ME. Omelyanovsky ‘DIALECTICS IN MODERN PHYSICS [in] PROGRESS PUBLISHERS MOSCOW‘Translated frou the Mussien Bited by 17. C. Creighton, BM, Ax (O500,) Dengned by Viodiatr Yeremin M.D, Oxeaanuozciati AUAREXTAKA 8 CORPEMEIUION oma0KT Ho ansautenes nstint REQUEST TO READERS Progress Pabbsbers would be glad to have your opinion of this book, 118 transla. son fd. dle end any sugrestions you may have for luture publications Please send all your comments to 47, ‘aubovsky Boulevard, Sloscow, USER. vosss Furst printing 1979 @ Suzarenscruo stiporpeece, $977 English translation @ Progress Publishers 1979 Primed in the Baton of Souted Soctadter Negublicy fosor— 055 5 OTS 70 osnangog00CONTENTS PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION .......- PREFACE TO THE RUSSIAN EDITION ......- . Chapter I. DIALECTICAL MATERIALISM IN MODERN PHYSICS 6 wwe ee ee eet et os Chapter II. THE PROBLEM OF OBJECTIVE REALITY IN QUANTUM THEORY .... 2.2... eae 4. The Methodological Significance of the Idea of Objective Reality in Physics... . . 1 6 ee eee ee ee 2. Observation, Complementarity, and Dialectics .. . 3. The Philosophical Evolution of the Copenhagen School 4, Physical Reality... ....-- be ee Chapter III. CAN WE FORM MENTAL PICTURES OF THE CONCEPTS AND THEORIES OF MODERN PHYSICS? 0 oe eee ee ee Chapter IV. THE PRINCIPLE OF OBSERVABILITY IN MODERN PHYSICS .. ww ee ee ee es 4, Formulation of the Question. The Significance or Mean- . ing of ‘Observability’ .... . wee ee eee 2. What Is an Observable (or a Non-observable)? . .. 3. The Heuristic Role of the Observability Principle Chapter V. DIALECTICAL CONTRADICTORINESS IN MODERN PHYSICS ..... 4. Introductory Remarks. ..........,4 ae 2. The Theory of Relativity and Dialectical Contradiction 8. Dialectical Contradiction and Quantum Theory .. . Chapter VI. DETERMINISM IN QUANTUM THEORY 1, The Objective Reality and Determinacy of Phenomena 2, On the Relationship Between Determinism and the. Principle of Causality in Physics... . 2.0.04 3, Statistical Laws and Determinism ......... 4, Statistical Laws, Determinism, and the Uncertainty Principle ee 5, The Concepts of Actuality and Poss’ Physics ee ee see ee ee 6. The Concepts of Reality and Possibility in Quantum _ Physics Se ee ee 7. A Contribution to the Problem of Causality in Non-local Quantum Field Theory 3 27 39 49 63 78 95 95 100 4107 4419 449 123 130 142 142 148 157 163 474 4179 189Chapter VI THE PROBLEM OF THE ELEMENTARY “AND THE COMPLEX IN QUANTUM PHYSICS i 2 3 Z On the ‘Concopts of to Simple and tho Complex an Bhutosopy snd Physics Glassieal Science of the Elementary and the Complex. The Problem of Simphesty im Microscopic Physics ‘The Concept of tho Clementary and Structure io the Physics of Elementary. Particles ‘Tho Blementary Parhiole of Matter and tho Umvorse Chapter VIII QUANTUM PHYSICS AND THE TRANS TORMABILITY OF UNDAMBNTAL PARTICLES THE ABSOLUTE AND THE RELATIVE 4 The ‘Transformabity. of Bleentary Particles a Gn the Absolute and the Relative an the Modern Physics Chapter IX PULLOSOPHICAL ASPECTS OF THE THEO ‘RY OF MENSURATION Imoinary Remarks ‘Pho Concept of Measurement Direct Measurement Standards and Units Sonsory Perception and Abstract Thought in Mensuration Laws’ of Note and Aletsoremeat indwect Afeasure mont ‘The Concept of Meastrement 1m Quantum Meshames On the Interaction of the Atomic Objects and Mea suring. Instruments apie X AXIOMATICS AND THE SEARCH FOR PRINCIPLES AND FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS IN 2 Cartan Aspects and Functions of 3 ‘io Axgomatie Approach to Phynveat Research the Axiomatic Meth od On tho Aziomaties of Contemporary Physics! Theones N LIEU OF A CONCLUSION 197PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH EDITION This is an English translation of my monograph Dia- lectics in Modern Physics published in Russian by Nauka Publishers in 1973. Its substance remains, for the most part, as in the Russian original, except for the addition of a short chapter ‘In Lieu of a Conclusion’, which rep- resents a sort of philosophical summing up. I do not propose to speak here about the book’s sub- stance. The reader will perhaps tell me that there are repe- titions in it. My reply would be that such repetitions are frequently necessary, especially when one allows for the fact that each time they express a new shade of mean- ing in the appropriate context. I would like to thank Progress Publishers for the work they have done in translating and publishing my book. J am the more pleased to do so since some of the material of the Rus- sian edition had been published abroad in the form of arti- cles and papers, In particular I would mention the following: Das Problem des elementaren Charakters der Teilchen (Physikalische Blatter, 1966, 22, 8); a paper on the absolute and the relative in the Proceedings of the XIVth World Con- gress of Philosophy (Vienna, 1968); an article on the principle of observabiiity in modern physics in Foundations of Phys- ics, 1972, 2, 2/3; a paper on elementary particles and the universe in the Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy (Varna, 1978); and a report Objektives und Subjektives in der Quantentheorie to the ‘Connaissance scien- tifique et philosophie’ colloquium of the Belgian Academy of Sciences (Brussels, 1975). It is my hope that the material presented here has not be- come out of date, since the Russian original was published in 1973, and that the book will prove useful to those who are interested in the philosophical problems of modern physics. M. E. OmelyanovskyPREFACE TO THE RUSSIAN EDISION ‘This monograph brings together suto a unwed whole the adeas and problems that have been considered im many of my published works (articles in Voprosy filosofic and papers in collective works devoted to the philosophical problems of science, published in Russian, for anstanco, in the series Dialectical Matertalism end Modern Science Most of the problems or the aspects of them that are treated here have hoon discussed in my earher work, but the prosent book con tams new material, additions and moro precise definitions, and also 2 pumber of new conelusions I have boon especially interosted to show that dialectics and 2ts very important requirement of applying the all-round universal flexibility of concepts objectively 18 the logic of moder science ‘The basie substance of the book (as 1ts ttle savs) 25 Marx- ast-Lomimist dialectics in modern phystes Dialecties 18 not a formal mental construction but rather a hving method of cogmsing nature and of searching for new truths 1 modern science, and in physics in particular, as far as this book 1 concerned Sts undoubtedly simpler to talk about this than to apply the propositions involved an basic research Itzsnot up tome to decide bow far I have managed to cope with the problems ansing One must, however, emphasise the following spectfic feature of Marnist-Lenimist dialectics today [ts an essen- ‘yal clement of the contemporary scientific and techmical revolution Only through creative development of dialects eo) materialism can we reap the rich rosults of solving the plulosophical problems posed by this revolution It takes its own coutse in socialist socroty, m a form that distin- guishes t from the . that they appear and disappeat depending on the choice of one method of observation or 2n0ther. The mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics 18 not so much objective as symbolic in nature (needed only for agreeing the readings of the instruments). The uncert®imty relation is becoming the absolute boundary of human knowledge; no new funda- mental physical concepts have Pee? developed in quantum mechanics. , te wt One must emphasise that Hejsenberg’s view formulated above (again, if it is held consist@@tly} on the uncontrolla- bility principle leads to non-ma/€tialist philosophical con- clusions. In fact, however, Heise berg himself by no means employed it consistently. When he considers philosophical questions inseparable from the theoretical content of modern physics, ifs basic materialist an@ Gialectical spirit is re- vealed, often quite clearly, in his Statements. When, on the other hand, he moves away from Physics into the realm of general philosophical problems, ti idealist and metaphys- ical line gains the upper hand in his reasoning. Consider his standpoint relative to the cognition of na- ture which underlies, as could be eXPected, his philosophica] reasoning about quantum mechanicS: . According to Heisenberg, man déscribes and explains ‘not nature in itself but nature expose4 to our method of ques- tioning’ and our techniques of rese2tch.™4 Heisenberg highly appreciated the idea of the Ger™an physicist Carl von Weizsicker that ‘Nature is earlier than man, but man is earlier than natural science’. ‘The fitst part of the sentence,’ he wrote, ‘justifies classical physic’: With its ideal of com- plete objectivity. The second part tells us why we cannot escape the paradox of quantum theo'Y: namely, the necessity of using the classical concepts. 2 4 if itis consistently held), momentum so much objectively real asFrom that pout of view it would appear that the transt tion of science from classical physics to quantum physics, anstead of strengthemng the bonds between man and sczence, separated them from each other The point 1s that, accord ing to Heisenberg, exporunents wath atomte processes are as real as any phonomena of daily hfe to desettbe whieh cles sical concepts are employed Atomic or elementary particles, however, are not as real They form a world of poteptial possibilities rather than a world of observed things or facts and can only be represented symhoheally by mathematrcal signs In other words, according to him, atomic and other mucto particles prove to be sn a sort of realm of things in themselves ‘The ‘thing 1n iteolf” 1s for the atomte physi ist, af he uses this concept at all, finally a mathematical structure, but thas structuro 1s—contrary to hant—mdirect ly deduced from experience “* On the other hand, the elas steal concepts (and they include, according to Hetsenberg, space, time, and causality) have to be sterpreted in a cer ‘aun sonso a5 a pricre mn respect to the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics Is xt true that there are adequate grounds in modern phys res to revise the concept of objective reality? Quantum physics appeared and developed, of course, through acceptance of the objective reahty of ‘the physical world, sneluding the atom and the elementary particles, Heisenberg, for example, noted that ‘quantum theory does not contain genuine subjective features, xt does not introduce the mind of the physicist as a part of theatomcevent “On the other hand, quantum theory has to take into account the condhtions'of observation (recardod. by amstroments) in which the objects of its research are found, because of their dual particle wave nature (relativity to the cond: tions of observation)!" whereas classical theory had every right to ignore them ‘The descraption of physical phenomena by the idea of relativity to the conditions (or means) of observation means that quantum theory has made » now advance sn cognition of the objective reality of nature and not that thes objective reahity is lamuted by the boundaries of classical physies, as Heisenberg asserts Dne also cannot agree with Tierseniberg wien to says Yat only classical theory released natute a8 such, while the rise of quantum theory Was accompanied with the establishment of another pomt of view, namely, that science describes na- a2ture not as it is in itself but as subjected to human methods of research. In classical physics the picture of nature is not completely adequate to nature; it is a rough approximation and simplification, as is proved by both the theory of relativ- ity and quantum theory. But then the statement to the effect that classical physics describes and explains nature without taking us ourselves into consideration is wrong. Much the same thought is to be found in Heisenberg’s remarks about the limited character of classical concepts. He does not, however, follow up these remarks, narrowing the philo- sophical concept of objective reality down in his argument to its presentation in classical theory. If one bears in mind that the reflection of nature through observation and thinking idealises, simplifies, and roughly approximates the reflected object, and that at the same time ‘the progress of cognition, theory, and science on the whole overcomes this simplification, which is inevitable in each individual cognitive act, it becomes clear that the develop- ment from classical to relativistic and quantum theories reflects nature more completely in the system of concepts and at a deeper level, without exhausting it. The forward movement of physical knowledge is thus accompanied with the introduction of new methods of describing the phenomena of nature, developing new fundamental concepts and princi- ples, constructing new theories, and creating the scientific picture of the world. It is understandable that this develop- ment of knowledge, which implies ever newer alteration of nature by the person cognising it, in no way resembles a one- sided increase of subjective elements in science through cognition of its objective content; but Heisenberg holds the opposite view.?? Thus, in the process of cognising (objectively real) nature the objective and the subjective should not be opposed and separated from one another, as has been done in his own way by Heisenberg, in whose view the difference between the subjective and objective in classical physics is only absolute, and in quantum physics only relative. The constant advance of science, which reflects the material world, reduces the one-sided elements of the objective and the subjective to nothing. In Lenin’s words, the ‘logical concepts are subjec- tive as long as they remain “abstract”, in their abstract form, but at the same time they express also the Things-in- themselves. Nature is both concrete and abstract, doth 43phenomenon and essence, botk moment and relation Human Concepts are subjective in ther abstractness, separateness, Dut objective as a whole, im the process, an the sum total, 1m the tendency, in the source’ ® The developmont of phys ies—from classical sexenee to that of today—confirms,these adeas of Lenin's in a remarkable way One can supposo that Heisonberg’s statoments above aro not so much a revision of the concept of objective reality mn moder phystcs as the fact that the subject plays an activo Folo in cognition According to lum, tho passive role of the subject in classical physies, and ats contemplative attitude ‘to cogmsod nature, are quite natural physica studies the objective world without violating its state 1n the courso of observation In moder physics (im quantum thoory it 1s expressed with extreme clarity) 1t 18 accepted to speak of the observer and the object, as we know, as opposites Hence at would seem to follow that Heisenberg’s argumentation do serves the closest attention and supportfrom the standpoint of dialectical matenalsm, which reyects contemplative mato nals ‘We would like, howover, to stress that the subject obyect solation (tho objective and the subjective) in classical physics as the same in principle as tn quantum theory Man cogmises naturo only when he changes it, 1 whon he 1solates some phenomena of naturefram athers (such isolation occursalready 1m the act, of observation), when he conducts expenments am whieh ho alters and controls the conditions under which these events take placo, when he reconstructs tho object in thought and spproximates or srmplifies concepts of at, ete , ete ‘Tho alteranon of uature by cognisimg man 1s both anovitable and necessary since 1t 18 only it that creates oppor tunities fot man to cogniso nature as it 1s and to understand ML as aunty of the diverse ‘This character of the alteration of nature, without which thero 18 no cognition of tt, has an essontial special feature ‘Tho more man changes nature, the deeper and more comple toly be cognises at. Naturo then appears more and more diver sified and united to hum, moro ‘wonderful” and richer an its mantiestations and paMinens, more and mote diffarant frow, ‘the naturo to which he was accustomed im the conditions of ‘the ‘conyentional experience From the ordbnary part of \iow, however man’s ‘strong et alteration of nature sn order to cognise at or, as some bhauthors put it, the subject's greater activity in cognition, is only the reverse of cognising man’s movement forward from ignorance to knowledge, from shallow knowledge to deeper knowledge. On the other hand, the relation itself between cognising man (the subject) and cognised nature (orrather, its fragment, i.e. the object) does not change in principle: both at the level of shallow knowledge (in physics, say, classical mechanics) and at the level of deeper knowledge (e.g. quantum mechanics) nature exists before it is cognised by man, to whom it tells its secrets when he alters it and to the extent that he alters it. There are statements in the literature that at the level of physics described by quantum mechanics the subject of cognition is taken, so to say, beyond the bounds of its ‘classical’ passive state, since the interaction between the atomic object and the instrument is regarded as ‘disturbance of phenomena by observation’ or as the ‘creation of phys- ical attributes of objects by measurements’ .*? Such statements now lack conviction. They were used to be common in the literature on quantum theory; now, if they are found at all, it is rather as relics. In his last works Bohr (and many other outstanding scientists) began to op- pose the use of such expressions, which led to erroneous philo- sophical conclusions. One must remember that from the time when quantum mechanics was created to the end of his life Bohr kept returning to the philosophical questions of this theory, refining his terminology and perfecting his argumentation; this, as we shall show later, yielded signifi- cant positive results, one of which was his idea that the words ‘phenomenon’ and ‘measurement’ should be used in matters of quantum mechanics in the direct sense in which they are employed in classical theory.®? The ideas and concepts developed and refined in recent years in quantum mechanics: viz. the proposition that ‘the interaction between object and apparatus ... forms an inseparable part of the phenomenon”; the notion of rela- tivity to the means of observation; the idea that a particle is a relative concept in respect to phenomena on the atomic level, or that the concepts of particle and wave make sense in atomic physics not so much as the concept of a particle in itself and the concept of a wave in itself, as in internal interconnection, and the idea of potential possibility and probability in quantum mechanics—are all convincing evi- 45donce of how far human thought has advanced hy virtue of abstraction, ats analytical and synthetic power since the ‘tumes when clossical mechames was constructed and other alassics] theories arose At tho same tame, the Jans of cognition oporating m clas sical phystes and an quantum physies, oF in any otier se1en ‘afie discaphino and theory, are tho ‘samo, othersiso there could be no unified science, and in goneral no united human Knowledge reflecting the objechvely real world It 1s for that reason that science has followed the path of materralism still does, and will, and why there 1s no place mn ats system of concepts for idéahsm and rehgion Fo conclude our discussion of cortsim opistemological vssues of quantum mechanics, lot us dvell bref on the fact that classical mechanics 18 much closet to it epistemole neally than certain authors think In classical mechanics, jor exemple, the inertial mohon of a parhcle cannot be Utought of indepencently of tho mertial frame of reforenee ‘This ‘relatavsty’ very much resembles the ‘relativaty’ of the particlo an quantum mechanies, although the contont of these ‘relattwities’ by no means comeides We shall return to tins point, and to othor topies discussed above, 1 the nett sections of this chapter and an Chapters V and IX on dialectical contradietormess in modern physics and philo sophical aspocts of the theory of monsuratron Lot us now turn to the conception of complementarity, which xo shall tako as presonted in Nils Bohr 6 ossay on quantum physics and philosophy * ‘There 1 no concept “uncontrollable interaction’ in xt The term *complementa nity’ used by Bobr denotes a novel kind of relationship hetween the different experimental data about atomic objects obtained by means of various experimental appara tws Although theso data, says Bohr, appear contradictory when combination nto a sungle picture 1s attempted they, an fact exhaust all conceivable knowledge about tho obyect ‘The description of atomic phenomena, Hobe stresses has an these respects a perfectly objective character, 1m the sense that, no exphat reforence 1s made to any mdividual observer’ ® In quantum mechames, in lis view, we are not concerned ‘with a restriction as to the accuracy of measurements, but with a limitation of the well defined app catioa,of apace timo concepts and dynamical conservation atten 46In quantum mechanics, Bohr writes, the word ‘measure- ment’ should be used in its direct sense of quantitative comparison (comparison with a standard). He is against using expressions like ‘disturbance of phenomena by obser- vation’ or ‘creation of physical attributes of objects by mea- surements. 8 . . Summarising, Bohr concluded that ‘far from involving any arbitrary renunciation of the ideal of causality, the wider frame of complementarity directly expresses our posi- tion as regards the account of fundamental properties of matter presupposed in classical physical description, but outside its scope’.* Thus, one can find explicit expression in Bohr’s essay Quantum Physics and Philosophy of a position that is basi- cally materialist and dialectical. By linking the mathe- matical apparatus of quantum mechanics with visualisable notions and classical concepts he reveals, as a philosopher would say, the antithetical character of the corpuscular and wave conceptions. Contrasting these ideas as a certain antino- my always played a decisive role in Bohr's notion of com- plementarity. In his early work on quantum mechanics, however, this antithesis was masked by the idea oftuncon- trollable interaction’; in Quantum Physics and Philosophy, however, this drawback is eliminated. The considerable philosophical significance of the idea of complementarity for physical theory is that, according to it, the application of opposite concepts to the same objects under study is not simply possible but even necessary in certain conditions. As Bohr demonstrated (especially in his discussions with Einstein), this does not lead to any formal logical contradictions in physical theory, bul enables the mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics to be inter- preted in accordance with the experimental data and a whole picture to be given of atomic phenomena that classical theo- ries could not cope with. _ We limit ourselves here toa brief outline of complementar- ity, allowing for the fact that Bohr’s ideas will be discussed almost throughout the present book. The complementarity principle, as a conception of quan- tum mechanics (taking it in its mature form), is distin- guished by a harmonious fusion of its philosophical and physical content. Although we have not touched on the other concepts of quantum mechanics in our presentation we shall 47‘make an exception for one of them, viz_Reichonbach’s con- ception, wich scems to us as a matter of fact tocontain al- most no physics but a great deal of plulosophy Jn Ins anal ysis of quantum mechanics and its phelosophieal aspect Hoxchenbach employed Ins theory of equrvalont descriptions (the essence of which will bo brought out. below Tn discussing quantum mechanies, Reichenbach speaks of phonomena and mterphenomene Phe physicist draws infer ferices about phenomena (eg about tho electrons striking photographic film) from mactoscopie events (tracks in emul Sion, anstrument readings), relying on a theory that contains no quantum Jaws 1s conclusions about interphonomena (eg about the motion of an electron before ut strikes a screen) aro deduced from phofomena relying on quantum theory Inferenees about interphenomens, Reichenbach notes, assume certain definitions or ruies,that make it pos- sible, not being eather true or false, ‘to oxtend the language ‘of phenomena to that of interphenomena’ ® For a description of interphenomena in torms of ‘particle’ and ‘wave', Heihenbach says, the following delimtions are adopted’ ‘When we lay down the rule that the quantity had tho same value before tho measurement, wo have intro duced the particle snterpretation * But af no assume that tho quantity has all possible values simultaneously heforo the measurement thus introduces the wave interpretation In certain conditions the particle and wave interpretations, Reichenbach notes further, are ‘equivalent descriptions, Hoth are admissible, and they say the same thing, merely using diferent languages "* {fcortain defintions are postulated and the question of the physical properties of interphenomena ts posed, Reichenbach states, one finds that ‘the behaviour of anterphenomona vio Jates the principle of causality’, 16 the principle of short range interaction fails and an anomaly arises Reichenbach thinks that the euistence of such anomahes 13 an mevitable feature of quantum mechanics, and therefore imtroduces a ‘principlo of anomaly" # The following examples will help oxplasn theso 1deas of Roichenbach's and to draw certain inferences If the particle interpretation 1s applied to tho difiraction of electrons by a single aperture, the principle of causality 13 satisfied, since the electron particles huttiag the screen produce scin ullations on rt When, on the other hand, ono employs the 48wave interpretation, an anomaly arises, in other words the principle of short-range effect is violated, since the electron- waves contract incomprehensibly into points on hitting the sereen. When electron diffraction by two apertures is observed and the particle interpretation is used, an anomaly arises (we omit the appropriate argument). When, on the other hand, this phenomenon is subjected to the wave interpre- tation, the principle of causality is satisfied, i.e. the principle of short-range interaction is not violated. It follows from Reichenbach’s argumentation about the various interpretations or equivalent descriptions applied to the atomic world that for him a physical theory is simply a means of systematising of the observed in one way or another, and that the question of objective reality’s being reflected by the theory is thought to be deprived of mean- ing. This idealist interpretation of physical theory by Rei- chenbach is closely related to his neglect of the real dialec- tical unity of the particle-wave properties of matter. 3 The Philosophical Evolution of the Copenhagen School The terms ‘Copenhagen school’ and ‘Copenhagen interpte- tation’ are usually employed to denote a certain community of physical and philosophical views typical for that trend in modern physics represented by Niels Bohr, Werner Hei- senberg, and other scientists. This school advanced new fundamental ideas relating to quantum theory that arose from discovery of the corpuscular properties of fields and the wave properties of matter, discoveries that classical. physics could not explain. . oo The philosophical views of the physicists of the Copenha- gen school used to coincide on the whole with the line of positivism, but it would now be wrong to characterise them in that way. The influence of positivism among the Western scientists has diminished considerably in recent years: As we have already mentioned, Bohr, Heisenberg, and Born have spoken out against positivist trends in science: Proba- 40975 49bly only P Jordan, among the distinguished members of the Copenhagen school, now clings to positivist dogmas ‘The Western physicists who have opposed positivist, philosophy im their Jatest works hold essentially different ideologieal ports of view, though this difference 1s not too clear on a number of ‘matters and rather resembles a trend Niels Bohr, for anstance, made a dofimte advance towards a materialist approach to quantum mechantes Het sonberg on the contrary, anchined in his objections to post tuvism towards views close to Piato’s objective idealism Max Born has spokon out particularly sharply against post tvism Tn this section wo shall discuss the evolution of the philo sophical viows of quantum theory shared by the leaders of the Copenhagen school, Niels Bohr and Wermer Heisen berg The facts given below witness to the butter phslosoph al struggle in modern science and ance; more demon strate that material st dialectics 1s at the centre of the philo- sophical issues of modern physics Without m any wey giving a full picture of the evolutton of tho Copenhagen sehool’s philosophical uieas we shall touch simply on how Bohr and Heisenberg troat the problem of realty n quantum theory ‘As we have scen, the Copenhagon school essentially faced the problem of giving meaning to, 1 ¢ oxpressing in phystea) concepts, the objective dialectics of atomic processes Were they successful in doing s0? History indicates that this problem was frequently resolved by physicists 1n spate of their personal philosophical incliations Because of certain circumstances, above all social factors, many phys yeasts of the Copenhagen school eithor agnored dialectical materialism or directly opposed it Tho ambivalence of the Copenhagen interpretation was already thero an embryo 1n Heisonborg’s formulation of the task of quantum theory *Our actual situation im serence 1s sach," be said,k'that we do uso the classical concepts for the description ‘of the experiments, and it was tho problem of quantum theory to find theoretical interpretation of tho experiments on this basis "# ‘This problem was msolved by adherents of the Copenha fen anterprotation by antrodueing the idoa of the uncontro! bility 1m principle which can be formulated as follows an order to employ classical concopts without contradic 80tions in the description of atomic experiments, the inter- action between the atomic object and the measuring instru- ment was regarded as uncontrollable in principle. The term ‘uncontrollable interaction’, taken in its literal sense, is wrong: all phenomena of nature are cognisable and hence controllable in principle. This philosophically erro- neous term expresses the truth that modern physics has discovered new forms of matter and motion (for which the notions of classical physics about matter and motion proved to be narrow); that the objectively real connections are much more diverse than it was admitted by classical theo- ries; that the laws of microphenomena cannot be reduced to those of classical mechanics, i.e. the latter are not abso- lute. This truth could not be philosophically comprehended by physicists who were not conscious adherents of materi- al' st dialectics, and contemporary positivism played up the term ‘uncontrollable interaction’ in the spirit of subjecti- vism. The idea of uncontrollability in principle led to idealist and metaphysical philosophical conclusions that were sup- posedly confirmed by quantum mechanics but in reality had nothing in common with its scientific content. A philosophically erroneous thought was associated with this idea, to the effect that one could only employ the concept of objective reality in classical physics in the sense that nature existed independently of the human mind; in quantum theory, however, the situation was such that the atomic object allegedly had a different ‘degree of reality’ than the macroscopic instrument. The idea of uncontrollability in principle replaced the problem of the dual particle-wave nature of atomic objects by that of whether the experimenter could decide which properties were manifested and which eliminated during observation, by selecting one method of observation or another. _ The idea of the uncontrollability in principle did not, in fact, break with the notion of an atomic object as a particle in the classical sense. An atomic object was repre- sented as possessing both classical position and classical momentum, which could not be cognised simultaneously because of the uncertainty relation. This relation was in fact converted into a kind of agnostic enigma, and the prob- gualitatively new quantum concepts (compared with cS 1. 2e aay GF BAGINEESING, LI ‘ UNIVER DETY 92 JOGHPU: i - 5 .fclassical ones) was completely eveluded from atomic phys xcs ‘The matenalist erticism of the Copenhagen interpre tation was directed mamly against the wea of uncontrol Iability in principle, which was counterposed to the idea ‘of umty of the opposite corpuscular and wave properties of matter and fields Among the papers devoted to this issue we would cite that of VA Foch, A Crituyue of Bohr s Veews on Quantum Mechantes,*® in ‘which ho justly drew attention to the fact that there cannot im genoral be any fundamentally uncontrollable interaction When speakiog, about unconttollability in principle, Bohr essentually con sidered tho question not of tho impossibility of full analysis of the interaction hetwoen object and measuming instrument but of this interaction bemg expressed in the admittedly incomplete Languago of classical mechames From the v cy begunning ho formulated an unresolvable problem to tul low the simultaneous changes of the position and momen ‘tum of an atomic object while remaining faithful to classrcal mechanics When, however, 1t proved that this was impos siblo, the rosult was ascribed not to the wavo properties of matter but to the presence of supposedly uncontrellable anteraction betweon tho object and tho anstroment Fock said this approach to the problems of quantum theory was an echo, perhaps, of the long abandoned yew that position and momentum wero always ‘in reilly’ allegedly characterised by certain values, but because of some whim ‘of nature would not be observed simultaneously Bohr nocded the concept of uncontrollabilty am prin eaplo in order to hide tho logical snconsistency resulting from the concepts of classical mechanics being used outside their field of appheability Tho introduction of tins idea rato quantum theory ones more confirmed the profound correeiness of Lenin's words ‘It 1 manly because the physioists did not know dhalecties that tho now physics strayed into idealism‘ "Tho development of the phystes of the microworld and the discovery of the contradictory and yet umted opposite aspects of the micro objects comeided with a very height ened wavering of some scientists hetween rdeahism and dia ectical materiahsm ‘The discovery of the wavo properties of matter and corpuscular properties of a field 1¢ discovery of the fret that matter and ficld have a dual particle wave 52nature, stimulated scientists’ recognition of dialectical contradictions in natural phenomena. Many physicists, including those whose philosophical views diverged from Marxism, began to talk about dialectics. But, through ignoring materialist dialectics they were unable to explain the contradictory nature of micro-particles or to understand the objective character of the contradictions, In that lay the source of their idealist errors. . . Wolfgang Pauli, for instance, agrees to apply ‘dialectical’ to the joint play (Zusammenspiel, his expression) of the typi- cal aspects of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics*’; his interpretation of the dialectic nature of atom- ic phenomena in accordance with the idea of the fundamen- tally uncontrollable interaction between the instrument and the observed system is, however, subjectivist. When Heisenberg discusses the relations between various philosophical systems, on the one hand, and quantum theo- ry, on the other, he finds that ‘the theory of knowledge anal- ysis of quantumj theory, moreover, especially in the form Bohr gave it, contains many features that resemble the meth- ods of Hegelian philosophy’.‘® All modern physics and its theoretical foundations are riddled with dialectical contradictions. The opponents of dialectical materialism, however, try to draw the unjusti- fied conclusion from their existence that there can allegedly be no objective meaning independent of the human mind in physics’ concepts and statements, as if truth were some- thing conditional, determined simply by the point of view of one researcher or another, and erroneously state that the concept of objective reality should be revised in the light of the new discoveries in physics. This is the main line of reasoning of all contemporary positivism and ‘physical’ idealism, whatever ‘scientific’ terminology their spokesmen hide behind. The very essence of modern positivism and idealism ex- cludes recognition that there are contradictions inherent in every object and phenomenon in the material world, that the concepts reflecting matter, which develops through contradictions, must necessarily be flexible, mobile, and relative, united in their opposites, and that dialectical logic with its mobile categories is incomparably more definite, consistent, and convincing than formal logic with its in- variable categories.To cogmse all nature's phenomena a they are, without subjectivist and other ideahst additions, means to cognise them as a untty of opposites This also apphes to the prob jem of realty sn quantum theory Physicists approach this problem in oxactly such 1 dialectical way, although many of them gropingly, spontancously, inclining towards adealist and metaphysical views This 18 obvious, in partic ular, from the facts of the evolution of the Copeahagen anterpretation Let us consider Bohr's essay Quantum Physics and Philosophy again, im which, as we hnow, he presents the conception of complementarity without the sdea of ‘uncon trollable snteraction’ In this exposition complementary concopls (porticle and wave, position and momentum) are juxtaposed am the form of an antinomy which is then resolved Such a juxtaposition always played a decisive role in Bohr's conception Let us dwell on the antinomy of comple mentarity in greater detail ‘We mitroduce this expresston here an ordet to stress the definite similarity between Kant’s antinamies and the con eopt of complementanty An antinomy asserts two mutually exclusive, opposite qwigmonts about the same object, each of them (thesis and antithesis) being stated with tho same necessity As wo have remarked more than once, employment of the corpuscular and wave concepts of classical phystes to desertbe atomic objects created contradictions sn physical theory, those eontradichons could be given the form of antimomes Bohr demonstrates tins convincingly whon discussing mumerous concrete examples im bis work Let us take one of them ‘Hf, he writes, ‘2 semi reflecting murcor 1s placed in the way of a photon, leaving two possibilities for its direction ‘of propagation, the photon may either he recorded on one, and only one, of two photographc plates situated at great distances in the two directions sn question, oF olso we may, ‘by replacing the plates by muzrors, obsor: 0 effects oxhibit angi an mterference between the two reflected wave-trams In any attempt of a pictorial reprecentation’ of a behaviour of the photon we would, thus, meet with ‘the dsfieulty to be obliged to say, on the one hand tht the plioton al ‘ways chootes one of the two ways and, on the other hand, Bethat it behaves as if it had passed both ways.’«° Bohr sees the way out of this difficulty in the conception of comple- mentarity. One should not, in his view, isolate the behav- jour of the photon in itself from the conditions in which the phenomenon takes place: in some experimental condi- tions it will behave as a particle, in others as a wave. If we consider the application of the concept of comple- mentarity, or rather the arguments about it employed in individual cases as they are presented in the literature, we can see quite clearly that both the conclusion and the premises contain mutually exclusive statements about one and the same thing which are formulated with the identi- cal necessity. For example, the conclusion obtained in the imaginary experiment with a microscope for gamma-rays (a description of this imaginary experiment can be found in many publications on quantum mechanics), namely, that the greater the accuracy of the determination of the electron's position the lower is the accuracy of the determination of its momentum, means essentially that the electron possesses both the property of a particle and the opposite property of a wave. But this latter is also confirmed by the fact that injthe’corresponding reasoning the essence of quantum mechan- ics is expressed by the formula p = hk/2x, where p is the momentum of the micro-object, 2 is Planck’s constant, and k is the wave vector. This formula demonstrates that both particle and wave quantities apply to the same micro-object, since p characterises a point particle, and & a spatially in- finite sinusoidal wave. Each of these mutually exclusive statements about the micro-object corresponds to the exper- iment. The same must be said about complementarity as such, regardless of the individual forms in which the idea of it isemployed. When it is said that the study of so-called com- plementary phenomena requires mutually exclusive experi- mental conditions and that only the whole totality of these phenomena can provide complete knowledge of an atomic object, this means, as a matter of fact, that from the stand- point of complementarity we can express two mutually exclu- sive opposing opinions about one and the same atomic object which would be equally correct. Thus, when the contradiction between the particle and wave concepts as applied to atomic objects is resolved, the complementarity principle emphasises the cognoscibility 5of the atome world and not Kant's point of view, who, in ‘resolving’ hus antinomies im his own way, introduced ‘the unknowable ‘thing in stself * And yet Bohr’s complemontarity principle does not finally resolve the problem of particle-wave dualism Accord sng to his xdeas, the contradiction between the particle and wave properties of atomic objects 18 supposedly frozen mm the form of an opposition of two classes of mutually exclu ‘ave experimental sttnations with which tho complementary phenomena’ are associated ‘The true solution of the ‘anti- tiomy of complementarity’ however consists im considering the particle and wave properties of an atomie object as x unt ty of opposites That iswhy quantum theory concepts releet ing the dual nature of atomic objects must difier qualita tively from classical ones ‘Tho drawhack of the complementanty prmerple 1m Bohr s exposition of ft, namely that 1t concentrates attention main ly on going into tho lm:tatons of the old classteal concepts stead of on phnlosophieal comprehension of the new con cepts mtrodueed by quantum mechanics stems from the woakness noted above ‘This was very clearly demonstrated by VA Fock ‘Bohr does not say what theso new primary ‘concepts aro (physical, visualisablo, pictorial and not smply symbolic) that should replaco the elassical ones, and does not ‘emphasise the unlimited possibilities of making the descrip tron of atomtc objects more precise by means of new concepts For not only do the Iumtations proper to the description of phenomena ‘in themselves’ in igolation from the means of observation (‘complemontanty') have philosophical sg nificance bat also the constractive part of quantum mechamts and the new primary concepts associated with at‘ Complementarity 1s undoubtedly x form of dialectical contradiction and, as Bohr, his supporters and followers who 1 sing a Kant thar a ony flor anomie hat th in gets solved th when Tt alerts to Cogn the word se wo sows from his reasontng about them that he accopted the dialectical atu of huraao Sroughtcant tho tie great were of his paosep ‘The ialotes of tho objective world however semaine ous he Fulcrophy uh toe vavable tpg Neel Rests thesry Satna vancmmcto’ extcatel, und Spoarcbend oy teeter Serelopment ofaragctics acre Real Hopelsmected re agnoe ite aaah thre nore pot it fat aptnoms” bt et tracy concept won aunty of apposite elenioats hat could Bo given She form of an aatanormy ® 56developed his ideas have pointed out, the logic of this dia- lectical contradiction is also the logic of the development of atomic physics. . From the angle of the questions discussed above Heisen- berg’s Physics and Philosophy also presents great interest. Like Bohr’s work, it contains certain new elements relating to philosophical views on quantum theory. | Unlike Bohr, Heisenberg actively opposed the principles of materialism. When speaking of ‘materialistic ontology’, however, he essentially had metaphysical, mechanistic materialism in mind. He did not reveal in his book that he was very familiar with dialectical materialism although one can find attacks on Marxist philosophy in places in the book that are hardly of serious philosophical significance. Heisenberg stressed that the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum theory was ‘in no way positivistic’. Positivism, he said, was ‘based on the sensual perceptions of the observ- er as the elements of reality’, while ‘the Copenhagen interpretation regards things and processes which are de- scribable in terms of classical concepts, i.e. the actual, as the foundation of any physical interpretation’. It was thus recognised, he continued, that ‘the statistical nature of the laws of microscopic physics cannot be avoided, since any knowledge of the “actual” is—because of the quantum-theo- retical laws—by its very nature an incomplete knowledge’.™ The Copenhagen interpretation is also not materialist, as Heisenberg has more than once pointed out. In this case he counterposed the Copenhagen interpretation to material- ism. But as regards philosophy, the point is not what Heisenberg personally thought of this interpretation but how he dealt with the basic problem of philosophy. In his own words, ‘the ontology of materialism rested upon the illusion that the kind of existence, the direct “actuality” of the world around us, can be extrapolated into the atomic range. This extrapolation is impossible, however’.™ According to Heisenberg physics is not so much concerned with nature itself, reflecting it in its concepts and theor- ies, as it is concerned} with the ‘actual’, i.e. nature trans- mitted as it were through man’s perception, and which has already been subjected to certain methods of research.®? Im Classical physies study of the ‘actual’ does not lead to Enee Ue ae edd ana Hee ee unavoidable since the uncertainty rela- 57tion himts the applicability of classical concepts to nature {The need for a dialectical approach to atome physics evident in connection with the discovery of the unity of the particle and wave properties of atomic objects 1s thus considered by Hexsenberg 15 2 need to revise the concept of obyectise revktty in physics One cannot of cource disagree with Hessenberg whon he says that expressing the rchieve- ments of modern physies 1n the concepts of the old philos ophy can hardly yield any advantages but he contradicts Iumeelf when he pours the young wine of quantum physics into the old bottles of metaphysical and idexst plulo sophical systems In Heisenberg observed phenomena things and the seturl are described by means of classical concepts atomic and other mitera particles aro chetacterised in terms of mathematical abstractions, both theso aspects are 2 1 mu tually exclusive but complomentary rolahonship which 1s the quintessenco of tho philosophy on which he bases quan tum theory In this respect he grees epistemological. sig mificance to complementarity trying tofrosolve the problem of realty am physies in an allegedly now way (it must bo noted that the meanmg of the term complementanty an Bohr s essay Quantum Phystes and Philosophy as we have seen 15 quito different ) Heisenberg s standpoint on realst 1s oxpressod particularly platnly io his polemic wit ‘opponents af tho Copenhagen interpretation including those scientists who dofend the position of dialeetxca? materraltsm an physics In Hexeenborg < view the merit of tho Copenhagen inter protation was that it ed the physicists far anny from the simple matermahistie views that prevailed in tho natural sctenco of the nmetecnth eontury “ Ho disapproved of thote who tried to return to the reality concept of classi cil physics or to use a more general philosophic term to the ontology of materialism ‘Thoy would prefer to come back to the idea of an obyeettve real world whose smallest parts exist objectively an the simo sense 13 stones or trees exist independently of whether or not wo observe them Ueveenberg thus wentified sn fact unjustifiably the plu! osophical concept of matter wath elesical physies notion about it and also fruled im excenee to notices the difference detween objective reility and te rctual or real Dialee {ical matenalism on tho other hand discriminates between 58them: e.g. the category of possibility, which plays an impor- tant role in philosophical questions of quantum theory, has (like the category of reality), an objective character from the standpoint of dialectical materialism. On this point dialectical materialism differs fundamentally from metaphysical, mechanical materialism, but Heisenberg did not notice this very cssential difference. Heisenberg perpetuated the language of classical concepts in physics and retained it to describe instrument readings, the actual, and the world of phenomena. As regards the essence of these phenomena, they appear, according to him, as peculiar Kantian ‘things-in-themselves’—the mathemat- ical abstractions of quantum theory are precisely such in his conception. It is not fortuitous that he believed the classical concepts to be somehow a priori with regard to the domains of the theory of relativity and quantum theory in which they were applied with the appropriate restric- tions. We noted above that the problems of quantum mechanics cannot be reduced to explaining the limited nature of clas- sical concepts. Heisenberg’s argument about the a priori character of the classical concepts ignored the dialectics of concepts, which reflects the dialectics of objective reality. The idea of the variability and evolution of concepts had already been current in science for a long time (although not all the scientists drew the appropriate philosophical conclusions from it). The development of non-classical physics has thus been accompanied with a change in the original meaning of concepts like mass and energy; they still have something in common with the original concepts but at the same time have acquired a deeper content. The radical revision of classical concepts made by quantum mechanics indicates that our knowledge of objective reality, nature, and matter has become deeper. Fock, in reproaching the Copenhagen interpretation of this theory for its one- sidedness, justly noted the importance of the ‘new primary concepts’, which in his view were relativity in respect to the means of observation, the distinction between the potentially possible and the realised, and the concept of probability as a numerical measure of the potentially possible.®* Quantum theory confirms dialectical materialism and differs with metaphysical materialism. As for mechanical] agmaterialism, Heisenberg was nght in a certain senso when he crilieised materialist ontology’ His criticism, howover, had nothing to do with diuicetieal materialism It 18 ampos cable to tako his words seriously that, sinco dialectical materialism was ciated in the nmeteenth century, ats concepts of matter and reality could not possibly be adapted to the results of the refined experimental technique of our days "7 (1) The very essence of dialectical maternihsm excludes dogmas of all kinds ond inevitably alters 1tg form with overy fundamental discov ory an scrence—both Engels and Lenin spobe directly about, this very 1mportant feature of Marxist philosophy drawing the appropriate conclusions an their philosophical works (3) Heisenberg never analysed the dialectical materialist conception of matter and reality, which differs sharply from those of the old materialism Hus statoment that the concepts of Marxist philosophy ‘could not possibly be adapted’ to the results of modern pure and applied science 1s not supported by any arguments jeisenberg wrongly presented the objective dialectics of the particle-wave properties of atomic objects, which 1s demonstrated in the well known expenments, as ‘comple- mentarity of the mathematical symbolies relating to these objects and of the doseription of the atomic experiments m classical concepts That 1s why the transition of physics from cognition of macro phenomena to cognition of atomic, and in general microscopic, events 18 treated by Hetsenberg, not as a deopening of the human knowledge of matter and objective reality but as dissalutton of the ‘objectively real’ world ‘in the transparent clarity of a mathematies whose Jawe govorn the possible and not the actual” ‘We must also mention however, Hersenberg's wobbling hetween idealism and dialectical materialism His reasoning shout the complementarity’ of particle and wave, the jossxble and the teal, and the mathematical apparatus as Form. and about the ‘plissical content of seientite. theories cortainly shows signs of his coming near to an understanding of the Significance of the unity of opposites that 1s the nucleus of dialectics Tho samo needs be sad about hus adeas about the relativity of physical theones and matter Tn this connection Heisenberg's statements about the unity of matter deserve mention Having presented the experimental data on elomentary particles, and the discov- 60ery of the many forms of these particles, etc., Heisenberg concluded: ‘These results seem at first sight to lead away from the idea of the unity of matter, since the number of fundamental units of matter seems to have again increased to values comparable to the number of different chemical elements. But this would not be a proper interpretation. The experiments have at the same time shown that the particles can be created from other particles or simply from the kinetic energy of such particles, and they can again disintegrate into other particles. Actually the experiments have shown the complete mutability of matter. All the elementary particles can, at sufficiently high energies, be trar smuted into other particles, or they can simply be created from kinetic ‘energy and can be annihilated into energy, for instance, into radiation. Therefore, we have here actually the final proof for the unity of matter. All the elementary particles are made of the same substance, which we may call energy or universal matter; they are just dif- ferent forms in which matter can appear.’® If we bear the philosophical aspect in mind and ignore certain inaccuracies in terminology, this statement undoubt- edly expresses a materialist point of view. Heisenberg, however, followed it up with: ‘If we compare this situation with the Aristotelian concepts of matter and. form, we can say that the matter of Aristotle, which is mere “potentia”, should be compared to our concept of energy, which gets into “actuality” by means of the form, when the elementary particle is created’. In this regard, we may recall Heisenberg’s words about the young wine of science and the old philosophical bottles. He does not see the new philosophy—dialectical material- ism, which fully corresponds to the new physics. The philosophical evolution of the Copenhagen interpre- tation still continues. The dialectical and materialistic elements in it have been strengthened in struggle with the metaphysical and, in particular, mechanistic ideas in atomic physics; the ‘uncontrollability in principle’ appears less and less frequently in the reasoning and arguments of the Copenhagen school. That this is how matters stand can be seen from the discussion on quantum theory between Alfred Landé, on the one hand, and Max Born, Walter Biem, and Werner Heisenberg, on the other hand, in 1969.% Landé opposed Bohr’s ideas and denied the interpreta- 64tion of quantum theory by Born and Biem who, aécording to him, regarded matter and field as having equally 1 par ticle and 2 wave nature He considered the Copenhagen interpretation to be positivist (introducmg a new term dialectical positivism’) In Lande's view there 1s every reason to Tegard matter as simply a da¢continuous formation and field as simply a continuous one In summarising the divcussion Heisenberg disagreed with Lande, suggesting that 1t had not been about the physical content of quantum theory atself but had been dealing with the language that should be used to deverthe quentum- theory phenomena He noted, mm parhoular, that Lande’s criticism of sloppy’ formulations 1m the earher Inter. ture on quantum theory was correct How can the problem of the language of quantum theory be solved? Neither the experimental facts nor logical consid erations, provide & criterion for answenng this queshon In that ‘case, Heisenberg says, 1t 15 necessary to resort to Instorical arguments A language hos become established among phystcists that had taken shape during the develop ment of quantum theory ‘The concepts ‘particle’ and ‘wave! otrowed from elassieal physics and the natural language had been equally employed to describe atomic phenomena rogardless of whother formations with @ non zeto rest mass (electrons, nucleons, mesons) were being described, or ones with zero rest mass (photons, neutrinos, phonous) The physicist, Hessenberg stressed, did not consider a quantum- mechanteal desersption as dualistic Ho had become accus- tomed to the fact that when thts monistie description was translated into natural language various addtional pictures: might appear, the question, which picture was correct—tho corpuseuler or the wave—then had no meamng Heisenberg also concluded that the anterpretation of quantum theory employed by Born and Biem was the histor teal product of physicists forty-year experience with atom- 1 phenomena thit wer explicable by quantum theory rather than the result of dogmatic statements of agreement of somo kind In our view, Heisonberg's argument essentially empha- suses the dialectics of concepts in physics that was left out by Lande in trying to snterprot quantum theory 1 the Janguage of tho concepts of classical physics ez4 Physical Reality The question of physical reality arose and was developed in modern physics. In classical physics it was never actually formulated, or rather, it coincided with the question of objective reality. If the concept of physical reality was used in classical physics at all, it meant nothing other than acceptance. of the objective reality of the physical world, which developed in accordance with one and the same invariable laws. Why, as we shall now see, has the question of physical reality now acquired special significance in arguments of a philosophical character about the theory of relativity and quantum theory? The most important reason is that the phenomena and processes with which the modern physics is concerned are covered by its theories by means of methods and abstrac- tions that appear strange from the point of view of the notions of classical physics. No physicist has ever seen an electron as he sees, say, a stone rolling down a mountain, or a sea wave. Ultraviolet light, however, is also invisible to man, and there are sounds that cannot be heard, but in these cases no special questions arisel To put it briefly, let us recall simply that the observed phenomena by which the physicist forms judgements (draws inferences) about the electron and its motion in the atom, about the atomic nucleus, or, let us say, about objects moving with velocities close to the speed of light, create paradoxical theoretical situations in physics when it is attempted to interpret them in terms of the ideas and sche- mes of classical theories. \ Generally speaking, modern physics does not generalise everyday experience but the experience pertaining to very refined phenomena that do not fit into classical physics’ notions about nature. In such a refined experiment, for whick high precision instruments are used, the physical facts art grasped by the cognising mind in a very complex way, through concepts of very different levels of abstraction (that appear strange from the angle of classical physics). an example we can take the discovery of resonances (as extremely unstable elementary particles with a half- life of 10-*8 second are called), which could not have been 63done wsthout a whole chain of theoretical considerapons that have nothasg an common wath elsssical ideas * So the physicist, who 1s not propared ta discard his belief us the objective reality of tho external world and its knows Iiuy by man, becomes on eye-witness of the following situation objective reality stems to eseapo cogaition, ‘whilo the concepts which, if ono can so express it, helped to cogaise the physical world, now refuse to serve ‘In Bap stoi's thoory of rolativity, Tor mstanco, space and time proved relative 1m contrast to tho corresponding concepts of classical physies, according to which space and time are absolute In quantum mechamcs, in accordance with 1s coutral idea of Bohe's complomentarity, something ssmilar happoned with tho torms “particlo" and ‘wave’, which lost ther signiheance of absolutes and acquired’ the seuse, unusual for classical physics, of ‘relatrvity to tho means of observation’. The most typical feature of tho relativistic fqaantuin theory of elomentary particlos 18 the absence rom 2 of tho principle of constancy of the aumber of particles apd recogmtion of tho fact that particles appear and disappear dunng interaction Tue fundamental propositions of modern physics are necessarily bizarre, ettange, and uncoaventional from the paint of view of common senso and classical theory Tn the now circumstances of tho development of phytcs of thas Jand the concept of physieal reality (‘the physueally real") began to acquire a new meaning for physteists that i did not have in elagueal setence In order to 2dentuly and Gotermino this now element, lot us first briefly considor Statements choot phyieal rohit of th founders of moder sues Pra Evasteia and Infeld's The Evolution of Physie wo road ‘We havo soon now roalites created by tho'advanco of phys- xa" "Physies really began with the maventien of mass, force and an anerbal system ‘These concepts are all free snven- tions" ‘For tho physiesst of the oarly uinoteonth century, Tesonsnces, lot us note, even when thay are moving wath a ve locity clos to Ital of lich ban cover a distance of an often of 10 Centoeteadarag thet ly apd uot more ‘Thay may thos be bora sad Alecay at inst Gne point’ They enanot, theroorey be discovered by tie conventional metuods of nuclear plysies (roc vista faces of ths frajoetonon of the passoge of ngieezorey changed parices 1p 3 ‘Wiloe loud eharnbes) tho existence of spesuances waa discovered by duect methods, Grvigh chuevation of their breakdown product, 6sthe reality of our outer world consisted of particles with simple forces acting between them and depending only on the distance.’ ‘The difficulties connected with the deflec- tion of the magnetic needle, the difficulties connected with the structure of the ether, induced us to create a more subtle reality. The important invention ofthe electromag- netic field appears.’ ‘Later developments both destroyed old concepts and created new ones. Absolute time and the inertial co-ordinate system were abandoned by the relativity theory.’ ‘The quantum theory again created new and essen- tial features of our reality.’ ‘The reality created by modern physics is, indeed, far removed from the reality of the early days.’ It does not follow at all from these statements that Bin- stein denied the objective reality of the physical world and suggested that the physicist’s sole reality is allegedly his free inventions. We could have wished, of course, that Binstein’s remarks about reality have been more precise and unambiguous. There is no doubt that he adopted a materialist standpoint of recognising the objective reality of the external world cognised by physicists, although he did not always express it clearly and distinctly enough. Here, however, is an extract from his paper Quantum Mechanics and Reality, which no longer leaves any doubt: ‘If one asks what are the typical features of the world of physical ideas, regardless of quantum theory, the following above all strikes one: physical con- cepts pertain to a real external world, i.e. they imply ideas about things that require a “real existence” (of a body, a field, etc.) that is independent of the perceiving subjects; on the other hand, these ideas are transformed to correspond as exactly as possible to the sensual impressions.’® We must recall that Einstein thought quantum mechanics (as understood by Bohr and Heisenberg) to be incompatible with the fundamentals of physics formulated by him. He opposed the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, considered it (bearing in mind the philosophical aspects of the discussions that arose in his time) as positi- vistic, and suggested that a complete and direct description of reality would be found, which in his view quantum mechan- ics in Bohr’s interpretation did not give, This matter has been discussed in the literature“; without going into details, we shall simply note that Einstein 5-0975 65approached the physical moaning of quantum mechanies from the standpoint of the basic tdeas of classical physics, ae in much the samo way as his theory of relativity was approached by opponents of physical relativism Let us refurn to lus remarks about physical reality In making Is objections to Einstem, Born believed that tho latter borrowed lus point of vow on physical concepts’ emg free mventions of the humen mind from. conventron- ahsts’ opinions on concepts In fact, however, Einstein, an stating that physical concepts wero free creations of joman mind, was stressing (as he lumself said) simply that thoy were ‘not logically derivable fiom what 1s empmieally gisen' This is a profound dialectical thought. the transi- tan from the perceived results of observation to theoretical judgements about tho observed phenomena, and also to the thoory of these phenomena stself, 18 not by any means made through logical inferences of a formal charactor As a matter of fact, Born was also saying the same thing wher he ana lyced the method of mathematical hypothesis and the syn- thetic forecasts associated with at * ‘What then was Born’s standpornt on physical reality? At bottom it did not difler from the yiows of Bohr and Heventerg (which wore considered in detail in sections 2 and “Phe main point of Born's argument about physical reality as that tins quastion should be approached an terms of tho ‘concept of invariance taken from sathemties Born did nat consider ‘very apt’ a statement common an tho Literature 1 connection with Bob's idoos that rt 15 impossible in quantum mechanics to spoah of an objectively custing external world, or of a ‘sharp distinction between subject and object” ® AL the some time, ie said the naive approrch to the problem of reality which was so successful an the elassical or Newtonian period, has proved to bo not satishretors? ® On the othor hand, Born disagreed with positavists understanding of reality according to which tho concept of reality was either apphed to atoms and clectrons with 1 moaning other thin to pereeptiblo phenomenr oF sts uso was forbsciden in general am science (as, for instance wie British posttevist Herbert Dingle pores the matter) The imicroseopo makes it posstblo to observo colloidal particles, the cleetron microscope, oven largo molecules "Whore doot 6that crude reality, in which the experimentalist lives, end, and where does the atomistic world, in which the idea of reality is illusion and anathema, begin?’ Born asked, criticising contemporary positivists. , But although the boundary between the ‘world of atoms and ‘macroscopic reality’ established by positivism does not exist, they still differ from each other as quantum phys- ics has demonstrated. Born asked whether ‘any philosophy can give a definition of the concept of reality that is untaint- ed’ by ‘the realities of a peasant or craftsman, a merchant or banker, a statesman or soldier’.”” He answered his ques- tion positively and considered the key to it to be in the idea of invariance. Born gave an example from the ‘pre-scientific field’: when a person sees a dog sitting beside him or jumping about or disappearing in the distance, all these different perceptions are unified in his subconsciousness as one and the same dog. ‘I propose,’ he said, ‘to express this by saying that the mind constructs, by an unconscious process, invar- iants of perception, and that these are what ordinary man calls real things.’7 The same thing essentially happens, in Born’s opinion, at the level of scientific cognition when instruments are used. Here ‘the innumerable possible observations are linked again by some permanent features, invariants, which differ from those of ordinary perception, but are neverthe- less in the same way indicators of things, objects, parti- cles’.”* In the theory of relativity, for example, such reality is the interval—the invariant of the spatial and temporal aspects; in quantum mechanics, the electrons and other atomic objects are the invariants of the corpuscular and wave aspects, which allows one to ascribe reality to them. The views of the American physicist Richard P. Feynman are close to Born’s opinions on the invariance. In the first volume of The Feynman Lectures on Physics, devoted to the special theory of relativity, one comes across various ver- sions of the idea that the four-vector momentum is more real’ than either the momentum or the energy alone, since the momentum (represented by the space components of the four-vector arrow) and the energy (represented by its time component) depend on the observer’s point of view, ie. on the frame of reference.”? This statement does not differ essentially at all from the proposition (which can be . 67often he met in the Iterature) that Munkowskt’s interval 1s more real than us components—the spatial distanco ‘and the temporal duration Whon this matesal on the views of physteists on physical reality 1s compared with the way the problem of reality was troated in the history of philosophy, points of intersection of the lines of development of the coriesponding ideas can be found Let us just sketch at brielly (The concept of reality ss usually not separated trom the more general concopt of berg and coincides wath tho con cept of eustence in lnstorically known systems of philos ophy, including contemporary philosophical theones, the content of tho reality eoncepi bearmg the stamps of the basic assumptions of the corresponding system For our theme the uden of ‘degree of reality’ first clearly formulated by sclolasties, wha ascribed the lughest degico of reality’ to God, who possessed the whote ‘completeness of being", 15 important In the fourteenth century dispute between the so called realists and nominalsts over the concept of reality oceupiod the foreground The realists, whose con- ception onginated in Plato's principles of rdealsm, said unwersalia sunt reala, 1e that tho existence was inherent an the umversal as indepondent being above and indepen dent of tho individual ‘The nomamalists raised objections to the reahsts, who most fully expressed tho tradntional scholastic philosophy, an the nominalists' view nothug existed im the real world ecopt andsvidwal things that had certain genotal propertics Marx called nominalism “the first form of matenalista’ ‘Tho realist and nommalist concepts were reborn 1m the subsequent historical development of philosophical thougitt, including modera bourgeois plulosophy Without mehang the relevant analysis wo shall simply note that tho sdeas of realism are also mamfested in special form in modern phystcs in the works of certain scientists in every outstanding philosophical system of modern ‘umes, matenahst and idealist, the rdca of dogree of realty has beon expressed and developed an one form or another Te can be found in the eystems of Descartes, and of Spinoza, according to whom substance possessed the Inghest degree of reality Locke believed that the so called primary qualt tues of Uunngs (length, impenetrabrltty, motion) had a greater degree of reality than secondary ones (colour, sound, smell) 68According to Leibniz monads had the highest degree of reality. Hume supposed that impressions, either renewed by the consciousness or stable, had a greater reality than any others. In Kant we find a distinction between the ‘empirical reality’ of phenomena and categorial (abstract) reality. In his Science of Logic Hegel differentiated reality (Realitat) from actuality (Wirklichkeit) as a unity of essence and existence, or of the internal and external. Contemporary bourgeois philosophy (e.g. logical positivism, critical re- alism) contains nothing new, compared with classical phi- losophy, on the question of reality. ee Let us summarise what we have said about reality in physics and formulate certain statements relating to this concept that appear important to us. The term ‘reality’ (the ‘real’) is used with several mean- ings. The most general of them is that of existence: the perceptible ball exists and the perception of the ball exists; a particle exists and a material point exists; a billiard ball exists and an ideal ball exists; an electron diffraction pat- tern exists and electron diffraction exists; matter exists and spirit exists; truth exists and error exists; they are all teal in this sense of the term. There is a difference between the ‘real’ in the sense of existence and the ‘objectively real’. The ‘objectively real’ or the ‘objective’ or the ‘objectively existing’ means exist- ing independently of the human mind and reflected by it under certain conditions. In opposition to the objective the ‘subjective’ means ‘existing in consciousness’. The subjective or spiritual* (sensations and perceptions, concepts, judg- ments, etc.) can and do reflect the objectively real in cer- tain conditions. This subjective functions in scientific theories and science as a whole, which objectively reflect the real world; it therefore also figures in physics and its theories. The subjective, however, may not reflect the objectively real because of errors and illusions; it appertains to man’s subjective world. The natural sciences, of course, are not concerned with this world, or rather physics is concerned with material realities and not with spiritual ones. That is why, when we speak of ‘the physical reality * We abstract from the ambiguity of the term ‘spirit’. 69of a certain something’, we mem that somehow or other the cancopt of this samething does or should correspond to the objeetsvely real ‘Tho term ‘real’ (‘reahty’) has another meamng of the actual’ (or ‘actuahty') It derives from the Latin res (thing, object), while the term ‘actual’ comes from ‘act’ (Latin actus) (German wirklich ftom wirken, Russian dastoctel nie from deastvovat’) The concept ‘physical reahty’, as we shall s0e lator, 1s closest of all to the concept ‘actuality’ (IPerklich- eit) 1n content and meaning The existing’ and the ‘actual’ are by no means identical and thus difference 18 literally tangible in modern physics With a Wilson eloud chamber, for instance which was designed for observing the trachs of fast moving, electri cally charged particles (electrons, protons, etc ), one ean draw inferences about the nature and properties of these particles from the poramoters of the visible tracks of therr trajectories But have wo tho night to infer from tho data obtained that an electron moves ‘1p actuality" in the way a macro particle does? Quantum theory, as we know, has given an answer to that, and st follows from this answor that (1) the “extsting’ and the ‘actual’ sn physics ate by no means the same, and (2) that every ‘obyectavely real’ in physics 1s not thereby ‘actual’ in a certain theory, but every ‘actual’ in a physical thoory 1s ‘objectively real" * The question of physical reality, as it 1s considered at present, cannot be comprehended outside the ‘epistemolog ical lesson" (Bohr) that. tho development of modern physics hhas guvoo ssiontisis “What as the essence of ths lesson? Tn elasseal physies the observed phenomena made 1t pos sublo to obtamn information (at least 2n principle) about the hehaviaur of objects regardless of their interaction with the means of observation (measuring instruments) In quen twm physics the observed phenomena also provide infor mation about the expermental conditions which can no Jongor be 1gnored in principle in other words quantum phenomenr charactersse the properties of the ‘wholo oxper imental situation’ rather than those of the object, “hy itself” In short, from the pont of view of quantum physics the ‘experimental puysrest nas proved Yo ‘be higuretrvery speeds cf Buy be amerabord that physi ana natural science deals with material realities 70ing, not simply a spectator but an actor in the drama of cognition, so it is put in the literature on quantum theory as is well known. Hence corresponding problems of phys- ical reality arose. It seems to us, however, that the content of the ‘episte- mological lesson’ that Bohr spoke about is much broader. Classical science considered it its job to find the universal constant laws of nature. Modern physics has rejected such an approach from its very inception: classical mechanics is a limiting case of the special theory of relativity and quantum mechanics, i.e. of the more general and deeper theories; the special theory of relativity is the limiting case of Einstein’s theory of gravitation; quantum electro- dynamics has developed and quantum field theory is being built; and ideas are voiced about the future of physics belonging to even more general and profound fundamental theories than those now existing. In other words, for modern physics it is essential not only to find the laws of the phenom- ena existing in a certain system (circle) of interrelations, but it is also important (this question arises sooner or later in one form or another at a certain stage of its development) to find the laws of the transition from the laws of one sphere of phenomena to the deeper, more general laws (which must and will be found) of a new, wider circle of phenomena. Modern physics thus undermined the prejudice of the old contemplative materialism, according to which cognition, i.e. reflection of nature by the human brain, should be under- stood ‘abstractly’, ‘devoid of movement’, ‘without contra- diction’,”® a philosophical prejudice that in essence was supported by classical science. With the creation of the theory of relativity and quantum theory Lenin’s idea of cognition found expression in physics: ‘Man cannot compre- hend=reflect=mirror nature as a whole, in its completeness, its “immediate totality”, he can only eternally come closer to this, creating abstractions, concepts, laws, a scientific picture of the world, ete., etc.’76 That spatial and temporal quantities prove to be depen- dent in the theory of relativity on the frame of reference chosen by the observer,. or that in quantum mechanics, in Bohr’s words, ‘any observation of atomic phenomena will involve an interaction with the agency of observation not to be neglected’”? does not in the least mean that. the theory of relativity and quantum mechanics in addition m4to employing their priveiples aud concepts allegedly maply ome dogreo of subjectivity, some relorence to the observing subject, some special activity of the observer On tho eon teary, these and simlar features which aro typical of the relativistie or quantum method of describing phenomena mean that the physical knowledge has penetrated deeper that the new concepts and principles developed by modern physies reflect nature s patterns more correctly and com pletely than those of classical theones When we turn, say, to quantum mechanics the wave and particle puctures of tho Behaviour af electrons* observed through the appropnato set np, tho concept of relativity reith respect to the means of obsorvation plus the comple mentanty principle interpreted in the sense that only the aggregate of ‘complementary’ phenomena can provide comptete information about tho behaviour of a micro object, the concept of the electron as a phystcal substance possesting certain inveriant characteristacs and the Scho dunger oquation which 1 anvariant with respect to unitary transformations—all these are lovels of cogmition of the moving olectron which combine to form an integral theory embracing tho experimental data On this plane tho concepts and statements of the quantum theory lisied above reflect the objectively reat In exretly the same way ‘probability’ im quantum mechanies athe matically represented by tho square of the modulus of the wavo function, is physieally real, 1 ats physical concept reflects the objectively ronl and 1s by no means just a ‘pare” construction of the physicist's ‘Theso constderations concerning quantum mechimes and sumilar arguments about Einstein's theory {we negleet them here), have a direct bearing on the problem of phystctl retlity Construction of a theary of a cortaan circle of phe nomena solves tho problom of tho roproduction sn thought of the objcet of this theory as at owists mm acturhty 1 9s a conerote integrity of phenomena and substance (the caus al relation, basic laws), of the external and tho internal oras a unity of the diverse ‘Tho construction of a theory provides the most complete knowledge of ats obycet, and from that pont of view ef we * The toem electron Is used bere for brevity + take to denote an) quantuns objset seus bee nconsider the examples above, physicists’ statements that the space-time continuum is ‘more real’ than either space or time separately, are logically justified. From the same point of view the hypertrophy of any one aspect of the cognition of something, and neglect of the fact that unily exists in its many-sidedness, leads in the final analysis to subjectivism and conclusions of an idealist and metaphysical character. A similar situation arises in the theory of relativity if ‘relativity’ is absolutised and one is abstracted from the fact that space and time are aspects of a single space-time.”® An analogous situation arises in quantum theory when the idea of interaction of atomic objects and the measuring instruments (which causes the ‘uncontrollability in principle’) is overemphasised and it is forgotten that complementary experiments ‘only in combi- nation with each other disclose all that can be learned about an object’.” In connection with what has been said one cannot help agreeing with Bohr who raised objections to Heisenberg and Dirac on how one should speak of the emergence of phenomena that permitted only predictions of a statistical character. According to Dirac, we are dealing here with choice by ‘nature’ when the point in question is the reali- sation of one individual effect (from the number of possible ones); according to Heisenberg, with choice by the ‘observer’ who built the measuring instruments and took the readings. ‘Any such terminology,’ Bohr said, ‘would, however, appear dubious since, on the one hand, it is hardly reasonable to endow nature with volition in the ordinary sense, while, on the other hand, it is certainly not possible for the observer to influence the events which may appear under the condi- tions he has arranged.’ Bohr believed that ‘there is no other alternative than to admit that, in this field of experience, we are dealing with individual phenomena and that our possibilities of handling the measuring instruments allow us only to make a choice between the different complemen- tary types of phenomena we want to study’.®? The rise of new relative concepts in science, and at the same time of new, more profound and more general theories in which they figure (e.g. the concepts of relative space and time in the theory of relativity, which is a new theory in regard to classical physics) does not mean the increase in clements of subjectivity (since the new types of reference 73systom appear that have not bean known before), xt means 2 now stop in understanding nature Indeed, first, tho new relative concepts reflect the objectively reat, second, tho appearance of new ‘relativities', more meaningful ‘then Hose known before, means the finding of Irmuts of appher- hultty of the absolute (invariant) concepts of tho old theory (irom which the new one was developed) The concept of physical reality thus comes into modern physical hterature also as a hind of synonym of the philo- sophieal concept of actuality im the sense of dralectical materialism It seems to us that it 1s logueally legitimate to employ the terms ‘emprrically real’ (‘empmieal realty’) and ‘ahstractly real’ (‘abstract reality’) The first of these denotes that which exists independently of the human mind {the objectively real) and 3s embraced by that stage of cognition which 1s called lnving contemplation and without which there can be no observation The second term denotes the objective realty that 1s reflected at a deoper level of human understanding—the abstract thanking that roveals the essence of cognised phenomena, the Jaws of nature But tho deopest and the most completo cognition of an object that exists independently of the human mind 3s achieved by combining observation and abstract thinking (we could nightly use the term ‘dialectical thinking’ here) when a scientific theory reflecting its object as reality, te asa umted whole of numerous aspects and their rela tions, 18 constructed logically on the basis of practice and aequires certain integrity and relative validity Physical reality 1s thus tho objechve reahty cognised in a physical theory, the content of the concept of which bocomes defimte depending on the defimtoncss of the theory tel as auch and the stages (elements) of ats structure REFERENCS 1 S00 Max Torn Symbol und Wurldicbheit Piystkallsche Dtatter 1904, 20, 12, 1965, 21, 2 52-63, 2 400-108, + Sto references tn Chapter V on dialetraleontradietoriess m mmol ern plysics + See, for instance, Kinstesn’s Autebiographical Notes an Albert Ets Heln Phitesopher-Sclendiat Bdnted by PA. Schilpp (Tudor Publish Fn'co New, Yorhy 1251), pp $9. Nels Dobr lente Phys ant Haman’ Kaowtedge (ohn % dey & Sans, New York, Chapman & Mall. Condon, (958); Max Gorn Physical Reality tn tax Horn Payer %in my Generation (Pergamon Press, London & N. Y., 1956), pp 154- 163; H. Margenau. The Nature of Physical Reality. A Philosophy of Modern Physics (McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, Toronto, London, 1950), pp 5, 51. 4 Vv. I. Lenin. Materialism and Empirio-criticism. Collected Works, Vol. 14 (Progress Publishers, Moscow), p 262. 5 Thid., p 264. © Rudolf Carnap. Meaning and Necessity. A Study in Semantic and Modal Logic (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1956), p 207. 7 V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., p 189, 8 Tbid., pp 126-127. 9 Max Born. Symbol und Wirklichkeit. Physikalische Blatter, 1965, 21, 2; 59. 10 Ibid. 1. Max Born. Physics in my Generation, pp 151-163, 12 Max Born. Symbol und Wirklichkeit. Physikalische Blatter, 1965, 21, 3: 107-408. 13 Henry Margenau. Op. cit., pp 5, 54, 85, 457. 4 Ibid., p 9 16 Max Born. Physics in my Generation, p 106. 10 -V. I. Lenin, Op. cit., p 246. 1 Niels Bohr. Op. cit., p 91. 418 See below in the last two sections of Chapter IX. 1° V. I. Lenin. Philosophical Notebooks. Collected Works, Vol. 38 (Progress Publishers, Moscow), p 98. 20 Werner Heisenberg. Der Teil und das Ganze (Piper & Co., Munich» 1969), p 124; idem. Gespriche iiber das Verhiltnis von Naturwissen™ schaft und Religion. Phystkalische Blatter, 1970, 26, 7: 294. "1 Werner Heisenberg. Physics and Philosophy (George Allen & Unwin, London, 1959), p 46. % Tbid., p 50. 23 Tbid., p 52. % Tbid., pp 57, 75. 23 Thid., p 56. % Tbid., p 83. 21 Tbid., p 55. *8 On relativity to the conditions (or means) of observation, see V. A. Fock. Quantum Physics and the Structure of Matter. In: M. E, Omelyanovsky (&d.). Struktura i ii - lishers, Mec Ison) ) va i formy materii (Nauka Pub *° Worner Heisenberg. Physics and Philosophy, pp 95-96. °° 'V. I, Lenin, Philosophical Notebooks, Op. cit., p 208. "Niels Bohr. Essays 1958-1962 on Atomic Physics and Human Knowl- edge (N.Y., London, Interscience Publ., 1963), p 5. 2 Tbid., p 6. 33 Tbid., p 4. ° 754 Nwls Boke Op ett % Tota, pb & Bid) 23 # nia, pS # ma) pS » tds 9 6 © Rewbeabach The Direction of Time (Univ of Cal Pres Ber Ireley'& Tos Angeles, 4990), pp 246 247 © Td, p 7 2 Jo1d, 248 etd, yp 247, 288, © Werner Hersetbeng Physics and Phitorphy, p 85 4 This papor sas fist pullished un UapelAt folehelakh nau, A851, BE Mss epubtied tam seve expasted fern tn the Cares Sietak Physice Journal, 4998, 5,4 A neatly ideatieat text was pub fished inte sympocuin Filet copresyaotremenra! ft (Pbslo sophical Issacs of Moder Physics) (Gospolitedat, Moscow, 1958) # YT Lenn Motonahsm and Empinoriticsm Op it, p22 yop Paul: Wabrecomlehielt und Physik Dias 1954 © ‘jerner Hiwsenbotg Dio tae sloophveckon Glundiapender RtomehueNatorercensa)ns 180. 15,10 200 e'Niels Holt léome Phys and Hunon hrostedge, Bp 50 5! © YA Fock Comments on Bobr's Paper About Ife Drscusions with Enostono Uipethe sect neo 4860, 05, 4 000 8 Werner tiewenborg Paster and Pattoophy, pp 122425 # Bid, po © Wenner Hessnterg Op cit Srna, p ts 8 thal p AM HY"A Bock Op ett, pp 598-600 1 Werner Reenberg Physics and Philerophy, p29 Werner Heveenberg. ‘The Development of tho Tateepcetation af the Quast Theory "in W_ von Poul (Gd) Niels otr end the Det Iepment of Pryce (Hergoraon Press, London, 1059), p28 salWernee Houenbore Physics and Philowrho, p $30 tot Seo aullassungen uber di Quantentheone Paysikatiche Batter 450/95,'3° 108 f33 © Albett Eusteln abd Leopold Iafeld_ the Beotaton of Phone (Sim00 2 oinare Rew Works Sah pp sw AE a © Albert Cinstein Quanten Mecham und Waldichkest Dietetic foik 2, 3° se4 Nel Bebe Atomte Physter ond Humes, Aneel 32.06, we tien VA Tock santa Pinsice ane the Sinaats of Nault fo HEE Ghoelpanovihy (oa). Struktare | Joray matert (Ope)66 Max Born. Physics in my Generation, p 105. 66 See P. A. Schilpp (Ed.). Albert Einstein. Philosopher-Scientist, p 684. %? Max Born. Experiment and Theory in Physics (CUP, Cambridge, 1944), pp 10-14. 68 Max Born. Physics in my Generation, p 105. °9 Ibid., p 152. 7 Max Born. Physikalische Wirklichkeit. Physikalische Blatter. 1954, 10, 2: 54; see also: idem. Physics in my Generation, pp 152-153. 2 Max Born. Physics in my Generation, p 105. Born expressed similar ideas in several of the papers of this collection. 7 Tbid., p 105. 73: R, P. Feynman, R. B. Leighton, and Matthew Sands. The Feynman Lectures on Physics, Vol. I (Addison-Wesley Publ. Co., Reading, Mass., 1963), p 17. 74 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. The Holy Family. Collected Works, Vol. 4 (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1975), p 127. %8 The words in inverted commas are from Lenin’s remarks in the Phil- osophical Notebooks (Collected Works, Vol. 38, p 195). % Tbid., p 182. 77 Niels Bohr. The Quantum Postulate and the Recent Development of Atomic Theory. Supplement to Nature, 1928, 127, 14 April: 580. WALD. Alexandrov demonstrated this beautifully ia his paper Space and Time in Modern Physics in the Light of Lenin’s Philosophical Ideas in: M. E. Omelyanovsky (Ed.). Lenin and Modern Natural Science (Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1978). 7 Max Born. Physics in my Generation, p 187. ® Niels Bohr. Atomic Physies and Human Knowledge, p 51.Tr CAN WE FORM MENTAL PICTURES oF TH CONCEPTS AND THEORIES OF MODERN PHYSICS prota Ory Suffice st to recall that the absense of nae, Ficorgy 23 Wwantum mochanses, as vt stormed (ochre eet sheory), used to be employed by radventact physicists as te sevett Sort simply of the tentatnre nature chs ot Thoegnatal ideas that gave it a revolutionaty “whose. he reblem could not hetp occupying ¢ promment place an the work of the founders of quartan theory JParae, for unstance, said that natures tues eental lane fo Rot govern the world as it appents is goon picture to 2p direct way, but instead thoy contrel o sles fm of which wo cannot form a moenval picture without Taredueingirrelovaneies Quantum theory meses et nok be faites Buult up ‘frou physical eoneepts wicks Senden gited 20 terms of things previously ken ete Student ‘which cannot, even he explomen adequately Bolog Mt SH * Wo shall totum to those sda tay 8 ry dag, Ste Limo, according to hie, ‘an aiken ol for 9 complementary way of description 1s uted precisely csby the quantum-mechanical formalism which _Tepresents a purely symbolic scheme permitting only predictions, on lines of the correspondence principle, as to results obtainable under conditions specified by means of classical concepts’. This apparatus, Bohr says, is an appropriate means of describing ‘complementary phenomena’, i.e. phenomena observed in mutually exclusive experimental set-ups permit- ting the particle and wave properties of atomic objects to be discovered. The idea of complementarity thus served Bohr as the key to the visualised interpretation of atomic processes. That this is the case is strikingly clear in his essay ‘Quantum Physics and Philosophy’, in which he wrote in particular: ‘the limited commutability of the symbols by which such variables are represented in the quantum formalism li.e. the quantities that characterise the state of a physical system in classical mechanics—Jf. O.} corresponds to the mutual exclusion of the experimental arrangements required for their unambiguous definition.’* The problem of forming a mental picture is directly related to the trends in philosophy. The concept of visua- lisation, which arose on the soil;of everyday experience and is linked with common sense, is not accepted by idealism, which disclaims its significance in man’s cognitive activity. Materialism, on the contrary, accepts it and develops it in depth (which also applies to dialectical materialism). An example of a point of view on visualisation in quan- tum physics that is close to the views of objective idealism is provided by Heisenberg's considerations on the comple- mentarity of the mathematical symbolics relating to the atomic world, and its description in terms of the concepts of classical physics, which were discussed in Chapter II. Positivists, if they are consistent, do not think in the least how to connect the content of the mathematical con- cepts of quantum theory with those of the natural language. The mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics makes it possible to give order to the observed results, e.g. to predict the possible results of some observations from those of other | observations, and that quite suits positivists.® The line of materialism on the problem of a menial picture of a physical theory implies recognition of the dialectical unity of sensuous knowledge and abstract think- tug reflecting objective reality. The combination in a single 79wholo of the mathematical formalism of tho physical theory and the expesimental data and results rolating to this theory and oxpressed an tho concopts of elassical physies comes ponds to tho point of viow of dralcetical matcrialisia on the problem of visualisation One must bear in mind that the naturo of this combination differs feom how it 1s presented from the standpoint of non dialectical materialism, as well eoomo quite clear from tho exposition that follows Born, iesdentally, when discussing this problem and analysing various plulosophical approaches 1m that con nection, did not oxpound the point of view of Marzist plutosophy on this problem in on adequate way He stated that, according to dialectical materialism, 14 was sulficrent to limit oneself to ‘the objectzve world of formulas without relation to sensual intuition’ ® As has already been sud above, tho point 1s quite different this chapter 13 devoted to elucidating issues rolating to the problem of visualisabil uty an physi from the pout of view of dislecticl mate naliem eee In our view, quantum mechanics reflects exactly, 1m precise concepts, the motron of atomic objects that resembles the motion of particles in somo experimental conditions and tn others the spread of waves and that differs redscalty from them both (with wineh classical theory 15 concerned) At the same time—and this has to be emphasised 1 every possible way—this motion 1s not picturable, 1@ st cannot he expressed in a visual picture like that im which the motion of a macroscopic body or the "wave, motion’ of a certain continuum 1s represented In this sense tt 18 sed that quantum theory cannot be visualsed As the German physicist Gothard Heber puts 2 ‘ANhough we descnbe the nature of atomic objects mathematically, we cannot understand 1t on the model level It 1s usually sard 1n this connection that the nature of quantum mechanical objects 1s not obvious T would assume that our rabihity to con struct a visual model of the micraworld 1s not fiual, and that it will be possible an the future to build a visual model of atomic objects, becauso our power of sonsual intuition 1s as capable of development os our power of abstraction 7 ‘That atomic objects aro onty described mathematseally by modern quantum mechanics and that there are not a8 80yet the appropriate words and images for them, is only partially, so to say, true. One has to bear in mind that quantum theory, like the other ‘not visualisable theories of modern physics, is being confirmed by experiment and hag grown up on that basis, And that means that quantum mechanics employs visualisable concepts (and others directly related to them) in one way or another, because its truth is verified by means of instruments that are macroscopic bodies, and their readings, from which inferences about atomic objects are drawn, are perceived by man. If this question is posed more broadly it cannot be otherwise: the atomic objects are material realities, and matter is not simply and only that which exists objectively independently of the human mind, but is the objective reality acting on the human sense organs and producing sensations in them. Man would have known nothing about the atomic world existing independently of his mind if this world, so to say, had not given signs of itself through macroscopic phenomena perceived by him which are related in a regular manner with atomic and microscopic phenomena in general. Thus, visual concepts are one way or another inevitable in quantum theory. The question is, however, how and in what form do they come into quantum theory. To answer that let us first consider the definition of the concept of a mental picture or visualisation. A theory is most frequently called easy to visualise if it employs habitual concepts. The concept has been defined in roughly this way by the Austrian physicist Arthur March.® Such a rather psychological definition can hardly, because of its extremely arbitrary nature, be accepted as satisfac- tory. Many authors add that a picturable theory is one that deals with phenomena that can be perceived di- rectly.® This last criterion of visualisation or obviousness of a theory, though to some extent satisfactory in itself, was not, in practice, separated in physics from certain other requirements of principle that in fact confused the matter. Thus, when mechanistic views were dominant, it actually meant a requirement for all physical phenomena to be . reduced to mechanical ones. In this case Maxwell’s clectro- magnetic theory, for example, proved not to be ‘visualisable’ as Boltzmann, in particular, suggested. In our day, when physicists have become accustomed to the fact that olectro- 6—0975 84thagnetie phenomena cannot be reduced to mechanteal ones, Maxwell's thoory hos come to be called obvious ® When we tum to quantum mechamies, 1t would seem that the samo situation as with Maxwell's theory has dove) oped in xt It has becomo quite clear that macroscopic phonomena cannot bo reduced to atomme ones, and vice versa Quantum mechanics has also become a ‘normal’ theory, but it 18 regarded, as wo hnow, a8 a theory about which ‘we cannot form a mental picture’ L 1 Mandelstam, in particular, stressed this, March, too, drow attention to at in Ins many diseussfons of the philosophteal problems of science He called a theory obvious or visualisablo (an schaulich) that omployed ‘only concepts borrowed from the world of everyday experienco’, but quantum mechanics “forbids the use of certam concepts, in which we are accus tomed to think, as misleading’ " ‘Thon why, sm his opimon, 15 Maxwell's electromagnetic theory visualisable? So, wo have not yet advanced 2 single stop in our reasoning about ‘mental picturing’ (anschaulichkert) What theory 18 easy to visualise? Let us return to this question Mon in lus tistorical practice has had to deal callous upon millions of times with macroscopic phenomena thet occur at relatively low velocities, This practice also Led to the theories and concepts of classical physics the first scientiBc generalisation of notions about the imantmate nature poreeived by man (historically the first such theory was Newton's mechanses) acquming a visual form m Ins mind Tt meant that it was possible to imagine, om the basis of the propositions and concepts of the theory of an object, the sensual smpressions and perceptions produced Inman by the object bomng stodied When, for amstance, starting from tho concept of a moving particle’ in classical’ mechames (an object charactonsed sumnltapeously by ats position and by ats momentum) we state that the parhelo 13 a visual concept, wo associate notions of a stone, a pellet, a bullet, a gram of sand with the coneept ‘particle’ In fact, we picture, say, that a bullet flymg from the muzzle of a pistol passes through a thin cardboard thsk Joaving a bolo m it ‘On the other hand, wo havo every reason 10 beheve that the pistol bullet 18 exactly a particle Let the flying ballet pass through two disks rotating at a ngh angular velocity around a common azis, at a short distance from eath other 82