SYLLABUS

Wills and Succession

General Provisions (Arts. 774 – 782)

A. Succession vs Inheritance

B. Elements of Succesion
1. A mode of acquisition
2. Transmission of the inheritance
 Of property

ALBA.1 BUTTE V MANUEL UY AND SONS, 4 SCRA 526

MAINPOINT: The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in the Civil
Code, and is supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time
the decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is
the in officiousness of the donation inter vivos (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission are
valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits accruing
after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).

FACTS: Jose V. Ramirez, during his lifetime, was a co-owner of a house and lot located at Sta. Cruz,
Manila, as shown by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52789, issued in the name of the following co-owners:
Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, 1/6; Jose V. Ramirez, 1/6; Jose E. Ramirez, 1/6; Rita de Ramirez, 1/6; and
Jose Ma. Ramirez, 1/6.
Jose V. Ramirez died. Subsequently, a special roceeding was instituted to settle his estate, that included
the one-sixth (1/6) undivided share in the aforementioned property. And although his last will and
testament, wherein he bequeathed his estate to his children and grandchildren and one-third (1/3) of the
free portion to Mrs. Angela M. Butte has been admitted to probate, the estate proceedings are still pending
on account of the claims of creditors which exceed the assets of the deceased. The Bank of the Philippine
Islands was appointed judicial administrator.
Meanwhile, Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de Ramirez, one of the co-owners of the late Jose V. Ramirez in the
Sta. Cruz property, sold her undivided 1/6 share to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. for the sum of P500,000.00.
After the execution by her attorney-in-fact, Mrs. Elsa R. Chambers, of an affidavit to the effect that formal
notices of the sale had been sent to all possible redemptioners, the deed of sale was duly registered and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 52789 was cancelled in lieu of which a new one was issued in the name of
the vendee and the other-co-owners.
Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. sent a letter to the Bank of the Philippine Islands as judicial administrator of the
estate of the late Jose V. Ramirez informing it of the above-mentioned sale. This letter, together with that of
the bank, was forwarded by the latter to Mrs. Butte.

Mrs. Butte, thru her lawyer, sent a letter and a Philippine National Bank cashier's check in the amount of
P500,000.00 to Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. offering to redeem the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda.
de Ramirez. This tender having been refused, plaintiff on the same day consigned the amount in court and
filed the corresponding action for legal redemption. Without prejudice to the determination by the court of
the reasonable and fair market value of the property sold which she alleged to be grossly excessive,
plaintiff prayed for conveyance of the property, and for actual, moral and exemplary damages.

ISSUE: WN plaintiff-appellant, having been bequeathed 1/3 of the free portion of the estate of Jose V.
Ramirez, can exercise the right of legal redemption over the 1/6 share sold by Mrs. Marie Garnier Vda. de
Ramirez despite the presence of the judicial administrator and pending the final distribution of her share in
the testate proceedings.

RULING: Angela M. Butte is entitled to exercise the right of legal redemption as provided for in Articles
1620, p. 1, and 1623 of the CC:

ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case the shares of all the other-
co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person. If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive,
the redemptioner shall pay only a reasonable one.

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 Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion
to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common.

ART. 1623. The right of legal predemption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days
from the notice in writing by the respective vendor, or by the vendor, as the case may be. The deed of sale
shall not be accorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he
has given written notice thereof at all possible redemptioners.

The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of adjoining owners.

As testamentary heir of the estate of J.V. Ramirez, she and her co-heirs acquired an interest in the
undivided one-sixth (1/6) share owned by her predecessor (causante) in the Santa Cruz property, from the
moment of the death of the aforesaid co-owner, J.V. Ramirez. By law, the rights to the succession of a
deceased persons are transmitted to his heirs from the moment of his death, and the right of succession
includes all property rights and obligations that survive the decedent.

ART. 776. The inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a person which are not
extinguished by his death.

ART. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.

ART. 947. The legatee or devisee acquires a right to the pure and simple legacies or devisees from the
death of the testator, and transmits it to his heirs.

The heirs of Jose V. Ramirez acquired his undivided share in the Sta. Cruz property from the moment of
his death, and from that instant, they became co-owners in the aforesaid property, together with the original
surviving co-owners of their decedent (causante). A co-owner of an undivided share is necessarily a co-
owner of the whole. Wherefore, any one of the Ramirez heirs, as such co-owner, became entitled to
exercise the right of legal redemption (retracto de comuneros) as soon as another co-owner (Maria Garnier
Vda. de Ramirez) had sold her undivided share to a stranger, Manuel Uy & Sons, Inc. This right of
redemption vested exclusively in consideration of the redemptioner's share which the law nowhere takes
into account.

 Of rights

AVILA.1 NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY V ALMEIDA, 525 SCRA 383

FACTS: The Land Tenure Administration awarded to Margarita Herrera several portions of land San Pedro,
Laguna. Margarita Herrera had two children: Beatriz Herrera-Mercado (the mother of private respondent)
and Francisca Herrera. Beatriz Herrera-Mercado predeceased her mother and left heirs. Margarita Herrera
passed away on October 27, 1971.On August 22, 1974, Francisca Herrera, the remaining child of the late
Margarita Herrera executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication claiming that she is the only remaining relative,
being the sole surviving daughter of the deceased. She also claimed to be the exclusive legal heir of the
late Margarita Herrera. The Deed of Self-Adjudication was based on a Sinumpaang Salaysay dated
October 7, 1960, allegedly executed by Margarita Herrera. The surviving heirs of Beatriz Herrera-Mercado
filed a case for annulment of the Deed of Self-Adjudication. The Deed of Self-Adjudication was declared
null and void.
During trial on the merits of the case assailing the Deed of Self-Adjudication, Francisca Herrera filed an
application with the NHA to purchase the same lots. Private respondent Almeida, as heir of Beatriz Herrera-
Mercado, protested the application. The NHA granted the application made by Francisca Herrera.
Francisca Herrera died. Her heirs executed an extrajudicial settlement of her estate which they submitted to
the NHA. Said transfer of rights was approved by the NHA. The NHA executed several deeds of sale in
favor of the heirs of Francisca Herrera and titles were issued in their favor.
The Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision setting aside the resolution of the NHA and the decision of
the Office of the President awarding the subject lots in favor of Francisca Herrera. It declared the deeds of
sale executed by NHA in favor of Herrera's heirs null and void. The Regional Trial Court ruled that the
"Sinumpaang Salaysay" was not an assignment of rights but a disposition of property which shall take
effect upon death. Both the NHA and the heirs of Francisca Herrera filed their respective motions for
reconsideration which were both denied on July 21, 1998 for lack of merit. They both appealed to the Court

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 of Appeals. On August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.
Petitioner NHA elevated the case to this Court.

ISSUE: Whether rights of Margarita Herrera over the property should be transmitted to her heirs.

RULING: Yes. When the petitioner received the "Sinumpaang Salaysay," it should have noted that the
effectivity of the said document commences at the time of death of the author of the instrument; in her
words "sakaling ako'y bawian na ng Dios ng aking buhay…" Hence, in such period, all the interests of the
person should cease to be hers and shall be in the possession of her estate until they are transferred to her
heirs by virtue of Article 774 of the Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue of which the property, rights and obligations to the
extent of the value of the inheritance, of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others
either by his will or by operation of law.
By considering the document, petitioner NHA should have noted that the original applicant has already
passed away. Margarita Herrera passed away on October 27, 1971. The NHA issued its resolution on
February 5, 1986. The NHA gave due course to the application made by Francisca Herrera without
considering that the initial applicant's death would transfer all her property, rights and obligations to the
estate including whatever interest she has or may have had over the disputed properties. To the extent of
the interest that the original owner had over the property, the same should go to her estate. Margarita
Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate upon her demise so as to
be able to properly distribute them later to her heirs—in accordance with a will or by operation of law.
The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property. Margarita Herrera had
an existing Contract to Sell with NHA as the seller. Upon Margarita Herrera's demise, this Contract to Sell
was neither nullified nor revoked. This Contract to Sell was an obligation on both parties—Margarita
Herrera and NHA. Obligations are transmissible. Margarita Herrera's obligation to pay became
transmissible at the time of her death either by will or by operation of law.
If we sustain the position of the NHA that this document is not a will, then the interests of the decedent
should transfer by virtue of an operation of law and not by virtue of a resolution by the NHA. For as it
stands, NHA cannot make another contract to sell to other parties of a property already initially paid for by
the decedent. Such would be an act contrary to the law on succession and the law on sales and
obligations.

MAIN POINT: To the extent of the interest that the original owner had over the property, the same should
go to her estate. Margarita Herrera had an interest in the property and that interest should go to her estate
upon her demise so as to be able to properly distribute them later to her heirs—in accordance with a will or
by operation of law. The death of Margarita Herrera does not extinguish her interest over the property.

 Of obligations

BAIDDIN.1 ESTATE OF HEMADY V LUZON SURETY, 100 PHIL 388

FACTS: Luzon Surety filed a claim against the estate of K.H. Hemady based on indemnity agreements
(counterbonds) subscribed by distinct principals and by the deceased K.H. Hemady as surety (solidary
guarantor). As a contingent claim, Luzon Surety prayed for the allowance of the value of the indemnity
agreements it had executed. The lower court dismissed the claim of Luzon Surety on the ground that
“whatever losses may occur after Hemady’s death, are not chargeable to his estate, because upon his
death he ceased to be a guarantor.”

ISSUES: What obligations are transmissible upon the death of the decedent? Are contingent claims
chargeable against the estate?

HELD: Under the present Civil Code (Article 1311), the rule is that “Contracts take effect only as between
the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the
contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law.” While in our
successional system the responsibility of the heirs for the debts of their decedent cannot exceed the value
of the inheritance they receive from him, the principle remains intact that these heirs succeed not only to
the rights of the deceased but also to his obligations. Articles 774 and 776 of the New Civil Code expressly
so provide, thereby confirming Article 1311.
In Mojica v. Fernandez, the Supreme Court ruled — “Under the Civil Code the heirs, by virtue of the rights
of succession are subrogated to all the rights and obligations of the deceased (Article 661) and cannot be
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 regarded as third parties with respect to a contract to which the deceased was a party, touching the estate
of the deceased x x x which comes in to their hands by right of inheritance; they take such property subject
to all the obligations resting thereon in the hands of him from whom they derive their rights.” The third
exception to the transmissibility of obligations under Article 1311 exists when they are ‘not transmissible by
operation of law.’ The provision makes reference to those cases where the law expresses that the rights or
obligations are extinguished by death, as is the case in legal support, parental authority, usufruct, contracts
for a piece of work, partnership and agency. By contrast, the articles of the Civil Code that regulate
guaranty or suretyship contain no provision that the guaranty is extinguished upon the death of the
guarantor or the surety.
The contracts of suretyship in favor of Luzon Surety Co. not being rendered intransmissible due to the
nature of the undertaking, nor by stipulations of the contracts themselves, nor by provision of law, his
eventual liability therefrom necessarily passed upon his death to his heirs. The contracts, therefore, give
rise to contingent claims provable against his estate. A contingent liability of a deceased person is part and
parcel of the mass of obligations that must be paid if and when the contingent liability is converted into a
real liability. Therefore, the settlement or final liquidation of the estate must be deferred until such time as
the bonded indebtedness is paid.

 Transmission through the estate

DALIS.1 LIMJOCO V ESTATE OF FRAGANTE, 80 PHIL 776

MAIN POINT: Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal fiction
by which, for certain purposes, the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance
of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of exercising such legal rights and fulfilling such
legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged.

FACTS: Petitioner opposed the issuance of Certificate of Convenience by the Public Service Commission
to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, to the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante.
Pending application for said certificate, Fragrante died. The Public Commission held that the evidence
therein showed that the public interest and convenience will be promoted in a proper and suitable manner
"by authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice plant of two and one-half (2-½) tons in the
municipality of San Juan; that the original applicant Pedro O. Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time of
his death; and that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service".

Petitioner contends that it was error on the part of the commission to allow the substitution of the legal
representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then pending
before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, which is said
to be in contravention of law. Petitioner questioned and raised the issue that the estate is not a person
within the meaning of the Public Service Act.

ISSUE: Whether the estate of Fragrante is considered as a person and thus the transmission of rights such
as to acquire the Certificate of Public Service Convenience can be done through the estate

RULING: Yes. Within the Philosophy of the present legal system and within the framework of the
Constitution, the estate of Fragrante should be considered an artificial or juridical person for the purposes
of the settlement and distribution of his estate which include the exercise during the judicial administration
thereof of those rights and fulfillment of those obligation which survived after his death of those rights was
the one involved in his pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case,
consisting in the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. The Court also ruled that the
citizenship of the decedent is extended to his estate.

If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to prosecute
his application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one would have denied him that right. The
Court ruled that the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the
meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the Constitution.

3. Object of succession
 Future property v future inheritance

DAUD.1 SANTOS V BLAS, 1 SCRA 899

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FACTS: Simeon Blas contracted a first marriage with Marta Cruz and had 3 children, only one of whom,
Eulalio, left children namely: Maria Blas, one of the plaintiffs, Marta Blas, one of the defendants, and Lazaro
Blas. Lazaro died and is survived by 3 legitimate children who are plaintiffs namely, Manuel, Leoncio and
Loid. After Marta’s death, Simeon contracted a 2nd marriage with Maxima Santos. On 2nd marriage, no
liquidation of the properties of Simeon and Marta was made. Before Simeon’s death, he executed a last
Will and Testament, and he ordered a a document (Exhibit A) since the properties he had acquired in his
first marriage had not been liquidated and not separated from those acquired in the 2nd marriage. Such
document contains promises by Maxima to respect the said will and to give 1/2 of the properties she and
her husband will leave to the heirs, legatees or beneficiaries named in the will. Pursuant to this document,
the plaintiffs instituted an action against the administration of the estate of Maxima Santos to secure judicial
declaration that 1/2 of the properties left by Maxima be adjudicated to them. Upon filing of opposition by the
administrator, the court dismissed the complaint. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the condition stipulated involves a future inheritance

RULING: No. Exhibit "A" is not a contract on future inheritance. It is an obligation or promise made by the
maker to transmit 1/2 of her share in the conjugal properties acquired with her husband, which are declared
to be conjugal in the will of the husband. The conjugal properties were in existence at the time of the
execution of Exhibit "A". Maxima Santos even included these properties in her inventory of her husband's
estate. The promise does not refer to any properties that the maker would inherit upon the death of her
husband, because it is her share in the conjugal assets. That the kind of promise in Exhibit "A" is not void
under Article 1271 of the old CC. The properties subject of Exhibit "A" are well defined properties, existing
at the time of the agreement, which Simeon Blas declares as belonging to his wife as her share in the
conjugal partnership. His wife's actual share in the conjugal properties may not be considered as future
inheritance because they were actually in existence at the time Exhibit "A" was executed. What is
prohibited to be the subject matter of a contract under Article 1271 is " future inheritance." Future
inheritance is any property or right not in existence or capable of determination at the time of the contract,
that a person may in the future acquire by succession. The properties subject of the contract Exhibit "A" are
well defined properties, existing at the time of the agreement, which Simeon Blas declares in his statement
as belonging to his wife as her share in the conjugal partnership. Certainly his wife's actual share in the
conjugal properties may not be considered as future inheritance because they were actually in existence at
the time Exhibit "A" was executed.

DECIN.1 DE BELEN VDA DE CABALU V TABU, 681 SCRA 625

Under Article 1347 of the Civil Code, “No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in
cases expressly authorized by law.”

Paragraph 2 of Article 1347, characterizes a contract entered into upon future inheritance as void. The law
applies when the following requisites concur: (1) the succession has not yet been opened; (2) the object of
the contract forms part of the inheritance; and (3) the promissor has, with respect to the object, an
expectancy of a right which is purely hereditary in nature.

FACTS: 1941: Faustina died without any children. Faustina left a holographic will, which was not probated
[1939], assigning and distributing her property to her nephews and nieces. One of her nephews is Benjamin
Laxamana, who died in 1960 and the father of Domingo. Domingo allegedly executed a Deed of Sale of
Undivided Parcel of Land, disposing of his 9,000 square meter share to Laureano Cabalu, petitioners’
father.
The forced and legitimate heirs of Faustina executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Succession with Partition,
to give effect to the holographic will. The deed imparted 9,000 sq. m. to Domingo. Domingo sold the 4,500
sqm. to his nephew, Eleazar. The remaining 4,500 sq. m was registered under his name.
Domingo passed away. October 1996 [2 months after]: Domingo allegedly executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of Tabu. Spouses Tabu subdivided the said lot into 2.
Dolores, together the heirs of Domingo filed an unlawful detainer action against petitioners and all
persons claiming rights under them. The heirs claimed that petitionerss were merely allowed to occupy the
lot by their late father Domingo, and that they refused to vacate the same. Petitioners filed cases claiming
that they were the lawful owners of the property because it was sold to their father, Laureano Cabalu
[1975]. Thus, being the rightful owners by way of succession, they could not be ejected from the property.
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 Respondent spouses countered that: 1. The Deed of Sale in 1975 was null and void because Domingo
was not yet the owner of the property, as the same was still registered in the name of Faustina. - Domingo
became the owner only on August 1, 1994. 2. Domingo was of unsound mind because he was confined in
a mental institution for a time.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the Deed of Sale of Undivided Parcel of Land covering the 9,000 square meter
property executed by Domingo in favor of Laureano Cabalu on March 5, 1975, is valid

2) Whether or not the Deed of Sale, dated October 8, 1996, covering the 4,500 square meter portion of the
9,000 square meter property, executed by Domingo in favor of Renato Tabu, is null and void.

RULING: (1) No. In this case, at the time the deed was executed, Faustina’s will was not yet probated; the
object of the contract, the 9,000 square meter property, still formed part of the inheritance of his father from
the estate of Faustina; and Domingo had a mere inchoate hereditary right therein. Domingo became the
owner of the said property only on August 1, 1994, the time of execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial
Succession with Partition by the heirs of Faustina, when the 9,000 square meter lot was adjudicated to him.
Thus, the 1975 Deed of Sale in favor of Laureano was null and void. Domingo’s status as an heir of
Faustina by right of representation, the TCT covering the 9,000 sq. m. property is valid, as this served as
the inheritance of Domingo from Faustina.

(2) Yes. The deed covering the remaining 4,500 sq. m. in favor of R Tabu is null and void. The deed itself
[October 1996] shows that it was executed more than 2 months after the death of Domingo. To form a valid
and legal agreement, it is necessary that there be a party capable of contracting and a party capable of
being contracted with. Thus, if any one party to a supposed contract was already dead at the time of its
execution, such contract is undoubtedly simulated and false and, therefore, null and void by reason of its
having been made after the death of the party who appears as one of the contracting parties therein. The
death of a person terminates contractual capacity. The contract being null and void, the sale to Respondent
Tabu produced no legal effects and transmitted no rights. Thus, the TCTs both registered in the name of
Spouses Tabu are void.

4. Death of the decedent

 Succession inter vivos (Arts. 50, 51 and 52, Family Code)
 Contractual succession (Art. 1331 old Civil Code, Art. 130 new Civil Code, Art. 84, Family Code)
5. Succession by will and intestate succession

C. Definition of “decedent”, “testator”, “heir”, “devisee” and “legatee”

1. Distinction among “heirs”, “devisees”, and “legatees”
2. Importance of the distinction between devisees/legatees and heir

D. The inheritance of a person (Arts. 776 and 781)

E. Opening of succession (Art. 777)

1. Significance of the time of death
2. Consequences of Art. 777

DELOTINA.1 BONILLA V BARCENA, 71 SCRA 491

FACTS: On March 31, 1975, Fortunata Barcena, mother of minors Rosalio Bonilla and Salvacion Bonilla
and wife of Ponciano Bonilla, instituted a civil action in the Court of First Instance of Abra, to quiet title over
certain parcels of land located in Abra. The herein defendants then filed a written motion to dismiss the
complaint, but before the hearing of the said motion, the plaintiff’s counsel moved to amend the complaint
which was granted. The defendants again filed another motion to dismiss the complaint. The said motion to
dismiss was then heard. On August 19, 1975, plaintiff’s counsel received a copy of the order dismissing the
complaint; he moved to set aside the said order. The court denied the MR filed by the plaintiff’s counsel
which the counsel later on filed a written manifestation allowing the minor petitioners to be allowed to
substitute their deceased mother. From the order, the plaintiff’s counsel filed a second MR of the order
dismissing the complaint but the same was denied. Hence, this present petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether the action survives even after the death of a party during the pendency of the case.
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RULING: Yes. While it is true that a person who is dead cannot sue in court, yet he can be substituted by
his heirs in pursuing the case up to its completion. Under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
"whenever a party to a pending case dies, it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of
such death, and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal
representatives." Moreover, Article 777 of the Civil Code provides "that the rights to the succession are
transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." When Fortunata Barcena, therefore, died her
claim or right to the parcels of land in litigation was not extinguished by her death but was transmitted to her
heirs upon her death. Her heirs have thus acquired interest in the properties in litigation and became
parties in interest in the case. In addition, Under Section17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court "after a party dies
and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative
of the deceased to appear and be substituted for the deceased, within such time as may be granted." The
question as to whether an action survives or not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued
for. The claim of the deceased plaintiff which is an action to quiet title over the parcels of land in litigation
affects primarily and principally property and property rights and therefore is one that survives even after
her death. It is, therefore, the duty of the respondent Court to order the legal representative of the
deceased plaintiff to appear and to be substituted for her. Thus, the action in the instant case survives.

HASSAN.1SALVADOR V STA. MARIA, 20 SCRA 603

FACTS: Several parcels of land in Bulacan were owned by Celestino Salvador and he executed a deed of
sale in favor of the spouses Alfonso Salvador and Anatolia Halili. Alleging that the sale was void for lack of
consideration, he filed a suit for reconveyance against said vendees in CFI Branch I. Later, Celestino
Salvador died, testate. As his alleged heirs, 21 persons were substituted as plaintiffs in the action for
reconveyance. Meanwhile, a special proceeding for the probate of his will was instituted in CFI Branch II
and Dominador Cardenas was appointed as administrator. In the special proceeding, 23 persons were
instituted heirs in the will. Of these, 9 were not among the 21 alleged relatives substituted in the
reconveyance case and of the 21 substituted alleged heirs 7 were not instituted in the will.
In the suit for reconveyance, the court ordered the defendants to reconvey the parcels of land to the
estate of Celestino Salvador. The defendants Appealed to CA, but the decision was affirmed, with the
correction that reconveyance be in favor of the 21 heirs substituted as plaintiffs therein.
3 years later, pursuant to an order in the testacy proceedings, one of the parcels of land was sold so
that debtors who filed claims may be paid. The PNB bought it and the amount was then deposited in the
same bank by the administrator, subject to Court order.
The defendants in the suit for reconveyance executed a deed of reconveyance over the subject parcels
of land, in favor of of the 21 persons substituted as plaintiffs in that action. The CFI Branch I then ordered
the PNB to release the proceeds of the sale to the 21 plaintiffs in the reconveyance case. Apparently,
although the passbook was given by the administrator to said 21 persons, no release was made, as the
PNB awaited CFI Br. II's (probate court) order. However, Br. II (probate court) ordered the return of the
passbook to the administrator and release to the administrator by the PNB of the proceeds or so much
thereof is needed to pay the afore-stated debts of the estate. After failing to get reconsideration of said
order, the 21 substituted heirs filed with the Court the present special civil action for certiorari with
preliminary injunction to assail the order to pay the debts of the estate with the proceeds of the sale of one
of the land; and to question Br. II's (probate court) power to dispose of the parcels of land involved in the
reconveyance suit in Br. I.

ISSUE: Whether the final judgment in the reconveyance suit in favor of the twenty-one so-called heirs who
substituted Celestino Salvador, bar the disposition of the reconveyed properties by the settlement court?

RULING: No. The right of the heirs to specific, distributive shares of inheritance does not become finally
determinable until all the debts of the estate are paid. Until then, in the face of said claims, the hereditary
rights cannot be enforced, are inchoate, and subject to the existence of a residue after payment of the
debts. Thus, notwithstanding that the properties of the decedent's estate under administration have been
ordered by final judgment in a separate action to be reconveyed to the decedent's heirs, said properties
remain subject to the debts of the estate. They cannot distribute said properties among themselves without
the debts of the estate being first satisfied. The reconveyance of said properties to the heirs was in trust for
the estate, subject to its obligations. Hence, the petition for certiorari is denied.

JOE.1 RAMIREZ V BALTAZAR, 24 SCRA 918

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FACTS: Victoriana Eguaras, single, mortgaged a real estate to spouses Baltazar and Susana Flores. Upon
the death of Victoriana, the mortgagees, as creditors of the deceased, filed a petition for the intestate
proceedings of Victoriana's estate; alleging further that plaintiffs, Felimon and Monica Ramirez, are heirs of
the deceased. Felimon was later appointed as adminstrator but did not qualify so that Artemio Diawan was
appointed as judicial administrator of the estate.
The mortgagees then filed a foreclosure of the property in question and succeeded, after Diawan failed
to file an answer against the petition. The foreclosure sale ensued, the property was bought by the
mortgagees themselves and the sale was confirmed by the court. Felimon Ramirez sued for the annulment
of the entire foreclosure proceedings, alleging among others the failure of the judicial administrator to
protect their interests by acting in collusion with the other defendants Artemio Baltazar and Susana Flores,
deliberately and in fraud of the plaintiffs. Defendants moved to dismiss the annulment contending that
plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue and have no cause of action. The court granted the motion to
dismiss on the ground that plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue since their status as legal heirs of the
deceased has yet to be determined, and until such status is so fixed by the Court, they have no cause of
action against defendants.

ISSUE: Whether the plaintiffs have a cause of action against the defendents

RULING: Yes. There is no question that the rights to succession are automatically transmitted to the heirs
from the moment of the death of the decedent. (Art. 777) While, as a rule, the formal declaration or
recognition to such successional rights needs judicial confirmation, this Court has, under special
circumstances, protected these rights from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial
declaration. In Pascual vs. Pascual, it was ruled that although heirs have no legal standing in court upon
the commencement of testate or intestate proceedings, this rule admits of an exception as "when the
administrator fails or refuses to act in which event the heirs may act in his place."
A similar situation obtains in the case at bar. The administrator is being charged to have been in
collusion and connivance with the mortgagees of a property of the deceased, allowing its foreclosure
without notifying the heirs, to the prejudice of the latter. Since the ground for the present action to annul the
aforesaid foreclosure proceedings is the fraud resulting from such insidious machinations and collusion in
which the administrator has allegedly participated, it would be farfetched to expect the said administrator
himself to file the action in behalf of the estate. And who else but the heirs, who have an interest to assert
and to protect, would bring the action? Inevitably, this case should fall under the exception, rather than the
general rule that pending proceedings for the settlement of the estate, the heirs have no right to commence
an action arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased. Hence, the order appealed from is hereby set
aside insofar as it dismissed the complaint.

KULANI.1 PUNO V PUNO ENTERPRISES, INC., 599 SCRA 585

FACTS: Carlos L. Puno, the decedent, was an incorporator of respondent Puno Enterprises, Inc. Petitioner
Joselito Musni Puno, claiming to be an heir of Carlos L. Puno, initiated a complaint for specific performance
against respondent. As surviving heir, he claimed entitlement to the rights and privileges of his late father
as stockholder of respondent. The complaint thus prayed that respondent allow petitioner to inspect its
corporate book, render an accounting of all the transactions, and give petitioner all the profits, earnings,
dividends, or income pertaining to the shares of Carlos L. Puno. The lower court ruled in favor of the
petitioner.
On appeal, the CA ordered the dismissal of the complaint because the petitioner was not able to
establish the paternity of and his filiation to Carlos L. Puno. Accordingly, the CA said that petitioner had no
right to demand that he be allowed to examine respondents books. Moreover, petitioner was not a
stockholder of the corporation but was merely claiming rights as an heir of Carlos L. Puno, an incorporator
of the corporation.

ISSUE: Whether the honorable court of appeals erred in not ruling that the Joselito Puno is entitled to the
reliefs demanded he being the heir of the late Carlos Puno, one of the incorporators of respondent
corporation.

RULING: Upon the death of a shareholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the
corporation and acquire the rights and privileges of the deceased as shareholder of the corporation. The
stocks must be distributed first to the heirs in estate proceedings, and the transfer of the stocks must be
recorded in the books of the corporation. The Corporation Code provides that no transfer shall be valid,
except as between the parties, until the transfer is recorded in the books of the corporation. During such
8
interim period, the heirs stand as the equitable owners of the stocks, the executor or administrator duly
appointed by the court being vested with the legal title to the stock. Until a settlement and division of the
estate is effected, the stocks of the decedent are held by the administrator or executor.[18] Consequently,
during such time, it is the administrator or executor who is entitled to exercise the rights of the deceased as
stockholder.

MAIN POINT: Upon the death of a stockholder, the heirs do not automatically become stockholders of the
corporation; neither are they mandatorily entitled to the rights and privileges of a stockholder.

LATIP.1 REYES V RTC BRANCH 142, 561 SCRA 593

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent, Rodrigo, are children of the spouses Pedro and Anastacia
Reyes. Each of whom owned shares of stocks of Zenith, a domestic corporation established by their family.
Pedro’s estate was judicially partitioned among his heirs, but Anastacia’s estate was not settled. Zenith and
Rodrigo filed a complaint with SEC against Oscar stating that it is a derivative suit to obtain an accounting
of the funds and assets of ZENITH which are in the possession of Oscar and to determine the shares of
stock of their parents that Oscar fraudulently appropriated for himself. Oscar denied the charge that he
illegally acquired the shares of Anastacia and questioned the SECs jurisdiction to entertain the complaint
because it pertains to the settlement of the estate of Anastacia. When RA 8799 took effect, SECs exclusive
and original jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Sec 5 of PD 902-A was transferred to the RTC
designated as a special comercial court. The records of the case was turned over to RTC Branch 142.
Oscar filed a motion to declare complaint as nuisance or harassment suit claiming that according to the
Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies, be dismissed; and that it is not a bona fide
derivative suit as it partakes of the nature of a petition for the settlement of estate of the deceased
Anastacia that is outside the jurisdiction of a special commercial court.

ISSUE: Is there an intra-corporate relationship between the parties that would characterize the case as an
intra-corporate dispute and within the jurisdiction of the trial court?

RULING: No. Insofar as the subject shares of stock are concerned, Rodrigo cannot be considered a
stockholder of Zenith. Rodrigo holds shares of stock in Zenith in his own right with respect to the shares
registered in his name and as one of the heirs of Anastacia with respect to the shares registered in her
name. What is material in resolving the issues of this case under the allegations of the complaint is
Rodrigos interest as an heir since the subject matter of the present controversy centers on the shares of
stocks belonging to Anastacia. Article 777 of the Civil Code declares that the successional rights are
transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, upon Anastacias death, her children
acquired legal title to her estate and they are, prior to the estates partition, deemed co-owners thereof.This
status as co-owners, however, does not immediately and necessarily make them stockholders of the
corporation. Unless and until there is compliance with Section 63 of the Corporation Code on the manner of
transferring shares, the heirs do not become registered stockholders of the corporation. Without the
settlement of Anastacias estate, there can be no definite partition and distribution of the estate to the heirs.
Without the partition and distribution, there can be no registration of the transfer. And without the
registration, the Court cannot consider the transferee-heir a stockholder who may invoke the existence of
an intra-corporate relationship as premise for an intra-corporate controversy within the jurisdiction of a
special commercial court.

MAINPOINT: The transfer of title by means of succession, though effective and valid between the parties
involved (i.e., between the decedents estate and her heirs), does not bind the corporation and third parties.
The transfer must be registered in the books of the corporation to make the transferee-heir a stockholder
entitled to recognition as such both by the corporation and by third parties. Without the partition and
distribution, there can be no registration of the transfer. And without the registration, the Court cannot
consider the transferee-heir a stockholder who may invoke the existence of an intra-corporate relationship
as premise for an intra-corporate controversy within the jurisdiction of a special commercial court.

LIM.1 DE BORJA V VDA, DE BORJA, 46 SCRA 577

MAIN POINT: Transmission of successional rights and obligations?

FROM THE MOMENT OF THE DECEDENT’S DEATH.

Art. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
9
FACTS: 3 cases were consolidated.

Francisco de Borja, upon the death of his wife Josefa Tangco filed a petition for the probate of her will.
The will was probated.

Francisco de Borja was appointed executor and administrator: their son, Jose de Borja, was appointed
co-administrator.

When Francisco died, Jose became the sole administrator of the testate estate of his mother, Josefa
Tangco.

Widower Francisco de Borja allegedly took unto himself a second wife, Tasiana Ongsingco. Upon
Francisco's death, Tasiana instituted testate proceedings she was appointed special administratrix.

The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana Ongsingco has been plagued
with several court suits and counter-suits; including the three cases at bar, some eighteen (18) cases
remain pending determination in the courts. The testate estate of Josefa Tangco alone has been unsettled
for more than a quarter of a century. In order to put an end to all these litigations, a compromise agreement
was entered into by Jose (heir and son in first marriage) and Tasiana (heir and surviving spouse in second
marriage).

Jose de Borja submitted for Court approval of the agreement to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in
special proceeding; and again, to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.

Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja opposed in both instances.

The Rizal court approved the compromise agreement, but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and
unenforceable.

Special administratrix Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja appealed the Rizal Court's order of approval
(now Supreme Court G.R. case No. L-28040), while administrator Jose de Borja appealed the order of
disapproval (G.R. case No. L-28568) by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija.

The genuineness and due execution of the compromised agreement is not disputed, but its validity is,
nevertheless, attacked by Tasiana Ongsingco on the ground that: (1) the heirs cannot enter into such kind
of agreement without first probating the will of Francisco de Borja; (2) that the same involves a compromise
on the validity of the marriage between Francisco de Borja and Tasiana Ongsingco; and (3) that even if it
were valid, it has ceased to have force and effect.

ISSUE: WN the heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of decedent.

RULING: No. Art. 777 provides that, the rights to the succession of the heirs are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent.

MANGUBAT.1 LEE V RTC BRANCH 85, 423 SCRA 497

FACTS: Dr. Juvencio Ortanez owned 90% shares in the Philippine International Life Insurance Company
Inc (Philinterlife). He was survived by his legal wife (Juliana Salgado), 3 legitimate children (Jose, Rafael
and Antonio) and five illegitimate children (Ma. Divina, Jose, Romeo, Enrico Manuel and Cesar). Petitions
for the administration of the intestate estate of the Dr. Ortanez were filed. Pending the appointment of a
regular administrator, brothers Rafael and Jose were named joint special administrators of their father’s
estate. Ma. Divina filed a petition before the court to be appointed as special administrator of the
Philinterlife shares of stock which was granted by the intestate court. Unfortunately, however, the writ of
execution was not enforced due to the resistance of herein petitioner. Juliana and her children, without
securing court approval, executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortanez (including the
Philinterlife shares), portioning the estate among themselves. Subsequently, Juliana sold half of Philinterlife
shares to FLAG. Rafael filed a motion for the approval of the deeds of sale of the Philinterlife shares and
the release of Ma. Divina as special administrator thereof. The intestate court denied the motion and held
10
that the sale of the said shares were null and void. Meanwhile petitioner Lee as president of FLAG,
increased the authorized capital stock of Philinterlife, diluting in the process the 50.725% controlling interest
of the decedent.

ISSUE: WON the sale executed by juliana in favor of flag is valid

RULING: No, the sale is void. An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under
administration under Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is
deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent. However, an
heir can only alienate such portion of the estate allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or
intestate court after final adjudication. In the present case, Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific
properties in favor of petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the
estate by the intestate court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to the
estate. Any disposition of estate property by an administrator or prospective heir pending final adjudication
requires court approval and any unauthorized disposition of estate property can be annulled by the probate
court, there being no need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized disposition. As ruled in many
cases, the sale of any property of the estate by an administrator or prospective heir without order of the
probate or intestate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser.

MAINPOINT: An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the property under administration under
Art. 533 of the Civil Code which provides that possession of hereditary property is deemed transmitted to
the heir without interruption from the moment of death of the decedent. However, an heir can only alienate
such portion of the estate allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or intestate court after
final adjudication. In the present case, Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties in favor of
petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate
court because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other claimants to the estate.

SAPHIE.1 HEIRS OF SANDEJAS V LINA, 351 SCRA 183

FACTS: Letters of Administration were issued by the lower court appointing Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. as
administrator of the estate of the late Remedios Sandejas, his wife. However, Records of the CFI Manila
was burned. As a result, Administrator Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a Motion for Reconstitution of the
records of the case which was granted by the court.
An Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention was filed by Movant Alex A.
Lina alleging among others that, movant and Administrator Sandejas bound and obligated himself to sell 4
parcels of land which formed part of the estate of the late Remedios R. Sandejas.
Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas died. Since none of the heirs of Mr. Sandejas moved for the appointment of
new administrator, the lower court issued an order granting the Motion of Alex A. Lina as the new
administrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios R. Sandejas in this proceedings. But later on, the lower
court granted the the Motion of Sixto Sandejas, son of spouses Sandejas, and substituted Alex Lina with
Sixto Sandejas as petitioner in the consolidated petitions for intestate estate proceedings of Mr. Sandejas
and Mrs. Sandejas.
Intervenor filed an Omnibus Motion to approve the deed of conditional sale executed between Plaintiff-
in-Intervention Alex A. Lina and Mr. Sandejas to which the administrator opposed. The lower court granted
the motion.
Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that Eliodoro Sr. was bound, as a matter of justice and good
faith, to comply with his contractual commitments as an owner and heir. When he entered into the
agreement with respondent, he bound his conjugal and successional shares in the property.

ISSUE: Whether or not the undivided shares of Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr. in the subject property is three-
fifth (3/5) and the administrator of the latter should execute deeds of conveyance therefor within thirty days
from receipt of the balance of the purchase price from the respondent

RULING: Succession laws and jurisprudence require that when a marriage is dissolved by the death of the
husband or the wife, the decedents entire estate under the concept of conjugal properties of gains -- must
be divided equally, with one half going to the surviving spouse and the other half to the heirs of the
deceased. After the settlement of the debts and obligations, the remaining half of the estate is then
distributed to the legal heirs, legatees and devices.

YAP.1 SANTOS V LUMBAO, 519 SCRA 408

11
FACTS: Herein petitioners Virgilio, Victorino, Ernesto and Tadeo, all surnamed Santos, are the legitimate
and surviving heirs of the late Rita Catoc Santos (Rita). The other petitioners Esperanza Lati and Lagrimas
Santos are the daughters-in-law of Rita.
Herein respondents Spouses Jose Lumbao and Proserfina Lumbao are the alleged owners of the
107-square meter lot (subject property), which they purportedly bought from Rita during her lifetime.
On two separate occasions during her lifetime, Rita sold to respondents Spouses Lumbao the subject
property which is a part of her share in the estate of her deceased mother, Maria Catoc (Maria), who died
intestate.
On the first occasion, Rita sold 100 square meters of her inchoate share in her mothers estate through
a document denominated as Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 17 August 1979. Respondents Spouses Lumbao
claimed the execution of the aforesaid document was witnessed by petitioners Virgilio and Tadeo, as
shown by their signatures affixed therein. On the second occasion, an additional seven square meters was
added to the land as evidenced by a document also denominated as Bilihan ng Lupa, dated 9 January
1981.
After acquiring the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao took actual possession thereof
and erected thereon a house which they have been occupying as exclusive owners up to the present. As
the exclusive owners of the subject property, respondents Spouses Lumbao made several verbal demands
upon Rita, during her lifetime, and thereafter upon herein petitioners, for them to execute the necessary
documents to effect the issuance of a separate title in favor of respondents Spouses Lumbao insofar as the
subject property is concerned. Respondents Spouses Lumbao alleged that prior to her death, Rita informed
respondent Proserfina Lumbao she could not deliver the title to the subject property because the entire
property inherited by her and her co-heirs from Maria had not yet been partitioned.
The Spouses Lumbao claimed that petitioners, acting fraudulently and in conspiracy with one another,
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement, adjudicating and partitioning among themselves and the other
heirs, the estate left by Maria, which included the subject property already sold to respondents Spouses
Lumbao and now covered by TCT of the Registry of Deeds of Pasig City.
Petitioners denied the allegations that the subject property had been sold to the respondents Spouses
Lumbao. They likewise denied that the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement had been fraudulently executed
because the same was duly published as required by law. They prayed for the dismissal of the Complaint
for lack of cause of action because respondents Spouses Lumbao failed to comply with the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law for barangay reconciliation.

ISSUE: Whether or not herein petitioners are legally bound to comply with the Bilihan ng Lupa dated 17
August 1979 and 9 January 1981 and consequently, reconvey the subject property to herein respondents
spouses Lumbao.

RULING: The general rule that heirs are bound by contracts entered into by their predecessors-in-interest
applies in the present case. Article 1311[32] of the NCC is the basis of this rule. It is clear from the said
provision that whatever rights and obligations the decedent have over the property were transmitted to the
heirs by way of succession, a mode of acquiring the property, rights and obligations of the decedent to the
extent of the value of the inheritance of the heirs.
Thus, the heirs cannot escape the legal consequence of a transaction entered into by their
predecessor-in-interest because they have inherited the property subject to the liability affecting their
common ancestor. Being heirs, there is privity of interest between them and their deceased mother. They
only succeed to what rights their mother had and what is valid and binding against her is also valid and
binding as against them. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a contract which
involves a property right and the rights and obligations thereunder pass to the personal representatives of
the deceased. Similarly, nonperformance is not excused by the death of the party when the other party has
a property interest in the subject matter of the contract.

MAINPOINT:
Art. 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.

Consequence of Art 777 (opening of succession) - after the death of the decedent, anyone of the heirs
may enter into a contract with respect to his share in the inheritance even before partition has been
effected. This is so because his right with respect thereto is already in the nature of a vested right in
accordance with the principle declared in Art. 777, to the effect that the rights to the succession are
transmitted at the moment of the death of the decedent. He may sell his undivided share in the inheritance
or even donate it.
12
 F. Different types of Succession
1. Testate
2. Intestate
3. Mixed

YU.1 RODRIGUEZ ET AL., V BORJA ET AL., 17 SCRA 418

FACTS: Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of
Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez, meanwhile the petitioners filed a petition
before the court to examine the purported will but which was later withdrawn, and a petition for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently field in a another court in Rizal. The
petitioners now sought the dismissal of the special proceeding on the settlement of the decedent's estate
based on the purported will, questioning therefore the jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan. In this case, there were 2
proceedings. First was an intestate proceeding instituted meaning, a proceeding to settle the estate of a
deceased person who died without a will. But subsequently, a will was found and again another proceeding
was instituted, this time, testate proceeding wherein the estate of the deceased person is settled if that
person has left a will. We are confronted here of 2 proceedings; one was instituted ahead of the other.

ISSUE: Which proceeding should be preferred?

RULING: The jurisdiction of the CFI of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery of the will of the late
Father Rodriguez, even if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being
deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and
issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised
Rules of Court. Intestate succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only
takes place in the absence of a valid operative will. As long as there is a will, even if that will is found later
and even if the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a person with a will is filed later, that should
be preferred. The will should be probated. The will should be given effect as much as possible in order to
give effect to the wishes of the testator. The wishes of the testator must be given such preference first.
Probate of the will is needed in order to determine whether or not the will was indeed valid, whether or not
the will was executed in observance with the formalities required by law and whether or not the testator
executed it with a sound mind. If later on in the probate proceeding, the will is found not to have validly
executed, then you go to intestate proceeding. But first you go to testate.

TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION

1. Wills in General (Arts. 783 – 795)

A. Characteristics of a Will
B. Testator’s Power of Control over the Estate and its Limitations
 Control over the legitime (Art. 886)
 The reservable property (Art. 891)

 ALBA.2 DISPOSITION IN FAVOR OF THE MISTRESS (NEPOMUCENO V CA, 139 SCRA 206)

MAIN POINT: Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:

The following donations shall be void:
(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation;

(2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration thereof;

(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office.

In the case referred to in No. 1, the action for declaration of nullity may be brought by the spouse of
the donor or donee; and the guilt of the donor and donee may be proved by preponderance of evidence in
the same action.

Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:

13
 The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary
provisions.

“Guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the making of the will.”

FACTS: Martin Jugo died on July 16, 1974 in Malabon, Rizal. He left a last Will and Testament duly signed
by him at the end of the Will on page three and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof in the
presence of Celestina Alejandro, Myrna C. Cortez, and Leandro Leano, who in turn, affixed their signatures
below the attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 of the Will in the presence of the
testator and of each other and the Notary Public. The Will was acknowledged before the Notary Public
Romeo Escareal by the testator and his three attesting witnesses.
In the said Will, the testator Jugo named and appointed herein petitioner Sofia J. Nepomuceno as his
sole and only executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a
certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he
had been estranged from his lawfully wedded wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife.
On December 5, 1952, the testator Martin Jugo and Sofia J. Nepomuceno were married in Victoria,
Tarlac before the Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced heirs, namely, his legal wife
Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita his entire estate and the free portion thereof to herein
petitioner.

ISSUE: Does the testator have absolute control over the disposition of his properties considering he has full
ownership over them?

RULING: No. In this case, the exception is Morality or Public Policy.

The very wordings of a will may invalidate the legacy, such as where the testator admits in the will
that he is disposing the properties to a person with whom he has been living in concubinage. Thus, the
prohibition mentioned in Art. 739 of the Civil Code concerning donations inter vivos apply to testamentary
provisions.
The SC affired the ruling of the respondent court, that the Will shall be valid except that the disposition
in favor of Sofia Nepomuceno is null and void pursuant to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.

 Limitation under a fideicommissary substitution (Art. 863)

 Condition not to marry (Art. 874)
 Disposicion captatoria (Art. 875)
 Disposition in favor of an incapacitated person (Art. 1031)

C. Necessity of Conveyance of Property (Arts. 783 and 838)

AVILA.2 SEANGIO V REYES, 508 SCRA 177

FACTS: Private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the late Segundo
Seangio. Segundo left a holographic will disinheriting one of the private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for
cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners averred that in the event the decedent is found
to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be automatically suspended and replaced by the
proceedings for the probate of the will. Thus, petition for the probate of the holographic will of Segundo was
filed by petitioners before the RTC.
The private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the ground
that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo did not contain any disposition of the
estate of the deceased and thus did not meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code.
According to private respondents, the will only showed an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of
his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as
heir, devisee or legatee, hence there was preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being the case,
private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule only on the extrinsic
validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the same, and ordering the
dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it contains no testamentary
disposition of the property of the decedent.
Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: (1) generally, the authority
of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; (2) private
respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; (3) disinheritance constitutes a
14
 disposition of the estate of a decedent; and (4) the rule on preterition did not apply because Segundo’s will
did not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs. The RTC
issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings, hence, a petition for certiorari was filed.

ISSUE: Whether the will can be considered as a holographic will and whether the trial court should have
allowed it to be probated.

RULING: A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely written, dated,
and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of
the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
Segundo’s document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the
hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa can be clearly deduced from the terms of the
instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latter’s property, the disinheritance
of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the
disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of
Alfredo.
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form
and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of
construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the
testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.
Considering that the questioned document is Segundo’s holographic will, and that the law favors
testacy over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code
provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in
accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his
property may be rendered nugatory. In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed
the holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of
the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose

MAIN POINT: Article 838 of the Civil Code provides that no will shall pass either real or personal property
unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the
right of a person to dispose of his property may be rendered nugatory. In view of the foregoing, the trial
court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be probated. It is settled that testate
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take precedence over intestate proceedings for
the same purpose

D. Delegation of Power (Arts. 784, 785, 786 and 1030)

E. Imperfect Testamentary Dispositions (Art. 789

 Types of Defects
 Remedial Measures (Sections 9 and 23, Rule 130, Rules of Court)

F. Rules of Interpretation (Arts. 788, 790 and 791)

BAIDDIN.2 DE ROMA V COURT OF APPEALS, 152 SCRA 205

FACTS: Candeleria De Roma adopted two daughters, Buhay and Rosalinda. She died intestate. When
administration proceedings was ongoing, Buhay was appointed administratrix and filed an inventory of the
estate. Opposed by Rosalinda on the ground that certain properties donated by their mother to Buhay and
fruits thereof had not been included. Private respondent rigorously argues that it is, conformably to Article
1061 of the Civil Code. Buhay, for her part, citing Article 1062, claims she has no obligation to collate
because the decedent prohibited such collation and the donation was not officious. The TC issued an order
in favor of Buhay because when Candelaria donated the properties to Buhay she said in the Deed of
Donation “sa pamamagitan ng pagbibigay na di na mababawing muli” which the TC interpreted as a
prohibitionto collate and besides the legitimes of the two daughters were not impaired. Onappeal, it was
reversed as it merely described the donation as irrevocable not an express prohibition to collate.

ISSUE: Whether or not these lands are subject to collation.

HELD: The pertinent Civil Code provisions are:

15
Art. 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of
the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination
of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition. (1035a)

Art. 1062. Collation shall not take place among compulsory heirs if the donor should have so expressly
provided, or if the donee should repudiate the inheritance, unless the donation should be reduced as
inofficious. (1036)

The SC affirmed the appellate court’s decision and that it merely described the donation as
irrevocable. The Fact that a donation is irrevocable does not necessarily exempt the donated properties
from collation as required under the provisions of the NCC. Given the precise language of the deed of
donation the decedent donor would have included an express prohibition to collate if that had been the
donor’s intention. Absent such indication of that intention, the rule not the exemption should be applied.

DALIS.2 DIZON-RIVERA V DIZON, 33 SCRA 554

MAIN POINT: The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments.

FACTS: Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga, and was survived by seven compulsory
heirs, to wit, six legitimate children named Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Marina Dizon
(herein executrix-appellee), Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a legitimate granddaughter named
Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a pre-deceased legitimate son of the
said decedent. Six of these seven compulsory heirs (except Marina Dizon, the executrix-appellee) are the
oppositors-appellants.

The deceased left a last will and written in the Pampango dialect. Named beneficiaries in her will
were the above-named compulsory heirs, together with seven other legitimate grandchildren. The estate
amounted to P 1,801,960.01 and Marina Dizon-Rivera, as executor, presented the partition to the probate
court, in accordance to the last will and the apellants presented a counter partition of the estate with the
exact amount of their respective legitime.
According to the apellants:
According to the last will:
1. Estela Dizon Php49,485.56
1. Estela Dizon Php98,474.80
2. Angelina Dizon 53,421.42
2. Angelina Dizon 106,307.06
3. Bernardita Dizon 26,115.04
3. Bernardita Dizon 51,968.17
4. Josefina Dizon 26,159.38
4. Josefina Dizon 52,056.39
5. Tomas Dizon 65,874.04
5. Tomas Dizon 131,987.41
6. Lilia Dizon 36,273.13
6. Lilia Dizon 72,182.47
7. Marina Dizon 576,938.82
7. Marina Dizon 1,148,063.71
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. 34,814.50
8. Pablo Rivera, Jr. 69,280.00
9.Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al. 36,452.80
9.Grandchildren Gilbert Garcia et al. 72,540.00
Total Php1,802,860.01 Total Php905,534.78
And that the remaining half would be equally divided among them
in seven equal parts of P129,362.11 as their respective legitimes.

The partition made by the Marina Dizon-Rivera was approved by the lower court thus this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the testamentary dispositions of the testator, being dispositions in favor of compulsory
heirs, be taken only from the free portion of the estate

RULING: No. The testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in the matter of
testaments, and to paraphrase an early decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, when expressed clearly
and precisely in his last will amount to the only law whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed
and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees and legatees, and neither these interested parties
nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the testator's will. Decisive of the issues at bar is the
fact that the testator’s testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. Thus, in
the third paragraph of her will, after commanding that upon her death all her obligations as well as the
expenses of her last illness and funeral and the expenses for probate of her last will and for the
administration of her property in accordance with law, be paid, she expressly provided that "it is my wish
16
 and I command that my property be divided" in accordance with the dispositions mentioned above,
whereby she specified each real property in her estate and designated the particular heir among her seven
compulsory heirs and seven other grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same. The decision
appealed from was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
*The computation of the apellants is erroneous as well as their conclusions (haha). I just copied the digits from the case. 

DAUD.2 VDA. DE VILLAFLOR V JUICO, 4 SCRA 550

FACTS: Don Nicolas Villaflor executed a will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing
in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta ½ of all his real and personal properties giving the other half to his brother.
Petitioner Leonor villaflor filed an action against Fausta contending that upon the widow’s death, he
became vested with the the ownership of the properties bequeathed by Nicolas under clause 7 pursuant to
its 8 clause of the will.

ISSUE: WON the petitioner is entitled to the ownership of the properties upon the death of Dona Faustina.

HELD: The intention of the testator here was to merely give usufructuary right to his wife Doňa Fausta
because in his will he provided that Doňa Fausta shall forfeit the properties if she fails to bear a child and
because she died without having begotten any children with the deceased then it means that Doňa Fausta
never acquired ownership over the property. Upon her death, because she never acquired ownership over
the property, the said properties are not included in her estate. Those properties actually belong to Villaflor.
That was the intention of the testator. Otherwise, if the testator wanted to give the properties to Doňa
Fausta then he should have specifically stated in his will that ownership should belong to Doňa Fausta
without mentioning any condition. .

MAINTPOINT: Intention and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed
law of interpretation, and all question raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be
settled in accordance therewith following the plain and literal meaning of the testator words, unless it clearly
appear that his intention was otherwise.

G. Rules of Severability (Art. 792)

DECIN.2 BALANAY, JR. V MARTINEZ, 64 SCRA 454

Art .792 – The invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of
the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other
dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made Doctrine Balanay stresses the jurisdiction of
the probate court. Unless the nullity of the will is patent on its face, the probate court should first pass upon
the extrinsic validity of the will before passing upon its substantive validity. Balanay further holds that there
is no such thing as preterition of the surviving spouse.

FACTS: Leodegaria Julian died testate leaving her husband, Felix Balanay Sr., and by their six legitimate
children as heirs. Felix Jr.(child) filed in the lower court a petition for the probate of his mother's notarial will.
In that will Leodegaria Julian declared: (a) that she was the owner of the "southern half" of nine conjugal
lots; (b) that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her father, and (c)
that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's
lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties.
In par. V of the will she stated that after her husband's death, her paraphernal lands and all the
conjugal lands (which she described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner
set forth in that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by
her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one-half share of the conjugal assets. Felix Balanay Sr. and
Avelina B. Antonio(child) opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity,
undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. Felix
Balanay Sr. wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that he was
interested in its probate. he manifested that out of respect for his wife's will he "waived and renounced" his
hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children. In that same instrument he confirmed the
agreement, which he and his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be
partitioned in the manner indicated in her will. Avelina, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and
17
 "conformation" of Felix Balanay Sr. were void. The lower court declared the will void and converted into
intestate proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its
allowance or formal validity, and in declaring the will void.

RULING: Yes. The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its
formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it
appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will
be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. But the probate court erred in
declaring in its order that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate
proceeding notwithstanding the fact that it gave effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will and
to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal
estate. The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the
invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such
other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code).

H. Property acquired after making the will (Art. 793)

 Distinguished from Art. 781

I. Grant of Full Interest (Arts. 794 and 869)

 Grant of greater interest (Arts. 929 and 931)

J. Governing Law of Formal Validity (Art. 795)

 As to time of execution of the will
 As to the place of execution of the will
 Governing law of Substantive Validity of a will

DELOTINA.2 BELLIS V BELLIS, 20 SCRA 358

FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. By his
first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children. His second wife, Violet
Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children; and finally, he had three illegitimate children:
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis. On 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in
the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of administration are
paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust.phï1.ñëtSubsequently, Amos died a resident of
San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on
September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein which it
released from time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the various motions or
petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on account of their respective legacies.
Later, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of
partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore,
compulsory heirs of the deceased. Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of
service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on
April 30, 1964, issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report
and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law
of the decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964,
oppositors-appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply — Texas law or
Philippine law.

ISSUE: Which law must apply in executing the will of the deceased – Texas Law or Philippine Law?

RULING: The said legitimate children are not entitled to their legitimes under the Texas Law which is the
national law of the deceased, here are no legitimes. The Renvoi Doctrine cannot be applied. Said doctrine
is usually pertinent where the decendant is a national of one country and a domiciliary of another. It this
said case, it is not disputed that the deceased was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the
time of his death.
18
 Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent,
in intestate or testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the
amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to
succeed. They provide that —
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and
to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be
regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the
nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that —
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when
they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without
substantial change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. The parties
admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the
laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision
of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law
on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.

2. Testamentary Capacity and Intent (Arts. 796 – 804)

A. Testamentary Capacity (Arts. 796, 797 and 798; see also Arts. 37, 38 and 39)

B. Soundness of the mind (Arts. 799 and 800)

HASSAN.2 DE GUZMAN V INTESTATE ESTATE OF FRANCISCO BENITEZ, 169 SCRA 284

FACTS: Dionisia Valenzuela and her brother, Melquiades Valenzuela, first-cousins of the deceased
Francisco Benitez, filed a petition for administration of his intestate estate and for the issuance of letters of
administration to Dionisia. Francisco Benitez died single at the age of 61 years, without descendants, nor
ascendants, nor brothers and sisters. He left an estate consisting of fourteen parcels of coconut land in
Laguna, a residential lot, and a small savings account (P3,843.08) in the Philippine National Bank.
However, the petition for administration was opposed by Emiterio de Guzman on the ground that the
deceased left a will bequeathing his entire estate to him and he also filed a petition for probate. De Guzman
later died and was substituted by his heirs.
In support of the petition for probate, the petitioner and two attesting witnesses of the will, Pelagio
Lucena and Judge Damaso Tengco who prepared the will, gave evidence. While the other party presented
six witnesses and moved to reject the will on account of insanity. Various documentary exhibits were
presented by both sides and the court rendered judgment disallowing the will and appointing Dionisia
Valenzuela administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased. The evidence shows that from January
18, 1929 up to March 12, 1941 Francisco Benitez was confined at the National Mental Hospital for varying
periods of time. This leads the court to the conclusion that at the time Francisco Benitez executed his
supposed will on August 18, 1945 he was not possessed of a sound and disposing mind. On appeal to the
Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether the Court erred in finding the deceased Francisco Benitez 'was not possessed of a sound
and disposing mind' when he executed his will on August 18, 1945

RULING: No. Plainly, the petition raises a purely factual issue, which We are not at liberty to review
because in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court only questions of law which must be
distinctly set forth, may be raised. In any event, the decision of the Court of Appeals reveals that the Court
carefully weighed the evidence on the question of the testamentary capacity or lack of it, of the deceased
Francisco Benitez and found "no compelling reason to disturb the lower court's findings and conclusions."
The resolution of that question hinged on the credibility of the witnesses. The cardinal rule on that point is
19
 that the trial courts, assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying is generally binding on the
appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor and its findings,
when supported by convincingly credible evidence, shall not be disturbed on appeal. WHEREFORE, the
petition for review is denied for lack of merit.

JOE.2 BALTAZAR V LAXA, 669 SCRA 249

FACTS: Paciencia, childless and has no siblings, was a 78 year old spinster. She made her last will and
testament in favor of her nephew Lorenzo Laxa and his wife and two children. She treated Lorenzo as her
own son. The said will was executed in the house of a retired judge, Limpin, and was read twice to
Paciencia. Present on the execution of the will were three witnesses and one of which is Dra. Limpin, the
daughter of Judge Limpin. The formalities of signing the will by the testator and the witnesses were fulfilled.
The will remained with Judge Limpin until Lorenzo, four years after the death of Paciencia, filed a petition
for the probate of the will and for the issuance of the letter of administration.
Petitioner Baltazar filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition averring that the properties subject to the
will belongs to his predecessor in interest, Mangalindahan. Later on, Baltazar was joined with several other
petitioners contending that Paciencia’s will was null and void because ownership of the properties had not
been transferred. Few more reasons raised by the petitioners were that the will was not executed in
accordance with the requirements of the law, and that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a will at
the time of the execution as she was magulyan or forgetful so much so that it effectively stripped her of
testamentary capacity. RTC ruled that Paciencia was of unsound mind during the execution of the will,
however, the CA reversed such decision and granted the probate of the will of Pacencia. Petitioners moved
for reconsideration but such was dismissed. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the CA gravely erred in ruling that petitioners failed to prove that Paciencia was not of
sound mind at the time the will was allegedly executed

RULING: We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a
person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to
being of unsound mind. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know
the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the
testamentary act. In this case, apart from the testimony of one of the petitioners pertaining to Paciencias
forgetfulness, there is no substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of
unsound mind at the time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence
Dra. Limpins testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpins
house and voluntarily executed the Will. The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the
testator’s mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent.
More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the Will
and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. The burden of proof that the testator was not of
sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but
if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who
maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval. Here, there was
no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before the making of the
Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the shoulders of
petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented by them to prove
the same, thereby warranting the CAs finding that petitioners failed to discharge such burden. Petition is
DENIED.

C. Supervening Incapacity (Art. 801)

D. Testamentary Capacity of a Married Woman (Arts. 802 and 803)

3. Forms of Wills (Arts. 804 – 819)

A. Notarial Will (Arts. 804 to 808)

 Purpose of the Formalities
 Written instrument
 Language Requirement

KULANI.2 SUROZA V HONRADO, 110 SCRA 388

20
FACTS: In 1973, Marcelina Suroza supposedly executed a notarial will bequeathing her house and lot to a
certain Marilyn Suroza. In 1974, Marcelina died. Marina Paje was named as the executrix in the said will
and she petitioned before CFI Rizal that the will be admitted to probate. The presiding judge, Honrado
admitted the will to probate and assigned Paje as the administratrix. Honrado also issued an ejectment
order against the occupants of the house and lot subject of the will.
Nenita Suroza, daughter in law of Marcelina (her husband, son of Marcelina was confined in the
Veteran’s Hospital), learned of the probate proceeding when she received the ejectment order (as she was
residing in said house and lot). Nenita opposed the probate proceeding. She alleged that the said notarial
will is void because (a) the instituted heir therein Marilyn Suroza is actually Marilyn Sy and she is a stranger
to Marcelina, (b) the only son of Marcelina, Agapito Suroza, is still alive and is the compulsory heir, (c) the
notarial will is written in English a language not known to Marcelina because the latter was illiterate so
much so that she merely thumbmarked the will, (d) the notary public who notarized will admitted that
Marcelina never appeared before him and that he notarized the said will merely to accommodate the
request of a lawyer friend but with the understanding that Marcelina should later appear before him but that
never happened.
Honrado still continued with the probate despite the opposition until testamentary proceeding closed
and the property transferred to Marilyn Sy.
Nenita then filed this administrative case against Honrado on the ground of misconduct.

ISSUE: Whether or not Honrado is guilty of misconduct for admitting into probate a void will.
RULING: Yes. The will is written in English and was thumb marked by an obviously illiterate Marcelina. This
could have readily been perceived by Honrado that that the will is void. In the opening paragraph of the will,
it was stated that English was a language “understood and known” to the testatrix. But in its concluding
paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the testatrix “and translated into Filipino language.” That
could only mean that the will was written in a language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it
is void because of the mandatory provision of Article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed
in a language or dialect known to the testator. Had Honrado been careful and observant, he could have
noted not only the anomaly as to the language of the will but also that there was something wrong in
instituting to Marilyn Sy as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to Agapito who was still alive.
Honrado was fined by the Supreme Court.

MAIN POINT: Every will must be executed in a language or dialect known to the testator.

LATIP.2 REYES V VDA. DE VIDAL, 2 SCUD 53

FACTS: This concerns the admission to probate of a document claimed to be the last will and testament of
Maria Zuñiga Vda. de Pando. A petition for the probate of said will was filed in the CFI. The court rendered
its decision disallowing the will citing as one of the ground is that it was not proven that the deceased knew
the Spanish language in which it was written.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is evidence to show that the testatrix knew the language in which the will was
written.

RULING: There is indeed nothing in the testimony of the witnesses presented by the petitioner which would
indicate that the testatrix knew and spoke the Spanish language used in the preparation of the will in
question. But, in our opinion, this failure alone does not in itself suffice to conclude that this important
requirement of the law has not been complied with, it appearing that there is enough evidence on record
which supplies this technical omission. In the first place, we have the undisputed fact that the deceased
was a mestiza española, was married to a Spaniard, Recaredo Pando, and made several trips to Spain. In
the second place, we have the very letters submitted as evidence by the oppositor written in Spanish by the
deceased possessed the Spanish language, oppositor cannot now be allowed to allege the contrary. These
facts give rise to the presumption that the testatrix knew the language in which the testament has been
written, which presumption should stand unless the contrary is proven. And this presumption has not been
overcome. And finally, we have the very attestation clause of the will which states that the testatrix knew
and possessed the Spanish language. It is true that this matter is not required to be stated in the attestation
clause, but its inclusion can only mean that the instrumental witnesses wanted to make it of record that the
deceased knew the language in which the will was written. There is, therefore, no valid reason why the will
should be avoided on this ground.

21
  Testator’s signature at the end of the will

LIM.2 TABOADA V ROSAL, 118 SCRA 195

MAIN POINT: Testator’s signature at the end of the will

There is nothing in the law (Art. 805) which requires that the attesting witnesses should also sign at
the end of the will or at the end of the attestation clause.

Article 809 provides the rule for substantial compliance that is, as long as the purpose sought by the
attestation clause is obtained, the same should be considered valid.

However, that the law speaks not of defects of sub- stance but defects and imperfections:
1) in the FORM of attestation, or
2) in the LANGUAGE used therein.

FACTS: In a notarial will consisting of two pages, the first containing the entirety of the will and the second,
both the attestation clause and the acknowledgment, the signature of the testator was placed at the end of
the first page thereof, but the signatures of the attesting witnesses were placed at the left-hand margin of
the page.

ISSUE: Can the will be admitted or probated?

RULING: Yes, for there is nothing in the law (Art. 805) which requires that the attesting witnesses should
also sign at the end of the will or at the end of the attestation clause. Besides the law is to be liberally
construed. While perfection in drafting is to be desired, unsubstantial departures ought to be ignored.

 Customary signature; facsimile signature

 Testator signing through an agent

MANGUBAT.2 BALONAN V ABELLANA, 109 PHIL 359

FACTS: Anacleta Abellana left a will. In said will, she let a certain Juan Bello sign the will for her. The will
consists of two pages. The first page is signed by Juan Abello and under his name appears typewritten
“Por la testadora Anacleta Abellana”. On the second page, appears the signature of Juan Bello under
whose name appears the phrase, “Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana” – this time, the phrase is
handwritten.

ISSUE: Whether or not the signature of Bello appearing above the typewritten phrase “Por la testadora
Anacleta Abellana” comply with the requirements of the law prescribing the manner in which a will shall be
executed.

RULING: No. Article 805 of the Civil Code provides that: “Every will, other than a holographic will, must be
subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator’s name written by some other person
in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.”
The name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana, does not appear written under the will by said Abellana
herself, or by Juan Abello. There is, therefore, a failure to comply with the express requirement in the law
that the testator must himself sign the will, or that his name be affixed thereto by some other person in his
presence and by his express direction.
Note that the phrase “Por la testadora Anacleta Abellana” was typewritten and above it was the
signature of Abello – so in effect, when Abello only signed his name without writing that he is doing so for
Anacleta, he actually omitted the name of the testatrix. This is a substantial violation of the law and would
render the will invalid.

MAINPOINT: No. Article 805 of the Civil Code provides that: “Every will, other than a holographic will, must
be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator himself or by the testator’s name written by some other
person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.”
22
 Attested and subscribed by three credible witnesses

SAPHIE.2 ICASIANO V ICASIANO, 11 SCRA 422

FACTS: Celso Icasiano, filed a petition for the probate of the will of Josefa Villacorte and for his
appointment as executor thereof. It appears from the evidence that the testatrix died on September 12,
1958. She executed a will in Tagalog, and through the help of her lawyer, it was prepared in duplicates, an
original and a carbon copy.
On the day that it was subscribed and attested, the lawyer only brought the original copy of the will
while the carbon duplicate (unsigned) was left in Bulacan. One of the witnesses failed to sign one of the
pages in the original copy but admitted he may have lifted 2 pages simultaneously instead when he signed
the will. Nevertheless, he affirmed that the will was signed by the testator and other witnesses in his
presence.

ISSUE: Whether or not the failure of one of the subscribing witnesses to affix his signature to a page is
sufficient to deny probate of the will

RULING: The inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to the
simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of probate.

 Credible v Competent Witnesses

 Test of presence

YAP.2 NERA V RIMANDO, 18 PHIL 450

FACTS: One of the subscribing witnesses was present in the small room where it was executed at the time
when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures; at that time he was
outside, some eight or ten feet away, in a large room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway,
across which was hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator
and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument.

ISSUE: Whether there is due execution of the will and should be admitted to probate.

RULING: The SC admitted the instrument to probate the last will and testament of Pedro Rimando.
At the moment when the witness signed the document he was actually and physically present and in
such position with relation to the other witnesses that he could see everything that took place by merely
casting his eyes in the proper direction and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so;
whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of
each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the
moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing conditions and their position
with relation to each other were such that by merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they could
have seen each other sign.

MAINPOINT: [Test of Presence, citing Jabonete vs Gustilo “the curtain case”]

The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether
they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have been seen each other sign, had they
chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and position with relation to each other at
the moment of inscription of each signature. But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties
with relation to each other at the moment of the subscription of each signature, must be such that they may
see each other sign if they choose to do so.

 Signatures on the left margin

 Pagination Requirement

YU.2 LOPEZ V LIBORO, 81 PHIL 429

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 FACTS: The will of Don Sixto Lopez was submitted for probate by Jose Lopez and Clemencia Lopez, the
Don’s sister. The probate was opposed by Agustin Liboro who contended that the will is not valid due to the
following grounds: (1) that the deceased never executed the alleged will; 2) that his signature appearing in
said will was a forgery; (3) that at the time of the execution of the will, he was wanting in testamentary as
well as mental capacity due to advanced age; (4) that, if he did ever execute said will, it was not executed
and attested as required by law, and one of the alleged instrumental witnesses was incapacitated to act as
such; and it was procured by duress, influence of fear and threats and undue and improper pressure and
influence on the part of the beneficiaries instituted therein, principally the testator's sister, Clemencia Lopez,
and the herein proponent, Jose S. Lopez; and (5) that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or
trick. Liboro pointed out that the first page of the will, which was contained in two pages in all, was not
numbered in letters or Arabic numbers as what should have been required by law. It was also argued that
the testator should have signed the will with his signature and not only with his thumb print if he indeed had
the capacity to execute the will. Furthermore, the will did not expressly state that the language used is a
language which the Don understood; in this case, it was in Spanish.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was substantial compliance to qualify the will for probate.

RULING: There has been substantial compliance even in the presence of the averred irregularities. The
purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is guard against fraud, and to afford means of
preventing the substitution or of defecting the loss of any of its pages. In the present case, the omission to
put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by other forms of identification more
trustworthy than the conventional numerical words or characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified
as the first page by the internal sense of its contents considered in relation to the contents of the second
page. By their meaning and coherence, the first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a
continuation of the last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom
of the preceding page. Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains the caption "TESTAMENTO," the
invocation of the Almighty, and a recital that the testator was in full use of his testamentary faculty, all of
which, in the logical order of sequence, precede the direction for the disposition of the marker's property.
Again, as page two contains only the two lines above mentioned, the attestation clause, the mark of the
testator and the signatures of the witnesses, the other sheet can not by any possibility be taken for other
than page one. The testator affixed his thumb mark to the instrument instead of signing his name. The
reason for this was that the testator was suffering from "partial paralysis." While another in testator's place
might have directed someone else to sign for him, as appellant contends should have been done, there is
nothing curious or suspicious in the fact that the testator chose the use of mark as the means of
authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or preference. Both ways are good. A statute requiring a will
to be "signed" is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark. As for the question on the
language of the will, there is no statutory requirement that such knowledge be expressly stated in the will
itself. It is a matter that may be established by proof. The will may therefore be submitted for probate.

 Attestation Clause
 Failure to state the number of pages

ALBA.3 Taboada v Rosal, 118 SCRA 195

MAINPOINT: The attestation (attestation clause) shall provide:

1) the number of pages used — upon which the will is written;
2) that the testator signed (or expressly caused another person to sign) the will and every page thereof in the
presence of the instrumental witnesses;
3) that the instrumental witnesses witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the presence of
the testator and of one another. 


The principal object of requirement #1 is to forestall any attempt to suppress or substitute any of the
pages of the will. It is mandatory in character. However, it is not necessary when all of the dispositive parts
of a will are written on one sheet only. Neither is it necessary that the pages of the will shall be numbered
correlatively in letters such as “one,” “two” or “three.” According to the weight of authority, substantial
compliance with the statutory requirement is sufficient.
Ref: Art 805, read also Art 809

FACTS: The attestation clause of a notarial will failed to state the number of pages thereof, however, it is
discernible from the entire will that it really consists of only 2 pages (the 1st containing the provisions, and
24
 the 2nd, both the attestation clause and the acknowledgment), BESIDES, the acknowledgment itself states
that “This Last Will and Testament consists of two pages including this page.”

ISSUE: WN the failure to state the number of pages renders the will null and void.

RULING: Under the circumstances, the will allowed probate. Although there is failure to state the number of
pages, but there is an acknowledgement that the will consists of 2 pages stated therein. The court
approached the matter liberally (Doctrine of Liberality), because the court there is sufficient compliance of
such requirement.

 Error in indicating the number of pages

AVILA.3 SAMANIEGO-CELADA V ABENA, 556 SCRA 569

FACTS: Margarita Mayores died single without any ascending nor descending heirs. She was survived by
her first cousins which included the petitioner. Before her death, Margarita executed a will where she
bequeathed portions of her undivided shares in real property to respondent. Margarita also left all her
personal properties to respondent whom she likewise designated as sole executor of her will. RTC
rendered a decision declaring the last will and testament of Margarita probated and respondent as executor
of the will. CA affirmed in toto.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not declaring the will invalid for failure to comply with the
formalities required by law.

RULING: No. A review of the findings of the RTC as upheld by the Court of Appeals, reveal that petitioners
arguments lack basis. The RTC correctly held:

Anent the contestants submission that the will is fatally defective for the reason that its attestation
clause states that the will is composed of three (3) pages while in truth and in fact, the will consists of two
(2) pages only because the attestation is not a part of the notarial will, the same is not accurate.
While it is true that the attestation clause is not a part of the will, the court, after examining the totality of the
will, is of the considered opinion that error in the number of pages of the will as stated in the attestation
clause is not material to invalidate the subject will. It must be noted that the subject instrument is
consecutively lettered with pages A, B, and C which is a sufficient safeguard from the possibility of an
omission of some of the pages. The error must have been brought about by the honest belief that the will is
the whole instrument consisting of three (3) pages inclusive of the attestation clause and the
acknowledgement. The position of the court is in consonance with the doctrine of liberal interpretation
enunciated in Article 809 of the Civil Code which reads:

In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and] improper pressure and influence,
defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not render
the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial
compliance with all the requirements of Article 805.

Thus, we find no reason to disturb the abovementioned findings of the RTC. Since, petitioner and her
siblings are not compulsory heirs of the decedent under Article 887 of the Civil Code and as the decedent
validly disposed of her properties in a will duly executed and probated, petitioner has no legal right to claim
any part of the decedents estate.

MAIN POINT: In the absence of bad faith, forgery or fraud, or undue [and] improper pressure and
influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used therein shall not
render the will invalid if it is proved that the will was in fact executed and attested in substantial compliance
with all the requirements of Article 805.

LOPEZ V LOPEZ, 685 SCRA 209

FACTS: Enrique S. Lopez (Enrique) died leaving his wife, Wendy B. Lopez, and their four legitimate
children. Before Enrique’s death, he executed a Last Will and Testament and constituted Richard, his son,
as his executor and administrator.

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 Richard filed a petition for the probate of his father's Last Will and Testament before the RTC of
Manila with prayer for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor.
The RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with Article 805 of the Civil Code
which requires a statement in the attestation clause of the number of pages used upon which the will is
written. It held that while Article 809 of the same Code requires mere substantial compliance of the form
laid down in Article 805 thereof, the rule only applies if the number of pages is reflected somewhere else in
the will with no evidence aliunde or extrinsic evidence required. While the acknowledgment portion stated
that the will consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment are
written, the RTC observed that it has 8 pages including the acknowledgment portion. As such, it disallowed
the will for not having been executed and attested in accordance with law.

ISSUE: Whether there was compliance with the required formalities of wills as prescribed in Article 805 of
the Civil Code.

RULING: The law is clear that the attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is
written. The purpose of the law is to safeguard against possible interpolation or omission of one or some of
its pages and prevent any increase or decrease in the pages.
While Article 809 allows substantial compliance for defects in the form of the attestation clause,
Richard likewise failed in this respect. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last will
and testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and acknowledgment
are written" cannot be deemed substantial compliance. The will actually consists of 8 pages including its
acknowledgment which discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through
the presentation of evidence aliunde.

 Failure to state the number of witnesses

BAIDDIN.3 TESTATE ESTATE OF ALIPIO ADABA V ABAJA, 450 SCRA 264

FACTS: This is a case of the probate of the will of Alipio Abada. Thereafter, the probate of the will of Paula
Toray was also filed with the court. The oppositors in the will of Abada and Toray are their nephews and
nieces. The ground for opposition is that decedent left no will or if there is a will it was executed not in
consonance with the law. Belinda Caponong-Noble was assigned as the administratix of the estate of
Abada by the trial court. Thereafter, Abellar was appointed administratix of Toray’s property. The RTC ruled
only on whether the will of Abada has an attestation clause as required by law. The RTC-Kabankalan
further held that the failure of the oppositors to raise any other matter forecloses all other issues.
Unsatisfied with the decision Caponong-Noble appealed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will of Abada has an attestation clause, and if so, whether the attestation clause
complies with the requirements of the applicable laws.

RULING: The Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the RTC-Kabankalan in admitting to probate the
will of Abada. Abada executed his will on 4 June 1932. The laws in force at that time are the Civil Code of
1889 or the Old Civil Code, and Act No. 190 or the Code of Civil Procedure which governed the execution
of wills before the enactment of the New Civil Code. The matter in dispute in the present case is the
attestation clause in the will of Abada. Section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No.
2645 governs the form of the attestation clause of Abada’s will.
There is no statutory requirement to state in the will itself that the testator knew the language or dialect
used in the will. This is a matter that a party may establish by proof aliunde. Caponong-Noble further
argues that Alipio, in his testimony, has failed, among others, to show that Abada knew or understood the
contents of the will and the Spanish language used in the will. However, Alipio testified that Abada used to
gather Spanish-speaking people in their place. In these gatherings, Abada and his companions would talk
in the Spanish language. This sufficiently proves that Abada speaks the Spanish language. An attestation
clause is made for the purpose of preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts attending the
execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the subscribing witnesses, or other casualty,
they may still be proved. (Thompson on Wills, 2d ed., sec. 132.) A will, therefore, should not be rejected
where its attestation clause serves the purpose of the law. We rule to apply the liberal construction in
the probate of Abada’s will. Abada’s will clearly shows four signatures: that of Abada and of three
other persons. It is reasonable to conclude that there are three witnesses to the will. The question
on the number of the witnesses is answered by an examination of the will itself and without the
need for presentation of evidence aliunde. The Court explained the extent and limits of the rule on liberal
26
 construction. Precision of language in the drafting of an attestation clause is desirable. However, it is not
imperative that a parrot-like copy of the words of the statute be made. It is sufficient if from the language
employed it can reasonably be deduced that the attestation clause fulfills what the law expects of it.

 Failure to state that the testator signed through an agent

DALIS.3 GARCIA V LACUESTA, 90 PHIL 489

MAIN POINT: Under our law, the requirement that the testator must subscribe the will at the end thereof is
complied with not only when the testator affixes his signature hereto, but also when the testator’s name is
written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction. It must be noted, however, that
this fact, among others, should be stated in the attestation clause.

FACTS: For failure of stating that the will was signed by another, the Court of Appeals disallowed the
probate of the will Antero Mercado dated Jan 1943. The said will was written in Ilocano dialect. The will
appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of the testator followed below
by 'A ruego del testador' and the name of Florentino Javier. In effect, it was signed by another although
under the express direction of the testator. This fact however was not recited in the attestation clause.
Mercado also affixed a cross on the will.

The lower court admitted the will to probate but this order was reversed by the Court of Appeals on the
ground that the attestation failed to recite the facts surrounding the signing of the testator and the
witnesses.

ISSUE: Whether the failure to state in the attestation clause that the will was signed not by the testator
himself render the will defective even though the testator affixed a mere cross on the will

RULING: Yes. The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused
Atty. Florentino Javier to write the testator's name under his express direction, as required by section 618 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. On the cross affixed on the will by the testator, the Court held that it is not
prepared to liken the mere sign of a cross to a thumbmark for obvious reasons- the cross does not have the
trustworthiness of a thumbmark so it is not considered as a valid signature. The appealed decision was
affirmed by the Supreme Court.

 Attesting Signatures

DAUD.3 CAGRO V CAGRO, 92 PHIL 1032

FACTS: This is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the CFI admitting to probate the
will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in 1949.
The main objection insisted upon by the appellant in that the will is fatally defective, because its attestation
clause is not signed by the attesting witnesses. There is no question that the signatures of the three
witnesses to the will do not appear at the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the
same is signed by the witnesses on the left-hand margin.

ISSUE: Whether the signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin conform substantially to the
law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause.

RULING: The attestation clause is 'a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will' required
by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their signatures. An unsigned
attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the omission of their signatures at
the bottom thereof negatives their participation.
The signatures of the three witnesses on the left-hand margin are in compliance with the legal
mandate that the will be signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If an attestation clause not signed
by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be easy to add such clause
to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.

 Fatally Defective Attestation Clause

27
 DECIN.3 AZUELA V COURT OF APPEALS, 487 SCRA 119

A will whose attestation clause does not contain the number of pages on which the will is written is
fatally defective. A will whose attestation clause is not signed by the instrumental witnesses is fatally
defective. And perhaps most importantly, a will which does not contain an acknowledgment, but a mere
jurat, is fatally defective. Any one of these defects is sufficient to deny probate. A notarial will with all three
defects is just aching for judicial rejection.

FACTS: Petitioner Felix Azuela sought to admit to probate the notarial will of Eugenia E. Igsolo. However,
this was opposed by Geralda Castillo, who was the attorney-in-fact of “the 12 legitimate heirs” of the
decedent. According to her, the will was forged, and imbued with several fatal defects. Particularly, the
issue relevant in this subject is that the will was not properly acknowledged. The notary public, Petronio Y.
Bautista, only wrote “Nilagdaan ko at ninotario ko ngayong 10 ng Hunyo 10 (sic), 1981 dito sa Lungsod ng
Maynila.”

ISSUE: Whether or not the will is fatally defective as it was not properly acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and the witnesses as required by Article 806 of the Civil Code.

RULING: Yes. The will is fatally defective. By no manner of contemplation can those words be construed
as an acknowledgment.
An acknowledgement is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent
officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby the
signore actually declares to the notary that the executor of a document has attested to the notary that the
same is his/her own free act and deed.
It might be possible to construe the averment as a jurat, even though it does not hew to the usual
language thereof. A jurat is that part of an affidavit where the notary certifies that before him/her, the
document was subscribed and sworn to by the executor.
Yet even if we consider what was affixed by the notary public as a jurat, the will would nonetheless
remain invalid, as the express requirement of Article 806 is that the will be “acknowledged,” and not merely
subscribed and sworn to. The will does not present any textual proof, much less one under oath, that the
decedent and the instrumental witnesses executed or signed the will as their own free act or deed. The
acknowledgment made in a will provides for another all-important legal safeguard against spurious wills or
those made beyond the free consent of the testator.

 Conflicting Testimonies of Witnesses

DELOTINA.3 VDA. DE RAMOS V COURT OF APPEALS, 81 SCRA 393

FACTS: The late Eugenia Danila left a will wherein she instituted among others Adelaida Nista as one of
the instituted heirs. Nista petitioned before the court to admit the will to probate. The petition was opposed
by Buenaventura Guerra and Marcelina Guerra. The two oppositors claimed that they were the legally
adopted children of Danila; that the said will sought to be probated by Nista was obtained through fraud.
The two parties talked and they came up with a compromise agreement which essentially stated that
Nista is admitting the invalidity of the will. The compromise agreement was approved by the trial court BUT
Rosario de Ramos et al – the other instituted heirs and devisees – intervened. The trial court allowed the
intervention and set aside the compromise agreement. Rosario de Ramos et al alleged that the Guerras
repudiated their shares when they abandoned Danila and committed acts of ingratitude against her.
Eventually, the probate court admitted the will to probate. The decision was appealed by the Guerras.
The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the probate court. The CA ruled that there was a failure to
prove that Danila was in the presence of the instrumental witnesses when she signed the will – this was
because two of the instrumental witnesses (Sarmiento and Paz) testified in court that the will was already
signed by Danila when they affixed their signatures.
HOWEVER, Atty. Ricardo Barcenas, the Notary Public before whom the will was executed and who
assisted in the execution, vehemently assailed the testimony of the two witnesses. He affirmed Danila and
the three instrumental witnesses were in each other’s presence when the will was signed by them. Another
lawyer, who was also present during the execution of the will, corroborated the testimony of Atty. Barcenas.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct in not allowing the will to probate.

28
 RULING: No. The attestation clause was signed by the instrumental witnesses. This serves as their
admissions of the due execution of the will and thus preventing them from prevaricating later on by
testifying against the will’s due execution.
The execution of the same was evidently supervised by Atty. Ricardo Barcenas and before whom the
deeds were also acknowledged. The solemnity surrounding the execution of a will is attended by some
intricacies not usually within the comprehension of an ordinary layman. The object is to close the door
against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of the will and testament, and to guarantee their truth and
authenticity. There is a presumption in the regularity of the performance of a lawyer with his duty as a
notary public. There has been no evidence to show that Barcenas has been remiss in his duty nor were
there any allegations of fraud against him. In fact, the authenticity of Danila’s and the witnesses’ signature
was never questioned.
The attestation clauses, far from being deficient, were properly signed by the attesting witnesses.
Neither is it disputed that these witnesses took turns in signing the will and codicil in the presence of each
other and the testatrix. Both instruments were duly acknowledged before a Notary Public who was all the
time present during the execution.
Subscribing witnesses may forget or exaggerate what they really know, saw, heard or did; they may
be biased and, therefore, tell only half-truths to mislead the court or favor one party to the prejudice of the
others. As a rule, if any or all of the subscribing witnesses testify against the due execution of the will, or do
not remember having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may, nevertheless, be
allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence presented
that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law.

 Acknowledgment Before a Notary Public

 Definition of acknowledgment
 Role of Notary Public
 Disqualifications of a Notary Public’

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