M A J U L A H

S IN G A P O R E

REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE COLLAPSE OF

HOTEL NEW WORLD

Cmd. 6 of 1987

Presented to Parliament by Command of

The President of the Republic of Singapore
Ordered by Parliament to lie upon the Table:
21st March, 1987

The President of the Republic of Singapore

by

M r Justice L. P. Thean
Dr A. V ijiaratnam
Professor S. L. Lee
Professor Bengt B. Broms
 X< /’!;li

REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE

COLLAPSE OF
HOTEL NEW WORLD

Presented to

The President of the Republic of Singapore

by

M r Justice L. P. Thean
Dr A. V ijiaratnam
Professor S. L. Lee
Professor Bengt B. Broms
 CO M M ISSIO N OF INQ UIRY
INTO THE COLLAPSE OF HOTEL NEW W ORLD

February 16, 1987

The President of the

Republic of Singapore,
Istana,
Singapore.

Mr President,

We have the honour to refer you to the Instrument of Appointment of

Commission of Inquiry dated March 22, 1986 with the following terms of reference:
(a) to determine the cause of the collapse of the premises at 305 Serangoon Road
on 15th March 1986;
(b) to make recommendations for such appropriate measures that can be taken to
prevent a similar occurrence,
and forward herewith our report for your consideration.

We have the honour to remain

most respectfully yours,

L. P. Thean A. Vijiaratnam
(Chairman)

S. L. Lee Bengt B. Broms

 REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO THE

COLLAPSE OF
HOTEL NEW WORLD

Presented to

The President of the Republic of Singapore

by

M r Justice L. P. Thean
D r A. V ijiaratnam
Professor S. L. Lee
Professor Bengt B. Broms
 CONTENTS

CHAPTERS Page

1 INTRODUCTION 1

2 BUILDING AUTHORITY 4

3 HISTORY OF LIAN YAK BUILDING 10

4 COLLAPSE OF LIAN YAK BUILDING 28

5 INVESTIGATIONS 34

6 M ATERIAL TESTS AND PROPERTIES 38

7 GEOTECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS 43

8 STRUCTURAL EVALUATION 49

9 CAUSES OF THE COLLAPSE 62

10 REPRESENTATIONS ON THE SECOND

TERM OF REFERENCE 65

11 PRESENT SYSTEM OF BUILDING CONTROL 69

12 RECOMMENDATIONS 77

ANNEXES

1 Persons who died in the Incident 91

2 Instrument of Appointment of the Commission 93

3 Invitation of Representations 95

4 Representations Received 96

5 Notice of Hearing (1st Stage of Inquiry) 98

i
 CONTENTS — continued.
ANNEXES Page

6 Notice of Hearing (2nd Stage of Inquiry) 99

7 List of Witnesses 100

8 Counsel Appearing on behalf of Interested Parties 113

9 Specimen of DBCD’s letters to owners of buildings

designed by K. N. Lekshmanan or Ee Hoong Khoon 114

10 Form of standard report required by DBCD 115

PHOTOGRAPHS
1 Photograph showing Lian Yak Building in the background ) facing
) page 2
2 What remained of Lian Yak Building after its collapse )
3 Aerial view of the collapsed Lian Yak Building as seen in the )
direction parallel to Serangoon Road ) facing
) page 32
4 Aerial view of the collapsed Lian Yak Building as seen in the )
direction parallel to Owen Road )
5 Column 25 showing its concrete encasement and two steel rails facing
therein page 56

6 Piles under pile cap 25 as viewed in direction B ) between

) pages
7 Pile cap 25 as viewed in direction A ) 56&57

FIGURES

1 Location of Lian Yak Building facing

page 3

2 Basement plans 16

3 Ground (first) floor plans 17

4 2nd storey plans 18

5 Typical floor plans (3rd-6th storeys) 19

6 Roof plans 20

7 Ground floor plan (BP 558D/67) 21

8 Renovation plan for bank premises on

ground floor (BP 5E/1191/73) 24

ii
 CONTENTS — continued.
FIGURES Page
9a Signs of structural distress at ground (1st) floor )
) 29
9b Signs of structural distress at 2nd storey )

9c Signs of structural distress at 3rd storey )

) 30
9d Signs of structural distress at 4th and 5th storeys )

10 Soil profile along Serangoon Road 44

11 Positions of columns and a ramp as shown in R.C.

drawings for basement and ground floor (BP 558B/67) 51

12 Positions of columns in basement 53

13 Construction details of pile cap 25 and column 25 between

pages
56 & 57

TABLES

1 Functions of the Building Control Branch of the

Development and Building Control Division 8 & 9

2 Breakdown of the Engineering Service Officers

in the Development and Building Control Division
as on October 13, 1986 87

iii
 CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1 At approximately 11.15 a.m. on the fateful morning of March 15, 1986, a six-
storey building called Lian Yak Building (see photograph 1) at 305, Serangoon Road
suddenly collapsed. It was a total collapse; the entire building from the ground level
upwards gave way and fell to the ground and basement levels with no wall or column
upstanding on the ground level (see photograph 2). The collapse was also swift: within
less than a minute the whole building was reduced to a mammoth pile of rubble,
burying all the occupants then in the building.

1.2 Rescue operation immediately started, and in the ensuing 96 hours or thereabout,
17 persons were rescued from the debris. Not all, however, were as fortunate; 33
persons perished in that catastrophe. Their particulars are given in Annex 1.

1.3 Lian Yak Building was built during the period from 1969 to 1971 and was owned
by a company, Lian Yak Realty Company Private Limited. It stood at the corner lot
abutting Owen Road and Serangoon Road (see figure 1). Comprised in it were: (i) a
car-park in the basement; (ii) another car-park on a part of the ground or first floor and
a branch of a bank, Industrial & Commercial Bank Limited, occupying the other part
of the floor; (iii) a night-club on the second floor; (iv) a hotel called the Hotel New
World occupying the remaining upper floors, i.e. the 3rd to the 6th storeys thereof, and
(v) a flat roof on which were installed a water tank, two storage water-heaters, a
cooling-tower and four condensing units of the air-conditioning system, a zinc-roofed
shed and an altar.

1.4 At this stage, a word of clarification should be made of the name of the building.
Since its collapse, the building has been popularly called Hotel New World. That
strictly is not correct. Hotel New World occupied only a part, albeit a major part, of the
building and the building was called Lian Yak Building. However, to avoid any
confusion, we have retained Hotel New World as the name of the building in the title to
this report, though in the report itself, we propose to adopt the correct name and refer
to the building as Lian Yak Building.

1.5 On March 22, 1986, we were appointed Commissioners under Section 2 of the
Inquiry Commissions Act (Chapter 48) with the following terms of reference, namely:
(a) to determine the cause of the collapse of the premises at 305 Serangoon Road
on March 15, 1986; and
(b) to make recommendations for such appropriate measures that can be taken to
prevent a similar occurrence.

The appointment was gazetted on March 27, 1986 in the Singapore Government
Gazette No. 980 dated March 22, 1986. A copy of the instrument of appointment is
reproduced in Annex 2.

1
1.6 A press release was issued on March 31, 1986 inviting all interested parties to
submit to the Commission any representation in regard to matters falling within the
terms of reference. A copy of the press release is reproduced in Annex 3. In response,
a total of 58 representations were received and they are listed in Annex 4.

1.7 Soon after the appointment, we inspected the site on which the building once
stood and examined what remained there. Subsequently, three of us, Dr Vijiaratnam,
Professor Lee and Professor Broms, inspected the site on several occasions when site
investigations were being carried out.

1.8 The Commission conducted the Inquiry in two stages: the first stage was held
from May 28 to May 30, 1986 at which the Commission dealt with all preliminary
matters and received formal evidence relating to the collapse of the building and
reports on the investigations which were then still in progress; and the second stage was
held from September 16 to October 13, 1986 at which the Commission heard evidence
and representations in regard to matters relevant to the terms of reference. Due notices
of the respective hearings were given, and these are reproduced respectively in
Annexes 5 and 6. The hearings were held at the Court of Appeal, Supreme Court
Building, Singapore.

1.9 In conducting the Inquiry, we followed as closely as possible the procedure

normally adopted in the High Court. Mr S. Tiwari, Senior State Counsel, who assisted
the Commission, opened and led evidence; witnesses called by Mr Tiwari were
examined by him, cross-examined by counsel representing interested parties respec­
tively (if they so desired) and re-examined by him. At the conclusion of the hearing of
evidence on matters relevant to the first term of reference, Mr Tiwari and the
respective counsel each made their submissions. Subsequently, counsel were given
permission to put in further submission in writing. At the conclusion of the hearing of
the representations on the second term of reference, no submission on this term of
reference was made by counsel then present representing the various parties. They
were informed by the Commission, however, that if they wished, they could
subsequently put in their submissions in writing, and such submissions were received
from counsel representing the Ministry of National Development and counsel
representing Industrial & Commercial Bank Limited. Since the conclusion of the
hearing, numerous representations on matters bearing on the second term of reference
were also received. These were collectively marked as Exhibit CE238 and are included
in the list in Annex 4.

1.10 A total of 117 witnesses were called and examined before the Commission and in
respect of non-controversial matters, statements from 39 witnesses who had not been
called and statements from 6 witnesses who had been called and examined were
tendered and admitted. The names of all these witnesses are set out in Annex 7.

1.11 Throughout the Inquiry, we had the benefit of assistance from a team of experts
assisting in the investigations. On evaluation of tests on material, we had Dr Tam Chat
Tim, Associate Professor of Civil Engineering at the National University of Singapore;
the geotechnical aspect was covered by Dr S. Buttling, a Senior Geotechnical
Engineer of the Mass Rapid Transit Corporation (“MRTC”). Dr Moh Za-Chieh, a
consulting engineer in private practice, considered and dealt with the possible effect of
MRTC construction work on the structural stability of Lian Yak Building, and Mr Teo

2
Photograph 1: A scene at Serangoon Road showing the facade o f Lian Yak Building in the
background. By sheer coincidence, this photograph was taken by a student, Mr.
Tay Kia Han, at about 2.30 p.m . on March 14, 1986 — less than 24 hours before
the collapse.
(Exhibit CE162)

Photograph 2: What remained o f Lian Yak Building after its collapse in the morning o f March
15, 1986.
(Photograph by courtesy of The Straits Times)
 RANGOON ROAD

S H O P H O l^ ^

n POST
OFFICE
i.r-n r\\
--------------- 1
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1
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LIAN YAK BUILDING \

OWEN ROAD
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\

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petrol
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0 - L0
Figure 1: Location o f Lian Yak Building
Teng Poh, a Principal Scientific Officer of the Department of Scientific Services,
explored the possibility of any explosion. Then we had Mr Terence W. Hulme, who is
the Project Manager (Civil and Structural Engineering) of MRTC, and Mr Hou
Ke-hua and Dr H. S. Parmar, both consulting civil and structural engineers who are in
private practice. Special mention should be made of these three gentlemen; they had
devoted a considerable amount of time in assisting in the investigations and jointly
presented to us a structural evaluation of the collapse of Lian Yak Building. In the
course of their investigations, we had from time to time discussions with them and
suggested to them various lines of inquiry and tests which were carried out. We have
not included herein as technical annexes the reports of these experts, some of which are
voluminous; to do so would overburden our report with considerable amounts of
technical data which are of very limited interest. We have, however, dealt with those
parts of the experts’ reports insofar as they are relevant to our terms of reference.

1.12 We are very grateful to all the experts, and in particular Mr Hulme, Mr Hou and
Dr Parmar, for the assistance they had given. To Mr Tiwari and his assistant, Mr David
Khor, we are specially indebted; they had collected and collated all the evidence and
materials, and at the hearing, presented them with proper care. We are also grateful to
counsel who appeared on behalf of interested parties for their assistance; the names of
counsel and parties they represented are set out in Annex 8. In addition, we would like
to thank members of the public and professional organisations who had submitted
memoranda and representations, and also those who had come forward to give
evidence. Finally, we thank the Secretary to the Commission, Mr Lim Soo Ping, and
his team, all of whom have worked very hard and have been of immense help to us in
the preparation of this report. In particular, we wish to mention that Mr Lim and his
assistants, Mr Choong Teck Min and Mr Ho Kee Yan, have greatly assisted us in going
through a massive volume of technical materials and extracting therefrom the relevant
parts for the purpose of our report. We are most appreciative of the efforts they made.

3
 CHAPTER 2

BUILDING AUTHORITY

H istorical Background
2.1 Before we recount the main events leading to the collapse of Lian Yak Building, a
brief explanatory note on the governmental authority concerned with the control of
planning and construction of buildings in Singapore would be helpful; over the past
20 years such authority has undergone multiple changes. At the time when the plan for
the development of Lian Yak Building was in a state of gestation, the authority vested
with the power of controlling (i) the planning of development of properties, and (ii) the
construction of buildings in Singapore was the Chief Building Surveyor. His depart­
ment, the Chief Building Surveyor’s Department, came into existence as a result of the
amalgamation in 1963 of the Building Surveyor’s Section of the City Architect and
Building Surveyor’s Department and the Building Surveyor’s Section of the Rural
Board. That Department administered the building by-laws then in force, namely, the
Building By-laws, 1926 to 1938, and the Rural Board (Building) By-laws, 1950.

2.2 As from February 1, 1966, the Chief Building Surveyor took over certain
functions of the Planning Department and was then the Competent Authority (within
the meaning of the Planning Ordinance, 1959) and administered the provisions of Part
III and Part IIIA of that Ordinance. As a result, the Chief Building Surveyor’s
Department had two separate divisions, namely: (i) Development Control Division,
and (ii) Building Survey Division. The respective functions of the two divisions are
these: the Development Control Division was responsible for regulating the planning
for the use and development of properties and administered the provisions of Part III
and Part IIIA of the Planning Ordinance, 1959 and the Building Survey Division was
responsible for the control of construction of buildings and administered the provisions
of Part III of the Local Government Integration Ordinance, 1963 and the Building
Regulations then in force. In 1966, two new Regulations were enacted, namely: the
Local Government (Advertisement) Regulations, 1966 and the Local Government
(Building) Regulations, 1966, the latter revoking the Building By-laws, 1926 to 1938,
and the Rural Board (Building) By-laws, 1950.

2.3 Subsequent changes took place in the Chief Building Surveyor’s Department.
First, as from July 15, 1970, the functions of the Development Control Division were
transferred back to the Planning Department. Secondly, as from February 1, 1972, the
Chief Building Surveyor’s Department was re-organised: the department was abo­
lished and its functions were taken over by a new arm of the Public Works Department
(“PW D”), called the Building Control Division and the Assistant Director (Building
Control), PWD was the head of that division. That division administered Part III of the
Local Government Integration Act (Chapter 210) and the subsidiary legislations made
thereunder, namely, the Local Government (Building) Regulations, 1966 and the
Local Government (Advertisement) Regulations, 1966. In other words, that division
was in charge of the control of construction of buildings.

4
2.4 In 1973, the Building Control Act, 1973 was passed and came into effect on April
1, 1974 and, amongst other things, it repealed the provisions of Part III of the Local
Government Integration Act (Chapter 210). However, the Local Government
(Building) Regulations, 1966 and the Local Government (Advertisement) Regula­
tions, 1966 were left intact. Under the Building Control Act, the Assistant Director
(Building Control), PWD was designated the Building Authority.

2.5 As from August 1, 1973, the Building Control Division took over the checking of
building plans for fire prevention requirements from the Singapore Fire Brigade, and
on April 1, 1974, the entire fire regulatory functions of the Singapore Fire Brigade
were transferred to the Building Control Division, PWD. As of that date, the Division
also took over the Development Control Division of the Planning Department, and the
Assistant Director (Building Control), PWD was also the Competent Authority under
Section 3 of the Planning Act (Chapter 279).

2.6 On January 1, 1975, the Building Control (Advertisement) Regulations, 1974

came into force replacing the Local Government (Advertisement) Regulations, 1966.

2.7 On December 12, 1977, the Building Control Division, PWD took over yet
another function; the Building Management Unit of the Ministry of National
Development was transferred to that division.

2.8 In 1979, the building regulations were updated. Three sets of regulations were
enacted, namely, the Building Control (Administration) Regulations, 1979 and the
Building Control (Space, Light and Ventilation) Regulations, 1979, both of which
came into force on August 3, 1979, and the Building Control (Construction)
Regulations, 1979 which came into force on November 23, 1979. These regulations
form the present building regulations of Singapore replacing the former set of building
regulations.

2.9 Thereafter, two further changes took place in the Building Control Division.
First, as from October 23,1981, the departmental title of the Building Control Division
was changed to Development and Building Control Division, PWD and the post of the
Assistant Director (Building Control), PWD was upgraded to Deputy Director
(Development and Building Control), PWD and he is the head of that division and is
the Building Authority under the Building Control Act. Secondly, as from February 1,
1985, the fire regulatory functions of the Development and Building Control Division,
PWD were transferred to the Singapore Fire Service.

Development and Building Control Division

2.10 The Development and Building Control Division, PWD (“ DBCD”) is currently
the department which controls the planning of development of properties and
construction of buildings in Singapore. It comprises three branches, namely:
(a) Development Control Branch (“DCB”);
(b) Building Control Branch (“BCB”), and
(c) Building Administration Branch (“ BAB”),
and each branch has separate functions and powers.

5
2.11 DCB regulates development of properties in the private sector and its main
function is to deal with applications for development of properties, such as:
(a) erection of new buildings or amendment to approved plans;
(b) subdivision of land/buildings;
(c) additions and alterations to non-residential buildings, and
(d) change of use of existing buildings and land.
From time to time, DCB undertakes studies to review planning standards and
guidelines. Such studies serve to ensure that planning requirements are responsive to
changing socio-economic conditions. The branch also carries out various studies to
improve procedures and to ensure that development applications are processed
expeditiously.

2.12 The principal functions and responsibilities of BCB may be summarised as

follows:
(a) processing and approving of building plans submitted by qualified persons;
(b) processing of mechanical and electrical (“ M&E”) plans for the provision of
air-conditioning and mechanical ventilation systems in buildings;
(c) issuing of temporary occupation licences and certificates of fitness for the
occupation of buildings;
(d) processing and issuing of permits for construction of site fencing, protective
hoardings, site offices and living quarters, etc.;
(e) processing of applications for permits in respect of internal re-partitioning in
non-residential buildings;
(f) processing of applications for additions and alterations to existing residential
buildings;
(g) documentation of technical materials for research purposes and the compiling
of development and building statistics for management information purposes,
and
(h) formulation and implementation of policies/standards on energy conservation
in buildings.

This branch of DBCD, for the purpose of discharging its functions, is again divided into
six sections, namely: Building Plan, Additions & Alterations, Mechanical & Electrical,
Certificate of Fitness, Permit/Special Duties and Data Sections.

2.13 BAB consists of three units: (i) Building Management Unit; (ii) Enforcement
Unit, and (iii) Advertisement Licensing Unit; and the principal functions of the branch
are:
(a) to ensure that existing buildings are properly maintained and managed;
(b) to control the unauthorised erection of buildings and the unauthorised change
of use of buildings and land, and
(c) to process and approve applications for licences in respect of advertisements,
sky-signs and hoardings.

2.14 From the brief account given above, it is clear that DBCD, though a division of
PWD, is a large department with three branches which in turn have various sections or

6
units discharging their respective functions and responsibilities. It is not necessary or
appropriate here to discuss in any detail the respective functions and responsibilities of
all these sections or units and in particular the six sections of BCB — that is the branch
of DBCD involved in the control of construction of buildings with which we are mainly
concerned. A summary of the respective functions of the six sections of BCB is
contained in a chart provided by DBCD which is reproduced in the following page
(table 1). For the purpose of this report, we propose to treat DBCD as a department
with multifarious functions covering all aspects of building construction and main­
tenance as contemplated by the building control legislations, and shall not be
concerned with any sub-division, branch or section as such within DBCD. We shall
regard DBCD as the building authority administering the Building Control Act and the
building regulations made thereunder, though technically in law the head of DBCD,
i.e. the Deputy Director (Development and Building Control), PWD, is the building
authority. What we are concerned with, as will be seen shortly, is the control DBCD
has in relation to planning, construction and maintenance of buildings and the system
of control it has.

7
TABLE 1: FUNCTIONS OF THE BUILDING CONTROL BRANCH (BCB) OF THE
DEVELOPMENT AND BUILDING CONTROL DIVISION

FUNCTIONS OF BUILDING

BUILDING PLAN ADDITIONS/ALTERATIONS MECHANICAL &

SECTION SECTION ELECTRICAL SECTION

(1) Process and approve (1) Process and approve minor (1) Process and approve
building plans additions and alterations for mechanical ventilation and/
submitted by residential buildings or air-conditioning plans
qualified persons and associated OTTV plans
(2) Process and approve perm it and calculations
(2) Process and approve for the following:—
OTTV submissions (2) Process and approve OTTV
(i) Residential buildings upgrading plans and
(3) Process and approve (ii) Expositions/Trade Fair/ calculations of existing
applications for Funfair commercial buildings as well
commencement of as tax claims in conjunction
(iii) Sheds for religious
building works with the above
ceremonies, marriage,
funeral and dinner (3) Energy Conscious Award
(4) Process and issue
permits for fencing, (iv) Wayang stage processing and data
protective hoarding, collection related to energy
site office and other Conservation in Buildings
temporary structures
in connection with
building
construction

(5) Deal with enquiries

and complaints
related to building
works

(6) Certify plans in

accordance with
approved building
plans

8
CONTROL BRANCH (BCB)

CERTIFICATE OF PERMIT/SPECIAL DUTIES

FITNESS SECTION SECTION D A I A SEC 1ION

(1) Processing, inspection ( 1) Process and approve plans of (1) Compile statistics on
and approval of: minor additions and planning and
(a) TOL alterations to non-residential building
buildings that were submitted applications, hotel
(1b) COF by non-qualified persons development,
(c) No objection commencement and
to occupation (2) Inspect site for work completion of
prior to completion in respect of building projects,
Endorsement item (1) and issuance of
TOLs/COFs
(d) Endorsement (3) Review rules and regulations
as “Works (2) Preparation of MIS
Completed (4) Library and documentation reports and
to Plans” productivity
(e) Renewal of (5) Permit Registry:— measurement
TOL (a) Attend to legal
requisitions (3) Monitoring of
(f) Temporary DBCD’s work
Permits (b) Attend to public enquiries progress
in respect of
(2) Processing and encumbrances on
approval of properties
Temporary Permits
for activities in ( 6) Representing BCB in the
public concourses ILUS Committee
and within public
areas

(3) Handle complaints

and miscellaneous
enquiries during
TOL stage

(4) Institute court action

for unauthorised
occupation of a
building without
TO L/CO For
equivalent approvals (Extracted from Exhibit CE12)

9
 CHAPTER 3

HISTORY OF LIAN YAK BUILDING

Acquisition of Site
3.1 On December 29, 1966, three gentlemen by the names, Teh Lee Thong, Ng
Khong Lim and Loh Ngat Chew, jointly purchased from Bajaj Textiles Limited a plot
of land marked on the Government Resurvey Map as Lot 952 of T.S.18, containing an
area of 12,695 sq. ft., for a sum of $205,000. Though the land was conveyed to them
beneficially, in fact, according to a Trust Deed executed by them on August 31, 1970,
they purchased it as trustees for the company, Lian Yak Realty Company Private
Limited (“Lian Yak Realty”) to which subsequently the land was transferred. Lian
Yak Realty was incorporated in Singapore on August 6,1963. Like most companies, it
has multiple objects, but its principal business appears to be that of real estate
development. Before the development of Lian Yak Building, it had developed 12 units
of flat at Haig Road and 30 terrace houses in Changi. Ng Khong Lim was the managing
director and Teh Lee Thong and Low Ngat Chew are two of the directors of Lian Yak
Realty; the three of them and their families are the major shareholders of the
company.

Design of Lian Yak Building

3.2 Soon after thp purchase, the owners, through their architect, F. J. Pestana,
submitted to the Chief Building Surveyor two applications for permission for the
development of the property. The first application submitted on January 4, 1967 was
for a proposed development of a seven-storey building, comprising: (i) a basement for
a car-park; (ii) the first storey for a car-park and shops; (iii) the second and third
storeys for shops; (iv) the fourth to the sixth storeys for a hotel, and (v) the seventh
storey for a restaurant. This application, however, was withdrawn on January 16,1967.
On January 30, 1967 a second application was submitted. That application was also for
a proposed seven-storey building, but comprising: (i) a basement for a car-park; (ii) the
first storey for a car-park and shops; (iii) the second storey for a shopping arcade; (iv)
the third storey for a restaurant, and (v) the fourth to the seventh storeys for a hotel.
The application was again withdrawn on March 11, 1967.

3.3 On March 20, 1967, a fresh application was submitted to the Chief Building
Surveyor by F. J. Pestana on behalf of the owners for planning approval for a proposed
development comprising: (i) a basement for a car-park for 21 cars; (ii) the first storey
for two shop units and a car-park for 10 cars; (iii) the second storey for a restaurant;
(iv) the third to the sixth storeys for a hotel, each storey with 16 rooms, and (v) a flat
roof with a motor-room. Submitted with the application were a site plan and sketch
plans.

3.4 At that time, working for F.J. Pestana was a young draughtsman by the name,
Leong Shui Lung (“ Leong” ). Leong is now 49 years old and gave evidence before us.
Leong started his career as a draughtsman in 1953 after he left school and joined F. J.

10
Pestana as an apprentice draughtsman. While working there, he attended a course on
draughtsmanship at the Singapore Polytechnic which, however, he did not complete.
He was, in fact, an unqualified draughtsman but with some years of experience behind
him. Be that as it may, he had considerable involvement in the design and construction
of Lian Yak Building. In fact, though not in name, he was the “architect” of the
building. He it was who prepared the plans submitted by F.J. Pestana together with the
application to the Chief Building Surveyor, and he it was also who prepared all
architectural plans for the building as subsequent events showed.

3.5 The proposed development as submitted by F. J. Pestana was considered by the

Development Control Committee chaired by the Chief Building Surveyor and was
approved on June 16,1967 subject to 4 conditions. The first 3 conditions concerned the
maximum allowable total floor area in the building, the number of car parking spaces
to be provided, and the gradient of the access ramp to the basement car-park. The
fourth condition required the owners to submit building plans for the “scrutiny and
certification by the Competent Authority” (the authority as defined in the Planning
Ordinance then in force) to ensure compliance with the other three conditions prior to
the submission of building plans to the Building Survey Division of the Chief Building
Surveyor’s Department for approval.

3.6 At or about that time, F. J. Pestana decided to move to Johore Bahru as his
business was not doing well in Singapore, and accordingly, he took steps to wind up his
practice here. Leong left his firm and worked as a free-lance draughtsman, and in that
capacity he continued to be involved in the project. Presumably, by then, he was well
acquainted with Ng Khong Lim, the managing director of Lian Yak Realty, and the
latter wished to retain his service. On the professional side, Ng Khong Lim then
appointed K. N. Lekshmanan to take over from F. J. Pestana the design work of the
project. Lekshmanan was an engineer by profession and an associate member of the
Institution of Structural Engineers. On September 10, 1954, he applied to the Board of
Architects to be registered under Section 6(2) of the Architects Ordinance then in
force; his application, however, was unsuccessful. Undeterred, he made subsequent
attempts and eventually on April 3, 1956, the Board of Architects approved his
application, and he was registered under Section 6(2) of the Architects Ordinance. By
reason thereof he was entitled to prepare plans or drawings and submit them to the
Chief Building Surveyor for approval.

3.7 The building plans for the project were prepared by Leong on the instructions of
Ng Khong Lim and these plans were adopted and signed by Lekshmanan. On July 18,
1967, Lekshmanan submitted the building plans to the Chief Building Surveyor for
approval and these plans were registered as BP 558/67. The then Assistant Building
Surveyor, Tan Hock Meng, checked the plans against the requirements of the Local
Government (Building) Regulations, 1966, and also referred the plans to various
Government departments to obtain their clearance or their respective technical
requirements. On September 17, 1967, the technical requirements of the various
departments were transmitted to Lekshmanan in a form of written directions. On
January 18, 1968, Lekshmanan re-submitted the building plans for approval. The then
Senior Technical Officer, Michael Ong, checked the plans and noted that the plans for
the basement and first to sixth storeys differed from the plans on which planning
approval by the Chief Building Surveyor (as the Competent Authority) was given.
Accordingly, further written directions were issued to Lekshmanan requesting that the

11
building plans be certified by the Competent Authority as required by the fourth
condition in the planning approval. On February 23, 1968, Lekshmanan re-submitted
the building plans together with a set of 9 plans certified by the Development Control
Division of the Chief Building Surveyor’s Department. On checking the building plans,
Michael Ong again found various discrepancies and the plans were again referred to
various Government departments for comments. Based on those comments, another
set of written directions was issued to Lekshmanan on April 19, 1968. By the end of
May 1968, clearances from the various government departments were received by the
Chief Building Surveyor’s Department. On June 24, 1968, Lekshmanan applied to the
Chief Building Surveyor for waiver of certain requirements contained in the written
directions. Eventually on July 6,1968, the building plans, BP 558/67, were approved by
the Chief Building Surveyor and the notice of approval dated July 11, 1968 was
forwarded to Lekshmanan.

3.8 In the meanwhile, prior to the approval, on May 16, 1968, Lekshmanan
submitted to the Chief Building Surveyor two copies of the piling layout plan (Drawing
RC/1) for record. The plan contained the following certificate signed by Lekshmanan:
“I hereby certify that these R.C. drawings and calculations are prepared
to the best of my knowledge and belief in accordance with regulation
15(2) of the Local Government (Building) Regulations, 1966.”

As of that date, however, neither the R.C. calculations nor other R.C. drawings, i.e.
structural drawings and calculations, had been lodged with the Chief Building
Surveyor; these were only lodged about 7 months later on December 12, 1968. The
copies of the piling layout plan were kept in abeyance by Michael Ong pending
approval of the building plans. Following the approval of the building plans, Michael
Ong checked the piling layout plan to see if it bore the certification and the signature of
Lekshmanan, and thereafter he merely filed the plan for record purposes.

3.9 As in the architectural aspect, so also was the structural aspect of Lian Yak
Building handled by an unqualified person; and this was in the person of Shum Cheong
Heng (“ Shum” ) who was then working in Lekshmanan’s firm as a draughtsman. Shum,
coincidentally, like Leong, is also 49 years old, and he gave evidence before the
Commission. At first he said that he prepared the R.C. drawings and did the R.C.
calculations. Subsequently, on being questioned by the Commissioner, Dr Vijiarat-
nam, he said that the R.C. calculations were prepared by Lekshmanan and he merely
copied them. Later, he said that some of the R.C. calculations were prepared by
Lekshmanan and some by him. He changed his evidence also as regards the
preparation of the R.C. drawings; he said that the R.C. drawings were based on
sketches provided by Lekshmanan. His evidence was unsatisfactory, but on a totality
thereof we find that he was the one who prepared the R.C. drawings and did the R.C.
calculations. We are not satisfied that they were prepared or even checked by
Lekshmanan. In particular, the R.C. calculations were so inadequate and contained so
many omissions (which we shall discuss shortly) that we find it difficult to accept that
they could have been prepared by an experienced professional engineer.

3.10 The R.C. drawings and R.C. calculations were submitted by Lekshmanan on
December 12, 1968 to the Chief Building Surveyor’s Department before building

12
works commenced pursuant to Regulation 15 of the Local Government (Building)
Regulations, 1966; these were registered as BP 558B/67. They were submitted to the
Department only for the purpose of record; they were not checked or verified by
anyone in the Department. Both the R.C. calculations and R.C. drawings contained
the following certificate signed by Lekshmanan:
“I hereby certify that these R.C. drawings and calculations are prepared
to the best of my knowledge and belief in accordance with regulation
15(2) of the Local Government (Building) Regulations, 1966.”

3.11 In November 1968, an event occurred which necessitated an appointment by the

owners of an architect or another qualified person to replace Lekshmanan. In June
1968 or thereabout, a complaint was made to the Board of Architects, Singapore,
against Lekshmanan to the effect that he shared his professional fees with an
unqualified person. The Board held an inquiry into the allegation, and at the
conclusion of the inquiry ordered that his registration be cancelled and his name be
struck off the register. In consequence, he could no longer submit any plans to the
Chief Building Surveyor. Hence, at the end of 1968 or the beginning of 1969, Ng
Khong Lim requested Leong to look for an architect, and the latter recommended him
to the architect, Ee Hoong Khoon, who eventually took over the project. Though Ng
Khong Lim engaged Ee Hoong Khoon as the architect, it was agreed among the three
of them, Ng Khong Lim, Ee Hoong Khoon and Leong, that the architectural fees for
the project would be $18,000 to $20,000, and that half of the fees would be paid to
Leong for drawing the plans and amending them, and presumably also for assisting in
the supervision of the works. On or about December 13, 1968, Lekshmanan signed a
letter to the effect that he had no objection to the owners engaging another architect to
take over the project, and on March 19, 1969, Ee Hoong Khoon wrote to the Chief
Building Surveyor stating that he had been appointed by the owners to take over the
supervision of the project and enclosing the letter of consent from Lekshmanan.

3.12 On June 3, 1969 or thereabout, Ee Hoong Khoon notified the Chief Building
Surveyor of his intention to proceed with the building works following the laying of the
damp-proof courses on the site. On the following day, June 4, 1969, Michael Ong
inspected the damp-proof courses and gave permission for the building works to
proceed. Building works then commenced.

3.13 It is clear to us on the evidence that the design of Lian Yak Building was handled
by unqualified persons. Leong prepared the architectural drawings and Shum prepared
the R.C. drawings and did the R.C. calculations. None of the works carried out by
them appeared to have been supervised or checked by any qualified persons — in the
case of the architectural drawings, by an architect and in the case of the R.C. drawings
and R.C. calculations, by a structural engineer — though they were signed and
submitted to the Chief Building Surveyor by qualified persons. In particular,
Lekshmanan did not check the R.C. drawings and R.C. calculations. We believe that if
he had, the errors and omissions contained therein (which we shall shortly discuss)
would have been apparent to him and probably would have been rectified.

Construction of Lian Yak Building

3.14 The construction of the building was equally unsatisfactory as the evidence
unfolded before us. It did not appear that the owners engaged a main contractor to
undertake the construction of the building. Leong testified that Ng Khong Lim caused

13
or procured bogus tenders to be submitted; that he (Leong) assisted Ng Khong Lim in
so doing, and that a building contract was signed. Apart from this piece of evidence,
there was no other evidence to show whether, in fact, a building contract was signed. A
firm called Hong Eng Construction Company was said to have undertaken the
construction of the building; the sole proprietor of this firm was Ang Ah Seng
(“ Ang” ), Ng Khong Lim’s brother-in-law who, however, denied that he was the sole
proprietor. He said that Ng Khong Lim made use of his name for the purpose of
registering the firm and for opening a bank account in the name of the firm. We were
not impressed with the evidence of both Leong and Ang on these points. However, one
point emerged distinctly from the evidence: Ng Khong Lim was very much involved in
the construction of the building. He was, in effect, the prime mover of the
development, and he it was who engaged various contractors to carry out the works,
such as piling, carpentry work, steel work and masonry and plastering works. The
piling work was carried out by the firm, Sun Yau Engineering Works of which the sole
proprietor was Chia Yew; that was the first piling work undertaken by the firm.
According to the evidence of David Chia Fong Weng, Chia Yew’s son, who was then
assisting in his father’s firm in carrying out the piling work, the piling was carried out
under the close supervision of Ng Khong Lim. The piles were cast on site and they were
driven in at positions as and where directed by Ng Khong Lim. David Chia said that
the length of each pile section was 20 feet (6.1 m) and the piles were driven to the
required set as prescribed by Ng Khong Lim himself. Further evidence revealed that
each pile was driven to ground level or was cut off at ground level. No pile test was
carried out. The whole piling work took about 2 to 3 months.

3.15 There was no supervision by Lekshmanan on the structural side, or by Ee Hoong

Khoon on the architectural side, in the construction of the building. According to
Shum, Ng Khong Lim refused to pay Lekshmanan any fee for supervising the
construction on the structural side. Nor was any clerk-of-works engaged by the owners
to supervise the construction. Shum or Lekshmanan only went to the site if there were
any problems encountered by Ng Khong Lim insofar as the structural aspect was
concerned. Mostly it was Shum who went there when requested; according to the
evidence, Lekshmanan visited the site only once or twice to ensure that the beams
connecting the pile caps in the foundations were provided as he was concerned about
uneven settlements. As for the architectural aspect, Leong said that he went to the site
about 2 or 3 times a week during the construction and that Ee Hoong Khoon went to
site to inspect the work at an average of once a month. Therefore, insofar as
supervision by an architect was required, it was carried out by Leong who said he did it
on behalf of Ee Hoong Khoon. However, Leong was not engaged by Ee Hoong
Khoon; he was engaged by Ng Khong Lim, and under the arrangement he shared the
fees with Ee Hoong Khoon. Ng Khong Lim, unfortunately, was one of the 33 persons
who died in the catastrophe; so also was one Soh Cheng Thum who was one of the sub­
contractors engaged by Ng Khong Lim in the construction of the building. Hence, no
account could be given by Ng Khong Lim of his personal involvement in the
construction of the building. However, the evidence that consistently emerged is that
Ng Khong Lim was very much in charge of the construction of the building and carried
out the supervision thereof himself.

Amendments to Approved Plans

3.16 A number of alterations were made in the course of construction. In particular,
two amendments were made to the building plans, BP 558/67. First, on or about June

14
1970, on Ng Khong Lim’s instruction, Leong prepared a set of amendment plans and
these were submitted to the Chief Building Surveyor’s Department by or in the name
of Ee Hoong Khoon. These plans were registered as BP 558C/67, and were approved.
The main changes were these:
(a) The position of the ramp going down from the ground floor to the car-park in
the basement was relocated from the middle of the building to a position at the
rear corner of the building. This resulted in the deletion of a retaining wall
which, according to the R.C. drawings, was to be erected;
(b) Nine columns in the basement were shown to be encased in brickwork;
(c) In one of the shop units, a strong-room was provided for, the toilet was relocated
and a glass panel wall was replaced by a 9-inch (229 mm) brick wall, and
(d) As for the floors from the third storey to the sixth storey, changes were made
to the arrangement of the hotel rooms.
(Figures 2 to 6 show the amended building plans BP 558C/67 in comparison with the
original building plans BP 558/67 as approved).

3.17 In drawing up these plans, Leong did not consult Lekshmanan on the changes
made; he merely said that he spoke to Ee Hoong Khoon about the amendments. There
was no evidence that either Ee Hoong Khoon or Ng Khong Lim consulted Lekshmanan
on the effect the changes would have on the structure of the building. We find that this
aspect was not explored by anyone and was wholly ignored at that time. According to
Leong, work had already commenced when the amendment plans were drawn up.

3.18 Then in mid-1971 or thereabout, a second amendment was made to the

approved plans. At about that time, Ng Khong Lim instructed Leong to prepare
further amendments to the plans, and these amendment plans were drawn by the latter
and handed to Ee Hoong Khoon who submitted them to the Chief Building Surveyor, and
these amendment plans were registered as BP 558D/67 (see figure 7). The second amend­
ment plans indicated, for the first time, the use of one of the shop units on the ground
floor as a bank. Presumably, by that time the owners had reached an agreement with the
bank, Industrial & Commercial Bank Limited, that that shop unit would be let out to
the bank for the purpose of setting up a branch there. Ee Hoong Khoon was directed to
apply for planning approval for the change of use of the first storey of the building. On
November 26,1971, on application by Industrial & Commercial Bank Limited, written
permission was given by the Chief Planner for the change of use from approved shops
to a bank in the first storey of the building under the Planning Act 1970. Subsequently,
after the amendment plans were checked and found to be in order, the Chief Building
Surveyor on January 14,1972 approved the amendment plans and notice of approval of
that date was issued to Ee Hoong Khoon on January 17, 1972.

3.19 According to Leong, in preparing the second amendment plans, BP 558D/67,

again no consultation with Lekshmanan or any engineer was made at that time. Ee
Hoong Khoon only told him that concrete should not be used for the wall in the strong­
room, and, accordingly, only bricks were used. When the amendment plans were
submitted to the Chief Building Surveyor’s Department, the building had already been
completed or substantially completed.

15
 ORIGINAL BUILDING PLAN
1 BP 558/67

r " - 1.

L J SUMP

a§|
Q CAR-PARK

W ------- R.C. RETAINING WALL

>, 1 RAMP DOWN

WI

A M EN DED BUILDING PLAN

I ram p dow n BP 5 5 8 C /6 7

H i111
U 1 CAR-PARK
V --------- R.C. RETAINING WALL

\ COLUMNS TO BE ENCASED
/ V WITH BRICKWORK
---------- ffi---- r----ffi-----r

2?____ 3f feet
-?--------? metres

Figure 2: Basement Plans (Based on Exhibits CE 24 and CE 29A)

 in a l b u il d in g p l a n
BP 5 5 8 /6 7

B
GLASS PANEL
^ -P A R A P E T WALL Y " 'L1FT \ \ AM ENDED BUILDING
- WITH ALUMINIUMPLAN
r~ ♦ 1 well 1 \ FRAME
BP 5 5 8 C /6 7

1\ RAMP DOWN \
\
\\
M l Vth o0rn
11Uyy^^ \\

Aill 11
1 (TO BASEMENT) 1/ ^ I " \

q w .,„ i j x m o \
j . \ |r o o m T ^ \ ^ p i O \
g CAR-PARK \ x ^ j l jA ^ \

% 1 \ V s-------- t ------ 9” BRICK WALL

sL j n i r F A - SH0P \ \ —
M 1 1 ill V \ \
\ FOOTWAY /

9_____ ip 20 feet

?---------+------- metres

Figure 3: Ground (first) floor plans (Based on Exhibits CE 24 and CE 29A)

 r LIFT I "\\ ORIGINAL BUILDING PLAN
1 well U ocker| BP 558/57

^ LOBBY ^OFFICE^

m g "^F" wc "^STQRE* \

1 KITCHEN \RESTAURANT A

W STORE I J I 4 - J - -----
|------------------- METAL WINDOWS
■ ■ ■ ■_______ i _______ %Z

n i F T T Z l AM ENDED BUILDING PLAN

1 toll BP 5 5 8 C /6 7

S
\ m II \ L0BBY \ office\

0 10 20 feet
?____ +______ ® metres

Figure 4: 2nd S to r e y plans (Based on Exhibits CE 24 and CE 29A)

RESTAURANT " \

18

\
 'JAL BUILDING PLAN
BP 5 5 8 /6 7

S ED BUILDING PLAN
BP 5 5 8 C /6 7

0_____ Ip_____ ?f> feet

?_____ | _____ ? metres
S
Figure 5: Typical floor plans (3rd — 6th storeys) (Based on Exhibits CE and CE 29A)

19
 ORIGINAL BUILDING PLAN
\ LIFT \\ A
\ WELL \\ \ BP 558/67
r--ii| iiiliii i — 1— — j M O TO R !

\ \
METAL WINDOWS WITH \\
P.C. VENTS OVER \\

FLAT ROOF \\

PARAPET WALL >

1 /

V ‘= = ^ AM ENDED BUILDING PLAN

rr- M... ..,1 room 1 \\ BP 5 5 8 C /6 7

-------------- WATER HEATERS \ |L i V M \\ \ U

— CONDENSING UNITS *— ^^LO BBy Y - \\
\WW ATER 1—7 Vi A \\
_____________________________________ \TraNK / _______ ^ ^ --------------- ALTAR
DOOR TO BE ^— V f \ \\
X BRICKED UP \ V*------------ W------------- ZINC-ROOFED SHED

l PARAPET WALL METAL WINDOWS \

FLAT ROOF Vt

j" ] ( W----------------------------------- COOLING-TOWER

\ r*------------------------------------ YT— WATER TANK

1 C > -------V - CONDENSING UNIT

0 10 2,° feet Structures and equipm ent not in th e Building Plan

0 3 — ? metres but were on the open r o o f until th e day o f th e collapse.

Figure 6: R o o f plans (Based on Exhibits CE 24, CE 29A and C E 117)

20
 V lift % \ AM ENDED BUILDING PLAN
r \ WELL I \ BP 5 5 8 D /6 7

\ RAMP DOWN \ \\ *7 /| \\ \\ \ \
1 (T0 BASEMENT) ^ \

1 \ \ 1 \ SH0P \ \
1 1 ___ 1 1___ \
U \ RA>IP,V CAR-PARK \ vA U \

&\ \ \\ V—\— 9"brickwall

Enri 1 1 i 1 \ ~ ~ \ \

\ FOOTW AY /

0 10 2,° feet
0 3 ? metres

Figure 7: Ground floor plan (BP 558D/67) (Based on Exhibit CE 31 A)

3.20 One of the major amendments made during the construction was the encasing of
all the basement columns with brickwork or concrete. The thickness of the encasement
varied from 150 mm to 200 mm. This amendment was made either at the commence­
ment of the construction or soon thereafter but before the completion of the 3rd storey.
The structural draughtsman, Shum, who visited the site said that the purpose of the
encasement was to hide defective work and also to prevent damage to the columns by
vehicles using the car-park. We do not accept his evidence on this point. The building
plans BP 588C/67 show the encasements of the columns in the basement. A site
inspection of what remained of the columns in the basement revealed that steel rails
were also incorporated at most of the columns between the pile caps and the ground
floor slab. The undamaged rails had the top bearing plates and bolts embedded into the
ground floor slab and formed an integral part of the encasements.

3.21 The original plans, BP 558/67, do not show that any water tank was to be
installed on the roof top. The amendment plans, BP 558C/67, however, do show that a
small water tank was to be installed but in a room on the flat roof. Subsequently, in the
course of construction, Ng Khong Lim ordered water tank panels from a supplier,
Yong Tai Seng Engineering Works Pte. Ltd., and caused to be assembled in-situ a water
tank of the size of 12 ft. by 8 ft. by 8 ft. (3.7 m x 2.4 m x 2.4 m). From the evidence, it
is clear to us that the water tank was not installed in the room on the roof as shown in
the amendment plans, but in the middle of the open roof (see figure 6) and this was
carried out before the water supply was turned on on August 8, 1970. The water tank
remained in that position until the date of collapse of the building.

3.22 It seems to us that the material changes to the building under construction, such
as relocation of the ramp leading to the basement and removal of a retaining wall,
could only have been made after consultation with, and with the assistance of either
Lekshmanan or Ee Hoong Khoon or both, and with the assistance of Leong who was
the draughtsman. Further, all the encasements of columns in the basement were most
likely incorporated at the time when the basement was under construction or
immediately thereafter when the ground floor was under construction. Here again, the
encasement must have been advised by some person or persons who had some
knowledge on structural engineering; it could be Lekshmanan or Shum or both of
them. It is obvious that the encasement was advisedly carried out to bolster up the
strength of the columns. We do not think that on his own, Ng Khong Lim would or
could have thought of this or taken the initiative of effecting such addition.

3.23 On March 2,1971, while the first amendment plans, BP 558C/67, were still being
processed by the Chief Building Surveyor’s Department, Ee Hoong Khoon informed
the Chief Building Surveyor that the building was “structurally completed” and applied
for a temporary occupation licence. In his letter, Ee Hoong Khoon explained that the
owners were anxious to obtain a temporary occupation licence to operate the night­
club, restaurant and hotel in the building. Two days later, on March 4, 1971, he
followed up with another letter to the Chief Building Surveyor with only one
paragraph, which is as follows:
“I hereby certify that I have personally supervised the construction of
the building at rear of Owen Road/Serangoon Road and that to the best
of my knowledge and belief, the building is in accordance with the
passed plan and any amendments thereto.”

22
The writing of this letter was inexplicable. It did not appear to have been requested for;
nor was it in compliance with the form prescribed by the Chief Building Surveyor. Not
surprisingly, this certificate was not accepted. Subsequently, on October 12, 1971, Ee
signed and delivered the following prescribed form of certificate to the Chief Building
Surveyor:
“ In accordance with Regulation 34 of the Local Government (Building)
Regulations, 1966, I, EE HOONG KHOON, 445, People’s Park
Complex, New Bridge Road, hereby certify that I have personally
supervised the erection of the abovementioned building/s and that to
the best of my knowledge and belief the building/s is/are in accordance
with the relevant regulations, plans and specifications, and conditions
under which such plans and amendments thereto, if any, were
approved.”
Thereafter, there was some delay on the part of Ee Hoong Khoon in obtaining
clearance from the various departments. These were eventually obtained. He
submitted clearance forms he received from the Senior Executive Engineer (Sewer­
age), the Commissioner of Public Health and the Fire Prevention Officer. The
clearance form from the Senior Executive Engineer (Roads) was issued five months
later on September 6,1972. That clearance form was submitted by Ee Hoong Khoon to
the Building Control Division, PWD on September 14, 1972, and on September 22,
1972 a certificate of fitness for occupation of Lian Yak Building was issued to the
owners.

Alterations & Additions to Lian Yak Building

3.24 After the certificate of fitness for occupation of Lian Yak Building had been
issued, a number of alterations or additions were made to the building.

3.25 On August 22, 1973, Ee Hoong Khoon on behalf of Industrial & Commercial
Bank Limited applied to the Assistant Director (Building Control), PWD for approval
for alterations and additions to the bank premises on the ground floor of the building
(see figure 8). At that time, the bank occupied only one shop unit for its business, and
the adjoining unit remained as a shop unit. The alterations and additions then
proposed involved a demolition of the party wall separating the bank from the
adjoining shop unit so that the premises of the bank would extend to and incorporate
the adjoining shop unit. The other alterations consisted of an addition of new
aluminium glass panel partition for the manager’s room; new roller grilles and roller
shutters on the front of the bank facing the footway; demolition of the wall of the
existing strong-room; new partition for the store and cashier; a new 9-inch thick brick
wall with steel lining for the strong-room; conversion of the originally approved shop to
the bank extension; new marble lining to the walls, and a new counter (see figure 8).
The application submitted by Ee Hoong Khoon bore the following certificate signed by
Mr Yew Boo Jamp, a professional engineer:
“I certify that the existing superstructure, walls and foundations (as
described in Part I) are capable of supporting any additional loads that
may be transmitted to them by the new works (as described in Part II)
with safety.”
There was no evidence before us as to what calculations or check Mr Yew did in
arriving at this conclusion. No R.C. calculations appeared to have been done by him,

23
 r 'u F T \ A BUILDING PLAN
p ' it mni11m \ mLL \ \ BP 5E /1191/73

\ RAMP DOWN \ p y p \ \ \\ \ \
\ (TO BASEMENT) ^ \ --------- \ ----------------- 9” BRICKWALL WITH
\ \ I strong! V\ \ STEEL LINING
\ \ . I room I v\ \
r "t \ T \ Y I ----------- NEW MARBLE WALL

0 1 \ \ \ \ V -\ l ------- \ ------------EXISTING WALL TO BE

3 ■ 1 \ 1 \________Y CV ____^ I p M \ DEMOLISHED

% 1 . V \f *f ^ T l --------- \ --------- EXISTING R.C. WALL

^ 1 RAMP \ \ CAR PARK \ Jfc-i s i BANKING \\ \ TO BE DEMOLISHED

m 11m V J it
> 1 UP ' \ ' \ \ \ HALL \
g 1 \ \N ^ — ^ --------- V------NEW COUNTER

A \ \ \ \ \ Is-------- \ -----9” BRICKWALL

FOOTW AY /

? y y feet
?-------- J______5 metres

Figure 8. Renovation plan for bank premises on ground floor

(BP 5E/1191173) (Based on Exhibit CE95)

24
and no such calculations were lodged or filed with the Chief Building Surveyor’s
Department. Mr Yew is presently in Canada and has been contacted by Mr Tiwari.
However, he refused to co-operate or assist on this matter and refused to answer
questions put to him in the form of a letter. It is unfortunate that he should adopt this
line of resistance. In the result, we are left in serious doubt as to whether he did in fact
carry out a check on the R.C. drawings and calculations before he signed the certificate
in such unqualified terms.

3.26 At the time when Ee Hoong Khoon submitted the application, work for the
alterations and additions had already started, and by reason of that, a penalty
amounting to a sum of $600 was imposed. The approval was granted on December 8,
1973. Owing to the failure to comply with the fire safety requirements, Ee Hoong
Khoon was not able to report completion of work until September 1975, and the
endorsement “work completed as per plan” was made by the Assistant Director
(Building Control), PWD on the building plan only on November 20, 1975.

3.27 On May 3, 1974, one Mohamed Yusoff bin Abdul Wahib, a technical officer
then in the Certificate of Fitness Section of the Building Control Division, PWD
inspected Lian Yak Building for the purpose of checking fire safety requirements of the
building in connection with the issue of a six-monthly certificate of fitness for
occupation. This inspection was meant solely for the purpose of seeing that the fire
safety requirements were complied with. In the course of his inspection, he noticed that
on the flat roof was erected a staff canteen with asbestos sheets, timber and plywood
(see figure 6), and that structure had not been approved by the Building Control
Division. He noted this unauthorised structure, and on return he wrote a letter to the
owner of the hotel, then known as New Serangoon Hotel, pointing out the unauthorised
structure and requesting the demolition thereof or an application for permission be
submitted within a week from that letter. Thereupon, Ng Khong Lim applied for a
temporary permit for retaining the structure, which application, however, was refused
and the structure was required to be demolished. On September 9, 1974, a letter was
written by Lian Yak Realty to the Assistant Director (Building Control), PWD to the
effect that the structure had been demolished. On May 8, 1975 or thereabout,
Mohamed Yusoff made another half-yearly inspection, and he said that he found that
the shed had been demolished. We are unable to accept his evidence on this point as
other evidence which emerged showed that the shed had remained up to the date of
collapse of Lian Yak Building.

3.28 In May 1976 or thereabout, Lian Yak Realty purchased two gas storage water-
heaters from Rheem Far East Pte. Ltd. for serving the hotel and these water-heaters
were installed on the flat roof (see figure 6). As these heaters were required to be
sheltered, a shed was built to shelter the water-heaters. Each water-heater weighed
about 200 kg and had a capacity of 60 gallons (273 litres) of water, giving a total weight
of 473 kg or thereabout.

3.29 In August or September 1978, Ng Khong Lim engaged Primier Airconditioning

and Refrigeration Co. to supply two cooling-towers to Lian Yak Building. One was
installed on the flat roof (see figure 6) and the other was installed on the ground floor
beside the ramp. The supplier of the cooling-towers did not undertake the installation
of the air-conditioning system in the hotel. This presumably was installed by a
contractor engaged by Ng Khong Lim.

25
3.30 On March 24, 1982, the Building Management Unit (now called the Building
Administration Branch) of PWD wrote to Lian Yak Realty requiring it to repaint all
the exterior walls of Lian Yak Building; presumably, the facade was in a deplorable
state and sadly in need of repainting. The company did not carry out the
repainting as required, but instead tiled the external walls of the building with heavy-
duty ceramic glazed tiles. It purchased about 67,000 pieces of such tiles from a supplier
and engaged a contractor, Speedwell Services Pte. Ltd., to carry out the tiling. The
contractor hacked off the “syntex” plaster and then replastered and affixed the tiles to
the wall. The whole of the external wall, excluding the bank premises on the first
storey, from the second storey upwards was tiled with the ceramic tiles. No application
for approval for such works was made to the Building Control Branch of DBCD as was
required under Section 5(1) of the Building Control Act. On the assumption that
substantially all the 67,000 pieces of tiles were used, the tiling added approximately 50
tonnes to the weight of the building.

3.31 In October 1984, on instructions from Ng Khong Lim, WKL Architects applied
to DBCD for permission to carry out Overall Thermal Transfer Value (“ OTTV”)
upgrading of Lian Yak Building. The OTTV upgrading consisted of a change of the
clear glass of all the windows to tinted glass and the addition of asbestos boards to
certain windows of the building. The application was signed only by the architect,
Wong Kon Loong, and no confirmation or certification was given by any engineer that
the existing beams, columns, walls and foundations of the building were capable of
supporting the additional loads of the proposed works to be carried out. Permission
was given by DBCD on November 1, 1984, and the works were completed by June
1985.

3.32 Apart from these works, internal renovations were carried out in the night-club
on the second storey of Lian Yak Building. These renovations were confined merely to
re-decoration and panelling of certain parts of the walls and the columns by different
proprietors of the night-club at various times. The night-club had changed hands
several times and each proprietor merely did the re-decorations for the purpose of his
business. No structural alteration or renovation was carried out by anyone to the
second storey. Certainly there was no evidence of any proprietor of the night-club
removing any-column or other structure in the second storey.

3.33 Apart from the improvements to the facade of Lian Yak Building in the form of
tiling and the OTTV upgrading and internal renovations carried out to the night-club
on the second storey, substantially no maintenance had been carried out to Lian Yak
Building throughout its short history. There was evidence that some minor repair
works, such as patching up of cracks in the walls with cement mortar were carried out,
but they were of no avail as the cracks reappeared shortly thereafter and nothing
appeared to have been done.

3.34 One of the problems we encountered in tracing the history of Lian Yak Building
is the absence or lack of satisfactory evidence, apart from the copies of the building
plans, R.C. drawings and R.C. calculations and other documents kept with DBCD.
The principal dramatis personae are no longer alive. Ng Khong Lim, the person who
played a major part in the design and construction of Lian Yak Building and his main
sub-contractor, Soh Cheng Thum, were 2 of the persons killed in the disaster. All the
professionals involved had also passed away. F. J. Pestana wound up his practice here

26
and moved to Johore Bahru at the end of 1967 or thereabout. He passed away in
Johore Bahru on November 27, 1976. As for Lekshmanan, presumably after he was
struck off the Register of Architects, he left for India; it is not clear when he left for
India. He passed away in India some six years ago. Ee Hoong Khoon, after the
construction of the building, was further involved in the alteration of the building in
1973 — the extension of the bank premises — and he passed away 4 years later or
thereabout.

27
 CHAPTER 4

COLLAPSE OF LIAN YAK BUILDING

4.1 As early as 1974, one Pan Ah Pok, a partner of the concern running the hotel in
Lian Yak Building, then called New Serangoon Hotel, started to notice cracks in the
walls of several rooms on the third storey of the building. In 1974, he noticed a crack
which was about 1.5 to 2 metre long in the wall near the door of room 214 (see figure
9c). The part of the crack near the ceiling was about 2 cm wide and there was also a
similar crack on the other face of the same wall (in room 216). When Ng Khong Lim
was told of this, he just caused the cracks to be patched up with “cement” . The cracks
reappeared 6 months later. Sometime between 1976 and 1978, the opposite wall in
room 216 also developed a crack which was as wide as 2 cm at one spot (see figure 9c).
In 1978 or 1979, Pan also saw a thin crack about 1.5 metre long in the wall of room 212.
According to Pan’s evidence it appears that the repairs which were carried out were
done in a shoddy manner.

4.2 A renovation contractor, Teo Lai Huat, said that he carried out renovation works
such as painting and changing of carpets in the hotel, then known as New Serangoon
Hotel, from 1974 to 1984. During this period, he had reported many times to the
owners that rain water was seeping into rooms 228, 328 and 428 through the external
walls because of cracks and poor cement plaster, but nothing was done about the
problem. He also noticed cracks in the floor slabs of the hotel lobby, corridors and
certain hotel rooms when he was changing the carpets. And on the roof, he saw cracks
about 1/8 in. to 3/8 in. wide in the roof slab “ near the water tank and the surrounding
walls” . There the cracks were patched up with bitumen, but they reappeared again and
again. He said that the owners of the building did not care about structural
maintenance.

4.3 Sometime in 1980, one Yeong Loke Man, a contractor, renovated the night-club
on the second floor. He said that he saw cracks of various sizes in at least 5 columns of
the night-club when the plywood panels covering them were removed. Plaster fell off
when he removed the plywood panels, and he found that three of the columns were
encased with brickwork; these were the columns that ran parallel to Serangoon Road
(see figure 9b). When he informed Ng Khong Lim about those defects, he was told not
to bother about them, but to continue with his renovation work. Yeong then replaced
the plywood panels, fixing them to the columns using one-inch steel nails, and covering
the plywood with formica. Yeong said that when he returned to the night-club in 1985
to wallpaper the columns and the walls, he found that the formica on the plywood
panels on three columns had split open and were bulging; he also found cracks in the
columns. He did not repair the cracks, but merely nailed the formica back into place
and covered it with wallpaper. If he had removed the formica from the other columns,
he might have seen cracks in the other columns as well; but he did not. Yeong also
found water leaking from the ceiling, and noticed vertical cracks in the wall behind the
stage of the night-club (see figure 9b). In our opinion, all these were indications that
the cracks in the columns and walls were developing progressively, but no one

28
 I RAMP DOWN \ \ f 1 © ^ \
l (TO BASEMENT) P | 1 j l» U © \

W © ® ® y j R
od \® \

1 1© \ 1© \ 1® \ ©V\ \

> 1 Ry ^ P-^ > CAR-PARK * \ \

g W> (g © ®\ bank \ @ \

P .m u n i r H \ \ \ \ \ \ r\ CRACKS ON RAISED

W in ® \ U \ \ © \ \_______ » © n ™s°™“ 1,83>

\ * - — ^ --------------------------- 7^—CRACKED COLUMN PROPPED
FOOTWAY / UP WITH TIMBER
l............... ......................................................................................................./ (MORNING OF MARCH 15, 1986)

Figure 9a: Signs o f structural distress at ground (1st) floor

\l_ WWWffl y^ A \\
®
■
©
—.........
®
1
^ © \
.... 1 ------------------------------------------------------- CRACKED COLUMN (1980)

■© l® 1® l® © \
f 1 1 1 - < ------- 1---------- CRACKED COLUMN (1980, 1985)
| 1 NIGHT-CLUB \

1 l I------------------------------------V------- CRACKED COLUMN (1980)

1© I© 1® © 1 PRAYER -------\ ------CRACKED COLUMNS (1980, 1985,

1 Z- ROOM * ^ EVENING OF MARCH 14,1986)
P lI l li m i K f —"1 J 1 DRESSING------- r \

|P P O @ . r M 1
V— \ | / l / Z J f STAGE / — MIRROR ON COLUMN SUDDENLY
1 1 ^ -1-.... 1 --v---------*■■■ A S CRACKED (EVENING OF
*— EXIT DOOR FOUND SAGGED MARCH 14, 1986)
(SEVERAL OCCASIONS) 1----------------- DOOR SUDDENLY JAMMED
(EVENING OF MARCH 14,1986)
•------------------------------- - VERTICAL CRACKS IN WALLS
ABOVE STAGE (1985)
0_____ S_____ ?P feet
9--------- 1--------- 9 metres

Figure 9b: Signs o f structural distress at 2nd storey

29
 vt M M X lobbyA \
\\- 11 V
s
)A(9
)\ \\
© © © ®\® $ A-?\| ■ A CRACKS APPEARED ON WALL
JUST BEFORE COLLAPSE
I \\ (MARCH 15, 1986)
S
^ jL ii x ^ o f f ic e !

CRACKS ON WALL
(1974, 1976 - 78)

a
1.5M LONG CRACK IN A WALL
IN THIS ROOM (1978 or 1979)

Figure 9c: Signs o f structural distress at 3rd storey

\ \ | | l \ m
LOBBY \ \
1® T ©J©A
\ r v ! \_ \©
\ ROOM I ROOM \ ROOM\ ROOM
© © © 1 318^ \l © 316 A \ 314 \ u 312
— ^ •*-?
\ (218) \ (216) \ (214) \ (212) /

I \\ \

S
— ^ © ^ — A \

CRACK ABOVE DOOR;

DOOR SUDDENLY COULD
NOT BE CLOSED
(MORNING OF MARCH 15, 1986)

DOOR SUDDENLY COULD

NOT BE CLOSED
(MORNING OF MARCH 15, 1986)

0 10 " 11 |N" ‘ \ \ ^ _ \ room \

2,° feet
0 3 F o o tn o te : R oom s 4 0 8 and 5 1 0 were on th e 4 th and
__ ? metres 5th storeys respectively
— Y ^ r S — \

Figure 9d: Signsm ? distress at 4 th and 5 th storeys

o f structural

30
appeared to have paid any attention to the serious implications of such cracks. Yeong
had also repaired, on two or three occasions, the rear exit door, leading to the staircase
of the car-park, which kept on sagging (see figure 9b). He said he brought these
problems to the attention of Ng Khong Lim, but the latter did not take the matter
seriously and took no steps to investigate or remedy the defects.

4.4 Kamla Rai, the watchman of the night-club, said that in 1983 he first saw a long
one-inch wide crack in the footway outside the bank at a location near the junction of
Owen Road and Serangoon Road (see figure 9a). He brought this to the attention of
Ng Khong Lim, but was given a short shrift and nothing was done to repair the cracked
footway; the crack remained there. There is also evidence that there were cracks and
water leakage in the external walls of the building; these were mentioned in a letter
from Lian Yak Realty to the Comptroller of Income Tax in July 1985. However, their
significance was probably not appreciated and nothing was done to find the cause of the
cracks. Instead, the external walls were covered with ceramic tiles.

4.5 Apart from all these cracks and other problems mentioned, no other signs of
structural deterioration or defects in the building appeared to have been observed or
noticed until the eve of the disaster. The building was then at an advanced stage of
serious distress. The night-club “mummy” , Lily Teo, said that when she arrived at about
5.30 p.m. on March 14, 1986, she was told of cracking sounds coming from the prayer
room. At about 7.00 p.m., she heard cracking sounds from a column, column 26 (see
figure 9b); she saw a small crack in the panelling at a corner of the column. Then, at
about 7.30 p.m., she noticed that the crack was wider, and through it she saw that the
plaster had flaked off revealing red brickwork with a large crack in it. She could put her
hand in the crack, but could not feel the column behind the brickwork. She reported
this to Philip Law, the night-club manager, who in turn told Ng Khong Lim about what
they found; the latter, however, did not consider the problem to be serious, saying that
the crack might have been due to a new air-conditioning cooling-tower that was
installed recently.

4.6 Earlier that evening at about 6.00 p.m., night-club singer Wee Kim Choo
reported for work and went to change in the dressing room adjacent to the stage. When
she came out of the dressing room, she heard cracking sounds coming from column 26,
but thought nothing of it. Later, at about 7.15 p.m. after her dinner in the kitchen, she
returned to the dressing room and found the door jammed. She tried but could not
open it and had to call Philip Law for assistance.

4.7 Sometime after 7.30 p.m ., another singer, Wai Choy Lin, was putting on her
make-up in the dressing room when the mirror suddenly cracked. She ran out in fright.
The mirror was mounted on column 32 in the dressing room and the crack in it,
according to witnesses, was in a diagonal direction and more than a foot long. Wai said
that during that evening, she also heard cracking sounds coming from another column,
column 26. Another singer, Goh Khee Ngoh, said that she found wall plaster on the
floor of the dressing room, and that the plywood panelling (on column 32) was bulging
near the right side of the mirror. She also heard, coming from column 26, a cracking
noise which she described as “continuous” . According to her testimony, at about 12.45
a.m. on March 15, after the night-club had closed and the lights were turned on, the
night-club employees went to look at the gap in the plywood panelling on column 26.
Through the gap, which she described as “big” , she saw red brickwork with a hole in it,

31
and fallen plaster. In our opinion, all the cracking sounds heard by the various
witnesses were due to the bursting of concrete in the columns.

4.8 Ng Khong Lim was informed of the cracks in columns 26 and 32 and, at about
9.00 p.m ., he came to inspect them and arranged for some workmen to prop up both
columns. According to witnesses, timber were brought later that evening and used as
props for the columns. Each timber prop was erected at an incline against the column
with one end on the floor slab and the other end on the column just below the
suspended ceiling. In our opinion, if this was how the props were erected, they did not
in any way help to strengthen the columns.

4.9 One Lim Thoe Eng, who was assisting his brother in running the Esso petrol
kiosk at the corner of Owen Road and Serangoon Road (see figure 1), said that at
about 11.45 p.m. on the night of March 14, 1986, he heard glass window panes falling
to the ground from the upper floors of the building fronting Owen Road.

4.10 On the following morning, at about 9.30 a.m., two chambermaids of the hotel,
Soh Geok Lian and Yap Siew Bee, who were in charge of the rooms on the 4th, 5th and
6th storeys went to clean rooms 408 and 510 respectively. After cleaning the rooms,
both of them found that they could not close the doors of the rooms. Soh also noticed,
in the wall above the door of room 408, a diagonal crack which she has not seen before
(see figure 9d). Yap said that Soh came to see her about the problem and she then felt
that something was going to happen to the hotel.

4.11 Helen Tan Quek Neo, a hotel guest staying in a room on the third floor facing
Serangoon Road, said that she heard a loud bang from above at about 5.00 a.m. in the
morning of March 15,1986. Later, at about 11.00 a.m. while she was in the bathroom,
the bathtub suddenly “exploded” and a lot of plaster and concrete started to fall down
followed by the collapse of the ceiling.

4.12 The hotel receptionist, Tan Oi Ling, told the Commission of a loud bang which
she heard at about 10.45 a.m. on March 15, 1986 when she was in the hotel office on
the third floor. A t about 11.15 a.m ., another loud bang was heard and cracks suddenly
began appearing in the wall between the office and the lift lobby (see figure 9c). Within
seconds, she-said, the building collapsed.

4.13 Albert Sim Siang Luck and Cheong Cheng Guan, both bank officers at the bank
on the ground floor, said that at about 10.00 a.m. that morning, they heard a distant
rumbling sound followed by what they described as a tremor; they felt the building
vibrating. They and other staff in the bank were shocked at first, but these disturbances
lasted for only a few seconds and they continued with their work. At around that time
Albert Sim was informed by a customer, Annie Quek, of the appearance of cracks at
the rear of the building and that pieces of concrete were falling off a column at the
ground floor car-park. He then went to check his car which was parked in that car­
park. There, he saw men, under the supervision of Ng Khong Lim, propping up
column 30 with timber (see figure 9a). He moved his car to the basement and then
returned to the bank. Then at about 11.15 a.m., according to Cheong Cheng Guan, the
ceiling in the bank suddenly “opened up and the whole thing just came crushing down
on us” .

32
Photograph 3: Aerial view o f the collapsed Lian Yak Building as seen in the direction parallel to
Serangoon Road.
(Photograph by courtesy of The Straits Times)

Photograph 4: Aerial view o f the collapsed Lian Yak Building as seen in the direction parallel to
Owen Road.
(Photograph by courtesy o f The Straits Times)
4.14 Earlier that morning at about 9.45 a.m., Ayoob bin Mohammed Thamby, the
hotel bellboy, was talking to R. R. Panday, the watchman of Lian Yak Building,
outside the building when he heard a loud sound coming from the ground floor car­
park. On checking, he found that a column in the car-park, column 30, had cracks at
the top on all 4 sides; pieces of concrete had fallen from it to the floor and the steel
reinforcement bars were visible. Ng Khong Lim told him to fetch some timber beams
from a construction site nearby to prop up the column. Accordingly, Ayoob with the
assistance of Diwaker Upadhya, the son of the building watchman, brought a piece of
timber and used it to prop up column 30. Diwaker Upadhya said in a statement that the
timber was about 15 feet long and 4 to 5 inches in cross-section. Ayoob noticed at about
that time that two other directors of Lian Yak Realty were also present, but they left
the site after about 10 minutes. Ayoob was further instructed by Ng Khong Lim to
obtain more timber props to support the column; Ng Khong Lim then went back to the
hotel to meet a contractor who, according to Ayoob, was one “Mr Soh” . Ayoob and the
watchman’s son then obtained a second piece of timber, but when they went to look for
a third piece, they heard a loud sound “like thunder” and on turning round, they saw
the building collapsing towards the Owen Road corner. Ayoob said that everything was
over within about 30 seconds.

4.15 Apart from Ayoob, there were at least 2 other persons who saw the building
collapsing. First, there was a businessman, Sukhdev Singh, who owns a textile and
garment shop at Serangoon Plaza situated on Serangoon Road and facing Lian Yak
Building. He said that at about 11.20 a.m. that morning, while on his way to a coffee
shop at the corner of Serangoon Road and Kitchener Road, he heard the sound of glass
shattering and saw pieces of concrete falling to the ground in front of Lian Yak
Building. As he looked up, he saw the front portion of the building breaking into two at
the middle and slipping towards Owen Road. This was also witnessed by S.
Krishnasamy, also a businessman, who was then alighting from a taxi on Serangoon
Road just before Burmah Road. He said that he saw the roof of the building caving in,
and the building came down within 30 seconds. (Photographs 3 and 4 show two aerial
views of the collapsed Lian Yak Building.)

4.16 Clearly at about 11.15 a.m. that morning the building could not stand the load
any longer and its collapse was inevitable; and collapse it did, suddenly and swiftly:
within less than a minute, it was all over. Until then, no one would have believed that
such a disaster could happen in the way that it did.

33
 CHAPTER 5

INVESTIGATIONS

5.1 Soon after the collapse of Lian Yak Building, investigations started to determine
the causes of the collapse. The investigations were led by DSP S. K. Menon of the
Criminal Investigation Department. Three civil and structural engineers were
appointed to assist in the investigations. They are Mr Terence W. Hulme, Project
Manager (Civil & Structural) of MRTC, Mr Hou Ke-hua, a consulting engineer in
private practice, and Dr H. S. Parmar, another consulting engineer in private practice.
Each of these three experts, apart from their high professional qualifications, is an
experienced civil and structural engineer and a specialist in his respective field. In
addition, other experts were enlisted to advise on various technical aspects, namely: Dr
S. Buttling, a Senior Geotechnical Engineer with MRTC, on the geotechnical aspects;
Dr Tam Chat Tim, Associate Professor of Civil Engineering at the National University
of Singapore, on the evaluation of materials recovered from the debris; Dr Moh Za-
Chieh, a consulting engineer, on the possible effects of construction work carried out
by MRTC, and Mr Teo Teng Poh, a Principal Scientific Officer of the Department of
Scientific Services, on the determination of any explosion which might have occurred.

5.2 In connection with the investigations, we wish to make two observations. First,
this is a case where the whole superstructure of the building fell to the ground and
basement levels. Apart from the basement retaining walls and a few column stumps
with protruding twisted steel bars, there was no column or wall upstanding. Secondly,
upon the collapse of the building, the paramount and overriding consideration was to
rescue the persons buried under the debris. Consequently, the debris was removed
with the view to rescuing these persons and not to preserving any members of the
structure, such as columns, beams and slabs, for the purpose of the investigations. The
rubble, as it was removed, was brought to a site nearby. Thereafter, what remained at
the site were merely the foundation, the basement, the ramp going down to the
basement car-park and a few column stumps with twisted steel bars. Hence, insofar as
the investigations of structural members and materials are concerned, they were thus
confined to examinations of what remained in the basement and the foundation
thereunder and what materials that could be usefully extracted from the debris.
Notwithstanding such constraints, very extensive and intensive examinations of what
remained, including columns, beams, slabs and foundations, were carried out. Tests
were done on concrete, steel and other materials that could be extracted from the
debris. Investigations were conducted at the foundations of five columns; three pile
caps were broken up and the piles beneath were examined, and two single piles and
one pile group were tested. In addition, an investigation was also carried out to
determine the ground water conditions at the site and whether there had been any
change of the ground water level. The R.C. drawings and R.C. calculations relating to
the design of the building which were submitted by Lekshmanan to the Chief Building
Surveyor are still available, and they were examined.

34
5.3 Investigations which have been carried out comprise principally the following
ones, namely:
Investigations
(1) Tests for presence of common
explosive substances
(2) Tensile tests on steel reinforce­
ment
(3) Bond pull-out tests
(4) Compression tests on concrete
(5) Various chemical tests
concrete
(6) Carbonation tests
(7) Concrete density tests
(8) Rebound hammer tests
(9) Windsor probe tests
(10) Water content tests on concrete
(11) Modulus of elasticity tests for
concrete
(12) Tests on bricks
(13) Boreholes
(14) Field vane tests
(15) Standard penetration tests
Purpose
To determine whether any explosion
had occurred.
To determine the tensile strength of
steel reinforcement bars.
To determine the bond strength
between steel reinforcement and con­
crete (ultimate anchorage strength).
To determine the compressive strength
of concrete.
on To determine the cement content,
cement-to-aggregate ratio, chloride con­
tent and sulphate content of concrete.
To determine the depth of carbonation
in structural members. Carbonation
leads to the corrosion of steel reinfor­
cement bars and may result in the con­
crete cover peeling off, thereby
exposing the reinforcement bars to
further corrosion.
To determine the density of concrete.
To determine the strength of concrete.
To determine the strength of concrete.
To determine the water content in con­
crete.
To determine the modulus of elasticity
of concrete.
To determine the modulus of elasticity
and the compressive strength of single
pieces of bricks and sections of brick­
work.
To determine the soil profile of the
area.
To determine the undrained shear
strength of the clay at the site.
To determine the soil profile and the
undrained shear strength of soil in the
different soil layers at the site.
35
 (16) Cone penetrometer tests To determine the soil profile and the
undrained shear strength of soil in the
different soil layers at the site.
(17) Piezocone tests To determine the pore water pressure
during penetration.
(18) Triaxial tests To determine the shear strength of soil
under different loading and drainage
conditions.
(19) Oedometer tests To determine the settlement character­
istics of soil in one-dimensional consoli­
dation.
(20) W ater content tests on soil To determine the water content in soil.
(21) Soil density tests To determine the density of soil.
(22) Particle size distribution To determine the proportions, by
weight, of soil particles within various
size ranges.
(23) Liquid limit and plastic limit To determine the liquid limit and plastic
tests limit of soil. These two parameters
define the range of water content over
which the soil exhibits plastic behaviour.
(24) Various chemical tests on soil To determine the acidity, alkalinity,
sulphate content and chloride content of
soil.
(25) Checks on ground water level To determine the ground water level at
using standpipes the site.
(26) Examinations of selected To determine the construction details of
foundations the foundations.
(27) Load tests on piles To determine the load-bearing capacity
of piles. The results were used to verify
theoretical estimations.
(28) Extraction of piles To determine the length of piles.
(29) Modified shock tests on piles To determine the length of piles
(30) Structural analyses To evaluate the design of structural
members, and the behaviour of the
structure as a whole under various
loading conditions.
5.4 Investigation No. 1 was carried out by the Department of Scientific Services; Nos.
2 to 12 were carried out mainly by the Singapore Institute of Standards and Industrial
Research (“ SISIR”); No. 13 was carried out by PWD and Chenyee Engineering
Enterprises Pte. Ltd.; Nos. 14 and 15 by MRTC; Nos. 16 and 17 by Fugro (Singapore)
Pte Ltd; Nos. 18 to 24 by PWD and MRTC; Nos. 25 to 28 by MRTC and No. 29 by
Testconsult CEBTP Pte. Ltd. The structural analyses, No. 30, were jointly carried out
by Mr Hulme, Mr Hou and Dr Parmar.

36
5.5 Part of the investigation was to determine whether there was any triggering
incident that had caused or led to the collapse of the building, and the possibility of an
explosion having occurred was therefore investigated. In his evidence, Mr Teo Teng
Poh of the Department of Scientific Services said that he made daily visits to the site
during the period from the day of the disaster to March 21, 1986, and was handed a
total of 8 bins of debris by the Criminal Investigation Department for tests; he also
collected 43 other samples from the rubble. All these were tested for the presence of
common explosive substances, namely: nitroglycerine, PETN, TNT, Tetryl and RDX.
No trace of such explosive substances was detected in any of the samples.

5.6 Mr Teo ruled out the possibility of an explosion having occurred. Apart from the
laboratory tests, he also conducted the following examinations. He said that the walls
and floors over the whole basement area were undamaged; this suggests that there was
no underground explosion. He noted that most of the cars in the basement were found
with at least one pane of glass (window or windscreen) still in one piece; this suggests
that there was no explosion in the basement. He concluded that there was no explosion
above the ground level within any part of the building. He said that an explosion “of
such a magnitude as to cause the collapse of the hotel would produce sound and blast
effects of such an intensity as not to escape the attention of persons anywhere in the
building, in adjacent buildings and in the immediate vicinity” . Further, there was no
“positive testimony of the presence of such sound and blast effects by persons present
within the hotel and in the immediate vicinity just prior to the collapse of the hotel” .

5.7 Mr Teo was also questioned on the possibility of a gas explosion, and he said that
such an explosion would have similar physical effects in terms of the sound and
vibration produced. He therefore concluded that there was also no explosion due to
gas. On the evidence before us, we find that no explosion had occurred.

5.8 The results of all the other tests described have been reviewed by the experts in
some considerable detail: an evaluation on the tests on materials was carried out by Dr
Tam in his report, Exhibit CE205; the geotechnical aspect was evaluated by Dr
Buttling in his reports, Exhibits CE10, CE206, CE207, CE208 and CE209; and the
structural aspect was jointly evaluated by Mr Hulme, Mr Hou and Dr Parmar in their
report, Exhibit CE210. We now proceed to consider the reports of Dr Tam and Dr
Buttling, and the joint report of Mr Hulme, Mr Hou and Dr Parmar.

37
 CHAPTER 6

M ATERIAL TESTS AND PROPERTIES

General
6.1 In his comprehensive report, Exhibit CE205, Dr Tam Chat Tim analysed and
interpreted the results of the tests on materials recovered from the debris after the
collapse of Lian Yak Building, and he considered principally the following aspects:
(a) strength of concrete;
(b) strength of steel reinforcement bars;
(c) bond strength between steel reinforcement bars and concrete;
(d) carbonation depth in structural members;
(e) composition of concrete, and
(f) density of concrete.

Strength of Concrete
6.2 From various structural members found in the debris and in the basement of Lian
Yak Building, namely: piles, pile caps, ground beams, beams, columns, basement
walls, basement slab and staircases, 356 concrete cores were obtained for the purpose
of testing. Of these, only 240 cores were tested; the rest were found to be unsuitable for
testing as they were either defective or too short to satisfy the standard requirements
prescribed in the test procedures. The test results of 160 cores were analyzed; the rest
of the results were rejected because of defective capping or abnormal failure pattern in
the tests.

6.3 At this point, it will be helpful to make a few general comments on the strength of
concrete. The strength of concrete in a structural member, e.g. a column, is
determined by tests on concrete cores extracted by drilling. There are three forms in
which the strength of concrete is usually described. The first is the“ specified cube
strength” or “ characteristic cube strength” which is the strength specified by the
engineer in his structural design. In the design of structural members, safety factors are
usually applied to the specified cube strength. In the case of Lian Yak Building, the
concrete strength was specified in the R.C. calculations in the form: Concrete mix 1:2:4
(Ordinary grade). The ratio 1:2:4 refers to the proportion of cement, sand and coarse
aggregates (stones) in that order by weight. According to Dr Tam, such a concrete mix
was commonly specified in the construction industry during the period when Lian Yak
Building was built and the specified cube strength of such a concrete mix was expected
to be typically 21.0 N/sq mm. The second is the “ standard cube strength” which is the
measured strength of concrete cubes prepared in a prescribed manner for the purpose
of checking the quality during construction. It is the usual practice in the construction
industry to target the standard cube strength with a margin above the specified cube
strength in order to reduce the risk of the concrete used for construction falling below
the specified cube strength. In current practice, the standard adopted by the
construction industry states that not.more than of the results of the concrete cube

38
tests should fall below the specified cube strength, and that the minimum value of the
results should not be less than 85% of the specified cube strength. In the case of Lian
Yak Building, concrete cube tests did not appear to have been conducted and there was
therefore no record of test results which could help to determine the actual quality of
the concrete used. The third is the “ estimated cube strength” which is a measure of the
strength of the in-situ concrete in the structural members. It is estimated by tests on
cores extracted from the members. Given the possible differences in compaction and
curing of concrete, and the effects of shape and size, the estimated cube strength is
usually lower than the standard cube strength determined during construction. In the
investigations, the estimated cube strength is derived from the strength of the
cylindrical cores by a conversion method following BS 6089: 1981, Guide to
Assessment of Concrete Strength in Existing Structures. The same conversion method
has been adopted in the revised edition of BS 1881: 1984, Part 120, Method for
Determination of the Compressive Strength of Concrete Cores.

6.4 Dr Tam examined the results of the tests on the 160 cores and he found the mean
value of the estimated cube strength to be 16.5 N/sq mm with a standard deviation of
4.5 N/sq mm. This is much below the typical specified cube strength of a 1:2:4 mix of
concrete which is 21.0 N/sq mm. Dr Tam, however, qualified that the strength of the
concrete members from which the cores were taken could have been reduced by the
effects of the collapse and the rescue operation. Such effects could not be quantified
unless the original strength of the undamaged concrete is known. He next considered
only the test results of the cores taken from the least damaged structural member: the
basement slab. A higher mean value of 22.0 N/sq mm for the estimated cube strength
with a standard deviation of 5.0 N/sq mm was obtained. This suggests that the lower
values of the estimated cube strength for the other structural members could be due to
the effects of the collapse and, as will be discussed later, micro-cracking. Given a
typical specified cube strength of 21.0 N/sq mm for a 1:2:4 concrete mix and allowing
for a margin of at least 10 N/sq mm to take into account the method of concrete
production, and a reduction factor of 25%, an average factor to allow for the difference
between the standard cube strength and the estimated cube strength, the estimated
cube strength is expected to be about 23.5 N/sq mm. The fact that the basement
slab had a mean estimated cube strength of 22.0 N/sq mm indicates that there was
hardly any margin above the specified cube strength of 21.0 N/sq mm. This suggests
that the production of the concrete was not carried out in a manner to ensure the
specified cube strength of 21.0 N/sq mm. According to Dr Tam, at the time when Lian
Yak Building was constructed, small concrete mixers of 0.1 to 0.2 cubic metre capacity
were typically used to produce concrete. The mix proportions were often measured by
volume instead of by weight which is a more accurate method. He commented that the
lower strength of the cores from the other structural members might be due partly to
the strength of the concrete being below specifications; this, however, cannot be
ascertained as these members were subject to the effects of the collapse and micro­
cracking.

6.5 Using another approach to assess the strength of the concrete, Dr Tam
considered the proportions of cores that gave results reaching various fractions of the
specified cube strength of 21.0 N/sq mm. Similar structural elements were grouped for
analysis, and then all the structural elements were taken together for a combined
analysis. The results show that, except for the basement slab and the staircases, for
most of the other structural members, less than 50% of the cores have strengths above

39
80% of the specified cube strength of 21.0 N/sq mm. The mean estimated cube strength
of the cores taken from the staircases is 20.5 N/sq mm with a standard deviation of 3.0
N/sq mm. Assuming that all the concrete in Lian Yak Building were produced in a
similar manner, Dr Tam inferred that the columns and beams might have suffered a
loss of strength due to effects not experienced by the basement slab and the staircases.
Having regard to the fact that the staircases were unlikely to have been overloaded as
staircases usually do not have permanent loads on them apart from their own weights,
Dr Tam came to the conclusion that the structural members, such as columns and
beams, might have suffered from micro-cracking due to sustained overloading.

Strength of Steel Reinforcement Bars

6.6 The structural members of a building are subject to both compression and tension
as they resist the loads imposed on them. Concrete alone can resist compressive
stresses but it is the steel reinforcement bars that resist the tensile stresses. The quality
of a steel reinforcement bar is defined in terms of its yield strength (the tensile stress
the bar can resist before it “yields” or suffers permanent deformation), the tensile
strength at fracture (the maximum tensile stress the bar can resist before fracture) and
the ductility (the extent to which the bar can be stretched before fracture).

6.7 Plain mild steel reinforcement bars were used in Lian Yak Building and the
specifications of mild steel reinforcement bars at that time were likely the requirements
prescribed in BS 785: Part 1 1967, namely:
• Specified yield strength : 250 N/sq mm
• Tensile strength at fracture : At least 1.15 x yield strength
• Ductility : At least 22% elongation at fracture
SISIR conducted tests on samples of steel bars obtained from the debris. These have
nominal diameters of 13 mm, 16 mm and 20 mm. The results show that the steel
reinforcement bars used in Lian Yak Building met the above specifications.

Bond Strength between Steel Reinforcement Bars and Concrete

6.8 The strength of reinforced concrete also depends on the strength of the bond
between the reinforcement bars and the concrete, which can be determined by “bond
pullout” tests. These tests were done on sections of reinforced concrete taken from the
debris to provide an indication of the bond strength. Altogether 17 samples taken from
beams, columns and slabs were tested. The bond strengths of the samples range from
0.3 N/sq mm to 1.5 N/sq mm with the majority (15 samples) in the range of 0.9 N/sq
mm to 1.5 N/sq mm.

6.9 According to BS 8110: 1985, Structural Use of Concrete, which, amongst other
things, gives a relationship between the ultimate bond strength and the concrete cube
strength, the prescribed ultimate bond strength is 1.8 N/sq mm for plain bars in tension
and a characteristic cube strength of concrete of 21.0 N/sq mm. The test results are
therefore substantially lower than the prescribed value possibly because of, amongst
other things, the effects of the collapse of the building, the handling of the structural
members in the rescue operation and micro-cracking.

Carbonation Depth in Structural Members

6.10 The atmosphere has a chemical effect on concrete, and this effect, called

40
carbonation, could in time reach the steel reinforcement bars and cause them to
corrode. This may result in the spalling of the concrete, thereby exposing the bars to
further corrosion. 24 samples from basement columns and floor slabs were checked for
their depth of carbonation. The structural elements chosen were without any plaster
layer. The carbonation depths were found to vary from zero to 19 mm. Since
reinforcement bars are normally located at least 20 mm inside the concrete, Dr Tam
concluded that carbonation had, in general, not reached the reinforcement bars
especially for those structural members which were covered by a protective layer of
plaster. This is supported by the fact that bars which were exposed showed no sign of
severe corrosion.

Composition of Concrete
6.11 Chemical analyses of concrete samples were conducted to determine the cement
content, the aggregate-cement ratio, the presence of chlorides and sulphates which
could cause deterioration of the concrete and the corrosion of steel reinforcement bars,
and, where possible, the water content.

6.12 The average cement content of the concrete, except that used in the pile caps,
was found to be about 290 kg/cu m. According to Dr Tam, this is reasonable for a 1:2:4
concrete mix for a specified cube strength of 21.0 N/sq mm. The aggregate-cement
ratio for all structural members, except the pile caps, ranged from 5.3 to 7.4 which is
also reasonable. The concrete in the pile caps tested was found to be extremely “lean”
with a cement content of only about 156 kg/cu m and an aggregate-cement ratio of 13.3.

6.13 According to BS 8110, the permitted limits of chloride and sulphate contents in
cement are 0.4% and 3% respectively. The chloride and sulphate contents of the
cement in all the members were found to be generally low and within the permitted
limits. This indicates that there had not been any contamination of the concrete by
chemicals from external sources and that there were no chemical attacks by sulphates
and chlorides on the concrete.

Density of Concrete
6.14 The density of the cores provides an indication of the degree of compaction of
the concrete as cast. The mean density of all structural elements as determined from
test results was 2295 kg/cu m with a standard deviation of 55 kg/cu m. According to Dr
Tam, the strength and the density of the cores in general do not show a clear
correlation. However, the samples from the basement slab and the staircases gave
concrete strengths and densities which are above the averages of all the samples tested.
According to him, “ such quality of concrete is expected of the building in order to
account for the fact that it stood up for about 15 years before the collapse.”

Behaviour of Concrete in Relation to the Collapse

6.15 Dr Tam also did a review of the role of concrete strength in relation to the
structural behaviour and collapse of Lian Yak Building. According to him, the
maximum stress assumed to be taken by concrete in design is normally about one-
quarter to one-third of the specified cube strength. Given such a safety margin, the
concrete should be able to resist loads indefinitely unless there is deterioration of the
concrete due to chemical attack. Chemical attack was ruled out in this case as the test
results showed that the chloride and sulphate contents in the cement were within

41
permitted limits and the depth of carbonation was shallow. However, when the stress
in concrete exceeds a certain critical level, micro-cracks would develop and propagate,
and this condition leads to progressive deformation of the structural members in a
process known as “ creep deformation” . Under a condition of sustained excessive
loading, this may eventually cause the member to fail even without any significant
increase in the applied load. The stress level at which this occurs (“critical stress level” )
is not well-defined but has been reported to be in the range of 70% to 90% of the
characteristic cube strength of concrete. It varies with the concrete mix and the rate,
magnitude and duration of loading, and, we add, the moisture content and the
temperature of the concrete. The time that concrete under such conditions takes to fail
decreases as the stress level is increased. This can range from a few seconds to years
depending on the combination of the factors mentioned.

6.16 Dr Tam, in his report, then relates his findings to the structural evaluation by Mr
Hulme, Mr Hou and Dr Parmar, and to the nature of the collapse itself. In the
structural evaluation, which we shall discuss shortly, it was found that the building was
grossly under-designed as a result of which many of its structural members were over­
loaded beyond the critical stress level. Dr Tam was of the view that with such sustained
over-loading, micro-cracks developed in the over-loaded members and creep deforma­
tions took place. As the creep deformation in these members gradually increased, a re­
distribution of the loads from the over-stressed areas of the structure to the less
stressed areas took place. The presence of brick in-filled frames, i.e. the frames formed
by columns and beams in-filled with brickwork, helped in this process of load re­
distribution. The gradual nature of creep deformation explains why the building lasted
for some time before it eventually collapsed. In this regard, Dr Tam observed from the
results of the tests on the cores from the basement slab and staircases that the strength
of the concrete could have been close to the specified cube strength of 21.0 N/sq mm. If
so, this is a factor that had helped the building to stand up for 15 years inspite of its
gross under-design.

6.17 As to the actual collapse of the building, it is Dr Tam’s opinion that the collapse
occurred after a sufficient number of over-stressed areas had developed. He stated that
although no specific calculations or finding could be made to support this, his opinion
was consistent with the mode of the collapse and the observation that the breaking up
of the structure was widespread with very few joints surviving the collapse. He added
that when the collapse of a part of the structure first occurred, it resulted instantly in
adjacent parts of the structure becoming over-loaded, including those parts that were
not over-loaded previously. According to him, the loss of even one column would lead
to a major re-distribution of forces causing severe over-loading in many parts of the
structure.

42
 CHAPTER 7

GEO TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

General
7.1 Basically we are concerned with two main considerations in the geotechnical
investigations and tests conducted. The first is whether there had been any significant
settlements of Lian Yak Building, and the second is whether any of the piles supporting
the building had failed.

7.2 As a starting point in the investigations, soil information for the Serangoon Road
area was obtained from records kept by PWD; such records were based on the results
of boreholes drilled in the past. In addition, after the debris was cleared, four
boreholes were drilled in places adjacent to the site of Lian Yak Building to gather
more information on the soil there.

7.3 Using data from the boreholes, a soil profile along Serangoon Road (see figure
10) was prepared by Dr S. Buttling who also gave evidence before the Commission.
The soil profile shows a layer of fill material of about 1.5 m thickness at the surface.
Below this is a layer of marine clay which, at the location of the building, is about 2 m
thick. Next is a layer of fluvial sand which has a thickness of about 4 m at the location of
the building. This is followed by a layer of fluvial clay which is about 5 m thick at the
location. A second layer of marine clay follows. This lower marine clay layer is about
18 m thick. Further down is an underlying layer of old alluvium of unknown thickness.
The soil profile was used as a basis for the investigations into the questions of
settlements of the building and pile failure.

Settlements
7.4 In the investigations, various soil tests and analyses were carried out to determine
the compressibility of the soil beneath Lian Yak Building. The compressibility of the
soil would give a good indication of likely settlements; the more compressible the soil
is, the greater the settlements will be. In this regard, it is necessary to find out whether
the lower marine clay layer was normally consolidated or overconsolidated since an
overconsolidated clay is less compressible than a normally consolidated clay. The
results on the lower marine clay is important because that layer carried, through the
piles, the larger part of the weight of the building.

7.5 From test results, Dr Buttling estimated that the undrained shear strength of the
lower marine clay varied from 34 kPa at 17 m depth to 52.5 kPa at 30 m depth. A
comparison of these values with values expected for a normally consolidated clay layer
suggested that the clay was normally consolidated to lightly overconsolidated. Dr
Buttling then used this information to estimate the likely settlements.

7.6 The location of and the variations in the ground water level were also considered
in estimating settlements. To evaluate this, stand-pipes were installed at 13 locations
near the building. Unavoidably, there were other investigation activities at the site

43
 _____________ / L____ _ ' // /

n - z i r s ^ ^

sWJ*/ A/.-/* /f if
i n * n

/ / Jl J i I CBS l FFt/T
J GG« /a ? /

S __ // ^ I
SERANGOON ROAD --------------------------- -----------------

R Ib I I LIAN YAK / / *JJ ] I

? 1?° metres • Location of boreholes

Fill
AA BB I CC DD EE FF GG HH JJ KK LL
0 j_ T.______ * ______ r _____U — 1 i : ~-Z :i ; 1 1 1___________ 1_

__ _____ ___ / . ’• • - Fluvial Sand . # ............... •, *

U pper Marine Clay y / . ^ 1 : __ • • • . • •^ # . • . • . ‘ ’

^ __ ____ ____ ____ ___ ^N r Estuarine Deposits | " =*

q 30 l — — — — — — — -L o w er Marine C l a y ^ ^ - • - — — ----------

V . V _ ___ ___ ___ —s^ T ^ rT f-. . M ixture o f Fluvial Sand,J-TJ----- -

>#***\— — — ‘ Clay and Old AUuvitmi^r - - r ^ r ^ T \ ^ \ | | | | . ]. ] • ]
40 , X - A .* \ . F l u v i a l ^

,*#*««« # # # • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
................. .. ........................................................................ ............. .. ................................... * . . .
................................................................ .. ........................... ......................................................... . . .

Figure 10: Soil profile along Serangoon Road.

(From E xhibit CE10)

44
which affected the readings; nevertheless from his interpretation of the readings taken,
Dr Buttling said, in his evidence, that he estimated the ground water level to be at
about 1.8 m below the ground surface.

7.7 Laboratory tests were also carried out to determine the preconsolidation pressure
of the lower marine clay. This is the maximum pressure that the clay has experienced
since it was deposited thousands of years ago. The preconsolidation pressure which was
determined from oedometer tests is also important in estimating settlements. If the
preconsolidation pressure was not exceeded or was only slightly exceeded by the
pressure on the clay due to the building, then the settlements would be small. In Dr
Buttling’s estimations, the values of preconsolidation pressure from the oedometer
tests were found to be consistent with values expected for lightly overconsolidated
clays.

7.8 Based on his interpretation of the test results, Dr Buttling estimated that the
settlements at 100% consolidation would have been between 150 mm and 400 mm. He
also estimated that differential settlements between any two columns could have been
as much as 10 mm. Such a movement would cause significant readjustments of the
loads on the columns, which could, in turn, affect the settlement patterns.

7.9 We have reviewed the test results and, with respect, we disagree with Dr
Buttling’s conclusions on settlements. Generally, we find that Dr Buttling has been
rather conservative in his interpretation of the test results. Our interpretation indicated
higher values for the undrained shear strength of the lower marine clay; our
estimations are 45 kPa at 17 m depth and 60 kPa at 30 m depth. A comparison of our
estimations with values expected for a normally consolidated clay indicated that the
clay layer was overconsolidated; hence, it is unlikely that significant settlements had
occurred. Generally, we obtained higher values for the undrained shear strength
because we considered the results from the field tests, which gave higher values for
undrained shear strength, to be more accurate than the results from the laboratory
tests. This is because samples collected for the laboratory tests could have been
disturbed during sampling thereby affecting the undrained shear strength. We also
believe that Dr Buttling’s values of preconsolidation pressure were underesti­
mated. On this point, the test results indicated that some of the soil samples had been
disturbed during sampling and consequently, this affected the results on preconsolida­
tion pressure. Taking that into consideration, our estimations showed that the
preconsolidation pressure of the clay layer was consistent with that of an over­
consolidated clay and that it was not exceeded by the pressure exerted on the clay due
to the building. From this, we conclude that settlements were small and that they had
taken place mainly during the construction of the building. Our conclusion is supported
by the fact that there was no evidence of significant cracks or deformations in the
basement walls or in the ground beams. It is also our conclusion that the soil condition,
in terms of settlements, had not affected the stability of the building or contributed to
the collapse.

Performance of the Piles

7.10 The next point to consider is whether the R.C. piles supporting Lian Yak
Building, which are of dimensions 6 in. x 6 in. (152 mm x 152 mm), had failed. To do
this, calculations were done to estimate the ultimate bearing capacity, i.e. the
maximum load the piles could carry. Load tests were also carried out on some selected

45
piles and groups of piles to determine their actual ultimate bearing capacities. The test
results were then compared with the calculated values.

7.11 Based on his calculations, Dr Buttling came to the following conclusions about
the capacity of the piles of the building:
(a) The calculated ultimate bearing capacity for a single pile of an assumed length
of 80 ft. (24.4 m) was 400 kN. Since the R.C. drawings and the R.C.
calculations show that the design load intended by the designer on the piles
was 200 kN, the factor of safety for the piles was therefore 2, and
(b) The calculated ultimate bearing capacities for piles in groups of nine and six
were 3060 kN and 1845 kN respectively. (These values are less than the total
ultimate bearing capacities for nine and six single piles respectively because
piles in a group act with lower efficiency).
From the structural analyses done by Mr Hulme, Mr Hou and Dr Parmar, the loads
transmitted from the columns to the pile caps were calculated to be as much as 2950 kN
for the 9-pile groups and 2165 kN for the 6-pile groups. Following from Dr Buttling
calculations, this would mean that the pile groups were loaded up to 96% and 117% of
their respective ultimate bearing capacities. Such a situation would have caused
substantial settlements of the foundation. However, as will be discussed shortly, we do
not think this had happened.

7.12 Load tests on two piles were carried out to determine their actual ultimate
bearing capacities for comparison with the calculated value of 400 kN. In the load tests,
one pile failed at a load of 400 kN while the other sustained the same load very well
with a settlement of 9.7 mm and a 75% recovery upon unloading. The second pile was
not loaded further to determine its actual ultimate bearing capacity. The lower ultimate
bearing capacity of the first pile is probably due to its length being shorter than what
was assumed in the calculations. Attempts were made to extract the piles to determine
their actual lengths. However, many of the piles broke off at the joints during
extraction possibly because the tensile resistance of the joints was very low. It was
therefore not possible to determine with certainty the actual length of those piles. A
non-destructive test based on sonic response was also carried out on other piles as a
further attempt to determine the lengths of the piles used in Lian Yak Building.
However, the results were also not conclusive.

7.13 A load test was also done on pile cap 25 — which according to the R.C. drawings
was a 9-pile group — to obtain results for comparison with the calculated ultimate
bearing capacity of a 9-pile group. However, it was discovered after the test, and when
the pile cap was removed for inspection of the piles, that there were two additional
piles in the pile group. The piles were arranged haphazardly. Nevertheless, Dr Buttling
commented in his report that nine of the piles could be expected to have carried the
applied loads. The load test results gave an ultimate bearing capacity of 3306 kN for the
pile group. This is higher than Dr Buttling’s calculated value of 3060 kN.

7.14 Our own calculations on the performance of the piles differed from Dr Buttling’s
in the following respects:
(a) The calculated ultimate bearing capacity for a single pile, assumed to be 80 ft.
(24.4 m) long, was 525 kN. This would correspond to a factor of safety of
about 2.6 based on the intended design pile load of 200 kN, and

46
 (b) The calculated ultimate bearing capacities for piles in groups of nine and six
were 3340 kN and 2860 kN respectively.
Our calculated values for the ultimate bearing capacities of a single pile and a 9-pile
group are therefore considerably closer to the actual ultimate bearing capacities
obtained from the load tests, namely: more than 400 kN, and 3306 kN respectively. On
this point, we note that Dr Buttling’s calculated values of the ultimate bearing
capacities were lower because his calculations were based on lower values of undrained
shear strength obtained from his interpretation of the test results.

7.15 Based on our calculations, the 6-pile group and the 9-pile group were loaded
only up to 76% and 88% of their calculated ultimate bearing capacities respectively,
i.e. considerably lower than Dr Buttling’s estimations of 96% and 117% respectively.
Furthermore, it should be noted that for the load test on the 9-pile group, the ground
beams were severed to avoid the effects of adjacent pile caps; the presence of the
ground beams would have increased the bearing capacity of the pile group. From this,
we believe that the piles were not loaded to such a degree as to have caused them to fail
or settle excessively. Based on the results of our estimations, we are of the opinion that
pile failure did not occur and did not contribute to the collapse of the building.

Effects of MRTC Construction Work

7.16 As part of the geotechnical investigations, the possibility of MRTC construction
work causing or contributing to the collapse of the building was examined. We heard
evidence from three engineers of MRTC, Mr S. D. Fielding and Mr A. J. Burchell,
both Senior Resident Engineers, and Mr B. R. Wildermuth, the Manager of Planning
and Computer Services. Mr Fielding and Mr Burchell gave evidence relating to the
construction of Lavender Station, Victoria Station (now called “Bugis Station”) and
Dhoby Ghaut Station which are the three MRT stations nearest to the site of Lian Yak
Building, at distances of 0.75 km, 1.25 km and 1.70 km respectively. We heard from Mr
Fielding and Mr Burchell that MRTC had carried out its own monitoring of ground
movements and ground water level at MRT stations during construction. Both
witnesses testified that the monitoring records for the three MRT stations showed no
significant ground movements or ground water level changes at locations farther than
20 m from the stations. Further, at the time of the collapse of Lian Yak Building,
excavation had not started at Lavender Station and excavation at the Dhoby Ghaut
Station which started in April 1984 had been completed by December 1984.

7.17 Mr Wildermuth gave evidence that MRTC carried out, amongst other things, a
study of the soil conditions in its North East Sector Study which covers a wide corridor
stretching from Outram Park Station, through New Bridge Road to Dhoby Ghaut, up
the general direction of Serangoon Road to Jalan Kayu and Ponggol. The geotechnical
investigations carried out as part of this study included the drilling of boreholes five of
which happened to be in the vicinity of Lian Yak Building.

7.18 Another witness, Dr Moh Za-Chieh, a consulting engineer, was also called to
give his expert opinion on the possible effects of MRTC construction work on the
collapse of the building. He prepared a report, “Assessment of Effect of MRT
Construction on the Collapse of Hotel New World” (Exhibit CE204), and also gave
evidence before us. In his report, Dr Moh examined whether there had been lateral
ground movements or settlements at the site of Lian Yak Building due to MRTC

47
construction work. To do this, he gathered relevant data based on records from the
three MRT stations as well as from elsewhere. In his evaluation, he deduced that there
were no lateral ground movements or settlements at locations farther than 100 m from
the three MRT stations. He also calculated and found that significant settlements as a
result of tunnel construction between the stations would not extend beyond the range
of 40 m to 50 m from the centre of the tunnels. Since the nearest MRT station was
about 750 m away from Lian Yak Building, he concluded that the building could not
have been affected by the construction work at any of the three stations or their
connecting tunnels. Dr Moh also made the following observations:
(a) There were no significant construction activities at the stations and their
connecting tunnels around the time of the collapse;
(b) There had not been any lowering of ground water level (which could cause
settlements) since no pumping of ground water was carried out at the stations.
This was confirmed by subsequent investigations into the ground water level;
(c) There were no obvious signs of ground movements observed in buildings
adjacent to Lian Yak Building. If there had been effects caused by MRTC
construction work, these effects would also have been observed in the
surrounding buildings;
(d) There were no material changes observed in the soil profile at the site of the
building obtained after the collapse as compared to that observed over ten
years earlier. This suggests that there had not been any significant ground
movements at the building, and
(e) There were no cracks observed in the basement slabs and beams of the
building except for some minor ones which could have been caused by the
impact of falling debris during the collapse. If there had been significant
ground movements, there would have been obvious cracks in the structural
members in the basement.

For these reasons, Dr Moh concluded, and we agree with him, that the MRTC
construction work did not cause or contribute to the collapse of the building.

48
 CHAPTER 8

STRUCTURAL EVALUATION

General
8.1 We now turn to consider the structure of Lian Yak Building. The structural
evaluation was carried out jointly by Mr Hulme, Mr Hou and Dr Parmar (the
“ Consulting Engineers”). In their report (Exhibit CE210), they dealt with, amongst
other things, the various main structural members of the building, namely: pile caps,
columns, beams, floor slabs and walls, and its reinforced concrete frame as a whole.
Their evaluation was based partly on the findings of Dr Buttling who assisted in the
investigation into the construction of the foundation and substructure. All three of
them also testified before the Commission.

8.2 We shall first deal with the design and construction of the substructure.
Thereafter, we shall consider the superstructure. In the case of the superstructure, the
Consulting Engineers were able to evaluate only the design aspects as there was no part
of the superstructure left intact.

8.3 In their analysis of the design of structural members, the Consulting Engineers
have primarily based their evaluation of design adequacy on code of practice CPI 14:
The Structural Use of Reinforced Concrete in Buildings. This code of practice was
applicable during the time when Lian Yak Building was designed and constructed.

8.4 In considering the design aspects, we shall be referring to the R.C. calculations
and R.C. drawings (BP 558B/67) submitted to the Chief Building Surveyor on
December 12, 1968. We shall also be referring to the original building plans (BP
558/67) and the amended building plans (BP 558C/67) approved by the Chief Building
Surveyor on July 6, 1968 and September 4, 1971 respectively. The building plans,
which represent the architectural design of Lian Yak Building, will be compared with
the R.C. drawings; as we shall show shortly, there are considerable discrepancies
between them.

The R.C. Calculations and R.C. Drawings

8.5 Before we proceed further, some comments about the R.C. calculations are
necessary. These were submitted to the Chief Building Surveyor together with the
R.C. drawings. Presumably, together, the R.C. calculations and the R.C. drawings
were intended to represent the structural design of the building for the purpose of the
submission. However, there are many discrepancies between the two. The R.C.
calculations were also very sketchy and grossly insufficient. It is found that:
(a) There are no calculations pertaining to the basement walls, but the R.C.
drawings do show the structural details of basement walls;
(b) The R.C. calculations show only columns of dimensions 9 in. x 18 in. (229 mm
x 457 mm) and 9 in. x 24 in. (229 mm x 610 mm), but columns of other sizes
are also found in the R.C. drawings;

49
 (c) The R.C. calculations give a single beam size, viz. 9 in. x 24 in. (229 mm x
610 mm), but the R.C. drawings show several other sizes for beams;
(d) The R.C. calculations give the design of a single pile cap for 9 piles, but the
R.C. drawings show the designs of pile caps for 2, 3, 4, 6 and 9 piles. In the
calculations, there appears to be no checks on the anchorage of the
reinforcement, the bending moment, the shear capacity, the punching shear
resistance or bursting steel;
(e) The R.C. calculations give the design of roof slabs of thicknesses of \ \ in.,
5 in. and 6 in. (114 mm, 127 mm and 152 mm) depending on their locations on
the roof, but the R.C. drawings show the roof slabs to be of 4 in. (102 mm)
thickness at all locations and 6 in. (152 mm) on the upper roof, i.e. the roof
over the enclosed area, and
(f) There are substantial deviations in the steel reinforcements specified in the
R.C. drawings as compared to the R.C. calculations. In the case of the beams
and slabs with similar dimensions in the R.C. calculations and the R.C.
drawings, less steel reinforcements were specified in 'the R.C. drawings.
It is our opinion that, in all probability, there were other or additional calculations not
submitted to the Chief Building Surveyor, which were used for the preparation of the
R.C. drawings.

8.6 A word is also necessary about the R.C. drawings. One would expect these to
have been based on the original building plans BP 558/67 submitted 17 months earlier.
But this apparently was not the case in at least one major aspect: the positions of the
ramps. In the original building plan, the ramp to the ground floor car-park is near the
rear corner of the building while the ramp going down to the basement car-park is at
the centre (see figure 3). In the R.C. drawings, however, the ramp to the ground floor
car-park is at the centre and there is no ramp leading to the basement (see figure 11).
So, as far as the R.C. drawings are concerned, except for a staircase, there is no access
to the basement car-park — certainly not for cars. The amended building plans BP
558C/67 are more consistent with the R.C. drawings. These building plans show the
ramp to the ground floor car-park to be at the same position as that shown in the R.C.
drawings, and the ramp to the basement car-park to be at a position near the rear
corner of the building (see figure 3). It therefore appears that this change of positions
of the ramps was probably contemplated at or around the time the R.C. drawings were
prepared, and that the R.C. drawings had preceded the amended building plans.

8.7 Even within the R.C. drawings, there are many discrepancies and ambiguities. A
long and detailed list of these was enumerated in the report of the Consulting
Engineers. It will suffice if we mention the principal ones, namely:
(a) The basement layout drawing shows skew pile caps, but the details show the
pile caps to be rectangular;
(b) There are no design details given for 94 beams and 13 sections of roof or floor
slabs;
(c) The drawings give details for several beams which are non-existent in the
layout drawings, and
(d) The sizes of 45 floor beams and 40 roof beams as shown in the layout drawings
differ from those shown in the detail drawings.

50
 _© ©

a y f R f e - , ©

© © © (M .© \ ©

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| BASEMENT V--- R.C. RETAINING WALL

© li ©1 @)« ©1 “©

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Figure 11: Positions o f columns and a ramp as shown in R. C. drawings for

basement and ground floor (BP 558B/67)
(Based on Exhibit CE28AJ

51
Design and Construction of the Basement
8.8 The basement, like the building itself, was a skew structure with non-parallel
opposite sides. It served as a car-park for 20 cars with access to it by means of a ramp
leading down from the service road behind the building, and a staircase near the
junction of the service road and Owen Road. There was a drainage sump at one end of
the basement mainly for the collection of water and oil from vehicles.

8.9 Apart from the omission of the ramp to the basement car-park, there are other
discrepancies or inadequacies in the R.C. drawings that should be mentioned. These
are principally the following:
(a) In the R.C. drawings and the amended building plans, the columns in the
basement were, in each case, arranged in straight lines in a non-regular grid
pattern; however, the grid patterns do not match each other in dimensions;
(b) In the amended building plans, 9 internal columns in the basement are shown
as encased in brickwork; this is not shown in the R.C. drawings;
(c) The skew angles of the building are specified neither in the R.C. drawings nor
in the building plans, and
(d) Both the R.C. drawings and the amended building plans do not show the
basement floor slab as having any slope for drainage.

8.10 It was obvious to any one visiting the site after the debris was cleared that a ramp
to the basement car-park was provided for and in the position indicated in the amended
building plans inspite of the omission in the R.C. drawings. To accommodate this, a
section of the retaining wall between columns 3 and 13 was deleted. The R.C.
drawings, however, were not revised and resubmitted to the Chief Building Surveyor,
and there was no evidence that the structural design was reviewed to accommodate this
change. As constructed, the basement floor did have a slope to the sump, and eleven
columns were provided with encasements of brick or mass concrete. There are two
other observations about the construction that must be pointed out; they are:
(a) The positions of the columns as constructed matched neither those shown in
the R.C. drawings nor the building plans, and were generally not along
straight lines (see figure 12), and
(b) Steel rails were incorporated inside the encasement of eight columns in the
basement (for example, see photograph 5); the R.C. drawings and building
plans do not show any steel rails.

8.11 The fact that the grid patterns in the R.C. drawings and the building plans do not
match and there was no ramp to the basement car-park shown in the R.C. drawings
suggests that either there was no proper co-ordination between the persons involved in
the structural and the architectural designs or that subsequent revisions had taken place
without any revised drawings or plans being submitted to the Chief Building Surveyor.
We also observe that without the skew angles of the building given, it would have been
difficult to set out the columns and walls in accordance with the design. It is
inexplicable why the columns were not at least constructed along straight lines as they
were so shown in both the R.C. drawings and building plans. This had led the
Consulting Engineers to conclude, and we agree with them, that no proper survey
method was used in the construction of Lian Yak Building.

52
\ ad\
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iO2®_________T329________ W 33______________ G031________________ OTO32__OTD\

OWEN ROAD

?__1__ ?__ 5__5__ 5 metres

Legend : O Centre o f colum n as constructed

□ Centre o f colum n as per R.C. drawing
V Centre o f colum n as per building plan

F o o tn o te : The p osition s o f colum n 28 and the row o f colum ns n ex t to Owen Road are made to
coincide in all 3 cases for com parison.

Figure 12: Positions o f columns in basement

(Based on Exhibit CE210)

53
Basement Floor Slab
8.12 The R.C. drawings show the basement floor slab designed as a “suspended
slab” , i.e. the floor slab was to be structurally integrated with the beams so that the
load on the slab would be carried by the beams and not directly by the ground. The
details in the R.C. drawings show 9 in. (229 mm) thick reinforced concrete floor slabs
supported on 18 in. x 24 in. (457 mm x 610 mm) reinforced concrete beams along the
grid lines with some 18 in. x 24 in. (457 mm x 610 mm) and 18 in. x 18 in. (457 mm x
457 mm) reinforced concrete beams at intermediate locations. The floor slab was to be
reinforced with top and bottom layers of \ in. (R13) steel reinforcement bars at 6 in.
(152 mm) spacing in the two directions (“both ways”) in a regular grid pattern. The top of
the pile cap is to be at the same level as the basement floor. The R.C. drawings also
show that the floor slab was to be founded on a 3 in. (76 mm) layer of lean concrete laid
on a composite layer of hard core, granite stones and sand. Such supporting layers are
normally not required for a suspended slab.

8.13 During the investigation, no signs of structural distress were found in the
basement floor slab except for some minor cracks at the foot of the ramp and in the
area near columns 17, 18, 19 and 20.

8.14 In the investigation, the portions of the basement floor slab in the vicinity of
column 14, and columns 24, 25 and 26 were removed to check the structural details
as constructed. It was found that the basement floor slab was actually constructed as a
non-suspended slab, i.e. the slab was not integrated with the beams but rested directly
on the ground. This is borne out by the fact that the reinforcement bars of the slab were
not linked with those of the beams, the columns or the basement walls. During the
investigation, the slab was easily separated from the columns and walls. This suggests
that it was simply cast against the columns and walls without structural connection.

8.15 The slab, as constructed, had a thickness which, on the average, was about
25 mm less than its designed thickness. The reinforcement provided consisted of only
one layer of R6 bars placed at the bottom of the slab at 180 mm to 220 mm spacing both
ways. There was no lean concrete layer below the slab; this is normally necessary to
serve as a firm and clean surface for casting. The slab had been simply cast onto the
surface of the sand and hard core layers below. The thicknesses of the hard core and
sand layers were generally less than those shown in the R.C. drawings.

8.16 Based on a specified concrete cube strength of 21.0 N/sq mm, checks done by the
Consulting Engineers show that the original design of the suspended floor slab was
satisfactory and complied with the requirements of code of practice CPI 14. The
constructed non-suspended slab, however, was of a design less satisfactory than the
original suspended floor slab. In spite of this, however, there was no evidence to show
that the basement floor slab did not perform satisfactorily.

Ground Beams
8.17 Calculations by the Consulting Engineers show that, based on the details shown
on the R.C. drawings, most of the ground beams, especially those of more than 5 m
span, were under-designed and did not comply with CP114. As constructed, some of
the ground beams were reinforced with as little as eight \ in. (R13) bars top and bottom

54
compared with eight f in. (R16) bars top and bottom as shown in the R.C. drawings.
This is only about 66% of the reinforcement specified for them in the R.C. drawings.

8.18 Some cracks were observed in three of the ground beams which were exposed in
the investigations. The crack found in the ground beam between columns 24 and 25
could have been caused by the investigation activities. However, the cracks in the
ground beams between columns 18 and 24 and between columns 24 and 30 appeared to
have existed for some time. These cracks, according to the Consulting Engineers,
might have been caused by torsional stresses on the ground beams resulting from the
eccentric position of the column on pile cap 24.

8.19 The Consulting Engineers found that the ground beams were not constructed in
accordance with the details in the R.C. drawings. Mr Hulme, in his evidence, testified
that even if they had been, many of the ground beams would still be under-designed.
We agree that for the purpose of supporting the suspended basement slabs, the ground
beams were under-designed. It should be noted, however, that the ground beams as
constructed were not structurally connected to the non-suspended basement slabs but
mainly served as tie beams between the pile caps.

Basement Walls
8.20 Inspection of the site soon after the rescue operation showed that the basement
wall suffered little damage except for a portion of it along Owen Road near columns 30
and 31. In that area, the basement wall was found leaning inwards at an angle of
approximately 10 degrees to the vertical.

8.21 On the R.C. drawings, the basement walls are indicated as 9 in. (229 mm) thick
reinforced concrete walls with \ in. (R13) reinforcement bars on both faces at 6 in.
(152 mm) spacing in both horizontal and vertical directions. The wall was to be
structurally integrated with the first storey floor slab above it and supported on 18 in. x
24 in. (457 mm x 610 mm) continuous beams spanning between the pile caps along the
wall. The investigation showed that the wall was under-designed. As constructed, its
thickness was, on the average, about 29 mm less than that specified in the R.C.
drawings. The reinforcement actually provided comprised f in. (R10) bars on both
faces at 150 mm spacing both ways. This is only about 60% of that specified in the R.C.
drawings. The basement wall was structurally connected with the basement beams.

Pile Caps
8.22 Before we move on to consider the pile caps, it may be helpful to explain first the
typical construction of a pile cap. Piles are usually driven in groups with the piles in
each group arranged in a regular pattern. The pile cap is then cast on top of the
individual piles. To ensure that the pile cap is structurally integrated with the piles, the
reinforcement bars inside the top end of each pile (in the case of reinforced concrete
piles) are usually exposed by hacking off the concrete. The exposed reinforcement bars
(“starter bars”) are then anchored to the pile cap when it is cast. Next, the column
which is to be carried by the pile cap is cast on top and at the centre of the pile cap. Like
the piles, the column is also connected to the pile cap by starter bars. Adjacent pile
caps are usually connected by means of ground beams. In proper construction practice,
a base of lean concrete (“blinding concrete”) would be laid on the ground to provide a
firm and clean working surface for the casting of the pile cap.

55
8.23 The R.C. drawings show pile caps with 2, 3, 4, 6 and 9 piles with different sizes
and spacings of reinforcement bars for different pile caps. The pile reinforcement bars
were to be exposed and anchored to the pile cap. According to the Consulting
Engineers, the pile cap designs comply with code of practice CP114.

8.24 In the investigation, pile caps 14, 24, 25 and 26 were exposed by excavation for
inspection. Pile caps 14, 25 and 26 were subsequently removed to expose the piles
under them. The inspection was revealing: there were many signs of poor construction.

8.25 Pile cap 25 appeared to have been cast in two parts with a distinct separation
between them. Timber pieces and marine clay were found in between the two parts.
The larger part was skew in shape and the column was positioned at a corner of this
part (see figure 13 and photograph 7). The column was encased in two layers of
concrete in which were embedded two steel rails and pieces of timber. Eleven piles
were found under the pile cap although the R.C. drawings show only 9 piles. The piles
were randomly positioned (see photograph 6) and, as a group, they were not concentric
with the column as should be the case. This is possibly a reason for the additional part
of the pile cap, i.e. to compensate for the eccentricity of the column on the pile cap.
Cracks were found on the sides of three of the piles and the starter bars of one of them
were found buckled. The starter bars for the columns were arranged in two rows with
one row cranked and crossing the other row. No blinding concrete was found below the
pile cap.

8.26 The findings for the other 3 pile caps inspected were generally similar to those
for pile cap 25 with the exception that the eccentricity of the columns on the pile caps
were much smaller. In pile caps 14 and 26, it was also found that there were marine clay
and other soft soil materials between the heads of several piles and the underside of the
pile caps. This suggests that the pile caps were not properly cast onto the piles. Pile cap
26 was also found to have five piles without starter bars.

8.27 In our opinion, with poor setting out of the positions of piles, pile caps and
columns during construction, it was likely that the ground beams or tie beams were
meant to compensate for the adverse effect of column eccentricity on the pile caps as
indicated by Shum Cheong Heng, the structural draughtsman who worked for
Lekshmanan at that time. In his evidence Shum said that tie beams were put in after
Lekshmanan learnt that there was no load test for the piles and that Lekshmanan was
concerned about the eccentricity of the columns on the pile caps and uneven
settlements. We would observe that, if this was in fact what happened, that would
mean that the pile caps, or at least some of them, were constructed even before the
R.C. drawings were submitted to the Chief Building Surveyor since those drawings
show all the pile caps connected by a system of ground beams.

8.28 A t this point we should add a comment about the piling work carried out.
According to the evidence of David Chia Fong Weng, the son of the piling contractor
who carried out the piling work, the drawing showing the size of the piles, the
reinforcements to be used and the concrete mix (1:1|:3) was given on a foolscap-size
sheet of paper and that there were no soil tests carried out. This is another indication of
poor construction practice at the site.

56
 ■ p ® -'

COL CS ^
f
■
A
I
r

3 ' A -8Cof ,

Photograph 5: Column 25 showing its concrete encasement and two steel rails therein.
(Extract from Exhibit CE201)
K 3

Photograph 6: Piles under pile cap 25 as viewed in direction B. (Extract from Exhibit CE210)
CONCRETE LUMP ------- \ 7V -------------- METAL PLATE
WOODEN PEG ----------------V---------------------------- \ ------------ STEEL RAIL
POSITION OF PILES I \ \ f WOODEN PEG

\ V -------JOINT

\ \ ' r --n \
\\ ' V \ \
\ U" J ‘u _ _ j r " r , -a\

GROUND -n f~~ \ \ \\ \ \\ CONCRETE

BEAM V\ ' ' ' \A \ \ \\ PILE CAP
>JL_ j u " \\\ \ E >\ \\\ EXTENSION GROUND
\ CONCRETE \ :: \ \ ' 1\ \\\ BEAM
l PTTF TAP \ '■ \ \ CONCRETE\ \ \\
\ \: \ \column \ \\\

B V " J l--\L \

0 10 20 » 40 50 pftntimetres \ G R O U N DBEAM ^\ A

Figure 13: Construction details o f pile cap 25 and column 25.

(From Exhibit CE210J

Photograph 7: P ile cap 25 as v ie w e d in direction A . (Extract from Exhibit CE210)

8.29 From their study of the construction of pile caps 14, 24, 25 and 26, the
Consulting Engineers came to the following conclusions:
(a) The construction of the pile caps was not in accordance with the R.C.
drawings: the shape of pile caps were different; the reinforcements provided
were about 25% less than what were specified; the columns were eccentrically
located on the pile caps; and additional cast sections were added to some pile
caps;
(b) The standard of construction was very poor: marine clay was found stuck to
the concrete because no blinding concrete was provided; starter bars were
neither properly arranged nor properly lapped to the column reinforcement
bars; some piles had no starter bars and consequently were not properly
connected to the pile caps; and piles within each pile group were randomly
arranged suggesting that there was no proper setting-out procedure;
(c) The considerable eccentricity of the columns on the pile caps could have
caused (i) the rotation of the pile caps which could result in over-loading of
some piles and increased bending stresses in the columns, and (ii) excessive
torsion and bending of the ground beams which could, in turn, result in cracks
in the ground beams and transfer of load to adjacent pile caps;
(d) The presence of marine clay between the piles and the pile caps would have
seriously affected the transfer of loads from the pile cap to the piles, and
(e) The additional cast sections of pile caps 24 and 25, which were probably
intended to compensate for the excessive eccentricity of the columns on the
pile caps, served no real structural purpose because the joints between the
sections were not properly constructed.

Basement Drainage
8.30 The layout of the drainage system for the basement, comprising the drains and
the sump is shown in the building plans but not in the R.C. drawings. According to the
Consulting Engineers, the actual layout of the drains under the basement floor and the
location of the sump in relation to the slope of the basement floor as constructed was
satisfactory. During the hearing, our attention was especially drawn to the sump in
view of the possibility of the ground water level having been lowered as a result of the
pumping of water from it; a lowering of the ground water level could affect the
settlements of the building.

8.31 The sump was about 1.5 m deep with a volume of about 1.7 cubic metres. W ater
from the basement would flow to it through drains in the basement slab. There were
two submersible pumps of different capacities installed at different levels in the sump
for pumping the water to a surface drain at the service road behind the building. The
pumps would be activated automatically when the sump was nearly full.

8.32 In the investigation, a 12 to 30 mm wide gap was found between the base of the
sump and its cylindrical wall. The presence of this gap is inexplicable and seems, to us,
to be an indication of poor construction. Because of this gap, it was probable that
ground water had also been seeping into the sump in addition to any water from the
basement; one Ang Kim Siang, an electrical and plumbing contractor, saw clear water
instead of effluent water in the sump when he was checking the pumps sometime in
January 1986 or thereabout. However, since the investigation showed that the pumping

57
level was close to the ground water level, the pumping of water from the sump was
unlikely to have caused any significant lowering of the ground water level.

8.33 We also considered the possibility of the lift well in the building having an effect
on the ground water level. The Consulting Engineers found that the bottom level of the
lift well was about 1.5 m above the basement slab. This would mean that it was above
the ground water level and therefore could not have any effect on it. Furthermore, we
heard the evidence of Mr Tan Teow Seng, the managing director of East Machinery
Pte. Ltd., which maintained the lift of Lian Yak Building, that there was no complaint
of water seepage in the lift well ever since an occurrence of water seepage in the lift
well from the basement wall in 1974 was rectified.

Design of the Superstructure

8.34 We now consider the design of the structural components of the superstructure
and its behaviour under various loading conditions.

Roof and Floor Slabs

8.35 The R.C. drawings show the roof slab to be of a uniform thickness of 4 in. (102
mm) over the entire roof and 6 in. (152 mm) over the upper roof, i.e. roof over the
enclosed area. The design did not take into account the weight of any water tank, i.e.
neither the tank supposedly intended to be installed in an enclosed space on the roof
nor the much larger tank measuring 12 ft. x 8 ft. x 8 ft. (3.7 m x 2.4 m x 2.4 m)
actually installed on the open roof. At the time when the R.C. drawings and R.C.
calculations were submitted to the Chief Building Surveyor, the building plans, which
had by then been approved, did not provide for any water tank on the roof top. It was
in the amended plan, BP 558C/67, that a smalf water tank in a room on the roof top
first appeared, and the larger water tank eventually installed on the open roof was
never provided for in any building plan.

8.36 The slabs for the typical floors (2nd to 6th storeys) were shown as conventional
4 in. (102 mm) reinforced concrete slabs in the R.C. drawings. For the ground floor
housing the bank and car-park, the R.C. drawings show all the floor slabs to be 9 in.
(229 mm) thick. However, the beams in this area, which were of the size of 9 in. x 24
in. (229 mm x 610 mm), could only support two-thirds of the live load which a 9 in.
(229 mm) slab is meant to carry.

Roof and Floor Beams

8.37 The R.C. drawings show various sizes for the roof and floor beams. These are
principally 9 in. x 18 in. (229 mm x 457 mm), 9 in. x 24 in. (229 mm x 610 mm), 9 in.
x 36 in. (229 mm x 914 mm), 12 in. x 18 in. (305 mm x 457 mm) and 18 in. x 24 in.
(457 mm x 610 mm). Analysis by the Consulting Engineers revealed that the floor
systems were generally grossly under-designed with many beams barely able to carry
the loads imposed on them. It was observed from the R.C. calculations that the
designer had chosen conservative design parameters and made conservative assump­
tions on live loads. However, the design dead loads were found to have been either
under-estimated or completely left out. The Consulting Engineers are of the opinion
that some of the beams on the 3rd to 6th floors were under-designed even without
taking into account live loads. With live loads taken into account, the factors of safety
would be even lower not only on those floors but also on the first and second floors.

58
They added that failure of these beams could have occurred, but probably did not
because of the brickwork in the in-filled frames which helped in the redistribution of
the loads.

Column Encasements and Steel Rails

8.38 Eleven columns in the basement were found to be encased in brickwork or
concrete. From the evidence of witnesses, these encasements were constructed in the
early stage of construction, probably during the period between the construction of the
basement and the third storey. Also found were steel rails embedded in the
encasements of eight o£the basement columns. The rails commenced from the pile caps
(see photograph 5) and some of them were found to have top bearing plates with bolts
embedded into the floor slab above. The evidence of various witnesses indicates that
some columns in the night-club on the second storey, e.g. columns 26 and 30, were also
encased in brickwork; however it could not be ascertained when the encasements were
constructed.

Frame Analyses
8.39 The Consulting Engineers carried out an analysis of the reinforced concrete
frame to determine the loads on the various columns and the behaviour of the structure
as a whole under various loading conditions. They also did further frame analyses to
take into account: (a) the presence of brick in-fill in the frames, and (b) the presence of
the brick encasements and the steel rails. In these analyses the loads due to the water
tank, bank strong-room, external tiling and OTTV upgrading were not considered as
they were dealt with in separate analyses.

8.40 The analyses revealed that, based on code of practice CP110: The Structural Use
of Concrete, the structure was grossly under-designed and that the factors of safety of
some columns were below one; that, in our view, requires qualification as the structure
had stood up for 15 years. First, in the analyses, the maximum compressive
stress in the concrete at the point of failure in the columns was taken as 0.67 times the
specified cube strength. It is a well established fact that the maximum compressive
stress in concrete at the point of failure under sustained load may be as high as 0.8 to
0.9 times the estimated cube strength. Secondly, because of the redistribution of loads
by the brick-infilled frames, the mean strength, which is higher than the specified cube
strength, is a better measure of the load-carrying capacity of the structure as a whole
for the purpose of determining the cause of the collapse of the building. Thirdly, the
yield strength of the steel reinforcement was found to be higher than the 250 N/sq mm
assumed in the analyses. These three points suggest that the factors of safety of the
most overloaded columns would have been above one. Furthermore, the full live load
assumed in the analyses was not imposed all the time.

8.41 When the presence of brick in-fill was considered in the analyses, the Consulting
Engineers found that some redistribution of loads from the weaker to the stronger
columns occurred. As a result, the factors of safety of these weaker columns were
slightly improved. When the presence of the brick encasements and the steel rails
were taken into account, there was a substantial increase in the factors of safety
of the encased columns. The Consulting Engineers went on to add that if not
for the encasement, the columns would have crushed during or immediately after
construction.

59
8.42 We observed that in their analyses, the Consulting Engineers found many
columns in the basement wall to have very low factors of safety. With respect, we
disagree with them because these columns were contiguous with, and hence were greatly
strengthened by, the reinforced concrete basement wall. This is borne out by the fact
that we found these columns to be barely damaged when we inspected the site after the
collapse.

8.43 The Consulting Engineers also did a further analysis of the performance of the
building frame on the assumption that differential settlements had taken place. Their
analysis showed that with a differential settlement of 25 mm, the increase in the loads
on some columns could be substantial.

Effects of Specific Loads

8.44 The water tank which was on the open roof weighed an estimated 21.8 tonnes
when full. The Consulting Engineers considered the effect of this load on 4 columns,
viz. columns 18, 19, 24 and 25, adjacent to the approximate position of the water tank.
They found that there was a slight reduction of factors of safety in these columns as a
result of the weight of the water tank. They said that for buildings designed to proper
standards and adequate factors of safety, such an additional weight would not be of
great consequence.

8.45 Another additional load in the building came from the bank’s strong-room on
the ground floor. The strong-room was first constructed in a location shown in building
plans BP 558D/67 (see figure 7). In 1974 or thereabout it was shifted to another
position shown in building plans BP 5E/1191/73 approved by the Building Control
Division, PWD on December 8, 1973 (see figure 8) when the bank premises was
extended into the adjoining shop unit. According to the calculations of the Consulting
Engineers, the second strong-room weighed about 21.6 tonnes and this load was mainly
imposed, through the beams, on columns 13 and 14 in the basement in the amounts of
8.2 tonnes and 11.5 tonnes respectively. According to them, these amounts were small
by normal standards. They pointed out, however, that these two columns had already
received additional loads as a result of the absence of columns 7, 8 and 9 in the
basement.

8.46 The tiling of the facade of the building added about 50.1 tonnes of load to
the building. The provision of asbestos insulations and the change of window panes
for the OTTV upgrading of the building added another load of about 2.7 tonnes.
According to the Consulting Engineers, these additional loads which are negligible for
most buildings designed to proper standards, acted mainly on the 19 columns around
the periphery of the building. These, in their opinion, were the columns with the lowest
factors of safety. We, however, disagree with them on this last point. As discussed
earlier, the peripheral columns were contiguous with, and hence greatly strengthened
by, the reinforced concrete basement wall. In our view, they would have significantly
higher factors of safety.

Conclusion
8.47 In their report the Consulting Engineers also generally discussed the structural
performance of the building based on their findings. According to them, the building
was so under-designed — even without considering the additional loads of the water
tank, etc. — that theoretically it should not have stood up even at the beginning. The

60
fact that it did, and for 15 years, was probably due to a combination of the following
factors: (i) the contribution to the strength of the structure by the encasement of many
internal columns in the basement and the presence of steel rails in some of these
columns, and (ii) the presence of brick in-fill which helped to stiffen the building frame
and to redistribute loads from the weaker to the stronger columns thereby enabling the
weaker columns to last for some time. The concrete in the structural elements,
however, had degraded with time because of the sustained excessive loads imposed on
them and this eventually led to the collapse of the building.

8.48 In respect of the conclusions arrived at by the Consulting Engineers, we agree

with them on the following points:
(a) The structure of the building was grossly under-designed;
(b) The construction of the building was far from satisfactory and was mainly
supervised by people who either did not possess sufficient competence in
construction or did not perform their duties properly, and it appears that no
engineer was employed to supervise the work;
(c) The redistribution of loads by the brick in-filled frames and the strengthening
effect of the encasement of columns in the lower floors helped the building to
stand up for 15 years despite the overloading, and
(d) The sustained excessive loads causing loss of strength in structural members
with time led to the gradual degradation of the concrete resulting in the
collapse of the structure.

8.49 There are, however, two points on which we do not agree with the Consulting
Engineers. First, they were of the opinion that the strength of the concrete was suspect
and could well be below the specified required cube strength. They arrived at this
based on their interpretation of the material test results and on their own observation.
On this point, the view that Dr Tam expressed, and we agree with him entirely, is that
the concrete could possibly have been satisfactory based on his evaluation of the results
of the material tests. Secondly, the Consulting Engineers also concluded that
differential settlements might have occurred thereby contributing to further overstres­
sing of the structure, and eventually to the collapse. As discussed in the previous
chapter, we are of the opinion that the total and differential settlements had been small
and that most of them probably occurred during the construction of the building.

61
 CHAPTER 9

CAUSES OF THE COLLAPSE

General
9.1 We now turn to our findings on the causes of the collapse of Lian Yak Building
on that tragic morning of March 15,1986. From the evidence, it is clear to us that there
had not been any triggering act or incident that brought the entire building to the
ground. The causes of the collapse, in our opinion, had their origin more than 15 years
ago when the structural design of the building was still on the drawing board.

Structural Design
9.2 The root and main cause of the collapse lies in the structural design of the
building. This was so grossly inadequate that, in our opinion, it was a matter of time
before the building would collapse unless a major and comprehensive effort was made
to save it. Analyses of the structural design showed that the dead weights of many
structural elements were underestimated and that a large number of individual
structural members were grossly under-designed. This resulted in many of the columns
and beams having very low factors of safety and being barely able to take the loads
imposed on them.

9.3 The R.C. calculations and R.C. drawings submitted to the Chief Building
Surveyor also reflect gross incompetence and shoddiness in the structural design in
other respects. The R.C. calculations are sketchy and insufficient, and the R.C.
drawings show many discrepancies and ambiguities in the technical details and other
information given. The presence of the section of the retaining wall at the position
where the ramp to the basement was eventually built is inexplicable. In general, the
R.C. drawings did not provide for what are called for in the R.C. calculations; for
example, the reinforcements for many structural members as shown in the R.C.
drawings are substantially less than those derived from the calculations.

Construction
9.4 The quality of the construction of the building was very unsatisfactory, and
therein lies another cause of the collapse. First, as revealed by the investigation on the
basement substructure, the construction deviated considerably from the R.C. drawings
and that compounded the inadequacy of the structural design. The reinforcements
provided in many structural members were substantially less than what are specified in
the R.C. drawings.

9.5 Secondly, the construction was carried out in a very haphazard and unsatisfactory
manner with virtually no professional supervision. No soil tests or concrete cube tests
were carried out. If, at all, setting out procedures and surveys were carried out, these
were not properly executed as could be seen from the haphazard positioning of many
piles and columns; these were not even positioned along straight lines. Columns were
eccentrically positioned and constructed on the pile caps. Most probably to compensate
for the eccentricities, some pile caps had to be enlarged by adding cast concrete

62
sections. Even then, these cast sections were poorly constructed as there was no proper
construction joint between them and the original pile caps. A layer of blinding concrete
was not provided under the pile caps. Starter bars of some piles were not properly
anchored to the pile caps, and, in some cases, starter bars were absent altogether.

Further Loading
9.6 During the life span of the building, decisions were made and events occurred
which further aggravated the sorry state it was already in. Substantial loads not
provided for in the structural design were added to the building and caused the over­
loaded and poorly constructed structure to be further loaded. These loads contributed
to the collapse of the building, and they were mainly due to:
(a) the installation of the water tank on the open roof which, with the water
stored, weighed about 21.8 tonnes; and
(b) the tiling of the building facade and the OTTV upgrading of the building
which together added about 52.8 tonnes to the building.
We should add a qualification here: normally, for most buildings, such additional loads
would not cause any serious overloading. However, for Lian Yak Building, which was
so grossly under-designed, any additional load, especially if it was imposed on the
columns with low factors of safety, would aggravate the situation.

Maintenance
9.7 There was no proper maintenance of Lian Yak Building during its life span. In
our opinion, had proper maintenance been provided, the structural problems in the
building would probably have been noticed, their seriousness appreciated and remedial
action taken in time. However, the signs of structural distress, namely persistent cracks
in columns, walls and floors were either ignored or superficially patched up. No
professional advice or assistance was sought by the owners who were probably ignorant
of the serious structural deterioration of the building. As a result, cracks that had
developed in the structure were allowed to propagate. The process of structural
deterioration thus continued unimpeded towards the eventual collapse of the building.

Collapse Mechanism
9.8 As a result of the gross structural under-design and the poor construction of the
building, many of the columns, particularly those on the first and second floors, were
highly overloaded. Under such sustained overloading, micro-cracks developed in the
concrete and, over the years, these grew and propagated. The resulting creep
deformation in the columns increased gradually. As the overloaded columns conse­
quently shortened, the loads on them were transferred to adjacent columns through the
brick in-filled frames thereby causing these columns to be also overloaded. In this
manner, the structural deterioration gradually spread to the other parts of the
structure.

9.9 From the evidence before us, it is our opinion that the collapse of the building
probably commenced at columns 26 and 32 in the night-club on the second floor and
column 30 at the car-park on the ground floor. As these columns failed, the loads they
carried were transferred progressively to other columns. It seems to us that either
columns 26 and 32 failed simultaneously as they appeared to have been the most
overstressed, or column 26 was the first to fail as it was found to have cracked very

63
severely in the evening before the collapse. Columns 26 and 32 were the columns from
which cracking sounds were heard that evening. When columns 26 and 32 failed in the
morning of March 15, 1986, loads carried by them were immediately transferred to
other parts of the structure thereby starting a chain reaction. In the process, the
building caved in at what was probably the part directly above these two columns, and
then collapsed completely, like a deck of cards, sealing the fate of the 33 persons who
perished in that tragedy.

64
 CHAPTER 10

REPRESENTATIONS ON THE SECOND TERM OF REFERENCE

Representations from Professional Bodies

10.1 We now turn to the second term of reference, namely: to make recommenda­
tions for such appropriate measures that can be taken to prevent a similar occurrence.
In connection with this term of reference, we received representations from the
following professional bodies:
(a) Association of Consulting Engineers, Singapore (“ACES”);
(b) Construction Industry Development Board (“ CIDB”);
(c) The Institution of Engineers, Singapore (“ IES”);
(d) Real Estate Developers’ Association of Singapore (“ REDAS”);
(e) Singapore Contractors Association Limited (“ SCAL”);
(f) Singapore Institute of Architects (“ SIA”), and
(g) Singapore Institute of Surveyors and Valuers (“SISV”).
In their representations, the professional bodies suggested diverse recommendations
for our consideration. A representative from each of the professional bodies also gave
evidence before us, elaborating and amplifying the recommendations made. We set out
below a summary of the principal recommendations gathered from the various
representations made which, for convenience, we have grouped into four different
categories: (i) general, (ii) design, (iii) construction, and (iv) post-completion.

General
10.2 Presently, CIDB has set up a system of registration of contractors and suppliers
undertaking construction works or other projects for the public sector, that is,
government and statutory bodies. Briefly, under this system, CIDB registers contrac­
tors and suppliers under three groups of registration heads, namely: General
Contracting Heads, Specific Contracting Heads and Public Housing Heads, and within
each head, the contractors and suppliers are graded into different financial categories
according to their financial and technical capabilities. Such contractors and suppliers
are eligible to undertake, for the public sector, construction works or projects of the
nature and size falling within the registration heads and financial categories in which
they are registered. Building owners in the private sector may, if they so wish, avail
themselves, and some of them do avail themselves, of such registration.

10.3 This system of registration has the support of practically all the professional
bodies. ACES suggested that the registration list should be revised regularly so that
contractors (and suppliers) with good track records would be upgraded and those who
have not performed satisfactorily would be down-graded or removed from the register.
SCAL went further and suggested that this system should be converted into one of
mandatory licensing of contractors so that only licensed contractors are allowed to
undertake major projects.

65
10.4 ACES recommended that building owners/developers should not be contractors
of their own projects as there is a conflict of interests between the two roles. The aim of
the building owners/developers is to minimise costs, ACES maintained, and if they
undertake their own construction, they may produce substandard work. RED AS, not
unexpectedly, is not in favour of such a proposal.

10.5 One of the principal complaints made by ACES is that, under the present
system, professional engineers are quite often appointed by the architects on behalf of
the building owners; and in some cases, even their fees at times are negotiated with and
paid by the architects out of the latter’s fees. In consequence, the professional
engineers invariably play a subordinate role in the construction of a building. This
practice, ACES felt, does not give the professional engineers their due recognition; it
erodes their independence and gives rise to the undesirable practice: occasionally
owing to pressures from their appointors, the architects, they find they have to
compromise their standard on structural matters. Accordingly, ACES recommended
strongly that professional engineers should be appointed directly by the building
owners/developers and their fees should be negotiated with and paid directly by the
latter. This would underscore the importance of the professional engineers in
construction works and enable them to discharge their duties more independently.

Design
10.6 IES suggested that soil investigation and design of foundations should be
undertaken under the supervision of professional engineers. They are particularly
concerned that soil investigations quite often have been done by firms which are not
fully qualified or equipped to carry out such tasks.

10.7 Mr Sim Bee Teck, the president of ACES, who gave evidence before us, said he
would agree that the structural plans and calculations prepared by a professional
engineer should be checked by a second engineer. He considered that it would be a
bonus if a check is further carried out by the Development and Building Control
Division. This, in substance, was supported by Mr Teh Hee Seang, the representative
of IES. Mr Yang Soo Suan, the president of SIA, however, is opposed to any check
either by DBCD or by an external professional engineer. Such a check, in his view, is
time-consuming and, on the structural side, he would rely on the professional
engineer’s opinion.

Construction
10.8 ACES said that consideration should be given to the employment of professional
engineers as full-time resident engineers in supervising all major projects, and that
clerks-of-works should be appointed for smaller or simpler projects, but such clerks-of-
works should have adequate training and experience to ensure that they can perform
their duties satisfactorily under the supervision of the professional engineers. They
further suggested that the appointment of clerks-of-works should be made by, or based
on the recommendation of, the professional engineers, though the fees for the clerks-
of-works are paid by the building owners.

Post-completion
10.9 ACES made four recommendations pertaining to matters or events occurring
after completion of a building. First, they pointed out that unauthorised additions or
alterations to buildings are common and enforcement against such unauthorised works

66
should be stepped up and more stringent measures be imposed on offenders. Secondly,
they suggested that in connection with minor alterations or additions, the present
system of granting permits in lieu, i.e. permits issued without the normal prior
submission of building plans, for such work should cease. Thirdly, to prevent
overloading of commercial or industrial buildings, load limit signs should be prominen­
tly displayed in the buildings. Lastly, they recommended that a mandatory periodical
inspection, say once in every three years, should be introduced. Such inspection, they
said, should only be confined to major buildings.

Individual Representations
10.10 We have received representations from divers individuals including some
professional engineers. Those which were received prior to the hearing were compiled
in one bundle marked Exhibit CE230, and those received after the conclusion of the
hearing were compiled in another bundle marked Exhibit CE238. Most of the
individual representations, other than those from the professional engineers, dealt with
the causes of the collapse of Lian Yak Building and these had been referred to and
considered by the persons concerned who conducted the investigations. As to the other
representations, including those of the professional engineers, which contain sugges­
tions relevant to the second term of reference, they are substantially similar to those
made by the professional bodies.

Foreign Practices
10.11 In addition, Mr Tiwari had made enquiries with authorities in foreign countries
on the practices and legislations with reference to matters relevant to this term of
reference and, in consequence, had received a huge bulk of materials which Mr David
Khor had very helpfully collated for our reference. All these, we find, are helpful. In
particular, we note with interest some of the practices of building authorities overseas
pertaining to matters such as checking of structural drawings and calculations prepared
by professional engineers, and supervision of construction works. We set out below
briefly some of these practices.

Checking of Structural Drawings and Calculations

10.12 In the United Kingdom, Japan, West Germany, Hong Kong, Taiwan and
certain parts of Australia and Canada, the regulatory authorities check structural
drawings and calculations prepared by professional engineers. In the United Kingdom,
such checking is carried out by the staff of the building authorities, and if they do not
have suitable staff, they would engage independent consulting engineers to undertake
the checking on their behalf. In Japan, the building authorities have building officials
to carry out the checking. In Australia, in general, the standard of such checking in
some city councils depend on the reputation and expertise of the designers. In certain
areas, the city councils just rely on the certification of the design engineers. In other
areas, the city councils undertake checking of more important works by in-house
professionals or by engaging independent consultants to check on their behalf. In the
Canadian province of Ontario, large municipalities check the design calculations and
drawings while smaller municipalities would usually depend on the professional
engineers for acceptable designs. The building authorities in Hong Kong and West
Germany have their own staff to carry out checks on structural drawings and
calculations. In Hong Kong, the building authority, we understand, concentrates
mainly on foundations because of the geological conditions there. In Taiwan, the
designs of buildings over 50 metres high and special structures must be reviewed and

67
endorsed by one of several professional bodies designated by the authorities for this
purpose.

10.13 Generally, in the practices of all these countries, the checking is confined to the
main structural elements and selected critical aspects of a building, e.g. foundations,
columns and beams.

Site Inspection
10.14 In Hong Kong, West Germany and the city of New York, building inspectors
carry out routine inspections of construction works in progress. In West Germany, the
authorities inspect the shells of buildings when they are completed to ensure their
structural safety. The building authorities, if necessary, may require special construc­
tion elements to be independently tested to ensure structural stability. In New York,
structural engineers have to submit regular reports to the Department of Buildings on
the inspection of concrete work done by the contractors. Specialised laboratories
designated by the owners are required to submit reports of test results on concrete
design mix, pouring, sampling and concrete compression tests to the department.
During the construction, site inspectors of the department make spot checks on
contractors. “ Super inspectors” carry out surprise checks on construction and visit sites
previously visited by the inspectors to prevent graft and corruption. In West Germany,
contractors are required to have full-time professional staff to supervise and certify on
completion that the works are in accordance with “ as-built drawings” .

Maintenance of Buildings
10.15 In most of the countries whose practices we examined, owners are held
responsible for ensuring that their buildings are properly maintained. In Japan, owners
of certain buildings such as “hospitals, hotels, department stores, theatres, collective
dwellings and offices exceeding certain scales” must have qualified persons to inspect
the buildings every 3 years or so, and must report the results of the inspections to the
special administrative agency concerned. The owners are also required to formulate
plans relating to the maintenance of their buildings.

Registration or Licensing of Contractors

10.16 Some countries require licensing or mandatory registration of contractors. In
Japan, Korea and the Philippines, criteria on technical, financial and equipment
capabilities are stipulated in the legislations governing licensing. In the case of Japan
and Korea, there are also requirements concerning professional persons in the employ
of the contractors. The state of Western Australia requires persons or corporations that
carry out building works to be registered under its Builders Registration Act “to ensure
that those who engage in the industry are competent” . There, eligibility for registration
is based on, inter alia, relevant experience and professional qualifications or
completion of prescribed courses and examinations.

68
 CHAPTER 11

PRESENT SYSTEM OF BUILDING CONTROL

11.1 Before we proceed to consider the measures to be recommended in pursuance of

our second term of reference, we must first examine the present system of building
control to see if it is adequate. In this connection, we find extremely helpful the
representation submitted by DBCD in which it has discussed, in some detail, the
system of building control as administered by it. We have taken the liberty of drawing
from that source a considerable amount of material for our discussion below.

Design Stage
11.2 The present system of building control is governed principally by the Building
Control Act, 1973 (“the Act”) and the 3 sets of subsidiary legislations made
thereunder, namely, the Building Control (Administration) Regulations, 1979, the
Building Control (Space, Light and Ventilation) Regulations, 1979 and the Building
Control (Construction) Regulations, 1979. Under Section 5 of the Act, no person shall
commence or carry out any building works without the written permission of the
Building Authority who may, in granting such permission, impose such terms and
conditions as he thinks fit, and every person intending to commence any building works
shall submit to the Building Authority plans and specifications prepared in accordance
with the regulations for the approval of the Building Authority. Building Authority
under the Act (as amended pursuant to the Departmental Titles (Alteration) Act
(Chapter 53)) means the Deputy Director (Development and Building Control), Public
Works Department (“PW D”), who is the head of DBCD. For our purpose, however,
we treat DBCD as the Building Authority.

11.3 The Building Control (Administration) Regulations, 1979 require all plans to
be prepared, signed and submitted by a qualified person. A qualified person under the
Regulations means: (a) an architect, (b) a professional engineer in the discipline that is
appropriate for the works of which a plan is submitted, or (c) any other person whom
the Building Authority may, with the approval of the Minister, regard as being
competent to prepare plan or plans of any building works for submission for approval.
Every plan so submitted is then checked by the staff of DBCD to ensure that it
complies with the requirements contained in the provisions of the Act and the
regulations made thereunder and also presumably the requirements for the time being
laid down by DBCD. Where the requirements are not complied with, they are listed in
a form of written directions and sent to the qualified person for compliance within a
stipulated time. When all the requirements have been satisfactorily complied with, the
plans are approved.

11.4 A word of clarification should be made as to the plans which are checked by the
staff of DBCD. It is the practice of DBCD — a practice which has been in existence for
the last 50 years or thereabout — that only architectural plans are checked by its staff to
see if they comply with the statutory and other requirements for the time being in
force. The structural plans and calculations which are submitted to DBCD before

69
commencement or resumption of any building work are not checked by anyone in
DBCD.

11.5 As provided in the Building Control (Administration) Regulations, 1979,

DBCD requires submissions of structural plans and calculations to be made by
engineers registered with the Professional Engineers Board (“ P.E. Board”) and these
are required to be submitted to DBCD before commencement or resumption of any
building work. The professional engineer submitting the plans and calculations has to
certify that the details and calculations are prepared in accordance with existing
building regulations. All that the staff of DBCD will check is whether the structural
plans and calculations have been properly certified, both in form and content, by a
professional engineer and, if they have been so certified, they are kept by DBCD as
records for future reference. DBCD does not verify whether they are correct or
adequate or whether they comply with the statutory and other requirements for the
time being in force; it relies entirely on the certificate of the professional engineer and
entrusts him to ensure that the structural plans and calculations are correct and
adequate and are in accordance with the requirements. The certificate endorsed on the
structural plans takes the following form:

“In accordance with Regulation 11(2) of the Building Control

(Administration) Regulations 1979,1,____________________________,
hereby submit the detailed structural plans and design calculations and
certify that they are prepared in accordance with the provisions of the
Building Control (Administration) Regulations, 1979, the Act and any
other written law pertaining to building construction for the time being
in force. I also certify that these R.C. details and calculations are in
reference to B P __________ ”

Of this practice, DBCD said:

“The practice of entrusting the Qualified Person with the building’s
structural design has existed since the 1930s. It allows for development
plans to be processed and executed in the minimum of time. The
prevailing practice thus places emphasis on both safety and speed in
implemention.”

Such a practice is founded on DBCD’s complete reliance on the skill and competence
of the professional engineers as can be seen from the following extract from DBCD’s
representation:

“3.1.4 The PE Board ensures that only competent engineers are

allowed to practise in Singapore. Besides academic qualifica­
tions, an engineer must have at least 2 years of practical
experience before he can be considered for registration by the
PE Board. If he possesses less than 5 years of practical
experience, he will also be required to sit for a Professional
Practice Examination. All applicants are further required to
attend an interview with the Board. An engineer will only be
registered by the PE Board when he clears each stage of the
evaluation process satisfactorily.

70
 3.1.5 It is the considered opinion of the Division that the current
practice of allowing only Professional Engineers to submit
structural drawings and calculations is not only sound but
ensures that there is:
(a) maximum self regulation;
(b) minimum Government interference;
(c) simplicity in operation.”
This then is the practice relating to the control of structural design as exercised by
DBCD; we now turn to the control it exercises in relation to the next stage in the
construction of a building, namely, the construction stage.

Construction
11.6 Under Regulation 14(c) of the Building Control (Administration) Regulations,
1979, a qualified person is required to supervise all building works of which plans are
prepared by him or for which he is responsible under the Regulations for the purpose
of ensuring that the works are carried out in accordance with the statutory
requirements and any written order or direction of the Building Authority, and on
completion of the building works and before issuing a certificate of completion of the
building to any other person, to submit his certificate of supervision in a standard form
to the Building Authority. Therefore, it is mandatory for both architect and engineer
involved or engaged in a building project to supervise their respective areas of the
building works and each of them is required to give a certificate of supervision on
completion thereof. Regulation 14(d) contains even more stringent provisions which
requires various reports to be furnished by a qualified person. Unfortunately, the
provisions of this paragraph (d) are not clearly drafted and do give rise to doubts. For
example, it is not clear what is required to be reported at the times or stages as
provided in sub-paragraphs (i) and (iv) of paragraph (d). However, without adopting
too legalistic an approach, we think that Regulation 14(d) probably requires a qualified
person to submit to the Building Authority, in standard forms, the following progress
reports and certificates on building works at the times or stages as follows:

(i) progress reports on the building works at regular intervals of three months
beginning from the date of the submission to the Building Authority of a
notice of intention of commencement, carrying out or resumption of the
building works, as the case may be;
(ii) when the foundation and the structural parts of the building below the ground
level thereof are completed and before any work on the structural parts of the
building above ground level are carried out, a progress report accompanied
by a record plan and full details of all piling works, which have been carried
out on the building site;
(iii) when all the structural parts of the building are completed, a report on the
completion including a certificate that all the building works relating to the
structural parts have been carried out under his supervision in accordance
with the detailed structural plans and calculations submitted to DBCD;
(iv) a report or certificate on completion of all the building works;
(v) when there is a termination of his services in the building works, within
fourteen days of such termination, a summary report on all the building

71
 works which have been carried out under his supervision and a certificate to
that effect, and
(vi) such other report or certificate when otherwise required by the Building
Authority in such manner as may be so required.

11.7 It seems that the practice of DBCD is that architects in charge of the building
works are required to furnish, and they do furnish, quarterly reports of the progress of
the building works and on completion of the buildings, both the architects and the
professional engineers furnish to DBCD their respective certificates. In the case of the
architects, the certificate takes the following form:
“ In accordance with the Building Control (Administration) Regulations
1979, I , _______________________ , hereby certify that I have super­
vised the erection of the building and that the building is in accordance
with the relevant regulations, plans, and conditions, under which such
plans and amendments thereto, if any, were approved.

5?

Signature of *Architect/Professional Engineer Date

(*Delete accordingly)
and in the case of the professional engineers, the following form:
“In accordance with the Building Control (Administration) Regula­
tions, 1979, I, _______________________ , hereby certify that:
1) I have supervised the abovementioned professional engineering
works and such works are structurally sound and in accordance with
the relevant regulations and drawings, details and amendments, if
any, (including conditions of approval, if any) that were submitted
under relevant Building Regulations.
2) I have o n _______________ inspected the land having a difference
in platform levels within the proposed site and/or between the
proposed site and any immediate adjoining lots, affected by the
completed works and to the best of my knowledge, the stability of
the slope is satisfactory under the conditions then existing.

Signature of Professional Engineer Date

11.8 It is not clear from the representation submitted by DBCD whether currently
the professional engineers in charge of the structural works of the building furnish to
DBCD the reports required under paragraphs (ii) and (iii) of Regulation 14(d). But it

72
is abundantly d ear to us that these provisions are mandatory and such reports must be
furnished at the times therein stated respectively. Indeed, we would say that practically
the whole of Regulation 14 applies both to the architects and professional engineers
involved in the building works, with the possible exception of Regulations 14(e) which
is probably more applicable to the architects than to the professional engineers.

11.9 The certificates given by the architects and professional engineers are relied
upon by DBCD. When all the requirements have been complied with and a site
inspection shows that the building has been constructed in accordance with the
approved plans, DBCD will then issue a certificate of fitness for occupation of the
building. Here again, the inspection is confined to ascertaining whether the building as
built complies with the architectural plans; as a matter of practice, no inspection is
carried out on any structural works of the building. Quite often, DBCD issues to the
building owner, first, a temporary occupation licence pending compliance by the
building owner with all the statutory and other requirements, and, when all such
requirements have been complied with, DBCD then issues a certificate of fitness for
occupation. It is the view of DBCD that since supervision of the works is carried out by
qualified professionals, this practice of building control at the construction stage is
adequate and no changes are required to be made.

Maintenance
11.10 DBCD considers that it is the duty of the building owner to preserve the safety
of his building. Where, however, DBCD finds that a building has not been properly
maintained by its owner and has become structurally unsafe, it will require the owner
to consult a professional engineer and carry out all necessary remedial works. If
necessary, it may require a closure of the building.

DBCD’s Conclusion
11.11 Having examined the current practice on building control and also made a brief
and cursory review of the practice of various countries, DBCD then came to the
following conclusion:
“The existing system of building control in Singapore is adequate and
has served the nation well in its physical development.”

11.12 W hether the system has served the nation well in its physical development is
not the subject matter of our inquiry; for our purpose, we are content to accept that it
has done so. However, with respect, we are unable to accept DBCD’s conclusion that
the present system is adequate if it implies, as it seems to us that it does, that no change
is necessary or desirable. One grave shortcoming in the present system is that DBCD
does not exercise any control on the structural aspects of the building works at any
stage — from the stage of design to that of completion of a building. It relies wholly on
the professional engineers: their expertise and integrity. Such a system may be
expedient and convenient; but it is unsafe as the experience from Lian Yak Building
had vividly demonstrated. It presupposes that every professional engineer who is
registered with the P.E. Board — even one who has just been registered — has the
requisite expertise to prepare structural plans and calculations for a building. This is
not always so. A professional engineer, particularly one who has just been registered
with the P.E. Board, may or may not have such expertise, depending on his exposure
and the size or complexity of the building. It also presupposes an absence of

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professional malpractice such as structural drawings and calculations being prepared by
an unqualified person but subsequently signed and submitted by a professional
engineer. Lastly, it makes no provision for human errors, on the part of a professional
engineer, which happen even among the best of professionals.

11.13 The Act and the regulations thereunder are legislations designed to provide
and ensure, inter alia, public safety, and DBCD as a building authority administers and
enforces these legislations. There are numerous provisions in the building regulations,
particularly the Building Control (Construction) Regulations, 1979, which relate to the
structural aspects of building works. It seems to us that DBCD cannot effectively
discharge its role if it merely relies on professional engineers and their certificates.

11.14 The stand taken by DBCD as regards plans is not logical. Insofar as
architectural plans and details are concerned, they are examined and scrutinised to see
if they comply with the building regulations for the time being in force and other
requirements laid down by DBCD from time to time. There is no question of its relying
on the professional expertise of the architects to ensure such compliance. As for the
structural plans and calculations submitted to DBCD, they appear to enjoy a more
privileged position; DBCD’s staff do not examine whether they are correct or comply
with the building regulations for the time being in force. It cannot be said that the
building regulations do not contain requirements with which the structural plans have
to comply; they certainly do. But DBCD relies on the certificate of professional
engineers which states that the plans have been prepared in compliance with, inter alia,
the building regulations. Such a stand on the part of DBCD is not logical or consistent.
It can only be explained and understood on the ground that DBCD does not have
sufficient staff and technical capabilities to review and examine the structural plans and
calculations.

11.15 DBCD’s practice is that the structural plans and calculations of a building
which are submitted to it by the professional engineers are only meant to be kept as
record for future reference. It is highly doubtful if such a practice is sustainable in law.
A cursory examination of some of the salient statutory provisions seems to suggest that
DBCD is required to play a more active role than it presently does even in respect of
the structural plans and calculations submitted by professional engineers. We have
earlier referred to Sections 5(1) and 5(2) of the Act, under which no person shall
commence or carry out any building works without the written permission of the
Building Authority, and every person intending to commence building works is
required to submit to the Building Authority plans and specifications prepared in
accordance with the building regulations, and to Section 5(3) which gives powers to the
Building Authority to approve or disapprove any plans or specifications submitted. We
should mention also the following provisions. Under Section 5(6), no person shall
commence building works unless two conditions are fulfilled: first, such works are
commenced within 6 months from the date on which the plans and specifications are
approved, and secondly, he or his agent has given 7 days’ written notice to the Building
Authority of his intention to commence work. Under Section 2 (which is a definition
section), “building” includes “the whole or any part of any house, hut, shed, enclosure
roofed or otherwise or any other structure whether used for the purpose of human
habitation or otherwise, and also any wall, shoring, fence, platform, staging, gate,
post, pillar, paling, frame, hoarding, slip, dock, wharf, pier, jetty, landing-stage or
bridge, or any structure, support or foundation connected to the foregoing” and

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“building works” includes “ any kind of building construction, site formation, repairs,
demolition, alteration, addition and every kind of building operation” . On the basis of
these definitions, there is no doubt that the structural aspects of building works fall
within the ambit of the provisions of Section 5 of the Act.

11.16 Turning now to the Building Control (Administration) Regulations, 1979, it is

noted that Regulations 4, 7 and 8 govern and prescribe the requirements of all plans of
any building or building works submitted under the Act. There is nothing to suggest
that the terms “ all plans submitted under the Act” or “ all plans of any building or
building works” refer only to architectural plans and not structural plans; on the
contrary, the requirements in Regulation 8(b)(ii) are structural ones, and Regulation
11(2) requires the structural plans and design calculations to be prepared “ in
accordance with the provisions of these Regulations, the Act and any other written law
pertaining to building construction” and further requires them to show or contain:
“ (a) statements indicating clearly the superimposed load for which each floor
system or part thereof has been designed;
(b) the results of any soil test carried out, the calculations for any determination
of soil bearing capacity and complete boring investigations and details of the
soil.”
Regulation 11(1) provides that “the detailed structural plans of any building works
together with a copy of the design calculations for the same shall be submitted to the
Building Authority before the building works are commenced, carried out or
resumed.” It is not provided here, nor is it provided elsewhere, that these structural
plans and a copy of the design calculations are submitted to DBCD for purpose of
record only. It therefore follows that the other provisions of the Regulations relating to
submission of plans and approval thereof apply equally to these “structural plans” as
they apply to architectural plans. We then come to Regulation 12 which provides that
where “a plan of any building or building works is submitted under the Act, the
Building Authority may approve the plan on such terms and conditions as he thinks
fit” and, on approval, the Building Authority is required to notify the building owner
and the qualified person concerned. On the basis of these provisions, it seems to us that
the structural plans, like the architectural plans, are subject to approval or disapproval
by the Building Authority and no building work including structural work can
commence without such approval. It is true that under Regulation 17(1), the building
owner has the obligation, amongst other things, to ensure that the detailed structural
plans of the building works have been submitted to the Building Authority and that
regulation does not say approval. But that provision relates to the obligation of the
building owner and does not in any way dispense with approval, if approval is required
under the Act or the regulations made thereunder.

11.17 We turn finally to the Building Control (Construction) Regulations, 1979. As

its name denotes, this set of regulations governs the construction of buildings. The
regulations contain substantial provisions relating to structural works and require such
works to comply with the same and also the specifications in the schedule thereto,
which again deal with structural requirements. In these Regulations, there are
numerous provisions — far too numerous to be referred to specifically for our purpose
— which call for approvals or requirements which the Building Authority may grant or
impose; in other words they call for an exercise of discretion or judgement on the part
of the Building Authority on certain structural matters in certain circumstances.

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11.18 For all these reasons, we are firmly of the opinion that DBCD cannot and
should not be content with merely taking a passive role in relation to the structural
design and structural works of a building by relying wholly on the certificates of
professional engineers. It should have a more active involvement, and we now proceed
to consider what part it should play.

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 CHAPTER 12

RECO M M ENDATIONS

General
12.1 Having considered the causes of the collapse of Lian Yak Building, we have now
identified four areas where problems may arise which could cause or contribute to the
collapse of a building. The first is the area of the designing of the structure of a building
where a professional engineer errs in his design or where he unwisely resorts to the
malpractice of completely delegating his task to unqualified persons without proper
supervision and accepting structural plans and calculations prepared by such persons
without adequate examination. The second is the area of selection and employment of
contractors by building owners where inexperienced and irresponsible contractors are
employed, knowingly or otherwise, for the simple reason that the prices they offered
are the lowest or the cheapest. The third concerns the construction stage where owing
to a lack or an absence of supervision by qualified persons, a building is poorly
constructed with shoddy workmanship and inferior materials. Lastly, and to a lesser
extent, there is the problem of a lack or an absence of maintenance of a building after it
has been completed.

Design Stage
12.2 We accept the proposition that we must rely on the integrity and competence of
a professional engineer in the designing of the structure of a building. He is expected,
and indeed is under an obligation, to exercise reasonable care and skill in the
performance of his professional duties. However, it is a hard fact of life that a
professional engineer, like any other professional, is capable of lapses and, at times,
errs in his preparation of structural plans or calculations. There is always the risk of
such errors which, if not detected and rectified, would have very serious and costly
consequences. Again, like other professionals, there are occasions of malpractices,
rare though they may be, in which he irresponsibly signs and submits to the
Development and Building Control Division (“DBCD”) structural plans and calcula­
tions prepared by others (whether qualified or not) without he himself reviewing and
examining the same, as had happened in the case of Lian Yak Building. It is against
contingencies such as these that we direct our minds in considering the appropriate
measures to be taken at the design stage of a building.

12.3 What we have just said may not occur — and so it is hoped — in the case of large
building projects, such as Raffles City, Marina Centre, OUB Centre and Treasury
Building. In such projects, and speaking generally, the building owners would engage
teams of able consulting engineers and other experts, and all structural designs
prepared and submitted by them would have been subject to very thorough review and
scrutiny, and also all geotechnical and other appropriate studies would have been
conducted and their results analysed. In brief, all necessary expertise would have been
brought to bear on the projects, and one would not expect to find any serious human
errors or any professional malpractice of the character we have mentioned. But these
are not the projects on which we entertain serious concern. It is the small projects, such

77
as the case of Lian Yak Building, on which we are most concerned. Ironically, the
smaller the project, the greater is the risk of human error and the greater is the
likelihood of professional malpractice and under-designing occurring; and because it is
small, it is less likely to receive the professional attention which it deserves.

12.4 We are therefore of the opinion that at the design stage, all structural plans and
calculations of a building prepared by a professional engineer for submission to DBCD
should be checked by another professional engineer, and it should be an independent
check. To this suggested requirement, there are two qualifications. First, it is
unnecessary that a complete or detailed check on the whole structural design should be
carried out; that would be costly, time-consuming and impractical. Nor should such
engineer be concerned with the aesthetic, economic or conceptual aspect of the
design. The checking is directed essentially against the collapse of a building and
hence, what is required is a check on the main structural elements such as foundations,
columns, beams and shear cores. Secondly, the check, if it is to be carried out
effectively and efficiently, must be done by a professional engineer who has some years
of experience in the design and construction of buildings. With his knowledge and
experience, he would be able to assess quickly the overall integrity of the structure and
know how to proceed and check the main structural elements expeditiously.

12.5 The next question is who should the second professional engineer be who carries
out the independent check. Should he be a professional engineer of another firm or an
associate in the same firm as the professional engineer who prepared the structural
plans and calculations? In other words, the question is whether the check should be
carried out internally within the firm or externally by a professional engineer of
another firm. In passing we should mention that normally in most engineering firms,
checking is carried out internally, and in the case of some large or complex projects, an
external check by an engineer of another firm is sought and carried out. However, it
seems to us that either form of checking has shortcomings. In the case of an internal
check, there are in our view at least two. First, in principle, an internal check within the
same firm cannot be considered as an independent check. Secondly, this requirement
cannot be fulfilled by a sole proprietorship or a small firm with only one professional
engineer who has the requisite experience and knowledge. As regards checking by an
external professional engineer, equally there are impediments in the way. First,
professional engineers generally do not like their designs to be examined by engineers
outside their firm because their firm may have developed their own engineering
expertise and, understandably, they do not wish to divulge such proprietary capability
to their firm’s competitors. Secondly, in the course of construction, there would
invariably be modifications to the architectural plans and this may give rise to the need
to amend the structural design. In such a case, there might then be difficulty in trying to
enlist the help of the same engineer who did the checking at the design stage. Thirdly, if
the plans and calculations are checked by a professional engineer of a different firm, a
question would arise as to who should accept responsibility in the event of a structural
failure: should it be the engineer who prepared the structural plans and calculations or
the one who checked the same, or both? Lastly, it is not unexpected that disagreement
between the two engineers could arise which cannot be resolved expeditiously.

12.6 Having regard to all these factors, we think that, to be truly effective, the
checking must be carried out by a building authority or someone assigned by the
authority to do so. This authority, in our view, undoubtedly should be DBCD. The

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consequences of a structural failure of a building are far too serious to be ignored, and
it is sufficiently important for DBCD to play an active role in ensuring that the
structural plans and calculations prepared by a professional engineer are independently
checked. We are aware of the lack of manpower in DBCD and that, in its present set­
up, it does not have the capability of carrying out such checking. However, such a
problem is not insuperable. DBCD can implement the proposal in one of two ways. It
may reorganise itself and recruit experienced engineers to carry out the task. This
would entail a major reorganization and a massive recruitment of engineers and other
technical staff, though we do not accept, as was claimed by DBCD, that it would entail
a recruitment of about 100 civil and structural engineers. Alternatively, and this we
believe is a more practical and sensible course for DBCD to take, it may refer the
structural plans and calculations to the Structural Engineering Branch and the
Geotechnical Engineering Branch of PWD for checking. Such a course is no more
different than DBCD referring building plans to various departments, such as the
Roads Division of PWD and the Sewerage Department of the Ministry of the
Environment, for clearance on technical matters. Department-wise, DBCD is a
division and a part of PWD. We are aware that PWD has a large pool of structural and
civil engineers who would have the experience and the technical skill to carry out the
checking contemplated. Even if the present professional staff of PWD is not adequate
for the purpose, it would not be too difficult for it to increase its professional strength.
Such a checking, we believe, should not entail considerable disruption to, and
expansion of, the existing PWD infrastructure. At times, when its work-load is
considerable, PWD may enlist the assistance of a panel of consulting engineers in
private practice, on a rotation basis, to carry out the checking under its control.

12.7 In our view, a mandatory checking of structural plans and calculations by a

regulatory authority would produce a salutary effect. Because such checking is being
carried out, professional engineers would probably exercise more care in their work
and check their plans and calculations thoroughly before submitting them to DBCD in
order to avoid a rejection of the same and consequential delay in their projects. If, in
respect of any plans or calculations, sub-standard and sloppy works are submitted by a
professional engineer, he should be warned by DBCD and should he fail to desist from
such bad practice, he should be reported to the Professional Engineers Board to be
dealt with accordingly by disciplinary action.

12.8 In passing we should perhaps make reference to a recommendation made by the

Association of Consulting Engineers, Singapore (“ACES”) that professional engineers
engaged for building projects should be engaged direct by building owners and not
through the agency of the latter’s architect. In practice, there are generally three ways
of appointing professional engineers for building projects, namely: (i) appointment
direct by the building owners; (ii) appointment by the architect as agent for the
building owners, and (iii) appointment by the architect as the principal. The question
as to which is the best way of appointing professional engineers is a matter of
professional practice best left to the Professional Engineers Board to determine and
make recommendations. We therefore make no recommendation on this matter.

Selection and Appointment of Contractors

12.9 “As it stands today, any person with little or no technical competence in
construction can start a construction firm. The Registrar of Companies

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 and Businesses admits any set-up irrespective of whether it has any
technical qualification in the field of construction.”
So said Singapore Contractors Association Limited (“SCAL”) in its representation to
us. The association therefore recommended the introduction of a system of mandatory
licensing of contractors so that only licensed contractors can undertake construction
work, and cited to us various countries which practise the system of mandatory
licensing of contractors. Such a system is, of course, restrictive; and to implement it
requires legislation and the creation of a body to enforce it. We are not satisfied that
such a system, if introduced, would be beneficial to the building industry as a whole;
and before any recommendation on such a system can be made, it is necessary to
conduct a comprehensive study of all relevant aspects of the building industry, which is
beyond the scope of this Inquiry. We are therefore unable to make any recommenda­
tion on such a system.

12.10 We think, however, that the system of voluntary registration of contractors

devised by the Construction Industry Development Board (“CIDB”) is very helpful.
That system, at present, registers only contractors (including suppliers of materials and
equipment) undertaking works for the public sector, though users in the private sector
may avail themselves of the benefit of such a registration system. We recommend that
CIDB expands that system of registration to include contractors (including suppliers)
undertaking works only for the private sector. The number of heads of registration
should be increased and contractors may then be registered under the respective heads
applied for and should be graded according to their financial and technical capabilities
into various categories. We also agree with the suggestion of ACES that the
registration be reviewed periodically, e.g. once every year, and that contractors with
good track record should be upgraded and those who have not performed satisfactorily
should be down-graded or removed from the register. This system of registration is
wholly voluntary on the part of contractors. It does not prevent, and it is not possible to
prevent, building owners or developers, if they are foolhardy enough, from employing
inexperienced or irresponsible contractors on the ground that the latter offered the
lowest or the cheapest prices for the building projects. But it does provide building
owners or developers with a source of information on contractors and assist them in
selecting suitable contractors they require for their specific projects.

12.11 Before we proceed to our next recommendation, we would like at this stage to
dispose of another proposal put forward by ACES. They suggested that developers
should not be contractors of their own building projects on the ground of a conflict of
interests between the two roles. This proposal, not unnaturally, was resisted by the Real
Estate Developers’ Association of Singapore who maintained that there were
advantages in developers being contractors of their own projects. Theoretically and in
principle, such a proposal has the merit of prudence. However, we know of some
developers who are good contractors and who had carried out good construction works
of their own; and there is no reason why they should not continue to undertake
construction work in respect of their own projects. We are not fully persuaded of the
merit of this proposal and, accordingly, we make no recommendation therefor.

Construction Stage
12.12 Checking structural plans and calculations is only part of a system of control
to avoid structural failure of a building. Equally important is supervision of the

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construction of a building. There is no question that there must be adequate and proper
supervision of the construction work carried out by contractors: on the structural
aspect by a professional engineer and on the architectural aspect, an architect. Under
the present system of building control, DBCD requires, and in our view rightly, that
architects and professional engineers supervise respectively the areas in which they are
involved and that, on the completion of the work, each is required to give a certificate
of supervision to DBCD in the form which we have set out.

12.13 The real question still is the extent of supervision actually provided or
undertaken by the professionals, be they architects or engineers. Speaking of only the
professional engineers, as we are concerned with the structural aspects of a building,
the realities of the situation are that, in some cases, supervision as provided by a
professional engineer is less than adequate. The principal reason, we think, is probably
an economic one in most of these cases. The fees normally paid or to be paid to a
professional engineer are far from generous and are not adequate to cover proper
supervision. Such a situation is probably not true in the case of large building projects
where adequate fees are paid to the professional engineers and proper supervision of
works is carried out. Again, our concern is not on such large projects but on the small
ones for reasons we have given.

12.14 Under the law, supervision is mandatory: see Building Control (Administra­
tion) Regulations, 1979 and Building Control (Construction) Regulations, 1979. We
are, however, doubtful if such provisions are enforced by DBCD as a regulatory
authority. Insofar as we can see, DBCD does not concern itself with finding out
whether there is, in fact, any supervision of the structural works by the professional
engineer in charge. It relies wholly on the certificate of supervision provided by the
professional engineer upon completion of the structural works. Therein lies the
shortcoming of the present system. Because of the lack or absence of enforcement by
any authority of supervision, professional engineers in some cases are inclined to be lax
in their supervision; and because supervision can be carried out in a lax manner, it can
be undertaken by professional engineers at uneconomic fees. All these seem to go in a
vicious circle. But the heart of the problem is that supervision is not enforced at all. In
our view, some steps must be taken towards enforcing supervision, and the task of
enforcing it must fall on DBCD. The method of enforcement must, of course, be left to
DBCD to decide. But it seems to us that occasional site inspections by an officer of
DBCD with a view to ascertaining whether in fact there is any supervision would
produce some fruitful results on the degree of supervision exercised by the professional
engineers concerned. There should further be a mandatory requirement that in a major
development, a full-time resident engineer must be engaged to supervise the
construction of structural works, and in a minor or simpler development, such
supervision may be carried out by a full-time resident clerk-of-works. The question
whether a project is a major or minor one may be left to the professional engineer, who
submits the structural design to DBCD, to decide; but the ultimate say on such an issue
must be vested in DBCD. In other words, DBCD should be given the power to
determine ultimately what, in its opinion, is a major or minor development for this
purpose, and it should also have the discretion to permit certain areas of structural work
even in a major development to be supervised by a full-time clerk-of-works in lieu of a
full-time resident engineer. DBCD should withhold permission to the building owner
to commence building work unless it is satisfied that a professional engineer or clerk-
of-works, as the case may be, has been engaged. The clerk-of-works should be engaged

81
by the professional engineer in charge of the structural work of the project and be
responsible to such engineer; the fees for the clerk-of-works will, of course, be paid by
the building owner. All clerks-of-works so employed should have the appropriate
technical qualifications such as the Singapore Polytechnic or Ngee Ann Polytechnic
Diploma or the equivalent, and at least two to three years of practical experience. The
responsibility of ensuring that a clerk-of-works engaged for the project has the
requisite qualifications and experience, of course, rests with the professional engineer.

12.15 In every building project, various tests should be required to be carried out
under the supervision of professional engineers and, primarily, the tests are:
(a) site investigations and soil tests;
(b) pile load tests if piling is required;
(c) tests on cement, sand and coarse aggregates;
(d) tests on concrete;
(e) tests on steel reinforcements, and
(f) tests on other structural materials and components as necessary.
The results of these tests and, if applicable, piling records, with the necessary
certificate of supervision should be lodged with DBCD by the professional engineer in
charge. It is, of course, unrealistic to say that these requirements should apply to all
projects, big or small. Hence, DBCD should be given the discretion to waive all or any
of the tests or agree to a modification of all or any of the tests in small projects, in
particular, private residential houses.

12.16 It is plainly impracticable for DBCD to send its staff to the site to supervise and
check all the structural works under construction. However, we think that DBCD
should play an active role during the construction of a building. On this point we wish
to refer to a joint representation submitted to us after the conclusion of the hearing by
a group of expatriate engineers, headed by Mr Terence W. Hulme, engaged by Mass
Rapid Transit Corporation. Drawing from their experience in the United Kingdom and
Hong Kong, they suggested that, during construction, an opportunity should be given
to the building authority to inspect the construction works at certain critical stages,
particularly where the main structural elements are to be covered up. With that
suggestion we agree entirely. We make two recommendations. First, in respect of
certain structural works which are to be covered up, such as foundations, transfer
girders, shear cores and other main structural elements, DBCD should require
contractors to give to it at least 48 hours’ notice before they are covered up and it is
wholly within the discretion of DBCD to decide whether or not to inspect such works in
each case. In other words, the facility for inspection should be made available and
DBCD should exercise its discretion in each case whether or not to send its staff to
carry out the inspection. Secondly, DBCD should make periodical inspections at the
construction site without any previous notice, i.e. spot checks, particularly at the stage
when the construction of the main structural elements is in progress.

12.17 Invariably, while a building is under construction, changes are made and
architectural plans are amended from time to time. DBCD should not approve any
such amended plans unless the professional engineer in charge has certified that he has
considered the amendments and that no change need be made to the structural plans or
calculations, and if any change, in his view, is required to be made, he should be

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required to submit appropriate amended structural plans and calculations. In either of
such cases, DBCD should decide, and it must exercise its own judgement sensibly,
whether there should be carried out an independent check along the line which we have
discussed. Further, unless the amendment is, in the opinion of DBCD, so major or
substantial, it should allow the construction works to continue in the meanwhile.

12.18 We are aware that at present upon completion of a building, the architect in
charge submits to DBCD, for record, a full set of “ as-built” architectural plans, i.e.
plans of the building as built as at the date of completion. This obviously is a good
practice and should be continued. As for the structural works of the building, the
professional engineer in charge does not submit to DBCD, for record, a full set of “ as-
built” structural plans and calculations. But if any amendment has been made to the
structural works, he does submit to DBCD, for record, amended structural plans and
calculations. The architectural “as-built” plans and the structural plans and calcula­
tions as submitted to DBCD are undoubtedly valuable for future reference, for
instance, on inspection of the building, which we shall discuss shortly.

Maintenance
12.19 No one can really dispute or question that every building needs maintenance
and that the obligation is on the building owner to maintain his building. However,
unfortunately, the fact is that not every building owner is too concerned with
maintenance; and indeed some hardly care about maintenance of their own buildings,
as again demonstrated by the case of Lian Yak Building. We are not concerned with
maintenance of buildings to preserve their aesthetic appearance, but with maintenance
to avoid or mitigate a deterioration of the structural elements of the buildings. We
think that it is highly necessary that regular periodical inspections of buildings by
professional engineers should be carried out with a view to ascertaining whether there
are any structural deterioration or defects so that remedial actions can be taken if such
deterioration or defects are found. In their joint representation to us on the subject of
maintenance of buildings, Mr Hou Ke-hua and Dr H. S. Parmar said:
“There are several reasons why buildings require maintenance. Some of
these are related to (i) faults in design, (ii) construction errors and
inadequacy of construction, (iii) material deficiencies, (iv) misuse
during life, and (v) environmental effects.
General defects and problems do not always manifest themselves early
and take many years to show up. Similarly, misuse, abuse and
environmental effects also take many years before the situation reaches
to a stage requiring repairs. As such it is considered prudent to inspect
buildings regularly at intervals.”
With that statement we entirely concur and, in our view, regular inspections should be
made mandatory. In this connection, the following aspects need to be considered: (i)
the suitable frequency of inspections; (ii) the extent of the inspection, and (iii) the
report or certificate, in substance, required from the professional engineer who carried
out the inspection.

12.20 It is debatable whether a building should be inspected after every period of 3

years or 5 years. It seems to us that an inspection every period of 3 years is too frequent
and would be unduly onerous and costly to building owners. We think that since the

83
purpose of the inspection is to detect the presence of structural deterioration or
defects, an inspection every period of 5 years would be more sensible and should
suffice. In the case of a new building or a building which has been built recently, the
first inspection should take place 5 years after the date of issue of temporary
occupation licence or, if no such licence has been issued, after the date of issue of
certificate of fitness for occupation. In the case of a building built more than 5 years
ago, the first inspection should be carried out as soon as it is reasonably practicable.
Subsequent inspections should then be carried out every period of 5 years.

12.21 The next question is the extent of inspection required. We again agree with the
joint representation of Mr Hou and Dr Parmar that inspection of a building should
proceed in stages. First, if the structural plans and calculations of the building are
available, as they should be, they should be checked; such checking should be along the
line of the structural check which we have discussed. Such checking would not be
necessary in the case of a subsequent inspection, unless the professional engineer
engaged to carry out the inspection decides otherwise. Secondly, a visual inspection,
including non-destructive testing, if necessary, for signs of structural deterioration or
defects should then be carried out. We accept that there are difficulties in the way of
such visual inspection, as some of the main structural elements in a building would have
been covered up; notwithstanding these difficulties, an inspection to a certain extent
can still be carried out and would not be entirely fruitless or futile. An experienced
professional engineer, if he exercises reasonable diligence, would, in most cases, from
a careful inspection of the building including all the structural elements which have not
been covered up, be able to come to certain conclusions. In certain cases, he may direct
that some areas that are covered up be exposed for inspection of the structural
elements therein. If there are no signs of any structural deterioration or defects, the
visual inspection should suffice and, unless the professional engineer otherwise advises,
no further action need be taken. If, on the other hand, signs of structural deterioration
or defects are present, then obviously the professional engineer should recommend
appropriate actions to be taken and they should be taken. It is, of course, not possible
for us here to recommend what actions should be taken; this must depend on the
nature and extent of the structural deterioration or defects, and is best left to the
professional engineer in charge at the time to advise or recommend. As part of the
work of a visual inspection, the professional engineer should also examine and find out,
by reference to the “ as-built” architectural plans and structural plans, whether there
has been any structural alteration made to the building for which no structural plans
and calculations have been submitted to DBCD, and also whether the building has
been subject to any additional loads which it was not originally designed to carry. If
either or both of such events have occurred, the professional engineer should
recommend appropriate corrective actions to be taken and they should be taken.

12.22 A great deal of controversy has centred on the proposed form of certificate
required to be furnished by the professional engineer who has conducted an inspection
of a building. Clearly, the answer to this problem must depend on what the
professional engineer has been engaged to do. For instance, if he has been engaged to
carry out a checking on the structural plans and calculations and a visual inspection of
the building, and also non-destructive tests where necessary, then all that he should be
required to give would be a report to DBCD and the building owner to the effect: (i)
that he has carried out a checking on the structural plans and calculations insofar as the

84
main structural elements are concerned and conducted the necessary visual inspection
of the building, and, if any, non-destructive tests; (ii) that he can find no structural
inadequacy or under-provision in the plans and calculations; (iii) that there is no
structural alteration made to the building for which structural plans and calculations
have not been submitted to DBCD; (iv) that the building is not subject to any
additional loads which it was not originally designed to carry, and (v) that there are no
signs of structural deterioration or defects. It would be unreasonable and unfair to
require from him an unqualified certificate to the effect that, in his opinion, the
building is structurally safe. If, in the visual inspection, he finds signs of any structural
deterioration or defects, he should report to DBCD and the building owner
accordingly and recommend necessary actions to be taken to monitor the position
and/or remedy the structural deterioration or defects. Similarly, if he has found
structural alteration to the building for which no structural plans or calculations have
been submitted, and/or that the building has been subject to additional loads which it
was not originally designed to carry, a report to this effect should be made to DBCD
and the building owner with recommendations on the appropriate corrective actions to
be taken. Eventually, when all such actions have been taken, he should again report to
DBCD and the building owner the results and effect thereof and give his opinion as to
whether the actions taken are adequate in the circumstances. Again, he cannot be
expected to give an unqualified certificate to the effect that the building is structurally
safe. One must be realistic and accept the fact that after a building has been completed
and has remained in existence for some time, it is virtually impossible for a professional
engineer who has merely conducted an inspection of the structural elements of the
building to give an unqualified certificate that the building is structurally safe.
12.23 DBCD should on its part consider all reports and recommendations made by
the professional engineer and issue such appropriate direction as it may deem fit. In the
extreme case where the professional engineer has reported that the building is
structurally unsafe, DBCD should take immediate action to declare the building as
dangerous and make the necessary orders under Section 13 of the Building Control
Act.
12.24 Lastly, we come to the question of the types of buildings that should be made
subject to this regular mandatory inspection. In our view, plainly all buildings to which
members of the public have access should fall within this category. In particular, it
should include all buildings which are public buildings within the meaning of the
Building Control (Administration) Regulations, 1979, e.g. shops, offices, hotels,
restaurants and theatres; it should also include buildings such as warehouses, godowns,
factories and buildings comprising residential apartments and condominiums. But
private residential houses — whether they be detached, semi-detached, terrace or
linked houses — should be exempted from such mandatory inspection.

DBCD’s Enhanced Role

12.25 It is obvious that our recommendations would entail DBCD playing an active
role in: (i) structural design, (ii) construction, and (iii) inspection of the building after
its completion. So it should be, in the interest of public safety. In this connection,
legislation may be necessary to be enacted to enable DBCD to assume the several
functions we have recommended. This is a matter which DBCD must consider. It is
also obvious that the present professional strength in DBCD does not have the
technical capabilities to cope with the multiple roles which, in our opinion, DBCD
should play. At the close of the hearing, we were informed that there were in DBCD

85
only 2 civil engineers, 4 mechanical engineers, 1 electrical engineer, 1 architect and 6
building surveyors, making a total professional strength of 14 (see table 2). That plainly
is not adequate; DBCD, as a building authority, regulates and controls the construc­
tion of all buildings, other than certain Government buildings, in Singapore. It
therefore must expand, and recruit professional staff so as to fulfil its functions
effectively. As to the extent and manner of recruitment, that, of course, must be left to
DBCD itself to decide.

12.26 The enhanced and active role of DBCD which we have recommended is not
intended to relieve any professional person of his responsibility for the work for which
he is engaged to perform; he remains fully responsible. Nor is it intended to visit upon
DBCD, as a regulatory authority, any liability for any structural failure of a building;
such a consequence would obviously be unfair to DBCD whose role is principally to
enforce a system of control in the interest of public safety. In this connection, the
Government should review the current legislations such as Regulation 46 of the
Building Control (Administration) Regulations, 1979 and Regulation 91 of the
Building Control (Construction) Regulations, 1979, and consider whether they
adequately protect the Government or the officers concerned from any liability by
reason of the functions they discharge and, if not, then legislation should be enacted
towards this end.

12.27 Before we conclude, there is one matter on which we wish to express our view.
Just before the conclusion of the hearing, Mr Tan Lien Seng, Deputy Director of
Development and Building Control Division, informed us that DBCD would be
despatching letters to owners of all buildings designed by K. N. Lekshmanan or Ee
Hoong Khoon as the case may be, suggesting to them to engage professional engineers
to carry out a check on their buildings for any cracks or signs of distress. Since then,
letters to this effect have been sent to these owners, a specimen of which is set out in
Annex 9. This certainly is a prudent course and we fully concur with what DBCD has
done in that respect. However, enclosed in each of such letters is a “standard report
format” which has created a furore amongst professional engineers. A copy of the
standard report is reproduced in Annex 10. It contains, inter alia, two sub-paragraphs,
namely:
“ *(a) I have checked the structure of my building and am satisfied that
the building is structurally safe.
*(b) I am engaging a professional engineer to carry out an investiga­
tion into the structural integrity of my building and to recom­
mend remedial measures if found necessary.”
(* Delete whichever not applicable.)
Dealing with the two sub-paragraphs of the report in the inverse order, sub-paragraph
(b) is undoubtedly appropriate and is all that is required from a building owner. Sub-
paragraph (a) is somewhat startling. We do not see how a building owner can really
check the structure of the building and say that he is “satisfied that the building is
structurally safe” . We understand also that where a professional engineer is engaged to
carry out the checking, he is also required to give a certificate along the same line. That
is very unrealistic; indeed we would say it is unfair to extract such a certificate from a
professional engineer. As we have recommended, the inspection should be carried out
in stages and a report should then be made to DBCD and the building owner along
the line as suggested. We make a point of mentioning this because we are fearful that

86
 TABLE 2: DEVELOPMENT AND BUILDING CONTROL DIVISION
(PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT)
BREAKDOWN OF ENGINEERING SERVICE OFFICERS (ESOs)
FY 1977 TO FY 1986 (AS AT 13 OCTOBER 1986)

FINANCIAL YEAR
APPOINTMENT
77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86

Civil
Engineer @ 3 3 3 3 5 5 3 2 2 2

Mechanical
Engineer 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 4 4

Electrical
Engineer 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Chemical
Engineer — — — 1 1 1 1 1 — —

Architect* 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Building
Surveyor** 6 6 6 6 6 5 8 9 6 6

Quantity
Surveyor*** — 1 1 1 1 — — — — —

TOTAL 16 17 17 17 19 19 19 19 14# 14#

Note:
* Architect: Post held by Mr Lim Soon Chye, DD (D & BCD) from 25.6.75 to
10.8.84 and Mr Tan Lien Seng, DD (D & BCD) from 11.8.84 todate.
** Building Surveyor: Mr Tan Hock Meng and Mrs Loh-Lee Moi Yin possess
Architectural Degree but appointed as Building Surveyors.
*** Quantity Surveyor: Post held by Commissioner of Buildings Mr Wong Chak
Wai from 25.3.78 to 31.7.81 and Mr Benedict Tan Chye Hup from 1.8.81 to
31.8.82.
# Approved Strength is 15 (The one vacancy can be filled by any Engineer/
Building Surveyor)
@ The work of Civil Engineers in D & BCD is similar to those of Building
Surveyors in D & BCD.

(Exhibit CE228)
such a form of report, if insisted upon, would deter professional engineers from
undertaking the inspection of the buildings; and some of these buildings may require
immediate inspection and prompt and urgent remedial action to be taken. We
therefore recommend suitable modification (along the line which we have discussed) to
be made to the form of report or certificate required to be furnished by the professional
engineers.

Summary of Recommendations
12.28 We now summarise the recommendations we have made:
(1) All structural plans and calculations of a building submitted by a professional
engineer to DBCD pursuant to the building regulations should be
independently checked; such checking should be carried out by DBCD or,
upon referral by DBCD, by the Structural Engineering Branch and the
Geotechnical Engineering Branch of PWD. The checking should focus on
the main structural elements such as foundations, columns, beams and shear
cores. If and when PWD, by reason of the considerable work-load it has, is
unable to carry out the checking, then it may enlist the assistance of a panel
of consulting engineers in private practice, on a rotation basis, to carry out
the checking under its control.
(2) The system of voluntary registration of contractors devised by the Construc­
tion Industry Development Board should be expanded to cover registration
of contractors for projects in the private sector. The register of contractors
should be periodically reviewed, and those contractors with good record
should be upgraded and those who have not performed satisfactorily should
be down-graded or removed from the register.
(3) DBCD as the regulatory authority should enforce proper supervision of
construction work by qualified persons. It should also require a full-time
resident engineer to supervise the construction of a major work and a full-time
clerk-of-works to supervise a minor development; it is for the professional
engineer concerned to decide whether a project is major or minor with
DBCD having the ultimate say on the matter and the discretion to permit
supervision of certain areas of a major work to be carried out by a clerk-of-
works. DBCD should not permit commencement of any building work
unless it is satisfied that a professional engineer or a clerk-of-works, as the
case may be, has been engaged to supervise the work. Where a clerk-of-
works is engaged, he should be engaged by the professional engineer and the
responsibility is on the professional engineer to see that the clerk-of-works he
engaged has the requisite technical qualification and experience.
(4) In every project, various tests relating to structural work should be carried
out under the supervision of a professional engineer, and the results of these
tests and, if any, piling records, with the necessary certificate of supervision
should be lodged with DBCD by the professional engineer in charge. DBCD
should be given the discretion to waive any of the tests or agree to a
modification of any of the tests in respect of small projects.
(5) It should be a mandatory requirement that contractors give to DBCD at least
48 hours’ notice before any main structural element is covered up; this is to
give to DBCD a facility of checking if it wishes to do so.

88
 (6) Spot checks on the construction works, particularly at the critical stage where
construction of the main structural elements is in progress, should be made
by DBCD’s staff from time to time.
(7) Where amended building plans are submitted to DBCD by architects, they
should not be approved unless the professional engineer has certified that no
change need be made to the structural plans or calculations already
submitted and if any change, in his view, is required to be made, he should be
required to submit appropriate amended structural plans and calculations.
In either of such cases, DBCD should decide whether there should be carried
out an independent check as discussed above. Further, unless the amend­
ment is in the opinion of DBCD so major or substantial, it should allow the
construction works to continue in the meanwhile.
(8) Regular inspection of buildings by professional engineers for structural
deterioration or defects should be made mandatory for every period of 5
years, and buildings subject to such mandatory inspection should include
buildings to which members of the public have access and, in particular,
buildings which are public buildings within the meaning of the Building
Control (Administration) Regulations, 1979 and also buildings such as
warehouses, godowns, factories and buildings comprising residential apart­
ments and condominiums. But private residential houses should be exempted
from such mandatory inspection.
(9) Inspection reports should be lodged with DBCD and furnished to the
building owners giving the results or findings of the inspections and the
remedial actions proposed or taken.
(10) DBCD should expand its professional staff to assume the several functions
recommended by us, and legislation may well be required to enable DBCD
to do so. Further, the Government should review and consider whether
existing legislations are adequate to protect the Government and officers
concerned from any liability arising from the various functions assumed by
DBCD.

89
 ANNEX 1

PERSONS WHO DIED IN THE INCIDENT

S/No. Name Sex Age Nationality Designation

1 Chew Sau Chun, Angelia F 22 Singaporean Bank staff
2 Chua Lew Chu F 39 Singaporean Wife of a mechanic
working in the building
3 Goh Khong Moh M 26 Singaporean Mechanic
4 Kan Mun Thong, Albert M 38 Singaporean Bank manager
5 Lau Sock Lian, Cindy F 24 Singaporean Bank staff
6 Lee Eng Huat M 31 Singaporean Bank staff
7 Lee Fook Kan M 45 Singaporean Production assistant
8 Lee Hock Boon M 17 Singaporean Bellhop
9 Leong Peng Way M 43 Singaporean Bank staff
10 Leong May Yin F 23 Singaporean Bank staff
11 Lim Kim Siew M 50 Singaporean Bank customer
12 Lim Seow Chin, Perlyn F 25 Singaporean Bank staff
13 Neo Kim Chui F 26 Singaporean Bank staff
14 Ng Khong Lim M 59 Singaporean Managing director of
Lian Yak Realty Co.
(Pte.) Ltd.
15 Ng Cheng Kee F 30 Singaporean Hotel staff
16 Ong Kek Soon M 33 Singaporean Bank staff
17 Png Eng Huat M 26 Singaporean Hotel staff
18 Ramnarain Raji Ram M 60 Singaporean Watchman
Panday
19 Durga Devi F 51 Indian Citizen Wife of the watchman
20 Shaharudin B Zakaria M 50 Singaporean CISCO guard
21 Sit Ah Lak F 25 Singaporean Bank customer
22 Soh Cheng Thum M 47 Singaporean Contractor
23 Song Teck Leong M 26 Singaporean Bank customer
24 Tan Lee Gek F 24 Singaporean Bank staff
25 Yeo Siew Tean F 32 Singaporean Bank staff

91
S/No. Name Sex Age Nationality Designation
26 Yong Kum Yip F 43 Singaporean Chambermaid
27 Lai Chan Sou F 28 Malaysian Hotel guest
28 Perumal A/L Kumarasamy M 34 Malaysian Hotel guest
29 Sarah A/P S. A. Philips F 36 Malaysian Hotel guest
30 Aaron Daniel Anand M 1| Malaysian Hotel guest
31 Halitha A/P S. A. Philips F 34 Malaysian Hotel guest
32 Nusrat Mahmood M 33 Pakistani Hotel guest
33 Nuzhat Hashmi F 20 Pakistani Hotel guest

92
 ANNEX 2

INSTRUMENT OF APPOINTMENT OF THE COMMISSION

T h e I n q u ir y C o m m is s io n s A c t .
(C hapter 4 8 ).

COMMISSION

B y W EE KIM WEE
P r e s id e n t o f T h e R e p u b l ic o f S in g a p o r e

f STATED
\S E A L J
(Signed)
W EE KIM WEE,
President.

W HEREAS it is provided by the Inquiry Commissions Act that it shall be lawful

for the President, whenever he shall deem it advisable, to issue a Commission
appointing one or more Commissioners to inquire, inter alia, into any matter in which
an inquiry would in the opinion of the President be for the public welfare:

AND W HEREAS I am of the opinion that it is in the public welfare that an

inquiry should forthwith be made by Commissioners so appointed in accordance with
the following terms of reference, namely:
(a) to determine the cause of the collapse of the premises at 305 Serangoon
Road on 15th March 1986;
(b) to make recommendations for such appropriate measures that can be taken
to prevent a similar occurrence.

NOW, TH EREFO R E, I, W EE KIM W EE, hereby appoint the following

persons, namely:
(a) Mr Justice Thean Lip Ping;
(b) Dr A Vijiaratnam;
(c) Prof Lee Seng Lip; and
(d) Prof Bengt B Broms
to be Commissioners and hereby authorize the said Commissioners to conduct such
inquiry in the manner hereinafter directed —
1. I direct that Mr Justice Thean Lip Ping shall be the Chairman of the
Commission of Inquiry;
2. I direct that the first sitting of the Commission shall take place in the High
Court on such date and at such hour as the Chairman may designate;

93
 3. I direct that the Commission shall normally hold its sittings in the High
Court but shall have power, in the discretion of the Chairman, to adjourn to
any suitable place to hear evidence or for any other purpose connected with
its duties;
4. I direct that the Inquiry shall be held in public:
Provided that the Chairman may in his discretion direct that any evidence
shall be heard in camera or otherwise recorded without being made
available to the public;
5. I appoint Mr Lim Soo Ping to be Secretary to the Commission and to
exercise the powers conferred and to carry out the duties imposed upon
such Secretary as are referred to in section 6 of the Inquiry Commissions
Act, and I authorize the Secretary to employ such clerical or other
assistance for the purpose of the Inquiry as the Commission may require. In
case of necessity, I also authorize the Commission to appoint any suitable
person temporarily to act as Secretary;
6. I direct the Commissioner of Police to detail police constables to attend
upon the Commission for the purpose of preserving order during the
proceedings, to serve summonses on witnesses and to perform such
ministerial duties as the Commission may direct; and
7. Finally, I direct the Commissioners, after completing the Inquiry, to render
to me their report and recommendations thereon.

Given at Singapore this 22nd day of March 1986.

BY COMMAND,

(Signed)
WONG CHOOI SEN
Secretary to the Cabinet

94
 ANNEX 3

INVITATION OF REPRESENTATIONS

PRESS RELEASE

The Commission of Inquiry in connection with the collapse of premises at 305

Serangoon Road (Hotel New World) invites all interested parties to submit to the
Secretary of the Commission at the address stated below any representation which they
may wish to make in regard to matters falling within the Commission’s terms of
reference.

Its terms of reference are:

a) to determine the cause of the collapse of the premises at 305 Serangoon
Road on 15 Mar 86;
b) to make recommendations for such appropriate measures that can be taken
to prevent a similar occurrence.

Any representation should be submitted in writing addressed and sent to:

The Secretary (Mr Lim Soo Ping)
Commission of Inquiry
(Collapse of Premises at 305 Serangoon Road)
c/o Court No. 4
Supreme Court Building
St Andrew’s Road
Singapore 0617

Those who wish to give oral evidence should communicate with the Secretary of
the Commission at Tel No. 2296221. The closing date for receipt of representations and
indication of desire to give oral evidence will be 30 April, 1986.

Issued on 31 March, 1986.

JUSTICE L.P. THEAN

CHAIRMAN
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

95
 ANNEX 4

REPRESENTATIONS RECEIVED

S/No Names of Individuals/Organisations

1 E. J. Lang (Australia)
2 Prof Donovan F. Covan (Canada)
3 Mohamed Esmail Abdul Latif (India)
4 “A Retired Contractor/Foreigner”
5 Lim Kiang Hai
6 Chow Yew Kheong
7 Yeo Hin Heng
8 John Lee
9 Norman Oh
10 “ Building Siteman”
11 “Secret Messenger”
12 Theng Chen Eng
13 Alan Teo
14 Lam Kwok Wing
15 Singapore Institute of Surveyors & Valuers
16 “Mr Ong”
17 “ARAR/Voe Schl”
18 “Dr Wong Guowei”
19 Ong Kai Ting
20 “K .T.G .M .”
21 K. T. Fam
22 Lim Chin Kheng
23 RAK Materials Consultants Pte. Ltd.
24 Albert Goh
25 Wong Pui Fun
26 ATS Software Centre
27 Pang Sai Kwong
28 Ricky Ng Ngak Hang

96
 S/No Names of Individuals/Organisations
29 “Singapore Citizens”
30 Andy Lee Yang Cheow
31 Fong Weng Meng and Fong Weng Cheong
32 Association of Consulting Engineers, Singapore
33 The Institution of Engineers, Singapore
34 Singapore Contractors Association Ltd.
35 Real Estate Developers’ Association of Singapore.
36 Singapore Institute of Architects
37 Construction Industry Development Board
38 Development and Building Control Division, PWD
39-43 5 anonymous persons
44 Public Utilities Board
45 Professional Engineers Board & Board of Architects
46 Tan Jettle
47 Eric Rawcliffe
48 S. Balasingam
49 Dr Moh Za-Chieh
50 A group of MRTC engineers comprising:
T. W. Hulme
J. P. Copsey
S. Buttling
S. A. Robinson
A. W. Knox
51 Dr Y. S. Lau
52 C. Tharmalingam
53 Dr Chin Kee Kean
54 Association of Consulting Engineers of Singapore
(further representation)
55 Albert Loh
56 BVSC Consulting Engineers Pte. Ltd.
57 Tan Ee Ping & Partners
58 Hou Ke-hua & Dr H. S. Parmar

Footnote: Representations No. 46 to 58 were received after the hearing was

concluded.

97
 ANNEX 5

NOTICE OF HEARING
(1ST STAGE OF INQUIRY)

PRESS RELEASE

The Commission of Inquiry in connection with the collapse of Hotel New World,
305, Serangoon Road, Singapore, will conduct the first stage of the inquiry commen­
cing on 28 May, 1986 at 10.30 a.m. in the High Court, Singapore. At this hearing the
Commission will deal with all preliminary matters, including applications, if any, for
direction on procedure, and receive formal evidence relating to the collapse of the
Hotel on 15 March, 1986 and reports on the progress of the investigations presently
undertaken. As soon as all the investigations are completed, the second stage of the
inquiry will commence.

The terms of reference of the Commission are:

a) to determine the cause of the collapse of the premises at 305 Serangoon
Road on 15 March, 1986;
b) to make recommendations for such appropriate measures that can be taken
to prevent a similar occurrence.

ISSUED ON 9 MAY, 1986

LIM SOO PING

SECRETARY
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

98
 ANNEX 6

NOTICE OF HEARING
(2ND STAGE OF INQUIRY)

PRESS RELEASE

The Commission of Inquiry in connection with the collapse of Hotel New World,
305 Serangoon Road, Singapore, will commence the second stage of the inquiry on
Tuesday, 16th September 1986. The hearing will be held daily (on weekdays except
Saturdays) from 10.30 a.m. to 4.30 p.m. (with an adjournment for lunch) at the Court
of Appeal on the 2nd Storey, Supreme Court Building, Singapore.

The terms of reference of the Commission are:

a) to determine the cause of the collapse of the premises at 305 Serangoon
Road on 15th March 1986;
b) to make recommendations for such appropriate measures that can be taken
to prevent a similar occurrence.

ISSUED ON 25 AUGUST 1986

LIM SOO PING

SECRETARY
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

99
 ANNEX 7

LIST OF WITNESSES

Date of
Examination/
Witness Submission
S/No. No. Name of Witness Designation of Statement
1 CW 1 Lee Siew San Managing Director, May 28, 1986
Elite Architectural
Models

2 CW 2 Pitt Kuan Wah Archives Officer, May 28, 1986

National Archives Sep 16, 1986(S)

3 CW 3 Foong Sze Fook Head (Climatology May 28, 1986

Section),
Meteorological
Service

4 CW 4 Yap Kheng Guan Senior Engineer May 28, 1986

(Planning & Design),
Drainage Department,
MOE

5 CW 5 Dr Stephen Senior Geotechnical May 28, 1986

Buttling Engineer, MRTC Oct 1, 1986
Oct 2, 1986

6 CW 6 Tan Lien Seng Deputy Director, May 28, 1986

DBCD, PWD May 29, 1986
Oct 10, 1986
Oct 13, 1986

7 CW 7 Quah Kay Seng Senior Executive May 29, 1986

Planner, Sep 24, 1986(S)
DBCD, PWD

8 CW 8 Tan Hock Meng Higher Executive May 29, 1986

Building Surveyor, May 30, 1986
DBCD, PWD

9 CW 9 Michael Ong Senior Technical May 30, 1986

Thiam Kok Officer,
DBCD, PWD

100
 Date of
Examination/
Witness Submission
S/No. No. Name of Witness Designation of Statement

10 CW 10 Lim Kwang Meng Inspector, May 30, 1986

Special Investigation Sep 25, 1986(S)
Section, CID

11 CW 11 Loh-Lee Moi Yin Head Sep 16, 1986

Building Control Sep 22, 1986
Branch, Sep 24, 1986
DBCD, PWD Sep 29, 1986

12 CW 12 Loh Ngat Chew Director and Share­ Sep 16, 1986

holder, Sep 24, 1986
Lian Yak Realty Co.
(Pte.) Ltd.

13 Statement Tay Ser Ngee Branch Manager, Sep 16, 1986

Asia Commercial
Bank Ltd.

14 CW 13 Ng Tiong Choon Son of Ng Khong Lim Sep 16, 1986

Sep 30, 1986

15 CW 14 Chua Ah Bah Owner of Kong Hong Sep 16, 1986

Building Contractor
Pte. Ltd.

16 CW 15 Ong Chin Swee Businessman/Former Sep 16, 1986

owner of Siam
Construction

17 CW 16 Jeffrey Toh Kok Managing Director, Sep 16, 1986

Wye Toh Kum Swee
Pte. Ltd.

18 CW 17 Ang Ah Seng Brother-in-law of Sep 16, 1986

Ng Khong Lim

19 Statement Lee Wan Sing Assistant Manager, Sep 16, 1986

Asia Commercial
Bank Ltd.

20 Statement Chua Tong Choon Former Advisor, Sep 16, 1986

Asia Commercial
Banking Corporation
Ltd.

101
 Date of
Examination/
Witness Submission
S/No. No. Name of Witness Designation of Statement

21 CW 18 Ho Chin Yu Former business Sep 17, 1986

partner of
Lee Sow Har

22 CW 19 Lee Sow Har Wife of Leong Shui Sep 17, 1986

Lung

23 Statement Chua Chiang CID Photographer Sep 17, 1986

Sep 30, 1986

24 Statement Loh Yong Chong CID Photographer Sep 17, 1986

25 Statement Zakaria Hassan CID Photographer Sep 17, 1986

26 Statement Ang Yan Oo CID Photographer Sep 17, 1986

27 Statement Kwok Nam CID Photographer Sep 17, 1986

28 Statement K. Ragunathan CID Photographer Sep 17, 1986

29 Statement Gooi Hong Peng CID Photographer Sep 17, 1986

30 Statement Ang Chwee Guan CID Photographer Sep 17, 1986

31 Statement Tan Ah Leng CID Photographer Sep 17, 1986

32 Statement Gunapalla CID Photographer Sep 17, 1986

33 Statement Chin Yoke Meng CID Photographer Sep 17, 1986

34 Statement Tay Soon Teck CID Photographer Sep 17, 1986

35 Statement Nadaraja CID Photographer Sep 17, 1986

36 Statement Low Seng Yam CID Photographer Sep 17, 1986

37 Statement Peter Yeo Kai CID Photographer Sep 17, 1986

38 Statement Govindasamy CID Photographer Sep 17, 1986

39 Statement Lim Seng Tiong Straits Times Sep 17, 1986

Photographer

40 Statement Steven Lee Chun Straits Times Sep 17, 1986

Toh Photographer

102
 Date of
Examination/
Witness Submission
S/No. No. Name of Witness Designation of Statement

41 CW 20 Leong Shui Lung Former architectural Sep 17, 1986

draughtsman of Sep 30, 1986
M/s F. J. Pestana

42 CW 21 Shum Cheong Heng Former structural Sep 17, 1986

draughtsman of Sep 18, 1986
M/s Lekshmanan
& Associates

43 Statement Abdul Rahman bin Technical Officer, Sep 18, 1986

Mohd Alwi Special Services
Branch, PWD

44 CW 22 Ong Tian Sun Former employee at Sep 18, 1986

Lian Yak Building
construction site

45 CW 23 Lee Hock Chye Building contractor Sep 18, 1986

46 CW 24 David Chia Fong Son of the piling Sep 18, 1986

Weng contractor for Sep 19, 1986
Lian Yak
Building project

47 Statement Chan Cheng Fai Police Officer, CID Sep 19, 1986
Sep 24, 1986
Sep 26, 1986
Sep 30, 1986

48 CW 25 Lee Kut Cheung Registrar, Sep 19, 1986

Board of Architects

49 CW 26 Yong Hock Khim Managing Director, Sep 19, 1986

Yong Tai Seng
Engineering Works
Pte. Ltd.

50 CW 27 Khoo Hue Mong Plumbing contractor Sep 19, 1986

51 CW 28 Chan Boon Kiang Senior Technical Sep 19, 1986

Officer,
Water Department,
PUB

103
 Date of
Examination/
Witness Submission
S/No. No. Name of Witness Designation of Statement

52 CW 29 Ooi Kiat Guan Engineer (Civil), Sep 19, 1986

Water Department,
PUB

53 CW 30 Sivaraman Arasu Senior Engineer Sep 19, 1986

(Civil),
Water Department,
PUB

54 Statement Egbert C. Dhing Senior Technical Sep 22, 1986

Officer,
DBCD, PWD

55 CW 31 Phang Siew Keong Engineer (Civil), Sep 22, 1986

Structural
Engineering Branch,
PWD

56 Statement Kok Siew Hoong Partner, Sep 22, 1986

Architects Team 3

57 CW 32 Lee Kip Lin Former partner, Sep 22, 1986

Architects Team 3

58 CW 33 Hwang Yen Kang Former Managing Sep 22, 1986

Director, ICB

59 CW 34 Koh Ai Hwee Technical Officer, Sep 22, 1986

DBCD, PWD

60 CW 35 Liew Mun Leong Registrar, Sep 22, 1986

Professional Oct 10, 1986
Engineers Board

61 CW 36 Lim Whye Teck Former Manager of Sep 22, 1986

ICB Serangoon
Road Branch

62 CW 37 Ong Bee Kok Former Sub-Manager, Sep 22, 1986

ICB Head Office

63 CW 38 June Tan Poh Hah Manageress, Sep 22, 1986

Industrial &
Commercial Realty
Co. Ltd.

104
 Date of
Examination/
Witness Submission
S/No. No. Name of Witness Designation of Statement

64 CW 39 Chan Chock Cheng Former Property Sep 22, 1986

Assistant of Industrial
& Commerical Realty
Company Limited

65 CW 40 Wee Cheeh Eng Former Manager of Sep 22, 1986

ICB Serangoon
Road Branch

66 CW 41 Wang Jer Hiong Former Manager of Sep 22, 1986

ICB Serangoon Sep 25, 1986
Road Branch

67 CW 42 Chiam Cheng Hai Building contractor Sep 23, 1986

68 CW 43 Poey Liang Huat Former Manager of Sep 23, 1986

ICB Serangoon
Road Branch

69 CW 44 Steven Ng Security Manager, Sep 23, 1986

Chubb Singapore
Pte. Ltd.

70 CW 45 Lim Oon Tiong Senior Manager, Sep 23, 1986

ICB Head Office

71 CW 46 Cheong Cheng Bank Officer of Sep 23, 1986

Guan ICB Serangoon Road Sep 25, 1986
Branch Sep 29, 1986

72 CW 47 Teng Lak Hoon Partner, Sep 23, 1986

Sinya Nite-Club
& Restaurant

73 CW 48 Tiang Liang Partner, Sep 23, 1986

Siong Golden Swallow
Nite-club

74 CW 49 Tan Kim Lek Partner, Sep 23, 1986

Golden Dragon
Nite-club and
Restaurant

105
 Date of
Examination/
Witness Submission
S/No. No. Name of Witness Designation of Statement

75 CW 50 Nguan Hai Hong Managing Director, Sep 23, 1986

Double Dragon Nite-
club & Restaurant
Pte. Ltd.

76 CW 51 Tang Tuck Wah Former Shareholder of Sep 23, 1986

Universal Neptune
Nite-club and
Restaurant Pte. Ltd.

77 CW 52 Philip Law Manager, Sep 23, 1986

Kam Hui Universal Neptune Sep 26, 1986
Nite-club & Sep 29, 1986
Restaurant Pte. Ltd.

78 CW 53 Yeong Loke Man Sole Proprietor, Sep 23, 1986

Mun Ngai Furniture Sep 25, 1986
Construction

79 CW 54 Ho Tat Fwe Hotel-keeper, Sep 23, 1986

Serangoon Hotel
(1971-1972)

80 CW 55 Tan Hing Sing Hotel-keeper, Sep 23, 1986

Serangoon Hotel
(1972-1973)

81 CW 56 Pan Ah Pok Shareholder, Sep 23, 1986

Serangoon Hotel/ Sep 25, 1986
New Serangoon
Hotel

82 CW 57 Wong Chong Poh Shareholder, Sep 23, 1986

Hotel New World

83 CW 58 Tan Sim Hoe Sub-contractor, Sep 23, 1986

Hock Hoe Construction
Company

84 CW 59 Ng Kee Siong Broker for houses Sep 23, 1986

and used cars Sep 24, 1986

85 Statement Keval Singh Detective police Sep 24, 1986

constable, CID

106
 Date of
Examination/
Witness Submission
S/No. No. Name of Witness Designation of Statement

86 CW 60 Seah Chang Huat Sole Proprietor, Sep 24, 1986

Primier Airconditioning
and Refrigeration Co.

87 CW 61 Mohd. Yusoff bin Technical Officer, Sep 24, 1986

Abdul Wahid Building Administration Sep 29, 1986
Branch,
DBCD, PWD

88 CW 62 Li Gik Ling Sales Manager, Sep 24, 1986

Rheem Far East
Pte. Ltd.

89 CW 63 Heng Chap Heang Superintending Sep 24, 1986

Engineer,
Gas Department,
PUB

90 Statement Chan Peng Soon Senior Technical Sep 24, 1986

Officer,
DBCD, PWD

91 Statement Lim Siang Hiong Former Managing Sep 24, 1986

Director,
Innovation (Singapore)
Pte. Ltd.

92 CW 64 Quek Chin Yean Managing Director, Sep 24, 1986

Speedwell Services
Pte. Ltd.

93 CW 65 Wong Shen Fuat Executive Engineer, Sep 24, 1986

DBCD, PWD

94 CW 66 Yeoh Hock Lam Free-lance Sep 24, 1986

architectural
draughtsman

95 CW 67 Wong Kon Loong Architect, Sep 24, 1986

WKL Architects

96 Statement Yong Fook Eng Managing Director, Sep 24, 1986

Samuel Contractor

107
 Date of
Examination/
Witness Submission
S/No. No. Name of Witness Designation of Statement

97 Statement Lim Choo Sin Former Assistant Sep 25, 1986

Engineer,
East Machinery
Sdn. Bhd.

98 CW 68 Lim Yeow Koon Student Sep 25, 1986

99 CW 69 Kamla Rai Night-club watchman Sep 25, 1986

Sep 29, 1986(S)

100 CW 70 David Yeo Sole Proprietor, Sep 25, 1986

Nge How Pace Furnishing

101 CW 71 Kho Kin Tee Taxi-driver Sep 25, 1986

102 CW 72 Teo Beng Hua Night-club “ mummy” Sep 25, 1986

103 Statement Yau Chung Seong Senior Technical Sep 25, 1986
Officer, PWD Sep 26, 1986

104 CW 73 Tan Teow Seng Managing Director, Sep 26, 1986

East Machinery Pte. Ltd.

105 CW 74 Wai Choy Lin Night-club singer Sep 26, 1986

106 CW 75 Goh Khee Ngoh Night-club singer Sep 26, 1986

107 CW 76 Wee Kim Choo Night-club singer Sep 26, 1986

108 CW 77 Goh Teck Ann Night-club organist Sep 26, 1986

109 CW 78 Lim Thoe Eng Petrol-kiosk assistant Sep 26, 1986

110 CW 79 Soh Geok Lian Chambermaid Sep 24, 1986(S)

Sep 26, 1986

111 CW 80 Yap Siew Bee Chambermaid Sep 26, 1986

112 CW 81 Ayoob bin Mohd. Bellhop Sep 24, 1986(S)

Thamby Sep 26, 1986

108
 Date of
Examination/
Witness Submission
S/No. No. Name of Witness Designation of Statement

113 Statement Diwaker Upadyha Son of the watchman Sep 26, 1986
s/o R.R. Panday of Lian Yak Building

114 CW 82 Quek Ah Suan, Bank customer Sep 26, 1986

Annie

115 Statement Suma A/P Parakat Hotel guest Sep 26, 1986
S. Menon

116 CW 83 Sim Siang Luck, Bank Officer of Sep 26, 1986

Albert ICB Serangoon
Road Branch

117 CW 84 Lian Gan Tiong Owner of Sin Guan Bee Sep 26, 1986
Metal Co.

118 Statement Tay Kia Han Student Sep 26, 1986

119 CW 85 Teo Lai Huat Renovation contractor Sep 26, 1986

120 CW 86 Wee Tong Guan Divisional Director, Sep 26, 1986

Audit Department

121 CW 87 K. Shanker Kumar Secretary, Sep 29, 1986

Hotels Licensing
Board

122 CW 88 Choy Marn Koon Head Inspector Sep 29, 1986

(Licensing and
Enforcement),
Singapore Fire Service

123 CW 89 V. Rajendram Head, Sep 29, 1986

Building Administration
Branch,
DBCD, PWD

124 Statement Abdul Aziz Technician, Sep 29, 1986

Azahari Building Administration
Branch,
DBCD, PWD

109
 Date of
Examination/
Witness Submission
S/No. No. Name of Witness Designation of Statement

125 CW 90 Tan Quek Neo, Hotel guest Sep 29, 1986

Helen

126 CW 91 Tan Oi Ling, Hotel receptionist Sep 29, 1986

Jerina

127 Statement Jaya Durgha Hotel guest Sep 29, 1986

128 Statement P. S. Menon Hotel guest Sep 29, 1986

129 CW 92 Stewart David Senior Resident Sep 29, 1986

Fielding Engineer, MRTC

130 CW 93 Anthony James Senior Resident Sep 29, 1986

Burchell Engineer, MRTC

131 CW 94 Bruno R. Manager (Planning & Sep 29, 1986

Wildermuth Computer Services),
MRTC

132 CW 95 Ang Kim Siang Electrical & Sep 30, 1986

plumbing contractor

133 CW 96 Thomas Lam Geotechnical Sep 30, 1986

Shiu Keung Engineer, MRTC

134 CW 97 Cheah Kok Choong Senior Technical Sep 30, 1986

Officer,
Mechanical & Electrical
Division, PWD

135 Statement Koh Boon Aik Superintending Sep 30, 1986

Engineer
(Maintenance),
Water Department,
PUB

136 CW 98 Lam Pang Chun Senior Engineer Sep 30, 1986

(Planning & Design),
Sewerage Department,
MOE

137 CW 99 Sukhdev Singh Businessman Sep 30, 1986

110
 Date of
Examination/
Witness Submission
S/No. No. Name of Witness Designation of Statement

138 CW 100 S. Krishnasamy Businessman Sep 30, 1986

139 CW 101 Tan See Ting Executive Engineer, Sep 30, 1986
Special Duties
Branch, PWD

140 Statement Leong Onn Seng Senior Technical Sep 30, 1986
Officer, PWD

141 CW 102 Teo Teng Poh Principal Scientific Oct 1, 1986

Officer, DSS

142 CW 103 Dr Moh Za-Chieh Consulting Engineer Oct 1, 1986

143 CW 104 Dr Tam Chat Tim Associate Professor of Oct 1, 1986

Civil Engineering,
NUS

144 CW 105 Terence W. Hulme Consulting Engineer Oct 2, 1986

145 CW 106 Hou Ke-hua Consulting Engineer Oct 2, 1986

146 CW 107 Dr H. S. Parmar Consulting Engineer Oct 2, 1986

Oct 3, 1986

147 CW 108 Eric Rawcliffe Consulting Engineer Oct 3, 1986

148 CW 109 Lam Siew Wah Secretary, Oct 8, 1986

Construction Industry Oct 9, 1986
Development Board

149 CW 110 Leslie Tan Council Member, Oct 8, 1986

Chwee Lye Real Estate Developers’
Association of
Singapore

150 CW 111 Dr Roland Neo Vice-President, Oct 9, 1986

Singapore Contractors
Association Ltd.

151 CW 112 Wan Fook Kong Chairman (Ad-hoc Oct 9, 1986

Committee),
Singapore Institute
of Surveyors and
Valuers

111
 Date of
Examination/
Witness Submission
S/No. No. Name of Witness Designation of Statement

152 CW 113 Sim Bee Teck President, Oct 9, 1986

Association of Consulting
Engineers, Singapore

153 CW 114 Teh Hee Seang Council Member, Oct 9, 1986

Institution of Oct 10, 1986
Engineers, Singapore

154 CW 115 Yang Soo Suan President, Oct 10, 1986

Singapore Institute
of Architects

155 CW 116 Michael Khor Deputy General Oct 10, 1986

Teik Hean Manager, PUB

156 CW 117 V. Krishna Former Head, Oct 10, 1986

Building Control
Branch,
DBCD, PWD

FO O TNO TES

a) Abbreviations: CID — Criminal Investigation Department

DBCD — Development and Building Control Division
DSS — Department of Scientific Services
ICB — Industrial and Commercial Bank Ltd.
MOE — Ministry of the Environment
MRTC — Mass Rapid Transit Corporation
NUS — National University of Singapore
PUB — Public Utilities Board
PWD — Public Works Department

b) The subscript “ (S)” denotes statement.

112
 ANNEX 8

COUNSEL APPEARING ON BEHALF OF INTERESTED

PARTIES BEFORE THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY

Name of Counsel Office Appearing for

Mr S. Tiwari Attorney-General’s Public Prosecutor

Chambers

Mr David Khor Attorney-General’s Assisting Mr S. Tiwari

Chambers

Mr N. K. Pillai and Niru & Co Estate of Mr Nusrat

Mrs Chong-Looi Mahmood (deceased)
Pek Hong and Mrs Nuzhat Hashmi
(deceased)

Mr Choo Si Sen and Tan, Lee & Choo Lian Yak Realty Company
Mr Tan Hoay Djin (Private) Limited

Mr P. Selvadurai, Rodyk & Davidson Industrial and Commercial

Mr David Lim and Bank Limited
Mr K. M. Wong

Mr J. Grimberg, Drew & Napier Public Utilities Board

Mr Muthu Arusu and
Mr Mohan Pillay

*Mr Woo Tchi Chu, Robert W.H. Wang Ministry of National

Miss Christine Lee and & Woo Development
Miss Serena Choo

*Mr Goh Joon Seng and Goh, Poh & Partners Professional Engineers Board
Miss Chong Pik Wah and Board of Architects

**Mr Laurence Wee Wee, Ramayah Mr Ng Tiong Choon

& Partners and Miss Ng Jiing Bin
(Petitioners of Letters of
Administration of the
Estate of Ng Khong Lim)

* As from the 4th day of hearing (September 16, 1986)

** As from the 12th day of hearing (September 26, 1986)

113
 ANNEX 9

SPECIMEN OF DBCD’S LETTERS TO OWNERS OF BUILDINGS DESIGNED BY

K. N. LEKSHMANAN OR EE HOONG KHOON (from Exhibit CE236)

(DBCD’s Letter-head)

Date:

Dear Sir

I wish to inform you that your building was designed by Mr K.N. Lekshmanan/Mr
Ee Hoong Khoon who also designed the Hotel New World which collapsed in March
1986. Expert evidence given at the Inquiry indicated that the structure of the Hotel
New World was under-designed. We are therefore concerned whether other buildings
designed by the abovementioned engineer/architect are structurally sound. As a
precaution, you, as owner of the building, are strongly advised to carry out a check on
the structure of your building for any cracks or signs of stress and if necessary engage a
professional engineer to conduct an investigation into its structural integrity and to
advise you on any remedies. If you require any assistance in the engagement of a
professional engineer, you may contact the Association of Consulting Engineers,
Singapore (Tel: 2205877) or the Institution of Engineers, Singapore (Tel: 2218915).

2 As this is a matter of concern, I would appreciate it if you could submit within 30

days a status report of the course of action taken by you. To facilitate your return, a
standard report format is enclosed for your case.

3 You or your professional engineer may contact our Building Plan Registry at Tel
No: 2296345 to ascertain if the plans and structural drawings and calculations of your
building are available, should you require them.

Yours faithfully

for DEPUTY DIRECTOR

DEVELOPMENT & BUILDING CONTROL DIVISION

114
 A N N E X 10

FORM OF STANDARD REPORT REQUIRED BY DBCD (from Exhibit CE236)

Date:

Deputy Director
Development & Building Control Division
Public Works Department
5 Maxwell Road #05-00
National Development Building
Singapore 0106

Dear Sir

RE: ____________________________ :__________________________________ _ _ _ _ _

I refer to your letter dated ___________ and confirm that I have taken the
following course of action:
*(a) I have checked the structure of my building and am satisfied that the building
is structurally safe.
*(b) I am engaging a professional engineer to carry out an investigation into the
structural integrity of my building and to recommend remedial measures if
found necessary.

Yours faithfully

(Owner’s Signature)

Owner’s Name :
Owner’s Address :

*Delete whichever not applicable.

 P r in te d b y S in g a p o r e N a t io n a l P r in te r s L td

Available from
Singapore National Printers Ltd, 303 Upper Serangoon Road, Singapore 1334
and S.N.P. Publications Sales Division, 8 Shenton Way #B l-07, Treasury Building, Singapore 0106