LIBI VS IAC

Since about 1976, minors Julie Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were lovers. In December
1978, Julie Ann decided to break up with Wendell because the latter has violent
tendencies. Julie Ann refused to give Wendell his second chance. On January 14, 1979,
both minors were found dead inside Julie Ann’s house. Both were only 18 years of age
(age of majority that time was 21).
Apparently, Wendell used his father’s gun to kill Julie Ann and then later he committed
suicide.
The parents of Julie Ann (Felipe and Shirley Gotiong) then filed a civil case for recovery
of damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the parents of Wendell
(Cresencio and Amelia Libi).
ISSUE: Whether or not the parents of Wendell are civilly liable?
HELD: Yes. It was determined from the evidence adduced that the Libis had been
negligent in safekeeping their gun. Wendell gained access to the gun in 1978 and the
Libis did not know that their son had possession of said gun. They only found out about
it when the shooting happened. Further, they were not even aware that their son is a
drug informant of the local Constabulary (police force at that time). Clearly, the parents
were negligent and were not acting with the diligence required by law (that of a good
father of a family) in making sure that their minor children shall not cause damages
against other persons.
What is the nature of their liability?
In this case, the Supreme Court also clarified that the nature of the liability of parents in
cases like this is not merely subsidiary. Their liability is primary. This is whether or not
what the damage caused by their minor child arose from quasi-delict or from a criminal
act. This is also the reason why parents can avoid liability if they will be able to show that
they have acted with the diligence required by law because if their liability is merely
subsidiary, they can never pose the defense of diligence of a good father of a family.

AGAPITO FUELLAS, petitioner, vs. ELPIDIO CADANO, ET AL., respondents.

G.R. No. L-14409 [October 31, 1961]

FACTS:

Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas, were both
13 years old and classmates at St. Mary’s High School, Dansalan City. While Pepito was
studying his lessons in the classroom, Rico took the pencil of one Ernesto Cabanok and
surreptitiously placed it inside the pocket of Pepito. When Ernesto asked Rico to return
the pencil, it was Pepito who returned the same, an act which angered Rico, who held
the neck of Pepito and pushed him to the floor. Villamira, a teacher, separated Rico and
Pepito and told them to go home. Rico went ahead, with Pepito following. When Pepito
had just gone down of the schoolhouse, he was met by Rico, still in an angry mood.
Angelito Aba, a classmate, told the two to shake hands. Pepito extended his hand to Rico,
but the latter instead held the former by the neck and with his leg, placed Pepito out of
balance and pushed him to the ground. Pepito fell on his right side with his right arm
under his body, whereupon, Rico rode on his left side. While Rico was in such position,
Pepito suddenly cried out “My arm is broken.” Rico then got up and went away. Pepito
was helped by others to go home. That same evening Pepito was brought to the Lanao
General Hospital for treatment and the results of the x-ray revealed that there was a
complete fracture of the radius and ulna of the right forearm which necessitated plaster
casting. As a result, a civil case for damages was filed against Agapito Fuellas, father of
the minor Rico.

ISSUE:

WON Agapito Fuellas may be held liable for damages for the deliberate criminal act of his
minor son.

HELD:

YES. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company. This civil liability of the father or the mother, as the case may
be, is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them and
the only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Since
children and wards do not yet have the capacity to govern themselves, the law imposes
upon the parents and guardians the duty of exercising special vigilance over the acts of
their children and wards in order that damages to third persons due to the ignorance,
lack of foresight or discernment of such children and wards may be avoided. If the parents
and guardians fail to comply with this duty, they should suffer the consequences of their
abandonment or negligence by repairing the damage caused”.

AGAPITO FUELLAS, petitioner, vs. ELPIDIO CADANO, ET AL., respondents.

G.R. No. L-14409 [October 31, 1961]

FACTS:

Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas, were both
13 years old and classmates at St. Mary’s High School, Dansalan City. While Pepito was
studying his lessons in the classroom, Rico took the pencil of one Ernesto Cabanok and
surreptitiously placed it inside the pocket of Pepito. When Ernesto asked Rico to return
the pencil, it was Pepito who returned the same, an act which angered Rico, who held
the neck of Pepito and pushed him to the floor. Villamira, a teacher, separated Rico and
Pepito and told them to go home. Rico went ahead, with Pepito following. When Pepito
had just gone down of the schoolhouse, he was met by Rico, still in an angry mood.
Angelito Aba, a classmate, told the two to shake hands. Pepito extended his hand to Rico,
but the latter instead held the former by the neck and with his leg, placed Pepito out of
balance and pushed him to the ground. Pepito fell on his right side with his right arm
under his body, whereupon, Rico rode on his left side. While Rico was in such position,
Pepito suddenly cried out “My arm is broken.” Rico then got up and went away. Pepito
was helped by others to go home. That same evening Pepito was brought to the Lanao
General Hospital for treatment and the results of the x-ray revealed that there was a
complete fracture of the radius and ulna of the right forearm which necessitated plaster
casting. As a result, a civil case for damages was filed against Agapito Fuellas, father of
the minor Rico.

ISSUE:

WON Agapito Fuellas may be held liable for damages for the deliberate criminal act of his
minor son.

HELD:

YES. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the minor children
who live in their company. This civil liability of the father or the mother, as the case may
be, is a necessary consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them and
the only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they prove that
they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. Since
children and wards do not yet have the capacity to govern themselves, the law imposes
upon the parents and guardians the duty of exercising special vigilance over the acts of
their children and wards in order that damages to third persons due to the ignorance,
lack of foresight or discernment of such children and wards may be avoided. If the parents
and guardians fail to comply with this duty, they should suffer the consequences of their
abandonment or negligence by repairing the damage caused”.

TAMARGO VS CA
Posted by kaye lee on 3:00 AM
G.R. No. 85044 June 3 1992 [Parental Authority]

FACTS:
In October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, a minor, shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo with an
air rifle. Jennifer's natural parents filed civil complaints for damages with the RTC
against Bundoc's natural parents.
In December 1981, spouses Rapisura filed a petition to adopt Adelberto. The petition
was granted in November 1982.
Adelberto's parents, in their Answer, claimed that the spouses Rapisura were
indispensable parties to the action since parental authority had shifted to them from the
moment the petition for adoption was decreed. Spouses Tamargo contended that since
Adelberto was then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not
ceased by mere filing and granting of the petition for adoption. Trial court dismissed the
spouses Tamargo's petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the spouses Rapisura are the indispensable parties to actions committed
by Adelberto.

RULING:
No. In Article 221 of the Family Code states that: "Parents and other persons exercising
parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts
or omissions of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their
parental authority subject to the appropriate defences provided by law." In the case at
bar, parental authority over Adelberto was still lodged with the natural parents at the
time the shooting incident happened. It follows that the natural parents are the
indispensable parties to the suit for damages.

SC held that parental authority had not been retroactively transferred to and vested in
the adopting parents, at the time the shooting happened. It do not consider that
retroactive effect may be given to the decree of the adoption so as to impose a liability
upon the adopting parents accruing at the time when adopting parents had no actual
custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may be essential if it permit the
accrual of some benefit or advantage in favor of the adopted child.
Categories: G.R. No. 85044, Parental Authority, Persons and Family Relations

ST. JOSEPH’S COLLEGE, SR. JOSEPHINI AMBATALI, SFIC, AND ROSALINDA

TABUGO, petitioners
vs.
JAYSON MIRANDA, REPRESENTED BY HIS FATHER, RODOLFO S. MIRANDA,
respondent
G.R. 182353, June 29, 2010

FACTS:
- November 17, 1994, 1:30PM, inside SJC’s premises, the class to which Jayson
Miranda (a sixth-grader) belonged was conducting a science experiment about
fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of petitioner Rosalinda
Tabugo, she being the subject teacher and employee of SJC. The adviser of Jayson
is Estefania Abdan.
- Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment without having adequately
secured it from any untoward incident or occurrence. In the middle of the
experiment, Jayson, who was the assistant leader of one of the class groups,
checked the result of the experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying
glass. The test tube was being held by one of his group mates who moved it close
and towards the eye of Jason. At that instance, the compound in the test tube
spurted out and several particles of which hit Jayson’s eye and the different parts
of the bodies of some of his group mates. As a result thereof, Jayson’s eyes were
chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery
and had to spend for his medication.
- Upon learning of the incident and because of the need for finances, Jayson’s
mother, who was working abroad, had to rush back home for which she spent
P36,070.00 for her fares, and had to forego her salary from November 23 –
December 26, 1994, in the amount of at least P40,000.00.
- Jayson and his parents suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish and wounded
feelings as a result of his injury due to petitioners’ fault and failure to exercise the
degree of care and diligence upon each one of them.
- Jayson sent a demand letter to petitioners for the payment of his medical expenses
as well as other expenses incidental thereto, which the latter failed to heed.
- On the other hand, petitioners alleged that before the science experiment was
conducted, the class was given strict instructions to follow the written procedure
for the experiment and not to look into the test tube until the heated compound
had cooled off. Jayson violated such instructions.
 - Jayson was rushed by the school employees to the school clinic and thereafter
transferred to St. Luke’s Medical Center for treatment.
- After the treatment, Jayson was pronounced ready for discharge and an eye test
showed that his vision has not been impaired or affected. In order to avoid
additional hospital charges due to the delay in Jayson’s discharge, Jayson’s father
Rodolfo requested SJC to advance the amount of P26,176.35 (the hospital bill)
until his wife could arrive from abroad and pay back the money. SJC acceded to
the request.
- On December 6, 1994, however, the parents of Jayson wrote SJC a letter
demanding that it should shoulder all the medical expenses of Jayson that had
been incurred and will be incurred further arising from the accident. SJC refused,
saying that the accident occurred by reason of Jayson’s failure to comply with the
written procedure for the experiment and his teacher’s repeated warnings.
Because of this, the Mirandas filed for an action for damages against petitioners.
- RTC ruled in favor of the Mirandas, holding the petitioners jointly and solidarily
liable to pay the amount of P77.338.25 as actual damages. However, Jayson is
odered to reimburse SJC the amount of P26,176.36 representing the advances
given to pay the hospital expenses or to deduct said amount to the 77,338.25 by
way of compensation; P50,000 for moral damages; and P30,000 for attorney’s
fees. CA affirmed in toto.

ISSUE:
- WON the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was his own act of looking at the
heated test tube, hence petitioners shouldn’t be held liable

HELD:
- NO.
- RTC: The immediate and proximate cause of the accident which caused injury to
Jayson was the sudden and unexpected explosion of the chemicals, independent
of any intervening cause. Petitioners failed to show that the negligence of Jayson
was the proximate cause of the injury.
- Petitioners could have prevented the mishap if they exercised a higher degree of
care, caution and foresight. All of the petitioners are equally at fault and are liable
for negligence because all of them are responsible for exercising the required
reasonable care and prudence to prevent or avoid injuries to the students. The
individual petitioners are persons charged with the teaching and vigilance over
their students as well as the supervision and ensuring their well-being. Based on
the facts presented before this Court, they were remiss in their responsibilities and
lacking in the degree of vigilance expected of them.
- No evidence was presented to establish that Tabugo was inside the classroom for
the whole duration of the experiment. The Court is inclined to believe that Tabugo
was NOT inside the classroom when the incident happened. It was unnatural in
the ordinary course of events that Jayson was brought to the school clinic for
immediate treatment not by Tabugo but by somebody else. Estefania Abdan is
equally at fault as the subject adviser in charge because she exercised control and
supervision over Tabugo and the students themselves. It was her obligation to
insure that nothing would go wrong and that the science experiment would be
conducted safely and without harm to the students. Sr. Josephini Ambatali is
likewise culpable under the doctrine of command responsibility because the other
individual petitioners were under her direct control and supervision.
- It was shown that it was guilty of inexcusable laxity in the supervision of its
teachers (despite an apparent rigid screening process for hiring) and in the
maintenance of what should have been a safe and secured environment for
conducting dangerous experiments. The school is still liable for the wrongful acts
of the teachers and employees because it had full information on the nature of
dangerous science experiments but did not take affirmative steps to avert damage
and injury to students.
- An educational institution may be held liable under the principle of RESPONDENT
SUPERIOR. The liability of the employer for the tortuous acts of negligence of its
employees is primary and solidary, direct and immediate and not conditioned upon
the insolvency or prior recourse against the negligent employee.
- Proximate cause was the concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the forseeable
mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment. They were
negligent by failing to exercise the higher degree of care, caution and foresight
incumbent upon the school, its administrators and teachers.
- Article 218 of the Family Code bestows special parental authority on the following
persons with the corresponding obligation, thus:
o FC 218: The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity
or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and
responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction
or custody.
- Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside
or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.
- And as provided in Art. 2180:
o Art. 2180: The obligation imposed by Art 2176 is demandable not only for
one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
- Teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody. Petitioners’ negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of care
is demonstrated by the following:
o Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury
to its students, although uit had full information on the nature of dangerous
science experiments conducted by the students during class;
o Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the students who
conduct experiments in class;
o Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices, especially
goggles, to shield students from expected risks and dangers; and
o Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her class
conducted the experiment, specifically when the accident involving Jayson
occurred.
- The mishap which happened was forseeable by the school. This neglect in
preventing a forseeable injury and damage equates to neglect in exercising the
utmost degree of diligence required of schools, its administrators and teachers,
and ultimately, was the proximate cause of the damage and injury to Jayson.
- As regards the contributory negligence of Jayson, he should not be entitled to
recover damages in full but must likewise bear the consequences of his own
negligence. Petitioners should be held liable only for the damages actually caused
by their negligence.
- Award of actual and moral damages, and attorney’s fees affirmed.
AQUINAS SCHOOL vs. SPS. JOSE INTON and MA. VICTORIA S. INTON, on their
behalf and on behalf of their minor child, JOSE LUIS S. INTON, and SR.
MARGARITA YAMYAMIN, OP
G.R. No. 184202, January 26, 2011

FACTS:

Respondent Jose Luis Inton was a grade 3 student at Aquinas School while Respondent
Yamyamin was a religion teacher at said school. Yamyamin caught Luis misbehaving in
class twice, going over to his classmate instead of copying what was written on the
blackboard. She allegedly kicked him in the legs and shoved his head on the
classmate's seat.

The parents of Luis filed an action for damages on behalf of their son against Yamyamin
and Aquinas school.

With regard to the action for damages, the Intons sought to recover actual, moral, and
exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, for the hurt that Jose Luis and his
mother Victoria suffered. The RTC dismissed Victorias personal claims but ruled in Jose
Luis favor, holding Yamyamin liable to him for moral damages of P25,000.00,
exemplary damages of P25,000.00, and attorneys fees of P10,000.00 plus the costs of
suit.

Not satisfied, the Intons elevated the case to the Court of Appeals and they asked it to
increase the award of damages and to hold Aquinas solidarily liable with Yamyamin.
Finding that an employer-employee relation existed between Aquinas and Yamyamin,
the CA found them solidarily liable to Jose Luis.

ISSUE: Whether or not Aquinas is solidarily liable with Yamyamin for the damages
awarded to Jose Luis Inton.

HELD:
No.

In this case, the school directress testified that Aquinas had an agreement with a
congregation of sisters under which, in order to fulfill its ministry, the congregation
would send religion teachers to Aquinas to provide catechesis to its students. Aquinas
insists that it was not the school but Yamyamins religious congregation that chose her
for the task of catechizing the schools grade three students, much like the way bishops
designate the catechists who would teach religion in public schools. Under the
circumstances, it was quite evident that Aquinas did not have control over Yamyamins
teaching methods. Consequently, it was error for the CA to hold Aquinas solidarily liable
with Yamyamin.
Of course, Aquinas still had the responsibility of taking steps to ensure that only
qualified outside catechists are allowed to teach its young students. In this regard, it
cannot be said that Aquinas took no steps to avoid the occurrence of improper conduct
towards the students by their religion teacher.

First, Yamyamins transcript of records, certificates, and diplomas showed that she was
qualified to teach religion.

Second, there is no question that Aquinas ascertained that Yamyamin came from a
legitimate religious congregation of sisters and that, given her Christian training, the
school had reason to assume that she would behave properly towards the students.

Third, the school gave Yamyamin a copy of the schools Administrative Faculty Staff
Manual that set the standards for handling students. It also required her to attend a
teaching orientation before she was allowed to teach beginning that June of 1998.

Fourth, the school pre-approved the content of the course she was to teach to ensure
that she was really catechizing the students.

And fifth, the school had a program for subjecting Yamyamin to classroom evaluation.
Unfortunately, since she was new and it was just the start of the school year, Aquinas
did not have sufficient opportunity to observe her methods. At any rate, it acted
promptly to relieve her of her assignment as soon as the school learned of the incident.
It cannot be said that Aquinas was guilty of outright neglect.

Amadora vs CA

In April 1972, while the high school students of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos were in
the school auditorium, a certain Pablito Daffon fired a gun. The stray bullet hit Alfredo
Amadora. Alfredo died. Daffon was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide. The parents of Alfredo sued the school for damages under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code because of the school’s negligence.
The trial court ruled in favor of Amadora. The trial court ruled that the principal, the dean
of boys, as well as the teacher-in-charge are all civilly liable. The school appealed as it
averred that when the incident happened, the school year has already ended. Amadora
argued that even though the semester has already ended, his son was there in school to
complete a school requirement in his Physics subject. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor
of the school. The CA ruled that under the last paragraph of Article 2180, only schools of
arts and trades (vocational schools) are liable not academic schools like Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos.
ISSUE: Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, an academic school, is liable
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the tortuous act of its students.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court made a re-examination of the provision on the last
paragraph of Article 2180 which provides:
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody.
The Supreme Court said that it is time to update the interpretation of the above law due
to the changing times where there is hardly a distinction between schools of arts and
trade and academic schools. That being said, the Supreme Court ruled that ALL schools,
academic or not, may be held liable under the said provision of Article 2180.
The Supreme Court however clarified that the school, whether academic or not, should
not be held directly liable. Its liability is only subsidiary.
For non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school who should be
directly liable for the tortuous act of its students. This is because historically, in non-
academic schools, the head of school exercised a closer administration over their students
than heads of academic schools. In short, they are more hands on to their students.
For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would be directly liable for
the tortuous act of the students and not the dean or the head of school.
The Supreme Court also ruled that such liability does not cease when the school year
ends or when the semester ends. Liability applies whenever the student is in the custody
of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school
and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended
at the time of the happening of the incident. As long as it can be shown that the student
is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise
of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right,
and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the
school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing
nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends
and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody
and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180.
At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid direct liability, and for the school, to
avoid subsidiary liability, is to show proof that he, the teacher, exercised the necessary
precautions to prevent the injury complained of, and the school exercised the diligence
of a bonus pater familias.
In this case however, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly named, and there
was no sufficient evidence presented to make the said teacher-in-charge liable. Absent
the direct liability of the teachers because of the foregoing reason, the school cannot be
held subsidiarily liable too.
This case abandoned fully the cases of Exconde vs Capuno and Mercado vs Court of
Appeals.

ST. FRANCIS HIGH SCHOOL vs. COURT OF APPEALS

GR No. 82465 February 25, 1991

FACTS:
 Ferdinand Castillo, a 13-year-old freshman student of Section 1-C at the St.
Francis High School (SFHS) wanted to join a school picnic at Talaan Beach,
Sariaya, Quezon. However, his parents, Dr. Romulo Castillo and Lilia Castillo,
because of short notice, did not allow him.
  He was only allowed to bring food (adobo) to the teachers for the picnic. However,
the teachers persuaded him to go with them to the beach.
 During the picnic, a teacher was apparently drowning. Some students, including
Ferdinand, came to her rescue, but in the process, it was Ferdinand himself who
drowned. He was brought to Mt. Cannel General Hospital but was pronounced dead
on arrival.
 Ferdinand’s parents filed a case for damages against SFHS and the teachers.
 The CA declared that the teachers failed to exercise the diligence of a good father
of the family to guard against the foreseen harm. Also, SFHS and principal
Benjamin Illumin was declared jointly and solidarily liable with the teachers for the
death of Ferdinand, under Art 2180.

ISSUE:
 WON the school SFHS, principal and teachers were liable for the death of
Ferdinand? – NO.

HELD:
 NO. petitioners were able to prove that they had exercised the required diligence.
 It is the rule in Art 2180 that the negligence of the employees in causing the injury
or damage gives rise to a presumption of negligence on the part of SFHS and its
principal; and while this presumption is not conclusive, it may be overthrown only
by clear and convincing proof that the owner and/or manager (SFHS and principal)
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and/or
supervision of the employee or employees causing the injury or damage (in this
case, the defendants-teachers).
 Art 2180, par. 4 provides:
 “The obligation imposed by Art 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.”
 “Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
former are not engaged in any business or industry.”

 SC found that CA committed an error in applying Art 2180 of the Civil Code in
rendering SFHS liable for the death of respondent's son.
 SC found that the teachers are neither guilty of their own negligence nor guilty of
the negligence of those under them. Consequently they cannot be held liable for
damages of any kind.
 At the outset, it should be noted that respondent spouses, parents of the victim
Ferdinand, allowed their son to join the excursion. The fact that he gave money to
his son to buy food for the picnic even without knowing where it will be held, is a
sign of consent for his son to join the same.
 In the case at bar, the teachers were not in the actual performance of their
assigned tasks. The incident happened outside the school premises, not on a
school day and most importantly while the teachers and students were holding a
purely private affair, a picnic. This picnic had no permit from the school head or
its principal, because this picnic is not a school-sanctioned activity or an extra-
curricular activity. Mere knowledge by the principal of the planning of the picnic
by the students and teachers does not in any way show acquiescence or consent
to the holding of the same.
  It was shown that Connie Arquio, the class adviser of I-C, did her best and
exercised diligence of a good father of a family to prevent any untoward incident
or damages to all the students who joined the picnic.
a. Connie invited co-petitioners Tirso de Chavez (who conducted first aid on
Ferdinand) and Luisito Vinas who are both P.E. instructors and scout masters
who have knowledge in First Aid application and swimming.
b. Even respondents' witness, Segundo Vinas, testified that the teachers brought
life savers in case of emergency.
c. The records also show that both petitioners Chavez and Vinas did all what is
humanly possible to save the child.
 Moreover, as already pointed out hereinabove, the teachers are not guilty of any
fault or negligence, hence, no moral damages can be assessed against them.
 “Art. 2217. Moral Damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's
wrongful act or omission.”
 While it is true that Ferdinand’s parents did give their consent to their son to join
the picnic, this does not mean that the school and teachers were already relieved
of their duty to observe the required diligence of a good father of a family in
ensuring the safety of the children. But in the case at bar, petitioners were able to
prove that they had exercised the required diligence. Hence, the claim for moral
or exemplary damages becomes baseless.
 As for Yoly Jaro and Nida Aragones, the two teachers who came to the picnic late
and after the drowning because they previously conducted entrance examinations
in said school, they had no participation in the alleged negligence. Accordingly,
they must be absolved from any liability.

SEPARATE OPINIONS:
 Other SC members dissented, saying that the teachers failed to exercise diligent
supervision over the students, including the two late teachers. Their negligent acts
are the proximate cause of the death.

St. Mary’s Academy vs. Carpitanos

GR No. 143363, February 6, 2002

FACTS:

Herein petitioner, conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-1996 They
visited schools from where prospective enrollees were studying. Sherwin Carpitanos
joined the campaign. Along with the other high school students, they rode a Mitsubishi
jeep owned by Vivencio Villanueva on their way to Larayan Elementary School. Such
jeep was driven by James Daniel II, a 15 year old student of the same school. It was
alleged that he drove the jeep in a reckless manner which resulted for it to turned
turtle. Sherwin died due to this accident.

ISSUE: WON petitioner should be held liable for the damages.

HELD:

CA held petitioner liable for the death of Sherwin under Article 218 and 219 of the
Family Code where it was pointed that they were negligent in allowing a minor to drive
and not having a teacher accompany the minor students in the jeep. However, for
them to be held liable, the act or omission to be considered negligent must be the
proximate cause of the injury caused thus, negligence needs to have a causal
connection to the accident. It must be direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken
by any efficient intervening causes. The parents of the victim failed to show such
negligence on the part of the petitioner. The spouses Villanueva admitted that the
immediate cause of the accident was not the reckless driving of James but the
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. Futhermore, there was no
evidence that petitioner allowed the minor to drive the jeep of Villanueva. The
mechanical defect was an event over which the school has no control hence they may
not be held liable for the death resulting from such accident.

The registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would primarily
be responsible to the public or to 3rd persons for injuries caused while it is being driven
on the road. It is not the school, but the registered owner of the vehicle who shall be
held responsible for damages for the death of Sherwin. Case was remanded to the trial
court for determination of the liability of the defendants excluding herein petitioner.

PALISOC VS BRILLANTES

41 SCRA 548 – Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Liability of teachers/heads of

establishments of arts and trades
In March 1966, while Dominador Palisoc (16 years old) was watching Virgilio Daffon and
Desiderio Cruz work on a machine in their laboratory class in the Manila Technical
Institute (a school of arts and trades), Daffon scolded Palisoc for just standing around
like a foreman. This caused Palisoc to slightly slap the face of Daffon and a fistfight ensued
between the two. Daffon delivered blows that eventually killed Palisoc. The parents of
Palisoc sued Daffon, the school president (Teodosio Valenton), the instructor (Santiago
Quibulue), and the owner (Antonio Brillantes). The basis of the suit against Valenton,
Quibulue, and Brillantes was Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
The lower court, as well as the CA, ruled that only Daffon is liable for damages and that
Valenton, Quibulue, and Brillantes are not liable because under Article 2180, they are
only liable “so long as they [the students] remain in their custody.” And that this means,
as per Mercado vs Court of Appeals, that teachers or heads of establishments are only
liable for the tortious acts of their students if the students are living and boarding with
the teacher or other officials of the school – which Daffon was not.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in the Mercado Case still applies.
HELD: No. The SC abandoned the ruling in the Mercado Case as well as the ruling in
the Exconde Case as they adopted Justice JBL Reyes’ dissenting opinion in the latter case.
Valenton and Quibulue as president and teacher-in-charge of the school must be held
jointly and severally liable for the quasi-delict of Daffon. The unfortunate death resulting
from the fight between the students could have been avoided, had said defendants but
complied with their duty of providing adequate supervision over the activities of the
students in the school premises to protect their students from harm, whether at the hands
of fellow students or other parties. At any rate, the law holds them liable unless they
relieve themselves of such liability, in compliance with the last paragraph of Article 2180,
Civil Code, by “(proving) that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage.” In the light of the factual findings of the lower court’s decision, said
defendants failed to prove such exemption from liability. The SC reiterated that there
is nothing in the law which prescribes that a student must be living and boarding with his
teacher or in the school before heads and teachers of the school may be held liable for
the tortious acts of their students.

METRO MANILA TRANSIT CORPORATION (MMTC) VS. COURT OF APPEALS

GR # 116617 , 16 November 1998

Facts:

On August 9, 1986, an MMTC Bus driven by Musa hit Liza Rosalie who was then
crossing Katipunan Avenue in Quezon City. An eye witness said the girl was already
near the center of the street when the bus hit her. She fell to the ground upon impact,
rolled between the two front wheels of the bus, and was run over by the left rear tires
thereof. Her body was dragged several meters away from the point of impact. Liza
Rosalie was taken to the Philippine Heart Center but died. Pedro Musa was found guilty
of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.

The spouses Rosales filed an independent civil action for damages against MMTC,
Musa, MMTC Acting General Manager Conrado Tolentino, and the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS). They subsequently amended their complaint to include
Feliciana Celebrado, a dispatcher of the MMTC, as a defendant therein. In a decision
rendered on March 6, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City found MMTC and
Musa guilty of negligence and ordered them to pay damages and attorneys fees.

Both parties raised the matter to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

1) MMTC EXERCISED THE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY IN THE

SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF ITS DRIVERS.
2) THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE COURT A
QUOS DECISION TO HOLD PETITIONER-APPELLANT MMTC PRIMARILY LIABLE TO
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.

3) WON all the defendants, now private respondents, are solidarily liable.

HELD:

the factual conclusions of the Court of Appeals which affirm those of the trial court bars
a reversal of the finding of liability against petitioners MMTC and Musa. Only where it is
shown that such findings are whimsical, capricious, and arbitrary can they be
overturned.

Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, which provides that employers shall be liable for the
damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of
their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or
industry. The responsibility of employers for the negligence of their employees in the
performance of their duties is primary, that is, the injured party may recover from the
employers directly, regardless of the solvency of their employees. The losses caused by
the torts of employees, which as a practical matter are sure to occur in the conduct of
the employers enterprise, are placed upon that enterprise itself, as a required cost of
doing business.

Presumption of Negligence on the part of the Employer

The law imposes the burden of proof of innocence on the vehicle owner. If the
driver is negligent and causes damage, the law presumes that the owner was negligent
and imposes upon him the burden of proving the contrary.
Employers may be relieved of responsibility for the negligent acts of their
employees within the scope of their assigned tasks only if they can show that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.[16] For this
purpose, they have the burden of proving that they have indeed exercised such
diligence, both in the selection of the employee who committed the quasi-delict and in
the supervision of the performance of his duties.

Art. 2194 provides that the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable
for a quasi-delict is solidary. The liability of the registered owner of a public service
vehicle for damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and
joint and several or solidary with the driver.

Selection of Employees

Employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience,

and service records.

Supervision of Employees

Employers should formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their

implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof.
Documentary Evidence

To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability,

employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence

MMTCs evidence consists entirely of testimonial evidence.

(1) that transport supervisors are assigned to oversee field operations in
designated areas;
(2) that the maintenance department daily inspects the engines of the vehicles;
and
(3) that for infractions of company rules there are corresponding penalties.

There is no record that Musa attended such training programs and passed the
said examinations before he was employed. No proof was presented that Musa did not
have any record of traffic violations. Nor were records of daily inspections, allegedly
conducted by supervisors, ever presented. The failure of MMTC to present such
documentary proof puts in doubt the credibility of its witnesses.

MMTC General Manger

Although the fourth paragraph of Art. 2180 mentions managers among those
made responsible for the negligent acts of others, it is settled that this term is used in
the said provision in the sense of employers

GSIS as Third Party Liability Insurer is Liable

an insurer in an indemnity contract for third party liability is directly liable to the
injured party up to the extent specified in the agreement, but it cannot be held
solidarily liable beyond that amount. The GSIS admitted in its answer that it was the
insurer of the MMTC for third party liability with respect to MMTC Bus No. 27 to the
extent of P50,000.00. Hence, the spouses Rosales have the option either to claim the
said amount from the GSIS and the balance of the award from MMTC and Musa or to
enforce the entire judgment against the latter, subject to reimbursement from the
former to the extent of the insurance coverage.

Victory Liner Inc. vs. Heirs of Andres Malecdan (Gr no. 154278)

Facts:

Andres, a 75 year old farmer, was crossing the national highway. As he was
crossing, a bus of Victory Liner, driven by Ricardo C. Joson, Jr., hit him and the carabao
he was riding on which caused Andres’ death. The heirs of Andres brought a suit for
damages in the RTC which held that the driver is guilty of gross negligence in the
operation of his vehicle and Victory Liner, Inc. also guilty of gross negligence in the
selection and supervision of Joson, Jr. In which the CA affirmed.

Issue:
 Whether or not the Victory Liner has exercised diligence of a good father of a
family in selecting and supervising its employees for them not to be liable for the act
committed by Joson.

Ruling:

Victory Liner was not able to prove that they exercised diligence of a good father
in selecting and supervising its employees. Although it has shown that they require
certain requirements before they hire, they were not able to prove that Joson has more
than 9 years of experience in driving. They were also not able to prove that Joson has
attended any of the said seminars they required and the records of the speed meters,
tickets and of the field inspectors were not shown which shows that Victory Liner was
negligent in supervising Joson. Hence, Victory liner is vicariously liable under Art. 2180
of the CC.

Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines v. Phil-American Forwarders

PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES and FELIX PANGALANGAN v. PHIL-AMERICAN

FORWARDERS, ARCHIMEDES BALINGIT, and FERNANDO PINEDA

1975 / Aquino / Appeal from CFI order

FACTS

Pineda recklessly drove a freight truck [owned by Phil-American Forwarders]

along the national highway at Pampanga, and the truck bumped the PRBL bus
driven by Pangalangan. As a result, Pangalangan suffered injuries and the bus
was damaged and could not be used for 79 days, thus depriving PRBL of earnings
amounting to P8,665.51. Balingit was the manager of Phil-American Forwarders.

PRBL and Pangalangan filed a complaint for damages against Phil-American

Forwarders, Balingit, and Pineda. Defendants said Balingit was not Pineda’s employer.
Balingit moved that the complaint against him be dismissed on the ground that PRBL
and Pangalangan had no cause of action against him. CFI dismissed the complaint
against Balingit, on the ground that he is not the manager of an establishment
as contemplated in NCC 2180.

ISSUE AND HOLDING

WON the terms “employers” and “owners and managers of an establishment or

enterprise” embrace the manager of a corporation owning a truck, the reckless
operation of which allegedly resulted in the vehicular accident from which the damage
arose. NO.

RATIO

Those terms do not include the manager of a corporation. It may be gathered from the
context of NCC 2180 that the term “manager” (“director” in the Spanish version) is
used in the sense of “employer”. Hence, no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be
imposed on Balingit as manager of Phil-American Forwarders, in connection with the
vehicular accident in question, because he himself may be regarded as
an employee or dependiente of Phil-American Forwarders.
CFI AFFIRMED

SPS. BUENAVENTURA JAYME AND ROSARIO JAYME, petitioners, vs. RODRIGO

APOSTOL, FIDEL LOZANO, ERNESTO SIMBULAN, MAYOR FERNANDO Q.
MIGUEL, MUNICIPALITY OF KORONADAL (NOW CITY OF KORONADAL),
PROVINCE OF SOUTH COTABATO, represented by the MUNICIPAL TREASURER
and/or MUNICIPAL MAYOR FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, and THE FIRST
INTEGRATED BONDING AND INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., respondents.

FACTS:

Fidel Loano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal, borrowed the pick-up truck
owned by Rodrigo Apostol from its current possessor Ernesto Simbulan to ferry Mayor
Miguel of Koronadal to Buayan Airport. The pick-up accidentally hit a minor, Marvin C.
Jayme, who was crossing the National Highway. The intensity of the collision sent
Marvin 50 meters away from point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving
at a very high speed at the time of the accident. Despite medical treatment, Marvin
died six days after the accident.

Marvin’s parents filed a complaint for damages with the RTC against the driver, the
mayor, the owner of the pick-up, Simbulan and the Municipality of Koronadal (now
City), pointing out that the proximate cause was Lozano’s negligent and reckless
operation of the vehicle. And that applying the doctrine of vicarious liability or imputed
liability, Mayor Miguel should be liable for his employee’s negligent acts. On the other
hand, Apostol and Simbulan averred that Lozano took the pick-up without their
consent. Mayor Miguel and Lozano pointed that Marvin’s sudden sprint across the
highway made it impossible to avoid the accident.

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of Marvin’s parents, absolving Simbulan and the
Municipality of Koronadal from liability. Fidel, Rodrigo and Mayor Miguel are ordered
jointly and severally liable to pay Marvin’s parents damages. In his appeal, Mayor
Miguel claims that the real employer of Lozano was the Municipality of Koronadal and
not him. The CA granted his appeal and dismissed the case.

ISSUE: Whether or not a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts
of the driver assigned to him, which resulted in the death of a minor pedestrian.

RULING: NO. PETITION DENIED.

Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that a person is not only liable for one's own
quasi-delictual acts, but also for those persons for whom one is responsible for. This
liability is popularly known as vicarious or imputed liability. To sustain claims against
employers for the acts of their employees, the following requisites must be established:
(1) That the employee was chosen by the employer personally or through another; (2)
That the service to be rendered in accordance with orders which the employer has the
authority to give at all times; and (3) That the illicit act of the employee was on the
occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him.
Significantly, to make the employee liable under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 2180, it
must be established that the injurious or tortuous act was committed at the time the
employee was performing his functions.

Indeed, it was the Municipality of Koronadal who is the lawful employer of Lozano at the
time of accident. Though Mayor Miguel, also an employee of the municipality, “loaned”
Lozano to drive him to the airport, the Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozano’s
employer.

Significantly, no negligence may be imputed against a fellow employee although the

person may have the right to control the manner of the vehicle's operation. In the
absence of an employer-employee relationship establishing vicarious liability, the
driver's negligence should not be attributed to a fellow employee who only happens to
be an occupant of the vehicle. Whatever right of control the occupant may have over
the driver is not sufficient by itself to justify an application of the doctrine of vicarious
liability.

SPS. BUENAVENTURA JAYME AND ROSARIO JAYME, petitioners,

vs.
RODRIGO APOSTOL, FIDEL LOZANO, ERNESTO SIMBULAN, MAYOR FERNANDO
Q. MIGUEL, MUNICIPALITY OF KORONADAL (NOW CITY OF KORONADAL),
PROVINCE OF SOUTH COTABATO, represented by the MUNICIPAL TREASURER
and/or MUNICIPAL MAYOR FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, and THE FIRST
INTEGRATED BONDING AND INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., respondents.

G.R. No. 163609 [November 27, 2008]

FACTS:

On February 5, 1989, Mayor Miguel of Koronadal, South Cotabato was on board the Isuzu
pick-up truck driven by Fidel Lozano, an employee of the Municipality of Koronadal. The
pick-up truck was registered under the name of Rodrigo Apostol, but it was then in the
possession of Ernesto Simbulan. Lozano borrowed the pick-up truck from Simbulan to
bring Miguel to Buayan Airport at General Santos City to catch his Manila flight.
The pick-up truck accidentally hit Marvin C. Jayme, a minor, who was then crossing the
National Highway in South Cotabato. The intensity of the collision sent Marvin some 50
meters away from the point of impact, a clear indication that Lozano was driving at a
very high speed at the time of the accident. Marvin sustained severe head injuries.
Despite medical attention, Marvin expired six (6) days after the accident.

ISSUE:

MAY a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for the negligent acts of the driver
assigned to him
MAY an LGU be held liable for the tortuous act of a government employee.

RULING:
1. It is uncontested that Lozano was employed as a driver by the municipality. That he
was subsequently assigned to Mayor Miguel during the time of the accident is of no
moment. The Municipality of Koronadal remains to be Lozano’s employer notwithstanding
Lozano’s assignment to Mayor Miguel. Even assuming arguendo that Mayor Miguel had
authority to give instructions or directions to Lozano, he still cannot be held liable. In
Benson v. Sorrell, the New England Supreme Court ruled that mere giving of directions
to the driver does not establish that the passenger has control over the vehicle. Neither
does it render one the employer of the driver.
Mayor Miguel was neither Lozano’s employer nor the vehicle’s registered owner. There
existed no causal relationship between him and Lozano or the vehicle used that will make
him accountable for Marvin’s death. Mayor Miguel was a mere passenger at the time of
the accident.
2. The municipality may not be sued because it is an agency of the State engaged in
governmental functions and, hence, immune from suit. This immunity is illustrated in
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Firme, where the Court held that municipal
corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be
sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the
discharge of governmental functions and can only be held answerable only if it can be
shown that they were acting in proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be
sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not
acting in governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes
under the
exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot recover.
Liability attaches to the registered owner, the negligent driver and his direct employer.
Settled is the rule that the registered owner of a vehicle is jointly and severally liable with
the driver for damages incurred by passengers and third persons as a consequence of
injuries or death sustained in the operation of said vehicles. Regardless of who the actual
owner of the vehicle is, the operator of record continues to be the operator of the vehicle
as regards the public and third persons, and as such is directly and primarily responsible
for the consequences incident to its operation.
The petition is DENIED.

ERNESTO MARTIN V. CA AND MERALCO

G.R. No. 82248 January 30, 1992

FACTS:

Ernesto Martin was the owner of a private car bearing license plate No. NPA-930.
At around 2 o’clock in the morning of May 11, 1982, while being driven by Nestor
Martin, it crashed into a Meralco electric post on Valley Golf Road, in Antipolo, Rizal.
The car was wrecked and the pole severely damaged. Meralco subsequently demanded
reparation from Ernesto Martin, but the demand was rejected. It thereupon sued him
for damages in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, alleging that he was liable to it as
the employer of Nestor Martin. The petitioner’s main defense was that Nestor Martin
was not his employee. Meralco did not present any evidence to prove that Nestor Martin
was the employee of Ernesto Martin and Ernesto Martin did not rebut such allegation.

ISSUE:
 WON Ernesto Martin can be held liable.

HELD:

NO. Meralco had the burden of proof, or the duty “to present evidence on the
fact in issue necessary to establish his claim” as required by Rule 131, Section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Failure to do this was fatal to its action. As the employment
relationship between Ernesto Martin and Nestor Martin could not be presumed, it was
necessary for the plaintiff to establish it by evidence. It was enough for the defendant
to deny the alleged employment relationship, without more, for he was not under
obligation to prove this negative averment. This Court has consistently applied the rule
that “if the plaintiff, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to
show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the defendant is
under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.”
Petition was granted.

CARTICIANO VS. NUVAL

FACTS: Plaintiff Zacarias Carticiano was on his way home to Imus, Cavite. He was
driving his father’s Ford Laser car. On the same date and time, defendant Nuval’s
owner-type Jeep, then driven by defendant Darwin was traveling on the opposite
direction going to Parañaque. When the two cars were about to pass one another,
Darwin veered his vehicle to his left going to the center island of the highway an
occupied the lane which plaintiff Zacarias was traversing. Zacarias’ Ford Laser collided
head-on with Nuval’s Jeep. Darwin immediately fled from the scene. Zacarias suffered
multiple fracture. He underwent a leg operation and physical therapy. Nuval offered
P100,000.00 as compensation for the injuries caused. Plaintiffs refused to accept it.
Plaintiffs filed a criminal suit against Darwin and a civil suit against defendants for
damages. Trial court ruled infavor of plaintiffs. CA reversed the decision.

ISSUE: W/N employer Nuval can be held liable.

RULING: Petition granted.

RATIO: Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides that employers shall be liable for
damages caused by their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks.
The facts established in the case at bar show that Darwin was acting within the scope of
the authority given him when the collision occurred. That he had been hired only to
bring respondent’s children to and from school must be rejected. True, this may have
been one of his assigned tasks, but no convincing proof was presented showing that it
was his only task. His authority was to drive Nuval’s vehicle. Once a driver is proven
negligent in causing damages, the law presumes the vehicle owner equally negligent
and imposes upon the latter the burden of proving proper selection of employee as a
defense. Respondent failed to show that he had satisfactorily discharged this burden.

Maximo Soliman v Hon. Judge Ramon Tuazon

Facts: On March 22, 1983, petitioner Soliman filed a civil complaint for damages
against private respondent Republic Central Colleges, the RL Security Agency Inc and
one Jimmy Solomon, a security guard, as defendants. The complaint alleged that on
August 13, 1982, while the plaintiff was in the campus ground and premises of the
defendant, Republic Central Colleges, as he is a regular enrolled student and taking his
morning classes, the defendant Solomon, without any provocation, in a wanton,
fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner, with intent to kill, attack,
assault, strike and shoot the plaintiff on the abdomen with a .38 Caliber Revolver. The
plaintiff was treated and confined at Angeles Medical Center, Angeles City, and as per
doctor’s opinion, the plaintiff may not be able to attend to his regular classes and will
be incapacitated in the performance of his usual work for a duration of from three to
four months before his wounds would be completely healed.

Private respondent Colleges filed a motion to dismiss, contending that the complaint
stated no cause of action against it. Private respondent argued that it is free from any
liability for the injuries sustained by petitioner for the reason that private respondent
school was not the employer of the security guard charged, Jimmy Solomon, and hence
was not responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon. Private respondent school further
argued that Article 2180, 7th paragraph, of the NCC did not apply, since said paragraph
holds teachers and heads of establishment of arts and trades liable for damages caused
by their pupils and students or apprentices, while security guard was not a pupil or
apprentice of the school.

In an order dated November 29, 1983, respondent Judge granted private respondent
school’s motion to dismiss, holding that security guard Solomon was not an employee
of the school. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, without success.

In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, it is contended that respondent trial judge
committed grave abuse of discretion when he refused to apply the provisions of Article
2180, as well as those of Articles 349, 350 and 352 of the NCC and granted the school’s
motion to dismiss.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to damages and the judge committed
grave abuse of discretion when he refused to apply provisions of Arts 2180, 349, 350
and 352.
Held: The Court resolved to grant due course to the petition, to treat the comment of
respondent Colleges as its answer and to reverse and set aside the order dated
November 29, 1983. The case was remanded to the court a quo for further
proceedings consistent with the Resolution.

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the obligation to respond for damage inflicted by
one against another by fault or negligence exists not only for one's own act or omission,
but also for acts or omissions of a person for whom one is by law responsible.

The first paragraph of Article 2180 offers no basis for holding the Colleges liable for the
alleged wrongful acts of security guard Jimmy B. Solomon inflicted upon petitioner
Soliman, Jr. Private respondent school was not the employer of Jimmy Solomon. Since
there is no question that Jimmy Solomon was not a pupil or student or an apprentice of
the Colleges, he being in fact an employee of the R.L. Security Agency Inc.

Persons exercising substitute parental authority are made responsible for damage
inflicted upon a third person by the child or person subject to such substitute parental
authority. In the instant case, as already noted, Jimmy Solomon who committed
allegedly tortious acts resulting in injury to petitioner, was not a pupil, student or
apprentice of the Republic Central Colleges; the school had no substitute parental
authority over Solomon.

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding
that the contract between the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's
negligence in providing proper security measures. This would be for the trial court to
determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could give rise
generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra,
the negligence of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that
negligence becomes material only because of the contractual relation between PSBA
and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine qua non to the
school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the
contract, unless the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of
the Civil Code.

The Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of
schools, above-mentioned, for conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be
an insurer of its students against all risks. This is specially true in the populous student
communities of the so-called "university belt" in Manila where there have been reported
several incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be
equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their
premises, for notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail
against an individual or group determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school
premises and environs. Should this be the case, the school may still avoid liability by
proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not due to its
negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which
is required by the nature of obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of
person, time and place.
In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied the school's motion to dismiss the
complaint against it, and both the Court of Appeals and this Court affirmed the trial
court's order. In the case at bar, the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss filed by
respondent Colleges, upon the assumption that petitioner's cause of action was based,
and could have been based, only on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. As PSBA, however,
states, acts which are tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at the same time
constitute breach of a contractual, or other legal, obligation. Respondent trial judge was
in serious error when he supposed that petitioner could have no cause of action other
than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Respondent trial judge should not
have granted the motion to dismiss but rather should have, in the interest of justice,
allowed petitioner to prove acts constituting breach of an obligation ex contractu or ex
lege on the part of respondent Colleges.

In line, therefore, with the most recent jurisprudence of this Court, and in order to
avoid a possible substantial miscarriage of justice, and putting aside technical
considerations, we consider that respondent trial judge committed serious error
correctible by this Court in the instant case.

AFRICA VS CALTEX

In March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila, a tank truck was hosing gasoline into the
underground storage of Caltex. Apparently, a fire broke out from the gasoline station
and the fire spread and burned several houses including the house of Spouses Bernabe
and Soledad Africa. Allegedly, someone (a passerby) threw a cigarette while gasoline
was being transferred which caused the fire. But there was no evidence presented to
prove this theory and no other explanation can be had as to the real reason for the fire.
Apparently also, Caltex and the branch owner (Mateo Boquiren) failed to install a
concrete firewall to contain fire if in case one happens.

ISSUE: Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are liable to pay for damages.

HELD: Yes. This is pursuant to the application on the principle of res ipsa loquitur (“the
transaction speaks for itself”) which states: “where the thing which caused injury,
without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and
the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does not occur if he having such
control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the
explanation, that the injury arose from defendant’s want of care.” The gasoline station,
with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of Caltex and
Boquiren. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses.
The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started were Boquiren, Caltex
and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and
reasonable inference that the incident happened because of want of care.

Note that ordinarily, he who charges negligence shall prove it. However, res ipsa
loquitur is the exception because the burden of proof is shifted to the party charged of
negligence as the latter is the one who had exclusive control of the thing that caused
the injury complained of.
Filamer Christian Institute vs IAC

Daniel Funtecha was a working student at the Filamer Christian Institute. He was
assigned as the school janitor to clean the school 2 hours every morning. Allan Masa was
the son of the school president and at the same time he was the school’s jeepney service
driver. On October 20, 1977 at about 6:30pm, after driving the students to their homes,
Masa returned to the school to report and thereafter have to go home with the jeep so
that he could fetch the students early in the morning. Masa and Funtecha live in the same
place so they usually go home together. Funtecha had a student driver’s license so Masa
let him take the driver’s seat. While Funtecha was driving, he accidentally hit an elderly
Kapunan which led to his hospitalization for 20 days. Kapunan filed a criminal case and
an independent civil action based on Article 2180 against Funtecha.
In the independent civil action, the lower court ruled that Filamer is subsidiarily liable for
the tortious act of Funcheta and was compelled to pay for damages based on Article 2180
which provides that employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees
and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Filamer assailed
the decision and it argued that under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR,
working scholars are excluded from the employment coverage hence there is no
employer-employee relations between Filamer and Funcheta; that the negligent act of
Funcheta was due to negligence only attributable to him alone as it is outside his assigned
task of being the school janitor. The CA denied Filamer’s appeal but the Supreme Court
agreed with Filamer. Kapunan filed for a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not Filamer should be held subsidiarily liable.
HELD: Yes. This time, the SC ruled in favor of Kapunan (actually his heirs cause by this
time Kapunan was already dead). The provisions of Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the
Labor Code IRR was only meant to provide guidelines as compliance with labor provisions
on working conditions, rest periods, and wages is concerned. This does not in any way
affect the provisions of any other laws like the civil code. The IRR cannot defeat the
provisions of the Civil Code. In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement
of the substantive law on labor. There is a distinction hence Section 14, Rule X, Book III
of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured
person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and against the
school itself.
The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between
an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for
damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-
employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to
disregard the primary liability of an employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code is
misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to
void liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code.
Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a
driver’s position in order that Filamer may be held responsible for his grossly negligent
act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit
of Filamer (the act of driving the jeep from the school to Masa’s house is beneficial to the
school because this enables Masa to do a timely school transportation service in the
morning). Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with
the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve Filamer of the burden of rebutting the
presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of
a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. Filamer has failed to show proof
of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its
employees Funtecha and Allan.

CASTILEX VS INDUSTRIAL CORP vs VASQUEZ CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL

CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR. and LUISA SO VASQUEZ,
and CEBU DOCTORS' HOSPITAL, INC.,respondents.

FACTS:
At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez (son of respondents Vicente
and Luisa Vasquez), was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda.
He was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without
any protective helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive
at the time.

Benjamin ABAD was a manager of petitioner CASTILEX Industrial Corporation, registered

owner of a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. ABAD drove the said company
car out of a parking lot but instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short
cut against [the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St.

In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of ABAD collided with
each other causing severe injuries to the former. ABAD brought Vasquez to
CEBU DOCTORS' HOSPITAL where he died.

A Criminal Case was filed against ABAD but which was subsequently dismissed for failure
to prosecute. An action for damages was then commenced by respondents against ABAD
and petitioner CASTILEX

Trial court ruled in favor of private respondents and ordered ABAD and to pay jointly and
solidarily respondents

Petitioner CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision.

Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and petitioner
CASTILEX liable but held that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not solidary"
with the former.

Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the
negligent operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle

RULING:

Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code
should only apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business
or industry. Since it is engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling
furniture it is therefore not covered by said provision. Instead, the fourth
paragraph should apply
- SC: Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase
"even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry" found in
the fifth paragraph should be interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the
employer to be engaged in any business or industry to be liable for the
negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his assigned task
o DISTINCTION between 4th and 5th paragraph of Art 2180 of CC:
 Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to
owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the
fifth paragraph, to employers in general, whether or not engaged in
any business or industry.
 The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees
committed either in the service of the branches or on the occasion
of their functions, while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent
acts of employees acting within the scope of their assigned task.
 The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage
and acts included.
 Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is
engaged in a business or industry, are covered so long as they
were acting within the scope of their assigned task, even though
committed neither in the service of the branches nor on the
occasion of their functions
o Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any
business or industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by
employees within the scope of his assigned tasks
 But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee
relationship; once this is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the
employer liable, that the employee was acting within the scope of
his assigned task when the tort complained of was committed

Whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was
acting within the scope of his assigned tasks.
- ABAD: testified that at the time of the incident, he was driving a company-issued
vehicle, registered under the name of petitioner. He was then leaving the
restaurant where he had some snacks and had a chat with his friends after
having done overtime work for the petitioner.
- TC and CA: that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is
within the scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and
circumstances.
- SC: do not agree with TC and CA. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service
vehicle at the time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge
petitioner with liability for the negligent operation of said vehicle unless it
appears that he was operating the vehicle within the course or scope of his
employment.
- American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuries inflicted by the
negligence of an employee in the use of an employer's motor vehicle:
o It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in
going from his work to a place where he intends to eat or in returning to
work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within the scope of his
 employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit
to the employer
o In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a
personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his
services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to
the employer other than the mere performance of the services available
at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the
scope of his employment even though he uses his employer's motor
vehicle
o In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a
personal problem or concern of the employee, and not a part of his
services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of some special benefit to
the employer other than the mere performance of the services available
at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the
scope of his employment even though he uses his employer's motor
vehicle
o However, even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the
scope of his employment in going to or from work in his
employer's vehicle, the employer is not liable for his negligence
where at the time of the accident, the employee has left the direct
route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand
of his own.
o An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the
latter's personal use outside of regular working hours is generally
not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle
during the period of permissive use
o Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle
has been accomplished and he has started the return trip to his
house where the vehicle is normally kept, it has been held that he
has not resumed his employment, and the employer is not liable
for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the
return trip
- In the case, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the
petitioner's office. After, he went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña, 7km
away from petitioner's place of business. A witness for the private
respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that Fuente Osmeña is a
"lively place" even at dawn because Goldie's Restaurant and Back Street
were still open and people were drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes,
pimps, and drug addicts littered the place.
- At the Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with friends.
It was when ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question
occurred
- ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal
purpose not in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular
accident. It was then about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond
the normal working hours. ABAD's working day had ended; his overtime
work had already been completed. His being at a place which, as
petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps, and drug
pushers and addicts," had no connection to petitioner's business;
neither had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his
 service vehicle even for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit
or one of the perks attached to his position
- Since no evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions
entrusted to him, petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle.
Thus, petitioner is relieved of vicarious liability for the consequences of
the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle.

Heirs of the Late Ruben Reinoso Sr., v. CA (2011)

Doctrine: A reiteration of the more liberal Sun Insurance case. Where the party does
not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees, and manifests its
willingness to abide by the rules by paying additional docket fees when required by the
court, the liberal doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict
regulations set in Manchester, will apply.

Facts:
 In 1979, Ruben Reinoso was a passenger in a jeepney traversing E. Rodriguez
Ave. The jeepney owned by Tapales, collided with a truck owned by Guballa.
 Reinoso died as a result of the collision. His heirs filed the instant case for
Damages against Tapales and Guballa
 IN 1988, RTC found the Truck liable and held Guballa liable for damages
sustained by the Heirs of Reinoso and the jeepney owner
 Case litigated before the RTC which rendered a decision
 In 1994, CA motu propio dismissed the petition on the ground of nonpayment of
docket fees pursuant to the 1987 Manchester ruling
 Reinoso’s defense: Manchester should not be made to apply retroactively to
their case as the case was filed prior to the promulgation of Manchester ruling

WON: The dismissal by the CA was proper due to the nonpayment of docket fees? NO!

HELD:
 The Court reiterates the ruling in Sun Insurance v. Asuncion
 the case at bench has been pending for more than 30 years and the records
thereof are already before this Court, a remand of the case to the Court of
Appeals (CA) would only unnecessarily prolong its resolution
 In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, it was held that a court acquires jurisdiction
over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee. The strict
application of this rule was, however, relaxed two (2) years after in the case
of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion
 The Court also takes into account the fact that the case was filed before the
Manchester ruling came out. Even if said ruling could be applied retroactively,
liberality should be accorded to the petitioners in view of the recency then of the
ruling. Leniency because of recency was applied to the cases of Far Eastern
Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals
 RTC decision was reinstated
Manliclic v. Calaunan
Ponente: Chico-Nazario
Third Division
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS:
1. The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus owned by petitioner
PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type jeep owned by
respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza
2. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay Lalangan,
Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided.
- The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep
causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch
with water resulting to further extensive damage.
- Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt.
3. By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed charging petitioner Manliclic with
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries.
4. Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages against
petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI
5. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case.
6. When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the transcripts of
stenographic notes (TSNs) of the testimonies in the criminal case be received in
evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not available to testify in
the civil case.
7. The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:

Respondent’s version:
- According to the respondent and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of
60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the
Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep,
the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side.
- At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the
jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep
when the jeep was hit.
- Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony of and Marcelo Mendoza. He said that
he was on another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of plaintiff
when the incident took place. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved to the
right because it was bumped by the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.

Petitioner’s version:
- The petitioner explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to
the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it
was to overtake another jeep in front of it.
- Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee
8. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. CA found no reversible error and affirmed the
RTC’s decision.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the TSNs from the criminal case may be admitted in evidence for the civil
case.
2. Whether the petitioner, Manliclic, may be held liable for the collision and be found
negligent notwithstanding the declaration of the CA in the criminal case that there
was an absence of negligence on his part.
3. Whether the petitioner, PRBLI, exercised due diligence and supervision of its
employee.

HELD: The petitioner, Manliclic, is civilly liable for the damages for his negligence or
reckless imprudence based on quasi-delict. The PRBLI is held solidarily liable for the
damages caused by the petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.

1. Admissibility of the TSNs

Petitioner’s contention:
- The TSNs should not be admitted to evidence for failure to comply with the
requisites of Sec. 47, Rule 130 of the ROC
- The petitioner, PRBLI, had no opportunity to cross examine the witnesses because
the criminal case was filed exclusively against Manliclic.
- Admission of the TSNs will deprive the petitioner of due process.
Court:
- The testimonies are still admissible on the ground that the petitioner failed to
object on their admissibility.
- Failure to object to the inclusion of the evidence is a waiver on the provision of the
law.
- In addition, the petitioner even offered in evidence the TSN containing the
testimony of Ganiban.
- The court disagrees that it would deprive the petitioner of due process. For the
failure of the petitioner to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object
for the non compliance with the ROC.

2. Civil liability arising from crime v. Quasi-delict/Culpa Acquiliana

Petitioner:
- The version of the petitioner deserves more credit as the petitioner was already
acquitted by the CA of the charge of Reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property with physical injuries.
Court:
- From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one
arising from or based on quasi-delict: Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his
negligence or reckless imprudence in causing the collision, while petitioner PRBLI
was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the selection
and supervision of its employees
- it appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on
the ground that he is not the author of the act complained of which is based on
Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless
the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil might arise did not exist.
- In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap.
The afore-quoted section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex
delicto and not to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
- The extinction of civil liability referred to in the quoted provision, refers exclusively
to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is
not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act
charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.

In sum, the court distinguished civil liability arising from a crime and that arising from
quasi-delict:

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM A CRIME

(a) if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability
arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
(b) if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door
to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto.

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM QUASI-DELICT

- A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code
with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from a delict or crime.
- The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-
contractual under the Civil Code. The acquittal of the accused, even if based
on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of
the civil liability based on quasi delict.
- civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be
extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that
accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist).
- An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil
case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

- The petitioners urge the court to give more credence to their version of the story
however, as they constitute a question of fact, it may not be raised as a subject
for a petition for review. Findings of the trial court and appellate court are binding
on the Supreme Court.
- The testimony of the petitioner about the jeep of the respondent overtaking
another vehicle in the criminal case was not consistent with what he gave to the
investigator which is evidently a product of an after-thought
- If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his
conductor, Oscar Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat
parallel to the jeep when the collision took place, the point of collision on the jeep
should have been somewhat on the left side thereof rather than on its rear.
 Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road itself rather than having been
forced off the road.

3. PRBLI’s liability
- Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both.
- The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the
private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

Petitioner’s contention:
- PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees
- In the matter of selection, it showed the screening process that petitioner Manliclic
underwent before he became a regular driver.
- As to the exercise of due diligence in the supervision of its employees, it argues
that presence of ready investigators is sufficient proof that it exercised the
required due diligence in the supervision of its employees
Court:
- In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine
them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision
of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating procedures,
monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach
thereof.
- As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence on
the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been
diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision of
their work.
- The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection but not in the supervision of its
employees
- it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good procedure of
recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no
evidence though that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel.
o no evidence introduced that there are rules promulgated by the bus company
regarding the safe operation of its vehicle and in the way its driver should
manage and operate the vehicles
o no showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to oversee
how its driver should behave while operating their vehicles
o The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not
enough. Same does not comply with the guidelines set forth with regard to the
supervision.
o Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have
been shown and established.
o the lack of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only one
set of manual containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers
 - For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father
of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner
PRBLI is held solidarily responsible for the damages caused by petitioner
Manliclic’s negligence.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that (1) the award of moral
damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the award of exemplary damages shall
be lowered to P50,000.00.

SANITARY STEAM LAUNDRY, INC., vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS,

G.R. No. 119092. DECEMBER 10, 1998

FACTS:

This case involves a collision between a Mercedes Benz panel truck of petitioner
Sanitary Steam Laundry and a Cimarron which caused the death of three persons and
the injuries of several others. The accident took place at the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus,
Cavite on August 31, 1980. The passengers of the Cimarron were mostly employees of
the Project Management Consultants, Inc. (PMCI). The Cimarron was owned by Salvador
Salenga. Driving the vehicle was Rolando Hernandez. It appears that at about 8:00 p.m.,
as it was traveling along Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on its way back to Manila,
the Cimarron was hit on its front portion by petitioner’s panel truck which was traveling
in the opposite direction. The driver, Herman Hernandez, claimed that a jeepney in front
of him suddenly stopped. He said he stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney
and that this caused his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the
opposite lane. As a result, his panel truck collided with the Cimarron on the north-bound
lane. The driver of the Cimarron, Rolando Hernandez, and two of his passengers, namely,
Jason Bernabe and Dalmacio Salunoy, died. Several of the other passengers of the
Cimarron were injured and taken to various hospitals.

ISSUE:

Whether the driver of the Cimarron was guilty of contributory negligence and,
therefore, the liability of the petitioner should be mitigated, if not totally extinguished.

RULING:

No. It has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver
contributed to the collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of
showing a causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the Land
Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the
proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto.
Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence,
is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Petitioner says
that “driving an overloaded vehicle with only one functioning headlight during nighttime
certainly increases the risk of accident,” that because the Cimarron had only one
headlight, there was “decreased visibility,” and that the fact that the vehicle was
overloaded and its front seat overcrowded “decreased [its] maneuverability.” However,
mere allegations such as these are not sufficient to discharge its burden of proving clearly
that such alleged negligence was the contributing cause of the injury.

YAMADA VS MANILA RAILROAD

In January 1913, Yamada et al hired a taxi owned and operated by Bachrach Garage so
that they may travel to Cavite Viejo. The trip was safe going to said place but when they
were going back from said place the taxi was hit by a train owned by Manila Railroad.
Yamada et al sued the driver, Bachrach, and Manila Railroad. They claimed that the driver
was negligent as he did not slow down while he was approaching the railroad tracks. The
driver said there was no way for him to see the train coming because of the tall growing
bushes and trees. Bachrach said that it is not liable as an employer because prior to hiring
the driver, the driver has been of good record for 5 years and had had no traffic infractions
prior to the collision; and that the negligence of the driver is also imputable to Yamada
et al they being the ones in control of the vehicle; that Yamada et al should have
controlled the driver and instructed him to slow down. Manila Railroad said that it is not
liable as well because its engineers provided proper warning signals on their approach
and that there were no tall trees or bushes at the time of the accident.
Yamada’s counsel presented the president of Bachrach who alleged that all their drivers
habitually drove their taxis over railroad crossings without slowing down or investigating
whether a train is coming – such practice being allowed and tolerated by Bachrach.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bachrach Garage Manila railroad should be liable.
HELD: It was established that the driver was negligent. A prudent driver should have
slowed down approaching a railroad crossing regardless if he could see a train or not
regardless of the presence of tall bushes.
Manila Railroad and its employees are not negligent as showed by the evidence which
were uncontroverted hence no liability can be had against them.
Bachrach Garage however is liable for damages as an employer. Although they did
establish that they have done their diligence in properly selecting their driver and in
providing said driver with a good car, they have failed to provide proper supervision and
control over their employee. Bachrach Garage did not perform its full duty when it
furnished a safe and proper car and a driver with a long and satisfactory record. It failed
to comply with one of the essential requirements of the law of negligence in this
jurisdiction, that of supervision and instruction, including the promulgation of proper rules
and regulations and the formulation and publication of proper instructions for their
guidance in cases where such rules and regulations and instructions are necessary.
Bachrach’s contention that Yamada et al were also negligent because they failed to
properly instruct the driver is untenable. Those on a cab do not become responsible for
the negligence of the driver if they exercise no control over him further than to indicate
the route they wish to travel or the places to which they wish to go. Note that in order to
impute negligence to a passenger, at least one of these two things must exist:

1. That the driver is actually the passenger’s agent in all respect

2. The passengers have cooperated in producing the injury complained of.

Pantranco North Express, Inc. V. Maricar Baesa (1989)

FACTS:
 Spouses Baesa, their 4 children, the Ico spouses and their son and 7 other people
boarded a passenger jeep driven by David Ico to go to a picnic in Isabela, to
celebrate the 5th wedding anniversary of the Baesa spouses
 While they were proceeding towards Malalam River at a speed of about 20 kph, a
speeding PANTRANCO bus from Aparri, on a route to Manila, encroached on the
jeepney’s lane while negotiating a curve, and collided with it.
 As a result, the entire Baesa family, except for their daughter Maricar Baesa, as well
as David Ico, died, and the rest suffered from injuries. Maricar Baesa, through her
guardian filed separate actions for damages arising from quasi-delict against
PANTRANCO.
 PANTRANCO: alleged David Ico's negligence as a proximate cause of the accident
and invoked the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
driver.
 CA upheld RTC: favor of Baesa
ISSUE: W/N the last clear chance applies thereby making David Ico who had the
chance to avoid the collision negligent in failing to utilize with reasonable care and
competence

HELD: NO.
 Generally, the last clear change doctrine is invoked for the purpose of making a
defendant liable to a plaintiff who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence,
although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat claim for damages
 For the last clear chance doctrine to apply, it is necessary to show that the person
who allegedly has the last opportunity to avert the accident was aware of the
existence of the peril, or should, with exercise of due care, have been aware of it
 there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the impending
danger
 When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching on his lane,
he did not immediately swerve the jeepney to the dirt shoulder on his right since he
 must have assumed that the bus driver will return the bus to its own lane upon
seeing the jeepney approaching form the opposite direction
 Even assuming that the jeepney driver perceived the danger a few seconds before
the actual collision, he had no opportunity to avoid it
 last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party charged is required to
act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the application of all
means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered

Secosa vs. Heirs of Francisco, [G.R. No. 160039. June 29, 2004]

Facts: Francisco, an 18 year old 3rd year physical therapy student was riding a
motorcycle. A sand and gravel truck was traveling behind the motorcycle, which in turn
was being tailed by the Isuzu truck driven by Secosa. The Isuzu cargo truck was owned
by Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc.. The three vehicleswere traversing the
southbound lane at a fairly high speed. When Secosa overtook the sand and gravel truck,
he bumped the motorcycle causing Francisco to fall. The rear wheels of the Isuzu truck
then ran over Francisco, which resulted in his instantaneous death. Secosa left his truck
and fled the scene of the collision.

The parents of Francisco, respondents herein, filed an action for damages against Secosa,
Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. and Dassad’s president, El Buenasucenso
Sy.

The court a quo rendered a decision in favor of herein respondents; thus petitioners
appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which unfortunately affirmed the appealed
decision in toto. Hence, the present petition.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees; hence it
cannot be held solidary liable with the negligence of its employee.

(2) Whether or not Dassad’s president, El Buenasucenso Sy, can be held solidary liable
with co-petitioners.

Held:

(1) No. Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. did not exercise the required
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees.
Hence, it cannot be held solidary liable with the negligence of its employee.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.

On the other hand, Article 2180, in pertinent part, states:

The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible x x x.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry x x x.

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Based on the foregoing provisions, when an injury is caused by the negligence of an

employee, there instantly arises a presumption that there was negligence on the part of
the employer, which however, may be rebutted by a clear evidence showing on the part
of the employer that it exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of his employee.

In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as

to their qualifications, experience, and service records. On the other hand, with respect
to the supervision of employees, employers should formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation, and impose disciplinary measures for
breaches thereof. To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of explicit
liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence. The
reason for this is to obviate the biased nature of the employer’s testimony or that of his
witnesses.

In the case at bar, Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc. failed to conclusively
prove that it had exercised the requisite diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees. Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc.
failed to support the testimony of its lone witness, Edilberto Duerme, with documentary
evidence which would have strengthened its claim of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of its employees. Such an omission is fatal on account of which, Dassad can
be rightfully held solidarily liable with its co-petitioner Secosa for the damages suffered
by the heirs of Francisco.

(2) No. Sy cannot be held solidarily liable with his co-petitioners. While it may be true
that Sy is the president of Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc., such fact is not
by itself sufficient to hold him solidarily liable for the liabilities adjudged against his co-
petitioners.

A corporation has a personality separate from that of its stockholders or members. The
doctrine of ‘veil of corporation’ treats as separate and distinct the affairs of a corporation
and its officers and stockholders. As a rule, a corporation will be looked upon as a legal
entity, unless and until sufficient reason to the contrary appears. When the notion of legal
entity is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend crime,
the law will regard the corporation as an association of persons. Also, the corporate entity
may be disregarded in the interest of justice in such cases as fraud that may work
inequities among members of the corporation internally, involving no rights of the public
or third persons. In both instances, there must have been fraud and proof of it.

The records of the case does not point toward the presence of any grounds enumerated
above that will justify the piercing of the veil of corporate entity such as to hold Sy, the
president of Dassad Warehousing and Port Services, Inc., solidarily liable with it.

Furthermore, the Isuzu cargo truck which ran over Francisco wasregistered in the name
of Dassad and not in the name of Sy. Secosa is an employee of Dassad and not of Sy.
These facts showed Sy’s exclusion from liability for damages arising from the death of
Francisco.

Metro Manila Transit vs. CA; Torts- Vicarious Liability of Employers

Facts:

MMTC is the operator of a fleet of passenger buses within the Metro Manila area and Musa
was its driver . The spouses Rosales were parents of Liza Rosalie, a third-year high school
student at the University of the Philippines Integrated School.

At around a quarter past one in the afternoon of August 9, 1986, MMTC Bus No. 27, which
was driven by Musa, hit Liza Rosalie who was then crossing Katipunan Avenue in Quezon
City. An eye witness said the girl was already near the center of the street when the bus,
then bound for the south, hit her. She fell to the ground upon impact, rolled between the
two front wheels of the bus, and was run over by the left rear tires thereof. Her body was
dragged several meters away from the point of impact. Liza Rosalie was taken to the
Philippine Heart Center, but efforts to revive her proved futile.

Pedro Musa was found guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. However, for
the civil liability, Souses Rosales filed an independent civil action for damages against
MMTC, Musa, MMTC Acting General Manager Conrado Tolentino, and the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS). They subsequently amended their complaint to include
Feliciana Celebrado, a dispatcher of the MMTC, as a defendant therein.

To free themselves from liability, petitioners attempted to prove that it exercise

diligentissimi patris familias in the selcetion and supervision of employees through oral
evidence.

The RTC ruled in favor of Spouses Rosales, but made MMTC primarily liable and Musa
secondarily liable.

Issue:

Whether or not MMTC is solidarily liable with Musa.

Ruling

Yes!

Petitioner’s attempt to prove its diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and
supervision of employees through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the
same with any other evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent
biased nature of the testimony.

Although, MMTC submitted brochures and programs of seminars for prospective

employees on vehicle maintenance, traffic regulations, and driving skills and claimed that
applicants are given tests to determine driving skills, concentration, reflexes, and vision,
there is no record that Musa attended such training programs and passed the said
examinations before he was employed. No proof was presented that Musa did not have
any record of traffic violations. Nor were records of daily inspections, allegedly conducted
by supervisors, ever presented.

The failure of the defendant company to produce in court any record or other
documentary proof tending to establish that it had exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of its drivers and buses,
notwithstanding the calls therefor by both the trial court and the opposing counsel, argues
strongly against its pretensions.

As already stated, MMTC is primarily liable for damages for the negligence of its employee
in view of Art. 2180. Pursuant to Art. 2181, it can recover from its employee what it may
pay. This does not make the employee’s liability subsidiary. It only means that if the
judgment for damages is satisfied by the common carrier, the latter has a right to recover
what it has paid from its employee who committed the fault or negligence which gave
rise to the action based on quasi-delict. Hence, the spouses Rosales have the option of
enforcing the judgment against either MMTC or Musa.

From another point of view, Art. 2194 provides that “the responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.” We ruled in Gelisan v. Alday that
“the registered owner/operator of a public service vehicle is jointly and severally liable
with the driver for damages incurred by passengers or third persons as a consequence of
injuries sustained in the operation of said vehicle.” In Baliwag Transit, Inc. v. Court of
Appealsit was held that “to escape solidary liability for a quasi-delict committed by an
employee, the employer must adduce sufficient proof that it exercised such degree of
care.” Finally, we held in the recent case of Philtranco Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals that “the liability of the registered owner of a public service vehicle . . . for
damages arising from the tortious acts of the driver is primary, direct, and joint and
several or solidary with the driver.”

Rationale for Imposing Vicarious liability

What has emerged as the modern justification for vicarious liability is a rule of policy, a
deliberate allocation of a risk. The losses caused by the torts of employees, which as a
practical matter are sure to occur in the conduct of the employer’s enterprise, are placed
upon that enterprise itself, as a required cost of doing business. They are placed upon
the employer because, having engaged in an enterprise, which will on the basis of all
past experience involve harm to others through the tort of employees, and sought to
profit by it, it is just that he, rather than the innocent injured plaintiff, should bear them;
and because he is better able to absorb them, and to distribute them, through prices,
rates or liability insurance, to the public, and so to shift them to society, to the community
at large. Added to this is the makeweight argument that an employer who is held strictly
liable is under the greatest incentive to be careful in the selection, instruction and
supervision of his servants, and to take every precaution to see that the enterprise is
conducted safely.

Vda. de Maglana vs. Hon. Consolacion (August 6, 1992)

FACTS:

Lope Maglana was on his way to his work station, driving a motorcycle. He met an
accident that resulted in his death. The PUJ jeep that bumped the deceased was driven
by Pepito Into, operated and owned by defendant Destrajo. The PUJ jeep was overtaking
another passenger jeep that was going towards the city, Poblacion. While overtaking, the
PUJ jeep of defendant Destrajo running abreast with the overtaken jeep, bumped the
motorcycle driven by the deceased who was going towards the direction of Lasa, Davao
City. The point of impact was on the lane of the motorcycle and the deceased was thrown
from the road and met his untimely death.

Thereafter, the heirs of the deceased filed an action against Destrajo and the Afisco
Insurance Corporation (AFISCO) for damages and attorney’s fees.

The lower court rendered a decision finding that Destrajo had not exercised extraordinary
diligence as the operator of the jeepney and ordered him to pay for the damages. The
second paragraph of the decision also ordered AFISCO to reimburse Destrajo whatever
amounts the latter shall have paid only up to the extent of its insurance coverage,
signifying only secondary liability.

The heirs however, filed a motion for reconsideration with respect to the said second
paragraph arguing that AFISCO should not merely be held secondarily liable because the
Insurance Code provides that the insurer’s liability is “direct and primary and/or jointly
and severally with the operator of the vehicle”, although only up to the extent of the
insurance coverage.

ISSUE:

Whether or not AFISCO’s liability is direct and primary and/or solidary with
Destrajo.

HELD:

Although the insurance policy clearly provides that AFISCO can be held directly liable by
petitioners on the basis of the insurance contract, nonetheless, AFISCO may not be held
solidarily liable with Destrajo since their respective liabilities are based on different
grounds. The liability of the insurer is based on contract; that of the insured is based on
tort. As such, petitioners have the option either to claim from AFISCO to the extent
agreed upon in the contract and the balance from Destrajo or enforce the entire judgment
from Destrajo subject to reimbursement from AFISCO to the extent of the insurance
coverage.

Erezo v. Jepte

Facts:

• Defendant-appellant is the registered owner of a six by six truck bearing. On

August, 9, 1949, while the same was being driven by Rodolfo Espino y Garcia, it collided
with a taxicab at the intersection of San Andres and Dakota Streets, Manila. As the truck
went off the street, it hit Ernesto Erezo and another, and the former suffered injuries, as
a result of which he died.

• The driver was prosecuted for homicide through reckless negligence. The accused
pleaded guilty and was sentenced to suffer imprisonment and to pay the heirs of Ernesto
Erezo the sum of P3,000. As the amount of the judgment could not be enforced against
him, plaintiff brought this action against the registered owner of the truck, the defendant-
appellant.

• The defendant does not deny at the time of the fatal accident the cargo truck
driven by Rodolfo Espino y Garcia was registered in his name. He, however, claims that
the vehicle belonged to the Port Brokerage, of which he was the broker at the time of the
accident. He explained, and his explanation was corroborated by Policarpio Franco, the
manager of the corporation, that the trucks of the corporation were registered in his
name as a convenient arrangement so as to enable the corporation to pay the registration
fee with his backpay as a pre-war government employee. Franco, however, admitted that
the arrangement was not known to the Motor Vehicle Office.

• The trial court held that as the defendant-appellant represented himself to be the
owner of the truck and the Motor Vehicle Office, relying on his representation, registered
the vehicles in his name, the Government and all persons affected by the representation
had the right to rely on his declaration of ownership and registration. It, therefore, held
that the defendant-appellant is liable because he cannot be permitted to repudiate his
own declaration.

Issue:

WoN Jepte should be liable to Erezo for the injuries occasioned to the latter because of
the negligence of the driver even if he was no longer the owner of the vehicle at the time
of the damage (because he had previously sold it to another)
Held:

YES.

• The registered owner, the defendant-appellant herein, is primarily responsible for

the damage caused to the vehicle of the plaintiff-appellee, but he (defendant-appellant)
has a right to be indemnified by the real or actual owner of the amount that he may be
required to pay as damage for the injury caused to the plaintiff-appellant

• The Revised Motor Vehicle Law provides that no vehicle may be used or operated
upon any public highway unless the same is properly registered. Not only are vehicles to
be registered and that no motor vehicles are to be used or operated without being
properly registered for the current year, but that dealers in motor vehicles shall furnish
the Motor Vehicles Office a report showing the name and address of each purchaser of
motor vehicle during the previous month and the manufacturer's serial number and motor
number.

• Registration is required not to make said registration the operative act by which
ownership in vehicles is transferred, as in land registration cases, because the
administrative proceeding of registration does not bear any essential relation to the
contract of sale between the parties, but to permit the use and operation of the vehicle
upon any public

• The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any
accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicles on the public
highways, responsibility therefore can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered
owner.

• A registered owner who has already sold or transferred a vehicle has the recourse
to a third-party complaint, in the same action brought against him to recover for the
damage or injury done, against the vendee or transferee of the vehicle.