STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – CHAPTER 5 CASE DIGEST
Gatchalian v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 32560, 22 October 1970
(General words construed generally)
Facts:
Pursuant to the request of the advertising firms and associations of the
Philippines, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. RR 707 which states that
“donations of billboards to the Commission by foreigners or companies or
corporations owned and controlled partially or wholly by foreigners are not
covered by Section 56 of the Revised Election Code.” The body also issued
Resolution RR-731 which states that the ban in Section 46 of the Revised Election
Code, as amended, does not cover campaign funds and other contributions by
the Advertising Council of the Philippines and other contributions by the
Advertising Council of the Philippines and others similarly situated, during the
120 days immediately preceding a regular or special election.
Petitioner, as a candidate in the election for delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, filed a complaint with the COMELEC assailing the validity of the both
resolutions, alleging that both are violative of Section 56 of the Revised Election
Code, as amended, which provides that:
No foreigner shall aid any candidate, directly or indirectly, or to take part in or to
influence in any manner any elections.
The prohibited active intervention of foreigners thereunder may consist of:
(1) aiding any candidate, directly or indirectly, in any election;
(2) taking part in any election; and
(3) influencing in any manner any election.
The COMELEC, however, denied the petitioner’s motion, declaring "that
contributions by foreigners to the COMELEC Billboards Committee for the
purpose of financing costs of COMELEC billboards are not made in aid or support
of any particular candidate in a particular district and that the allocation of space
for its candidate is allowed by lottery, nor would it in any way influence the result
of the election, ... .He then filed an appeal with the Court, contending that said
order of the COMELEC is null and void as contrary to law or having been issued in
excess of the powers of the Commission on Elections or in grave abuse of its
discretion, and praying for a writ of preliminary as well as permanent
injunction.No restraining order was issued as COMELEC itself did not implement
the said resolution.
Issue:
Whether or not the term “any elections,” “foreigner,” and “any candidate;” as
well as the terms “aid,” “take part,” and “influence,” as contemplated In Section
56 of the Revised Election Code, had other meanings
Held:
The term “any elections” definitely comprehends or applies to election of
delegates Constitutional Convention. “Foreigner,” on the other hand, refers to
both natural and juridical persons or associations or organized groups, as
provided by Section 39 of Article 3 of the Revised Election Code, broadening the
application of the term and not limiting the prohibition to natural persons only.
“Any candidate” likewise comprehends ‘some candidates’ or ‘all candidates.’ The
terms “aid,” “to take part,” and “influence,” were also construed in their general
sense- with “aid” referring to to support, to help, to assist or to strengthen or to
act in cooperation with; "to take part" means to participate or to engage in; and
"influence" means to use the party's endeavors, though he may not be able to
carry his point, or to exert or have an effect on the nature or behaviour of, or
affect the action or thought of, or modify; or to sway; to persuade; to affect; to
have an effect on the condition or development of; to modify or act upon
physically, especially in some gentle, subtle, or gradual way; or to exert or
IN GENERAL
maintain a mental or moral power upon or over; to effect or sway by
modifications, feelings or conduct.
There is nothing in the Revised Election Code which impliedly or expressly
prescribes a different meaning to the aforementioned terms. Hence, they should
be understood in their general sense. There was likewise no manifest or
expressed intention that the meaning of the words were to be restricted or
limited.Where general terms are used, the terms are to be understood in their
general meaning, unless it is expressed that they have acquired a special and
restricted meaning. Hence, in this case,
“generaliaverbasuntgeneraliterintelligenda” applies.
The billboard contributions may not specifically favor a single candidate, but the
effect that all candidates benefit from the contribution amounts to an assistance
greater than the aid that may be given to one candidate. Allowing such
undesirable alien influence will inevitably lead to a circumvention of the laws
protecting our national interest. The practice allegedly condoned by the
COMELEC in the subject resolutions, therefore, constitute a violation of the
Revised Election Code.The law penalizing corrupt election practices should be
given a reasonable construction in the interests of the purity of the elections. The
resolutions of the Commission on Elections Nos. RR-707 and 731 promulgated
respectively on August 13, 1970 and September 17, 1970 are therefore declared
illegal and null and void.
Gatchalian v. COMELEC
· “foreigner”- in Election Code, prohibiting any foreigner from contributing
campaign funds includes juridical person
· “person”- comprehends private juridical person
· “person”- in penal statute, must be a “person in law,” an artificial or natural
person
Gatchalian v. COMELEC
· “any election” - not only the election provided by law at that time, but also to
future elections including election of delegates to Constitutional Convention
G.R. No. L-360 November 15, 1947
ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appelant, vs. THE REGISTER OF DEEDS,
CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.
FACTS:
Alexander Krivenko, an alien, bought a residential lot in December of 1941. The
registration was interrupted by war. In 1945, he sought to accomplish the
registration but was denied by the register of deed on ground that, being an
alien, he cannot acquire land within the jurisdiction. Krivenko appealed to the
Court.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential land?
2. Whether or not the prohibitions of the rights to acquire residential lot that was
already of private ownership prior to the approval of this Constitutions is
applicable at the case at bar?
RULING:
1. NO. Under the Article XIII, Section 1, of the Constitution states that: All
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other
natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition,
exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the
Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government
established under this Constitution. This means to say that, under the provisions
of the Constitutions, aliens are not allowed to acquire the ownership of urban or
residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions made in
contravention of the prohibitions since the fundamental law became effective
are null and void per se and ab initio.
2. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874 sections
120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of
reciprocity. It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in this section
refers to all private lands, whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise,
there being practically no private land which had not been acquired by any of the
means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition contained in
these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to
aliens except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to
citizens of Philippine Islands the same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber,
dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens were granted the right to
acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity.
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds
STATUTE: In Sec.1 , Art. XIII of 1935 Constitution - “public agricultural lands shall
not be alienated” except in favor of Filipinos, SAME as Sec. 5 “no private
agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned.”
Both have same meaning being based on same policy of nationalization and
having same subject.
Krivenko v. Register of Deeds
STATUTE: lands were classified into timber, mineral and agricultural
Word “agricultural” – used in broad sense to include all lands that are neither
timber, nor mineral, such being the context in which the term is used.
Malanyaon v. Lising
Facts:
Mayor Pontanal was charged with violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act). He was suspended from office but he died during his incumbency,
and while the case was pending. The case was dismissed due to his death.
Petitioner sought the payment of the Mayor's salary during his period of
suspension pursuant to Section 13 of RA 3019 which provides - should a public
officer be convicted by final judgement he shall lose all retirement or gravity
benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted he shall b entitled to reinstatement
and to the salaries and benefits to which he failed to receive during his
suspension. Malanyaon was a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Bula,
Camarines Sur. He filed an action to declare illegal the disbursement made by
Goleta as Municipal Treasurer to the widow of Mayor Pontanal a portion of the
salary of the late Mayor as such Mayor of such municipality during the period of
his suspension from August 16, 1977 up to November 28, 1979. However, Judge
Lising dismissed the action on the ground that the criminal case against Mayor
Pontanal due to his death amounted to acquittal.
Issue:
Whether or not the dismissal of the case due to the death of the accused
constitutes acquittal.
Held:
No. It is obvious that the statute speaks of the suspended officer being
"acquitted". It means that after due hearing and consideration of the evidence
against him the court is of the opinion that his guilt has not been proved beyond
 STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION – CHAPTER 5 CASE DIGEST IN GENERAL
reasonable doubt. Dismissal of the case against the suspended officer will not
suffice because dismissal does not amount to acquittal.

Mustang Lumber, Inc. v CA

STATUTE: Sec. 68 PD 705 - penalizes the cutting, gathering & or collecting timber
or other forest products without a license.

ISSUE: WN “lumber” included in “timber”

HELD: Reversing first ruling, SC says lumber is included in timber.

“The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of timber or lumber. Timber is
included in definition of forestry products par (q) Sec.3. Lumber - same definitions
as “processing plants”
Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of machine
used for processing of logs & other forest raw materials into lumber veneer,
plywood etc… p. 183.
Simply means, lumber is a processed log or forest raw material. The Code uses
lumber in ordinary common usage. In 1993 ed. of Webster’s International
Dictionary, lumber is defined as timber or logs after being prepared for the
market. Therefore, lumber is a processed log or timber. Sec 68 of PD 705 makes
no distinction between raw & processed timber.
Claudio v. COMELEC
STATUTE (LGC): “No recall shall take place within 1 yr from the date of the
official’s assumption of office or 1 year immediately preceding a regular election”

ISSUE: Does the 1st limitation embraces the entire recall proceedings (e.g.
preparatory recall assemblies) or only the recall election?

HELD: the Court construed “recall” in relation to Sec.69 which states that, “the
power of recall… shall be exercised by the registered voters of an LGU to which
the local elective official belongs.”
· Hence, not apply to all recall proceedings since power vested in electorate is
power to elect an official to office and not power to initiate recall proceedings.

· Word or provision should not be construed in isolation form but should be

interpreted in relation to other provisions of a statute, or other statutes dealing
on same subject in order to effectuate what has been intended.