas Corpus Petition for Nida Blanca Slay Suspect (2006)............................................................................................33
Remedial Law; SC Dismisses Petition to Compel Use of Alternative Fuel for PUVs (2006).......................................................................................33
Remedial Law; SC Issues Guidelines on Judicial Solemnization of Marriage (2007)...................................................................................................34
Remedial Law; SC resolves Boracay land dispute (2007)..............................................................................................................................................35
Remedial Law; SC Upholds Search Warrants against Alleged Fake PlayStation Manufacturer (2007)........................................................................35
Remedial Law; SC: Final Judgments of Courts May Not be Disregarded by DAR Secretary (2006)...........................................................................36
Remedial Law; State Prosecutors Can’t File Informations Unless Validly Authorized (2007).....................................................................................37
Remedial Law; Validity of the Court Martial Proceedings Against Oakwood Rebels (2006).......................................................................................38
Taxation; BIR: Donations to Society for Judicial Excellence Tax Exempt (2006)........................................................................................................39
Taxation; SC Exempts MIAA from Parañaque Realty Taxes (2006).............................................................................................................................39
Taxation; SC Holds DIGITEL Accountable to Pangasinan for Local Taxes (2007)......................................................................................................40

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Social Legislations; Agrarian;
Exemption of Livestock Farms from
CARP (2007)
Lands that are devoted to commercial
livestock, poultry, and swine-raising are
classified as industrial and, therefore,
excluded from agrarian reform coverage.
The Court reiterated the unconstitutionality
of DAR Administrative Order (AO) No. 9
which sought to “regulate livestock farms
by excluding them in the coverage of
agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum
retention limit for their ownership.” The
Court had held in DAR v. Sutton that the DAR
exceeded its authority in issuing the said
AO as it had “no power to regulate
livestock farms which have been
exempted by the Constitution from the
coverage of agrarian reform.”
The Court also said that a perusal of the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission confirms the intent to exclude
from agrarian reform all lands used
exclusively for livestock, swine, and poultry-
raising which are classified as “industrial”
activities. The Court likewise cited the
cases of Luz Farms v. Secretary of the DAR and
Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR where it
categorically ruled that lands devoted
to residential, commercial, and
industrial purposes were exempted
from agrarian reform without any
other qualifications.
The Court also pointed out that the passage
of RA 7881 which amended certain
provisions of the 1988 CARL “changed the
definition of terms ‘agricultural activity’ and
‘commercial farming’ by dropping from its
coverage lands that are devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry and swine-
raising.” The Court held that this significant
modification showed that Congress “clearly
sought to align the provisions of our
agrarian laws with the intent of the 1986
Constitutional Commission to exclude
livestock farms from the coverage of
agrarian reform.”(GR No. 169277,
Department of Agrarian Reform v. Vicente
K. Uy, February 9, 2007)
Administrative Law; Validity of
Administrative Issuances; MTRCB’s
Jurisdiction (2007)
The Supreme Court has declared null and
void the suspension order issued by the
Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB) against GMA
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Network, Inc. (GMA) in 2000 for airing sans
a permit “Muro Ami: The Making” on EMC
Channel 27. However, it affirmed the
MTRCB’s jurisdiction to review “Muro Ami:
The Making” prior to its broadcast.
The Court said that Memorandum Circular
98-17, MTRCB’s basis for its January 7, 2000
suspension order, was not binding on GMA
since the subject memorandum circular has
yet to be registered with the Office of the
National Administrative Register (ONAR) of
the University of the Philippines Law Center
at that time. Citing Sec. 3 of the
Administrative Code of 1986, the Court said
that all agencies are required to file with
ONAR three certified copies of every rule
adopted by it. Administrative issuances
which are not published or filed with
the ONAR are ineffective and may not
be enforced, the Court added.
The Court, however, ruled that MTRCB has
jurisdiction over GMA’s subject program
which was advance publicity for the Cesar
Montano-starrer “Muro Ami,” a movie
depicting one of the worst forms of child
labor in the illegal fishing system.
Section 3 of PD 1986 (MTRCB Charter)
empowers the MTRCB to screen, review,
and examine all motion pictures and
television programs, subject only to the
exemptions expressly mentioned in Sec. 7.
The program in question did not fall under
these exemptions, the Court said.
On January 7, 2000, the MTRCB issued a
suspension order against GMA for airing
“Muro Ami: The Making” without first
securing a permit from the MTRCB as
provided in Sec. 7 of PD 1986 (MTRCB
Charter). GMA then filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals after its
motion for reconsideration was merely
“noted” by the MTRCB. The CA affirmed in
toto MTRCB’s suspension order prompting
GMA to elevate the case to the High Court.
(GMA Network, Inc. v. MTRCB, GR No.
148579, February 5, 2007)
Administrative Law; PNP Chief has
Jurisdiction to Try Civilian Complaints
vs. PNP Members (2007)
The Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief
can act upon complaints of private citizens
against any of the PNP’s officers. Thus
stressed the Supreme Court when it upheld
the August 17, 2001 decision of the Court of
Appeals holding that the PNP Chief had

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jurisdiction to try the civilian complaint
against respondent P/Senior Inspector Jose
J. Asayo and that the respondent’s failure to
exhaust the administrative remedy of filing
an appeal with the National Appellate Board
was fatal to his cause. Respondent, who
was accused of obstructing police officers
from arresting his brother, argued that his
case fell under the jurisdiction of the
People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB).
The Court cited Section 42 of the Republic
Act No. 6975, or the Department of the
Interior and Local Government Act of 1990,
stating that the PNP Chief and regional
directors are vested with the power to
summarily dismiss erring PNP members if
any of the causes for summary dismissal
enumerated in Section 42 is attendant.
“Thus, the power to dismiss PNP
members is not only the prerogative of
PLEB but concurrently exercised by
the PNP Chief and regional directors,”
the Court said.
Asayo before the Office of the Inspector was
charged by one Delia Bun General of the
PNP for obstructing the arrest of his brother.
According to records, the suspects in the
shooting of Bun respondent even gave
refuge to the suspects in the shooting of
Bun of witness. The Court said that his son
and intimidated and harassed Bun these
acts constitute conduct unbecoming a
police officer, a ground for summary
dismissal against RA No. 6975, Section 42.
In his defense, Asayo insisted he was not
given the opportunity to and her witnesses.
However, the Court noted the cross-
examine Bun testimony of the summary
hearing officer, S/Insp Ermilando O.
Villafuerte, revealing that respondent was
indeed given the opportunity to cross-
examine his accusers but that he chose to
waive it. The Court said that the assistance
of counsel “is not imperative” in
administrative proceedings so that
respondent can waive the right to cross-
examine even without counsel. (GR No.
154243, Deputy Director General Roberto
Lastimoso, et al. v. P/Senior Inspector Jose
J. Asayo, March 6, 2007)
Civil Law; Carriers liable for cargo loss
(2007)
A CARRIER is liable for the loss of cargo
resulting from the sinking of the ship it used
but did not own.
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Thus ruled the Supreme Court recently as it
dismissed a petition that sought the
reversal of the rulings of a Makati City
Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals ordering a carrier to reimburse an
insurance firm for the amount it paid when
the ship carrying the insured shipment
sank.
The SC’s First Division held that petitioner
Cebu Salvage Corporation (CSC) was a
common carrier and therefore should be
responsible for the lost shipment unless it
can prove that the ship’s sinking was
brought about by the causes specified in
Article 1734 of the Civil Code (flood, storm,
earthquake, lightning, or other natural
disaster or calamity; act of the public
enemy in war, among others). A common
carrier is one engaged in the business of
carrying and transporting goods for
compensation, and which offers its services
to the public.
The Court noted that CSC “failed to prove
that it exercised extraordinary diligence to
prevent such loss or that it was due to some
casualty or force majeure” despite the
contract of carriage of goods. It also noted
that CSC had control over what vessel it
would use. The fact that CSC did not own
the vessel it decided to use to consummate
the contract of carriage did not negate its
character and duties as a common carrier,
it added.
“To permit a common carrier to escape
its responsibility for the goods it
agreed to transport would radically
derogate from the carrier’s duty of
extraordinary diligence. It would also
open the door to collusion between the
carrier and the supposed owner and to the
possible shifting of liability from the carrier
to one without any financial capability to
answer for the resulting damages,”
cautioned the Court. (Cebu Salvage
Corporation v. Philippine Home Assurance
Corporation, GR No. 150403, January 25,
2007)
Civil Law; Damages; Mercury Drug
Liable for Selling Wrong Medication
(2007)
The Supreme Court recently ordered
Mercury Drug Corporation (Mercury Drug)
to pay Php50,000 and Php25,000 in moral
and exemplary damages, respectively, due
to its employee’s error in selling the wrong
medicine to a customer. As a result, the

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customer fell asleep on the wheel and had
an accident.
The SC’s First Division found that
respondent Sebastian M. Baking would not
have fallen asleep and lost control of his car
had the employee of Mercury Drug issued
the correct medication. Thus, the Court
found Mercury Drug liable for the resulting
injuries as its employee’s negligence
implies that there has also been negligence
on its part.
Baking, who was diagnosed with high blood
sugar and triglyceride in November 1993
was sold Dormicum, a potent sleeping
tablet, instead of the prescribed Diamicron,
in an Alabang branch of the Mercury Drug
Corporation because the latter’s sales
representative had misread his prescription.
Unaware that he was given the wrong
medicine, Baking took one pill of Dormicum
for three consecutive days. On the third
day, he fell asleep on the wheel, causing his
car to collide with another vehicle. (GR No.
156037, Mercury Drug Corporation v.
Baking, May 25, 2007)
Civil Law; Liability; Hospital; Doctor
liable for medical negligence (2007)
THE SUPREME COURT has upheld the
SOLIDARY LIABILITY of the owners of the
Medical City General Hospital and Dr.
Miguel Ampil, a member of its surgical staff,
amounting to over Php3 million for medical
negligence for leaving behind two pieces of
gauze inside a cancer patient’s body during
surgery in 1984.
The Court held both the Professional
Services, Inc. (PSI), owner of the Medical
City Hospital, and Dr. Ampil liable for the
injury sustained by Natividad Agana.
The Court said Dr. Ampil’s negligence was
the proximate cause of Natividad’s injury,
which could be traced from his act of
closing the incision despite the information
given by the attending nurses that two
pieces of gauze were still missing. It found
that Dr. Ampil did not inform Natividad
about the two missing pieces of gauze.
Worse, he even misled her that the pain she
experienced after the procedure was the
ordinary consequence of her operation.
Natividad died in 1986. “To our mind, what
was initially an act of negligence by Dr.
Ampil has ripened into a deliberate
wrongful act of deceiving his patient…This
is a clear case of medical malpractice or
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more appropriately, medical negligence,”
the Court said.
Citing Ramos v. CA, the Court said that PSI
was liable since an employer-employee
relationship exists between PSI and Dr.
Ampil. By accrediting Dr. Ampil and publicly
advertising his qualifications, the hospital
created the impression that Dr. Ampil was
its agent, authorized to perform medical or
surgical services for its patients, it added.
(Professional Services, Inc v. Agana and
Agana, GR No. 126297; Agana, et al. v.
Fuentes, GR No. 126467; Ampil v. Agana
and Agana; GR No. 127590; January 31,
2007)
Civil Law; Damages; Mercury Drug to
Pay Damages to Paraplegic (2007)
The Supreme Court ordered Mercury Drug
Corporation to pay more than Php40 million
in damages to a vehicular accident victim
who became paralyzed for life when his car
collided with the company’s delivery truck.
Stephen Huang, whose sedan-type car
collided with Mercury Drug’s six-wheeler
truck, suffered massive injuries to his spinal
cord, head, face, and lungs. Despite a series
of operations, he is now paralyzed from the
chest down and requires continuous
medical and rehabilitation treatment. The
compensatory damages amounting to more
than half of the damages are for the life
care cost of Huang and for the loss of his
earning capacity.
The SC affirmed the Court of Appeals ruling
finding the Mercury Drug truck driver liable
during the accident in which Huang’s car
was totally wrecked. It found that the
Mercury Drug truck suddenly swerved and
rammed into the right side of Huang’s car
while the two vehicles were traversing
along the C-5 highway in Taguig, Metro
Manila.
The Court thus held Mercury Drug liable for
the irreparable injuries suffered by Huang
after the company failed to show that it
exercised due diligence on the supervision
and discipline over its employees,
particularly its driver. The Court also noted
that the driver didn’t have a driver’s license
during the accident and only had a Traffic
Violation Receipt for being previously
apprehended for reckless driving. Moreover,
it was also observed that petitioner Mercury
Drug did not provide for a back-up driver for
long trips; and at the time of the accident,

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the driver had already been out on the road
for more than 13 hours without any
alternate. (GR No. 172122, Mercury Drug v.
Spouses Huang, June 22, 2007)
Criminal Law; No Crime of Frustrated
Theft (2007)
Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, the crime of theft does not have a
frustrated stage. Theft can only be
attempted or consummated.
The Supreme Court upheld a conviction for
consummated theft, stating that theft can
never be frustrated as its element of
“unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is
deemed complete from the moment
the offender gains possession of the
thing, even if he has no opportunity to
dispose of the same.”
Explaining that the difference between a
frustrated and consummated crime lies in
“whether the felony itself was actually
produced” by the acts of execution
completed by the offender, the Court
concluded that the statutory definition of
theft under Article 308 cannot admit of a
frustrated stage as theft is produced upon
the completion of the element of unlawful
taking.
This ruling lays to rest the controversy
surrounding the existence of frustrated
theft as created by the 1948 and 1964
Court of Appeals rulings of People v. Diño (No.
924-R, 18 February 1948, 45 O.G. 3446.) and
People v. Flores (6 C.A. Rep. 2d 835 (1964)),
which deemed the crimes involved as
frustrated theft.
“While the Diño/Flores dictum is considerate
to the mindset of the offender, the statutory
definition of theft considers only the
perspective of intent to gain on the part of
the offender, compounded by the
deprivation of property on the part of the
victim,” the Court said.
Valenzuela and his cohort, Jovy Calderon,
were convicted of consummated theft by
Branch 90 of the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court in February 2000 for filching
Php12,090-worth of detergent from the
Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the
ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA.
They had finished loading the stolen
merchandise onto a taxi cab when they
were apprehended by SM security forces
before they could leave the complex
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premises. (GR No. 160188, Valenzuela v.
People, June 21, 2007)
Criminal Law; Penalties; SC Clarifies
Effects of RA 9346 on Graduation of
Criminal Penalties (2006)
The penalty of “death” as provided for in
Article 71 of the Revised Penal Code will no
longer be included in the graduation of
criminal penalties.
Thus the Supreme Court, affirming with
modification the conviction of Alfredo Bon
for the rapes and attempted rapes of his
two minor nieces. The Court ruled that it
“cannot find basis to conclude that Rep. Act
No. 9346 intended to retain the operative
effects of the death penalty in the
graduation of the other penalties in our
laws.”
Bon was found guilty by the trial court of
eight counts of rape and was given eight
death sentences. The Court of Appeals
upheld six of the eight death sentences and
downgraded the other two rape convictions
to attempted rape for which the penalties
were reduced to an indeterminate penalty
of 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum,
to 17 years and four months of reclusion
temporal as maximum for each count. On
review, the Supreme Court had to
determine the proper penalty to be given
Bon: whether he should be sentenced to
prision mayor, the penalty two degrees
lower than reclusion perpetua, which is now
the highest remaining penalty with the
removal of the death penalty by RA 9346.
The Court reduced Bon’s penalty for each of
the six counts of rape to reclusion perpetua
while his penalty for each of the two counts
of attempted rape was reduced to a
minimum two years, four months, and one
day to a maximum eight years and one day
of imprisonment. He was also ordered to
pay the victims civil indemnity, moral
damages, and exemplary damages.
The Court said that “the negation of the
word ‘death’ as previously inscribed in
Article 71 will have the effect of
appropriately downgrading the proper
penalties attaching to accomplices,
accessories, frustrated and attempted
felonies to the level consistent with
our penal laws.” It maintained that if RA
9346 was to be interpreted in such a way as
to limit its effects only to matters
concerning the physical imposition of the
death penalty, there would be an

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anomalous situation where the penalties for
the principals and accomplices are
equalized in certain felonies but not in
others.
The Court pointed out that had Congress
explicitly stated in the law that the
proscription of death penalty caused the
modification of other penalties, the Court
would have acknowledged that the
illustrated inconsistencies formed part of
the legislative intent. But given that there
is no such thing expressed in RA 9346, the
Court maintained that section 1 of the law
“is susceptible to a reading that would
harmonize its effects with the precepts and
practices that pervade our general penal
laws, and in a manner that does not defy
the clear will of the Congress.”
The Court also clarified that the
prohibition against the death penalty
did not result in the reclassification of
those crimes previously defined as
“heinous.” It underscored the fact
that the amendatory effects of the law
pertain only to the application of the
death penalty and not to the
classification of felonies. Thus, the
Court held that it does not serve as basis
for the reduction of civil indemnity and
other damages that adhere to heinous
crimes.
While the Court conceded that it had no
choice but to adhere to Article 22 of the
RPC and extend the retroactive benefits of
the enactment of RA 9346 to persons
previously convicted of capital offenses
(except habitual criminals), it stressed that
“this decision does not make operative the
release of such convicts” as there are other
remedies under the law which could be
utilized to secure the reasonable release of
such prisoners. (GR No. 166401, People v.
Alfredo Bon, October 30, 2006)
Criminal Law; SC Oks Graft Charge
against Herminio Disini et al. (2007)
The Supreme Court recently gave the go-
ahead for the filing of an information for
violation of RA 3019, otherwise known as
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices, against
Herminio T. Disini, Vice-President and
General Counsel of the Herdis Group of
Companies (Herdis), and the members of
Herdis’ Board of Directors, namely, Jesus T.
Disini, Angelo V. Manahan, Domingo O.
Borja, Rodolfo Jacob, and Jerry Orlina.
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In a unanimous 10-page decision of the
Court’s First Division penned by Justice
Adolfo S. Azcuna, the Court held that then
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto committed
grave abuse of discretion in dismissing “for
lack of legal and factual basis” the
complaint of the Presidential Commission
on Good Government against Disini et al.
The complaint had alleged that Disini, a
personal friend and golfing partner of the
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos, gave to
the latter shares of stock of Vulcan
Industrial and Mining Corporation (VIMC)
and The Energy Corporation (TEC)
worth Php40 million and Php 25 million,
respectively, in the name of Herdis in
violation of RA 3019.
In finding probable cause against Disini et
al., the Court held that the Ombudsman has
ignored “vital evidence,” i.e., the stock
certificates of VMC and TEC found in
Malacañang when the late President fled
the country in 1986 and the affidavit
presented by Manahan, “one of the trusted
men” of Disini, stating that there was
divestment plan to turn over those
certificates to the late President. It
therefore reversed the resolution of the
Ombudsman dismissing the PCGG’s
complaint and denying the latter’s motion
for reconsideration, respectively.
“The resolution of dismissal is not based on
the evidence presented and is not
warranted by the facts thus far available to
[the Ombudsman],” the Court noted. (GR
No. 135123, Republic v. Desierto, January
22, 2007)
Election Law; Election Protest;
Jurisdiction of SC over Interlocutory
Orders of the COMELEC (2007)
Maintaining its June 7, 2006 status quo ante
order allowing Mayor Noel E. Rosal to
continue performing the functions of mayor
of Legaspi City pending the resolution of the
case before it, the Supreme Court directed
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) “to
determine with utmost dispatch and all due
regard for the parties’ right to be heard, the
true result of the 2004 elections for mayor
of Legaspi City.”
The SC En Banc granted the petitions filed
by Rosal to declare null and void the order
of the COMELEC’s Second Division denying
the request of petitioner Rosal to present
evidence disputing the authenticity of the
ballots contained in 441 out of 520 boxes,

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as well as the COMELEC En Banc’s orders
declaring private respondent Michael Victor
Imperial as the winning candidate and
directing petitioner Rosal to vacate the
contested office. Likewise, the Supreme
Court directed the Comelec to exclude from
the recount ballot boxes “found in such a
condition as would afford a reasonable
opportunity for unlawful access to their
contents.”
“Under the circumstances, the question as
to who between the parties was duly
elected to the office of mayor cannot be
settled without further proceedings in the
COMELEC. In keeping with the precepts laid
down in this decision, the COMELEC must
first ascertain, after due hearing, whether it
has before it the same ballots cast and
counted in the elections. For this purpose,
it must determine: (1) which ballot boxes
sufficiently retained their integrity as to
justify the conclusion that the ballots
contained therein could be relied on as
better evidence than the election returns
and (2) which ballot boxes were in such a
condition as would afford a reasonable
opportunity for unauthorized persons to
gain unlawful access to their contents. In
the latter case, the ballots must be held to
have lost all probative value and cannot be
used to set aside the official count reflected
in the election returns,” the Court said.
The Court found that the COMELEC’s
Second Division “adopted a manifestly
unreasonable procedure” when it refused to
allow petitioner Rosal to present evidence
that the ballots being revised had been
tampered with, and insisted on its own
authority to determine the ballots’
authenticity.
In delineating the procedure in addressing
post-election fraud, the Supreme Court
held: “The integrity of the ballots and
therefore their probative value, as evidence
of the voters’ will, are contingent on the
integrity of the ballot boxes in which they
were stored. Thus, it is incumbent on the
protestant to prove, at the very least, that
the safety features meant to preserve the
integrity of the ballot boxes and their
contents were installed and that these
remained in place up to the time of their
delivery to the COMELEC for the revision
proceedings. If such substantial compliance
with these safety measures is shown as
would preclude a reasonable opportunity of
tampering with the ballot boxes’ contents,
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the burden shifts to the protestee to prove
that actual tampering took place. If the
protestee failes to discharge this burden,
the court or the COMELEC, as the case may
be, may proceed on the assumption that
the ballots have retained their integrity and
still constitute the best evidence of the
election results. However, where a ballot
box is found in such a condition as would
raise a reasonable suspicion that
unauthorized persons would have gained
unlawful access to the ballots in it and the
official count reflected in the election return
must be upheld as the better and more
reliable account of how and for whom the
electorate voted.”
Private respondent Imperial had repeatedly
assailed the earlier petition under Rule 65
by citing the doctrine under Repol v.
Commission on Elections (GR No. 161418, April
28, 2004) that the Supreme Court has no
power to review via certiorari an
interlocutory order or final resolution of a
Division of the Comelec.
In addressing this procedural issue, the
Supreme Court said that “A sensible
reading of our decision shows that
Repol was not a negation or
repudiation of this Court’s jurisdiction
over pertitions for certiorari from
interlocutory orders rendered by a
Comelec division… Rather, this Court
in Repol merely applied the rule that a
petition for certiorari must be justified
by the absence of a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.” The Court pointed out
that the situation in the present case
differed from that in Repol as petitioner
Rosal filed a motion for reconsideration of
the Second Division’s order. “When that
failed, no other speedy and adequate
remedy against the unpardonable vices
attending the Second Division’s treatment
of the election protest was left to him
except recourse to this Court under Rule
65. Under the circumstances, he was
without the shadow of a doubt justified in
taking it,” the Court said.
Petitioner Rosal was proclaimed the duly
elected mayor of Legaspi City, having
received 44,792 votes, over private
respondent’s 33,747, in the May 10, 2004
elections. On May 24, 2004, the latter filed
a petition to annul the proclamation and
subsequently filed an election protest
contesting the results of the election in all

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520 precincts on the grounds of alleged
irregularities.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio wrote a concurring
opinion wherein he opined that there is no
need to rule on the propriety of the petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 on the
interlocutory order assailed in GR No.
168253 as its consolidation with the main
case, as decided by the Comelec En Banc
and elevated to the Supreme Court under
Rule 64, rendered the issue moot and
academic. (GR Nos. 168253, 172741, Mayor
Noel E. Rosal v. Commission on Elections
Second Division and Michael Victor
Imperial, March 16, 2007)
Labor Law; Reinstatement of Employee
Dismissed on Account of Pregnancy
(2007)
It is illegal to terminate an employee
on account of her pregnancy. Thus ruled
the Supreme Court when it denied the
petition for review of Del Monte Philippines,
Inc. and affirmed the July 23, 2001 decision
and May 7, 2002 resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA), which held that absences
due to a justified cause cannot be a
ground for dismissal.
The Court held that respondent Lolita
Velasco’s absences are justified even if the
dates of her absences do not correspond to
those in her medical certificates because
pregnancy is a long-term condition
accompanied by an assortment of
related illnesses. “It can be safely
assumed that the absences that are not
covered by, but which nonetheless
approximate, the dates stated in the
Discharge Summary and Medical
Certificate, are due to the continuing
condition of pregnancy and related
illnesses, and hence, are justified
absences,” the Court said.
The Court also agreed with the CA in
concluding that the respondent’s sickness
was pregnancy-related and that terminating
Velasco would be a violation of the Labor
Code, specifically Article 137, which states
that “it is unlawful for any employer to
discharge a woman on account of her
pregnancy, while on leave or in
confinement due to her pregnancy.”
The Court ruled that Del Monte had no legal
basis to terminate Velasco on the ground
that the latter had an alleged “long history”
of unauthorized absences committed
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several years beforehand and that these
absences should also be considered. The
Court held that Velasco’s last string of
absences is justifiable and had been
subsequently explained. These cannot be
considered together with her previous
infractions as gross and habitual neglect.
Both the National Labor Relations
Commission and the CA found that
respondent Velasco was able to justify her
absences in accordance with the company
rules and policy and that she attempted to
file leaves of absence but Del Monte’s
supervisor refused to receive them. Velasco
suffered from urinary tract infection during
pregnancy while being one of Del Monte’s
field laborers in 1994 and was even advised
by the company’s doctor to have rest-in-
quarters for several days. (GR NO. 153477,
Del Monte Philippines, Inc. v. Lolita
Velasco, March 6, 2007)
Labor Law; SC Junks Company Ban on
Employees from Marrying Co-Workers
(2006)
Thou shall not compel an employee to
resign by reason of his or her marriage
to a colleague. The Supreme Court has
affirmed a Court of Appeals’ ruling that
declared invalid a company’s policy
requiring employees to resign in the event
they get married to a co- worker.
The SCs Second Division ruled that that the
questioned policy of Star Paper Corporation
(Star Paper), a firm engaged in trading of
paper products, “is an invalid exercise of
management prerogative.” Under the said
policy, which had been in effect since 1995,
new applicants will not be allowed to be
hired if he or she has a relative, up to the
3rd degree of relationship, already
employed by the company. In case two
single employees develop a friendly
relationship during the course of their
employment and then decide to get
married, the policy requires one of them to
resign.
The CA had ruled that the assailed policy
was “violative of the constitutional rights
towards marriage and the family of
employees and of article 136 of the Labor
Code.” It also held that the resignations of
its employees “were far from voluntary.”
The Court found “lame” petitioner Star
Paper, et al.’s sole contention that the
company did not just want to have two or
more of its employees related between the

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third degree by affinity and/or
consanguinity. It added that the company
failed to present undisputed proof of a
reasonable business necessity to justify
such a policy.
The Court stressed that the protection given
to labor in our jurisdiction is vast and
extensive. “The questioned policy may not
facially violate Art. 136 of the Labor Code
but it creates a disproportionate effect and
under the disparate impact theory, the only
way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a
showing that it is reasonable despite the
discriminatory, albeit, disproportionate,
effect. The failure of petitioners to prove a
legitimate business concern in imposing the
questioned policy cannot prejudice the
employee’s right to be free from arbitrary
discrimination based upon stereotypes of
married persons working together in one
company,” the Court said.
The Court noted that the 1987 Constitution
states the policy towards the protection of
labor. Article II, sec. 18 provides that “the
state affirms labor as a primary social
economic workforce” and that “it shall
protect the rights of workers and promote
their welfare” while Art. XIII, sec. 3 provides
that “the State shall afford full protection to
labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment
and equality of employment opportunity for
all.”
The Court also noted Art. 136 of the Labor
Code which states that “it shall be unlawful
for an employer to require as a condition of
employment or continuation of employment
that a woman employee shall not get
married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly
that upon getting married a woman
employee shall be deemed resigned or
separated, or to actually dismiss, discharge,
discriminate or otherwise prejudice a
woman employee merely by reason of her
marriage.”
Due to the said company policy,
respondents Ronaldo Simbol and Wilfreda
Comia were forced by Star Paper to resign
subsequent to their respective marriages to
co-workers. A third respondent, Lorna E.
Estrella, was forced to resign after she was
impregnated by a married co-worker.
Estrella said she was forced to submit a
letter of resignation in exchange for her
thirteenth month pay when she was barred
from work after going on leave.
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The respondents filed a complaint with the
Labor Arbiter who dismissed the same for
lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed
the Labor Arbiter’s decision. When NLRC
denied their motion for reconsideration, the
respondents brought the case to the
appellate court. Concurring were Justices
Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, Renato C.
Corona, Adolfo S. Azcuna, and Cancio C.
Garcia. (GR No. 164774, Star Paper
Corporation, et al. v. Simbol, et al., April
12, 2006)
Labor Law; Security of Tenure vs.
Management Prerogative and Police
Power (2007)
ISSUE: Ultimately, the issue raised by the
parties boils down to whether petitioner
Santos was illegally dismissed by private
respondent SLMC on the basis of her
inability to secure a certificate of
registration from the Board of Radiologic
Technology.
HELD: While the right of workers to
security of tenure is guaranteed by the
Constitution, its exercise may be
reasonably regulated pursuant to the
police power of the State to safeguard
health, morals, peace, education,
order, safety, and the general welfare
of the people. Consequently, persons who
desire to engage in the learned professions
requiring scientific or technical knowledge
may be required to take an examination as
a prerequisite to engaging in their chosen
careers. The most concrete example of this
would be in the field of medicine, the
practice of which in all its branches has
been closely regulated by the State. It has
long been recognized that the
regulation of this field is a reasonable
method of protecting the health and
safety of the public to protect the
public from the potentially deadly
effects of incompetence and ignorance
among those who would practice
medicine. The same rationale applies in
the regulation of the practice of radiologic
and x-ray technology. The clear and
unmistakable intention of the legislature in
prescribing guidelines for persons seeking
to practice in this field is embodied in
Section 2 of the law:
Sec. 2. Statement of Policy. — It is
the policy of the State to upgrade
the practice of radiologic technology
in the Philippines for the purpose of

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protecting the public from the
hazards posed by radiation as well
as to ensure safe and proper
diagnosis, treatment and research
through the application of machines
and/or equipment using radiation.
Indeed, complainant-appellant cannot
insist on her “sterling work
performance without any derogatory
record” to make her qualify as an x-ray
technician in the absence of a proper
certificate of Registration from the
Board of Radiologic Technology which
can only be obtained by passing the
required examination. The law is clear
that the Certificate of Registration cannot
be substituted by any other requirement to
allow a person to practice as a Radiologic
Technologist and/or X-ray Technologist
(Technician).
No malice or ill-will can be imputed upon
private respondent as the separation of
petitioner Santos was undertaken by it
conformably to an existing statute. It is
undeniable that her continued employment
without the required Board certification
exposed the hospital to possible sanctions
and even to a revocation of its license to
operate. Certainly, private respondent could
not be expected to retain petitioner Santos
despite the inimical threat posed by the
latter to its business. This notwithstanding,
the records bear out the fact that petitioner
Santos was given ample opportunity to
qualify for the position and was sufficiently
warned that her failure to do so would
result in her separation from work in the
event there were no other vacant positions
to which she could be transferred. Despite
these warnings, petitioner Santos was still
unable to comply and pass the required
exam. To reiterate, the requirement for
Board certification was set by statute.
Justice, fairness and due process demand
that an employer should not be penalized
for situations where it had no participation
or control.
While our laws endeavor to give life to the
constitutional policy on social justice and
the protection of labor, it does not mean
that every labor dispute will be decided in
favor of the workers. The law also
recognizes that management has rights
which are also entitled to respect and
enforcement in the interest of fair play.
Labor laws, to be sure, do not authorize
interference with the employer's judgment
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in the conduct of the latter’s business.
Private respondent is free to determine,
using its own discretion and business
judgment, all elements of employment,
"from hiring to firing" except in cases of
unlawful discrimination or those which may
be provided by law. None of these
exceptions is present in the instant case.
The fact that another employee, who
likewise failed to pass the required exam,
was allowed by private respondent to apply
for and transfer to another position with the
hospital does not constitute unlawful
discrimination. This was a valid exercise of
management prerogative, petitioners not
having alleged nor proven that the
reassigned employee did not qualify for the
position where she was transferred. In the
past, the Court has ruled that an objection
founded on the ground that one has better
credentials over the appointee is frowned
upon so long as the latter possesses the
minimum qualifications for the position.
Furthermore, the records show that Ms.
Santos did not even seriously apply for
another position in the company. St. Luke's
Medical Center Employee's Association-
AFW vs. NLRC , March 7, 2007
Labor; Mapua’s Change in Ranking
of College Faculty Voided
(2007)
The Supreme Court recently declared null
and void the Mapua Institute of Technology
(MIT)’s unilateral change in the ranking of
its college faculty from 19 levels to 23
levels and the computation of the salary of
its high school faculty from a rate-per-load
to a rate-per-hour basis.
In a decision penned by Justice Leonardo A.
Quisumbing, the Court’s Second Division
reversed the Court of Appeals, and
reinstated the ruling of the Panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators that the new faculty
ranking and evaluation system of its college
faculty proposed by respondent MIT is an
unauthorized modification of the 2001
Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by
petitioner Faculty Association of MIT (FAMIT)
and MIT. “It is made up of a faculty
classification that is substantially different
from the one originally incorporated in the
current CBA between the parties,” the Court
said. As such, it ruled that the proposed
system contravenes the existing provisions
of the CBA which constitutes the law
between the parties.

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Likewise, the Court ruled that since it is
clear from the parties’ CBA that the salary
of a high school faculty member is based on
a rate-per-load and not on a rate-per-hour
basis, there is no room for the change in
formula by MIT.
The Court stressed that in cases of doubt in
the interpretation of any law or provision
affecting labor, such should be interpreted
in favor of labor. (GR No. 164060, FAMIT v.
CA and MIT, June 15, 2007)
Labor; Reinstatement for Employee
Dismissed on AWOL Due to
Flood (2007)
The Supreme Court ordered Coca-Cola
Bottlers Philippines, Inc. (Coca-Cola) to
immediately reinstate an employee who
was terminated for not reporting to work
and for failing to file a leave of absence
before the said absence.
In a decision penned by then Acting Chief
Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, a former
Secretary of Labor himself, the Court’s
Second Division also ordered Coca-Cola to
pay the employee’s full backwages,
allowances, and other benefits from the
time of his dismissal up to his
reinstatement, as well as attorney’s fees
equivalent to 10 percent of his total
monetary award.
Alberto Navarro, a forklift operator for Coca-
Cola for more than a decade, was not able
to report to work on August 11, 1997
because of heavy rains which flooded his
entire barangay. Though failing to file a
leave of absence before his absence and
only doing so a day after the same, he was
able to submit a written explanation
accompanied by a Certification from his
Barangay Captain stating that his absence
was due to flooding on the day of his
absence. Despite these, Navarro was
terminated. He filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal which the Labor Arbiter dismissed
for lack of merit. On appeal, the National
Labor Relations Commission reversed the
Labor Arbiter. The Court of Appeals
reversed the NLRC and reinstated the
decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Reversing the CA, the Court held that
Navarro’s application for leave after his
absence should have been allowed by the
company because “his absence was due to
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a fortuitous event outside of petitioner’s
control.” The Court also ruled that Navarro
had no “wrongful, perverse, or even
negligent attitude” when he absented
himself. The Court said that a worker
cannot be reasonably expected to
anticipate times of sickness nor emergency.
“Hence, to require prior notice of such
times would be absurd. He can only give
proper notice after the occurrence of the
event—which is what petitioner did in this
case,” the Court explained. (GR No. 162583,
Navarro v. Coca-Cola, June 8, 2007)
Labor; Retired Lieutenant’s
Pension Terminated upon
Loss of Filipino Citizenship
(2007)
The Supreme Court en banc denied the
petition of Salavador Parreño, a retired
Lieutenant of the Philippine Constabulary,
for the continuance of his monthly pension
which the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) stopped releasing when Parreño
became a naturalized American citizen.
Parreño filed a claim before the Commission
on Audit (COA) for the continuance of his
pension, contesting the constitutionality of
Section 27 of PD 1638 or the AFP Military
Personnel Retirement and Separation
Decree, as amended by PD 1650, which
provides that a retiree who loses his Filipino
citizenship shall be removed from the
retired list and consequently have his
retirement benefits terminated.
Citing lack of jurisdiction, COA denied
Parreño’s petition and advised him to file
his claim with the court authorized to rule
on issues of constitutionality of provisions of
law. In his motion for reconsideration,
Parreño argued that since his pension
involves government funds, it is within
COA’s jurisdiction to resolve the dispute.
COA dismissed his appeal, reiterating its
lack of jurisdiction over the case. It ruled,
however, that even if it assumed authority
over his claim, its ruling would still be a
dismissal of the petition. Parreño then
brought his case to the Supreme Court.
In a decision penned by Justice Antonio T.
Carpio, the High Court affirmed the COA
ruling, underscoring that the jurisdiction of
COA over money claims, defined as
“demand(s) for payment of a sum of
money, reimbursement or compensation
arising from law or contract due from or

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owing to a government agency” under
Commonwealth Act No. 327 or An Act Fixing
the Time within which the Auditor General
shall Render his Decisions, does not include
the power to rule on the constitutionality of
laws. Citing Spouses Mirasol v. Court of
Appeals, the Court further emphasized that
the power of judicial review is vested by the
1987 Constitution in the Supreme Court and
all Regional Trial Courts.
Citing Section 11 of Republic Act (RA) No.
7077 or the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Reservist Act, which provides that citizen
soldiers or reservists include ex-servicemen
and retired officers of the AFP, the High
Court ruled that as retirees remain a part of
the Citizen Armed Forces even when no
longer in the active service, “[t]he state has
a right to impose a reasonable condition
that is necessary for national defense… [as]
[t]o rule otherwise would be detrimental to
the interest of the state.” The requirement
imposed by Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended, is thus not contrary to public
policy and welfare, neither is it oppressive
and discriminatory, the Court held. It further
held that the AFP, in stopping Perraño’s
pension upon the change in the retired
Lieutenant’s citizenship, was only acting in
accordance with Section 27 of PD 1638, as
amended. Perraño was given the chance to
contest his pension’s termination before the
Judge Advocate General. Thus, there was no
violation of due process.
The High Court, however, clarified that
should Parreño re-acquire his Filipino
citizenship under RA 9225 or the Citizenship
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,
he will again be entitled to the benefits and
privileges of Filipino citizenship starting
from the time of its re-acquisition.
On whether Section 27 of PD 1683 is
retroactive or prospective in application,
the High Court agrees with Parreño and the
OSG that the provision should apply
prospectively. However the High Court
disagrees with their interpretation that the
law applies only to those who joined the
service after the effectivity of the Decree.
Rather, the High Court ruled that PD 1683,
which was signed on 10 September 1979,
citing Section 2 of the Decree, as amended,
“appl[ies] to all military personnel in the
service of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.” Parreña, who joined the
service in 1950 and retired in 1982, long
after the effectivity of PD 1638, as
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amended, is thus covered by the Decree.
(GR No. 162224, 2nd Lt. Salvador Parreño,
represented by his daughter Myrna P.
Caintic v. Commission on Audit and Chief of
Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines, June
7, 2007)
Labor; School Guilty of Illegal
Dismissal (2007)
The Supreme Court recently found a
Catholic school guilty of illegal dismissal.
Petitioner Rodelia S. Fungo, former
secretary of the Rector of Lourdes School of
Mandaluyong Fr. Servillano B. Bustamante,
was forced to resign in 1996 after 15 years
of service when Fr. Bustamante claimed
that she breached the trust he reposed on
her. Fungo, who had authorized access to
all the confidential documents of Fr.
Bustamante, looked into the files and
retrieved the summary of efficiency ratings
of all the teachers after her husband was
fired due to a low rating.
In a 10-page decision penned by Justice
Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, the Court’s
First Division reinstated with modification
the decision of the Labor Arbiter and held
that the appellate court erred when it
affirmed the National Labor Relations
Commission ruling that petitioner had
voluntarily resigned from employment.
The Court found that after Fungo asked Fr.
Bustamante the reason for her husband’s
low performance rating, she was summoned
to the school treasurer’s office and was
threatened that if she did not resign within
30 minutes, her separation pay would be
forfeited. Given her husband’s
unemployment and her family’s financial
problems, Fungo was compelled to resign.
As such, the Court said that Fungo was
constructively dismissed from her
employment because the circumstances
clearly showed that respondents wanted to
terminate Fungo’s employment, but made it
appear that she voluntarily resigned.
The Court also held that Fungo did not
breach the trust and confidence reposed on
her by Fr. Bustamante since she did not
show the subject documents to any other
person except to Fr. Bustamante himself,
and it was established that Fungo did have
authorized access to the files from the
beginning of her job as his secretary.

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The Court also held that resignation is a
voluntary act and is not consistent with the
absence of petitioner’s intention to leave
the school and the way she pursued her
complaint against the respondents.
Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an
employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement.
However, the Court considered that Fungo’s
working relationship with Fr. Bustamante as
having been already strained and thus
ordered the payment of separation pay and
other benefits in lieu of reinstatement. (GR
No. 152531, Fungo v. Lourdes School of
Mandaluyong, July 27, 2007)
Legal Ethics; SC Bans Coterminous
Employment of Justices’
Spouses
Starting April 1, spouses of incumbent
justices are banned from working as
coterminous employees in the Judiciary. In
AM No. 07-3-02-CA, the Supreme Court
issued a prohibition against the
employment of spouses of Justices in the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
Sandiganbayan, and Court of Tax Appeals.
Spouses presently employed and covered
by the rule are deemed resigned at the
close of office hours on March 31.
The Court found it necessary to control and
regulate the employment of the spouses of
Justices “to enforce the letter and the spirit
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary calling for an ethical
judiciary that is above suspicion.” The New
of Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, the Court noted, “is premised,
among others, on the fact that ‘public
confidence in the judicial system and
in the moral authority and integrity of
the judiciary is of utmost importance
in a modern democratic society; and…
it is essential that judges, individually
and collectively, respect and honor
judicial office as a public trust and
strive to enhance and maintain
confidence in the judicial system.’” (AM
No. 07-3-02-CA, In re: Rule Banning the
Employment of Spouses of Justices in the
SC, CA, Sandiganbayan and CTA as
Coterminous Employees, March 6, 2007)
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Legal Ethics; SC Disbars PBA
Commissioner for Extra-
Marital Affair (2007)
For carrying on “a different ballgame”
outside his marriage, Philippine Basketball
Association (PBA) Commissioner Atty. Jose
Emmanuel “Noli” M. Eala was disbarred by
the Supreme Court.
In an 18-page per curiam decision, the
Court annulled and set aside Resolution No.
XVII-2006-06 passed on January 28, 2006
by the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) dismissing the
disbarment case against Eala for lack of
merit, and instead disbarred him for grossly
immoral conduct, violation of his oath of
office, and violation of Canons 1 and 7 of
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, effective immediately. The
Court found that Eala, a married man, in
carrying on an extra-marital affair with a
married woman prior to the judicial
declaration that her marriage was null and
void “showed disrespect for an institution
held sacred by the law” and “betrayed his
unfitness to be a lawyer.”
Joselano Guevarra filed a complaint for
disbarment before the IBP-Committee on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) against Eala on the
ground of gross immorality, alleging that
the latter carried on an adulterous
relationship with complainant’s then-wife,
Irene Moje.
Guevarra alleged that he found in their
conjugal home a love letter dated on the
day of their wedding from Eala to Moje,
where Eala wrote, “BE MINE….AND MINE
ALONE, and I WILL BE YOURS AND YOURS
ALONE! I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU
FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I’M LIVING MY
TWEETIE YOU’LL BE!” Guevarra also
alleged that right after Moje abandoned
their conjugal home, he soon saw Eala’s
and Moje’s respective cars constantly
parked at a place where, he later found out,
Moje was already residing. Complainant
also learned that on February 14, 2002,
Moje gave birth to a baby girl whose father
she identified in the preparation of the birth
certificate as Eala.
Eala, in his Answer, denied both flaunting
an adulterous relationship with Moje,
alleging that their relationship was “low
profile and known only to members of their
respective families,” and having personal

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knowledge of the Certificate of Live Birth of
Moje’s daughter. He countered that under
the circumstances, his “purely personal and
low profile special relationship with Irene
(Moje) is neither under scandalous
circumstances nor tantamount to grossly
immoral conduct as would be ground for
disbarment.”
Eala later moved to dismiss the disbarment
complaint due to the pendency of a case
filed by Guevarra for annulment of
marriage, which was later granted by
Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, and a criminal complaint for
adultery also filed by Guevarra against him
and Moje.
The IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner
recommended that Eala be disbarred for
violating Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. The IBP Board
of Governors, however, annulled and set
aside the said decision of the IBP-CBD and
dismissed the disbarment case for lack of
merit.
The Court, adopting the finding of the IBP-
CBD Investigating Commissioner, held that
the Eala’s statements in his Answer, taken
with the Certificate of Live Birth of Moje’s
daughter, “sufficiently prove that there was
indeed an illicit relationship between
respondent and Irene (Moje) which resulted
in the birth of the child.”
The Court emphasized that Eala did not
deny carrying an adulterous relationship
with Moje; what he denied was having
flaunted such relationship.
“Without doubt, the adulterous relationship
between respondent and Irene has been
sufficiently proven by more than clearly
preponderant evidence – the evidence
adduced by one party which is more
conclusive and credible than that of the
other party and, therefore, has greater
weight than the other – which is the
quantum of evidence needed in an
administrative case against a lawyer,” held
the Court.
The Court said that it was immaterial
whether Eala carried out his affair discreetly
as the case involved “a relationship
between a married lawyer and a married
woman who is not his wife.” It added that
“While it has been held in disbarment cases
that the mere fact of sexual relations
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between two unmarried adults is not
sufficient to warrant administrative action
for such illicit behavior, it is not so with
respect to betrayals of the marital vow of
fidelity.”
The Court further stressed that it was also
of no consequence that the marriage
between Guevarra and Moje was eventually
declared void ab initio as the acts
complained of occurred before such
declaration of nullity. “As a lawyer,
respondent should be aware that a man and
woman deporting themselves to be
husband and wife are presumed, unless
proven otherwise, to have entered into a
lawful contract of marriage.” (AC No. 7136,
Guevarra v. Eala, August 1, 2007)
Local Government; Mayor & Councilors
are liable for Demolishing Public
Market (2007)
A municipal mayor and his councilors
cannot take the law into their own
hands and demolish a project funded
by the government without proper
authorization.
Thus the Supreme Court stressed when it
recently sentenced a municipal mayor and
his four councilors to imprisonment for not
less than six years and one month nor more
than 15 years. The Court also disqualified
the mayor and his councilors from holding
public office for life for violating various
provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (RA 3019). The five officials
were previously found by the
Sandiganbayan to be guilty of bad faith
and to have caused undue injury to the
government by demolishing a public
market construction.
The Court affirmed the decision and
resolution of the Sandiganbayan that found
the petitioners Mayor Robert Tayaban and
Councilors Francisco Maddawat, Artemio
Balangue, Francisco Mayumis, and Quirino
Pana of the Municipality of Tinoc, Ifugao,
liable to reimburse Php134,632.80 to the
government, which the latter disbursed for
the construction of the Tinoc Public Market.
The group demolished the half-finished
Tinoc Public Market in August 15, 1999 on
the impression that the market was being
constructed on the wrong location by
contractor Lopez Pugong, who was awarded
the project by the funder, Cordillera
Executive Board (CEB).

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The Court said that the Sandiganbayan did
not err in finding Tayaban and his
councilors guilty of bad faith in causing the
demolition because the municipal resolution
that allowed the demolition was adopted
without due notice given to the CEB and the
private contractor. More proof of the
officials’ bad faith was provided by
Pugong’s testimony that the site where his
laborers began construction of the
demolished public market was pointed out
by Tayaban himself when he asked the
mayor where the market was to be erected.
Moreover, the Court found that the
petitioners failed to present any evidence of
having informed the CEB of their objections
regarding the project’s location. Thus, the
Court said that Pugong and his men cannot
be blamed for ignoring the memorandum
issued by petitioner because the CEB is the
legitimate owner of the project and its plans
and specifications should be the ones
followed. Additionally, the petitioners
admitted that the blueprint they had
prepared for the project was completed
only in August 1989 but the market
construction had started in June 1989.
The Court also emphasized that the
petitioners cannot “seek cover under
the general welfare clause authorizing
the abatement of nuisances without
judicial proceedings.” The petitioners had
claimed that the public market would pose
danger to the safety and health of school
children if it were built on the place being
contested. The Court pointed out that the
petitioners never made known their
concerns either to the Governor or to the
CEB and simply acted on their own accord.
(GR No. 150194, Robert Tayaban, et al. v. People
of the Philippines and the Honorable
Sandiganbayan, March 6, 2007)
Political Law: PCGG Members Not
Exempt from Testifying before Senate
(2006)
The Supreme Court has dismissed the
petition for habeas corpus of PCGG
Chairman Camilo Sabio for being moot, as
well as the petition of his fellow
Commissioners and the PCGG nominees to
Philcomsat.
The Court ruled that Section 4(b) of
Executive Order No. 1 which exempts PCGG
members and staff from the Congress’
power of inquiry is “directly repugnant to
Article VI, Section 21 of the Constitution.”
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Article VI, sec. 21 grants Congress the
power to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. “Certainly, a mere provision of
the law cannot pose a limitation to the
broad powers of Congress, in the absence
of any constitutional basis,” the Court said.
The Court also held that sec. 4(b) is
inconsistent with the principle of public
accountability under Article XI, sec. 1 of the
Constitution since it places the PCGG
members and staff beyond the reach of
courts, Congress, and other administrative
bodies. It likewise held sec. 4(b) as contrary
to Article II, sec. 28 (policy of full public
disclosure of all government transactions
involving public interest) and Article III, sec.
7 (right of the people to information on
matters of public concern).
By virtue of Article XVII, sec. 3 of the
Constitution, which states that only those
laws and issuances existing at the time of
its effectivity not inconsistent with its
provision were to remain operative, sec.
4(b) of EO 1 has been repealed by the 1987
Constitution, the Court ruled. The High
Court likewise upheld the authority of
the Senate and any of its Committees
to conduct legislative inquiries and all
powers necessary and proper for its
effective discharge, including the
power of contempt.
On the other hand, the Court also dismissed
the petition of Philcomsat Holdings
Corporation and its directors and officers
which alleged that the Senate inquiry
violates their right to privacy and self-
incrimination. The Court said that the
subject of the Senate inquiry concerns
the discharge of their duties as
officers and directors of the
corporation and as such, “they have no
reasonable expectation of privacy over
matters involving their offices where
the government has interest. Certainly,
such matters are of public concern and over
which the people have the right to
information.”(GR No. 174340, In the Matter of
the Petition for Issuance of Habeas Corpus of
Camilo L. Sabio; GR No. 174318, Hon. Sen.
Richard Gordon et al. v. PCGG, et al.; GR No.
174177, Philcomsat Holdings Corp, et al. v.
Senate Committee on Gov’t Corp. and Public
Enterprises, et al., October 17, 2006.)
Election Law; ‘Probationers’ not
disqualified from running for Local
Elections (2006)

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THOSE WHO HAVE not served their
sentence by reason of the grant of
probation are not disqualified from
running for local elective office.
The Supreme Court ruled that the
disqualification under Section 40(a) of the
Local Government Code does not apply to
probationers because the two-year
period of ineligibility does not even
begin to run. Section 40(a) of the LGC
provides “those sentenced by final
judgment for an offense involving moral
turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment,
within two (2) years after serving sentence,
are disqualified from running for any
elective local position.”
The Court said that “the period within which
a person is under probation cannot be
equated with service of the sentence
adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation Law
specifically provides that the grant of
probation suspends the execution of
the sentence. During the period of
probation, the probationer does not serve
the penalty imposed upon him by the court
but is merely required to comply with all the
conditions prescribed in the probation
order.” (Moreno v. Comelec and Mejes, GR No.
168550, August 10, 2006)
Political Law; COMELEC; Decision
Against Use of COMELEC Machines
‘Final and Unalterable’ (2006)
The validity of the contract between the
Commission on Elections and Mega Pacific
Consortium and the use of the machines
subject of this contract is already a closed
issue.
This according to Assistant Court
Administrator and Public Information Chief
Atty. Ismael G. Khan, Jr. who said the
Court’s January 13, 2004 decision on the
case has been final and executory for over
two years. The motions for reconsideration
of the Court’s decision were denied with
finality on February 17, 2004 and the
decision recorded in the Book of
Entries of Judgments on March 30, 2004,
Atty. Khan said. In the Court’s August 22,
2006 resolution, it stressed that its ruling is
already “immutable and unalterable”
and “may no longer undergo any
modification.”
Atty. Khan explained that the Court found
that Atty. Romeo Macalintal had failed to
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demonstrate that “certain supervening and
legal circumstances [have] transpired” to
justify the retesting of the automated
counting machines (ACMs) allegedly to
confirm claims of the Department of
Science and Technology that these were
100% accurate. The Court said that to allow
Macalintal’s motion would effectively
overturn its findings and conclusions in its
final and executory Decision.
The Court also reiterated in its August 22,
2006 resolution that the contract entered
into by Comelec was void because of clear
violations of law and jurisprudence. The
Court found that the poll body entered into
the contract without adequately checking
and observing the mandatory financial,
technical, and legal requirements and in
“reckless disregard for its own bidding rules
and procedures.” (GR No. 159139,
Information Technology Foundation of the
Philippines et al. v Comelec et al.)
Political Law; Congress Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation vs. Question Hour (2006)
The Supreme Court upheld the right of
Congress to compel the appearance of
executive officials in congressional inquiries
in aid of legislation by partially voiding
Executive Order No. 464.
However, the Court, speaking through
Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, declared
constitutional EO 464 insofar as it
bans executive officials from
appearing during the question hour.
In making a distinction between
congressional investigations in aid of
legislation and investigation during the
“question hour,” the Court said that the
former should be untrammeled because it is
co-extensive with the power to legislate of
Congress. On the other hand, investigations
relating to the QUESTION HOUR do not
relate to specific legislations but are
directed merely to congressional
oversight over the implementation of
laws. Section 1 of EO 464 required all
heads of departments in the Executive
branch to secure the consent of the
President before appearing in an inquiry
conducted by either House of Congress,
pursuant to Art. VI, sec. 22 of the
Constitution. On the other hand, sec. 2(a)
enumerates the types of information
covered by the order.

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The Court invalidated Sections 2(b) and 3 of
EO 464, thus resolving the major issues
raised in six petitions filed against the
order. It can be recalled that on September
28 last year, the President issued the
questioned executive order banning the
appearance of heads of departments and
other officers of the executive branch in
congressional inquiries without the prior
consent of the President.
Under sec. 2(b), officials within the
coverage of EO 464 are: senior officials of
executive departments; generals, flag
officers, and other officers of the Armed
Forces; Philippine National Police officials
with the rank of chief superintendent or
higher and other PNP officials; senior
national security officials who in the
judgment of the department head, Chief of
Staff, PNP Chief, and National Security
Adviser, respectively, are covered by
executive privilege, as well as such other
officers as may be determined by the
President to be likewise covered. Sec. 3
states that all such officials should
first secure the “prior consent” of the
President before appearing in a
congressional inquiry.
“The infirm provisions of EO 464…allow the
executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of
clearly asserting a right to do so and/or
proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the
power of Congress to conduct inquiries in
aid of legislation is frustrated,” the Court
said.
The Court held that only the President
can invoke executive privilege. She may
also authorize the Executive Secretary to
invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which
case the Executive Secretary must state
that the act is “By order of the President,”
which means that he personally consulted
with the President, it added.
The Court also held that the claim of
privilege under sec. 3 of EO 464 in relation
to sec. 2(b) is invalid per se for being so
broad as to allow even “implied claims” of
privilege by lesser officials. The proviso
requiring the President to give her prior
consent, the Court explained, means only
that the she may reverse the prohibition
which already exists by virtue of EO 464.
This may allow the President to authorize
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claims of executive privilege by mere
silence, the Court said.
“It is not asserted. It is merely implied.
Instead of providing precise and certain
reasons for the claim, it merely invokes EO
464, coupled with an announcement that
the President has not given her consent. It
is woefully insufficient for Congress to
determine whether the withholding of
information is justified under the
circumstances of each case,” the Court
said.
It emphasized that a claim of privilege,
being a claim of exemption from an
obligation to disclose information, must
therefore be clearly asserted.
“Congress has the right to know why
the executive considers the requested
information privileged. It does not
suffice to merely declare that the
President, or an authorized head of
office, has determined that it is so,
and that the President has not
overturned that determination,” the
Court stressed.
The High Court also reminded
Congress that although the power of
legislative inquiry may be broad, it is
not unlimited. It explained that in order to
avoid conflicts, Congress should indicate in
its invitation the possible needed statute
which prompted the need for the inquiry, in
addition to stating the subject of the inquiry
and questions relative to and in furtherance
thereof.
It explained that there are clear distinctions
between the right of Congress to
information which underlies the power of
inquiry and the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.
However, to the extent that investigations
in aid of legislation are generally conducted
in public, any issuance to unduly limit
disclosures in such investigations
necessarily deprives the people of
information which are presumably a matter
of public concern. In that sense, EO 464
directly impairs the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern.
Political Law; PCGG Chair Can’t Be
Chief Presidential Legal Counsel
Simultaneously (2006)
The Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) chair can’t serve as

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Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC) at
the same time.
Thus ruled the Supreme Court as it declared
unconstitutional the then concurrent
appointments of Magdangal B. Elma as
PCGG Chair and CPLC by deposed President
Joseph E. Estrada.
The Court’s First Division held that Article
IX-B, sec. 7 of the Constitution prohibits the
concurrent appointments of respondent
Elma as PCGG Chairman and CPLC
inasmuch as they are incompatible offices.
The general rule contained in Art. IX-B of
the 1987 Constitution permits an appointive
official to hold more than one office only if
“allowed by law or by the primary functions
of his position.”
“An incompatibility exists between the
positions of the PCGG Chairman and the
CPLC. The duties of the CPLC include giving
independent and impartial legal advice on
the actions of the heads of various
executive departments and agencies and to
review investigations involving heads of
executive departments and agencies, as
well as other Presidential appointees. The
PCGG is, without question, an agency under
the Executive Department. Thus, the
actions of the PCGG Chairman are subject
to the review of the CPLC,” the Court said.
“As CPLC, respondent Elma will be required
to give his legal opinion on his own actions
as PCGG Chairman and review any
investigation conducted by the Presidential
Anti-Graft Commission, which may involve
himself as PCGG Chairman. In such cases,
questions on his impartiality will inevitably
be raised. This is the situation that the law
seeks to avoid in imposing the prohibition
against holding incompatible offices,” it
added.
The Court, however, said that Article VII,
sec. 13 of the Constitution, the other
constitutional provision regarding multiple
offices, was not applicable to the PCGG
Chairman nor to the CPLC, as neither of
them is a secretary, undersecretary, nor an
assistant secretary, even if the former may
have the same rank as the latter positions.
Even if sec. 13 is applicable, the Court said,
Elma still could not be appointed
concurrently to the said offices because
neither office was occupied by him in an ex-
officio capacity, and the primary functions
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of one office do not require an appointment
to the other post. Moreover, even if the
appointments in question are not
covered by sec. 13, said appointments
are still prohibited under Article IX-B,
sec. 7, which covers all appointive and
elective officials, due to the
incompatibility between the primary
functions of the offices of the PCGG
Chairman and the CPLC.
The Court noted there no longer exists an
actual controversy that needs to be
resolved since the appointees of Estrada
were replaced by President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo in 2001. The present
PCGG chairman is Camilo Sabio while the
position vacated by the last CPLC, now
Solicitor General Antonio Nachura, has not
yet been filled. However, the Court still
decided the case since it raised a significant
legal question as yet unresolved – whether
the PCGG Chairman can concurrently hold
the position of CPLC. (GR No. 138965,
PublicInterestCenter Inc., et al. v. Elma and
Zamora, June 30, 2006)
Political Law; People’s Initiative
Petition; Dismissed (2006)
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition
for a People’s Initiative to amend the 1987
Constitution by shifting the present
Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form of
government.
The Court affirmed the Commission on
Elections’ August 31, 2006 resolution
denying due course to an initiative petition
to amend the Constitution by petitioners
Raul Lambino, et al.
“This Court cannot betray its primordial
duty to defend and protect the Constitution.
The Constitution, which embodies the
people’s sovereign will, is the bible of this
Court. This Court exists to defend and
protect the Constitution. To allow this
constitutionally infirm initiative, propelled
by deceptively gathered signatures, to alter
basic principles in the Constitution is to
allow a desecration of the Constitution. To
allow such alteration and desecration is to
lose this Court’s raison d’etre,” the Court
said.
“Verily, the Supreme Court is now on the
crossroads of history. By its decision, the
Court and each of its members shall be
judged by posterity. Ten years, fifty years, a

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hundred years – or even a thousand years
-- from now, what the Court did here, and
how each justice opined and voted, will still
be talked about, either in shame or in pride.
Indeed, the hand-washing of Pontius Pilate,
the abomination of Dred Scott, and the
loathing of Javellana still linger and haunt to
this day….Let not this case fall into the
same damnation. Rather, let this Court be
known throughout the nation and the world
for its independence, integrity, industry and
intelligence,” Chief Justice Panganiban said.
The dissenters led by Senior Associate
Justice Reynato S. Puno argued for a
remand of the Lambino Petition to the
Comelec for verification of the over six
million signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 Constitution. No one voted
to grant the Lambino prayer to reverse the
Comelec and subject the proposed
constitutional changes to a plebiscite.
The Court said that Lambino Group’s
initiative is a revision and not an
amendment. As such, it violated sec. 2, Art.
XVII of the Constitution limiting the scope of
a people’s initiative to “Amendment to this
Constitution.” The Court ruled that “the
Lambino Group’s initiative is void and
unconstitutional because it dismally fails to
comply with the requirement of Section 2,
Article XVII of the Constitution that the
initiative must be ‘directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition.’”
It noted that the Lambino Group itself
admitted that their ‘people’s’ initiative is an
‘unqualified support to the agenda’ of
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo to
change the Constitution. It stressed that the
ULAP Resolution No. 2006-02, which the
Lambino Group used as basis in their
petition, specified that “ULAP maintains its
unqualified support to the agenda of Her
Excellency PGMA for constitution reforms.”
The Court noted that the Lambino group
submitted to the Court a copy of the paper
that the people signed as their initiative
petition only after the September 26 oral
arguments when they subsequently filed
their memorandum. It stressed that the
signature sheet did not show to the
people the draft of the proposed
changed before they are asked to sign
the signature sheet. “Clearly, the
signature sheet is not the ‘petition’ that the
framers of the Constitution envisioned when
they formulated the initiative clause in
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Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution,” it
said.
The Court further ruled that the present
initiative violated sec. 5(b) of RA 6735
which requires that the ‘petition for an
initiative on the 1987 Constitution must
have at least 12 per centum of the total
number of registered voters as signatories.
It noted that the over six million signatories
did not sign the petition nor the amended
petition filed with the Comelec.
In contrast, the Court noted that the an
overwhelming majority – 16,622,111 voters
comprising 76.3 percent of the total votes
cast – approved our Constitution in the
1987 plebiscite. “That approval is the
unmistakable voice of the people, the full
expression of the people’s sovereign will.
That approval included the prescribed
modes for amending or revising the
Constitution,” the Court said.
The Court said that the Comelec did not
abuse its discretion when it dismissed the
Lambino Group’s initiative on the basis of
the Court’s ruling in Santiago and People’s
Initiative for Reform, Modernization and
Action v. Comelec.
The Court stressed that the Constitution
being the fundamental law of the land
deserves the utmost respect and obedience
of all the citizens of this nation, adding that
“no one can trivialize the Constitution by
cavalierly amending or revising it in blatant
violation of the clearly specified modes of
amendment and revision laid down in the
Constitution itself.”
The Court further stressed that to allow
such change in the fundamental law “is to
set adrift the Constitution in unchartered
waters, to be tossed and turned by every
dominant political group of the day.” If this
Court allows today a cavalier change in the
Constitution outside the constitutionally
prescribed modes, tomorrow the new
dominant political group that comes will
demand its own set of changes in the same
cavalier and unconstitutional fashion. A
revolving-door constitution does not augur
well for the rule of law in this country.
The Court said that “incantations of
‘people’s voice,’ ‘people’s sovereign
will,’ or ‘let the people decide’ cannot
override the specific modes of
changing the Constitution as
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prescribed in the Constitution itself. In deciding the case, the tribunal
Otherwise, the Constitution – the people’s recognized the Philippine Supreme Court’s
fundamental covenant that provides decision of December 19, 2005, holding the
enduring stability to our society – becomes writ of possession issued by a Pasay City
easily susceptible to manipulative changes Regional Trial Court in abeyance, “pending
by political groups gathering signatures proof of actual payment of the proferred
through false promises. Then, the value of three billion pesos to the claimant.”
Constitution ceases to be the bedrock of the
nation’s stability.” (GR No. 174153, The writ was issued on the government by
Lambino and Aumentado v. Comelec; GR the late Pasay Judge Henrick Gingoyon on
No. 174299, Binay, et al. v. Comelec, et al.; December 21, 2004. The tribunal also took
October 25, 2006) note of the fact that in answering a
question posed by Pryles, Solicitor General
Political Law; PIL; International Court
Eduardo Nachura “conceded that the
rules in favor of PIATCo (2006)
(government), through the MIAA (Manila
AN INTERNATIONAL arbitration court in
International Airport Authority), purported
Singapore has ordered the Philippine
to enter Terminal 3 in reliance upon the writ
government to “give up possession” of
of possession.”
Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA)
Terminal 3 to its builder, the Philippine
“It is now clear from the Supreme
International Air Terminals Co. Inc. (PIATCo),
Court’s ruling in the Gingoyon case
until a valid writ of possession is issued by a
that the writ of possession should not
Philippine court.
have been issued and that it is
effectively in abeyance until the
“The respondent, its officers and agents,
proferred value of 3 billion pesos is
are ordered to cease occupation and give
paid,” the tribunal said.
up possession of Naia Terminal 3 and not to
obstruct the claimant in entering into
“Mr. Nachura also stated that the MIAA was
occupation and taking up possession of
still present in Terminal 3 together with
Naia Terminal 3,” the Singapore-based
personnel from the contractor Takenaka. He
International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
sought to justify the continued presence of
Arbitration Tribunal said in a 14-page
personnel from MIAA on the basis of police
decision dated August 23.
powers which were not clearly established
to the satisfaction of the tribunal,” the ICC
The decision was signed by tribunal chair
added.
Prof. Michael Pryles. The tribunal,
nevertheless, said that “nothing in this
The government had continually deferred
order is intended to prohibit or restrain the
payment of the three billion pesos to
respondent from entering into occupation or
PIATCo on one pretext or another, despite
taking up possession of NAIA Terminal 3
averring that the money was in an escrow
pursuant to a valid and enforceable writ of
account in Land Bank. The government,
possession issued by a court in the
through the MIAA, on August 24 finally
Philippines authorizing the same.”
moved to pay PIATCo the P3 billion.
The respondent is the Philippine
Payment was withheld, however, after the
government, while the claimant is PIATCo,
Court of Appeals issued a temporary
the consortium that built and originally
restraining order against MIAA and the bank
owned NAIA 3. PIATCo filed an arbitration
on a petition of Rep. Salacnib Baterina. The
case in the tribunal seeking interim
following day, PIATCo lawyer Eduardo de los
measures to maintain the status quo,
Angeles wrote Nachura saying PIATCo
following the government’s expropriation of
should still be paid the three billion pesos.
NAIA 3 in 2004.
De los Angeles said that PIATCo and its
A Pasay City court had ordered the
authorized representatives “shall enter into
government to pay PIATCo three billion
occupation and take up possession” of NAIA
pesos for NAIA 3. For its part, the
3 on Aug. 31, or within five days of receipt
government, represented by the Office of
of the letter.
the Solicitor General, questioned the
jurisdiction of the ICC.
“We expect that you will properly advise
GRP (Government of the Republic of the

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Philippines), its officers and agents and its
authorized representatives not to obstruct
PIATCo and its representatives in doing so,”
De los Angeles said.
MIAA general manager Alfonso on Monday
Cusi told reporters government lawyers will
file today a motion to quash the TRO so that
the three billion pesos payment to PIATCo
could proceed.
Cusi also said that PIATCo should bring
before Philippine courts the Singapore
tribunal’s decision “if they want that
enforced.”
“The ICC decision has no jurisdiction here,”
Cusi said, echoing the government’s stand.
Political Law; President, as
commander-in-chief of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (2006)
Whether or not the President’s directive
preventing military officers from testifying
before Congress without the President’s
consent as unconstitutional (characterizing
the same as a “gag order” that interferes
with Congress’ power of investigation in aid
of legislation.)
The Supreme Court ruled that the President,
as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), has the right to
require military personnel to obtain prior
consent before testifying in a legislative
inquiry.
The Court, however, held that the President
has constitutional authority to prevent a
member of the armed forces from testifying
before Congress and any military officer
who defies such injunction is liable under
military justice.
“Outside explicit constitutional limitations…
the commander-in-chief clause vests on the
President, as commander-in-chief, absolute
authority over the persons and actions of
the members of the armed forces,” the
Court said. This authority includes the
ability of the President to restrict travel,
movement, and speech of military officers,
it added.
The Court distinguished its ruling from that
in Senate v. Ermita. In the latter, the Court
has held that the President could not
impose, through Executive Order No. 464, a
blanket prohibition barring executive and
military officials from testifying before
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Congress without the President’s consent
on the account of executive privilege.
In this case, however, the Court ruled that
the President’s ability to prevent
military officers from testifying before
Congress “does not turn on executive
privilege, but on the Chief Executive’s
power as commander-in-chief to
control the actions and speech of
members of the armed forces.”
“When a military officer is torn between
obeying the President and obeying the
Senate, the Court will without hesitation
affirm that the officer has to choose the
President. After all, the Constitution
prescribes that it is the President, not the
Senate, who is the commander-in-chief of
the armed forces,” the Court added.
The Court also held that Congress was not
without recourse should the President not
consent to the appearance of military
officers. It held that members of the
military may be compelled to attend
legislative inquiries, even if the
President desires otherwise, through a
judicial order.
“It is only the courts that can compel,
with conclusiveness, attendance or
non-attendance in legislative
inquiries…And once the courts speak
with finality, both branches of
government have no option but to
comply with the decision of the
courts,” it held. In this case, it noted that
“the impasse [between the Congress and
the President] did not come to pass, since
petitioners testified anyway despite the
presidential prohibition.”
Gudani and Balutan were invited to appear
before the Senate Committee on National
Defense and Security in its inquiry into
alleged cheating during the 2004 elections.
The day before they were to testify in the
senate inquiry, they were given orders by
Gen. Senga, per instruction of the President,
that “no AFP personnel shall appear before
any congressional or senate hearing
without [the President’s] approval.”
Nonetheless, Gudani and Balutan appeared
at the hearing and testified on the conduct
of the 2004 elections and were
subsequently charged with violating Articles
of War 65 and 97.

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While Gudani had compulsorily retired on
October 4, 2005, the Court ruled that the
military justice had already fully attached to
him inasmuch as both the acts complained
of and the initiation of the proceedings
against him occurred beforehand. (GR No.
170165, BGen. Francisco V. Guadani and Lt. Col.
Alexander F. Balutan v. Lt. Gen. Generoso
Senga, et al., August 15, 2006)
Political Law; Seizure of Equipment
Owned by Unauthorized Seller (2007)
The Supreme Court upheld the seizure
under search warrants of the equipment
and steel cylinders used to illegally refill
and sell Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG)
products using Petron GASUL and Pilipinas
Shell Shellane LPG tanks.
The Court’s Third Division upheld the Court
of Appeals which affirmed the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 17, Cavite City orders
denying the motions to quash the search
warrants which led to the equipment
seizure.
The Court held that Cavite City RTC
Presiding Judge Melchor Q.C. Sadang had
sufficient basis in finding probable cause of
an infringement of Petron and Pilipinas
Shell’s intellectual property rights due to
the use of their trademarks to justify the
issuance of the search warrants. The Court
said that the questions of Judge Sadang to
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Agent
Ritche N. Oblanca, who applied for the
search warrants, and Private Investigator
Bernabe C. Alajar were “sufficiently
probing.” The testimonies of Oblanca and
Alajar were consistent with each other and
their narration of facts, regarding their two
test-buys from the refilling plant in which
they were able to buy Petron GASUL and
Pilipinas Shell SHELLANE LPG cylinders and
their contents, was credible, ruled the
Court.
The Court likewise ruled that there is
nothing in the provisions on search
warrants under Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure which
specifically command that the applicant law
enforcer must be a member of a division
that is assigned or related to the subject
crime or offense, shooting down a contrary
allegation posited by petitioner William C.
Yao, Sr., against whom the search warrants
were issued.(GR No. 168306, Yao, Sr. v. People,
June 19, 2007)
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Political Law; SC affirms
constitutionality of national ID system
(2006)
THE SUPREME Court has declared
constitutional President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo's plan to set up a nationwide
identification card system, clearing the way
for its implementation.
Arroyo in April 2005 issued an order for the
creation of one unified ID card. But
opposition and civil rights groups petitioned
the Supreme Court to reject this, saying it
was a violation of privacy and would lead to
abuse. But the information required for the
cards "are the usual data required for
personal identification by government
entities, and even by private sector," the
Court said. It added that the system "will
reduce the data required to be collected
and recorded in the ID databases of
government entities."
Under the plan, people will not be required
to apply for the cards, the court noted. It
said one unified ID card would replace
existing cards such as social security and
health system cards issued by government
agencies.
The high court said there was no usurpation
of legislative authority when the President
issued Executive Order 420 or the Unified
Multi-Purpose ID system in February 2005,
saying, the EO "is well within the power of
the President to promulgate." "EO No. 420
is nothing more than the President's
exercise of the power of control over the
executive branch of the government," the
high court said.
It said that under the EO, “the government
would not collect individual data other than
the standard information being collected
from every citizen when applying for a
government ID.” “In fact, the information
that will be required from executive officials
and employees is less than the information
being given when applying for an ID from
agencies like the Land Transportation Office
(LTO),” the high court noted. "Making the
data collection and recording of
government entities unified, and making
their ID formats uniform, will admittedly
achieve substantial benefits,” the high court
said. “These benefits are savings in terms
of procurement of equipment and supplies,
compatibility in systems as to hardware and
software, ease of verification and thus
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friendliness of a single ID formal for all
government entities," the high court said.
The high court even pointed out that EO
420 was not a national identification system
which would require legislation as it only
covered executive offices. "The EO does not
extend to the Judiciary or to the
independent constitutional commissions.
This only shows that EO 420 does not
establish a national ID system because
legislation is needed to establish a single ID
that is compulsory for all branches of
government," it noted.
On allegations that it would violate privacy
rights, the high court said the petitioners
failed to show proof that the system would
be used to spy on citizens. "Petitioners have
not shown how EO 420 will violate their
right to privacy. Petitioners cannot show
such violation by a mere facial examination
of EO 420 because EO 420 narrowly draws
the data collection, recording, and
exhibition while prescribing comprehensive
safeguards," the high court said.
The petitioners maintained that the EO was
unconstitutional because it was basically
the same as the ID system that then
president Fidel Ramos tried to enforce in
1996 through Administrative Order 308.
On July 23, 1998, in the case of Ople vs.
Torres, the high court declared as
unconstitutional Ramos’ AO 308, calling it a
“clear and present danger” that would
infringe on the people’s right to privacy.
Respondents in the petition were Ermita,
National Economic and Development
Authority Director-General Romulo Neri, and
the administrator of the National Statistics
Office.
Political Law; SC Allows Dual Citizens
to Vote (2006)
Filipinos abroad with dual citizenship can
now vote and register as absentee voters.
As such, they may vote for the position of
President, Vice-President, Senators, and
Party-list representatives.
The Court granted the petition by Loida
Nicolas-Lewis, et al to compel the
Commission on Elections to allow them to
exercise their voting rights. Petitioners have
dual citizenship having reacquired
Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, the
Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act
of 2003.
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“Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds
that those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act
No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the
right to vote under the system of absentee
voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003,” the
Court said. In effect, they are likewise
exempt from the residency requirements
prescribed under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution.
The Court said that “there is no provision in
the dual citizenship law, RA 9225, requiring
‘duals’ to actually establish residence and
physically stay in the Philippines first before
they can exercise their right to vote. On the
contrary, RA 9225, in implicit
acknowledgment that ‘duals’ are most likely
non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1)
the same right of suffrage as that granted
an absentee voter under RA 9189. It cannot
be overemphasized that RA 9189 aims, in
essence, to enfranchise as much as possible
all overseas Filipinos who, save for the
residency requirements exacted of an
ordinary voter under ordinary conditions,
are qualified to vote.”
The Court noted that no less than the
COMELEC itself admits that RA 9225
expanded the coverage of overseas
absentee voting. “Considering the unison
intent of the Constitution and RA 9189 and
the expansion of the scope of that law with
the passage of RA 9225, the irresistible
conclusion is that ‘duals’ may now
exercise their right of suffrage thru
the absentee voting scheme and as
overseas absentee voters,” the Court
stressed.
The petitioners had sought registration and
certification as “overseas absentee voter”
during the 2004 national elections. They,
however, were barred from exercising their
voting rights. (GR. 162759, Nicolas-Lewis, et al.
v. Comelec, August 4, 2006)
Political Law; SC declares Calibrated
Preemptive Response unconstitutional
(2006)
THE SUPREME Court, in a unanimous
decision, has declared as unconstitutional
the Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR)
policy of the government but upheld Batas
Pambansa 880 or the Public Assembly Act
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Voting 13-0, the high court said the CPR,
which bans street protests without permits,
"served no valid purpose" if, as admitted by
Solicitor-General Eduardo Nachura during
oral arguments on the issue, it only meant
maximum tolerance.
"CPR serves no valid purpose if it means the
same thing as maximum tolerance and is
illegal if it means something else.
Accordingly, what is to be followed is and
should be that mandated by the law itself,
namely maximum tolerance," the high court
said in a 36-page decision penned by
Associate Justice Adolf Azcuna.
“The so-called CPR policy has no place in
our legal firmament and must be struck
down as darkness that shrouds freedom. It
merely confuses our people and is used by
some police agents to justify abuses.” At
the same time, the high court upheld BP
880, a 21-year-old law on public
assemblies, which requires organizers to
secure a permit for rallies in public places.
The high tribunal also gave local
governments 30 days to designate
"freedom parks" where demonstrations
could be held without a permit under the
same 1985 law.
It said BP 880 “could not be condemned as
unconstitutional because it does not curtail
or unduly restrict freedoms but merely
regulates the use of public places as to
time, place, and manner of assemblies."
"Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates
the exercise of the right to peaceful
assembly and petition only to the extent
needed to avoid a clear and present danger
of the substantive evils Congress has the
right to prevent," the high court said.
"There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since
the content of speech is not relevant to the
regulation," the high court said. The high
court also asked the Department of Interior
and Local Government to adhere
particularly to Section 15 of BP 880, which
allows every city and municipality
nationwide to designate at least “a suitable
freedom park.”
"Every city and municipality in the country
shall within six months after the effectivity
of this Act establish or designate at least
one suitable ‘freedom park’ or mall in their
respective jurisdictions which, as far as
practicable, shall be centrally located within
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the poblacion [town center] where
demonstrations and meetings may be held
at any time without the need of any prior
permit,” according to the same section. “In
the cities and municipalities of Metropolitan
Manila, the respective mayors shall
establish the freedom parks within the
period of six months from the effectivity of
this Act, otherwise all their public parks will
become freedom parks” it added.
Political Law; SC Dismisses Petition
Questioning Article V, par. 6 of VFA
(2007)
The Supreme Court has dismissed the
petition questioning Article V, paragraph 6
of the Visiting Forces Agreement on the
custody of United States Military personnel
being tried for offenses in the Philippines
and the one-year period prescribed to
complete judicial proceedings.
In a three-page En Banc resolution, the
Court ruled that the petition has become
moot since the trial of the case, which took
place within the one year period prescribed
in the VFA, has been terminated and
judgment has been rendered on December
4, 2006. “Consequently, the issue of
whether the obligation of the United States
under the VFA to present the accused for
the trial continues even after the one-year
period is now merely academic in this case,
since the one-year period was not
exceeded,” the Court said.
As to the issue of the custody of Daniel
Smith, who was found by the trial court
guilty of raping the complainant known as
“Nicole,” the Court said that this has been
raised by petitioner in a new petition filed
on January 8, 2007 and would be more
properly addressed in that case.
In June last year, “Nicole” filed a petition for
certiorari in the High Court to annul and set
aside three orders issued by Judge
Benjamin T. Pozon, Presiding Judge of the
Makati City Regional Trial Court, Branch
139. The three orders are: (1) the order
denying petitioner’s Omnibus Motion for the
declaration of Article V, par. 6 of the VFA as
unconstitutional, for the issuance of an alias
warrant of arrest, and for the deferment of
the arraignment until questions of custody
and jurisdiction are settled and the denial of
the motion for reconsideration thereof; (2)
the order denying petitioner’s Supplemental
Arguments and Motion; and (3) the order
denying petitioner’s Motion for clarification
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which had asked to clarify when the one- “In sum, the backdoor recourse for a hugely
year period under Article V, par. 6 shall priced favor from the government itself,
have started by construing the term and more in tandem with other brazen
“judicial proceedings.” (GR No. 172884, relevant damning circumstances, indicates
“Nicole” v. Hon. Benjamin T. Pozon, et al., the impudent abuse of power and the
February 6, 2007)
detestable misuse of influence that
homologously made the acquisition of ill-
Political Law; SC Orders Marcos’
gotten wealth a reality. Upon the facts
Cronies to Pay Php2M in Damages
borne out by the evidence for the Republic
(2007)
and guideposts supplied by the governing
The era of the final judicial reckoning for the
laws, the Republic has a clear right to the
Marcoses and their associates has begun.
reliefs it seeks,” the Court said.
Thus said the Supreme Court as it ordered a
longtime associate of the late President
The Court further said that the
Ferdinand E. Marcos and the former’s son to
Sandiganbayan erred in granting Tuvera’s
pay Php2 million in damages plus litigation
and Twin Peaks’ demurrer to evidence
costs in connection with an ill-gotten wealth
purportedly since the recovery case was
case filed against them for alleged illegal
barred by res judicata (a matter settled by
logging activities in the 1980s.
judgment). It stressed that the principle of
res judicata could not be applied as there
The Court’s Second Division granted the
was no identity of parties and no identity of
petition of the Republic of the Philippines
causes of action between the present case
and reversed the Sandiganbayan’s May 23,
and that of Ysmael v. Secretary of
2001 resolution dismissing the ill-gotten
Environment and National Resources.
wealth case instituted in 1988 by the
Republic, through the Presidential
The Republic, however, cannot recover
Commission on Good Government (PCGG).
actual damages which could have
The anti-graft court had sustained the
amounted to Php48 million. The Court
demurrer to evidence filed by respondents,
expressed its frustration over PCGG’s failure
Marcos’ Presidential Executive Assistant
to present any proof of actual damages that
Juan C. Tuvera, his son Victor, and Twin
would have had established the amount to
Peaks Development Corp. (Twin Peaks),
be restituted to the State by reason of the
where the younger Tuvera is a major
illegal acts committed by the respondents.
stockholder.
It said that actual damages must be proven,
not presumed.
The PCGG had alleged the elder Tuvera,
using his influence on and connection with
The Court found it “severely unfortunate
Marcos, secured Timber Licensing
that the Republic did not exert its best
Agreement (TLA) No. 356 on behalf of Twin
efforts in the full recovery of the actual
Peaks despite existing laws expressly
damages caused by the illegal grant of the
prohibiting the exportation of mahogany of
Twin Peaks TLA.”
the narra species and Twin Peaks’ lack of
qualification to be a grantee thereof for lack
“If only the Court’s outrage were
of sufficient equipment to engage in the
quantifiable in sums of money, respondents
logging business.
are due for significant pecuniary hurt.
Instead, the Court is forced to explain…why
The Court said that there were several
respondents could not be forced to
factors that taint Twin Peaks’ backdoor
recompensate the Filipino people in
application for a TLA. It said that the forest
appropriate financial terms. The fault lies
area covered by the TLA was already the
with those engaged by the government to
subject of a pre-existing TLA in favor of
litigate this case in behalf of the State,” the
Felipe Ysmael, Jr. and Corp. It added that
Court said.
Twin Peaks directly wrote Marcos to request
for a permit and Marcos made a marginal
The Court instead ordered the Tuveras and
note indicating his approval. Likewise, the
Twin Peaks to jointly and severally pay to
elder Tuvera, in his capacity as Presidential
the Republic Php1 million temperate
Executive Assistance, penned a
damages, Php1 million exemplary damages,
memorandum to the Director of Forestry
and the cost of litigation.
informing him about Marcos’ approval.

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Temperate or moderate damages avail
when “the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but
its amount can not from the nature of
the case, be proved with certainty.
Under Article 2234 of the Civil Code, a
showing that the plaintiff is entitled to
temperate damages allows the award of
exemplary damages.”
Organized in 1984, Twin Peaks engaged in
logging operations pursuant to the 1984
TLA granted by Marcos to operate on
26,000 hectares of forest land located in
the Municipality of Isabela, Quirino with an
annual allowable cut of 60,000 cubic meters
of timber and to export 10,000 cubic meters
of mahogany of the narra species. A year
after the ouster of the Marcoses in 1986,
then President Corazon C. Aquino created
the PCGG to go after the alleged ill-gotten
wealth acquired by the Marcoses and their
associates.
The ill-gotten wealth case against the
Tuveras and Twin Peaks was filed in 1988.
From 1988 to 1993, the proceedings before
the Sandiganbayan were delayed owing to
the difficulty of acquiring jurisdiction over
the person of President Marcos, who was by
then already in exile. Subsequently, the
Tuveras were granted a separate pre-
trial/trial from President Marcos.
After the Republic rested its case in 1994,
respondents filed a demurrer to evidence
arguing that the Republic failed to present
sufficient affirmative legal evidence to
prove its claim. On May 23, 2001, the
Sandiganbayan sustained the demurrer to
evidence and did not give credence to the
Republic’s allegations concerning
respondents’ abuse of power and/or public
trust. The Sandiganbayan effectively held
the validity of TLA.
“The long-term campaign for the recovery
of ill-gotten wealth of former President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his wife Imelda, and
their associates, has been met with many
impediments…that have led to doubts
whether there is still promise in that
enterprise. Yet even as the prosecution of
those cases have drudged on and on, the
era of their final reckoning is just beginning
before this Court. The heavy hammer of the
law is just starting to fall,” the Court said.
(Republic v. Tuvera, et al., GR 148246,
February 16, 2007)
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Political Law; Authority of the
President to Re-organize the Executive
Branch (2007)
The President has the power to effect
organizational changes in departments and
agencies under the executive branch
provided the reorganization is done by
reason of economy or to increase efficiency
in the bureaucracy.
Thus the Supreme Court held anew when it
affirmed the dismissal of the Court of
Appeals of the petition of Malaria
Employees and Workers Association of the
Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) for the
nullification of EO 102, “Redirecting the
Functions and Operations of the
Department of Health (DOH),” issued by
then President Joseph E. Estrada on May 24,
1999.
The High Court’s First Division upheld the
validity of EO 102 underscoring the
executive power and control of all the
executive departments, bureaus, and
offices given to the President under Article
VII, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution.
Further, the Court, citing Larin v. Executive
Secretary, held that, in the absence of a law
amending or repealing PD 1416, “Granting
Continuing Authority to the President of the
Philippines to Re-organize the National
Government,” as amended by PD 1722, the
President has the power “to group,
consolidate bureaus and agencies, to
abolish offices, to transfer functions, to
create and classify functions, services and
activities and to standardize salaries and
materials.” Finding MEWAP’s arguments as
“illogically and unduly restrictive” and
lacking of legal basis, the Court denied the
group’s petition.
The High Court also found the
implementation of the presidential issuance
to be in good faith, in the absence of any
showing that circumstances which may be
considered as evidence of bad faith as
provided under RA 6656, “An Act to Protect
the Security of Tenure of Civil Service
Officers and Employees in the
Implementation of Government
Reorganization.”
MEWAP, a union of employees in the
Malaria Control Service of the DOH affected
by the re-organization policy, claimed
Estrada was guilty of a lack or grave abuse
of discretion in issuing EO 102, alleging that
it violated EO 292 or the Administrative

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Code of 1987 and RA 8522 or the 1998
General Appropriations Act. MEWAP argued
that the President has the power to re-
organize only the Office of the President
and not the departments, bureaus, or
offices within the executive branch. The
group further claimed that re-organization
under EO 102 is unauthorized under RA
8522 as Sections 78 and 80 of the said law
refer only to “changes in organizational
units or key positions in any department of
agency” and “scaling down and phasing
out of activities within the executive
department.” (GR No. 160093, Malaria
Employees and Workers Association of the
Philippines, Inc, et al. v. Executive Secretary
Alberto Romulo, et al., July 31, 2007)
Local Government; SC Directs Removal
of Pandacan Oil Terminals (2007)
The Supreme Court today ordered Manila
City Mayor Jose L. Atienza, Jr. to
immediately enforce Ordinance No. 8027
which reclassifies portions of the Manila
districts of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from
industrial to commercial and directs certain
business owners and operators, including
Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Petron Corporation
and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation,
to cease and desist from operating their
businesses within six months from the
ordinance’s effectivity date.
The Court’s First Division granted the
original action for mandamus filed by the
political party Social Justice Society (SJS)
and Manila residents Vladimir T. Cabigao
and Bonifacio S. Tumbokon praying that
Mayor Atienza be compelled to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 and to immediately
remove the terminals of the said oil
companies. The Court held that “there is
nothing that legally hinders [Mayor
Atienza] from enforcing Ordiinance No.
8027.”
“The Local Government Code imposes upon
Atienza the duty, as city mayor, to ‘enforce
all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city.’ One of these is
Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive
of the city, he has the duty to enforce
Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not
been repealed by the Sanggunian or
annulled by the courts. He has no other
choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so,”
the Court added.
The Court described Ordinance No.
8027 as a measure enacted pursuant
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to the delegated police power of local
government units “to promote the
order, safety, and health, morals, and
general welfare of the society.”
Ordinance No. 8027, approved by Manila
City Council on November 28, 2001 and
effective December 28, 2001, reclassifies
portions of Pandacan and Sta. Ana from
industrial to commercial and directs the
owners and operators of businesses
disallowed under Section 1 to cease and
desist from operating their businesses
within six months from the ordinance’s
effectivity. Among the businesses in the
area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals
of Caltex, Petron, and Shell.
On June 26, 2002, the City of Manila and the
Department of Energy entered into a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with
the oil companies in which they agreed that
“the scaling down of the Pandacan
Terminals [was] the most viable and
practicable option.” The Manila City Council
ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97 but
declared the MOU effective only for a period
of six months starting July 25, 2002.
Subsequently, the Council adopted
Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of
Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and
authorizing Atienza to issue special
business permits to the oil companies.
Subsequently, the petitioners filed with the
High Court an original action for mandamus
praying to compel Atienza to enforce said
ordinance and to order the immediate
removal of the terminals of the oil
companies.
“Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right
after the Philippines, along with the rest of
the world, witnessed the horror of that
September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin
Towers of the World Trade Center in New
York City. The objective of the ordinance is
to protect the residents of Manila from the
catastrophic devastation that will surely
occur in case of a terrorist attack on the
Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists
why such a protective measure should
be delayed,” the Court said. (Social Justice
Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., GR No. 156052,
March 7, 2007)
Political Law; SC Orders Dismissal of
Rebellion Charges against Beltran, et
al. (2007)

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For want of probable cause and due
process, the Supreme Court has ordered
the dismissal of the criminal cases for
rebellion against six party-list
representatives and four private individuals
implicated in an alleged foiled plot to
overthrow the Arroyo administration on
February 24, 2006 on the occasion of the
20th anniversary of the EDSA Revolution.
The Court’s Second Division granted the
consolidated petitions for the writs of
prohibition and certiorari to stop the
prosecution for rebellion of Representatives
Liza L. Maza, Joel G. Virador, Saturnino C.
Ocampo, Teodoro A. Casiño, Rafael V.
Mariano (known as the “Batasan 5”), Crispin
B. Beltran, and private individuals Vicente
P. Ladlad, Nathanael S. Santiago, Randall B.
Echanis, and Rey Claro C. Casambre. The
Court ruled that the inquest proceeding
against Beltran was void for failure of the
latter’s panel of inquest prosecutors to
comply with the rules on preliminary
investigation in cases involving lawful
warrantless arrests as provided for by the
Rules of Court and by DOJ Circular No. 61.
The High Court also alluded to “the
obvious involvement of political
considerations in the actuations” of
Secretary of Justice Raul M. Gonzalez
concerning the rebellion charges, stressing
the partiality of the prosecutors after the
Secretary stated in an interview that “We
[the DOJ] will just declare probable
cause, then it’s up to the Court to
decide x x x.” The Court said “this
clearly shows pre-judgment, a The Court held that the requirements of an
determination to file the Information
even in the absence of probable
cause.”
The Court found that in the case of Beltran,
none of the arresting officers saw him
commit in their presence the crime of
rebellion, nor did the arresting officers have
personal knowledge of the facts and
circumstances sufficient to form probable
cause to believe that Beltran had
committed rebellion. It also ruled that there
was no probable cause to indict him for
rebellion as none of the affidavits executed
by members and some civilians presented
as evidence before the panel of prosecutors
that conducted the inquest stated that
Beltran committed specific acts of
rebellion.
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The High Court also held that the
preliminary investigation conducted
against the petitioners was tainted
with irregularities for the failure of the
respondent prosecutors to comply
with the rule which provides that the
complaint be accompanied by
affidavits of the complainant and his
witnesses, subscribed and sworn to
before any prosecutor or government
official authorized to administer oath,
or, in their absence or unavailability,
before a notary public. (GR Nos. 172070-
72, Ladlad v. Velasco, June 1, 2007)
Remedial Law; Declaratory Relief;
No suspension of telecom
stocks public offering (2007)
THE SUPREME COURT has denied the
petition of Bayan Telecommunications, Inc.
(Bayantel) to suspend the requirement
imposed by RA 7925 on telecommunication
entities with regulated types of services to
offer to the public 30 percent of its
aggregate common stocks within five years
from the effectivity of said law or the
commencement of the entity’s commercial
operations, whichever date is later.
In a decision penned by Senior Associate
Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, the Court’s
Second Division affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals and denied for lack of
merit the petition for declaratory relief filed
by Bayantel against the Republic of the
Philippines and the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC).
action for declaratory relief have not been
met as Bayantel was merely anticipating
the risk of possible sanctions, which does
not, by itself, give rise to a justiciable
controversy. It said, “Rep. Act No. 7925
does not provide for a penalty for
noncompliance with Section 21, and as
correctly pointed out by the Solicitor
General, there are yet no implementing
rules or guidelines to carry into effect the
requirement imposed by the said provision.
Whatever sanctions petitioner fears are
merely hypothetical.”
Bayantel had sought to defer the aforesaid
requirement imposed by RA 7925 (An Act to
Promote and Govern the Development of
Philippine Telecommunications and the
Delivery of Public Telecommunications
Services), claiming that it was not possible

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for it to make a legitimate public offering at
the time of the filing of the petition because
its financial situation, the national economy,
and the stock market were not favorable for
a successful public offering. (Bayan
Telecommunications Inc. v. Republic and
NTC, GR No. 161140, January 31, 2007)
Remedial Law; Evidence;
Conditions for Discharge of
State Witness (2007)
The testimony of a prospective state
witness is not required to be substantially
corroborated by other prosecution
witnesses who are not among the accused
in the same criminal case. Otherwise, the
condition that “there must be no other
direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed,
except the testimony of the state witness”
will be rendered nugatory.
Thus the Supreme Court First Division,
through Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
clarified when it affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals discharging accused
Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix
from the information in a murder case to
become state witnesses.
The Court held that the corroborative
evidence required by rules on the
discharge of an accused to be a state
witness does not have to consist of the
exact same evidence that will be
testified on by the anticipated state
witnesses. “We have ruled that ‘a
conspiracy is more readily proved by the
acts of a fellow criminal than by any other
method…Even if the confirmatory testimony
only applies to some particulars, we can
properly infer that the witness has told the
truth in other respects.’ It is enough that
the testimony of a co-conspirator is
corroborated by some other witness or
evidence,” the Court said. (GR No. 143093,
Salvanera v. People, May 21, 2007)
Remedial Law; FPA’s jurisdiction
only over agri pesticides
(2007)
ONLY AGRICULTURAL PESTICIDES and not
urban pest control products fall under the
jurisdiction of the Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority (FPA).
Thus the Supreme Court’s First Division
held recently in a decision penned by Chief
Justice Reynato S. Puno affirming the Court
of Appeals’ July 31, 2003 decision and
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January 8, 2004 resolution. The CA ruled
that FPA, an attached agency of the
Department of Agriculture, did not have
jurisdiction or regulatory power over the
acts and business operations of the Manila
Pest Control Company (MAPECON).
The Court said that PD No. 1144 sets the
parameters of the powers and duties of the
FPA. The Court stressed that FPA’s purposes
limit its jurisdiction to agricultural
pesticides. It noted that FPA was created
“for the purpose of assuring the agricultural
sector of adequate supplies of fertilizer and
pesticide at reasonable prices, rationalizing
the manufacture and marketing of fertilizer,
protecting the public from the risks inherent
in the use of pesticides, and educating the
agricultural sector in the use of these
inputs.”
Likewise, the Court stressed that PD No.
1144 uses the term “pesticides” always in
conjunction with “fertilizers” or with the
phrase “fertilizers and other agricultural
chemicals/chemical inputs” or the phrase
“other agricultural chemicals.” Urban pest
control or pesticide used in households,
offices, hotels, and other commercial
establishments has nothing to do with
agriculture, it said.
The Court further said that the various
provisions of PD No. 1144 show its
consistent intent to apply the term
“pesticides” only to agricultural use. Thus,
urban pest control operators and their
urban pesticides are excluded from its
coverage. (Fertilizer and Pesticide
Authority v. Manila Pest Control Co. and
Woodrow, GR No. 161594, February 8,
2007)
Remedial Law; Jurisdiction; SC
Upholds Textbook Supply
Deal (2007)
Voting unanimously, the Supreme Court En
Banc recently upheld the validity of the
award of the Department of Education
(DepEd) to Vibal Publishing House, Inc.
(Vibal) and Watana Phanit Printing and
Publishing Co., Ltd. (Watana) of the World
Bank-funded supply and delivery of some
17.5 million copies of social studies
textbook “Makabayan” and teachers’
manual.
In a 16-page decision penned by Justice
Cancio C. Garcia, the Supreme Court
nullified and set aside the order dated

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December 4, 2006 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 18, which granted a
petition for injunction filed by losing bidder
Kolonwel Trading (Kolonwel) to enjoin the
DepEd and the Department of Budget and
Management Procurement Service (DBM-
PS) from awarding the project to Vibal and
Watana.
The Court said that Kolonwel failed to meet
the requirements prescribed by Section 55
of RA 9184, or the Government
Procurement Reform Act, which provides
that decisions of the DBM’s Inter-Agency
Bids and Awards Committee (IABAC) may
be protested by submitting a verified
petition paper to the head of the procuring
entity and paying a non-refundable protest
fee. It stressed that Kolonwel “sought
judicial intervention even before completing
the protest process.
Hence, its filing of SP Civil Case No. 06-
116010 was precipitate. Or, as the law
itself would put it, cases that are filed in
violation of the protest process ‘shall be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.’”
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and Justice
Conchita Carpio-Morales were on leave,
while Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura
took no part as he participated in the case
when he was still Solicitor General. (GR No.
175608, Department of Budget and
Management Procurement Service and the
Inter-Agency Bids and Committee v.
Kolonwel Trading, June 8, 2007)
Remedial Law; PAO Clients Now
Exempt from Court Fees
(2007)
All clients of the Public Attorney’s Office
(PAO) are now exempt from paying court
fees.
The Supreme Court has recently ordered
the exemption of all PAO clients from court
fees following the enactment of RA 9406
(An Act Reorganizing and Strengthening the
Public Attorney’s Office) last March 23.
The Court directed the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA), the Office of the Clerk
of Court, and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to disseminate this information
to all concerned.
RA 9406, sec. 16-D provides that “clients of
PAO shall be exempt from payment of
docket and other fees incidental to
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instituting an action in court and other
quasi-judicial bodies, as an original
proceeding or on appeal.” It also provides
that “the costs of the suit, attorney’s fees
and contingent fees imposed upon the
adversary of the PAO clients after a
successful litigation shall be deposited in
the National Treasury as trust fund and
shall be disbursed for special allowances of
authorized officials and lawyers of the
PAO.”
Acting upon the Court’s directive, the OCA
has issued OCA Circular No. 67-2007,
providing guidelines on the implementation
of the exemption in accordance with the
conditions prescribed under Section 19,
Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court. (AM
No. 07-5-15-SC, Re: RA 9406, Exempting
Clients of PAO from Payment of Docket and
Other Fees, June 12, 2007; OCA Circular No.
67-2007, Re: Exemption of the Indigent
Clients of the Public Attorney’s Office from
the Payment of Docket and Other Fees, July
12, 2007)
Remedial Law; SC Clarifies Rules on
Indigent Litigants (2006)
Even if an applicant for exemption from the
payment of docket and legal fees does not
meet the salary and property requirements
under Rule 141, sec. 19, i.e., the applicant’s
gross income and that of his immediate
family do not exceed an amount double the
monthly minimum wage of an employee
and the applicant does not own real
property with a market value of more than
Php300,000, the applicant may still be
exempted if he can prove that he has “no
money or property sufficient and available
for food, shelter and basic necessities for
himself and his family” under Rule 3, sec.
21.
Thus ruled the Supreme Court in a 19-page
decision penned by Justice Presbitero J.
Velasco, Jr. and concurred in by Justices
Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Antonio T. Carpio,
and Conchita Carpio Morales. Justice Dante
O. Tinga concurred in the result. The Court
therefore set aside the orders of the
Regional Trial Court, Naga City disqualifying
spouses Antonio F. Algura and Lorencita S.J.
Algura as indigent litigants and ordered the
RTC to set for hearing the spouses’ motion
to litigate as such.
“Recapitulating the rules on indigent
litigants, therefore, if the applicant for
exemption meets the salary and property

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requirements under Sec. 19 of Rule 141,
then the grant of the application is
mandatory. On the other hand, when the
application does not satisfy one or both
requirements, then the applicant should not
be denied outright; instead the court should
apply the ‘Indigency Test’ under Section
21 of Rule 3 and use its sound discretion in
determining the merits of the prayer for
exemption,” the Court held.
The Court noted that access to justice by
the impoverished is “held sacrosanct”
under the Constitution and that it is a
priority and imperative under the Court’s
Action Program for Judicial Reform initiated
by former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.
and the judicial philosophy of “Liberty and
Prosperity” of Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban. “Without doubt, one of the
most precious rights which may be
shielded and secured is the
unhampered access to the justice
system by the poor, the
underprivileged, and the
marginalized,” it added.
The RTC of Naga had disqualified the Algura
spouses as indigent litigants and dismissed
on the ground of non-payment of legal fees
their suit for damages against the Naga City
Government for the alleged illegal
demolition of their residence and boarding
house. The RTC had done so on the ground
that the gross income or total earnings of
Antonio Algura exceeded the income
requirement under Rule 141. This prompted
the Algura spouses to file a petition for
review on certiorari on pure question of law
to the Supreme Court. (GR No. 150135,
Spouses Algura v. The Local Government
Unit of the City of Naga, et al., October 30,
2006)
Remedial Law; SC Decisions to
Withhold Names of Women
and Child Victims (2006)
“To respect the dignity and protect the
privacy of women and child victims,” the
Supreme Court has recently resolved to
withhold their names and instead use
fictitious initials in its decisions. Likewise,
the personal circumstances of the victim-
survivors or any other information tending
to establish or compromise their identities,
as well as those of their immediate family
or household members, shall not be
disclosed.
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Thus held the Court in a 20-page decision
penned by Justice Dante O. Tinga affirming
the conviction of Melchor Cabalquinto on
two counts of rape against his eight-year
old daughter. Pursuant to its ruling, the
victim was referred to as “AAA” in the
decision.
The Court said its ruling effectuates the
provisions of Republic Act No. 7610, the
Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act,
and its implementing rules; RA 9262, or the
Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004, and its implementing
rules; and the Court’s own Rule on Violence
Against Women and their Children.
These enactments, the Court pointed out,
unequivocally express the intention to
maintain the confidentiality of information
in cases involving violence against women
and children. The Court also took into
account separate comments from the Office
of the Solicitor General, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, National Press Club,
Philippine Press Institute, Kapisanan ng mga
Brodkaster sa Pilipinas, and the Department
of Social Welfare and Development.
The case stemmed from a sworn statement
filed by “AAA,” assisted by her mother
“ABC,” Cabalquinto’s common-law wife,
saying that “AAA” was raped by
Cabalquinto on November 8 and 13, 1998
inside their house. Both the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals found
Cabalquinto guilty and sentenced him to
death. However, in view of Republic Act No.
9346 which prohibits the imposition of the
death penalty, the Court sentenced
Cabalquinto to reclusion perpetua without
eligibility for parole and ordered him to pay
“AAA” Php 75,000 civil indemnity damages,
Php75,000 moral damages, and Php 25,000
exemplary damages.
Giving full credence to the
contemporaneous and subsequent conduct
of mother and child that reveal the veracity
of the rape charge, the Court said, “Persons
who witness an event may perceive it from
different points of reference, hence they
may have different accounts of how the
incident took place. What is important is
that their testimonies reinforce each other
on the essential fats and that their versions
corroborate and substantially coincide with
each other to make a consistent and
coherent whole.”

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It may be recalled that in its February 14,
2006 resolution, the Court has resolved to
refrain from posting in the Court website
the full text of the decisions in cases of
child sexual abuse.
Concurring in the decision are Chief Justice
Artemio V. Panganiban, Senior Associate
Justice Reynato S. Puno, and Justices
Leonardo A. Quisumbing, Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago, Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Antonio T. Carpio, Ma. Alicia Austria-
Martinez, Renato C. Corona, Conchita
Carpio Morales, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. Adolfo
S. Azcuna, Minita V. Chico-Nazario, Cancio
C. Garcia, and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (G.R.
No. 167693, People of the Philippines v.
Melchor Cabalquinto, September 19, 2006)
Remedial Law; SC Denies Habeas
Corpus Petition for Nida
Blanca Slay Suspect (2006)
The Supreme Court has denied a petition
for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus
to produce the body of Michael Martinez, a
suspect in the killing of movie actress Nida
Blanca.
In a 13-page decision penned by Chief
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, the Court’s
First Division found that petitioners had not
established by competent and convincing
evidence that Martinez is indeed under the
custody of respondents.
“When respondents making the return of
the writ state that they have never had
custody over the person who is the subject
of the writ, the petition must be dismissed,
in the absence of definite evidence to the
contrary,” the Court said.
The Court said that while the matter of
Martinez’ disappearance has been
established, the writ still could not be
issued as “the grant of relief in a habeas
corpus proceeding is not predicated on the
disappearance of a person, but in his illegal
detention.”
It added that when forcible taking and
disappearance – not arrest and detention –
have been alleged, the proper remedy is
not habeas corpus, but criminal
investigation and proceedings. “This
proceeding for habeas corpus cannot be
used as a substitute for a thorough criminal
investigation,” it said.
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Martinez’ mother and wife had filed a
petition for habeas corpus with the Quezon
City Regional Trial Court, Branch 78 against
then PNP Director General Leandro
Mendoza, CIDG Chief Nestorio Gualberto,
Sr., Senior Superintendent Leonardo Espina,
Sr., Senior Superintendent Jesus Versoza,
and the members of Task Force Marsha,
which was investigating Blanca’s death. It
was alleged that Martinez was abducted
and later seen at Camp Crame.
The RTC ordered respondents to show
cause why the writ of habeas corpus should
not issue. Respondents submitted a return
denying any involvement in Martinez’
disappearance. However, the RTC directed
respondents to produce the body of
Martinez. They appealed this decision to the
Court of Appeals, which gave credence to
respondents’ assertion that Martinez is not
and was never in their custody. Thus
Martinez’ wife, Estrelita, filed the petition
for habeas corpus before the High Court.
Concurring in the decision are Justices
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Ma. Alicia
Austria-Martinez, Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., and
Minita V. Chico-Nazario. (GR No. 153795,
Ma. Estrelita D. Martinez v. Dir. Gen.
Leandro Mendoza, et al., August 17, 2006)
Remedial Law; SC Dismisses
Petition to Compel Use of
Alternative Fuel for PUVs
(2006)
The Supreme Court recently dismissed a
petition for the issuance of a writ of
mandamus by private individuals asserting
“their right to clean air” to direct the Land
Transportation Franchising and Regulatory
Board (LTFRB) and the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to
use compressed natural gas (CNG), an
alternative fuel.
In a 14-page resolution penned by Justice
Leonardo A. Quisumbing, the Court said
that “the plain, speedy and adequate
remedy” sought by the petitioners which is
the WRIT OF MANDAMUS is unavailing
because it is available only to compel
the performance of an act specifically
provided for by law as a duty. The
petitioners were unable to pinpoint the law
that imposes an indubitable duty on
respondents that will justify a grant of the
writ, the Court said. It added there is no law

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that mandates respondents LTFRB and
DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to
use CNG.
The Court added, “mandamus will not
generally lie from one branch of
government to a coordinate branch,
for the obvious reason that neither is
inferior to the other. The need for
future changes in both legislation and
its implementation cannot be
preempted by orders from this Court,
especially when what is prayed for is
procedurally infirm.”
To remedy this environmental problem, the
Court said that the legislature should
provide first the specific statutory remedy
before any judicial recourse by mandamus
is taken. CNG, petitioners claim, is a
colorless and odorless natural gas
comprised mostly of methane and
“considered the cleanest fossil fuel.” It
produces much less pollutants than coal
and petroleum, produces up to 90 percent
less carbon oxide compared to gasoline and
diesel fuel, reduces nitrous oxide emissions
by 50 percent, and cuts hydrocarbon
emissions by half, petitioners said. (GR No.
158290, Hilarion M. Henares, Jr., et al. v.
LTFRB and DOTC, October 23, 2006)
Remedial Law; SC Issues Guidelines
on Judicial Solemnization of
Marriage (2007)
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno yesterday laid
down guidelines on the solemnization of
marriage by the members of the Judiciary to
address the spate of controversies in
connection with alleged irregular
solemnization of marriages by judges. The
Guidelines take effect immediately.
Earlier, the Chief Justice had placed under
preventive suspension four Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) judges in Cebu City
and a Makati Regional Trial Court Judge for
alleged irregular solemnization of
marriages. Similar charges have also been
made against some trial court judges in
Mindanao.
Under the Guidelines, the solemnizing
officer shall be duty-bound to do the
following before performing a record book of all marriages solemnized
marriage ceremony:
1. ensure that that the parties appear
personally and are the same contracting
parties to the marriage;
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2. personally interview the contracting
parties and
3. personally examine the documents
submitted to ascertain if there is
compliance with the essential and
formal requisites of marriage under the
Family Code, as well as the presented
marriage license to determine its
authenticity, completeness, and validity.
4. There shall not be less than two
individuals of legal age to witness the
marriage when the parties take each
other as husband and wife.
In cases when either or both of the
contracting parties is a foreigner, the
solemnizing officer must also examine the
certificate of legal capacity to contract
marriage issued by the concerned
diplomatic or consular officials attached to
the marriage license.
Chief Justice Puno reiterates the general
rule that a marriage shall be solemnized
publicly at the chambers of the judge or in
open court, except in instances when it is
contracted at the point of death or
solemnized in a remote place under Article
29 of the Family Code or when both parties
submit a written request to the solemnizing
officer that the marriage be solemnized at a
house or place designated by them in a
sworn statement.
The Guidelines also reiterate that the legal
fees for solemnization of marriage and
issuance of marriage certificate by justices
or judges is in the amount of Php300,
regardless of who will be the solemnizing
officer. These must be paid in Philippine
currency and must be properly receipted. A
demand for excess amounts shall subject
the solemnizing office to administrative
disciplinary measures.
After every solemnization of marriage, the
solemnizing officer shall ensure that the
marriage certificate is properly
accomplished and contains the complete
entries (i.e., declaration that the contracting
parties take each other as husband and
wife; the true and correct information and
statements required under Art. 22 of the
Family Code; among others). The
solemnizing officer shall also ensure that a
shall be kept.
Judges of the Shari’a District Courts and
Shari’a Circuit Courts shall have the
authority to solemnize marriages within the

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court’s jurisdiction should the proper wali
(guardian for marriage) refuse without
justifiable reason to authorize
solemnization. Marriages shall be
solemnized publicly in any mosque, office of
the Shari’a judge, office of the District or
Circuit Registrar, residence of the bride or
her wali, or at any other suitable place
agreed upon by parties. Marriages among
Muslims sans marriage license may be
performed validly if solemnized in
accordance with their customs, rites, or
practices.
Likewise, the Guidelines state that
appropriate administrative disciplinary
proceedings shall be taken against any
judge or court employee, who, alone or with
the connivance of other court personnel or
third persons not employed by the court,
shall intervene so that the marriage of
contracting parties is facilitated or
performed despite the lack of or without the
necessary supporting documents, or
performs other acts that tends to cause the
solemnization of the marriage with undue
haste.
Judges are also required to indicate in their
monthly report of cases all marriages
solemnized by them.
In the case of the suspended Cebu judges,
copies of the marriages certificates and
other supporting documents for marriages
solemnized by the judges concerned were
found in the custody of other courts than
their own. Documents, including logbooks
for marriages, invariably show the names of
court employees who have been identified
as “fixers” or “facilitators” for marriages as
well as the names of “runners” or
“assistants” who facilitate the application
for marriage license.
Two individuals had also issued affidavits
confirming that in Cebu City, “package
fees” for marriage solemnization go from
Php1,500 to Php15,000. (Guidelines on the
Solemnization of Marriage by the Members
of the Judiciary,Administrative Order No.
125-2007, August 9, 2007)
Remedial Law; SC resolves Boracay
land dispute (2007)
THE SUPREME COURT recently wrote finis to
the 21-year-old dispute involving 14,771
sq.m. of land in Boracay Island, Malay,
Aklan.
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In a unanimous decision penned by Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., the Court’s Second
Division denied the petition of Vicente delos
Santos et al. and affirmed the May 11, 1999
decision and January 31, 2000 resolution of
the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed
on a technicality their appeal concerning
four adjoining Boracay lots based on a
compromise agreement and considered
their respective appeals withdrawn.
“With the loss of their right of appeal to the
CA, we see no need to resolve the issue of
ownership. Such issue should have been
first resolved by the CA, but it was not able
to do so because of the dismissal of the
appeal. Thus, the claim of ownership is a
non-issue before this Court,” it said.
The Court noted that petitioners delos
Santos et al. failed to file their motion for
reconsideration before the CA within the 15-
day reglementary period which begins to
run upon receipt of notice of the decision or
final order appealed from pursuant to sec. 1
of Rule 37, in conjunction with sec.3 of Rule
41 of the Rules of Court. It said that the 15-
day period ran from May 24, 1999, when
Atty. Napoleon Victoriano, counsel of
petitioners, received a copy of the assailed
CA decision and not from June 2, 1999 when
petitioners claimed to have received their
copy. The Court stressed that “service
upon the parties’ counsels of record is
tantamount to service upon the
parties themselves, but service upon
the parties themselves is not
considered service upon their
lawyers.”
The Court stressed that petitioners were
“guilty of inexcusable negligence,”
noting that they did not even know that
Victoriano failed to file an appellants’ brief
on their behalf during the more than 180
day extension that he sought from the CA,
aside from their failure to learn of the CA
decision. (Delos Santos, et al. v. Elizalde, et
al., GR Nos. 141810 & 141812, February 2,
2007)
Remedial Law; SC Upholds Search
Warrants against Alleged
Fake PlayStation
Manufacturer (2007)
The Supreme Court has granted the petition
of Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc.

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(Sony) to declare valid the warrants issued
by the Manila City Regional Trial Court
(RTC) to search the premises in Cavite of an
alleged manufacturer of counterfeit
“PlayStation” consoles, joy pads, housing,
labels, and game software.
In a seven-page decision penned by
Division Chair Senior Associate Justice
Leonardo A. Quisumbing, the Court’s
Second Division set aside the Court of
Appeals June 30, 2003 decision and January
16, 2004 resolution. The CA rulings had
denied the petition for certiorari and
subsequent motion for reconsideration
assailing the Manila RTC, Branch 1’s order
of October 5, 2001 quashing warrants to
search the premises of Supergreen
Incorporated (Supergreen) in Cavite while
upholding those concerning Supergreen’s
premises in Parañaque City. The CA had
held that the Manila RTC had no jurisdiction
to issue search warrants enforceable in
Cavite and that lack of jurisdiction was not
deemed waived by Supergreen.
The Court, however, partly modified the
Manila RTC’s October 5, 2001 order by
declaring valid the subject search warrants
to be enforced in Cavite.
“(Supergreen’s) imitation of the general
appearance of (Sony’s) goods was done
allegedly in Cavite. It sold the goods
allegedly in Mandaluyong City, Metro
Manila. The alleged acts would constitute a
transitory or continuing offense. Thus,
clearly, under Section 2(b) of Rule 126,
Section 168 of Rep. Act No. 8293 and
Article 189 (1) of the Revised Penal Code,
petitioner may apply for a search warrant in
any court where any element of the alleged
offense was committed, including any of the
courts within the National Capital Region,”
the Court said.
The case stemmed from the complaint filed
with the National Bureau of Investigatin
(NBI) by Sony against Supergreen. The NBI
found that Supergreen engaged in the
reproduction and distribution of counterfeit
“PlayStation” game software, consoles, and
accessories in violation of Sony Computer’s
intellectual property rights. PlayStation is
among the video game products of Sony.
The NBI applied with Manila RTC, Branch 1
for warrants to search Supergreen’s
premises in Parañaque City and Cavite.
Armed with warrants issued by the Manila
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RTC, the NBI in April 2001 simultaneously
served the search warrants and seized a
replicating machine and several unit of
counterfeit “PlayStation” consoles, joy pads,
housing, labels, and game software.
In June 2001, Supergreen filed a motion to
quash the search warrants, but the RTC
denied the motion. Supergreen filed
another motion, and this time, the RTC
upheld validity of search warrants in
Parañaque City but quashed the search
warrants in Cavite City. Sony then brought
case to CA, which dismissed Sony’s petition
for certiorari, ruling that the Manila RTC had
no jurisdiction to issue search warrants to
be enforced in Cavite. When the CA also
denied Sony’s motion for reconsideration,
the latter brought the case to the SC.
The Court gave weight to Sony’s contention
that the case involves a transitory or
continuing offense of unfair competition
under Section 168 of RA 8293 (Intellectual
Property Code of the Philippines) where it
may apply for a search warrant in any court
where any element of the alleged offense
was committed. (Sony Computer
Entertainment, Inc. v. Supergreen,
Incorporated, GR No. 161823, March 22,
2007)
Remedial Law; SC: Final Judgments
of Courts May Not be
Disregarded by DAR
Secretary (2006)
The Supreme Court recently sustained the
primacy of final judgments of the courts
over orders emanating from the Secretary
of Agrarian Reform.
In a 26-page decision penned by Justice
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., the Court’s Third
Division directed the Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to respect
and recognize the February 8, 1972
Decision of the Court of Agrarian
Relations (CAR) in CAR Case No. 266-
Bataan ’69, which ordered the conversion
of a 26.5-hectare parcel of land into a
subdivision project and the cancellation of
the Emancipation Patents or Land Transfer
Certificates over the said property in Samal,
Bataan. According to the Court, the belief
of public respondent Secretary that the
aforementioned Decision should be
declared null and void for want of
jurisdiction is considered “an affront to the

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Court and the entire judiciary.” It added
that the DAR Secretary is “supposed to be
aware of the immutability and inalterability
of final judgments of the courts.”
Citing the case of Sacdalan v. Court of
Appeals, the Court said that a decision
that attained finality “becomes
immutable and unalterable and may
no longer be modified in any respect
even if the modification is meant to
correct erroneous conclusions of fact
or law and whether it will be made by
the court that rendered it or the
highest court of the land.” The Court
added that if any DAR official “is
allowed to revoke or annul final
judgments of the courts of law…then
such acts trench on judicial power of
the courts under the Constitution.
Without doubt, such abuse and misuse of
authority on the part of the DAR and its
officials constitute serious and grave abuse
of discretion.”
The assailed DAR order, issued by then
Secretary Ernesto V. Garilao in 1995, stated
that the Decision of the Court in CAR Case
No. 266-Bataan ’69 was null and void
because the jurisdiction to hear and issue
the said Decision was originally vested in
the Court of First Instance (CFI) where the
land is located and not in the CAR. Garilao
likewise opined that even if the CAR had
jurisdiction over the case, the power of the
CAR under RA 3844 was to rule on the
dispossession of the tenants but not to
order the conversion of the landholding for
non-agricultural purposes.
The case involved a parcel of land in Samal,
Bataan, owned by petitioners Rodrigo and
Elisa Coloso. They sought to expand their
subdivision project by converting a portion
of their property occupied by a group of
agricultural leasehold tenants. The
petitioners entered into negotiations with
the tenants for the payment of the requisite
disturbance compensation but were not
able to reach an agreement on the matter.
Thus, on September 8, 1969, petitioners
filed a complaint for ejectment with the
then Balanga, Bataan Court of First Instance
Branch IV, acting as a CAR, against the
leasehold tenants. They prayed that the
tenants be ordered to vacate the subject
property after receiving the required
disturbance compensation to be fixed by
the CAR. The CAR ultimately rendered a
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decision in favor of the petitioners. The
tenants appealed the decision to the Court
of Appeals, which was denied as the CA
affirmed in toto the CAR Decision. (GR No.
129165, Spouses Rodrigo Coloso and Elisa
Coloso v. Hon. Sec. Ernesto V. Garilao, et
al., October 30, 2006)
Remedial Law; State Prosecutors
Can’t File Informations
Unless Validly Authorized
(2007)
As provided in the 2000 Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, state prosecutors
cannot file an Information unless authorized
by the provincial or city prosecutor, chief
state prosecutor, or the Ombudsman or his
deputy.
Thus reiterated the Supreme Court as it
dismissed for lack of merit the petition for
certiorari and mandamus filed by State
Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino, et al.
against a Regional Trial Court (RTC) judge
who annulled an Information against an
employer who allegedly failed to pay his
employees’ Social Security System (SSS)
premiums. The petition prayed for the
nullification of the quashal of the
Information charging employer Benedict Dy
Tecklo, the owner of Qualistronic Builders,
of violation of Sec. 22(a) in relation to Sec.
28(e) of Republic Act No. 8282 (The Social
Security Act of 1997).
In a decision penned by Justice Adolfo S.
Azcuna, the Court found that Judge Pablo M.
Paqueo, Jr. of RTC Branch 23, Naga City, did
not gravely abuse his discretion in quashing
the Information filed by Tolentino because
the latter is not duly authorized to file the
same.
Tolentino contended that he had the
authority to file the Information since he
was designated Special Prosecutor for SSS
cases and authorized to investigate, file the
necessary Informations, and prosecute SSS
cases by Regional State Prosecutor
Santiago M. Turingan. The Court, however,
ruled that under the law (PD 1275), the
functions of the Regional State Prosecutor
do not include that of approving the
Information filed or dismissed by the
investigating prosecutor. Furthermore, the
Court noted that the Regional State
Prosecutor is not included among the law
officers authorized to approve the filing of
Informations of the investigating prosecutor
under sec. 4, Rule 112 of the 2000 Revised

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Rules of Criminal Procedure. Consequently,
the non-compliance was a ground to quash
the Information under Sec. 3(d), Rule 117 of
the said Rules, the Court said. (GR No.
150606, Tolentino v. Paqueo, Jr., June 7,
2007)
Remedial Law; Validity of the Court
Martial Proceedings Against
Oakwood Rebels (2006)
The Supreme Court cleared the way for the
prosecution by the general court martial, for
violation of Article 96 (conduct unbecoming
an officer and a gentleman) of the Articles
of War, of the 29 junior officers and enlisted
men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) who forcibly took over the Oakwood
Premier Apartments in Makati City in 2003
in a bid to overthrow the Arroyo
administration.
The Supreme Court holds that herein
respondents have the authority in
convening a court martial and in charging
petitioners with violation of Article 96 of the
Articles of War,” the Court said. Named as
respondents were Gen. Narciso Abaya,
then AFP Chief of Staff, and B. Gen. Mariano
M. Sarmiento, Jr., Judge Advocate General of
the Judge Advocate General’s Office (JAGO).
The Court held that the offense for violation
of Article 96 of the Articles of War is
service-connected as expressly provided in
sec. 1, paragraph 2 of RA 7055, An Act
Strengthening Civilian Supremacy Over the
Military By Returning to the Civil Courts the
Jurisdiction Over Certain Offenses Involving
Members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, Other Persons Subject to
Military Law, and the Members of the
Philippine National Police, Repealing for the
Purpose Certain Presidential Decrees. It
stressed that there was no dispute that
petitioners, being AFP officers, are subject
to military law.
“[T]he charge has a bearing on their
professional conduct or behavior as military
officers. Equally indicative of the ‘service-
connected’ nature of the offense is the
penalty prescribed for the same – dismissal
from service – imposable only by the
military court,” the Court said.
The Court dismissed the petitioners’
contention that they can no longer be
charged before the court martial for
violation of Article 96 of the Articles of War
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because the same had been declared by
the Pasig City Regional Trial Court, Branch
148 in its 2004 order as “not service-
connected, but rather absorbed in the
alleged crime of coup d’ etat.”
“The RTC, in making such declaration,
practically amended the law which
expressly vests in the court martial the
jurisdiction over ‘service-connected crimes
or offense.’…Evidently, such declaration by
the RTC constitutes grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction and is, therefore, void,” the
Court held.
On July 27, 2003, more than 300 heavily
armed junior officers and enlisted men of
the AFP – mostly from the elite units of the
Army’s Scout Rangers and the Navy’s
Special Warfare Group – entered the
premises of the Oakwood Premier Luxury
Apartments in Makati City.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) filed coup
d’etat charges against the Oakwood
participants before the Makati City RTC.
Subsequently, respondent Abaya, pursuant
to Article 70 of the Articles of War, ordered
the arrest and detention of the soldiers.
During the DOJ inquiry, Abaya created a
pre-trial investigation panel to determine
the propriety of filing with the military
tribunal charges for violations of
Commonwealth Act No. 408 (The Articles of
War) against the Oakwood rebels.
Of the 321 accused before the RTC, 243
filed a motion praying for the Makati City
RTC to assume jurisdiction over all charges
filed with JAGO. Subsequently, the JAGO
recommended that only 29 of the officers
involved be prosecuted for violation of
Article 96 before a general court martial.
In 2004, the Court already held that General
Court-Martial has jurisdiction over the
charges of violations of the Articles of War
in connection with Oakwood rebellion. The
Court held that “the writs of prohibition and
habeas corpus prayed for by the petitioners
must perforce fail” and that as a general
rule, the writ of habeas corpus will not issue
where the person alleged to be restrained
of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under a process issued by the court that
has jurisdiction to do so. It clarified that the
term “court” includes a General Court-
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corpus should not be allowed after the party
sought to be released has been charged
before any court or quasi-judicial body.
The Oakwood rebellion prompted President
Arroyo to declare “a state of rebellion”
which was subsequently lifted on August 1,
2003 through Proclamtion No. 435. (GR No.
164007, Gonzales, et al. v. Abaya and
Sarmiento, Jr., August 10, 2006)
Taxation; BIR: Donations to Society
for Judicial Excellence Tax
Exempt (2006)
The Bureau of Internal Revenue has
declared that donations to the Society for
Judicial Excellence (SJE) are exempt from
donor’s tax and that all such donations shall
be fully deductible from the donor’s gross
income.
The SJE is a non-stock, non-profit
organization aimed primarily for the
improvement of the judicial system and the
professional advancement of its members.
It is composed of past winners of the annual
search for outstanding first and second
level judges and clerks of courts. Its
functions were previously lodged with
Supreme Court’s Committee on Judicial
Excellence. In January 2006, then Chief
Justice Artemio V. Panganiban devolved the
committee’s tasks to the then newly
organized SJE, which now serves as a
regular committee of the SC.
The BIR upheld the SJE as both a charitable
institution and an entity of the government.
As such, donations to the SJE are exempt
from donor’s tax. It said that under the Tax
Code of 1997, gifts in favor of charitable
institutions are exempt from the payment
of donor’s tax, provided that not more than
30 percent of the gift shall be used for
administration purposes. The Tax Code also
provides that donations to the national
government or any entity created by any of
its agencies not conducted for profit, or to
any of the government’s political
subdivision are exempt from payment of
donor’s tax.
The BIR likewise opined that donations to
the SJE are fully deductible from the donors’
gross income. Under section 34(H)(2)(a) of
the Tax Code of 1997, donations to the
Philippine government or any of its
agencies are deductible in full, the BIR said.
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Among its donors are the Madrigal Abad
Santos and Avanceña families, who are
sponsoring the Chief Justice Jose Abad
Santos Award and Chief Justice Ramon Q.
Avanceña Award for outstanding trial court
judges, respectively. This year, the Society
also received donations from Don Emilio T.
Yap, the Manila Bulletin Corporation, and
the Euro-Med Corporation.
All such donations are intended to cover the
expenses incident to the Judicial Excellence
Awards such as cash prizes, plaques, costs
of seminars, testimonials, and researches
on the improvement of the administration
of justice, explained SJE Chair Justice
Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez. No part of the
donations goes to administrative expenses
because this is assumed by the Supreme
Court, she added. (BIR Ruling No. DA-502-
06, August 16, 2006)
Taxation; SC Exempts MIAA from
Parañaque Realty Taxes
(2006)
The Supreme Court, voting 11-3, granted
the petition of the Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) to exempt its
Airport Lands and Buildings from paying the
City of Parañaque Php624.5 million in real
estate tax and penalties for the taxable
years 1992 to 2001.
In a 43-page decision penned by Justice
Antonio T. Carpio, the Court also declared
void all the real estate tax assessments,
including final notices of real estate tax
delinquencies, issued by the City of
Parañaque on MIAA’s Airport Lands and
Buildings, except for the portions that MIAA
has leased to private parties. Likewise, the
Court declared void the assailed auction
sale, and all its effects, of the Airport Lands
and Building of the MIAA.
In 2001, the Parañaque city government
issued notices of levy and warrants of levy
on MIAA’s Airport Lands and Buildings for its
failure to pay real estate taxes plus
penalties amounting to Php624.5 million for
the taxable years 1992 to 2001. The city
government then put the subject properties
up for sale at a public auction. Thus, MIAA
brought a case for prohibition to the Court
of Appeals against the City of Parañaque.
The CA, however, dismissed the petition,
prompting MIAA to file a petition in the SC,
which was eventually granted.

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“Under Article 420 of the Civil Code, the
Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA, being
devoted to public use, are properties of
public dominion and thus owned by the
State or the Republic of the Philippines.
Article 420 specifically mentions ‘ports…
constructed by the State,’ which includes
public airports and seaports, as properties
of public dominion and owned by the
Republic. As properties of public dominion
owned by the Republic, there is no doubt
whatsoever that the Airport Lands and
Buildings are expressly exempt from real
estate tax under Section 234(a) of the Local
Government Code (LGC). This Court has
also repeatedly ruled that properties of
public dominion are not subject to
execution or foreclosure sale,” the Court
ruled.
The Court held that MIAA is a government
instrumentality and not a government-
owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) as
defined under sec. 2(10) and (13) of the
Introductory Provisions of the
Administrative Code. Citing sec. 133(o) of
the LGC, the Court said that MIAA, as a
government instrumentality, “is not
subject to ‘[t]axes, fees or charges of
any kind’ by local governments.”
The Court added that the only
exception is when MIAA leases its real
property to a ‘taxable person’ as
provided in Section 234(a) of the LGC,
in which case the specific real property
leased becomes subject to real estate
tax. “Thus, only portions of the Airport
Lands and Buildings leased to taxable
persons like private parties are subject to
real estate tax by the City of Parañaque,”
the Court said.
Concurring were Chief Justice Artemio V.
Panganiban, Senior Associate Justice
Reynato S. Puno, and Justices Leonardo A.
Quisumbing, Consuelo Ynares-Santiago,
Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, Renato C.
Corona, Conchita Carpio Morales, Minita V.
Chico-Nazario, Cancio C. Garcia, and
Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. Justice Dante O.
Tinga wrote a separate dissenting opinion.
He was joined by Justices Ma. Alicia Austria-
Martinez and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr. Justice
Adolfo S. Azcuna was on leave.
Justice Tinga argued that sec. 133 of the
LGC was not intended to be so absolute a
prohibition on the power of local
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government units to tax the National
Government, its agencies, and
instrumentalities. He said that Mactan-Cebu
International Airport Authority v. Hon.
Marcos and a long line of succeeding cases
have already settled the rule that under the
LGC, “all natural and juridical persons, even
those GOCCs, instrumentalities and
agencies, are no longer exempt from local
taxes even if previously granted an
exemption. The only exemptions from local
taxes are those specifically provided under
the Local Government Code itself, or those
enacted through subsequent legislation.”
He also said that under sec. 232 of LGC,
instrumentalities, agencies, and GOCCs are
generally liable for real property taxes.
“Make no mistake, the majority has virtually
declared war on the seventy nine provinces,
one hundred seventeen cities, and one
thousand five hundred municipalities of the
Philippines,” Justice Tinga said in his 82-
page dissenting opinion. (GR No. 155650,
MIAA v. CA, et al., July 20, 2006)
Taxation; SC Holds DIGITEL
Accountable to Pangasinan
for Local Taxes (2007)
The Supreme Court recently found Digital
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc.
(DIGITEL) liable to the Province of
Pangasinan for the payment of provincial
franchise and real property taxes.
Furthermore, the Court said that DIGITEL is
liable for the corresponding interests,
penalties, and surcharges of its tax
liabilities.
In a 21-page decision penned by Justice
Minita V. Chico-Nazario, the Court affirmed
the ruling of the Regional Trial Court of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 68 in holding
that the tax exemption in Republic Act No.
7925, the “Public Telecommunications
Policy Act of the Philippines,” stating that
any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption,
or immunity granted under existing
franchises, or may hereafter be granted,
shall be made part of previously enacted
franchises and made automatically
applicable to the grantees thereof, does not
work to exempt DIGITEL from payment of
provincial franchise and real property taxes.
Citing the 1991 case of PLDT v. City of
Davao, the Court held that there is nothing
in Section 23 of RA No. 7925 which shows
that it “contemplates the grant of tax

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exemptions to all telecommunications
entities, including those whose exemptions
had been withdrawn by the Local
Government Code (LGC).” The Court noted
that the exemption in § 23 of R.A. No. 7925
could contemplate exemption from certain
regulatory or reporting requirements. It
thus held DIGITEL liable for the payment of
the provincial franchise tax. However, it
held that in view of the passage of Republic
Act No. 7716 abolishing the franchise tax
imposed on telecommunications companies
effective 1 January 1996 and in its place
imposing a 10 percent Value-Added-Tax
(VAT) from 1 January 1996, petitioner
DIGITEL is liable for only 10 percent VAT
starting January 1, 1996.
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On the issue relating to the payment of real
property taxes, the Court ruled that the
exemption in DIGITEL’s franchise (R.A. No.
7678) only applies to those real properties
actually, directly and exclusively used by it
in its franchise. As such, Pangasinan can
still levy real property tax on the remaining
real properties of the grantee located within
its territorial jurisdiction, the Court added.
The Court thus directed the recomputation
of DIGITEL’s tax liabilities in accordance
with its decision. (GR No. 152534, Digital
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. v.
Province of Pangasinan, February 23, 2007)