1
FIRST DIVISION Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued Proclamation
G.R. No. 187587 June 5, 2013
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision1promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97925.
THE FACTS
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in
the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation.
The military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later on renamed Fort Andres
Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation No. 208,
amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a
national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the
administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-
PVAO).
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending
Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from
the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the provisions of
Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.
At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which reads:
"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official
Gazette3 on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.
No. 172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this time excluded Lots
1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said lots open
for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the same day.
Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including
portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General Order
No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further unauthorized occupation and to
cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed
a Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), where it was docketed as
COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the following: (1) the reclassification of the areas they
occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and
disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director
of Lands; and (3) the Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject
lot to its bona fide occupants.4
On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed a Petition-
in-Intervention substantially praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for by NMSMI with regard to
the area the former then occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in Western Bicutan.5
Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution6 granting the Petition and declaring the portions
of land in question alienable and disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General
dissenting.7
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of
Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not be
defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Further, considering that Proclamation
No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers, it could not be
amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172 could
not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was issued on October 16,
1987 when President Aquino’s legislative power had ceased.
In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral stressed that pursuant to Article
2 of the Civil Code, publication is indispensable in every case. Likewise, she held that when the provision
of the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the court to look into legislative
intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.8 Finally, she maintained
that the Commission had no authority to supply the addendum originally omitted in the published
version of Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so would be tantamount to encroaching on the field of the
legislature.
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which was denied by the COSLAP in a
Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10

MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP Resolutions dated 1
September 2006 and 24 January 2007.
Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed Decision granting
MSS-PVAO’s Petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
September 1, 2006 and January 24, 2007 issued by the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems
in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the petitions of
respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as discussed herein. Further,
pending urgent motions filed by respondents are likewise
DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)
Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their respective Petitions for Review
with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
THE ISSUES
Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE
HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS ON THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS NOT PUBLISHED
IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
PROCLAMATION NO. 172 LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF LAND OCCUPIED BY MEMBER OF
HEREIN PETITIONER.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE HON.
COSLAP HAS BROAD POWERS TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT >INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO
RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS LAND CASES.14
On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476
BECAUSE THE HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS INCLUDING WESTERN
BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION.15
2
Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
subject lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that the
handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included in the publication of the said law.
THE COURT’S RULING
We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.
Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots), their claims
were anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476. They
allege that the former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the reclassification of
portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a notation just below the printed
version of Proclamation No. 2476.
However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation No.
2476 was published in the Official Gazette.
The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the
determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect of
law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law,
unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a different
effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s publication in the
Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with. The
issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon.
Tuvera,16 in which we had the occasion to rule thus:
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief
Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not become
effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The
reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of
the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall
become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply
because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must
also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An
example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who
was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public
although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter
of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a
proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be
invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential
decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual or
exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board
must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank
Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the
public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the
number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary
Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot
satisfy the publication requirement.1âwphi1 This is not even substantial compliance. This was the
manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree
undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The
evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their
dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure
and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry
or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. (Emphases supplied)
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was
not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force
and effect.
Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the publication of any
law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its
authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only
3
irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the
legislature apart from the words appearing in the law.17 This Court cannot rule that a word appears in
the law when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano,18 we ruled that "under
Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.' This does not mean, however, that courts can create
law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of
the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret
the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not
arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial
interpretation, but another legislation that would amend the law ‘to include petitioners' lots in the
reclassification.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED in
toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all
pending motions to cite respondent in contempt is DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of land in
the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military reservation.
The military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later on renamed Fort Andres
Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio). On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued
Proclamation No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio
and reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which
is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs
Office (MSS-PVAO). Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further
amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangays Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal
Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the
provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730. At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President
Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which reads: "P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan (SGD.)
Ferdinand E. Marcos"2 The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published
in the Official Gazette on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum. Years later, President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as
published, but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation
No. 423 and declared the said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.
Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including
portions of the Libingan ngmga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General Order
No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further unauthorized occupation and to
cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio. On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner
Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on
Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP). Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution granting
the Petition and declaring the portions of land in question alienable and disposable, with Associate
Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General dissenting. The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of
President Marcos was an integral part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The
 4

intention of the President could not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Herein
respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the COSLAP. MSS-PVAO
filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP Resolutions. The Court of
Appeals First Division rendered the assailed Decision granting MSS-PVAO’s Petition, Both NMSMI and
WBLOAI appealed the said Decision.

Issue: Whether or not the handwritten addendum was considered published also at the time the
Proclamation was published.

HELD:

No. Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots), their
claims were anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476.
They allege that the former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the reclassification of
portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a notation just below the printed
version of Proclamation No. 2476. However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not
included when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette. The resolution of whether
the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the determination of whether the
handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect of law. In relation thereto, Article 2
of the Civil Code expressly provides: ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall
take effect one year after such publication. Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is
indispensable to give effect to the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless
otherwise provided" refers to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the
completion of the law’s publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of
publication may be dispensed with.

The issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon.
Tuvera. Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as
published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force and effect. Furthermore, under
Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the publication of any law, resolution or other
official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or
not President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply
put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words
appearing in the law.17 This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when, evidently, there is
none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano,18 we ruled that "under Article 8 of the Civil Code,
'judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal
system of the Philippines.' This does not mean, however, that courts can create law. The courts exist for
interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be violative of the principle of
separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws,
particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate
unto itself the task of legislating." The remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but
another legislation that would amend the law ‘to include petitioners' lots in the reclassification.

EN BANC
RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND
PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND
OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY.
Promulgated: June 13, 2012
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
In a letter,[1] dated July 30, 2009, Rowena C. Paraan, Research Director of the Philippine Center for
Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), sought copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth (SALN)
of the Justices of this Court for the year 2008. She also requested for copies of the Personal Data Sheet
(PDS) or the Curriculum Vitae (CV) of the Justices of this Court for the purpose of updating their database
of information on government officials.
In her Letter,[2] dated August 13, 2009, Karol M. Ilagan, a researcher-writer also of the PCIJ, likewise
sought for copies of the SALN and PDS of the Justices of the Court of Appeals (CA), for the same above-
stated purpose.
The two requests were ordered consolidated by the Court on August 18, 2009.[3] On the same day, the
Court resolved to create a special committee (Committee) to review the policy on requests for SALN and
PDS and other similar documents, and to recommend appropriate action on such requests.[4]
On November 23, 2009, the Committee, chaired by then Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario
submitted its Memorandum[5] dated November 18, 2009 and its Resolution[6] dated November 16,
2009, recommending the creation of Committee on Public Disclosure that would, in essence, take over
the functions of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) with respect to requests for copies of, or
access to, SALN, and other personal documents of members of the Judiciary.
Meanwhile, several requests for copies of the SALN and other personal documents of the Justices of this
Court, the CA and the Sandiganbayan (SB) were filed. In particular, these requests include the:
(1) SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM,[7] dated September 10, 2009, issued by Atty. E. H. Amat, Acting Director,
General Investigation Bureau-B of the Office of the Ombudsman, directing the Office of Administrative
Services, Supreme Court to submit two (2) copies of the SALN of Associate Justice Roland B. Jurado of the
Sandiganbayan for the years 1997-2008, his latest PDS, his Oath of Office, appointment papers, and
service records.
(2) LETTER,[8] dated April 21, 2010, of the Philippine Public Transparency Reporting Project, asking
permission to be able to access and copy the SALN of officials and employees of the lower courts.
5
(3) LETTER,[9] filed on August 24, 2011, by Marvin Lim, seeking copies of the SALN of Chief Justice Renato
C. Corona, Associate Justices Antonio T. Carpio, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita Leonardo-De Castro,
Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad, Martin
S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez, Jose C. Mendoza, and Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno.
(4) LETTER,[10] dated August 26, 2011, of Rawnna Crisostomo, Reporter, GMA News and Public Affairs
also requesting for copies of the SALN of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona, Associate Justices Antonio T.
Carpio, Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Teresita Leonardo-De Castro, Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M. Peralta,
Lucas P. Bersamin, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Roberto A. Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose Portugal Perez,
Jose C. Mendoza, and Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno, for purposes of producing a story on transparency and
governance, and updating their database.
(5) LETTER,[11] dated October 11, 2011, of Bala S. Tamayo, requesting for a copy of the 2010 SALN of any
Justice of the Supreme Court as well as a copy of the Judiciary Development Fund, for purposes of her
securing a huge percentage in final examination in Constitutional Law I at the San Beda College Alabang
School of Law and for her study on the state of the Philippine Judiciary, particularly the manner, nature
and disposition of the resources under the JDF and how these have evolved through the years.
(6) LETTERS, all dated December 19, 2011, of Harvey S. Keh, Lead Convenor of Kaya Natin! Movement
for Good Governance and Ethical Leadership, addressed to Chief Justice Renato C. Corona,[12] Associate
Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.,[13] Teresita Leonardo-De Castro,[14] Arturo D. Brion,[15] Diosdado M.
Peralta,[16] Mariano C. Del Castillo,[17] Jose Portugal Perez,[18] and Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno,[19]
requesting for copies of their SALN and seeking permission to post the same on their website for the
general public.
(7) LETTER,[20] dated December 21, 2011, of Glenda M. Gloria, Executive Director, Newsbreak, seeking
copies of the SALN of the Supreme Court Justices covering various years, for the purpose of the stories
they intend to put on their website regarding the Supreme Court and the Judiciary.
(8) LETTERS, all dated January 3, 2012, of Phillipe Manalang of Unlimited Productions, Inc., addressed to
Associate Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.,[21] Teresita Leonardo-De Castro,[22] Mariano C. Del
Castillo[23] and Jose Portugal Perez,[24] and Atty. Enriqueta Esguerra-Vidal, Clerk of Court, Supreme
Court[25] requesting for copies of the SALN of the Supreme Court Justices for the years 2010 and 2011.
(9) LETTER,[26] dated December 19, 2011, of Malou Mangahas, Executive Director, PCIJ, requesting for
copies of the SALN, PDS or CVs of the Justices of the Supreme Court from the year they were appointed
to the present.
(10) SUBPOENA AD TESTIFICANDUM ET DUCES TECUM,[27] issued on January 17, 2012, by the Senate,
sitting as an Impeachment Court, in connection with Impeachment Case No. 002-2011 against Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona, requiring the Clerk of Court, among others, to bring with her the SALN of Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona for the years 2002 to 2011.
(11) LETTER,[28] dated January 16, 2012, of Nilo Ka Nilo H. Baculo, Sr., requesting copies of the SALN of
the Supreme Court Justices for the years 2008 to 2011, for his use as a media practitioner.

(12) LETTER,[29] dated January 25, 2012, of Roxanne Escaro-Alegre of GMA News, requesting for copies
of the SALN of the Supreme Court Justices for the networks story on the political dynamics and process
of decision-making in the Supreme Court.
(13) LETTER,[30] dated January 27, 2012, of David Jude Sta. Ana, Head, News Operations, News 5,
requesting for copies of the 2010-2011 SALN of the Supreme Court Justices for use as reference
materials for stories that will be aired in the newscasts of their television network.
(14) LETTER,[31] dated January 31, 2012, of Michael G. Aguinaldo, Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs, Malacaang, addressed to Atty. Enriqueta Esguerra-Vidal, Clerk of Court, Supreme Court, seeking
her comments and recommendation on House Bill No. 5694,[32] to aid in their determination of whether
the measure should be certified as urgent.
(15) Undated LETTER[33] of Benise P. Balaoing, Intern of Rappler.com, a news website, seeking copies of
the 2010 SALN of the Justices of the Court and the CA for the purpose of completing its database in
preparation for its coverage of the 2013 elections.
(16) LETTER,[34] dated April 27, 2012, of Maria A. Ressa, Chief Executive Officer and Executive Officer
and Executive Editor of Rappler, Inc., requesting for copies of the current SALN of all the Justices of the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan also for the purpose of completing its
database in preparation for its coverage of the 2013 elections.
(17) LETTER,[35] dated May 2, 2012, of Mary Ann A. Seir, Junior Researcher, News Research Section,
GMA News and Public Affairs, requesting for copies of the SALN of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona and
the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court for the calendar year 2011 for the networks use in their
public affairs programs.
(18) LETTER,[36] dated May 4, 2012, of Edward Gabud, Sr., Desk Editor of Solar Network, Inc., requesting
for copies of the 2011 SALN of all the Justices of the Supreme Court.
(19) LETTER,[37] dated May 30, 2012, of Gerry Lirio, Senior News Editor, TV5 requesting for copies of the
SALN of the Justices of the Court for the last three (3) years for the purpose of a special report it would
produce as a result of the impeachment and subsequent conviction of Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.
(20) LETTER,[38] dated May 31, 2012, of Atty. Joselito P. Fangon, Assistant Ombudsman, Field
Investigation Office, Office of the Ombudsman, requesting for 1] certified copies of the SALN of former
Chief Justice Renato C. Corona for the years 2002-2011, as well as 2] a certificate of his yearly
compensation, allowances, and bonuses, also for the years 2002-2011.
(21) LETTER,[39] dated June 8, 2012, of Thea Marie S. Pias, requesting a copy of the SALN of any present
Supreme Court Justice, for the purpose of completing her grade in Legal Philosophy at the San Beda
College of Law.
Pursuant to Section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,[40] the Court, upon recommendation of the
OCA, issued its Resolution[41] dated October 13, 2009, denying the subpoena duces tecum for the SALNs
and personal documents of Justice Roland B. Jurado of the SB. The resolution also directed the
6
Ombudsman to forward to the Court any complaint and/or derogatory report against Justice Roland B.
Jurado, in consonance with the doctrine laid down in Caiobes v. Ombudsman.[42] Upon compliance by
the Ombudsman, the Court, in its Resolution[43] dated February 2, 2010, docketed this matter as a
regular administrative complaint.
Also, considering the development in Impeachment Case No. 002-2011 against Chief Justice Renato C.
Corona, the Court, on January 24, 2012, resolved to consider moot the Subpoena Ad Testificandum Et
Duces Tecum issued by the Senate impeachment court.[45]
In resolving the remaining pending incidents, the Court, on January 17, 2012 required the CA, the SB, the
CTA, the Philippine Judges Association, the Metropolitan and City Judges Association of the Philippines,
the Philippine Trial Judges League, and the Philippine Women Judges Association (PWJA), to file their
respective comments.
In essence, it is the consensus of the Justices of the above-mentioned courts and the various judges
associations that while the Constitution holds dear the right of the people to have access to matters of
concern, the Constitution also holds sacred the independence of the Judiciary. Thus, although no direct
opposition to the disclosure of SALN and other personal documents is being expressed, it is the uniform
position of the said magistrates and the various judges associations that the disclosure must be made in
accord with the guidelines set by the Court and under such circumstances that would not undermine the
independence of the Judiciary.
After a review of the matters at hand, it is apparent that the matter raised for consideration of the Court
is not a novel one. As early as 1989, the Court had the opportunity to rule on the matter of SALN
disclosure in Re: Request of Jose M. Alejandrino,[46] where the Court denied the request of Atty.
Alejandrino for the SALNs of the Justices of the Court due to a plainly discernible improper motive.
Aggrieved by an adverse decision of the Court, he accused the Justices of patent partiality and alluded
that they enjoyed an early Christmas as a result of the decision promulgated by the Court. Atty.
Alejandrino even singled out the Justices who took part in the decision and conspicuously excluded the
others who, for one reason or another, abstained from voting therein. While the Court expressed its
willingness to have the Clerk of Court furnish copies of the SALN of any of its members, it however,
noted that requests for SALNs must be made under circumstances that must not endanger, diminish or
destroy the independence, and objectivity of the members of the Judiciary in the performance of their
judicial functions, or expose them to revenge for adverse decisions, kidnapping, extortion, blackmail or
other untoward incidents. Thus, in order to give meaning to the constitutional right of the people to
have access to information on matters of public concern, the Court laid down the guidelines to be
observed for requests made. Thus:
1. All requests for copies of statements of assets and liabilities of any Justice or Judge shall be filed with
the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court or with the Court Administrator, as the case may be (Section 8
[A][2], R.A. 6713), and shall state the purpose of the request.
2. The independence of the Judiciary is constitutionally as important as the right to information which is
subject to the limitations provided by law. Under specific circumstances, the need for fair and just
adjudication of litigations may require a court to be wary of deceptive requests for information which
shall otherwise be freely available. Where the request is directly or indirectly traced to a litigant, lawyer,

or interested party in a case pending before the court, or where the court is reasonably certain that a
disputed matter will come before it under circumstances from which it may, also reasonably, be
assumed that the request is not made in good faith and for a legitimate purpose, but to fish for
information and, with the implicit threat of its disclosure, to influence a decision or to warn the court of
the unpleasant consequences of an adverse judgment, the request may be denied.
3. Where a decision has just been rendered by a court against the person making the request and the
request for information appears to be a fishing expedition intended to harass or get back at the Judge,
the request may be denied.
4. In the few areas where there is extortion by rebel elements or where the nature of their work exposes
Judges to assaults against their personal safety, the request shall not only be denied but should be
immediately reported to the military.
5. The reason for the denial shall be given in all cases.
In the 1992 case of Re: Request for Certified True Copies of the Sworn Statements of Assets, Liabilities
and Networth,[47] the request was denied because the Court found that the purpose of the request was
to fish for information against certain members of the Judiciary. In the same case, the Court resolved to
authorize the Court Administrator to act on all requests for copies of SALN, as well as other papers on file
with the 201 Personnel Records of lower court judges and personnel, provided that there was a court
subpoena duly signed by the Presiding Judge in a pending criminal case against a judge or personnel of
the Judiciary. The Court added that for requests made by the Office of the Ombudsman, the same must
be personally signed by the Ombudsman himself. Essentially, the Court resolved that, in all instances,
requests must conform to the guidelines set in the Alejandrino case and that the documents or papers
requested for must be relevant and material to the case being tried by the court or under investigation
by the Ombudsman.
In 1993, the Court, in Request for Certified True Copies of the Sworn Statements of Assets, Liabilities and
Net Worth of former Judge Luis D. Dictado,[48] ruled that the OCA may extend its granted authority to
retired members of the Judiciary.
With respect to investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman in a criminal case against a
judge, the Court, in Maceda v. Vasquez,[49] upheld its constitutional duty to exercise supervision over all
inferior courts and ruled that an investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman without prior referral of
the criminal case to the Court was an encroachment of a constitutional duty that ran afoul to the
doctrine of separation of powers. This pronouncement was further amplified in the abovementioned
case of Caiobes. Thus:
x x x Under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is the Supreme Court which is vested with
exclusive administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel. Prescinding from this premise, the
Ombudsman cannot determine for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a judge, or
court employee, involves an administrative matter. The Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases
against judges and court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for determination as to
whether an administrative aspect is involved therein. This rule should hold true regardless of whether an
administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint before the Ombudsman is already pending
7
with the Court. For, aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this matter unless he is
informed of it, he should give due respect for and recognition of the administrative authority of the
Court, because in determining whether an administrative matter is involved, the Court passes upon not
only administrative liabilities but also administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in the case of
Maceda v. Vasquez (221 SCRA 464[1993]).
The Ombudsman cannot dictate to, and bind the Court, to its findings that the case before it does or
does not have administrative implications. To do so is to deprive the Court of the exercise of its
administrative prerogatives and to arrogate unto itself a power not constitutionally sanctioned. This is a
dangerous policy which impinges, as it does, on judicial independence.
Maceda is emphatic that by virtue of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all
courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals down to the lowest
municipal trial court clerk, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court personnels
compliance with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of
the doctrine of separation of powers.
Corollary to the above pronouncements, Section 7, Article III of the Constitution is relevant in the issue
of public disclosure of SALN and other documents of public officials, viz:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Emphasizing the import and meaning of the foregoing constitutional provision, the Court, in the
landmark case of Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.,[50] elucidated on the import of the right to information in
this wise:
The cornerstone of this republican system of government is delegation of power by the people to the
State. In this system, governmental agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority
conferred by the people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the
citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power had been delegated.
The postulate of public office is a public trust, institutionalized in the Constitution to protect the people
from abuse of governmental power, would certainly be mere empty words if access to such information
of public concern is denied x x x.
x x x The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure
and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in
governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government. (Emphases supplied)
In Baldoza v. Dimaano,[51] the importance of the said right was pragmatically explicated:
 8

The incorporation of this right in the Constitution is a recognition of the fundamental role of free (e) all business interests and financial connections.
exchange of information in a democracy. There can be no realistic perception by the public of the
nations problems, nor a meaningful democratic decision-making if they are denied access to information The documents must be filed:
of general interest. Information is needed to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies
of the times. As has been aptly observed: Maintaining the flow of such information depends on (a) within thirty (30) days after assumption of office;
protection for both its acquisition and its dissemination since, if either process is interrupted, the flow
inevitably ceases. However, restrictions on access to certain records may be imposed by law. (b) on or before April 30, of every year thereafter; and

Thus, while public concern like public interest eludes exact definition and has been said to embrace a (c) within thirty (30) days after separation from the service.
broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because such matters directly
All public officials and employees required under this section to file the aforestated documents shall also
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen,[52]
execute, within thirty (30) days from the date of their assumption of office, the necessary authority in
the Constitution itself, under Section 17, Article XI, has classified the information disclosed in the SALN as
favor of the Ombudsman to obtain from all appropriate government agencies, including the Bureau of
a matter of public concern and interest. In other words, a duty to disclose sprang from the right to know.
Internal Revenue, such documents as may show their assets, liabilities, net worth, and also their business
Both of constitutional origin, the former is a command while the latter is a permission. Hence, the duty
interests and financial connections in previous years, including, if possible, the year when they first
on the part of members of the government to disclose their SALNs to the public in the manner provided
assumed any office in the Government.
by law:

Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may
be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of
the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the
Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with
general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.
This Constitutional duty is echoed and particularized in a statutory creation of Congress: Republic Act No.
6713, also known as "Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees":[53]
Section 8. Statements and Disclosure. - Public officials and employees have an obligation to accomplish
and submit declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net
worth and financial and business interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children
under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.
(A) Statements of Assets and Liabilities and Financial Disclosure. - All public officials and employees,
except those who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, shall file
under oath their Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and a Disclosure of Business Interests
and Financial Connections and those of their spouses and unmarried children under eighteen (18) years
of age living in their households.
The two documents shall contain information on the following:
(a) real property, its improvements, acquisition costs, assessed value and current fair market value;
(b) personal property and acquisition cost;
(c) all other assets such as investments, cash on hand or in banks, stocks, bonds, and the like;
Husband and wife who are both public officials or employees may file the required statements jointly or
separately.
The Statements of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth and the Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial
Connections shall be filed by:
(1) Constitutional and national elective officials, with the national office of the Ombudsman;
(2) Senators and Congressmen, with the Secretaries of the Senate and the House of Representatives,
respectively; Justices, with the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court; Judges, with the Court
Administrator; and all national executive officials with the Office of the President.
(3) Regional and local officials and employees, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions;
(4) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, with the Office of the
President, and those below said ranks, with the Deputy Ombudsman in their respective regions; and
(5) All other public officials and employees, defined in Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, with the Civil
Service Commission.
(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives. - It shall be the duty of every public official or employee to
identify and disclose, to the best of his knowledge and information, his relatives in the Government in
the form, manner and frequency prescribed by the Civil Service Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information, with its companion right of access
to official records, is not absolute. While providing guaranty for that right, the Constitution also provides
that the peoples right to know is limited to matters of public concern and is further subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.

(d) liabilities, and;


Jurisprudence[54] has provided the following limitations to that right: (1) national security matters and
intelligence information; (2) trade secrets and banking transactions; (3) criminal matters; and (4) other
confidential information such as confidential or classified information officially known to public officers
and employees by reason of their office and not made available to the public as well as diplomatic
correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, and
the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.
This could only mean that while no prohibition could stand against access to official records, such as the
SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to regulation.
In this regard, Section 8 (c) and (d) of R.A. No. 6713 provides for the limitation and prohibition on the
regulated access to SALNs of government officials and employees, viz:
(C) Accessibility of documents. - (1) Any and all statements filed under this Act, shall be made available
for inspection at reasonable hours.
(2) Such statements shall be made available for copying or reproduction after ten (10) working days from
the time they are filed as required by law.
(3) Any person requesting a copy of a statement shall be required to pay a reasonable fee to cover the
cost of reproduction and mailing of such statement, as well as the cost of certification.
(4) Any statement filed under this Act shall be available to the public for a period of ten (10) years after
receipt of the statement. After such period, the statement may be destroyed unless needed in an
ongoing investigation.
(D) Prohibited acts. - It shall be unlawful for any person to obtain or use any statement filed under this
Act for:
(a) any purpose contrary to morals or public policy; or
(b) any commercial purpose other than by news and communications media for dissemination to the
general public.
Moreover, the following provisions in the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 6713 provide:
Rule IV
Transparency of Transactions and Access to Information
Section 3. Every department, office or agency shall provide official information, records or documents to
any requesting public, except if:
(a) such information, record or document must be kept secret in the interest of national defense or
security or the conduct of foreign affairs;
(b) such disclosure would put the life and safety of an individual in imminent danger;
9
(c) the information, record or document sought falls within the concepts of established privilege or
recognized exceptions as may be provided by law or settled policy or jurisprudence;
(d) such information, record or document compromises drafts or decisions, orders, rulings, policy,
decisions, memoranda, etc;
(e) it would disclose information of a personal nature where disclosure would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
(f) it would disclose investigatory records complied for law enforcement purposes, or information which
if written would be contained in such records or information would (i) interfere with enforcement
proceedings, (ii) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial adjudication, (iii) disclose the
identity of a confidential source and, in the case of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement
authority in the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency conducting a lawful national security
intelligence investigation, confidential information furnished only by the confidential source, or (iv)
unjustifiably disclose investigative techniques and procedures; or
(g) it would disclose information the premature disclosure of which would (i) in the case of a
department, office or agency which agency regulates currencies, securities, commodities, of financial
institutions, be likely to lead to significant financial speculation in currencies, securities, or commodities
or significantly endanger the stability of any financial institution, or (ii) in the case of any department,
office or agency be likely or significantly to frustrate implementation of a proposed official action, except
that subparagraph (f) (ii) shall not apply in any instance where the department, office or agency has
already disclosed to the public the content or nature of its proposed action, or where the department,
office or agency is required by law to make such disclosure on its own initiative prior to taking final
official action on such proposal.
Rule VI
Duties of Public Officials and Employees
Section 6. All public documents must be made accessible to, and readily available for inspection by, the
public during working hours, except those provided in Section 3, Rule IV.
The power to regulate the access by the public to these documents stems from the inherent power of
the Court, as custodian of these personal documents, to control its very office to the end that damage
to, or loss of, the records may be avoided; that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of
the books and documents and other employees may be prevented; and that the right of other persons
entitled to make inspection may be insured.[55]
In this connection, Section 11 of the same law provides for the penalties in case there should be a misuse
of the SALN and the information contained therein, viz:
Section 11. Penalties. - (a) Any public official or employee, regardless of whether or not he holds office or
employment in a casual, temporary, holdover, permanent or regular capacity, committing any violation
of this Act shall be punished with a fine not exceeding the equivalent of six (6) months' salary or

suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or removal depending on the gravity of the offense after due
notice and hearing by the appropriate body or agency. If the violation is punishable by a heavier penalty
under another law, he shall be prosecuted under the latter statute. Violations of Sections 7, 8 or 9 of this
Act shall be punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding five
thousand pesos (₱5,000), or both, and, in the discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction,
disqualification to hold public office.
(b) Any violation hereof proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall be sufficient cause for
removal or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against
him.
(c) Private individuals who participate in conspiracy as co-principals, accomplices or accessories, with
public officials or employees, in violation of this Act, shall be subject to the same penal liabilities as the
public officials or employees and shall be tried jointly with them.
(d) The official or employee concerned may bring an action against any person who obtains or uses a
report for any purpose prohibited by Section 8 (d) of this Act. The Court in which such action is brought
may assess against such person a penalty in any amount not to exceed twenty-five thousand pesos
(₱25,000.00). If another sanction hereunder or under any other law is heavier, the latter shall apply.
Considering the foregoing legal precepts vis--vis the various requests made, the Court finds no cogent
reason to deny the public access to the SALN, PDS and CV of the Justices of the Court and other
magistrates of the Judiciary subject, of course, to the limitations and prohibitions provided in R.A. No.
6713, its implementing rules and regulations, and in the guidelines set forth in the decretal portion.
The Court notes the valid concerns of the other magistrates regarding the possible illicit motives of some
individuals in their requests for access to such personal information and their publication. However,
custodians of public documents must not concern themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of
the persons seeking access to the records. The moral or material injury which their misuse might inflict
on others is the requestors responsibility and lookout. Any publication is made subject to the
consequences of the law.[56] While public officers in the custody or control of public records have the
discretion to regulate the manner in which records may be inspected, examined or copied by interested
persons, such discretion does not carry with it the authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination,
or copying of the records.[57] After all, public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must,
at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.[58]
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the requests contained in the (1) Letter, dated July 30, 2009,
of Rowena C. Paraan; (2) Letter, dated August 13, 2009, of Karol M. Ilagan; (3) Letter, dated April 21,
2010, of the Philippine Public Transparency Reporting Project; (4) Letter, filed on August 24, 2011, by
Marvin Lim; (5) Letter, dated August 26, 2011, of Rawnna Crisostomo; (6) Letter, dated October 11, 2011,
of Bala S. Tamayo; (7) Letters, all dated December 19, 2011, of Harvey S. Keh; (8) Letter, dated December
21, 2011, of Glenda M. Gloria; (9) Letters, all dated January 3, 2012, of Phillipe Manalang; (10) Letter,
dated December 19, 2011, of Malou Mangahas; (11) Letter, dated January 16, 2012, of Nilo Ka Nilo H.
Baculo; (12) Letter, dated January 25, 2012, of Roxanne Escaro-Alegre; (13) Letter, dated January 27,
2012, of David Jude Sta. Ana; (14) Letter, dated January 31, 2012, of Michael G. Aguinaldo; (15) undated
10
Letter of Benise P. Balaoing; (16) Letter, dated April 27, 2012, of Maria A. Ressa; (17) Letter, dated May 2,
2012, of Mary Ann A. Seir; (18) Letter, dated May 4, 2012, of Edward Gabud, Sr., Desk Editor of Solar
Network, Inc.; (19) Letter, dated May 30, 2012, of Gerry Lirio, Senior News Editor, TV5; (20) Letter, dated
May 31, 2002, of Atty. Joselito P. Fangon of the Office of the Ombudsman; and (21) Letter, dated June 7,
2012, of Thea Marie S. Pias, insofar as copies of the 2011 SALN, PDS, and CV of the Justices of the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, and the Court of Tax Appeals; Judges of lower
courts; and other members of the Judiciary, are concerned, subject to the limitations and prohibitions
provided in R.A. No. 6713, its implementing rules and regulations, and the following guidelines:
1. All requests shall be filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax Appeals; for the lower courts, with the Office of the Court
Administrator; and for attached agencies, with their respective heads of offices.
2. Requests shall cover only copies of the latest SALN, PDS and CV of the members, officials and
employees of the Judiciary, and may cover only previous records if so specifically requested and
considered as justified, as determined by the officials mentioned in par. 1 above, under the terms of
these guidelines and the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 6713.
3. In the case of requests for copies of SALN of the Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, the authority to disclose shall be made by the
Court En Banc.
4. Every request shall explain the requesting partys specific purpose and their individual interests
sought to be served; shall state the commitment that the request shall only be for the stated purpose;
and shall be submitted in a duly accomplished request form secured from the SC website. The use of the
information secured shall only be for the stated purpose.
5. In the case of requesting individuals other than members of the media, their interests should go
beyond pure or mere curiosity.
6. In the case of the members of the media, the request shall additionally be supported by proof under
oath of their media affiliation and by a similar certification of the accreditation of their respective
organizations as legitimate media practitioners.
7. The requesting party, whether as individuals or as members of the media, must have no derogatory
record of having misused any requested information previously furnished to them.
The requesting parties shall complete their requests in accordance with these guidelines. The custodians
of these documents[59] (the respective Clerks of Court of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals,
Sandiganbayan, and Court of Tax Appeals for the Justices; and the Court Administrator for the Judges of
various trial courts) shall preliminarily determine if the requests are not covered by the limitations and
prohibitions provided in R.A. No. 6713 and its implementing rules and regulations, and in accordance
with the aforecited guidelines. Thereafter, the Clerk of Court shall refer the matter pertaining to Justices
to the Court En Banc for final determination.
SO ORDERED.
 11

Facts:

Rowena Paraan, Research Director of the PCIJ, sought copies of the SALN of the Justices of the Supreme
Court for the year 2008. She also requested for copies of the Personal Data Sheet of the Justices of
thisCourt for the purpose of updating their database of information on government officials.

Issue #1:

Can the SALN of justices be accessed via the right to information?

Ruling:

Yes. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure
and honesty in the public service

Issue #2:

What are the limitations on the constitutional right to information?

Ruling:

The right to information is not absolute. It is further subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law. Jurisprudence has provided the following limitations to that right:(1) national security matters and
intelligence information;(2) trade secrets and banking transactions;(3) criminal matters; and(4) other
confidential information such as confidential or classified information officially known to public officers
and employees by reason of their office and not made available to the public as well as diplomatic
correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, and
the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.
 12

FIRST DIVISION subjects (b) her answer sheets; (c) the answer keys to the questionnaires, and (d) an explanation of the
grading system used in each subject (collectively, the Examination Papers).5
G.R. No. 165036 July 5, 2010
Acting Chairman Domondon denied petitioner’s request on two grounds: first, that Section 36, Article III
of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals, as amended by
HAZEL MA. C. ANTOLIN, Petitioner,
Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Resolution No. 332, series of 1994, only permitted access to
vs.
the petitioner’s answer sheet (which she had been shown previously), and that reconsideration of her
ABELARDO T. DOMONDON, JOSE A. GANGAN, and VIOLETA J. JOSEF, Respondents.
examination result was only proper under the grounds stated therein:

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Examinations have a two-fold purpose. First, they are summative; examinations are intended to assess
and record what and how much the students have learned. Second, and perhaps more importantly, they
are formative; examinations are intended to be part and parcel of the learning process. In a perfect
system, they are tools for learning. In view of the pedagogical aspect of national examinations, the need
for all parties to fully ventilate their respective positions, and the view that government transactions can
only be improved by public scrutiny, we remand these cases to the trial court for further proceedings.
Factual Antecedents
Sec. 36 An examinee shall be allowed to have access or to go over his/her test papers or answer sheets
on a date not later than thirty (30) days from the official release of the results of the examination. Within
ten (10) days from such date, he/she may file his/her request for reconsideration of ratings.
Reconsideration of rating shall be effected only on grounds of mechanical error in the grading of his/her
testpapers or answer sheets, or malfeasance.6lawph!l
Second, Acting Chairman Domondon clarified that the Board was precluded from releasing the
Examination Papers (other than petitioner’s answer sheet) by Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No.
338, series of 1994, which provides:
Sec. 20. Illegal, Immoral, Dishonorable, Unprofessional Acts – The hereunder acts shall constitute
prejudicial, illegal, grossly immoral, dishonorable, or unprofessional conduct:

Petitioner took the accountancy licensure examinations (the Certified Public Accountant [CPA] Board A. Providing, getting, receiving, holding, using or reproducing questions
Exams) conducted by the Board of Accountancy (the Board) in October 1997.1 The examination results
were released on October 29, 1997; out of 6,481 examinees, only 1,171 passed. Unfortunately,
3. that have been given in the examination except if the test bank for the subject has on deposit at least
petitioner did not make it. When the results were released, she received failing grades in four out of the
two thousand (2,000) questions.7
seven subjects.2

After a further exchange of correspondence,8 the Board informed petitioner that an investigation was
Subject Petitioner’s Grade conducted into her exam and there was no mechanical error found in the grading of her test papers.9
Theory of Accounts 65 %
Proceedings before the Regional Trial Court
Business Law 66 %

Management Services 69 % Undeterred, on January 12, 1998, petitioner filed a Petition for Mandamus with Damages against the
Board of Accountancy and its members10 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. The case was
Auditing Theory 82 % raffled to Branch 33, and docketed as Civil Case No. 98-86881. The Petition included a prayer for the
issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction ordering the Board of Accountancy and its members (the
Auditing Problems 70 % respondents) to furnish petitioner with copies of the Examination Papers. Petitioner also prayed that
final judgment be issued ordering respondents to furnish petitioner with all documents and other
Practical Accounting I 68 %
materials as would enable her to determine whether respondents fairly administered the examinations
Practical Accounting II 77 % and correctly graded petitioner’s performance therein, and, if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of
registration as a CPA.11

Convinced that she deserved to pass the examinations, she wrote to respondent Abelardo T. Domondon
(Domondon), Acting Chairman of the Board of Accountancy, and requested that her answer sheets be re-
corrected.3 On November 3, 1997, petitioner was shown her answer sheets, but these consisted merely
of shaded marks, so she was unable to determine why she failed the exam.4 Thus, on November 10,
1997, she again wrote to the Board to request for copies of (a) the questionnaire in each of the seven
On February 5, 1998, respondents filed their Opposition to the Application for a Writ of Preliminary
Mandatory Injunction, and argued, inter alia, that petitioner was not entitled to the relief sought, that
the respondents did not have the duty to furnish petitioner with copies of the Examination Papers, and
that petitioner had other plain, speedy, adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, namely,
recourse to the PRC.12 Respondents also filed their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim in the main
case, which asked that the Petition for Mandamus with Damages be dismissed for lack of merit on the
 13

following grounds: (1) petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies; (2) the petition stated no On June 21, 2002, the trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that the petition had already
cause of action because there was no ministerial duty to release the information demanded; and (3) the become moot, since petitioner managed to pass the 1998 CPA Board examinations.20 Petitioner sought
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern is subject to limitations provided by law, reconsideration21 which was granted by the trial court in its Omnibus Order22 dated November 11, 2002.
including Section 20, Article IV, of PRC Resolution No. 338, series of 1994.13 The Omnibus Order provides in part:

On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed an Amended Petition (which was admitted by the RTC), where she On the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner, the Court is inclined to reconsider its Order
included the following allegation in the body of her petition: dismissing the petition. The Court agrees with the petitioner that the passing of the petitioner in the
subsequent CPA examination did not render the petition moot and academic because the relief "and if
warranted, to issue to her a certificate of registration as Certified Public Accountant" was deleted from
The allegations in this amended petition are meant only to plead a cause of action for access to the
the original petition. As regard the issue of whether the petitioner has the constitutional right to have
documents requested, not for re-correction which petitioner shall assert in the proper forum depending
access to the questioned documents, the Court would want first the parties to adduce evidence before it
on, among others, whether she finds sufficient error in the documents to warrant such or any other
can resolve the issue so that it can make a complete determination of the rights of the parties.
relief. None of the allegations in this amended petition, including those in the following paragraphs, is
made to assert a cause of action for re-correction.14
The Court would also want the Professional Regulation Commission to give its side of the case the
moment it is impleaded as a respondent in the Second Amended Petition for Mandamus filed by the
If only to underscore the fact that she was not asking for a re-checking of her exam, the following prayer
petitioner which this Court is inclined to grant.
for relief was deleted from the Amended Petition: "and, if warranted, to issue to her a certificate of
registration as a CPA."
As to the Motion for Conservatory Measures filed by the petitioner, the Court denies the same. It is clear
that the PRC has in custody the documents being requested by the petitioner. It has also an adequate
On June 23, 1998, respondents filed a Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Application for Writ of
facility to preserve and safeguard the documents. To be sure that the questioned documents are
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, on the ground that petitioner had taken and passed the May 1998
preserved and safeguarded, the Court will order the PRC to preserve and safeguard the documents and
CPA Licensure Examination and had taken her oath as a CPA.15 Petitioner filed her Opposition on July 8,
make them available anytime the Court or petitioner needs them.
1998.16 Subsequently, on October 29, 1998, respondents filed their Answer with Counterclaim to the
amended petition. They reiterated their original allegations and further alleged that there was no cause
of action because at the time the Amended Petition was admitted, they had ceased to be members of WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court dated June 20, 2002 is reconsidered and set aside. The Professional
the Board of Accountancy and they were not in possession of the documents sought by the petitioner.17 Regulation Commission is ordered to preserve and safeguard the following documents:

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court a) Questionnaire in each of the seven subjects comprising the Accountancy Examination of
October, 1997;
In an Order dated October 16, 1998, the trial court granted respondent’s Motion to Dismiss Petitioner’s
Application for a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction (not the main case), ruling that the matter b) Petitioner’s Answer Sheets; and
had become moot since petitioner passed the May CPA Licensure 1998 Examination and had already
taken her oath as a CPA.18
c) Answer keys to the questionnaires.

Undaunted, petitioner sought and obtained leave to file a Second Amended Petition for Mandamus with
SO ORDERED.23
Damages19where she finally impleaded the PRC as respondent and included the following plea in her
prayer:
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied.24
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays that:
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
2. Judgment be issued –
The RTC Decisions led to the filing of three separate petitions for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
(CA):
(a) commanding respondents to give petitioner all documents and other materials as would enable her
to determine whether respondents fairly administered the same examinations and correctly graded
petitioner’s performance therein and, if warranted, to make the appropriate revisions on the results of (a) CA-GR SP No. 76498, a petition filed by respondents Domondon, Gangan, and Josef on
her examination. (Emphasis ours) April 11, 2003;

(b) CA-GR SP No. 76546, a petition filed by respondent Ibe on April 30, 2003; and

(c) CA-GR SP No. 76545, a petition filed by the Board of Accountancy and PRC.
It is the first two proceedings that are pending before us. In both cases, the CA set aside the RTC
Decisions and ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 98-8681.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its December 11, 2006 Decision25 in CA-GR SP No. 76546, the CA ruled that the petition has become
moot in view of petitioner’s eventual passing of the 1998 CPA Board Exam. In CA-GR SP No. 76498, the
CA found, in a Decision dated February 16, 2004,26 that (i) Section 20, Article IV of PRC Resolution No.
338 constituted a valid limitation on petitioner’s right to information and access to government
documents; (ii) the Examination Documents were not of public concern, because petitioner merely
sought review of her failing marks; (iii) it was not the ministerial or mandatory function of the
respondents to review and reassess the answers to examination questions of a failing examinee; (iv) the
case has become moot, since petitioner already passed the May 1998 CPA Board Examinations and took
her oath as a CPA; and (v) petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies, because, having failed to
secure the desired outcome from the respondents, she did not elevate the matter to the PRC before
seeking judicial intervention.27
CA-GR SP No. 76498 and CA-GR SP No. 76546 were brought before us by the petitioner and docketed as
G.R. Nos. 165036 and 175705, respectively. The cases were then consolidated, in view of the similarity of
the factual antecedents and issues, and to avoid the possibility of conflicting decisions by different
divisions of this Court.28
Issues
Before us, petitioner argues that she has a right to obtain copies of the examination papers so she can
determine for herself why and how she failed and to ensure that the Board properly performed its
duties. She argues that the Constitution29 as well as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees30 support her right to demand access to the Examination Papers. Furthermore,
she claims that there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies, since no recourse to the PRC was
available, and only a pure question of law is involved in this case. Finally, she claims that her demand for
access to documents was not rendered moot by her passing of the 1998 CPA Board Exams.
Our Ruling
Propriety of Writ of Mandamus
At the very outset let us be clear of our ruling. Any claim for re-correction or revision of her 1997
examination cannot be compelled by mandamus. This much was made evident by our ruling in Agustin-
Ramos v. Sandoval,31 where we stated:
After deliberating on the petition in relation to the other pleadings filed in the proceedings at bar, the
Court resolved to DENY said petition for lack of merit. The petition at bar prays for the setting aside of
the Order of respondent Judge dismissing petitioners’ mandamus action to compel the other
respondents (Medical Board of Examiners and the Professional Regulation Commission) "to reconsider,
recorrect and/or rectify the board ratings of the petitioners from their present failing grades to higher or
passing marks." The function of reviewing and re-assessing the petitioners’ answers to the examination
14
questions, in the light of the facts and arguments presented by them x x x is a discretionary function of
the Medical Board, not a ministerial and mandatory one, hence, not within the scope of the writ of
mandamus. The obvious remedy of the petitioners from the adverse judgment by the Medical Board of
Examiners was an appeal to the Professional Regulation Commission itself, and thence to the Court of
Appeals; and since they did not apply for relief to the Commission prior to their institution of the special
civil action of mandamus in the Regional Trial Court, the omission was fatal to the action under the
familiar doctrine requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. Apart from the obvious undesirability
of a procedure which would allow Courts to substitute their judgment for that of Government boards in
the determination of successful examinees in any administered examination – an area in which courts
have no expertise – and the circumstance that the law declares the Court of Appeals to be the
appropriate review Court, the Regional Trial Court was quite correct in refusing to take cognizance of an
action seeking reversal of the quasi-judicial action taken by the Medical Board of Examiners.32(Emphasis
ours)
For a writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a well-defined, clear, and certain legal right to
the thing demanded. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be
equally clear.33 No such clarity exists here; neither does petitioner’s right to demand a revision of her
examination results. And despite petitioner’s assertions that she has not made any demand for re-
correction, the most cursory perusal of her Second Amended Petition and her prayer that the
respondents "make the appropriate revisions on the results of her examination" belies this claim.
Like the claimants in Agustin, the remedy of petitioner from the refusal of the Board to release the
Examination Papers should have been through an appeal to the PRC. Undoubtedly, petitioner had an
adequate remedy from the Board’s refusal to provide her with copies of the Examination Papers. Under
Section 5(a) of Presidential Decree No. 223,34 the PRC has the power to promulgate rules and regulations
to implement policies for the regulation of the accounting profession.35 In fact, it is one such regulation
(PRC Resolution No. 338) that is at issue in this case. In addition, under Section 5(c), the PRC has the
power to
review, coordinate, integrate and approve the policies, resolutions, rules and regulations, orders or
decisions promulgated by the various Boards with respect to the profession or occupation under their
jurisdictions including the results of their licensure examinations but their decisions on administrative
cases shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission within thirty (30) days from the
date of promulgation thereof.
Petitioner posits that no remedy was available because the PRC’s power to "review" and "approve" in
Section 5(c) only refers to appeals in decisions concerning administrative investigations36 and not to
instances where documents are being requested. Not only is this position myopic and self-serving, it is
bereft of either statutory or jurisprudential basis. The PRC’s quasi-legislative and enforcement powers,
encompassing its authority to review and approve "policies, resolutions, rules and regulations, orders, or
decisions" cover more than administrative investigations conducted pursuant to its quasi-judicial
powers.37 More significantly, since the PRC itself issued the resolution questioned by the petitioner here,
it was in the best position to resolve questions addressed to its area of expertise. Indeed, petitioner
could have saved herself a great deal of time and effort had she given the PRC the opportunity to rectify
any purported errors committed by the Board.
One of the reasons for exhaustion of administrative remedies is our well-entrenched doctrine on
separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with
matters falling primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of other departments.38 Courts,
for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available

administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an
appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative
forum. 39
However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to exceptions, among which is
when only a question of law is involved.40 This is because issues of law – such as whether petitioner has a
constitutional right to demand access to the Examination Papers - cannot be resolved with finality by the
administrative officer.41
Issues of Mootness
We now turn to the question of whether the petition has become moot in view of petitioner’s having
passed the 1998 CPA examination. An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy, so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value.42
In this jurisdiction, any citizen may challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his or her right to
information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus.43 And since every citizen possesses the
inherent right to be informed by the mere fact of citizenship,44 we find that petitioner’s belated passing
of the CPA Board Exams does not automatically mean that her interest in the Examination Papers has
become mere superfluity. Undoubtedly, the constitutional question presented, in view of the likelihood
that the issues in this case will be repeated, warrants review.45
The crux of this case is whether petitioner may compel access to the Examination Documents through
mandamus. As always, our inquiry must begin with the Constitution. Section 7, Article III provides:
Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as
well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen,
subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
Together with the guarantee of the right to information, Section 28, Article II promotes full disclosure
and transparency in government, viz:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The people's right to
information is limited to "matters of public concern," and is further "subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law." Similarly, the State's policy of full disclosure is limited to "transactions involving
public interest," and is "subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law". The Court has always
grappled with the meanings of the terms "public interest" and "public concern." As observed in Legaspi
v. Civil Service Commission:46
In determining whether x x x a particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can
be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms
embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly
affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In
15
the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is
of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.
We have also recognized the need to preserve a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as
national security, trade secrets and banking transactions, criminal matters, and other confidential
matters.47
We are prepared to concede that national board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are matters
of public concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would understandably be
interested in the fair and competent administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those
qualified are admitted into the accounting profession. And as with all matters pedagogical, these
examinations could be not merely quantitative means of assessment, but also means to further improve
the teaching and learning of the art and science of accounting.
On the other hand, we do realize that there may be valid reasons to limit access to the Examination
Papers in order to properly administer the exam. More than the mere convenience of the examiner, it
may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding,
administration, and checking of these multiple choice exams that require that the questions and answers
remain confidential for a limited duration. However, the PRC is not a party to these proceedings. They
have not been given an opportunity to explain the reasons behind their regulations or articulate the
justification for keeping the Examination Documents confidential. In view of the far-reaching implications
of this case, which may impact on every board examination administered by the PRC, and in order that
all relevant issues may be ventilated, we deem it best to remand these cases to the RTC for further
proceedings.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. The December 11, 2006 and February 16,
2004 Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 76546 and CA-GR SP No. 76498, respectively, are
hereby SET ASIDE. The November 11, 2002 and January 30, 2003 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 33, in Civil Case No. 98-86881 are AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial
Court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
Petitioner Hazel Antolin took the 1997 CPA Board Exams but failed, receiving failing grades from four out
of seven subjects. Convinced that she deserved to pass, she wrote to respondent AbelardoDomondon,
Acting Chairman of the Board of Accountancy, and requested that her answer sheets be re-corrected.
Her answer sheets were shown but these consisted merely of shaded marks. She requested for copies of
the questionnaire, their respective answer keys, and an explanation of the grading system used in each
subject. Respondent denied the request.
Issue: WON Antolin has a right to obtain copies of the examination papers.
Petitioner:
Primarily, petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with damages against the Board of Accountancy and
its members before the Manila RTC, praying that the court would order the board to furnish her with
copies of the examination papers and other documents and materials. She later amended her petition,
 16

pleading a cause of action for the access of the documents requested for. However, the RTC dismissed
the petition on the ground that the petition had already become moot and academic since she already
passed the 1998 CPA Board Exams. However, an omnibus order of the trial court reconsidered her case.
The CA, however, ruled that (i) the PRC regulation preventing her from gaining access to said documents
were valid limitations on petitioner’s right to information and access to government documents; (ii) that
the examination documents were not of public concern; (iii) it was not the function of the respondents
to review and reassess the answers to exam questions of a failing examinee; (iv) the case was moot and
academic as petitioner already passed the 1998 CPA Board Exams; (v) that petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies, having not elevated the matter to the PRC before seeking judicial intervention.
Petitioner insists she has the Constitutional right to gain access to said examination documents, that she
did not need to exhaust administrative remedies since no recourse to the PRC was available as only a
pure question of law is involved in the case and that her petition was not rendered moot and academic
when she passed the 1998 CPA Board Exams.

Respondents:

Respondent primarily denied the request of petitioner on two grounds: first, the PRC rules only
permitted access to the petitioner’s answer sheet and that reconsideration of rating shall be effected
only on grounds of mechanical error in grading the answer sheets or malfeasance; secondly, he clarified
that the Board was precluded from releasing the exam papers as such act were considered
unprofessional by the PRC resolution. The Board did not find any mechanical error in the grading of
petitioner’s test papers. Nonetheless, the petitioner elevated the case to the RTC wherein respondents
argue that petitioner was not entitled for the relief sought, among others. They also filed to dismiss the
petition on damages since (1) petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies, (2) the petition stated
no cause of action as there was no ministerial duty to release the information demanded, (3) and the
constitutional right to information on matters of public concern is subject to the limitation set forth by
the PRC Resolution No. 338. Also, they added that the petition had become moot and academic since
petitioner already passed the 1998 CPA Board Exams.

Dispositive Portion:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. The December 11, 2006 and February 16, 2004 Decisions
of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 76546 and CA-GR SP No. 76498, respectively, are hereby SET
ASIDE. The November 11, 2002 and January 30, 2003 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, in Civil
Case No. 98-86881 are AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings.

Court:

The Court rules in favor of the petitioner. Section 28, Article 2 of the Constitution provides that the State
may adopt policies in the disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest while Section 7, Article
3 provides the right of the people to information on matters of public interest. It is clear that the
people’s right to information is limited to matters of public concern and subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law. The Court, nonetheless, conceded that the CPA Board Exams are matters of
public concern. The examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and competent
administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting profession.

Furthermore, on the issue of mootness, the Court held that the petitioner’s belated passing of the Board Exams does
not automatically mean that her interest in the examination papers has become mere superfluity.

Lastly, CA erred in ruling that petitioner should have exhausted administrative remedies before seeking judicial
intervention because issues of law cannot be resolved with finality by an administrative officer.
 17

THIRD DIVISION
(fake)

G.R. No. 172835 December 13, 2007

3. a. Trixohtropic Grease EPC 81,876.96 4582 01/29/99
AIR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner, b. Di-Electric Strength EPC#2 81,876.96 5446 04/21/99
vs. Protective Coating (fake)
PENNSWELL, INC. Respondent.

DECISION 4. a. Dry Lubricant ASC-EP 87,346.52 5712 05/20/99

b. Anti-Seize Compound ASC-EP 124,108.10 4763 & 02/16/99 &
(fake) 2000 5890 06/24/99
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation seeks, via the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, the nullification of the 16 February 2006 Decision1 and the 25 May 2006 Resolution2 of
According to petitioner, respondent’s products, namely Excellent Rust Corrosion, Connector Grease,
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86329, which affirmed the Order3 dated 30 June 2004 of the
Electric Strength Protective Coating, and Anti-Seize Compound, are identical with its Anti-Friction Fluid,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City, Branch 64, in Civil Case No. 00-561.
Contact Grease, Thixohtropic Grease, and Dry Lubricant, respectively. Petitioner asseverated that had
respondent been forthright about the identical character of the products, it would not have purchased
Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air the items complained of. Moreover, petitioner alleged that when the purported fraud was discovered, a
transportation services. On the other hand, respondent Pennswell, Inc. was organized to engage in the conference was held between petitioner and respondent on 13 January 2000, whereby the parties
business of manufacturing and selling industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants. agreed that respondent would return to petitioner the amount it previously paid. However, petitioner
was surprised when it received a letter from the respondent, demanding payment of the amount of
On various dates, respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade, covered by Sales ₱449,864.94, which later became the subject of respondent’s Complaint for Collection of a Sum of
Invoices No. 8846,4 9105,5 8962,6 and 8963,7 which correspond to Purchase Orders No. 6433, 6684, 6634 Money against petitioner.
and 6633, respectively. Under the contracts, petitioner’s total outstanding obligation amounted to
₱449,864.98 with interest at 14% per annum until the amount would be fully paid. For failure of the During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel10 respondent to give a detailed list
petitioner to comply with its obligation under said contracts, respondent filed a Complaint8 for a Sum of of the ingredients and chemical components of the following products, to wit: (a) Contact Grease and
Money on 28 April 2000 with the RTC. Connector Grease; (b) Thixohtropic Grease and Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating; and (c) Dry
Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound.11 It appears that petitioner had earlier requested the Philippine
In its Answer,9 petitioner contended that its refusal to pay was not without valid and justifiable reasons. Institute of Pure and Applied Chemistry (PIPAC) for the latter to conduct a comparison of respondent’s
In particular, petitioner alleged that it was defrauded in the amount of ₱592,000.00 by respondent for its goods.
previous sale of four items, covered by Purchase Order No. 6626. Said items were misrepresented by
respondent as belonging to a new line, but were in truth and in fact, identical with products petitioner On 15 March 2004, the RTC rendered an Order granting the petitioner’s motion. It disposed, thus:
had previously purchased from respondent. Petitioner asserted that it was deceived by respondent
which merely altered the names and labels of such goods. Petitioner specifically identified the items in
The Court directs [herein respondent] Pennswell, Inc. to give [herein petitioner] Air Philippines
question, as follows:
Corporation[,] a detailed list of the ingredients or chemical components of the following chemical
products:
Label/Description Item No. Amount P.O. Date
a. Contact Grease to be compared with Connector Grease;
1. a. Anti-Friction Fluid MPL-800 153,941.40 5714 05/20/99
b. Excellent Rust MPL-008 155,496.00 5888 06/20/99
b. Thixohtropic Grease to be compared with Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating; and
Corrosion (fake)

c. Dry Lubricant to be compared with Anti-Seize Compound[.]

2. a. Contact Grease COG #2 115,236.00 5540 04/26/99
b. Connector Grease CG 230,519.52 6327 08/05/99 [Respondent] Pennswell, Inc. is given fifteen (15) days from receipt of this Order to submit to [petitioner]
Air Philippines Corporation the chemical components of all the above-mentioned products for chemical
comparison/analysis.12

Respondent sought reconsideration of the foregoing Order, contending that it cannot be compelled to
disclose the chemical components sought because the matter is confidential. It argued that what
petitioner endeavored to inquire upon constituted a trade secret which respondent cannot be forced to
divulge. Respondent maintained that its products are specialized lubricants, and if their components
were revealed, its business competitors may easily imitate and market the same types of products, in
violation of its proprietary rights and to its serious damage and prejudice.
The RTC gave credence to respondent’s reasoning, and reversed itself. It issued an Order dated 30 June
2004, finding that the chemical components are respondent’s trade secrets and are privileged in
character. A priori, it rationalized:
The Supreme Court held in the case of Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 299
SCRA 744, p. 764, that "the drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that aside from
national security matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the
Intellectual Property Code and other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the
Secrecy of Bank Deposit Act) are also exempted from compulsory disclosure."
Trade secrets may not be the subject of compulsory disclosure. By reason of [their] confidential and
privileged character, ingredients or chemical components of the products ordered by this Court to be
disclosed constitute trade secrets lest [herein respondent] would eventually be exposed to unwarranted
business competition with others who may imitate and market the same kinds of products in violation of
[respondent’s] proprietary rights. Being privileged, the detailed list of ingredients or chemical
components may not be the subject of mode of discovery under Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of Court,
which expressly makes privileged information an exception from its coverage.13
Alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals, which denied the Petition and affirmed the
Order dated 30 June 2004 of the RTC.
The Court of Appeals ruled that to compel respondent to reveal in detail the list of ingredients of its
lubricants is to disregard respondent’s rights over its trade secrets. It was categorical in declaring that
the chemical formulation of respondent’s products and their ingredients are embraced within the
meaning of "trade secrets." In disallowing the disclosure, the Court of Appeals expounded, thus:
The Supreme Court in Garcia v. Board of Investments (177 SCRA 374 [1989]) held that trade secrets and
confidential, commercial and financial information are exempt from public scrutiny. This is reiterated in
Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (299 SCRA 744 [1998]) where the Supreme
Court enumerated the kinds of information and transactions that are recognized as restrictions on or
privileges against compulsory disclosure. There, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that:
"The drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security matters
and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and
other related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act) re also
exempt from compulsory disclosure."
It is thus clear from the foregoing that a party cannot be compelled to produce, release or disclose
documents, papers, or any object which are considered trade secrets.
18
In the instant case, petitioner [Air Philippines Corporation] would have [respondent] Pennswell produce
a detailed list of ingredients or composition of the latter’s lubricant products so that a chemical
comparison and analysis thereof can be obtained. On this note, We believe and so hold that the
ingredients or composition of [respondent] Pennswell’s lubricants are trade secrets which it cannot be
compelled to disclose.
[Respondent] Pennswell has a proprietary or economic right over the ingredients or components of its
lubricant products. The formulation thereof is not known to the general public and is peculiar only to
[respondent] Pennswell. The legitimate and economic interests of business enterprises in protecting
their manufacturing and business secrets are well-recognized in our system.
[Respondent] Pennswell has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing
strategies and other confidential programs and information against the public. Otherwise, such
information can be illegally and unfairly utilized by business competitors who, through their access to
[respondent] Pennswell’s business secrets, may use the same for their own private gain and to the
irreparable prejudice of the latter.
In the case before Us, the alleged trade secrets have a factual basis, i.e., it comprises of the ingredients
and formulation of [respondent] Pennswell’s lubricant products which are unknown to the public and
peculiar only to Pennswell.
All told, We find no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
public respondent Judge in finding that the detailed list of ingredients or composition of the subject
lubricant products which petitioner [Air Philippines Corporation] seeks to be disclosed are trade secrets
of [respondent] Pennswell; hence, privileged against compulsory disclosure.14
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Unyielding, petitioner brought the instant Petition before us, on the sole issue of:
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS RULED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PREVAILING LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT UPHELD THE RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE CHEMICAL
COMPONENTS OR INGREDIENTS OF RESPONDENT’S PRODUCTS ARE TRADE SECRETS OR INDUSTRIAL
SECRETS THAT ARE NOT SUBJECT TO COMPULSORY DISCLOSURE.15
Petitioner seeks to convince this Court that it has a right to obtain the chemical composition and
ingredients of respondent’s products to conduct a comparative analysis of its products. Petitioner assails
the conclusion reached by the Court of Appeals that the matters are trade secrets which are protected
by law and beyond public scrutiny. Relying on Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, petitioner argues
that the use of modes of discovery operates with desirable flexibility under the discretionary control of
the trial court. Furthermore, petitioner posits that its request is not done in bad faith or in any manner as
to annoy, embarrass, or oppress respondent.
A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner
and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it.16 The definition also extends to a secret
formula or process not patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in compounding some
article of trade having a commercial value.17 A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device,
or compilation of information that: (1) is used in one's business; and (2) gives the employer an

opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do not possess the information.18 Generally, a
trade secret is a process or device intended for continuous use in the operation of the business, for
example, a machine or formula, but can be a price list or catalogue or specialized customer list.19 It is
indubitable that trade secrets constitute proprietary rights. The inventor, discoverer, or possessor of a
trade secret or similar innovation has rights therein which may be treated as property, and ordinarily an
injunction will be granted to prevent the disclosure of the trade secret by one who obtained the
information "in confidence" or through a "confidential relationship."20 American jurisprudence has
utilized the following factors21 to determine if an information is a trade secret, to wit:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the employer's business;
(2) the extent to which the information is known by employees and others involved in the
business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the information;
(4) the value of the information to the employer and to competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the information;
and
(6) the extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained through an
independent source.22
In Cocoland Development Corporation v. National Labor Relations Commission,23 the issue was the
legality of an employee’s termination on the ground of unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets. The
Court laid down the rule that any determination by management as to the confidential nature of
technologies, processes, formulae or other so-called trade secrets must have a substantial factual basis
which can pass judicial scrutiny. The Court rejected the employer’s naked contention that its own
determination as to what constitutes a trade secret should be binding and conclusive upon the NLRC. As
a caveat, the Court said that to rule otherwise would be to permit an employer to label almost anything
a trade secret, and thereby create a weapon with which he/it may arbitrarily dismiss an employee on the
pretext that the latter somehow disclosed a trade secret, even if in fact there be none at all to speak
of.24 Hence, in Cocoland, the parameters in the determination of trade secrets were set to be such
substantial factual basis that can withstand judicial scrutiny.
The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondent’s special lubricants are trade
secrets within the contemplation of the law. Respondent was established to engage in the business of
general manufacturing and selling of, and to deal in, distribute, sell or otherwise dispose of goods, wares,
merchandise, products, including but not limited to industrial chemicals, solvents, lubricants, acids,
alkalies, salts, paints, oils, varnishes, colors, pigments and similar preparations, among others. It is
unmistakable to our minds that the manufacture and production of respondent’s products proceed from
a formulation of a secret list of ingredients. In the creation of its lubricants, respondent expended
efforts, skills, research, and resources. What it had achieved by virtue of its investments may not be
wrested from respondent on the mere pretext that it is necessary for petitioner’s defense against a
collection for a sum of money. By and large, the value of the information to respondent is crystal clear.
The ingredients constitute the very fabric of respondent’s production and business. No doubt, the
information is also valuable to respondent’s competitors. To compel its disclosure is to cripple
respondent’s business, and to place it at an undue disadvantage. If the chemical composition of
19
respondent’s lubricants are opened to public scrutiny, it will stand to lose the backbone on which its
business is founded. This would result in nothing less than the probable demise of respondent’s
business. Respondent’s proprietary interest over the ingredients which it had developed and expended
money and effort on is incontrovertible. Our conclusion is that the detailed ingredients sought to be
revealed have a commercial value to respondent. Not only do we acknowledge the fact that the
information grants it a competitive advantage; we also find that there is clearly a glaring intent on the
part of respondent to keep the information confidential and not available to the prying public.
We now take a look at Section 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Court, which permits parties to inspect
documents or things upon a showing of good cause before the court in which an action is pending. Its
entire provision reads:
SECTION 1. Motion for production or inspection order. – Upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefore, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his
possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon designated land or other
property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall
specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and
may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
A more than cursory glance at the above text would show that the production or inspection of
documents or things as a mode of discovery sanctioned by the Rules of Court may be availed of by any
party upon a showing of good cause therefor before the court in which an action is pending. The court
may order any party: a) to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing of any
designated documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, which
are not privileged;25 which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action;
and which are in his possession, custody or control; or b) to permit entry upon designated land or other
property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon.
Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things that may be produced and inspected should not be privileged.26 The
documents must not be privileged against disclosure.27 On the ground of public policy, the rules
providing for production and inspection of books and papers do not authorize the production or
inspection of privileged matter; that is, books and papers which, because of their confidential and
privileged character, could not be received in evidence.28 Such a condition is in addition to the requisite
that the items be specifically described, and must constitute or contain evidence material to any matter
involved in the action and which are in the party’s possession, custody or control.
Section 2429 of Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of privileged communication, to
wit: (a) communication between husband and wife; (b) communication between attorney and client; (c)
communication between physician and patient; (d) communication between priest and penitent; and (e)
public officers and public interest. There are, however, other privileged matters that are not mentioned
by Rule 130. Among them are the following: (a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of
published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d)
information contained in tax census returns; and (d) bank deposits. 30

We, thus, rule against the petitioner. We affirm the ruling of the Court of Appeals which upheld the
finding of the RTC that there is substantial basis for respondent to seek protection of the law for its
proprietary rights over the detailed chemical composition of its products.
That trade secrets are of a privileged nature is beyond quibble. The protection that this jurisdiction
affords to trade secrets is evident in our laws. The Interim Rules of Procedure on Government
Rehabilitation, effective 15 December 2000, which applies to: (1) petitions for rehabilitation filed by
corporations, partnerships, and associations pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 902-A,31 as amended;
and (2) cases for rehabilitation transferred from the Securities and Exchange Commission to the RTCs
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as The Securities Regulation Code, expressly
provides that the court may issue an order to protect trade secrets or other confidential research,
development, or commercial information belonging to the debtor.32 Moreover, the Securities Regulation
Code is explicit that the Securities and Exchange Commission is not required or authorized to require the
revelation of trade secrets or processes in any application, report or document filed with the
Commission.33 This confidentiality is made paramount as a limitation to the right of any member of the
general public, upon request, to have access to all information filed with the Commission.34
Furthermore, the Revised Penal Code endows a cloak of protection to trade secrets under the following
articles:
Art. 291. Revealing secrets with abuse of office. — The penalty of arresto mayor and a fine not exceeding
500 pesos shall be imposed upon any manager, employee or servant who, in such capacity, shall learn
the secrets of his principal or master and shall reveal such secrets.
Art. 292. Revelation of industrial secrets. — The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos shall be imposed upon the person in charge,
employee or workman of any manufacturing or industrial establishment who, to the prejudice of the
owner thereof, shall reveal the secrets of the industry of
the latter.
Similarly, Republic Act No. 8424, otherwise known as the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, has a
restrictive provision on trade secrets, penalizing the revelation thereof by internal revenue officers or
employees, to wit:
SECTION 278. Procuring Unlawful Divulgence of Trade Secrets. - Any person who causes or procures an
officer or employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to divulge any confidential information regarding
the business, income or inheritance of any taxpayer, knowledge of which was acquired by him in the
discharge of his official duties, and which it is unlawful for him to reveal, and any person who publishes
or prints in any manner whatever, not provided by law, any income, profit, loss or expenditure appearing
in any income tax return, shall be punished by a fine of not more than two thousand pesos (₱2,000), or
suffer imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than five (5) years, or both.
Republic Act No. 6969, or the Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of 1990,
enacted to implement the policy of the state to regulate, restrict or prohibit the importation,
manufacture, processing, sale, distribution, use and disposal of chemical substances and mixtures that
present unreasonable risk and/or injury to health or the environment, also contains a provision that
limits the right of the public to have access to records, reports or information concerning chemical
substances and mixtures including safety data submitted and data on emission or discharge into the
environment, if the matter is confidential such that it would divulge trade secrets, production or sales
20
figures; or methods, production or processes unique to such manufacturer, processor or distributor; or
would otherwise tend to affect adversely the competitive position of such manufacturer, processor or
distributor.35
Clearly, in accordance with our statutory laws, this Court has declared that intellectual and industrial
property rights cases are not simple property cases.36 Without limiting such industrial property rights to
trademarks and trade names, this Court has ruled that all agreements concerning intellectual property
are intimately connected with economic development.37 The protection of industrial property
encourages investments in new ideas and inventions and stimulates creative efforts for the satisfaction
of human needs. It speeds up transfer of technology and industrialization, and thereby bring about social
and economic progress.38 Verily, the protection of industrial secrets is inextricably linked to the
advancement of our economy and fosters healthy competition in trade.
Jurisprudence has consistently acknowledged the private character of trade secrets.1âwphi1 There is a
privilege not to disclose one’s trade secrets.39 Foremost, this Court has declared that trade secrets and
banking transactions are among the recognized restrictions to the right of the people to information as
embodied in the Constitution.40 We said that the drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed
that, aside from national security matters and intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets
(pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other related laws) as well as banking transactions
(pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act), are also exempted from compulsory disclosure.41
Significantly, our cases on labor are replete with examples of a protectionist stance towards the trade
secrets of employers. For instance, this Court upheld the validity of the policy of a pharmaceutical
company prohibiting its employees from marrying employees of any competitor company, on the
rationalization that the company has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas,
marketing strategies and other confidential programs and information from competitors.42 Notably, it
was in a labor-related case that this Court made a stark ruling on the proper determination of trade
secrets.
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot rely on Section 7743 of Republic Act 7394, or the Consumer Act of
the Philippines, in order to compel respondent to reveal the chemical components of its products. While
it is true that all consumer products domestically sold, whether manufactured locally or imported, shall
indicate their general make or active ingredients in their respective labels of packaging, the law does not
apply to respondent. Respondent’s specialized lubricants -- namely, Contact Grease, Connector Grease,
Thixohtropic Grease, Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating, Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound --
are not consumer products. "Consumer products," as it is defined in Article 4(q),44 refers to goods,
services and credits, debts or obligations which are primarily for personal, family, household or
agricultural purposes, which shall include, but not be limited to, food, drugs, cosmetics, and devices. This
is not the nature of respondent’s products. Its products are not intended for personal, family, household
or agricultural purposes. Rather, they are for industrial use, specifically for the use of aircraft propellers
and engines.
Petitioner’s argument that Republic Act No. 8203, or the Special Law on Counterfeit Drugs, requires the
disclosure of the active ingredients of a drug is also on faulty ground.45 Respondent’s products are
outside the scope of the cited law. They do not come within the purview of a drug46 which, as defined
therein, refers to any chemical compound or biological substance, other than food, that is intended for
use in the treatment, prevention or diagnosis of disease in man or animals. Again, such are not the
characteristics of respondent’s products.

What is clear from the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is that the chemical
formulation of respondent’s products is not known to the general public and is unique only to it. Both
courts uniformly ruled that these ingredients are not within the knowledge of the public. Since such
factual findings are generally not reviewable by this Court, it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all
over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.47 We need not delve into the
factual bases of such findings as questions of fact are beyond the pale of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Factual findings of the trial court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding and conclusive on
the Supreme Court.48
We do not find merit or applicability in petitioner’s invocation of Section 1249 of the Toxic Substances
and Hazardous and Nuclear Wastes Control Act of 1990, which grants the public access to records,
reports or information concerning chemical substances and mixtures, including safety data submitted,
and data on emission or discharge into the environment. To reiterate, Section 1250 of said Act deems as
confidential matters, which may not be made public, those that would divulge trade secrets, including
production or sales figures or methods; production or processes unique to such manufacturer, processor
or distributor, or would otherwise tend to affect adversely the competitive position of such
manufacturer, processor or distributor. It is true that under the same Act, the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources may release information; however, the clear import of the law is
that said authority is limited by the right to confidentiality of the manufacturer, processor or distributor,
which information may be released only to a medical research or scientific institution where the
information is needed for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment of a person exposed to the
chemical substance or mixture. The right to confidentiality is recognized by said Act as primordial.
Petitioner has not made the slightest attempt to show that these circumstances are availing in the case
at bar.
Indeed, the privilege is not absolute; the trial court may compel disclosure where it is indispensable for
doing justice.51 We do not, however, find reason to except respondent’s trade secrets from the
application of the rule on privilege. The revelation of respondent’s trade secrets serves no better
purpose to the disposition of the main case pending with the RTC, which is on the collection of a sum of
money. As can be gleaned from the facts, petitioner received respondent’s goods in trade in the normal
course of business. To be sure, there are defenses under the laws of contracts and sales available to
petitioner. On the other hand, the greater interest of justice ought to favor respondent as the holder of
trade secrets. If we were to weigh the conflicting interests between the parties, we rule in favor of the
greater interest of respondent. Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discovery, because
they derive economic value from being generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by the
public.52 To the mind of this Court, petitioner was not able to show a compelling reason for us to lift the
veil of confidentiality which shields respondent’s trade secrets.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 16 February 2006, and the Resolution dated 25
May 2006, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86329 are AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air transportation services. Respondent
Pennswell Inc was organized to engage in the business of manufacturing and selling industrial chemicals,
solvents and special lubricants. Respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade.
Under the contracts, petitioner’s obligation amounted to P 449,864.98 until the amount would be fully
paid. For failure to pay comply with its obligations unders said contract.
21
Respondent then filed a complaint against the petitioner. Petitioner then filed an ANSWER alleging that
the respondent defrauded the former for its previous sale of four items. Said items were misrepresented
by respondent as belonging to a new line, but were in truth and in fact, identical with products petitioner
had previously purchased from respondent.
During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel respondent to give a detailed list of
the ingredients and chemical components of the following products, to wit: (a) Contact Grease and
Connector Grease; (b) Thixohtropic Grease and Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating; and (c) Dry
Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound.
RTC: Granted the motion then reversed its prior decision. Ruled infavor of the respondent
CA: Affirmed
ISSUE: WON the court of appeals ruled was correct when it upheld the ruling of the trial court that the
chemical components or ingredients of respondent’s products are trade secrets or industrial secret that
are not subject to compulsory disclosure.
RULING:
Yes. A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its
owner and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it.
The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondent’s special lubricants are trade
secrets within the contemplation of the law. Jurisprudence has consistently acknowledged that the
private character of trade secrets-there is a privilege not to disclose one’s trade secret.
● Trade secrets are privileged information and thus may not be the subject of mode of discovery under
Rule 27, Section 1 of the Rules of Court.
Facts:
Pennswell sold and delivered to Air Philippines Corporation industrial chemicals, solvents, and special
lubricants amounting to P450,000.00. When Air Philippines refused to pay the obligation, Pensswell filed
a collection case before RTC Makati. In its Answer, Air Philippines alleged that: it refused to pay because
it was defrauded in the amount of P600,000.00 by Pennswell for its previous sale of 4 items; said items
were misrepresented by Pennswell as belonging to a new line, but were in truth and in fact, identical
with products it had previously purchased from Pennswell; and, Pennswell merely altered the names and
labels of such goods. During the trial, Air Philippines filed a motion to compel Pennswell to give a
detailed list of the chemical components and the ingredients used for the products that were sold.
Pennswell opposed the motion for production, contending that the requested information was a trade
secret that it could not be forced to disclose.
Issue: May Pennswell be compelled to disclose the chemical components and the ingredients used for its
products through a motion for production?

Held:
No. Rule 27 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 1. Motion for production or inspection order. Upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefore, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the
inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his
possession, custody or control; or (b) order any party to permit entry upon designated land or other
property in his possession or control for the purpose of inspecting, measuring, surveying, or
photographing the property or any designated relevant object or operation thereon. The order shall
specify the time, place and manner of making the inspection and taking copies and photographs, and
may prescribe such terms and conditions as are just.
Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things that may be produced and inspected should not be privileged. Section 24 of
Rule 130 draws the types of disqualification by reason of privileged communication, to wit: (a)
communication between husband and wife; (b) communication between attorney and client; (c)
communication between physician and patient; (d) communication between priest and penitent; and (e)
public officers and public interest. There are, however, other privileged matters that are not mentioned
by Rule 130. Among them are the following: (a) editors may not be compelled to disclose the source of
published news; (b) voters may not be compelled to disclose for whom they voted; (c) trade secrets; (d)
information contained in tax census returns; and (d) bank deposits.
A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner
and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. The definition also extends to a secret
formula or process not patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in compounding some
article of trade having a commercial value. American jurisprudence has utilized the following factors to
determine if an information is a trade secret, to wit:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the employer’s business;
(2) the extent to which the information is known by employees and others involved in the business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the information;
(4) the value of the information to the employer and to competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the information; and
(6) the extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained through an independent
source.
The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of respondents special lubricants are trade
secrets within the contemplation of the law. Respondent was established to engage in the business of
general manufacturing and selling of, and to deal in, distribute, sell or otherwise dispose of goods, wares,
22
merchandise, products, including but not limited to industrial chemicals, solvents, lubricants, acids,
alkalies, salts, paints, oils, varnishes, colors, pigments and similar preparations, among others. It is
unmistakable to our minds that the manufacture and production of respondents products proceed from
a formulation of a secret list of ingredients. In the creation of its lubricants, respondent expended
efforts, skills, research, and resources. What it had achieved by virtue of its investments may not be
wrested from respondent on the mere pretext that it is necessary for petitioners defense against a
collection for a sum of money. By and large, the value of the information to respondent is crystal clear.
The ingredients constitute the very fabric of respondents production and business. No doubt, the
information is also valuable to respondents competitors. To compel its disclosure is to cripple
respondents business, and to place it at an undue disadvantage. If the chemical composition of
respondents lubricants are opened to public scrutiny, it will stand to lose the backbone on which its
business is founded. This would result in nothing less than the probable demise of respondents business.
Respondents proprietary interest over the ingredients which it had developed and expended money and
effort on is incontrovertible.
The chemical composition, formulation, and ingredients of special lubricants requested by Air Philippines
formed part of the trade secrets of Pennswell. Because of public policy, trade secrets are privileged and
the rules providing for the production and inspection of books and papers do not authorize their
production in a court of law.
Trade secrets should receive greater protection from discovery, because they derive economic value
from being generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by the public.
Facts:
Petitioner Air Philippines Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of air
transportation services. On the other hand, respondent Pennswell, Inc. was organized to engage in the
business of manufacturing and selling industrial chemicals, solvents, and special lubricants.
Respondent delivered and sold to petitioner sundry goods in trade. Under the contracts, petitioner’s
total outstanding obligation amounted to P449,864.98 with interest at 14% per annum until the amount
would be fully paid. For failure of the petitioner to comply with its obligation under said contracts,
respondent filed a Complaint for a Sum of Money on 28 April 2000 with the RTC.
In its Answer, petitioner alleged that it was defrauded in the amount of P592,000.00 by respondent for
its previous sale of four items. Petitioner asserted that it was deceived by respondent which merely
altered the names and labels of such goods. Petitioner asseverated that had respondent been forthright
about the identical character of the products, it would not have purchased the items complained of.
Moreover, petitioner alleged that when the purported fraud was discovered, a conference was held
between petitioner and respondent on 13 January 2000, whereby the parties agreed that respondent
would return to petitioner the amount it previously paid. However, petitioner was surprised when it
received a letter from the respondent, demanding payment of the amount of P449,864.94, which later
became the subject of respondent’s Complaint for Collection of a Sum of Money against petitioner.

During the pendency of the trial, petitioner filed a Motion to Compel respondent to give a detailed list of
the ingredients and chemical components of the following products. The RTC rendered an Order granting
the petitioner’s motion.
Respondent sought reconsideration of the foregoing Order, contending that it cannot be compelled to
disclose the chemical components sought because the matter is confidential. It argued that what
petitioner endeavored to inquire upon constituted a trade secret which respondent cannot be forced to
divulge.
The RTC gave credence to respondent’s reasoning, and reversed itself. Alleging grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the RTC, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with
the Court of Appeals, which denied the Petition and affirmed the Order dated 30 June 2004 of the RTC.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Unyielding, petitioner brought the instant Petition
before SC.
Issue: W/N CA erred in upholding RTC decision denying petitioner’s motion to subject respondent’s
products to compulsory disclosure.
Held:
No. The products are covered by the exception of trade secrets being divulged in compulsory disclosure.
The Court affirms the ruling of the Court of Appeals which upheld the finding of the RTC that there is
substantial basis for respondent to seek protection of the law for its proprietary rights over the detailed
chemical composition of its products.
The Supreme Court has declared that trade secrets and banking transactions are among the recognized
restrictions to the right of the people to information as embodied in the Constitution. SC said that the
drafters of the Constitution also unequivocally affirmed that, aside from national security matters and
intelligence information, trade or industrial secrets (pursuant to the Intellectual Property Code and other
related laws) as well as banking transactions (pursuant to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act), are also
exempted from compulsory disclosure.
A trade secret is defined as a plan or process, tool, mechanism or compound known only to its owner
and those of his employees to whom it is necessary to confide it. The definition also extends to a secret
formula or process not patented, but known only to certain individuals using it in compounding some
article of trade having a commercial value. American jurisprudence has utilized the following factors to
determine if an information is a trade secret, to wit:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of the employer’s business;
(2) the extent to which the information is known by employees and others involved in the business;
(3) the extent of measures taken by the employer to guard the secrecy of the information;
(4) the value of the information to the employer and to competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by the company in developing the information; and
23
(6) the extent to which the information could be easily or readily obtained through an independent
source.
Rule 27 sets an unequivocal proviso that the documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things that may be produced and inspected should not be privileged. The documents
must not be privileged against disclosure. On the ground of public policy, the rules providing for
production and inspection of books and papers do not authorize the production or inspection of
privileged matter; that is, books and papers which, because of their confidential and privileged character,
could not be received in evidence. Such a condition is in addition to the requisite that the items be
specifically described, and must constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the
action and which are in the party’s possession, custody or control.
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot rely on Section 77of Republic Act 7394, or the Consumer Act of the
Philippines, in order to compel respondent to reveal the chemical components of its products. While it is
true that all consumer products domestically sold, whether manufactured locally or imported, shall
indicate their general make or active ingredients in their respective labels of packaging, the law does not
apply to respondent. Respondent’s specialized lubricants — namely, Contact Grease, Connector Grease,
Thixohtropic Grease, Di-Electric Strength Protective Coating, Dry Lubricant and Anti-Seize Compound —
are not consumer products.
What is clear from the factual findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is that the chemical
formulation of respondent’s products is not known to the general public and is unique only to it. Both
courts uniformly ruled that these ingredients are not within the knowledge of the public. Since such
factual findings are generally not reviewable by this Court, it is not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all
over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below.
The revelation of respondent’s trade secrets serves no better purpose to the disposition of the main case
pending with the RTC, which is on the collection of a sum of money. As can be gleaned from the facts,
petitioner received respondent’s goods in trade in the normal course of business. To be sure, there are
defenses under the laws of contracts and sales available to petitioner. On the other hand, the greater
interest of justice ought to favor respondent as the holder of trade secrets. Weighing the conflicting
interests between the parties, SC rules in favor of the greater interest of respondent. Trade secrets
should receive greater protection from discovery, because they derive economic value from being
generally unknown and not readily ascertainable by the public.